


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Will the Gandhian Non-Violence Produce Nonviolence Peacekeeping: From Shanti Sena (Peace Army) to the Islamic Nonviolence

Sezai ÖZÇELİK*

Abstract

The improvement of global security and world peace is the raison d'être of the United Nations. The concept of multilateral peacekeeping has been practiced by the UN over the last eighty-five years. The peacekeeping operations have three main objectives: collective security, preventive diplomacy and peaceful settlement of international conflicts. The idea of creating an international nonviolence "peace army" can be traced to the Shanti Sena (Gandhian peace brigade). The members of the Shanti Sena used nonviolent unarmed tools not kill but die for their peacekeeping duties. The present study aims to shed light on the evolution of nonviolent peacekeeping ideas and present some examples in the post-Cold War conflicts.

In the post-Covid-19 world, it is possible to refrain from the threat or actual use of force and replace it with unarmed civilian peacekeeping. Nonviolent peacekeeping may employ some Western (relationships, influence, advocacy, solidarity) and Islamic (sabr (patience), Hijra (exodus), fasting, umma (community), sulha (reconciliation) cultural and traditional principles and commitments. With the help of social media, citizens may become a central force for pro-democracy and anti-dictatorship movements with the emphasis of nonviolence for preventing escalation of violence and conflict early warning and early response.

Keywords: *Peacekeeping, Nonviolence, Collective Security, Shanti Sena (Peace Army)*

Gandiyan Şiddetsizlik, Şiddetsiz Barış Gücü Yaratabilir mi? Shanti Sena'dan (Barış Ordusu) İslami Şiddetsizliğe

Özet

Küresel güvenlik ve dünya barışı alanlarında ilerleme sağlamak Birleşmiş Milletler (BM)'in varoluş sebebidir. Çok uluslu barış gücü kavramı, BM tarafından son seksen beş yıldır uygulanmaktadır. Barış gücü operasyonlarının üç ana amacı vardır: Ortak güvenlik, önleyici diplomasi ve uluslararası çatışmaların barışçıl yollarla çözümü. Uluslararası şiddetsizlik "barış ordusu" yaratma fikri Shanti Sena'ya (Gandiyan barış tugayları) kadar uzanmaktadır. Shanti Sena üyeleri şiddetsiz ve silahsız araçları kullanarak öldürmek için değil barış gücü ile ilgili görevlerini yerine getirmek için ölmeyi göze alarak görev yapmışlardır. Bu çalışma şiddetsiz barış gücü fikrinin evrilme aşamalarını açıklamak ve Soğuk Savaş çatışmalarında şiddetsiz barış gücü örneklerini sunmayı amaçlamaktadır.

COVID-19 sonrası dünyada, güç kullanma ya da güç kullanma tehdidi yerine silahsız ve sivil barış gücünün gelmesi mümkün gözükmektedir. Şiddetsiz barış gücü bazı Batıcı (ilişkiler, etki, savunuculuk, dayanışma) kavramlar yanında sabır, hicret, oruç tutma, ümmet, sulh gibi İslami kültürel ve geleneksel ilkeler ve uygulamaları da kullanabilir. Sosyal medya yardımıyla vatandaşların demokrasi yanlısı ve

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anti-diktatörlük hareketlerde merkezi güç olabilirler. Bunu yaparken çatışmalara karşı erken uyarı ve erken müdahale teknikleri ve şiddetsizliğe vurgu yapılarak çatışmaların tırmanışa geçmesine engel olunabilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Barış Gücü, Şiddetsizlik, Ortak Güvenlik, Shanti Sena (Barış Ordusu)*

1. Introduction: Three Major Paradigms

Peace is an inherently elusive, multi-dimensional, continuous, relative, and not a promising subject. Although many people in the world desire peace, historical records show that the persistence of conflict with fears and misunderstandings have been common with the most widespread pessimism. It is almost impossible to reach positive peace in many deep-rooted, protracted, and full-scale conflicts. Many peace initiatives have begun with optimism but it has mostly reached only negative peace, namely the silencing of weapons and the ending of physical and psychological violence. They hardly achieve the ending of structural and cultural violence.¹ Many conflicts especially in the former Soviet Union republics have been labeled as frozen conflicts with “no war, no peace” status quo.²

“Peace through strength” (political realism) and “peace through law” (idealism) are two important paradigms to be examined to assess the emerging trends in international security, conflict resolution, and peace studies. A third paradigm, the “trans-systemic or ecological paradigm”, has become an alternative paradigm. “Peace through strength” tends to emphasize the interests of the state, balance of power, promoting war for peace, military alliance, deterrence, military power, security dilemma, and collective security. “Peace through law” incline to study the interests of the international community, state sovereignty, rule of law, international dispute resolution mechanisms, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and the United Nations.³ Within the “peace through law” paradigm, the visions of the world have varied from the Utopian approach of Kant’s “perpetual peace” project, or of those who favor of the establishment of a world government, to the paradigmatic vision of a world policed and

¹Sezai Özçelik, *Uluslararası Çatışma Analizi ve Çözümü*, (Ankara: Nobel Yayınevi, 2020).

²Sezai Özçelik, “II. Soğuk Savaş ve Kırım’daki Jeopolitik Gambit: Rusya’nın Stratejik Derinliği Bağlamında Kırım’ın İşgali ve Kırım Tatarları” in *Karadeniz ve Kafkaslar: Riskler ve Fırsatlar: Ekonomi, Enerji ve Güvenlik*, ed. Osman Orhan (İstanbul: TASAM Yayınları, 2018), 59.

³ W. Raymond Duncan, Barbara Jancar-Webster and Bob Switky, *World Politics in 21st Century* (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Company, 2009), 33.



governed by international organizations as is explained by functionalism and neo-functionalism. Peace through law supports the promotion of peace through existing international and national institutional and normative structures.

Peace studies have supported from its beginning a paradigm shift within the Kuhnian explanation and understanding.⁴ There is a need to have a new methodological, ontological, epistemological lens, approaches, and assumptions to analyze conflict, violence, war, and peace. Therefore, there is a need to establish a new paradigm for the 21st century. A paradigm shift requires moving from peace through strength and law to the trans-systemic paradigm or peace by peaceful means. Instead of containing violence with the use of force, a culture of peace must be taken place from interpersonal to global conflict levels.

The “peace through strength” concept draws heavily on the positivist school of science and the technological-edge concept. It assumes that we can understand a phenomenon intuitively. The historical origin of the “peace through law” concept goes back to the Greek city-state (polis) and originates from the Judaeo-Christian notion of social justice. The peaceful settlement of the dispute is one of the strongest pillars of this paradigm. Without institutional support, the peaceful settlement of conflict cannot be achieved. Moreover, realists and neo-realists describe the world as an anarchic system. The UN collective security system is a marriage of the first two paradigms of international relations. For example, those who favored a peaceful settlement of a dispute asked for more time for the sanctions to operate in the Gulf War. Chapter VI of the UN Charter postulates that all efforts to find a peaceful settlement to a conflict must be exhausted before the use of force can even be contemplated. The “peace through strength” paradigm has dominated during the Cold War. In other words, the end of the Cold War was the mark of the end of diplomacy and Chapter VII authorizes the organization to contemplate the use of force a breach of the peace, or a military threat against international peace.

Many states are dealt with inter-state, intra-state, and global conflicts coming from non-state actors. However, they are ill-equipped of the rise of global terrorist threats and non-state

⁴Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).



violent and extremist armed groups. The states have countered these threats traditional ways that further increase the extremism with new waves of violence. The threat to global security may require a new approach to combat extremism that re-connects the experience of the non-violent army into the current UN system. Since its establishment, the UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) have strived for resolving armed conflicts and protect innocent people. This chapter aims to study the possibility of non-violent PKOs by strengthening peacemaking, peacebuilding, and post-conflict transformation efforts and by constructing non-violent means of law enforcement. By transforming traditional military aspects of UN PKOs into non-violent police agents with the effective UN civilian non-violent army units. This chapter provides explanations and understanding by new means and ends by using the non-violent mechanism in the 21st-century conflicts. Islamic peace paradigm may offer the Islamic non-violent peace army for new challenges. To what extent is the militarization' of peacekeeping necessary for dealing with violent internal conflicts? What non-violent mechanisms could be used instead?

2. Collective Security

Collective security is one of the paradigms associated with coercion. Many scholars believe that the concept of collective security is a Wilsonian concept. The Wilsonian collective security rejected the balance of power politics and traditional defense pact. It is directed against the general threat and supports the universal arrangement of all member states against any threats to peace. In a broader meaning, collective security includes peacekeeping efforts by international organizations such as the United Nations or the African Union to address specific conflicts and to enhance the security of all members of the international system.⁵ During and after World War I, the founders of the League of Nations have supported a project for the collective enforcement of peace. The League of Nations was created in 1919 to institutionalize the ideas of peace and stability based on the collective security system. After the establishment of the United Nations (UN), the founders gave some “teeth” to the new organization. The Charter gave authority to the Security Council makes recommendations, or decides what

⁵Stephen M. Walt, “Collective Security and Revolutionary Change: Promoting Peace in the former Soviet Empire” in *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, ed. George W. Downs (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1994), 169.



measures shall be taken following the UN Charter Article 41 and 42 maintain or restore international peace and security □ “in case of □any threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression.” One of the most important realist scholars Hans Morgenthau believed that “the organizing principle of collective security is the respect for the moral and legal obligation to consider an attack by any nation upon any member of the alliances as an attitude upon all members of the alliance.” He explained alliances as a “universal alliance against potential aggression.”⁶

The UN collective security system is created for solving the conflict between two states. The UN collective security system has been based on peacekeeping activities during the Cold War era. However, the election of Michael Gorbachev as General Secretary of the USSR in 1985 heralded an end to over four decades of ideological conflict. The international community has witnessed historic events such as the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Germany, and the collapse of Warsaw Pact past decade. The changes in the international environment require a renaissance and reform of the collective security system.

According to Kritz, “ethnic and religious conflicts, disputes over self-determination or secession, and the violent power struggle between opposing domestic political factors account for 96 percent of the major armed conflicts recorded in recent years worldwide.”⁷ For the success of future collective security activities, there is a need for compromising three main principles of the UN Charter: the principle of non-intervention of internal affairs of states, the principle of non-use of force, and the principle of equality and self-determination. Because of the need for adjustment of the UN, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali produced the report, *An Agenda for Peace* (1992) which was indicative of the changing nature of United Nations action in the post-Cold War world. Rather than being satisfied with the simple prevention of escalation of the conflict, which had been its major objective during the Cold War, the post-Cold War period has witnessed the emergence of peacekeeping as one of conflict resolution tools.

⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Alfred A.Kropf, 1967), 142.

⁷ N.J. Kritz, “The Risk of Law in the Post-conflict Phase: Building a Stable Peace”, in Crocker et.al, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, (Washington D.C.: USIP, 1996), 584.



3. Peacekeeping

3.1. Definition and Traditional and Expanded Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping has been developed during the Cold War as a response to the needs of the Cold War system. Because of competition between superpowers, peacekeeping has been a tool of conflict management, a means of preventing war in one part of the world drawing in the super-powers and escalating to the brink of nuclear war. But there was an idealistic element of peacekeeping that it was important for the international community to save lives wherever possible. With the end of the Cold War, this dual imperative (realpolitik and humanitarian) changed in favor of humanitarianism. Moreover, the greater understanding between the super-powers enabled the UN to dramatically increase the number of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period. And the UN's role during the Gulf War demonstrated that as long as there was a consensus in the Security Council, the Organization could be successful in maintaining peace. The UN established ten new peacekeeping operations by the end of 1991 and this rapid expansion seemed to indicate that the UN would finally be able to fulfill its primary goal the preservation of peace.⁸

Boutros-Ghali's conflict resolution framework has been expanded to present peacekeeping as future thinking about conflict management. Peacekeeping defined as “...the deployment of military or police personnel, and frequently civilians as well to assist in the implementation of agreements reached between governments or parties who have been engaged in conflict.”⁹In other words, it refers to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of armed conflict or the resolution of longstanding disputes. There are six basic principles for peacekeeping: consent, impartiality, restraint in the use of force, credibility, legitimacy, and promotion of national and local ownership.¹⁰ It is possible to outline two types of peacekeeping: traditional and expanded. Traditional peacekeeping has as its principal role the positioning of forces between or among combatants...

⁸ David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood, “Introduction” in *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, ed. David S. Sorenson and Pia Christina Wood, (London: Frank Cass, 2005),1-18.

⁹Garenth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace* (St.Leonards,NSW, Australia: Allen&Unwin, 1993), 99.

¹⁰Alex J., Bellamy, Paul d. Williams and Stuart Griffin, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2010), 142.



the goal [of which] is to contain or prevent further conflict. Expanded peacekeeping is one of the components of peace agreement with third-party international military reinforcement. As a result, it is not surprising that UN peacekeeping was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1988.¹¹

Even though there are common features between collective security and peacekeeping, there are differences. One distinguishing attribute of peacekeeping is the performance of a non-coercive mission. The goal of the traditional military operation is to deter an opponent or defeat that opponent in battle. And these missions usually include enforcement and coercion with military force. However, peacekeeping operations are usually deployed following a cease-fire agreement by the protagonists. Peacekeeping troops do not have a mission of stopping the bloodshed. Whereas traditional military mission involves the defense or attempted seizure of territory, peacekeeping forces have no offensive role in the conflict. They do not seek to acquire territory, nor do they use military force except self-defense. Second, peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and they are designed only to use those arms in self-defense. Peacekeeping troops have neither an offensive military mission nor the capability to carry one out. For example, a typical peacekeeping soldier is equipped only with a rifle, and peacekeeping units have access only to vehicles for transportation.¹² A third distinguishing component of peacekeeping is its neutrality. Although in collective security system the aggressor who is the target of enforcement action is identified, peacekeeping forces do not mark one side or the other responsible for the military conflict. They are not designed to provide a military advantage to either side. The concept of neutrality goes beyond the purpose of the force to the composition and activities of the troops. Most U.N. peacekeeping forces are composed of military personnel from nonaligned states such as Fiji, Canada, and Sweden.¹³ Another distinguishing feature of peacekeeping operations is that they must have the permission of the state or states on whose territory the troops will be stationed. They recognize and respect the sovereignty of states and assign a role

¹¹ Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, "Cascading Generations of Peacekeeping: Across the Mogadishu Line to Kosovo and Timor" in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement*, ed. Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel, (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2001), 11.

¹² Gary Wilson, *The United Nations and Collective Security* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 116-151.

¹³ N.D. White, *Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, 2nd ed., (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), 238.



for the implementing agency commensurate with the authority granted by the states involved.¹⁴ Finally, peacekeeping forces generally perform a range of functions that distinguish them from collective security. The first function is that they detect violations of cease-fires and supervise troop withdrawals. Second, they have roles as buffer or interposition forces. Therefore, they prevent isolated hostile incidents or accidents that could escalate to full-scale war. And they provide a moral barrier to hostile action. A third function concerns the maintenance of law and order, especially common for peacekeeping operations deployed in intra-national conflicts. They have police and administrative duties. A final function of peacekeeping operations is the performance of humanitarian activities. They set up services for the local population and these activities help bring acceptance for peacekeeping force and lessen the danger of attack.¹⁵

Traditional peacekeeping operations have shared several operational characteristics. First, they inherently have been reactive to international conflict. The United Nations, like many organizations, is crisis-driven: peacekeeping operations are not often suggested, much less authorized, until lives have been lost and the prospects for war expansion are great. A second characteristic surrounds the authorization of the typical peacekeeping mission. At the height of the Cold War, some peacekeeping operations relied on the political support of members in the General Assembly. More recently, the Security Council has reassumed the mantle of leadership on peace and security issues. The third aspect of a typical peacekeeping operation is its formation mechanisms. Peacekeeping operations remain distinctly ad hoc. Then, the size of peacekeeping operations generally ranges from one or two thousand to twenty thousand depending on the willingness of states to contribute troops, the mission assigned the operation, and the breadth of the area of deployment. The last characteristic is command and control. Peacekeeping operations are under U.N. command. The commander of the operation is often from a neutral state.¹⁶

Peacekeeping is, therefore, the imposition of neutral and lightly armed interposition

¹⁴Brian Frederking, *The United States and the Security Council: Collective Security since the Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 42.

¹⁵Paul F. Diehl, *Peace Operations* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008), 4-5.

¹⁶Joachim Koops, A. et al. "Introduction", in *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Joachim A. Koops et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1-8.



forces following cessation of armed hostilities, and with the permission of the state on whose territory these forces are deployed, to discourage a renewal of military conflict and promote an environment under which the underlying dispute can be resolved. Peacekeeping has the following functions: maintaining law and order, humanitarian activity, interposition, and observation. They are not mutually exclusive. Some or all may be included in peacekeeping missions depending on the type of conflict.¹⁷ The other functions are the long-term which tries to build a new social structure that considers the needs of the antagonists. According to the researchers, “the first role is not very effective but is easy to implement. The second may be very effective, but is exceedingly difficult to implement.”¹⁸ The solution is to add peacemaking (negotiation and mediation) and peacebuilding (social change through socioeconomic development and reconstruction) components to the peacekeeping role. It is achieved because of the nature of conflicts.

To peacekeeping become useful and practical, the conflict must be between equals and have competition over goals rather than interests (horizontal conflict). However, most conflicts are between unequal parties in which oppressed groups attempt to free themselves from domination (vertical conflict). Because most conflicts are intra-state conflicts, peacekeeping forces solely result in securing an often unjust status quo.¹⁹

Therefore, it is possible to suggest two solutions. The first one to which that seems more problematic than the second one is the use of force. In other words, the principle of non-use of force should not be applied to intra-state conflicts. The international community has increasingly accepted the use of force in these situations: “protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare, protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas and pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept.”²⁰

¹⁷ Paul F. Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1993), 13.

¹⁸ Johan Galtung and H.Hveem, “Participants in Peacekeeping Forces” *Essays in Peace Research*, ed. J.Galtung, (Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, 1976), 264.

¹⁹ Thomas Weber, *Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), xviii.

²⁰ Boutros Ghali-Boutros, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping,” *Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*, New York: United Nations, n34, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r120.htm>.



However, there is another alternative that is based on Gandhian nonviolence principles. Thus we can reach Galtung's aim and transform the relationships in the conflict. The main power of Gandhian non-violent peacekeeping is that it can be applied vertical as well as horizontal conflicts.

“More problematic is the idea of expanded peacekeeping which leads to what I see as the militarization of peacekeeping... Rather than turn to increasingly militarized solutions - a habitus that pervades thinking about conflict management at the international level - we must consider instead non-violent alternatives which take account of the range of complex issues involved in violent conflicts and the people who experience them.”²¹

3.2. Use of force

The principle of non-use of force except in self-defense is central to the concept of United Nations peacekeeping. It is based on practical as well as idealistic considerations. Also, this principle is closely linked with consent. The UN peacekeeping operations can be set up in areas of the conflict only with the consent of the parties directly concerned. With the end of the Cold War and the new consensus within the Security Council, it seemed to many that the principle of non-use of force was no longer applicable to the post-Cold War world. It is indicated that expanding peacekeeping in Evans's sense is necessitated no longer the principle of consent, impartiality, and the non-use of force. It is argued that:

“Tasks such as containment or the disarming of belligerents, for which demonstration of authority is essential, require significantly more military strength than traditional peacekeeping. An early display of strength, moreover, may well obviate the need to resort to force to maintain peacekeeping and peace-making authority.”²²

In this statement, there are two implicit assumptions. First, it is suggested that peacekeeping should move much further toward enforcement, and also calls for the use of large numbers of military personnel. Second, he links peacekeeping and enforcement. This belief was strengthened after the successful execution of the first-ever Chapter VII enforcement action in

²¹ A.B. Fetherston, “Habitus in Cooperating for Peace: A Critique of Peacekeeping” in the *New Agenda for Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond*, ed. Stephanie Lawson, (St.Leonards, New South Wales: Allen and Unwin, 1994), 116.

²² Evans, *Cooperating for Peace*, 110.



the Gulf in 1990-91. It did not come as a surprise, therefore, that when the Security Council requested the

The report of the Secretary-General in January 1991 opened new ways that UN peacekeeping may be strengthened in the future. The Boutros-Ghali's replying document, *An Agenda for Peace*, included a suggestion for peace enforcement units” which he envisaged might enforce a ceasefire where one was not already present. Furthermore, he defined three reasons for recent mandates that, in particular, have led peacekeeping operations to relinquish the consent of the parties, to behave in a way that was perceived to be partial and/or to use force other than in self-defense. These tasks are:

- a) Protecting humanitarian operations during continuing warfare;
- b) Protecting civilian populations in designated safe areas;
- c) Pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they were ready to accept the cases of Somalia and Bosnia and Herzegovina are instructive in this respect.²³

Brian Urquhart, a former Under-Secretary-General, stated that:

*“Before changing the existing rules on the use of force in peacekeeping or moving towards enforcement, it is important to consider the implications, practical, military, legal, political, and even psychological and the likely responses of those most directly concerned in peacekeeping operations, the parties to the conflict and the troop-contributing countries.”*²⁴

Moreover, he emphasizes that peacekeeping should be strengthened, but there is a very important difference between the use of force and a show of strength.²⁵ Similarly, it assumes that the militarization of peacekeeping is problematic and important for the future of peaceful third-party intervention.²⁶ If our aim shows strength, we should consider instead non-violent alternatives which take account of not only settlement but also resolution. Therefore, even

²³Ghali, “An Agenda Peace”, n34.

²⁴Brian Urquhart, “Beyond the Sheriff’s Posse”, *Survival* 32, no.3, (1990): 203.

²⁵Brian Urquhart, “Foreword” in *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force*, ed.F.T. Liu, (Lynne Rienner: Boulder, 1992), 7.

²⁶Fetherston, “Habitat in Cooperating for Peace”, 116.



though Evans suggests new alternatives, it is still an ineffective realist approach to conflict management. He remains embedded in the established thinking of conflict settlement. In complex violent situations, we should move toward a conflict resolution approach which is the emphasis of the transformation of the conflictual relationship.

There are three peacekeeping operations in which the use of enforcement action was seriously considered and implemented in the post-Cold War era: Cambodia, Somalia, and Bosnia. Unlike the operations in Bosnia and Somalia, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) at no stage had a mandate referring to a Chapter VII enforcement action. Nevertheless, in Paris Accords, which finished the protracted and deep-rooted conflict in Cambodia, allowed that “all means necessary to ensure the implementation of this agreement.”²⁷ However, there was no incident about the use of force in these operations. Using coercive peace-enforcement in Somalia demonstrated that impartiality, once lost, is practically impossible to regain.

On the other hand, it was enacted Chapter VII enforcement measures in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II). The UN operation has lost its impartiality as it attempted to find and arrest the warlord Mohammed Aideed through Resolution 837. The fight which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers, 78 injuries, and the abduction of a US helicopter pilot caused the immediate collapse of domestic support for the Somali operation.²⁸ When peacekeeping forces take sides, they lose their legitimacy and credibility as a trustworthy third party. Moreover, this situation results in the loss of popular support, a loss of control, and uncontrolled escalation upwards which will heighten political tension.

In former Yugoslavia, there was not the enforcement mandate similar to in Somalia. There were three levels of using enforcement measures in the former Yugoslavia. First, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) could use force to provide security for humanitarian operations. Second, enforcement measures were initiated in 1993 with the introduction of a “no-fly zone” over Bosnia. Last, the most unsuccessful peace enforcement

²⁷ Stephen M.Hill and Shahin P.Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations*, (Dartmouth:Brookfield, 1996), 175.

²⁸Robert J. Jr. Schneller and John Darrell Sherwood, *Anchor of Resolve: A History of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command/Fifth Fleet* (Washington D.C: Naval History Center, 2007), 52.



operations in former Yugoslavia occurred the international coalition established “safe heavens.” The most disaster incident took place in Srebrenica where 3000 civilians were butchered by Serbs. The main reason is that there was little consensus between Europeans, the US, and Russia on the use of airstrikes and the introduction of peace-enforcement measures in general. The military strategists at NATO and the civilian authorities at the UN had different understandings about the use of force and peace enforcement. NATO has been concerned more with its *raison d'État* (national interest) and credibility rather than the concerns of UN peacekeeping objectives.²⁹ For the UN itself, the main lesson of peace-enforcement has been the realization of its inadequacies. In the words of Chester Crocker the UN's attempt at a “peace-enforcement” operation in Somalia □...shows that it cannot manage complex political-military operations when its structure is an undisciplined and often chaotic set of rival fiefdoms that resist unified command and control in the field at both the military and civilian levels.”³⁰ Also, the Secretary-General stated in May 1995 that “...nothing is more dangerous for a peacekeeping operation than to ask it to use force when it's existing composition, armament, logistical support and deployment is the capacity to do so.”³¹

4. Nonviolence Methods and Shanti Sena (Peace Army)

It is an old dream of peace-lovers - an unarmed, non-violent army to keep the peace. The dream is still alive, perhaps now more than ever because of the failures of the blue-helmeted UN peacekeepers to end fighting in war-torn areas such as Somalia, Rwanda, and former Yugoslavia. This section talks about Gandhi's way of Shanti Sena that is a civilian people's army. Shanti Sena is a Gandhian organization specializing in non-violently helping to quell urban riots. The civil society and the multiple networks of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) examines the problem-solving skills in a conflict-ridden world. In such a context, the possibility of “civilian peacekeeping” takes on new meaning. Shanti Sena/Peace Army experience is the most important of practical knowledge for contemporary peace brigade projects. The main argument is that there can be a new model for peacekeeping activities that

²⁹Sezai Özçelik, “Çatışma Bilimleri ve Çatışma Haritalaması Çerçevesinde Balkanlar,” *Yeni Türkiye Özel Sayı-V*, no. 70 (2015): 5966-5983.

³⁰Chester Crocker, “The Lessons of Somalia,” *Foreign Affairs* 74, no.3 (1995): 5.

³¹Stephen M.Hill and Shahin P.Malik, *Peacekeeping and the United Nations* (Dartmouth: Brookfield, 1996), 185.



can be carried out by private as well as public bodies and that it can be done within the framework of Gandhian nonviolence. Moreover, international unarmed peacekeeping initiatives (in particular, Maude Royden's Peace Army, the World Peace Brigade, the Cyprus Resettlement Project [CRP], Peace Brigade International [PBI], and the Gulf Peace Team [GPT]) which are based on nonviolence principles have attempted to combine various elements that are necessary for the effective long-term resolution of inter-group and international conflicts. And because the Shanti Sena was conceived as an intrastate non-violent force rather than as non-violent army with international duties, it will be the most appropriate model for peacekeeping in the 21st century.

There is a long but little known history of attempted unarmed inter-positional peacekeeping from Maude Royden's Peace Army in the 1930s to the Gulf and Balkan Peace Teams in the 1990s. All of these initiatives have attempted to physically place a non-violent “buffer” force between two opposing armed forces to prevent an outbreak of renewed fighting among those forces.³² Yet the Gulf Peace Team did manage, for the first time, to place a group of peace campaigners between belligerents in a time of war. Although it is doubtful whether independent inter-positional peacekeeping activities will ever be able to command the economic and logistical resources and, more importantly, raise enough volunteers to achieve a critical mass that would make a difference in terms of preventing or stopping hostilities, unarmed peacekeeping forces present an unprecedented and revolutionary alternative for two paradigms in international relations. The establishment of such forces can serve in the two realms: non-violent escort duties and peace-making and peace-building. Moreover, especially grassroots efforts and NGOs encourage the establishment of local peace brigades and to interest the United Nations in the creation of a truly non-violent and unarmed peace-keeping force. For example, Peace Brigade International (PBI) has conducted projects in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Sri Lanka, Balkans, and Chiapas. Moreover, Mahatma Gandhi may have been surprised when he first heard of the non-violent resistance of Badshah Khan's Pathan tribesmen resistance during the Salt Satyagraha of 1930. “Khan’s miracle” was entirely consonant with Gandhi's idea of nonviolence. And Badshah Khan was one of the best examples of nonviolence in

³² Michael Harbottle, *The Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978), 20.



Islam.³³ Nonviolence is the main weapon of the Prophet Mohammed PBUH. The closest translation of Gandhi's satyagraha in Islam is *sabr* (patience, endurance). Abdul Ghaffar Khan or nicknamed "Frontier Gandhi" was established history's first mass professional non-violent army, the *Khudai Khidmatgar*, or "Servants of God."³⁴ Khan has merged two nonviolence theories: the Islamic tradition of the Mecca period and Gandhian nonviolence.³⁵

It is theoretically possible that international peacekeeping resorts to without the use of force or enforcement measures. However, it is a fact that force and enforcement tend to extend and prolong both interstate and intrastate conflict. Even though there have been some proposals for making peacekeeping operations more effective, the voices for unarmed peacekeeping force are the most important attempt for 21st-century peacekeeping. The alternatives to the mainstream style of peacekeeping are not merely theoretical; there have been many attempts to think through a non-violent and unarmed approach, and several examples have been attempted in practice. The first attempt of the idea of a non-violent peace army implemented in the Sino-Japan conflict in September 1931. Dr. Maude Royden, who is an acquaintance of Mahatma Gandhi, proclaimed: "I would like now to enroll people who would be ready if war should break out to put their bodies unarmed between the contending forces, in whatever way it be found possible-and there are ways that you do not think of now in which it would be possible."³⁶ In her other work, she explained what they wanted "an army of pacifists who should offer themselves of the League of Nations as the "shock troops" of peace."³⁷ Although volunteers have enrolled themselves for service in the Peace Army during the first weeks of conflict, the plan faded away without government help and the Peace Army was put to the test. After World War II, the Ralph Bell (1959) advocated an approach to war that the saw as an alternative to the pacifist (do nothing because of a lack of an agreed practical policy) position and the militarist

³³ Sezai Özçelik, "From Terrorism to Nonviolence and the Islamic Peace Paradigm: Jihad, Just War, Peace and Islamic Nonviolence," *Peace and Conflict Studies Journal* 12, no. 2, (2005).

³⁴ Easwaran Eknath, *Non-violent Solider of Islam, Badshah Khan: A Man to Match His Mountains* (USA: Blue Mountain Center of Mediation, 1999), 110.

³⁵ Özçelik, "From Terrorism to Nonviolence and the Islamic Peace Paradigm."

³⁶ Thomas Weber, "From Maude Royden's Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team: An Assessment of Unarmed Interpositional Peace Forces," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no.1 (1993): 46.

³⁷ Thomas Weber, *Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 199.



(want to fight) position. He called this approach the “Active Non-Violent Resistance Army”. Bell's central thesis was that merely to say “No to war” was not enough what was required was an alternative positive approach.³⁸ Even though Bell strives to create an alternative model, there was already a model in operation. In India, the Shanti Sena, or “Peace Army”, founded by Gandhi's spiritual heir, Vinoba Bhave, had been active since 1957. The Sena, however, included peace-making and peace-building functions as of equal importance to the third-party intervention role that had been the main focus of the advocates of interpositionary peace-keeping. As an organization, the Shanti Sena is committed in principle to grassroots peacekeeping and peace-building actions. These actions were concerned with restoring peace in communal disturbances, working with refugees (after the war in Bangladesh and the international sphere in Cyprus), doing peace work in India's sensitive border areas, and establishing training camps to instill the ethos of service and nonviolence in the youth of India. Gandhi insinuated the possibility of a peace army as the defense force of a disarmed and neutral India and desired that his followers work for the poor and structural violence rather than enter the realm of power politics. Interestingly, the Shanti Sena's focus would have shifted from the realm of peacekeeping, through peacemaking, to peacebuilding to establish a Sarvodaya³⁹ social order. After the founding of the Sena, many called the “internationalizing of the Shanti Sena idea”. Generally, these calls concentrated on the Sena as a peacekeeping force.

It is important to examine two leading figures and their philosophies to understand the Indian Shanti Sena. These two figures are, Jayaprakash Narayan (JP), Gandhi's political heir, and Vinoba Bhave, Gandhi's spiritual heir. Vinoba claimed that he aimed to bring about a threefold revolution. First, he wanted to change people's hearts, second, to bring about a change in their lives, and third, to change the social structure.⁴⁰ He believed that wars would only cease when a world government came into existence. There were two alternate ways to bring this about. First, the United Nations had to be strengthened so that it could boast an army bigger than that of either the United States or the USSR or raise a large peace army to function in the

³⁸ Ralph Bell, *Alternative of Peace* (London: James Clark, 1959), 77.

³⁹Sarvodaya: The uplift of all, or welfare of all. Sarvodaya Movement. Movement for the Welfare of All; the name adopted by the Gandhian constructive workers for their movement, after Gandhi's death.

⁴⁰Weber, *Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping*, 142.



way that Maude Royden envisaged. Second, the causes of the war had to be removed by bringing about mutual goodwill between people through a spiritual revolution that would ultimately make the coercive apparatus of the state redundant.⁴¹ It can be achieved where sathagrahis can go to the theatre of war, facing bullets, offer non-violent resistance. Vinoba would prefer that fellow-pilgrims Shanti Sainik⁴² go their own countries and create model units of the Shanti Sena rather than pushing for the creation of an international Shanti Sena forces.⁴³ In short, world peace armies were secondary in his overall strategy of generating non-violent revolution. He emphasized the non-violent revolution through the spiritual uplift of the self and then the masses. On the other hand, JP viewed the peacekeeping role of the Shanti Sena as a primary objective. Both are anarchists, but Indian anarchism is more gradual than the Western one. But JP was more anarchistic in the Western sense, reverting to active struggle and “negative” Satyagraha. Unlike Vinoba, he was also anti-state and advocated using people's power against that of the state.⁴⁴ Vinoba stressed spiritual values and primarily consider the conversion of the individual. JP, as a Marxist, was more practical and more practical than if the environment had been changed, people would have been changed. Both believed that the Sena lead in the building up of the ideal non-violent society of the future.⁴⁵ In other words, both dealt with stopping exploitation and structural violence.

4.1. The World Peace Brigade

Fifty-five delegates representing thirteen countries gathered in Lebanon to establish the World Peace Brigade (WPB). The WPB reflected the Indian Shanti Sena's work of providing a non-violent alternative to the police force as well as a non-violent alternative to the army. For JP, it changed ways of thinking:

“...the only existing agency for maintaining world peace, the United Nations, is employing nothing but armed forces to achieve peace; and no

⁴¹M.S. Wallace, *Security without Weapons: Rethinking Violence, Non-violent Action, and Civilian Protection* (New York: Routledge, 2017).

⁴²Shanti Sainik: Peace soldier; a member of Shanti Sena

⁴³K.S. Brahathi, *Thoughts of Gandhi and Vinoba: A Comparative Study* (New Delhi: Concept Publishing, 1995), 112.

⁴⁴Thomas Weber, *Gandhi as Disciple and Mentor* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 155.

⁴⁵April Carter, *Peace Movements: International Protest and World Politics since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 245-250.



one sees any contradiction in that. The very idea that it is possible to achieve peace through a non-violent force is absent from the minds of both the peoples and their governments. The emergence of a World Peace Brigade would give that idea a concrete form. That might become a landmark in the world's quest for peace.”⁴⁶

The functions of the Brigade included border patrols in trouble areas, the offer of volunteers to any nation prepared to disarm, the inspection and control of disarmament agreements, the undertaking of fact-finding missions, and development of an information network so that pre-emptive measures could be taken before crises develop. The WPB existed only a few short years and managed to conduct three projects—the proposed Northern Rhodesia March, the *Everyman III* voyage, and the Delhi to Peking Friendship March—none of them particularly successful.

In 1969, Galtung noted, “many people have been thinking in terms of world peace brigades that would mobilize volunteers to penetrate through national borders and intervene in cases of intra-national manifest and/or latent violence.”⁴⁷ World Peace Brigades must have taken place under three conditions: non-violence, international composition, and non-governmental auspices.

During the Vietnam War, non-violent activists have been mobilized and sent towards a war zone. The emphasis shifted away from inter-positional peacekeeping to constructive ventures in conflict areas. This approach was taken a few years later by the Cyprus Resettlement Project (CRP). The aim was to help restore peaceful conditions in Cyprus by using nonviolence in conjunction with the mandate of the United Nations. For this purpose, fifteen to twenty thousand Turkish villagers tried to be resettled and negotiation was held with both Greek and Turkish leader. However, the coup and the Turkish intervention put an end to the project. CRP proved that the presence of a reconciliation group or an international non-violent third force may help solve the problem through mediation without hampering the work of the judiciary or the government.

⁴⁶ Weber, “From Maude Royden’s Peace Army to the Gulf Peace Team,” 50.

⁴⁷Weber, *Gandhi’s Peace Army*, 39.



4.2. Peace Brigade International (PBI) and the Gulf Peace Team (GPT)

After the Cyprus project ended, an idea to develop a peace force linked to the United Nations was developed. And it was proposed that Peace workers was sent to conflict areas where they would assist with arbitration and mediation, provide unarmed buffer forces if necessary, undertake reconciliation work between communities, and engage in relief work. To press for the resolution of conflict the teams could organize non-violent actions in the form of marches, fasts, and civil obedience. And PBI established in 1981 and dedicated to unarmed peacekeeping and peace-making.⁴⁸

It aimed to promote, support, and coordinate local peace brigades, based in communities, states, or provinces, and nations in practice they have not attempted to set up any unarmed interpositional peacekeeping force. Instead, PBI's peacekeeping ventures have centered on intervention in conflict situations by a small number of activists.

The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 and the United Nations sanctions resulted in the formation of the GPT. GPT effort was reactive rather than proactive. The aim of GPT was an international multi-cultural team working for peace and opposing any forms of armed aggression, past, present, or future, by setting up one or more international peace camps between the opposing armed forces. They wanted to withstand non-violently any armed aggression by any party to the Gulf War in 1991.⁴⁹

5. Conclusion

In the post-Cold War era, there is a little difference between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. The main feature of expanded or second-generation peacekeeping operations is that there is no more consensus about three principles of peacekeeping namely the non-use of force, consent, and impartiality. Yet, many scholars and practitioners advocate realist assumptions about peacekeeping. However, it becomes obvious that the realist paradigm does

⁴⁸N. Radhakrishnan, "Brief Overview of the Shantisnea (Gandhi's Peace Brigade)" in *Global Nonkilling Leadership Forum Book of Proceedings*, ed. Glenn D. Paige and Joam Evans Pim, (Hawaii: Center for Global Nonviolence, 2008), 289-299.

⁴⁹Bela Bhatia, Jean Dreze and Kathy Kelly, *War and Peace in the Gulf: Testimonies of the Gulf Peace Team* (UK: Spokesman, 2001).



not present effective alternatives to intrastate conflicts. Even though UN peacekeeping troops received the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize for their contribution to international peace and security, the international community is increasingly questioning the future of peacekeeping. As I mentioned earlier, there is another paradigm apart from two main paradigms. Trans-systemic paradigm as an alternative method of realist paradigm can be applied non-violent methods not only peacekeeping but also other conflict resolution methods. All other methods and concepts such as multi-track diplomacy, interculturalist approach, environmental and economic security, grassroots movements, gender, and spirituality should implement non-violent principles. In other words, non-violent methods should also be applied to other methods not only peacekeeping.

Non-violent peacekeeping operations have had a well-documented past and the Shanti Sena was a successful example. The Sainiks pledge to fight against injustice and violence. Besides, its successors like the World Peace Brigade and Peace Brigade International adopt a more modest and realistic approach. Maybe, we should adopt a combination of possible approaches to conflict. It might be possible to combine the peacekeeping function of the UN soldier, the peacemaking function of the mediator, e.g. of the Quaker type, and the peace-building function of the peace-corps volunteer. And the best example of this approach is Gandhi's nonviolence satyagraha brigades.⁵⁰

A conclusion about peacekeeping will generally revolve around the question of whether humanitarian (non-violent) third party intervention results in a more effective settlement of violent disputes than does an authoritarian (violent) third party intervention. How can we measure "effectiveness?" It is concluded that we can measure effectiveness in terms of the quality of the conflict outcome (varying from the most positive, compromise, to the least positive, domination), the duration of the conflict intervention (the number of time peacekeepers spent intervening), the permanence of the conflict outcome (how many repeat interventions were necessary), and the casualties of the conflict intervention (the number of

⁵⁰Timothy A. McElwee, "The Role of UN Police" in *Non-violently Countering Terrorism in Nonviolence: An Alternative for Defeating Global Terror*, ed.Senthil Ram and Ralph Summy, (New York: Nova Science Publishers, 193).



deaths and injuries among first, second, third, and fourth parties during the intervention). The results supported that non-violent third party interventions provide a higher quality of outcome and better outcomes in terms of duration and the level of casualties.⁵¹

In short, the non-violent peacekeeping method requires economic and logistical resources. Also, there is a need to raise enough volunteers to achieve a critical mass that would make a difference in preventing or stopping hostilities. The most appropriate task for an international Shanti Sena is interventional peacekeeping, especially peacemaking and peace-building. Moreover, we should continue our efforts to encourage the establishment of local peace brigades and to interest the United Nations in the creation of truly non-violent and unarmed peacekeeping forces.

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⁵¹ Peter Woodrow, "Training for Non-violent Action" in *Protest, Power and Change: An Encyclopedia of Non-violent Action from ACT-UP to Women's Suffrage*, ed. Roger S. Powers and William B. Voegelé, (New York: Routledge, 1997), 529-533.



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