



Religion, Pluralism, and the Problem of Living Together in the Light of Kymlicka's Thoughts: An Overlapping Consensus or A Modus Vivendi?

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Abstract: Today's societies face the minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the challenge of multiculturalism. It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the perception of subject, truth, reason caused by postmodernism. Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, either. So, it is not true that we cannot get common grounds by we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. So, he thinks that an overlapping consensus is possible. However, I will defend a different perspective about pluralism and living together. I think that modus vivendi is an undeniable universal fact. For this reason, an overlapping consensus as a model of living together can only be possible domestically at the expense of a global modus vivendi.

Keywords: Modernism, postmodernism, religion, living together, modus vivendi, overlapping consensus.

Introduction

This article includes some concepts such as modernism, postmodernism, religion, living together, modus vivendi and overlapping consensus in the light of Will Kymlicka's thoughts.¹ However, they require many others to mention. So, since pluralism and living together come with identity and recognition matters, this work will include these two, among others. Accordingly, I will refer to them much.

I will handle this far-reaching, multilayer issue that requires almost every discipline of philosophy, the philosophy of history as well as sociology. By the way, it is useful to specify that by religion I primarily imply monotheistic religions with personal God as ex nihilo creator of everything, belief in the afterlife and legal, political order. After all, concepts such as pluralism, autonomy and questioning will be examined to make clear whether or not they are reasonable from the religious perspective and coherent even from their own inner logic, contingent or final phase of humanity. And as the last step: it will be discussed what the appropriate religious reaction to this reality can be.

It is widely accepted that modernity was raised on the individual/self who constructed his own self and the nation-state became the political organization of this individual. However, the nation-state that claims to be based on homogeneous race, language, ethnicity, and culture has produced many "disadvantaged others" and caused fatal sorrows. With the second part of

¹ This article is based on my TUBITAK Research Project, the title of which is *Religion, Pluralism and the Problem of Living together in Political Philosophy within the Transition Period from Modernism to Postmodernism: An Overlapping Consensus or a Modus Vivendi* that I completed at Queen's University (Kingston, Canada) under the tutelage of famous philosopher Will Kymlicka from August 2018 to August 2019 in accordance with 2219 International Post-Doctoral Research Fellowship Program. I would like to take this opportunity to thank TUBITAK for their support and to Kymlicka, despite his great reputation, for never refusing my appointment requests and being kind enough to discuss various issues of political philosophy. Accordingly, I generally use the materials I collected from our conversations with Kymlicka, unless otherwise specified, during my research period there along with some other sources.

the 20. century, the subject and hence the nation-state underwent weakening. The placement of the subject in history, culture and a context gave rise to a perception according to which human being was a product of their environment. Therefore it was accepted that the commitments that encompass the subject such as society, skin color, language, culture, religion were effective factors as “sources of the self” in the process of the making of the identity.² The logical result of this acceptance is that the individuals who are deprived of their commitments feel an ontological imperfection and disintegration. That's why the politics of the identity, recognition and multiculturalism that demands some respect and rights for those with a different culture, language, etc. the nation-state has usually suppressed instead of discerning has gained an important position in the political theory of the postmodern world.

The sentences of the last paragraph would be a good abstract of what has been going on for decades. However, it needs a clear explanation and discussion in detail. So, after sketching World's intellectual panorama, I will try to give common ideas related to the reasons and transformations by means of which today's controversial agenda has come into being. I'll analyze this topic at the philosophical level by referring to the concepts above and at the practical level to the facts, Will Kymlicka, the most leading liberal theorist of multiculturalism³, has pointed out. However, I will argue that these two levels are not completely separate or disconnected, for in practice if there are still some people, minority, immigrant, refugee or native fellow citizens, there must be some theoretical reasons which should be searched or there may be just practical reasons and facts. But, this time, they should be

² This is such an important issue that no socio-political philosophy attempt can ignore. There is a large literature but especially Taylor's *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity* is very important. See Charles Taylor, *Benliğin Kaynakları: Modern Kimliğin İnşası*, Tr. trans. Selma A. Baş and Bilal Baş (İstanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2012).

³ Tariq Modood, *Çokkültürcülük: Bir Yurttaşlık Tasarımı*, Tr. trans. İsmail Yılmaz (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2014), 39.

theorized to form schemes and frameworks. Doubtlessly, to know reasons and conclusions is a good starting point to be able to cope with the challenges of pluralism and living together.

Kymlicka's view on the matters that cause especially religions to get involved in political issues is practical rather than being meta-narrative concerning the postmodern, post-structuralist paradigmatic shift from modernism. For example, according to him, what called Rawls's attention to the relations between religions and political process was largely abortion conflict and the resistance from religious sides. He holds that Rawls was more worried about the future and stability of liberal democracy and that he attempted to develop a new interpretation of liberalism to be able to answer this challenge and prevent liberal democracy from being scattered around such topics.

The Decentralization of the Modern Self as the Harbinger of New World

As the postmodern condition, the well-known definition of which is incredulity toward metanarratives has gained importance and become tangible more and more in every aspect of human life and with the spreading of the idea that individuals/selves are constructed in a socio-cultural-political-historical context, social structures and other features of background cultures of people have been started to be seen as a crucial and indispensable part of human beings, instead of the abstract, ahistorical, universal, homogeneous, isolated subject of modernism who creates himself and the entire world out of nothing.

Therefore, it is hard to think that these features are contingent things that are easily separated from human identity. From now on these are the constitutive elements of identity. The turn from the understanding of ahistoric self-isolated from all contingencies to the contextual one which is located in historical-social-cultural bonds means that we owe our identities to the others. Consequently, this leads to the idea that it should be accepted

human beings are the bearers of different faiths, languages, ethnicities, genders, colors, cultures which all make undeniable contributions to the formation of their identities. Doubtlessly, it is a game-changing approach to human beings modern universalism oppressed or at least ignored.

By the same token, it has been claimed that in the postmodern period, with the decentralization of modern self and the nation-state which is seen as identical to the former, so many elements that construct different identities and subjects have taken to the stages. As formulated by Rawls' *reasonable pluralism*, the contemporary world consists of many worldviews, comprehensive doctrines, different cultures. Hence, one can hardly see homogeneous societies that do not need to face the minorities demanding recognition of their identities and asking for respect for cultural differences.⁴

Pluralism, Identity and Recognition as Challenging Outputs

Modern societies face minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the *challenge of multiculturalism*.⁵ It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the value of human beings. This transformation is described as the collapse of old hierarchies which are the source of honor. Instead of a concept of honor, just some people have, now the honor of citizenship everybody equally has and necessary for democracy.⁶ Therefore "to find morally defensible and politically valid answers is the most serious challenge modern democra-

⁴ Will Kymlicka, *Çokkültürlü Yurttaşlık: Azınlık Haklarının Liberal Teorisi*, Tr. Trans. Abdullah Yılmaz (İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1998), 37.

⁵ Kymlicka has a key question to understand the transformation: why has a new citizenship that focuses on the politics of identity and differences taken the place of a social-right-based one that seeks the unity by getting equal education and wealth. He states that there are two kind of hierarchies: Economical and Status. The former demands politics of redistribution whereas the latter does the politics of recognition which aims at selling the differences.

⁶ Charles Taylor, "Tanınma Politikası," Tr. trans. Yurdanur Salman, *Çokkültürlülük; Tanınma Politikası*, ed. Amy Gutman (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), 44.

cies have encountered.”⁷ Accordingly, the last years of the previous century witnessed the emergence of a series of intellectual and political movements. These have traditions, lifestyles that are different from those of dominant culture and hence they are being oppressed. Although they have differences in the way that there can be no common philosophical and political agendas, these groups have resisted against the oppression of dominant culture which is homogenizing and assimilating and against the claim that there is only one true path to follow.⁸

According to Kymlicka, a nation is an institutionally developed historical community which has a separate language and culture on the same territory. A country including at least two or more cultural groups is a multinational/multicultural state, not a national one. As for multiculturalism which can be called as a demand to minimize the risks for all nations, social groups appear as a puzzle asking how can we provide justice, equality among the three sides, the ones who believe homogeneous *national identity*, and the ones who trace the signs of their cultures in their *ethnic identity* and the ones who see their *religion* as their identity too.⁹ In relation to that, *the politics of recognition* upon which today’s social and political life centered simply states that ethnic origins, skin colors and cultures of individuals have to be politically and legally accepted. The concept of identity with which the politics of recognition and multiculturalism have a close relationship can be used about everything that separates individuals or groups from others as well as all elements they choose or inherit and play important role in their thoughts about themselves. Therefore, the demand that the recognition of identity differences has to be accepted is assumed to be a crucial part of politics of recognition.

⁷ Kymlicka, *Çokkültürlü Yurttaşlık*, 25-26.

⁸ Bikhu Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek: Kültürel Çeşitlilik ve Siyasal Teori*, Tr. trans. Bilge Tanrıseven (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2002), 1.

⁹ Modood touches on the confusion about some issues after 9/11, terror attacks: are pluralism, multiculturalism dead or have they made the differences “ob-session” and are they really has-been now? Modood, *Çokkültürcülük*, 24-28.

Some thinkers like Taylor hold that we should consider, to understand the close connection between identity and recognition, a crucial characteristic of the human condition that monological inclination of mainstream modern philosophy made nearly invisible. Therefore, today identity has to get recognition via interactions, which leads people to the acceptance of such a necessity. Now, besides, we are facing with the demands going beyond the recognition and explanation of specific cultures. The desire for recognition in multicultural politics appears as the recognition of the individual's culture and their cultural identities. Modood claims that the normative and pragmatic rationale of multiculturalism is that the oppressed identities people care about and that it can never be ignored neither for the sake of individuals nor for the citizenship needs respect.¹⁰

Nation-State versus Pluralism, Multiculturalism and Politics of Identity

The politics of identity and recognition has another modernity-oriented facet: their connection to the reign of nation-states.¹¹ In the post-Westphalian period, the nation-state strengthened its hegemony with the help of its nature which overlapped with early capitalism. Nation-state which has the right to use legitimate force/violence is also the point where solid power is centralized. As Anderson said, in modern times it was the nation-state that founded its nation/people with constitutive myths.¹² But such a construction necessitates rendering people one homogenous body by ignoring differences and using educa-

¹⁰ Modood, *Çokkültürcülük*, 167.

¹¹ Meanwhile, for sure, modernism was put on trial on the ground that it caused deep sorrows and troubles all around the world. Besides the calamities, it brings forward have been accepted as the inevitable consequences of some fundamental ideas. So some big thinkers such as Descartes, Hobbes, Bacon, among many others have been held responsible for this situation, which has also provided the new theories with ground and legitimacy, even if they insist they do not need any kind of legitimacy or justification.

¹² Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, Tr. trans. İskender Savaşır (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2007), 20.

tion, ideological history, eventually violence as many historical facts have proved. This means that even though the nation-state aims at going beyond ethnic differences and making one nation a super-ethnos which embraces all ethnic differences, for the sake of it, it made some groups minorities. Herein lies the source of tension between nation-state and multiculturalism. Once it is understood that nation-state which is expected to solve the problem of unity can only do it by oppressing a remarkable number of people, that nation-state underwent a process of losing power and legitimacy became manifest.¹³ So some claim that losing its legitimacy forced the nation-state to replace its public sphere which is close to cultural membership that rests in different life practices and based on homogenous citizenship with a new one which is sensitive and respectful to differences. It is told that on the one hand nation-state that was weakened by the emergence of a national and international cultural and electronic network, the local and global political actors seem too small to cope with economical, ecological and informatics problems, but on the other hand too big to hear identity-based social movements.

Will Kymlicka's Thoughts

I will try to exhibit Kymlicka's ideas. He has explained these opinions in our conversations in which he has attributed the birth of recognition, identity and multiculturalism primarily to the phenomenal world rather than the noumenal world. It can be said that his approach to the socio-political philosophy shows very practical characteristics. He seems that he thinks it useless to look for some deeper speculative, metaphysical meanings and reasons in history and human conduct.

Therefore, for him, the issue has more practical roots like immigrants. With the coming of those immigrants with different cultures, religions, languages, color skins emerged the problems of pluralism, multiculturalism and living together. He maintains

¹³ Gerd Baumann, *Çokkültürcülük Bilmecesi: Ulusal, Etnik ve Dinsel Kimlikleri Yeniden Düşünmek*, Tr. trans. Işıl Demirakın (Ankara: Dost Kitabevi, 2006), 35.

that for instance, today's Canada is closer to the overlapping consensus while what they first did to indigenous people could be a *modus vivendi*. The dominant culture has more just feelings about indigenous people than before, which is moral itself. According to him, *modus vivendi* is real-politics but we as humans have been trying to head towards *overlapping consensus*. In this direction, he attaches importance to recognition. He thinks that everybody wants to be recognized by others. All groups think of how others see them. We are so obsessed with the opinions of others.

Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, either. So it is not true that we can not get common grounds because we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He also argues that there are no things such as modernism and postmodernism separated from each other by thick lines. Besides, he refuses the idea that in modernity there was a universal consensus whereas postmodernism makes it a long shot. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. The idea of the nation served this purpose. Although it has had some bad examples in the course of its history like Hitler, not all nations have some flaws. So it is crucial to living together as a national culture. Kymlicka thinks that the idea of a nation has still positive energy, hence what should be done is to liberalize it, not removed.

He thinks that we should work to calm it down at two levels. The strategies of social sciences about strengthening living together have to focus on the creation of public spheres in which communicate and stay together with their differences without any fear. After regulating local levels and connecting them, it must be thought at the national level. However *right-wing populism* and *white supremacism* have been bringing damage to these efforts. There have been and will always be us/them discrimina-

tion. But we are always getting socialized everywhere in the ordinary routine of daily life, on the streets, in the malls. We are not monads. That is the culture we inherited, and we do nonstop daily moral explanations. Humans are moral beings and show it every day. There are values, rules which render our lives meaningful. So, our efforts for justice contain justification and persuasion, definitely not threat, which is again a moral process itself. Persuasion is more moral than threatening. For achieving the politics of living together, he supports the approach of “live and let them live” and mutual non-interference. Because, for him, the most significant promises of any liberal democracy are freedom and equality of its citizens. Besides, according to Kymlicka, individual autonomy is a right for every individual to question and decide to change the lifestyles, religious community that inherited from parents.¹⁴

Unlike the general discontent about nation-state in recent times, he has positive thoughts about nation and welfare nation-state. The idea of a nation has done good deeds and supported the welfare state. This energy should be utilized by amending its extremisms. According to Kymlicka, the welfare state should be strong enough to reduce inequality. However, with the leadership of Reagan and Thatcher, the free-market economy attacked the welfare state and it has been on the decline ever since. Finally, free markets crushed it.¹⁵ That’s why the steps to justice stopped in the 1980s. In the meanwhile, *welfare chauvinism* that has a distrust of other races appeared. If the government helps Canadians, chauvinists do not object, if it helps others they ob-

¹⁴ Despite being a very distinguished philosopher, Kymlicka's emphasis on daily practical life and phenomena rather than philosophical abstractions is also understood from the fact that he points out to me the university youth with different origins walking together on Queen's University campus. According to him it is a strong evidence that human beings are moral beings and able to live together. As can be seen, these ideas are mostly the ones taken from our conversations.

¹⁵ About the function and history of welfare state, see Asbjorn Wahl, *Refah Devletinin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü*, Tr. trans. Haldun Ünal and Baran Öztürk (İstanbul: H2O Kitap, 2015).

ject. He thinks that our basic political problem is to find a solution for how we can get support for the welfare state and social consent for it. We have been in the age of nativist populism since 2008. Humans worry about concern for the future. A fight between elites and people emerged but there is a misunderstanding about the definition of the enemy: are Bankers, that is, the ones who waste people's money or the others? While the answer is obvious, they fired arrows of criticism to the others and racist grudge came into existence. The feeling of economic ambiguity dominated, which actually meant the domination of perception instead of reality. The young generation who does not see gay marriage wrong anymore is not aware that the welfare state had a big role in this kind of liberties. So, since they found it already available, it seems spontaneous.¹⁶

Today's reality is nation-states. The idea of a nation includes a desire for a collective agent/actor. People imagine themselves as agents acting together. The idea of a nation is based on people who act together and a sense of belonging to a territory/land.¹⁷ They must be able to communicate to act together. If being a nation can only be possible by creating a society, it requires belonging to certain land and shared public culture. He states that these are pre-conditions for a nation to be a democracy. According to Kymlicka, these conditions in question may be realized by a race-obsessed society and even some can claim that one can only be a member of the society so long as their grandfathers were the members of the same society. That is called *biological social membership*. But, for him, those whose grandfathers were not the members of society can also be the members by coming a country and feeling of belonging and being a part of it (just like his

¹⁶ By the way, he sees himself as left-liberal, not a libertarian. He does not accept to be "communitarian", either.

¹⁷ Kymlicka has "still" deep positive feelings concerning welfare nation states that he applies the ideas developed for political structures and concepts of human condition to the "animal condition". This approach is also clear in the book *Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights*, about which I am about to publish an article: "Zoopolis or Postmodern Fabl".

forefathers). That is *nonbiological membership*. Besides, one can inherit from the past actions of his/her country since they have become a part of it now. For instance, he says that although his ancestors had nothing to do with the slaughter of indigenous people, he takes responsibility. Therefore, he has responsibility for the past and future generations. This patriotism must be passed on to the next generations.

He states that multiculturalism started in the 60s in Canada and had different reasons such as the human rights revolution and the democratization of liberalism. But it had no relation with religion. Only when religious groups began to take an active role in the discussions on multiculturalism in the 80s and 90s, Canada has confronted an ongoing problem that how can religions be integrated into the multicultural structure which was based on democracy, liberalism and rights aftermath of 60s. *Ethnicity, race and religion* are the three layers, waves, phases of multiculturalism.¹⁸ So there is no need for some “post-multicultural” concepts to discuss them. He claims that they are already included in the inner logic of multiculturalism, which means that the discussion of belief problems is also multiculturalism, not post-multiculturalism. According to him, the problem is how to relate post-1960s multiculturalism in Ontario to the Catholic-Protestant tension in the 1880s that occurred not based on the human rights, liberalism, and democracy. They faced each other with just power politics. But it still gave some rights to some groups like Catholics even if they did not confront a rights-based liberal framework. Nonetheless, the problem is that there are still some groups that have fewer rights than the Catholics had in the 1880s even though Canada has been constantly trying to apply liberal democratic values. This matter results from the fact that some Christian groups, before the multiculturalism conditions, got

¹⁸ Will Kymlicka, “The Three Lives of Multiculturalism,” *Revisiting Multiculturalism in Canada*, eds. Shibao Guo and Lloyd Wong (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2015), 17-35. Here, he explains the origin of multiculturalism as a three-layer-process: From ethnicity to race, from ethnicity and race to religion.

some different rights from the ones which seem correct in terms of the logic of liberal democracy. It's hard to get rid of and to know how to do with that asymmetry.

As we have pointed out, Kymlicka has doubts about the great narratives of secularization, modernism and postmodernism. However, he holds that it is evident that US academia defended secularist modernism in philosophy, sociology and politics in the 50s-60s. The same was valid for race and ethnicity. There was a strong belief in the rationalization and secularization of societies. But it has been proven wrong both for religion, race and ethnicity. People see now that modernity is not the sole way and they do not believe its meta-narrative. Canadians and Americans were living in both secular-liberal and kind of patriarchal states. But soon after the human rights revolution, in 1965, with the liberalization of laws on the criminalization of homosexuality and abortion as well as banning of divorce and gender discrimination, things started to change. They all provoked a religious reaction from evangelic Christians and conservative Catholics. It triggered a counter-revolution and a culture war between secular liberals and religious conservatives. This conflict, at the very beginning, was about the decriminalization of homosexuality. But today, after it cooled off, there are severe debates about same-sex marriages.

However, the fact that religions have become apparent and active more and more may not mean the return/revival of religions. Kymlicka has some doubts about what has returned. It may not be religion in the traditional meaning of the word, but kind of spiritualisms, the essence of which is the suggestion that people feel as if something important is missing because of a life captivated by a world of materialist consumption. This can be called an "escape of materialism." Nevertheless, the reason why they are not religious, but spiritualist is that they deeply internalized the liberal democratic values. Therefore, they cannot put up with established churches. Even if some tend towards spiritual things since they feel something went wrong in such a material-

istic world¹⁹, in any case, the remedy is the liberal rights. These non-religious but spiritual groups who internally feel uneasiness support the liberal gay rights, whilst those who challenge liberal rights are religious conservatives. According to Kymlicka;

Very few, if any, of the religious-based claims being raised in Canada today threaten the principle of secularism. No one is seriously proposing to replace the secular state with a religious state or to privilege one faith over others in tax codes or service delivery. The real issue, I believe, is not secularism, but human rights, and in particular norms of individual freedom and equal citizenship. The task for the third stage of multiculturalism is to determine which claims for religious accommodation enhance the freedom of individuals to lead the kinds of lives they choose, strengthen their ability to participate as democratic citizens in our collective life, and remedy the inherited stigmas and burdens that minorities have faced. As I said, this can only be done on a case-by-case basis: there is no magic formula, such as ‘secularism,’ that can solve all these issues at once. And we can only address these case-by-case issues if we create new mechanisms of consultation, participation and deliberation that enable the expression of the full range of voices within religious communities.²⁰

He thinks that sociological and psychological biases still prevent us from a better understanding of the world. But if we count on post-structuralism which holds that every thought is equally valid, it cannot be certain what is bias or not because of the absence of any standard. So, what about Rawls’ position on fixing standards? Rawls and Dworkin had a significant role in the justification of redistribution politics and made a huge contribution to the constitutional liberal welfare state. Rawls justified basic liberal values and said we should respect each other. He decisively defended that there is a coherency between redistribution and

¹⁹ For the discussions on moral behaviors and (post)modern world, see Zygmunt Bauman, *Etğın Tüketiciler Dünyasında Bir Şansı Var mı?*, Tr. trans. Funda Çoban and İnci Katırcı (İstanbul: De Ki Yayınları, 2010).

²⁰ Kymlicka, “The Three Lives of Multiculturalism,” 31.

equality, freedom, not a gap. Even if one does not share the common doctrines of good, he can still get on well with them. A sense of belonging/commitment has other roots. It must not necessarily be originating from common views of good. The tension between modernism and postmodernism cannot explain Rawls' approach. He has a specific motive when handling religions: Abortion. He was trying to answer to a culture war in the context of the abortion conflict. This was the main reason. What was none was that the liberal rights revolution stirred serious resistance among conservatives. There can be two answers one of which is to assert that religions are only superstitions, intrinsically illiberal, pre-modern dinosaurs, hence they should not be taken seriously. We should exclude them and follow modern liberalism. This is one extreme. The second one is the position of post-modernist/relativist circles who assert that there is no objective reason, truth. Rawls follows a different path. He thinks that it is incumbent upon us to find a solution by which religious people can see themselves as volunteer members of a democratic regime. Rawls did not want the USA to get involved in culture wars. Therefore, he looked for a middle way between two extremes.²¹

Kymlicka thinks that although the west is not self-interested about their citizens but irrelevant to the rest of the World. In brief, foreign politics is Hobbesian. Some maintain that domestic politics is about justice, whereas foreign politics should be based on self-interest. This is philosophically incoherent, for we must adopt strong moral responsibilities. Morality has to be universal which tells us to help those in need. As Pogge said that even if "the more advantaged citizens of the affluent countries" do not believe such a moral principle that demands to help those who

²¹ Rawls, the most important political philosopher of the last century, writes a lot about the stability of liberal democracies under the conditions of reasonable pluralism and developed so many concepts, ideas especially in his works: John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2003), 184-188. See also Selçuk Erincik, "Kamusal Aklın Sınırları İçinde Din (John Rawls'un Düşünceleri Bağlamında)," *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 51, no. 2 (2010), 291-314.

suffer in other countries, they still have to help them because they are the ones who pushed them into the poverty. The affluent countries are actively responsible for most of the life-threatening poverty in the World.²² The poor ones did not do that by themselves. The universal economy-political system forced millions of people to be confined in a structure within which the rich and powerful peoples are at the top of the decision-making mechanism. Seeing that humans incline to think that their interests are compatible with universal interests, they cannot see that these interests are actually against those of others. People really have to discern that they get some advantages at the cost of sufferers, lives of others in remote countries. Eventually, power reproduces itself. It is striking that powerful societies think the world is just. They believe that their countries act justly. So the riddle is: How can one think that the world is just while they are taking advantage of such inequalities? The answer is that human nature sees itself to be reasonable, which is a cognitive thing. Human beings have some strong biases to justify their privileged position. As moral beings, humans want to believe that they are acting morally. The problem is not that they do not have a sense of justice or ignore it or not to commit moral judgments. It is the decomposing of them within injustice and the conditions of will to power. Since we are beings with deeply incomplete reason and not good at reasoning, our reasons are not enough to remove all inequalities. We are incomplete biased, fallible beings whose theories are not sufficient to catch the World. However, we have to try to be more objective and humbler in our lives. Human beings should discuss this main question: what we owe others in politics, morality. What kind of reasoning can be legitimate when using reason? It is a sense of justice.²³

²² Thomas Pogge, "Real World Justice," *The Journal of Ethics* 9, no. 1 (2005), 29.

²³ Pogge's remarks are of importance. For him, "a prominent concept in economics is that of homo economicus, an individual who, single-mindedly and rationally, seeks optimally to satisfy his preferences. Such imaginary creatures are not good approximations of persons in the real world." Therefore, lots of politicians and economists' function as ideologists for the elites of developed

According to Kymlicka, liberal political philosophy needs a theory about the distribution of the responsibility to decide who is responsible for what and to what extent? He thinks that the most fundamental question of political philosophy is this: "who is responsible for what?" But we can not solve it referring to the metaphysical free will. This debate does not give any answer to how can we be held responsible for our behaves to each other. Even in Spinoza's Universe, the question of responsibility should be solved. This has no connection with the issue of free will. Even if someday somebody claims that there is no free will and that all of us are predetermined, the responsibility would still matter.²⁴

The liberal riddle is to determine what gives the right to govern the others to those holding the state power. This is a long-term liberal puzzle, that is to say, to justify the right to govern the others and to decide the way they are supposed to behave. The problem for liberals is that the state power has always the potential to be used for oppressing some people. So, we need a balance between the usage of state power and the rights of people. First, we should handle the state and show that it needs the consent of people. One of the ways to get the consent is Lockean approach, which is the liberal side of liberal democracy in the sense that the state needs the consent,²⁵ whereas its democratic side starts with the people and asks: Why do the people demand a state?

countries, "much like most theologians did in an earlier age." Thus, he thinks, somebody can claim that global inequality and poverty are "not a question of justice." Besides, if we look at the experts, we see important flaws: "From Amartya Sen to the Chicago School, which is overwhelmingly focused on relating the persistence of severe poverty to local causes -bad governance, sexist culture, geography, and much else- while leaving unstudied the huge impact of the global economic order on the incidence of poverty worldwide." Pogge, "Real World Justice," 29-30.

²⁴ These, again, can be taken as Kymlicka's focus on praxis rather than conflictual abstract concepts.

²⁵ Locke is an important and positive figure in the liberal political philosophy with his famous concepts such as consent, freedom, labor and property. Nevertheless, it is also a very disputable matter. Parekh, for instance, explains how Locke's labor theory of property had a merciless justificatory role in the colonization process of lands of the indigenous people in America. Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek*, 47-52.

From the angle of democracy, the main idea is that the state is just a medium for implementing the will of people. This is the idea of popular sovereignty. The people are sovereign and they use the state as a tool for their goals. But the riddle of the democracy side of liberal democracy, for both sides indeed, is that they do not have certain answers for which people, of all, have the right to govern the others, this or that or only one or ten peoples? Democracy and liberalism cannot say which people should govern. They can just demand that the people holding the state power and using it have to do it in compliance with liberal democratic rights.

Political philosophy, for Kymlicka, is a normative matter of just about the right to govern others. “Might makes right” is not the answer. On the contrary, it is just the opposite of bargaining about justice which is a highly normative concept. Politics is about solving conflicts. But given that conflicts cannot be removed, it does not require as if persuasion has no place in politics, otherwise, we will face threatens and bargaining. The essence of Rawls’ theory is that the advantages which are gained by menace are not justice. If one is sure that there is no chance to convince the others, he/she will threaten them. Rawls attaches to the idea that put persuasion in the first place when giving reasons. Kymlicka thinks that this idea which is after persuasion with rational communication, discussion, deliberation, has to be supported instead of threat and bargaining.

Comments and Evaluations

What Kymlicka generally regards as individual freedom is questioning. But it can be criticized whether it has to be accepted as a unique norm to value everything else. For many societies, it is not a meta-criterion. Therefore, they may first and foremost want to question the quiddity of questioning itself along with long philosophical and historical background behind it. People are supposed to comply with the rules even if they cannot prevent others from questioning. But it is likely to result in confront-

ing a fate in two or three generations: To disappear as a different, separate tradition, culture. So, they may demand a right to question the questioning in the mid and long run as the main premise of the dominant culture they had to accept in the short term due to urgent need for security. Perhaps it is going to be their most important contribution to the culture they are living in. In short, it is not useful for them to question the identity, at all. So, I can put it like that: What if some people keep saying that "I believe to understand" instead of questioning? What can the proper reaction to them be apart from that: "if you are in Roman, act as Roman". But this means "the establishment" should question their presence therein.

Lately, the peoples of the World who have not yet got accustomed to the nation-states were suddenly thrown into a new uncertainty by a new discourse: "forget about all we said before; nation-states, universal reason, positivism were all iron cage, the eclipse of reason, sources of totalitarianism that created Hitler, so say farewell to reason, be against Cartesian method. Therefore, since there have been endless chaos, identity crisis, intellectual confusion, political and military turbulences over 100 years leads people to despair of their cultures. To sum up, it is another facet of an identity crisis. In such conditions in which minds can not keep pace with the pendulum, a cognitive complexity arises, nothing is possible to get an integrated approach that enables us to question the prevailing thoughts concerning the legitimacy of the government/sovereignty. Therefore, whatever is in the air will be esteemed a priori, innate ideas, which makes what is a posterior a priori. So, it would not be reasonable to accept the birth of this fact without question. Hence, what those who have been going through a state of nature where human life is "solitary, nasty, poor, brutish and short"²⁶ choose can not necessarily be the best options, reasonable and rational choice or considered judgments consistent with reflective equilibrium. On the contra-

²⁶ Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Tr. trans. Semih Lim (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), 94-95.

ry, they may be the hopeless, irrational panic effort of the global worst-offs to get rid of the state of nature behind a veil of ignorance (uncertainty/unknown). To put it another way, I want to formulate it like that: Can imaginative overlapping consensus solely be a new conformism?

When taken this way, there seems to be nothing except “an invisible hand” to rely upon. Therefore I believe that while there must still be abstract philosophical investigations, if an approach tells us the theoretical debates have ended a long time ago, hence we should focus on how can be possible to keep pace with pluralism and change our tradition per it, it has to be questioned, too. Because some have enough time to handle the case in terms of identity or redistribution, for some others it is an ontological problem. In short, the balance between freedom and security is upset in favor of security and the need for security will push them to adopt the principles of other cultures as universal primary goods and get close to the overlapping consensus. If so, it can be asserted that an *overlapping consensus* inside still arises from an international *modus vivendi* (mutually assured destruction). This is just an identification implying that almost all models of living together look like *modus vivendi* aside from small ones around families. Therefore I am not as optimistic as Kymlicka about the idea that human beings have a sense of justice which is enough to solve the problems, not because I do not believe in the existence or necessity of a sense of justice, but because it is not strong enough remove all barriers. In my opinion, these usually come from inside of human beings as “the conflict of faculties” such as self-interest, will to power, desire, grudge. Plus, for sure, even if a sense of justice is very important and should permanently be foster, very few people may agree on the definition of justice unless they are Platonists at least, let alone co-religionists in such a nominalist era. Therefore, it directs us to Pogge’s thoughts that criticize some crucial concepts of current economy-politics of the World, such as globalization, invisible hand, free markets, private investment, etc. and linked them to

poverty-related sorrows. One of his interesting claims is that the rich countries have been holding the poor nations responsible for their own miserable condition.²⁷ It means that there is a global (dis)order in which people who have not yet been able to be accustomed to the previous order become dazed by changing the rules one more time. Accordingly, they are forced to move to other countries with very different civilizations codes. As the turmoils, chaos, violence, poverty have been lasting for decades, eventually nowhere has left to go back and nothing to do apart from developing a sense of belonging to the new conditions. Because constant, consecutive and deep problems lead people to think that what happened to them and their homelands are rooted in their traditions, cultures and religions. That kind of suspicion about themselves is always key to get ready to embrace and accept strange ideas/concepts/points of view.

As many thinkers articulate, the politics of identity, recognition and multiculturalism sometimes can be divisive, which is mostly related to the conditions of underdeveloped countries. These nations with economical and geopolitical disadvantages, and also if their model or method of living together that once worked well has lost its efficiency, troubles arise. Because it is the charism/attraction of the power and GNP to keep the crowd together and to turn chaos into cosmos.²⁸ If they do not have any,

²⁷ See Pogge, "Priorities of Global Justice," *Metaphilosophy* 32, no. 1-2 (2001), 6-24. If this situation has nothing with the laziness of the poor and wealthy nations live without "any burdens of judgement", there is a *global natural lottery*. So, we can suggest a *global difference principle* in favor of *globally worst-off people*.

²⁸ Rorty, for example, argues that the prosperity in the West has a deep impact on the spread of human rights. Today, human rights find wider support in prosperous places where people feel more secure than the places where they experience economic poverty and famine. So, there is a close relationship between wealth, trust, and empathy, and those with that feeling volunteer to engage in moral society and live together. Ruth Abbey, "Closer Kinships: Rortyan Resources for Animal Rights," *Contemporary Political Theory* 16, no. 1 (2017), 8. However a crucial question arises: Where this wealth come from? Are there freedom, equality and living together at the root of wealth? Which one is the cause? Which one is the effect? Are pluralism and living together cause or effect?

that is, if there is no sufficient power, money and glory to satisfy all desires for recognition, tension can become serious disturbances. I think that Parekh has the same point when mentioning that a multicultural society cannot achieve stability and live long without developing a common feeling of commitment.²⁹

Parekh's distinction between autonomy and happiness is also useful. To him, human beings can be happy without a feeling of autonomy. So one may claim happiness can be possible within the boundaries of society/culture, and there is no proof showing that the pre-modern societies which never knew autonomy for centuries were less happy and had more sorrows than today's society. Plus, from the point of religion (monotheist ones in particular) autonomy have a completely different and deeper meaning. Religion describes autonomy as a full commitment to God's will and as being free from anything else but God. That is an onto-theological autonomy that has so many social, political implications. Per these principles and their lexical order, religious people are expected to build a holistic, all-around, comprehensive society, politics, culture, morality, aesthetic.³⁰ But unlike the widespread belief, it is not unquestioning, on the contrary, it is with free will to devote one's reason/heart to a Being that is superior to him/her.

However, I feel close to multiculturalism as communitarianism. This seems to me to be the only idea that can be reasonable and possible to continue. Because (socially and culturally) there is nothing such as individual no matter what M. Thatcher claimed. So-called individual choice is dictated to him by culture. Besides meaning, identity, sense of self all are social construc-

²⁹ Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek*, 434-435.

³⁰ Again as Parekh said, even if very important, to shape society by reducing to one and making a feature essential to a specific society based on a certain doctrine sole fact for signifying another society means to declare that any other moral senses are unreasonable. This gives two advantages to liberals. They both release themselves from the need for justification and saddle others with the task of defending themselves in a way that pleases liberals. Parekh has important criticisms about the contradictions of liberals. Parekh, *Çokkültürlülüğü Yeniden Düşünmek*, 141-146.

tions and culture dresses members with them. So a politics based on the recognition of identity can be possible at the intercultural level, not individual. Because the vital motives even the most adamant individualists see necessary for the stability of multicultural societies such as commitment, loyalty, altruism are learned from the family and close relatives and most probable for them without expecting a personal gain. Social and familial bonds, self-sacrifice teach humans the things required for living together by making them to be acquainted with empathy, which gives a stable meaningful environment. After learning that a familiar environment is good and safe for them, people will remember it in political life and try to realize it. Thus it can be said that *familial overlapping consensus* which is not much possible for bigger circles actually provides people of different backgrounds with a stable, softer, calm, peaceful *modus vivendi* as much as possible. Moreover, the fact that some words such as mother-land, mother language, brotherhood, the big family are used to ask for dying for the sake of homelands proves that only by analogies can people adopt something, for “knowledge is generally remembrance.” Nevertheless, as Calhoun mentioned, “modernity destroyed the schemes of identity which include everything or reduce the family bonds. Even if we still attach importance, family relations are not functioning anymore as a model presenting us with social and individual identities.³¹

This means that questioning has turned into a telos itself, not a medium. So, an individual may not have integrity as a fixed self and serenity because the distance/gap between the imaginative next person he/she has to be and the person who he/she is now can never close. Perhaps we can call it the “identity paradox.” It seems sometimes that “to make a difference” becomes an obsession and turns in every field of human life into minimum standard below which is regarded as a big flaw, incompleteness of individuals. Therefore, everybody is obsessed with updating, re-

³¹ Craig Calhoun, “Kimlik ve Tanınma Politikası,” *Kimlik Politikaları*, ed. Fırat Mollaer (Ankara: Doğu Batı Yayınları, 2014), 136.

creating themselves in terms of fashion, habitual (not enough time to construct a habitus), “lifestyles” and even religion. Because of today’s *panta rhei obsession*, everybody tries to keep pace with the speed of change in which “all that is solid melts into air.” It should be also regarded as natural that the young generations across the world have some trouble with persistence, patience and thereby understanding in depth. Even for philosophers or social thinkers, there is no time/moment to look at, to see and to grasp deeply and to determine what has been happening. It is simple: one cannot catch the clear pose of ever-changing, shaking, flashing objects while even he/she themselves are not stable and on the move. So, a situation in which neither observer/photographer nor objects are fixed does not give any opportunity for having a certain image of the world.

The world, nowadays especially human beings “in the age of quantum” has not been willing to have their photo taken by others (like subatomic particles). If anybody attempts to name someone, it is at once called “oppression, disrespect”. Even parents do not have a say any more to tell something to their beloved kids, or spouses to each other. Because, so to speak, it’s the age of Selfie whereas the time goes by more and more people think that they need nobody to be and to define themselves. It means that the same logic once used against The Church, The State and God respectively are still at work against whatever seems unchanged, old-fashion, static. But what is illusionary/simulative and hazardous is the idea that everything has to change. It seems that today’s people have kind of “original sin: serenity” never seen before. One can purify the original sin only by obeying a categorical imperative: “To Make a Difference, Just Do It (without questioning).” Therefore, I think that Bauman’s question(ing) is of importance: *Does Ethics Have a Chance in a World of Consumers?*

It should be made clear that the problem of (religious) pluralism and living together has really deep theological dimensions. To Eberle, “religious pluralism is the biggest epistemologi-

cal challenge with which any religious tradition faces aside from theodicy. Different and conflicting religious pluralism leads any members of religious groups to doubt...Pluralism injects a high dose of doubt into religious commitment."³² But even if I am on the same page with him in general, to me, it is not religious pluralism or even pluralism alone which can be a real challenge as strong as theodicy has been. They are just resulting. The core of the problem lies elsewhere. Although it looks small and simple separation, I strongly believe that this is a very important, crucial nuance that has a potential all religious traditions have been steering clear of facing.

The reason why I think that the real trouble for religions is to suggest that everybody may have a right to read and infer conclusions is that religious pluralism, unlike widespread convictions, fortifies and reinforces the belief in God, religious pillars. Because it supports the idea that human beings who are creatures of a *casua sui*, an almighty, omnipresent being who transcends us and the entire universe cannot be sufficient for themselves and need Him from the very beginning of their life to the end. When everybody in every society, state and civilization believes in an absolute being, especially in monotheism's God who wants people to worship only one true God, it constructs a world in which nobody can think that other possible Worlds without God are even possible to begin, to exist and to endure, to have meaning. So, what's left to people is to commit themselves to one of them by following their society. Most probably, the system of Millet in Ottoman Empire is the best evidence to show that among the societies that share the same premodern wisdom telling that we cannot be sufficient beings to come into existence, to lead a good life and should look to "the sky" could lose political power but not religious commitments/beliefs. The only thing which is possible is that they could convert into another religion. But today's condition is different. What is at stake now is a reli-

³² Cristopher J. Eberle, *Religious Convictions in Liberal Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 32-33.

gious belief in general or the idea of God. Thus, C. Taylor's question in *Secular Age* is very important: "in the 1500s why could not nobody imagine/think a World without God whereas today in the 2000s so many people can think that a world without God is possible?"³³ What has changed? In my opinion, the answer is very complex and filled with numerous motives, historical facts I cannot embrace and discuss here. But all reasons converge on the same case: *sapere aude* or to think not to need anything and to be "self-sufficient", which is the biggest mistake of mankind ever since his creation from the angle of celestial religions. I do not claim that it gives directly rise to an atheistic World or society, culture but to secularism and relativity that enable people to criticize and then to rationalize that traditional definition of God and religion can not be absolute and fixed sole way of thinking about them. Plus, we have been living a post-Lutherian culture that has shaped the entire World with its epistemology, morality, even with the theology which says everybody has the right to interpret and understand the sacred texts. Now God speaks through our mouth whereas especially in Islam only prophets can get revelation and have the right to explain what is God's true intention in his verses. That means prophets determine the boundaries of legitimate and possible interpretations of revelation. What modernity and, if any, postmodernity has done is to undermine and trivialize this methodology and limitations prophet and scholars put for concluding orders, ideas from the texts.

Therefore, again, the problem is not about having a right to refuse traditional bonds, beliefs, convert into another religion, or even not to believe in any God(s), at all. It is the change in believing that there can only one true/mainstream interpretation which is brought both by God's messengers and explained by them. What I exactly mean is that with the increase of legitimacy concerning the individual reading of texts, religious pillars, a

³³ Taylor, *Seküler Çağ*, Tr. trans. Dost Körpe (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), 31.

great number of ideas and behaves that premodern religious establishment never accepted before have been seen as true and counted in religious boundaries. If one means this fact by religious pluralism, for sure, it is a real deal, otherwise, a kind of pluralism consists of other religions is not a serious menace. However, no doctrine is okay with all interpretations no matter what they are. Can liberalism connive the violation of its lexical order and breaking of freedom even for the sake of equality? That's why pluralism taken as an inside legitimacy of every individual opinion regardless of the distance between the mainstream body and them produces crucial methodological chaos that comes along with structural ambivalences of the establishment at the end. Well then. What is wrong with that? What is wrong is that (especially monotheist) religions as the most comprehensive meta-narratives, holistic doctrines have turned to a hybrid/collage/eclectic movement as one of the thousands of cults, trends, new age spiritualism without any trademarks, distinctive essentials that are ontological for them. Deprived of vital content and force, religion, thus, has become just content of another meta-narrative that steadily speaks about the death of meta-narratives. So it should be seen natural for religions to refrain their boundaries from excessive obscuring or even erasing. Because, no matter what they say, every worldview rules just by inventing good and bad deeds which are determined by their own elites.

Given that all I am mentioning about the facts and ideas, it can be concluded that all models of living together can be construed as *modus vivendi* provided that any universal single doctrine in some way has not established a matrix which is composed of similar constituents since as if they all share the same single universal Logos. Because it is hardly possible for a worldview to remain the same as what it has been understood for centuries, which makes it different and separate. Once the essentials of another view are adopted, it is often done so at the expense of yours. I have already said before what problems reli-

gion has with the flexible understanding of sacred texts. It causes to see almost all interpretations as legitimate, which sounds like “anything goes” by rejecting the limits of orthodoxy. Here is the exact point that the uncertainty/ambiguity/undecidability about boundaries steps in and provides people with a chance of both remaining to be members of the religion and becoming a part of another worldview.

What I am talking about above is the best way to look at the relation between religion and postmodernism which is a significant component of this essay. “Anything goes, difference and deferral of meaning, undecidability, deconstruction, author’s intention, the death of the author” are the most known, debated concepts especially in theological circles. Therefore, I have to say that postmodernism and post-structuralism do to religion what they did to the modernity. The religious people who seek arsenal against the modernity are so deeply immersed in post-structuralist logic that it escaped their notice the same methodology hits back at religion. Moreover, here to see the convergence of the two important aspects is very illuminating: theory and practice coincide as follows: The people of societies that have been in poor conditions like the state of nature over a century finally starts to think that the reason why they have been stuck in such conditions emanates from their religion and tradition. Hence, they lose their self-respect (even before expecting the respect of others) to themselves and their cultures, religions: here is a previous (self) crisis of Identity. Since they lose trust in the fundamentals of their culture, they become vulnerable, open to new ideas and at that point postmodern logic gets involved in the case by suggesting a lot of bombastic concepts by scholars from every field to reinterpret, re-read, which bends the rules.

As Kymlicka said: A theory must evaluate not only the current conditions but also the next ones. And therein emerges the need for a comprehensive philosophy of history which is necessarily a meta-narrative, for it is predictable that new perspectives, new Robinsons and Fridays may appear depending on the

course of history, zeitgeist, events bringing about sudden and unexpected changes. It should not be expected that this dialectic will be over. Those who look at and see the world out of another window and explain human nature, morality differently can take these problems. Within the framework of it, a political philosophy that will be done within the philosophy of history can find a way of speaking out from its perspective. Seeing that the act of questioning is of the essence, political philosophy in cooperation with history of philosophy must interrogate whether or not today's primary goods and the burdens of judgments became prevalent by the natural and fair process of an *overlapping consensus* of all reasonable parts or it is just some sort of theodicy.

Conclusion

My objections, doubts and criticisms are permanent but the facts are staring us in the face. We have been living in a world imposing pluralism by any means. So this topic has also that dimension. If something is worldwide, it is one thing to look for, grasp, judge, criticize its philosophical, historical, practical motives. However, it is another thing to ponder about which social-political and moral attitudes we have to adopt until some dramatic changes have occurred. Which actions and ideas can be legitimate? What kind of approaches should be shown both to the narrow differences of methodology in domestic culture and to the structural differences which concern with fundamentals? It is manifest that no matter what happens in the remote corner of the World immediately creates a butterfly effect and shakes the economy and social stability of other countries which are filled with millions by power struggles of superpowers. That's why we need immediate theoretical and practical solutions. Turkey is also at the same historical conjunction as the entire World. For a country that once experienced a very multicultural society with a different scheme, it is really difficult to cope with the burdens of new pluralist conditions and to find new models of living together while the majority of its population has lost the experience/memory of living together because of rude positivist appli-

cations for decades. This is a new kind of challenge we are not familiar with.

Therefore, Islamic societies like all religious traditions have to successfully express themselves for a moral interaction with the rest of the world even for a *modus vivendi*, let alone *overlapping consensus*. This must be done not only for showing themselves nice but also for convincing their generations who have lost trust in their own culture because of the pornography of violence taking place routinely. *Overlapping consensus* may be questioned but it has to be, of course only by defining it in a different way, protected and kept as an ideal theory/telos to reach. Despite everything, it must be put as a flawless answer key, the highest good. If we renounce to keep the ideal of *overlapping consensus* as to the possible highest good, as a meta-criterion by which actions and opinions are valued means that we are beaten to the naked real politics. As a result, “is” ascends the throne of “ought to be.” However, that some moral political fixed principles which are determined independently from practical desires, interests, sensations become common ground moves the realities to the “ought to be” and keeps higher purposes alive for people. So the idea of the ideal must not be given up, just as we do not remove traffic rules since people violate them. Otherwise, we have affirmed the Machiavellian turn from moral politics to real politics. So, the power of reality cannot be the excuse of pulling the ideal over reality. Because *modus vivendi* is seen much more in practice should not make it normal to act in the way Machiavelli suggests. Therefore, a new kind of *overlapping consensus* which are abundant with “domestic” concepts and ideas.

Even if it may be thought that religions have to change the facts or to be dominant over others, it is more reasonable to be oppressed ones to hope to get awarded with the afterlife than cruel to oppress to earn this world. For sure, in the meantime, they have a right to claim that the current one is not “the best of all possible worlds” by showing flaws and to suggest another possible world that will come into existence by far the best. They

must also show the reason why good is prior to right and how and why the latter should be concluded from the former.

Should religions come back through the holes of disappointments that secular meta-narratives caused or if they have never gone anywhere and now one of the active components of this pluralism, they have to develop a discourse of communication to join the public discussion? For the sake of it, religious people must take the risk of loss in translation to some extent. This can be done only by using the terminology and methodology of prevailing political philosophy. However, as Kymlicka said, no political philosophy can solve alone all troubles of pluralism, for none of the theory of justices can overcome the demands neither side steps back as Parekh pointed out. This fact means that it is inevitable to face the multicultural challenge, even if you accept today's conditions as deep and constant as Rawls does or although you see within the philosophy of history it as a volatile step of dialectical journey or temporary stop of Geist.

What I believe to be the most important step is that religious efforts against pluralist challenge should refute the bias/illusion which has been arguing that to hold an idea defending "the oneness of the Truth" is necessarily totalitarianism. This false image should not be allowed to use as a trump card. Because there is no convincing proof to show that there were more sorrows in a world where people were seeking after one single Truth/path. Moreover, even if a World that tried to reach one single universal truth caused sorrows, how can it be reasonably expected that a different experience of different possible worlds would result in the same consequences? In my opinion, at least in terms of the Islamic worldview, it is of importance to show that why/how a monist approach holding that it enjoys sole truth at hand does not always bring about tyranny. To sum up, if history has not yet ended somewhere in the course of history, and human beings continue to reason, celestial religion should convince others of the possibility of another "holistic" world where whole and good have priority over part and right.

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