The Political Sociology of International Organisations (IOs) in the Age of Neoliberal Globalisation

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Abstract

The aim of this research is to understand how international organisations (IOs) shape the politico-sociological structure of the nation-states in the age of neoliberal globalisation. IOs have become the most dominant actors of the liberal international order in the post-war era. This article specifically focusses on the Bretton Woods (BW) institutions, namely International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and their impact on the political sociology of the sovereign states. This article argues that the IOs, especially the BW institutions, eventually shape the political sociology of nation-states in two ways. First, it changes the ideological structure of the country, and second it increases the authoritarian tendencies in these countries. To analyse the paradigm, this research studies the Turkish case vis-à-vis its relationship with the IMF since the 1960s. On the ideological side, the BW institutions involvement in the Turkish political economy cause the rise of political Islam since the 1980s. For the authoritarian tendencies, the relationship with BW institutions increased the level of authoritarianism, and as a matter of fact, it even triggered the coup d’etat in 1980.

Keywords: Neoliberal Globalisation, International Organisations, Political Sociology, Bretton Woods.
Neoliberal Küreselleşme Çağında Uluslararası Örgütlерin Politik Sosyolojisi

Öz

Anahtar Kelimeler: Neoliberal Küreselleşme, Uluslararası Örgütlер, Siyaset Sosyolojisi, Bretton Woods.
Introduction

The aim of this research is to understand how international organisations (IOs) shape the politico-sociological structure of the nation-states in the age of neoliberal globalisation. IOs have become the most dominant actors of the liberal international order in the post-war era. This article specifically focusses on the Bretton Woods (BW) institutions, namely International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB), and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and their impact on the political sociology of the sovereign states. This article argues that the IOs, especially the BW institutions, eventually shape the political sociology of nation-states in two ways. First, it changes the ideological structure of the country, and second it increases the authoritarian tendencies in these countries. To analyse the paradigm, this research studies the Turkish case vis-à-vis its relationship with the IMF since the 1960s. On the ideological side, the BW institutions involvement in the Turkish political economy cause the rise of political Islam since the 1980s. For the authoritarian tendencies, the relationship with BW institutions increased the level of authoritarianism, and as a matter of fact, it even encouraged the coup d’état in 1980.

Today, there are approximately 330 international governmental organisations (Pavehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke, 2004) and 37,500 international non-governmental organisations (Rittberger, Zangl, Kruck and Dijkstra, 2019) in the world. Clearly, IOs have become one of the cornerstones of the international order. Though, they do not accept them as sovereign actors of the international system, even the neo-realists highlight the importance of IOs. No need to say, liberals give a great importance to the IOs as they are the crucial point for them in terms of institutionalising and regulating the once anarchical society of the international.

It is fairly safe to argue that, the importance of IOs have increased in the Washington Consensus era and their roles are shaped by globalisation. Many would argue that today, globalisation is stealing the sovereignty of the nation-states in many areas, and IOs are playing the key role in there. However, when we look at the overall literature, it is predominantly focussing on the political relationship between the states and globalisation. However, the political sociology of the impact of the globalisations and/or the IOs on the national sovereign states are widely ignored. This research asks this question: to what extent do the IOs shape the political sociology of the sovereign states?
This research argues that the impact of IOs on the political sociology of the sovereign states is in two-folds. First, it changes the ideological structure, and second it increases the authoritarian tendencies. This article will analyse the relationship between Turkey and the BW institutions from a historical perspective. First a general evaluation is given. Second, it will examine the rise of political Islam as the ideological change. Finally, the article will focus on the authoritarian inclinations.

The Impact of IOs on the Politico-Sociological Structure of the Nation-States

Between 1947 and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the IMF and the World Bank decisions were generally determined by two main criteria. The first one is to provide funding to large-scale projects for the World Bank or policies for the IMF enabling main industrialised countries to increase exports; and the second one is, to refuse to help regimes that are seen as a threat by the United States government and other important shareholders. To exercise this policy these institutions have maintained a general tactic. They were more flexible towards right-wing governments that are faced a strong left opposition than towards left-wing governments that are faced strong opposition from the right (Toussaint, 2004). To intervene in the political economies of the Third World countries (also semi-peripheral countries) the Bretton Woods institutions establish agencies in these countries. These agencies exercise their own rules, but these rules are generally developed on the recommendations of the Bretton Woods institutions. They are usually staffed by the technocrats rooted in these institutions. Finally, above all, these agencies work for creating a stable and trustworthy source for demands of these institutions which are ‘viable loan proposals’ (Toussaint, 2004).

As Aydin asserts the coup d’état of 1980 represents a milestone in the integration of Turkey into the world economy. Within the auspices of the military junta, the IMF and the World Bank began to have a strong influence on the arena of Turkish policy-making. Thereafter the coup d’état, a three-year stand-by agreement was signed by the government that is engaged with the military junta in 1980. This agreement could be assumed as the end of the Turkish national sovereignty on the Turkish policymaking process. The leg-
islative functions of the Turkish Parliament were bypassed with the implementation of the performance criteria for the fiscal and monetary policies and these functions of the Parliament were canalized to the Bretton Woods institutions. The decision-making process was centralised to the government in which these institutions have been embedded (Aydin, 2005, p. 43). The World Bank and the IMF, so-called the Bretton Woods institutions apply a strong influence policy to support its network of loans.

The circumstances of the economy in the late 1970s were in an inconsistent situation. Especially there was a strong influence of the sanctions of the United States. This situation forced Turkish governments before the coup d’état to highlight the advantages of the free market economy as suggested by Bretton Woods institutions. Stabilisation policies that were introduced on 24 January 1980 were established in the light of this situation (Aydin, 2005, p. 44). Within the implementations of Bretton Woods institutions, some identity and urbanisation problems have occurred as well. “This transformation and struggle, among other things then, involves a dialectical interplay between forces and that is relatively cosmopolitan, and others that are more territorially bounded, such as nationalist movements and ideologies, military-security structures, particular linguistic forms and pattern of identity” (Gill, 1991, p. 62).

The Kurdish question cannot be thought without the implementations of the neoliberal paradigm. Although it is an identity issue and the appearing reasons for the problem are the denial of their identities and assimilation of them by the state, there are some more detailed economic reasons underneath. The two main economic activities of the Kurdish people who live in the South-East part of Turkey was smuggling of goods from the Middle East, and the animal husbandry until the early 1980s. The most significant reasons for the smuggling are the unsustainable agriculture and the failure of the state in improving their economic conditions. But, after the trade liberalisation, the demand for smuggled goods rapidly decreased. Animal husbandry was also influenced by the neoliberal transformation. There are two liberalisation-based reasons for this. Firstly, the privatisation of the meat and animal food industries and secondly, freeing of meat imports. For instance, from 1980 to 1997, the sheep population in Turkey decreased from 49 million to 32 million (Cam, 2002, p. 99)
The effects of neoliberal transformation also can be observed in the problems of urbanisation. A huge housing problem has arisen since the early 1980s. The problem has accelerated due to the massive migration from rural regions to the cities. The sectoral shift from agriculture to the industry in the context of neoliberalism can be counted as the main reason for the migration. The flexible administration of the governments to create cheap labour also played a key role in the issue (Cam, 2002, p. 104). “Municipal services to shanty towns and the working-class quarters of the cities have been expanding significantly. Partial property rights are granted to former squatters and municipal restrictions on new buildings are relaxed which lead to dramatic increases in capital gains to certain residents of shanty towns located near city centres. Hence lower wages may lose their significance in a social atmosphere where the wage as such starts to become a secondary element determining the welfare of the family” (Boratav, 1990, p.224).

The proportion of gecekondu (shantytown) dwellers covers more than half of the urban population in 2002. It was almost 25 per cent in 1980. Here, the Turkish term gecekondu was used because of its sui generis features (Cam, 2002, p.104) (Keles, 1993). The impact of the IMF on the political and social structure of Turkey are going to be examined in two sections hereupon as the rise of political Islam and the authoritarian state.

The Ideological Change

The rise of Political Islam in Turkey has become a new phenomenon in the last two decades. Analysing this case with only considering identity issues will be superficial. The historical course of the political economy of Turkey embodies the blueprints of this fact. As Bedirhanoglu and Yalman point out neoliberal transformation processes in different countries have been assumed as “passive revolutions” by several Gramscian studies. Here, passive revolution represents a slow and top-down social transformation with the hands of cooperation of different classes over the political scene in the name of transformism (Bedirhanoglu and Yalman, 2010, p.109) which attempts to assimilate or dissolve the opposition via policies that applied without suppression of organized working-class (Morton, 2007). In some studies, “winning coalitions” has been debated to explain the strategy of the application of the neoliberal transformation (Evans, 1992).
In Gramscian words, the relationship between the state and the civil society in the half-century between the 1920s and 1970s can be thought as one in which the coercive aspect of the rule is more salient as state-building was prioritised. On the other hand, the same relations in the post-1980s period can be understood as an ideological struggle for the hegemony (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p.113). After the coup d’État of 1980, a new ideology has risen which is a synthesis of Ottoman Islam, Turkish popular culture and an emphasis on the dangers of ideological fragmentation. In Gramscian way of thinking, it can be assumed that family, mosque and military barracks have become the privileged institutions as a new historic bloc (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p.113-114).

To transform the economy of Turkey, various specific policies have been applied since the early 1980s. This process covers a transition from a state-dominated and protectionist model to a market-oriented model via liberalisation of trade, privatization of state-oriented enterprises and increasing competitiveness (Atasoy, 2009, p.1). In the post-crisis era, the AKP came into the power and their first declaration was their commitment to the IMF-led economic programme and to sustain the implementation of policies to complete the conditions for joining the EU (Aydin, 2005, p.219). The AKP cooperated with the IMF to cut public spending, control wages, roll back agricultural support, and, privatize enterprises and natural resources. Also, the AKP used a spiritual and religious language to employ its policies and without this spiritualisation, these policies of the neoliberal paradigm cannot be sustained (Tugal, 2009, p.55-56).

The regulations made by the AKP to accomplish EU-oriented democratic reforms which include liberalisation of the economy have been often assumed as the institutionalisation of Islamism in Turkey with a hidden agenda. This institutionalisation refers to a shift from Kemalist state ideology to political Islamism (Atasoy, 2009, p.3). “An Islamic intersection with European framing of neoliberal practices gains meaning within this context among the social forces which utilize a distinct neoliberal imaginary in the social and material relations of reconstituting the Kemalist state” (Atasoy, 2009, p.11). As well as the EU, the IMF played a key role as the mechanism of the international coercion to determine the policy-making process of Turkey. “Empirical research on ‘international coercion’ – defined as the exer-
tion of international pressures for policy imitation among countries – focuses on the role of dominant states and multilateral organizations in affecting policy results” (Atasoy, 2009, p.13).

Here, she suggests that the IMF, the EU, the United States, and the World Bank are not only examples for international coercion. To extract the point, she utilizes a term from works of Slavoj Zizek. In this context, the members of the symbolic class (Zizek, 2000, p.322) play a key role as the agents of international coercion. As she points out, the symbolic class stands for a range of group which involves religious groups, academics, scholars, journalists, and others whose domain of work includes the production of a symbolic universe (Atasoy, 2009, p.13).

A term from Poulantzas, “crystallisation of different class strategies”, could be used here to make a connection with Gramsci’s war of position (Bedirhanoglu and Yalman, 2010). As Mouffe asserts, the power is exercised in the society with a struggle that tries to organize consent for convincing people about a social change model, in Gramsci’s war of position (Mouffe 1979, p.168 - 204). Here, Atasoy gives an example from Turkey. As she demonstrates “…this is played out over the bellicose unitary imagery of Kemalism in a way that connects an Islamic orientation to the politics of neoliberal social transformation” (Atasoy, 2009, p.108). The political Islam as a political project has risen due to the absence of a strong Leftist movement in Turkey. Although one of the reasons for this absence is the antipathy of people to the vulgar Marxism, the role of the military junta is extremely important in this context. This political Islamism covers a strong countermovement against Kemalist developmentalism, Kemalist secularism and the Istanbul-based bourgeoisie which accompanies Kemalist developmentalism. This Kemalist paradigm embodies the authoritarian and homogenized culture of civil-military state bureaucrats (Atasoy, 2009, p.108). There are several reasons for the absence of a strong Leftist movement in Turkey. But, the coup d’état of 1980 can be accepted as the fundamental reason for it. Within the global phenomenon of the paradigm shift towards neoliberalism, Turkish state applied the structural reform of 24 January 1980 in order not to be isolated from the global environment. The military coup accompanied this reform package after almost nine months. Thereafter, the junta had suppressed any fraction of Leftist actions in the following three years.
to create an unopposed environment for the governments that would main-
tain the reform package. Undoubtedly, the international coercion played a
key role in this context. The letter of intent that was given to the IMF by the
government before the coup d’état shows us the dominant classes of Turkey
and the government were the part of this coercion. This agreement between
internal and external dominant powers brings the Gramscian term trans-
formismo to the mind.

To make a comprehensive analysis of the political positioning of Islamic
groups against the power players of the old Kemalist state, the Gramscian
term of ‘war of positions’ should be highlighted. Although they are against
it, the Islamic groups share the same pro-developmental bias with the Ke-
malist State because of not only their ideological structure of Turkish Islam
but also their internationalisation of developmental ideology that obstructs
their attempt to create a ‘cultural hegemony’ in the state. Therefore, this sit-
uation led them to the foundation of their emergence as a ‘neo-bourgeoisie’.
Culturally, this new class is different from the secular one. However, there
is still an absence of power to create hegemony. This creating of hegemony
is crucial for them to maintain a system of social reconstruction managing
via the apparatuses of the state which are coercion and consent. In this con-
text, there are two main bases of the environment of political Islam. First,
the growing Islamic mobilisation via the democratization packages of the
EU negotiations; and the second, reinstitution of the relation between cul-
ture and capital in the context of neoliberalism (Atasoy, 2009b, p.123).
“Through a commitment to the IMF program mixed with a certain dose of
pragmatism and its pro-active approach to Turkey’s relations with the EU,
the JDP (AKP), in office, has contributed to Turkey’s economic recovery and
an intense phase of democratization reforms that were already underway
before the party had assumed power” (Onis, 2006, p.29).

For the first one, it can be claimed that it is not only an implementation
of the EU but also an enforcement of the Bretton Woods institutions, partic-
ularly the IMF. Because, the democratisation process cannot be thought
without the IMF. Therefore, within the democratisation discourse, the Is-
lamic mobilisation in Turkey has been assisted by the IMF. Among the sec-
ond one, there is clear participation of the IMF. The Bretton Woods institu-
tions have implemented a reinstitution process towards the peripheral and
semi-peripheral countries within the neoliberalisation paradigm. According to these processes, the capital structure of countries has been redesigned to realise the passive revolution. This includes the redistribution of the capital. Inside this, the relation between culture and capital has been changed. In Turkey, political Islam has arisen from within this context. A new type of bourgeoisie has risen during the 1990s following this reinstitution of the relation between capital and culture. This new bourgeoisie can be denoted as the authentic bourgeoisie (Laciner, 2007) and the conventional one can be described as comprador bourgeoisie. Because the conventional bourgeoisie of Turkey had arisen from the statist (statist) policies of the young Republic in the pre-1970s period. Therefore, the Istanbul-based bourgeoisie has been statist and secular. The authentic bourgeoisie is based on the Anatolian tigers (this term is used for non-Istanbul-based enterprises) and they embody the authentic features of the Anatolia such as being religious. This competition of the authentic and comprador bourgeoisie also occurs at the institutional platform. TUSIAD is the organisation for the Istanbul-based companies, and MUSIAD (Organisation of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) consists of the Anatolian tigers. It can be assumed that MUSIAD is the result of the bourgeoisiefication of Anatolian employers.

It is better to emphasise the passive revolution here. A passive revolution combines two points. A revolution from above without mass participation and a slow but intense social transformation in which the progressive class finds itself enforced to advance in a more or less surreptitious compromised fashion (van der Pijl, 1997, p.128). The passive revolution of political Islam in Turkey shows both these features. There is no mass and bottom-up participation in this revolution. This revolution is a top-down process and it has a slow but intense social transformation. The rise of the conservativism in Turkey (Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu, 2009) can be thought within this slow and intense social transformation. In this point, the erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-state must be emphasised. As Aydin claims “the conditionalities imposed on less economically developed countries by the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO, acting on behalf of corporate capital, contribute further to the erosion of the sovereignty of the nation-state” (Aydin, 2005, p.207). To clarify the point, the Coxian description of different forms of states should be given. As he points out, to the national economy from the external impacts, the welfare-nationalist state was established. On the
other hand, the reason that the neoliberal state was built is to create a security network in which states seek their economic growth in a stable alliance system as a member of an open world economy (Cox, 1987, p.219). “Cox not only attributes a moderate degree of domestic autonomy or agential power to the state but also grants it a moderate international agential power to shape the international system” (Hobson, 2000, p.133).

The characteristics of the Turkish welfare-nationalist state can be given as secularist and socio-economic developmentalist statism. Tugal assumes the economic developmentalist aspect of the state as a corporatist model of capital accumulation (Tugal, 2009, p.41) “The history of the Turkish nation-state can be seen as a political project to create a citizenry with a moral-intellectual outlook receptive to legal-rational domination (authority) organized based on a nationalist ideology” (Öncü, 2003, p.310). As Yeldan asserts, to facilitate the hegemony of international finance capital, the mechanisms of states had to be transformed (Yeldan, 2006, p.193). Within the neoliberal paradigm, the characteristics of the Turkish state have been transformed as well. Because, the previous model could not respond rapidly to the financial crises due to embedded patronage-led environment of electoral politics (Ayata, 1996). Its secular structure has been at stake due to the rising political Islam and its state-based developmental perception has been diminished because of the privatisation process. On the other hand, due to the failure of previous (especially nationalist Kemalism) populisms, the Islamic type of populism has emerged. Because this failure left the Islamic one as the only untarnished cultural system (Tugal, 2009, p.20).

To sum up, the phenomenon of rising political Islam in Turkey can be traced back to the 1980s. The neoliberal transformation policies which include the privatisation of state-oriented companies, liberalisation of trade, cuts on public spending, controlling wages, deunionised working life and the shift from agriculture to industry, brought a new fact with themselves that is passive revolutions. In Turkey, this fact has occurred within transformism that consists of the authentic bourgeoisie and international powers such as the IMF and the EU. It has been also upheld by the global phenomenon of the state transformation from national to neoliberal. Therefore, a new and strong ideology, political Islam had risen in Turkey. The togetherness of neoliberalist coercion from outside and the authenticity of Islam makes the ideology stronger. Briefly and metaphorically, as the name of
Yildiz Atasoy’s book (Atasoy, 2009), a marriage between Islam and neoliberalism has been observed in the Washington consensus era. Here, the role of the IMF could be the registrar officer who solemnizes the ceremony. Also, this marriage is photographed on the cover of Zulkuf Aydin’s book (Aydin, 2005) with a snapshot from Istanbul that demonstrates the harmony of golden arches, minarets and the Turkish flag.

The Authoritarian Change

The coup d’état of 1980 can be accepted as one of the most authoritarian intervention not only for the working class but also for social life generally. The main state policy during the early 1980s can be given as struggling against the obstacles to the existing capital accumulation strategy, and liberalisation of trade and finance. These policies are supported by the IMF through the period (Cakmakci and Oba, 2007, p.702). As one of the accompaniments of the passive revolution, Caesarism can be observed in Turkey during the neoliberal transformation process. “The military coup of 1980 signified not only a change in the political regime but also a change in the form of the state which maintains itself despite the return to a civilian government within the confines of an authoritarian constitution put into effect by the referendum in 1982” (Yalman, 2009, p.298)

The authoritarian character of the state has been institutionalised with the iron fist of the military junta and continued with the constitution that prepared by them. Throughout the Washington consensus era, the paternalist state authoritarianism of Turkey has remained. “The case of Turkey is an intriguing example to develop an analysis of how the IMF-imposed stabilisation programmes functioned not only as adjustment strategies but also as hegemonic projects for dominant classes to entrench their hegemony in the wake of a crisis within the context of an authoritarian form of the state. The key to the puzzle as to why neoliberalism as a hegemonic discourse has prevailed in the Turkish context necessitates an analysis of the relations between the state and a set of differentiated capitalist interests on the one hand, and the internationalisation of specific policy regimes on the other” (Yalman, 2010). The IMF’s position here can be accepted as an apparatus of international coercion. Through the IMF-led stabilisation programmes, the political structure of Turkey has been influenced as well as its
economic structure. The ambition of dominant classes to apply their hegemonic projects fatefully brought the authoritarian state.

There are many concerns about the authoritarian character of the AKP today (The Economist, 2011; The Guardian, 2011). But, this fact cannot be thought separately from the last three decades. The AKP’s authoritarianism takes its source from the military junta as a heritage. For instance, the constitutional amendment package of 2010 was criticised by Andrew Arato and as he points out the amendments may lead Turkey to a shift from parliamentary to a presidential system (Arato, 2010). Historically thinking, this was one of the tendencies of military junta during the 1980s. Yeldan describes the political transformation of Turkey under the supervision of the IMF within the neoliberal paradigm as a shift “from ‘fiscal’ to ‘democracy’ deficit” (Yeldan, 2009, p.20).

“Democratic institutions are put under siege through endless lists of conditionalities imposed by the IMF and the World Bank. In the meantime, transnational companies and international financial institutions have become the real governors with implicit veto power over any economic and/or political decision that is likely to act against the interests of global capital” (Yeldan, 2009, p.20). It can be assumed that the structure of the elements of international coercion is not democratic as well. “However, while international system, UN Security Council, the IMF and the World Bank are entitled to intervene in national contexts when it comes to human and trade union rights either through military force or economic sanctions, there is no comprehensive suggestion for the democratization of these institutions themselves” (Erdogdu, 2010, p.82). There is a concern about the democratic character of the Bretton Woods institutions. “The IMF tends to be a more enclosed and a less heterogeneous organisation, less open to self-criticism” (Onis and Senses, 2005). These institutions have voting systems that cannot be accepted as democratic. Although their role has expanded, their accountability has been still anti-democratic. On the other hand, these institutions legitimate their duty and the neoliberalism with the discourse of democratisation. Due to the fact that it can be assumed that the IMF force the democratisation, but its structure is not democratic (Woods, 2001, p.88). “When the IMF and the World Bank were created, there was a clear and explicit concern to ensure some equality among members to reinforce the universal and public character of the institutions, as opposed to giving them a structure
which simply reflected relative economic and financial strength in the world economy” (Woods, 2001, p.86).

Here, as the international organisations legitimate their duty and the neoliberalism, it must be highlighted that they make orientations of neoliberalism at the national level (Cox, 1983, p.173). They use the democratisation discourse as a tool to realise this, however, their structure is not democratic. Also, especially in the cold war era, they supported military juntas and dictatorships in Chile, Brazil, Nicaragua, Zaire, and Romania (Toussaint, 2004). The military junta of Turkey in 1980 can be included as well, as it was a dictatorship with its iron fist. As Toussaint points out, “the IMF and the World Bank did not hesitate to support dictatorships when they (and other major capitalist powers) found it opportune” (Toussaint, 2004).

**Conclusion**

This research sought for answers to the question of to what extent the IOs shape the political sociology of the sovereign states? It aimed to understand how IOs, especially BW institutions such as IMF, WB, and TWO shape the politico-sociological structure of the nation-states in the age of neoliberal globalisation. This article argued that the IOs eventually shape the political sociology of nation-states in two ways. First, it changes the ideological structure of the country, and second it increases the authoritarian tendencies in these countries. To analyse the paradigm, this research studied the Turkish case vis-à-vis its relationship with the IMF since the 1960s. On the ideological side, the BW institutions involvement in the Turkish political economy caused the rise of political Islam since the 1980s. For the authoritarian tendencies, the relationship with BW institutions increased the level of authoritarianism, and actually, it even triggered the coup d’état in 1980.

It is plausible to argue that, the prominence of IOs have boosted in the Washington Consensus era and their roles are shaped by globalisation. Many would argue that today, globalisation is appropriating the sovereignty of the nation-states in many areas. IOs’ role in this is undeniable. This research argued that the impact of IOs on the political sociology of the sovereign states is in two-folds. First, it changes the ideological structure, and second it increases the authoritarian tendencies.
Kaynakça / References


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