

Reporting What's Going on at the Neighbors from a Distance: Turkish News Channels' Breaking News Coverage of the 2018 Missile Strikes against Syria

Komşuda Olup Bitene Uzaktan Bakmak: Türkiye'deki Haber Kanallarının 2018 Suriye Bombardımanında Sergiledikleri Son Dakika Haberciliği

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Abstract

The research variables of this study are “Turkish journalists’ role preferences” and “Turkish television channels’ use of sources” during the first eight hours of breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria. The researcher employs content analysis to answer mainly two questions: “Did Turkish journalists perform roles other than “traditional disseminator?” and “Was their reporting balanced insofar as conflicting perspectives were treated equitably?” The study identifies that Turkish journalists preferred the “traditional journalist” role when reporting from Turkey but that of “social commentator” when reporting from abroad. Deviations from traditional journalism consisted of “reporting rumors,” “citing anonymous sources,” and “making personal references.” On the other hand, there was a lack of diversity and balance in the use of sources. For instance, no broadcast journalists reflected the opinions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey, and very few reported from anywhere near the scene of the action. Thus coverage was inadequate insofar as reporters largely focused on one side’s perspective.

Keywords: Turkish News Channels, Breaking News, Sources, Violations of Journalism Conventions, International News

Öz

Bu çalışma, 2018 Suriye Bombardımanı çerçevesinde Türk haber kanallarının ilk sekiz saatte sergiledikleri son dakika haberciliğini, tercih edilen “gazetecilik rolleri” ve kanalların “kaynak kullanımı” açısından irdelemektedir. İçerik analizi yaklaşımının kullanıldığı çalışmada araştırmacı başlıca şu iki

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sorunun yanıtlarını aramaktadır: “Yayıncılar ‘haberi veren/dağıtan geleneksel gazeteci’ rolünün dışına çıkmışlar mıdır?” ve “Karşıt görüşlerin eşit bir biçimde yer aldığı dengeli bir yayın politikası gözetilmiş midir?” Araştırmada Türkiye’den yayın yapan gazetecilerin “geleneksel gazeteci” rolünü tercih ettikleri; ancak yurtdışından yayına bağlanan Türk gazetecilerin ise daha çok “toplumsal yorumcu” rolünü üstlendikleri tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca yayın esnasında “söylenti haber,” “kaynağı belli olmayan haber kullanımı” ve “kişisel imalarda bulunmak” gibi gazetecilik normlarından sapmalar kaydedilmiştir. Öte yandan kaynak kullanımında denge ve çeşitliliğin gözetilmediği saptanmıştır. Örneğin olayın geçtiği yerden yok denecek kadar az yayın yapılmış; Türkiye’de yaşayan Suriyeli mültecilere ise hiç başvurulmamıştır. Yayıncıların olayı tek taraflı bir biçimde sunarak doyurucu bir yayın yapmaktan uzak kaldıkları gözlemlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ulusal Haber Kanalları, Son Dakika Haberleri, Kaynak Kullanımı, Gazetecilik Normlarından Sapmalar, Uluslararası Haber

Introduction

The second week of April 2018 was one of those tense seven days when the world seemed to hold its breath. Turkey, which shares 911 kms of border with neighboring Syria, was abuzz with rumors that “World War III is coming.” That very week Donald Trump first warned Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad and his government’s backers Russia and Iran saying “Big price to pay” and then, two days later, he wrote a Twitter message that missiles “will be coming, nice and new and smart!” (“Big price to pay: Inside Trump’s decision to bomb Syria,” 2018). Many Turkish newspapers published banner headlines proclaiming the approach of a third world war. At last on 14 April at 04:00 Syrian time, the United States together with its allies France and the United Kingdom carried out a series of military strikes involving aircraft and ship-based missiles against targeted sites in Syria. It was rather a shock for those who believed Trump when he had declared, just ten days previously, that he wanted to withdraw US troops from Syria. His sudden “change of tune” was explained as a response to the alleged Douma chemical attack against civilians on 7 April (Calia & Macias, 2018).

As expected, after the strikes the Syrian government denied involvement in the Douma attacks and declared the 14 April operation to be a violation of international law. Supporting Bashar al-Assad was Vladimir Putin, who condemned the US-led military strikes against Syria as an “act of aggression” and said Russia would convene an emergency session of the UN Security Council (“Vladimir Putin calls US-led Syria strikes an ‘act of aggression,’” 2018). Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said “The attack this morning against Syria is a crime” and “The American president, the French president, and the British prime minister are criminals; they will gain nothing from it” (“World reacts to overnight strikes on Syria by US, UK and French forces,” 2018). Beijing voiced concerns that the Western operation had complicated efforts to find a solution to the crisis (Zhou, 2018).

From the United States and its allies came statements explaining how the strikes were justified. For instance, British Prime Minister Theresa May defended herself against accusations of participating in a “legally questionable” action by publishing a summary of the legal advice

given to her government stating that the UK was “permitted under international law” to take measures to “alleviate overwhelming humanitarian suffering” (“Syria air strikes: UK confident strikes were successful says PM,” 2018). French President Emmanuel Macron for his part declared that he had “convinced” Donald Trump to keep troops in Syria and also defended the use of airstrikes in the country (Stevenson, 2018).

Countries like Canada and Israel as well as international organizations like the European Union and NATO approved the operation. Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdoğan on the other hand welcomed the airstrikes on Syria (“World reacts to overnight strikes on Syria by US, UK, and French forces,” 2018). He said that “the Syrian regime has received the message that its massacres won’t be left unanswered” (“Turkey’s Erdoğan welcomes Western attack on Syria, says operation a message to Assad,” 2018). It was reported that Erdoğan had a telephone conversation with British Prime Minister Theresa May just after the strikes (“Erdoğan, Britain’s May discuss Syria air strikes in phone call,” 2018) and he said that he was in contact with Russian President Vladimir Putin and would have talks with the US side the following day (“Erdoğan welcomes Western attack on Syria,” 2018). The only party missing in this diplomacy traffic was the government of Syria, with which Erdoğan had been on strained terms since 2011 (“Türkiye’nin 7 yıllık Suriye politikası,” 2018).

All of Turkey’s news channels announced the strikes against the country’s neighbor with breaking news coverage. One could make a case that Turkish journalists had a leg up in the coverage of this long-anticipated operation as there were by then over 3.5 million Syrian refugees living in Turkey (“Türkiye’de kaç Suriyeli yaşıyor? Kaçı Türk vatandaşı oldu? İşte yanıtı,” 2018). These people escaping what Christopher Phillips called “the greatest humanitarian disaster of the 21st century” (“Syria: Donald Trump’s ‘World War III’ attack on Hillary Clinton is coming back to haunt him,” 2018) still had many connections in Syria and news of the latest developments back home would have been delivered to them instantly. The refugees, especially the better-educated ones, were well aware of their country and its current social, economic and political atmosphere (Yıldırım, İslamoğlu & İyem, 2017). Turkish journalists would therefore have had ready access to knowledgeable sources –the Syrian refugees in Turkey– to help them interpret the details of events. Taking these considerations into account, this article tries to identify the use of sources and the roles that Turkish journalists played in the breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria with content analysis.

As there has been surprisingly very little work done looking into breaking news coverage by Turkish journalists (Yüksel & Yıldırım, 2016; Yurdigül, 2014; Temiztürk, 2012) and knowing that none of these studies have analyzed the roles that journalists played, the author of this paper hopes to contribute to the literature of breaking news. Using some variables of previous breaking-news research (Reynolds & Barnett, 2003a; Reynolds & Barnett, 2003b), the author sought to shed light on the roles that Turkish broadcast journalists assumed considering such questions as “Did they gather and disseminate information as “traditional journalists” or did they speak as “eyewitnesses” or “social commentators”?” “What was reported during live coverage of events and did it qualify as “facts” or “rumors”?”

Moreover and as there is evident disagreement among the parties involved (Syria and its backers vs the United States and its allies), the author developed several questions to identify journalists' use of sources. Mindful of Bob Franklin and Matt Carlson (2011) who wrote "News sources not only provide details about a situation but, more importantly, ascribe meaning to the events of the world," the author tried to determine whether Turkish journalists captured information which their Western colleagues had not. In other words, did Turkish journalists benefit from the Syrian sources to which they had access, or did they just replicate information given by Western media? Or recalling Leon V. Sigal (1986, p.16), did they attempt to balance sources with differing perspectives?

Breaking News Literature

Breaking news has always been an important part of television news culture. Research in many countries shows that television is still a significant source of information, especially during a crisis (Pew Research Center, 2018; Radio Television Supreme Council, 2018). More than 50 years ago Wilbur Schramm (1965) wrote that people approach television for "consolation or emotional support" in times of crisis and he called this process "monitoring crisis through television." Pamela J. Shoemaker (1996) refers to "biological and cultural factors that influence a surveillance function in the consumers' minds (p. 36)." Many studies have also noted that the formats used in breaking news are effective in getting viewers' attention (Tandoc & Johnson, 2016, p. 155; Miller, 2006, p. 520). Renita Coleman and Denis Wu (2010) wrote that negative visual portrayals during breaking news broadcasts activate viewers' emotions and deeper cognitive processing while some studies draw attention to ethical problems when analyzing such negative portrayals. Aslı Yurdigül (2014) for instance analyzed the exaggerated "negative tone" created in four Turkish news channels' breaking news coverage of the Soma coal mine disaster. Dan Berkowitz (2005) analyzed how mythical archetypes become a journalistic tool for reporting news about terrorism. Similarly, Victoria Bemker LaPoe and Amy Reynolds (2016, pp. 3-21) drew attention to "resonance" through storytelling in breaking news coverage. Andrea Miller (2006) reported that viewers claimed that they remembered more from breaking news stories than from traditional ones.

Advances in technology have also dramatically changed the nature of breaking news broadcasting. As veteran broadcaster Bob Schieffer, who covered the John F. Kennedy assassination over half a century earlier, told Reuters, looking back one gets a real sense of the incredible evolution that breaking news coverage has undergone in the decades since then. Schieffer explained what breaking news content was then in these words: "The idea of broadcasting live was born from the scene having an anchor for the coverage and letting the images do the talking when possible" (Herskovitz, 2013). Nowadays correspondents and experts can connect to their home studios from anywhere in the world and contribute immediately to in-depth discussions about breaking news incidents. On-the-spot images and videos captured not just by professional reporters but also by bystanders are frequently shared and rebroadcast by TV channels (Murrell 2017, p. 289; Lorenzo-Dus & Byran, 2011, p. 23; Lipschultz & Hilt, 2012, p. 213; Niekamp, 2010).

Likewise, the numberless opinions, images, and “facts” displayed on social media are frequently used by broadcasters and news organizations while giving breaking news (Wigley & Fontenot, 2009; Yüzer, 2006; Lysak, Cremedas & Wolf, 2012; Vis, 2012; Bulunmaz, 2015).

Allen (quoted in LaPoe & Reynolds, 2013,) wrote that most television organizations form marketing plans that address how they will cover breaking news stories (p. 7). Analyzing Sky News and BBC News 24 in certain weeks of 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007, Justin Lewis and Stephan Cushion (2009, pp. 316-317) demonstrated that breaking news has become an increasingly important part of 24-hour news culture. However, the decision to cover more breaking news stories has impoverished the quality of journalism. Bülent Çaplı and OğuzhanHakan Tuncel (2010) noted the ethical problems that can arise when breaking news stories become the norm and expectation of news organizations.

Several studies have focused on how and why breaking news reporting is different from traditional journalism. For instance, Reynolds’ study done after the Oklahoma City bombing in 1997 showed that “in the absence of the traditional journalistic routine, the strength of ideological influence that journalists exerted at the individual level was greater than in a non-breaking news situation when journalists have time to gather information and adhere to prescribed norms” (Reynolds & Barnett, 2003a, p. 690). Six years later Reynolds and Barnett (2003a) analyzed USA television breaking news coverage after the September 11 attacks. Using Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy (1996) they conducted a content analysis to explore how breaking news functions differently than traditional news by focusing on the ideological, routine, and individual levels. One of the results was that there were violations of journalistic conventions and the role of the journalist transformed in the breaking news coverage of September 11. While broadcasters adopted multiple roles including that of “expert” and “social commentator,” only a small percentage of the time did they report “rumors” or have recourse to “anonymous sources.” Although objectivity is a cornerstone of journalism, the speed with which information must be conveyed when dealing with breaking news may put paid to such detachment. In this particular case, broadcasters kept to the role of “traditional journalist” (Reynolds & Barnett 2003a: 699-700). Reynolds and Barnett (2003a, p. 691) echoing Shoemaker and Reese (1996) asserted that a journalist’s personal and professional backgrounds; education; personal attitudes, values, and beliefs; and professional orientations, role conceptions, and ethics all have an impact on how a story is reported. In another study, Reynolds and Barnett (2003b) qualitatively explored the visual and verbal framing of the first twelve hours of CNN’s breaking news coverage of September 11. Reynolds and Barnett (2003a) pointed out when journalists have limited time to gather information, adherence to traditional journalistic norms becomes difficult.

Another crucial issue in breaking news coverage that needs research is the use of “sources,” particularly when matters of controversy are involved. Whenever there are conflicting perspectives of an incident, as is the case with the 2018 missile strikes against Syria, researchers should focus on the use of sources. As Sigal (1986, p. 16) puts it “Who the reporters talk to tells us a lot about news”. For him news “is not reality, but a sampling of sources’ portrayals of reality” (p.28). Franklin and Carlson (2011) assert that journalists rely on definitions of sources

to define the contours of reality. Rodney Tiffen and her colleagues (2014) on the other hand write that “using multiple sources sometimes means that media are providing checks on what is said, bringing more variety and balance to the views presented (p. 5).”

Similarly, some breaking news articles took “source” as one of their research variables. For instance, Lewis and Cushion (2009), while examining the nature and role of breaking news and its impact on the quality of television news journalism, analyzed the range of sources used in Sky News and BBC News 24. Matthew Bannister (2005), as a journalist in the studio when the event happened, explained how the breaking news coverage of the 7 July 2005 Bombing was conducted in Radio5 Live reflecting “how” and “why” certain sources were used. As an example of much research based on the effects of social media on news, Tandoc and Johnson (2016) demonstrate how Twitter is displacing traditional news sources in the breaking news coverage (p.163). Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Annie Bryan (2011) explore how images captured by ordinary people on their mobile devices were used as sources in the live coverage of the 2005 London Bombings.

This study's main concern is whether Turkish journalists performed a “role other than that of a traditional disseminator” and performed “balanced reporting” by placing conflicting perspectives on an equal footing. Thus the use of “sources” comes into prominence for the study in the sense of “diversity of sources” and “balance of sources”. Based on the literature reviewed above, research was formulated and carried out to find answers to the eleven questions set out below.

Research Questions

The first eight questions provide the framework for the first phase of the author's study. In the first phase Turkish journalists' reporting of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria are analyzed with attention being giving to such variables as “journalistic roles,” “reporting locations,” “reporting characteristics,” and “conflicting perspectives”:

RQ 1: How often did journalists play a role other than that of traditional disseminator?

RQ 2: How often did journalists report from Syria or one or more of its backer countries? What roles did journalists perform while engaging in such reporting?

RQ 3: How often did journalists report from the United States or one or more of its allies? What roles did journalists perform while engaging in such reporting?

RQ 4: Which parties' voices were heard the most?

RQ 5: How often did journalists make personal references using the pronouns “I” or “me”?

RQ 6: How often did journalists report information citing “unconfirmed reports” or “rumors”?

RQ 7: How often did journalists report information citing one or more “anonymous sources”?

RQ 8: Did journalistic conventions vary from one TV channel to another?

The last three questions provide the framework for the second phase of the author's study, which explores how sources are used. The main variables of this part of the research are thus "diversity of sources," and "balancing of sources":

RQ 9: Was there a diversity of sources in the news?

RQ 10: Was there a balance of sources regarding the covering of the conflicting parties' perspectives?

RQ 11: Did the use of sources vary from one TV channel to another?

Method

The present study was designed to be a two-phased investigation of breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria, with content analysis being used as the technique for each phase. The author used a descriptive method to analyze the characteristics of Turkish television channels' breaking news coverage. In other words, the focus is more on the "what" of the research subject rather than its "why." The study's findings, therefore, do not go beyond those of a situation analysis.

Sampling and Data Collection

Eighteen national news channels were broadcasting in Turkey when the 2018 missile strikes against Syria took place. The author had recourse only to the first two hours' broadcasts of sixteen of these channels because two of the channels' transcripts were unobtainable. It was quickly observed that while more "experienced" channels covered the news with crews of reporters connecting to their studios both from abroad and from some locations in Turkey, more recently-established channels hardly ever used any sources at all, preferring instead to run the same archive videos accompanied by a single broadcast journalist repeating the same information over and over again. To make the data-measurement more robust, the author, therefore, decided to choose channels that, at that time, had had at least a decade of broadcasting experience. This criterion narrowed the field to twelve channels: NTV¹ CNN Türk², Ulusal Kanal³, Habertürk TV⁴, TGRT

1 NTV was Turkey's first privately-owned nationwide news channel. Established by the industrialist Cavit Çağlar in 1996, it is now owned by Doğu Media Group.

2 CNN Türk is a nationwide pay-TV news channel. Established in 1999, it is owned by the Turner Broadcasting System Europe and Demirören Group.

3 Ulusal Kanal is a nationwide TV channel. Established in 2000, it is associated with Patriotic Party (please also provide the party's title in English), a leftist opposition political party.

4 Habertürk TV is a nationwide TV channel established in 2001 by Turkish journalist Ufuk Güldemir. It is owned by Ciner Media Group, which acquired it in 2007.

Haber⁵, Halk TV⁶, TVNET⁷, Cem TV⁸, 24 TV⁹, BengüTürk TV¹⁰, Ülke TV¹¹, and TRT Haber¹².

The transcripts of nine of these channels broadcasts were purchased and the first eight hours of programs being aired at the time of President Trump's initial declaration and the reports of missile strikes against Syria at 4 am and ending at 1noon were analyzed. The author was able to include only nine channels' breaking news coverage in her sample because the Media Monitoring Center could not provide the transcripts for either Cem TV or BengüTürk while Ülke TV's broadcasts were incomplete since its records didn't start until three hours after 4 am. Thus the sample for the study consisted of the transcripts of NTV, CNN Türk, Ulusal Kanal, Habertürk TV, TGRT Haber, Halk TV, TVNET, 24 TV, and TRT Haber.

Besides the author, an assistant was employed to carry out the coding procedure. Every time a speaker or source changed in a transcript that was taken as a unit of analysis. In this way, the coders were able to come up with concrete data for evaluation purposes. For this study, speakers were initially identified as "journalists" and "non-journalists." The data collected from non-journalists were left to be analyzed in the second phase of the study. The first phase of the study analyzes the roles which broadcast journalists played during the coverage of strikes while the second phase analyzes the use of television channels' sources.

Coding Procedure

The author used the role categories which were developed by Reynolds and Barnett (2003a) for the breaking news coverage of the September 11 attacks. Broadcast journalists' performances were analyzed according to Reynolds and Barnett's "traditional journalist," "expert," "social commentator," "eyewitnesses" and "other" categories. The term "traditional journalist" in Reynolds and Barnett's (2003a, p. 693) words "describes an anchor or reporter asking an interview question or for journalists who reported objective, factual information in a context devoid of commentary or analysis." In other words, traditional journalists are not "interpreters" or "adversaries" but they fit the category that David Weaver and Cleveland Wilhoit (1986) called "disseminator (p. 190)." The two coders of the study followed this definition as their guide. For this phase of the study, the term "expert" describes journalists who spoke in the capacity of a specialist authority. In other

5 TGRT Haber is a nationwide TV news channel. It was established in 2004 by İhlas Holding.

6 Halk TV is a nationwide TV channel. Established in 2005, it is associated with Republican People's Party (in English?), a center-left opposition political party.

7 TVNET is a nationwide news channel. Established in 2005, it is owned by Albayrak Group, which is alleged to be pro-government.

8 Cem TV is a nationwide news channel founded by İzzettin Doğan in 2005. It is broadly associated with Turkey's Alevi community.

9 24 TV is a nationwide news channel. It was established in 2007 by Ethem Sancak, who has publicly identified himself as a sympathizer of President Tayyip Erdoğan.

10 BengüTürk TV is nationwide news channel established in 2007 by Ahmet Turgut. It has links with Nationalist Movement Party yetçi (in English?), an far-right political party that supports the current government (there is no coalition government, but MHP only supports the government, so it should be rephrased).

11 Ülke TV is nationwide news channel established by New World Media Group in 2006.

12 TRT Haber is a nationwide news channel owned by Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT).

words, the speaker goes beyond the role of a traditional journalist and tries to describe, explain, or clarify something. “Social commentator” is defined as a journalist who offers opinions or points of view about events. “Eyewitness” is defined as a journalist who relates personal stories and/or experiences concerning events. Finally, the “Other” category is a catch-all for speakers that do not fit in any of the others. At this point, it is important to state that all categories were coded as being mutually-exclusive. For instance, a role assumed by a journalist in any given exchange could not simultaneously be that of a traditional journalist and an expert.

As noted already, in the case of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria there is more than one side to the story. And for a balanced, satisfactory reporting, broadcast reporters are expected to present the opposing views of different sides (Sigal, 1986, p. 16). For this purpose, the author developed location categories such as “Reporting from the United States and its allies” and “Reporting from Syria and its backers.” It is assumed that journalists reporting from abroad would reflect the perspectives of the country being reported from. To analyze broadcasts done from Turkey, the author examined the first two hours of each channel and observed that most Turkish journalists gave the perspectives and concerns of the United States and its allies but also reflected the ideas of the Syrian government while many concentrated on the attitudes and actions of the Turkish government in handling the Syrian crisis. The author thus decided to analyze the material according to the following subcategories: “reflecting the perspectives of Syria and its backers,” “reflecting the perspectives of the United States and its allies,” “mentioning the actions of the Turkish government in a positive way,” “mentioning the actions of the Turkish government in a negative way,” “mentioning the actions of the Turkish government in a neutral way,” and “other.”

Next, the researcher investigated whether there are relationships between these “location” and “role” categories. For example, what roles did Turkish journalists give the most preference to when reporting from the United States and its allies, when reporting from Turkey’s provinces along the Syrian border, and/or when reporting while among Syrian exiles in Turkey? Likewise, which parties’ views are expressed the most frequently by reporters? For purposes of this study, the author’s “location” categories were operationally defined as follows: “The United States and its allies” covers all event-related broadcasts done from the United States, France, or the United Kingdom by Turkish journalists; “Syria and its backers” includes all broadcasts by Turkish journalists from Syria or any country that stated their opposition to the attacks within the first eight hours after their occurrence, which is to say Syria, Russia, Iran, and China (“World reacts to overnight strikes on Syria by US, UK, and French forces,” 2018, 14 April).

Apart from examining the role categories and location categories of these Turkish broadcast journalists, attention was also given to the characteristics of reporting. Did journalists report rumors? Did they cite anonymous sources? Did they make personal references? In order to find out the answers to these questions, the author adopted the variables developed by Reynolds and Barnett (2003a) such as reporting “rumors,” “anonymous sources,” and use of pronouns such as “I” and “me.” Such variables are subcategories that determine the degree of deviation from the “Traditional journalist” role category. The coders marked the “rumors” category if the word

“rumor” or the phrase “unconfirmed report” occurred. Similarly, the “anonymous sources” category was marked if the phrase “anonymous source” was used. Finally, the coders counted any use of the first-person singular pronouns “I” and “me” as an instance of commentary.

The second phase of the study focused on news channels' use of sources. In matters of controversy, as is the case of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria, broadcast journalists are expected to balance sources with conflicting perspectives. In other words, at this point, it is important to determine whether all parties' perspectives and concerns are duly reflected in broadcasts. For this purpose, first of all, an appropriate source categorization has to be chosen. Research shows that much of the academic literature on news sources emerged in the late 1970s (Franklin & Carlson, 2011). Until then, many researchers analyzed or wrote in terms of source categories such as “knowns-unknowns,” “authoritative-potential,” “affiliated-not affiliated,” “elites-nonelites,” “elite-civil society-citizen” etc. (Gans, 1980; Sigal, 1986; Brown, Bybee, Wearden & Straughan, 1987; Grabe, Zhou & Barnett, 1999; Miller & Kurpius, 2010; Kleemans, Schaaps & Hermans, 2015). For instance, Herbert J. Gans (1980) used the “unknowns” category for ordinary people like victims, protestors, strikers, voters, and low-level public officials such as police, etc. (p. 13). Gans (p. 9) also defined “knowns” as a “combination of people. Some are assumed by journalists to be familiar names among the audience; others have appeared frequently in the news and are therefore well known to the journalists. Some are not necessarily known by name but occupy well-known positions, like the governor of a large state or the mayor of a troubled city”. Sigal (1986, p. 18) in “Sources Make the News” focuses on “authoritative sources”: “With the rise of the beat system authoritativeness came to be identified with the ability to exercise authority in important political and social institutions”. He (1986) initially included presidents, governors, heads of corporations and private bodies, and those who speak on their behalf in this category and later he added celebrities. He wrote that generally “reporters choose authoritative sources over other potential sources” (Sigal, 1986, p.19). What he meant by “potential sources” are any group of people “wishing to disseminate information to the press, and through it, to other audiences” (p.18).

Jane D. Brown *et al* (1987) in their study “Invisible Power: Newspaper News Sources and the Limits of Diversity” categorized news sources either as being “affiliated” or “not affiliated” with an institution. Non-affiliates are those who spoke simply as individuals while affiliated sources are those who were executives, spokespersons and employees of the US government, state governments, local governments, and foreign governments as well as affiliated US citizens and foreign nationals (pp. 48-50). Maria E. Grabe *et al* (1999) also used the “affiliated” and “unaffiliated” source categories for their research on network news magazines. Miller and Kurpius (2010) in their study “A Citizen's-Eye View of Television News Source Credibility” used the “elites” and “non-elites” categories for sources. They took representatives of organizations, businesses, and governments as elites and people who are unaffiliated (in other words, who speak only for themselves) as non-elites (p. 141). In “Citizen Sources in the News: Above and Beyond the Vox Pop?” Mariska Kleemans and her colleagues (2015), grouped their sources as “elite”, “civil society” and “citizen”. They operationally defined “elite” sources as government agencies,

politicians, media, or journalists; “civil society” sources as public organizations, interest groups, clubs, or unions; and finally, “citizen” sources as ordinary people who appeared in the news without representing an institutional organization at the macro or meso level”. Their study, which analyzed two and a half decades of Dutch Public Service Broadcaster’s (NOS) and RTL Nieuws news bulletins, showed that though the elite sources were still the primary definers in news, citizen sources are becoming increasingly more prominent at the expense of elite sources.

Following the source categories of Kleemans and her colleagues (2015), the author created a separate “citizen” category in order clearly to sort out the perspectives and concerns of different parties. Included in this category are the ordinary people of Syria, Turkey, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France whose countries were involved in the 2018 missile strikes either as the strikers, the stricken, or a neighbor. Another category is the “elite” category, which the author uses to classify statements by experts, academicians, politicians, retired bureaucrats, foreign journalists, etc. Representatives of public organizations, advisory and commercial diplomacy firms and research firms are grouped in the “civil society” category.

To determine whether different parties’ perspectives and concerns were expressed by sources, the author examined the first two hours of each channel’s transcripts and observed that some sources reflected the perspectives of the Syrian government and some the perspectives of the United States and its allies while, just as in the case of journalists, many focused on the attitudes and actions of the Turkish government. The researcher, therefore, created similar subcategories for sources: “reflecting the perspectives of Syria and its backers,” “reflecting the perspectives of the United States and its allies,” “mentioning the actions of the Turkish government in a positive way,” “mentioning the actions of the Turkish government in a negative way,” “mentioning the actions of the Turkish government in a neutral way,” and “other.” In both phases of the study, there were no overlapping categories and the two coders completed the coding process of the entire sample independently of one another.

Reliability and Data Analysis

Krippendorff’s alphas were calculated for two coders. For the first phase of the study, overall codings for roles was $\alpha = 0.74$, reporting rumors was $\alpha = 0.95$, anonymous sources was $\alpha = 0.93$, and making personal references $\alpha = 0.91$. The reliability score for perspectives of journalists reporting from Turkey was $\alpha = 0.96$. For the second phase of the study overall coding for the perspectives in elite discourses was $\alpha = 0.87$. And overall coding for the perspectives in civil society discourses was $\alpha = 0.78$. Data analysis was conducted using IBM SPSS Statistics 22.0. Findings were evaluated through the chi-square test with the p value being taken as less than 0.05. For some chi-square analysis, certain categories (Eyewitness, Other, TG Negative, and Halk TV) were coded as missing categories as the number of cells expected are less than 5 is more than 20 % of the cells.

Findings

The two coders separately examined a total of 2,033 speaker changes. From these, each of them identified that 1,489 instances were those of “Turkish journalists.” Next, they analyzed the Turkish journalists’ breaking news coverage according to the first eight questions referred to in “Methods” above. The first research question asked how often the journalists performed a role other than that of the traditional journalist. To answer it, speaker roles were analyzed and it was found that Turkish journalists acted as experts (n: 389) 26.4% of the time, and as social commentators (n: 317) 21.5% of the time. They spent more than half of their time (n: 765, 52%) in the role of the traditional journalist. The eyewitness role was so rarely preferred (n: 6) that it has been coded as a missing category (Table1).

Table 1: Roles According to the TV channels

TV Channels	Roles			Total
	Traditional journalist	Expert	Social commentator	
CNN Türk	100 50.8%	54 27.4%	43 21.8%	197 100.0%
Halk TV	75 65.2%	30 26.1%	10 8.7%	115 100.0%
Habertürk TV	89 46.1%	63 32.6%	41 21.2%	193 100.0%
24 TV	111 42.0%	83 31.4%	70 26.5%	264 100.0%
NTV	107 48.6%	59 26.8%	54 24.5%	220 100.0%
TGRT Haber	56 98.2%	0 0.0%	1 1.8%	57 100.0%
TRT Haber	88 53.3%	52 31.5%	25 15.2%	165 100.0%
TVNET	72 54.1%	38 28.6%	23 17.3%	133 100.0%
Ulusal Kanal	67 52.8%	10 7.9%	50 39.4%	127 100.0%
Total	765 52.0%	389 26.4%	317 21.5%	1471 100.0%

$\chi^2=119.293$, d.f.=16, *p<0.01

“Eyewitness”(n:6) and “other”(n:12) were coded as missing categories as the number of cells expected are less than 5 is more than 20 % of the cells.

The second research question asked how often journalists reported from Syria and its backer countries: Turkish journalists reported only 2 % of their time from Syria and its backer countries. The second half of the question examined the roles that journalists performed while reporting from “Syria and its backer countries.” While they were reporting from these countries, the

reporters acted as social commentators (n: 15) 50 % of the time, as traditional journalists (n: 11) 36.7% of the time, and as experts (n: 4) 13.3% of the time (Table 2).

Table 2: Roles According to Location of Broadcasting

Turkish journalists	Location			Total
	Turkey	USA& allies	Syria & backers	
Traditional journalist	700 55.2%	54 31.4%	11 36.7%	765 52.0%
Expert	346 27.3%	39 22.7%	4 13.3%	389 26.4%
Social commentator	223 17.6%	79 45.9%	15 50.0%	317 21.5%
Total	1269 100.0%	172 100.0%	30 100.0%	1471 100.0%

$\chi^2=89.058$, d.f.=4, * $p<0.01$

"Eyewitness"(n:6) and "other"(n:12) were coded as missing categories as the number of cells expected are less than 5 is more than 20 % of the cells.

The third research question asked how often journalists reported from the United States and its allies: Turkish journalists reported 11.7% of the time from the United States and its allies. This rate was more than five times that of their reporting from Syria and its backer countries. The second half of the question examined the roles that journalists performed while reporting from the United States and its allies: Turkish journalists acted as social commentators (n: 79) 45.9% of the time, as traditional journalists (n: 54) 31.4% of the time, and as experts (n: 39) 22.7% of the time while reporting from the United States and its allies (Table 2).

The fourth research question was which parties' voices were heard the most frequently in broadcasts. While reporting from outside Turkey, Turkish journalists devoted (n: 172) 85% of the time to the United States and its allies' views and only (n: 30) 14.9% of the time to Syria and its backer countries' views (Table 2). While reporting from Turkey, Turkish reporters devoted (n: 484) 38.2% of their time to the United States and its allies' perspectives and only (n: 201) 15.9% of the time to Syria and its backer countries' perspectives (Table 3).

Table 3. Perspectives in Turkish Journalists' Broadcasts while Reporting from Turkey

Turkish journalists reporting from Turkey	Perspectives					Total
	USA & allies	Syria & backers	TG Pos.	TG Neut.	Other	
CNN Türk	71 46.7%	17 11.2%	6 3.9%	14 9.2%	44 28.9%	152 100.0%
Halk TV	25 21.7%	55 47.8%	0 0.0%	15 13.0%	20 17.4%	115 100.0%
Habertürk TV	64	16	32	18	49	179

	35.8%	8.9%	17.9%	10.1%	27.4%	100.0%
24 TV	109 46.6%	0 0.0%	37 15.8%	41 17.5%	47 20.1%	234 100.0%
NTV	70 35.4%	35 17.7%	12 6.1%	10 5.1%	71 35.9%	198 100.0%
TGRT Haber	29 53.7%	15 27.8%	6 11.1%	2 3.7%	2 3.7%	54 100.0%
TRT Haber	45 34.1%	5 3.8%	29 22.0%	4 3.0%	49 37.1%	132 100.0%
TVNET	71 55.9%	4 3.1%	15 11.8%	22 17.3%	15 11.8%	127 100.0%
Ulusal Kanal	0 0.0%	54 70.1%	4 5.2%	9 11.7%	10 13.0%	77 100.0%
Total	484 38.2%	201 15.9%	141 11.1%	135 10.6%	307 24.2%	1268 100.0%

$\chi^2=484.742$, d.f.=32, * $p<0.01$

"TG Negative" (n:11) was coded as a missing category as the number of cells expected are less than 5 is more than 20 % of the cells

The data showed significant variation among television channels in terms of the perspectives of Turkish journalists reporting from Turkey ($p<0.01$). Journalists of TVNET and TGRT Haber were more likely to give the United States and its allies' perspectives while the journalists of Halk TV gave the United States and its allies' perspectives at the lowest level and this perspective was ignored by Ulusal Kanal journalists. Syria and its backers' perspectives were mostly given by Ulusal Kanal journalists while the journalists of TVNET gave Syria and its backers' perspectives at the lowest level and this perspective was ignored by 24 TV journalists (Table 3). Another finding was that some journalists of TGRT Haber, TVNET, 24 TV, Habertürk TV, and the public broadcaster TRT Haber used words approving the Turkish government's handling of the Syrian crisis in ways that were inappropriate for breaking news coverage.

The fifth, sixth, and seventh research questions asked respectively how often Turkish journalists made personal references, gave information about unconfirmed reports or rumors, and reported information from "anonymous sources." Turkish journalists used "personal references" in (n: 196) 13.2% of their speaking turns, referred to "rumors" in (n: 57) 3.8% of their speaking turns and cited "anonymous sources" in (n: 164) 11% of their speaking turns (Table 4).

Table 4: Rumors, Anonymous Sources, Personal References According to TV channel

TV Channels	Reported rumors	Did not report rumors	Reported anonymous sources	Did not report anonymous sources	Made personal references	Did not make personal references
CNN Türk	4 2.0%	193 98.0%	10 5.1%	187 94.9%	49 24.9%	148 75.1%
Halk TV	10	110	20	100	15	105

	8.3%	91.7%	16.7%	83.3%	12.5%	87.5%
Habertürk	6	187	4	189	31	162
TV	3.1%	96.9%	2.1%	97.9%	16.1%	83.9%
24 TV	4	260	13	251	39	225
	1.5%	98.5%	4.9%	95.1%	14.8%	85.2%
NTV	13	207	24	196	17	203
	5.9%	94.1%	10.9%	89.1%	7.7%	92.3%
TGRT Haber	0	57	17	40	3	54
	0.0%	100.0%	29.8%	70.2%	5.3%	94.7%
TRT Haber	11	154	24	141	20	145
	6.7%	93.3%	14.5%	85.5%	12.1%	87.9%
TVNET	0	137	26	111	16	121
	0.0%	100.0%	19.0%	81.0%	11.7%	88.3%
Ulusal Kanal	9	127	26	110	6	130
	6.6%	93.4%	19.1%	80.9%	4.4%	95.6%
Total	57	1432	164	1325	196	1293
	3.8%	96.2%	11.0%	89.0%	13.2%	86.8%

$$\chi^2=29.248, \text{ d.f.}=8, p<0.01 \quad \chi^2=77.390, \text{ d.f.}=8, p<0.01 \quad \chi^2=44.029, \text{ d.f.}=8, p<0.01$$

The eighth research question examines whether journalistic conventions varied from one news organization to another. The data showed significant differences among television channels in terms of reporting rumors ($p<0.01$). Halk TV was more likely to report rumors and it was followed by TRT Haber and Ulusal Kanal. The data showed significant disparities among television channels in terms of citing anonymous sources ($p<0.01$). TGRT Haber was more likely to cite anonymous sources and it was followed by Ulusal Kanal and TVNET. The data showed significant differences among television channels in terms of making personal references ($p<0.01$). CNN Türk journalists were more likely to make personal references and they were followed by Habertürk and 24 TV journalists (Table 4).

The second phase of the study concentrated on “the use of sources” while covering breaking news. The author and the coder identified the utterances of academicians, retired bureaucrats, politicians, citizens, experts, and foreign journalists, etc. in the transcripts and each of them came up with 544 speaker turns during which sources were mentioned. The last three research questions also helped the researcher to organize her findings about the use of sources. For instance, the ninth research question asked whether there is a diversity of sources in breaking news. In other words whether “citizen,” “elite” and “civil society” category members created a diversity of sources on the screen. The study shows that Turkish journalists favored elite sources ($n: 444, 81.6\%$) over civil society ($n: 80, 14.7\%$) and citizen sources ($n: 20, 3.7\%$). All the channels used elite sources albeit in different ratios. For instance, Habertürk TV, 24 TV, TRT Haber, and NTV channels used no other source than elite sources. CNN Türk, Halk TV, TVNET, and Ulusal Kanal referred to elite sources at lower rates respectively. Among the channels that used civil society sources, TVNET came first followed by Halk TV, CNN Türk, and Ulusal Kanal. Habertürk TV, 24 TV, NTV, and TRT Haber did not use any civil society sources. The only channel that used citizens

as a source was Ulusal Kanal. It would therefore be difficult to say that there was a diversity of sources in the breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria. Moreover, the data showed significant differences among the television channels in terms of the use of sources ($p < 0.01$) (Table 5).

Table 5. Use of Sources According to News Channels

Turkish TV channels	Source categories			Total
	Elite	Civil society	Citizens	
CNN Türk	48 68.6%	22 31.4%	0 0.0%	70 100.0%
Habertürk TV	40 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	40 100.0%
24 TV	78 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	78 100.0%
NTV	72 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	72 100.0%
TRT Haber	100 100.0%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	100 100.0%
TVNET	38 57.6%	28 42.4%	0 0.0%	66 100.0%
Ulusal Kanal	56 56.0%	24 24.0%	20 20.0%	100 100.0%
Halk TV	12 66.7%	6 33.3%	0 0.0%	18 100.0%
Total	444 81.6%	80 14.7%	20 3.7%	544 100.0%

$\chi^2=216.035$, d.f.=14, * $p < 0.01$

The tenth research question asked whether the channels balanced sources with conflicting perspectives. In other words, the author analyzed whether both sides' conflicting perspectives were presented in a balanced way. The data showed significant differences among television channels in terms of the perspectives in elite discourses ($p < 0.01$). The perspectives and concerns of the United States and its allies were given the most by the elite sources of Habertürk. The elite sources of Ulusal Kanal preferred to give the perspectives and concerns of the Syrian government and its backer countries. The elite sources of NTV ignored the Syrian government's perspectives entirely. Thus, having analyzed the statements of experts, academicians, politicians, retired bureaucrats, foreign journalists, etc., the author found that conflicting perspectives were not reported on an equal footing. Some elite sources of 24 TV, TRT Haber, and NTV used words approving the Turkish government's handling of the Syrian crisis in ways that were inappropriate for breaking news coverage (Table 6).

Table 6. Perspectives in Elite Discourses According to TV Channel

TV Channels	Perspectives				Total
	US & allies	Syria & backers	TG Pos.	Other	
CNN Türk	10 22.2%	5 11.1%	3 6.7%	27 60.0%	45 100.0%
Habertürk TV	20 50.0%	10 25.0%	0 0.0%	10 25.0%	40 100.0%
24 TV	18 23.1%	5 6.4%	30 38.5%	25 32.1%	78 100.0%
NTV	22 30.6%	0 0.0%	13 18.1%	37 51.4%	72 100.0%
TRT Haber	10 10.0%	15 15.0%	20 20.0%	55 55.0%	100 100.0%
TVNET	10 30.3%	15 45.5%	0 0.0%	8 24.2%	33 100.0%
Ulusal Kanal	0 0.0%	35 85.4%	5 12.2%	1 2.4%	41 100.0%
Total	90 22.0%	85 20.8%	71 17.4%	163 39.9%	409 100.0%

$\chi^2=221.194$, d.f.=18, *p<0.01

“TG Negative”(n:23) and “Halk TV”(n:12) were coded as missing categories as the number of cells expected are less than 5 is more than 20 % of the cells.

When we look at the dispersion of the perspectives in civil society discourses it was observed that concerns of the United States and its allies were not given by the civil society sources of Ulusal Kanal or Halk TV. Similarly, the perspectives and concerns of the Syrian government and its backers were not given by the civil society sources of CNN Türk or TVNET. Thus, having analyzed the statements of the representatives of public organizations, advisory and commercial diplomacy firms, and research firms, etc., the author found that conflicting perspectives were not reported on an equal footing. In the case of many channels (TGRT Haber, Habertürk TV, 24 TV, NTV, and TRT Haber), journalists had no recourse whatsoever to civil society representatives (Table 7).

Table 7. Dispersion of the Perspectives in Civil Society Discourses According to TV Channel

TV Channels	Perspectives					Total
	US & allies	Syria & backers	TG Pos.	TG Neut.	Other	
CNN Türk	13 59.1%	0 0.0%	5 22.7%	2 9.1%	2 9.1%	22 100.0%
TVNet	23 82.1%	0 0.0%	5 17.9%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	28 100.0%
Ulusal Kanal	0 0.0%	20 83.3%	4 16.7%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	24 100.0%
Halk TV	0 0.0%	4 66.7%	0 0.0%	0 0.0%	2 33.3%	6 100.0%

Total	36 45.0%	24 30.0%	14 17.5%	2 2.5%	4 5.0%	80 100.0%
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As for the “citizens” category, no channel other than Ulusal Kanal used citizens as its source and even that consisted of just three and a half minutes of broadcast time during which Syrian citizens appeared and only 20 speaker changes were identified. The last question examines whether the use of sources varies by the news organization. The data showed significant differences among the television channels in terms of diversity of sources and balancing sources with conflicting perspectives (Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7).

Discussion and Conclusion

Similar to the findings of the study conducted by Reynolds and Barnett (2003a), Turkish journalists mostly preferred the role of “traditional journalist” during the breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria, which is to say that we observed anchors and broadcast journalists asking questions and reporting objective, factual information in a context devoid of commentary. We also observed them serving as “experts” as they tried to describe, explain, or clarify contexts.

Faced with the social media messages of viewers who were thirsty for information and competing with other channels, Turkish broadcast journalists were undergoing a grueling test. The journalists sometimes did not identify their sources or they referred to “anonymous sources.” While Turkish journalists tended to prefer personal references, they also reported rumors with the result that eventually they were obliged to issue retractions. However one must bear in mind that these were instances of the earliest coverage. As Reynolds and Barnett (2003a) ascertained in the case of the breaking news coverage of the September 11 attacks, Turkish journalists in 2018 were performing roles other than that of a traditional journalist, exactly as their American counterparts had done in 1999. Moreover, this example shows that even if the event is a long-anticipated one examples of violations of traditional journalistic conventions may still be witnessed during live coverage. Another interesting finding of the present study is that when reporting from abroad, Turkish journalists behaved largely as “social commentators,” which is to say that they acted not just as disseminators but also offered their takes on events; indeed in most cases, they also spoke at some length.

One robust finding of this study is that Turkish journalists’ coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria was inadequate insofar as while this was an international incident involving many countries but with essentially only two conflicting perspectives, Turkish journalists preferred to focus on just one side’s perspective instead of presenting both sides’ perspectives equally. This reminds us of Sigal (1986), who said that the press “in amplifying some voices and muting others, in distorting some messages and letting others come through loud and clear, affects the nature of the opposition and hence of governance.” We cannot claim that Turkish broadcast journalists did this deliberately because our research was not designed to detect such a thing; however, as a situation analysis, this study does reveal that the Turkish broadcast journalists of five of the

channels under consideration amplified the perspective of the West (in other words that of the United States and its allies), while those of the remaining two channels (which are essentially opposition-party channels) amplified the Syrian government's and its backers' views.

Thus all the channels explained the attacks from the point of view of the side that they preferred. For example, the journalists and anchors of CNN Türk, NTV, TRT Haber, 24 TV, and TVNET showed which missiles destroyed which targets on maps while Ulusal Kanal used maps to show how Syrian forces rendered missiles ineffective; the anchormen and reporters of TGRT Haber for their part frequently referred to al-Assad as a “baby killer” and “murderer of millions of innocent people.”

The same thing can be seen in the use of sources. For example, the sources referred to by CNN Türk, NTV, TRT Haber, Habertürk, 24 TV, and TVNET presented the US and its allies' perspectives for the most part whereas, on Ulusal Kanal and Halk TV, only sources presenting the perspectives of the Syrian government were given airtime. On this basis, it would be impossible to assert that there was any conflicting-perspective balance in Turkish TV channels' breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria. There was also a lack of diversity in the use of sources, with a near-complete absence of citizen sources, the sole exception being Ulusal Kanal, which referred to Syrian citizens gathered in Damascus clamoring their support for al-Assad and declaring that the United States, the UK, and France would never succeed in their plans. Even more tellingly, no Turkish broadcast journalists reflected the opinions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey and—even though this was a long-anticipated operation and Syria shares a border with Turkey—very few reporters broadcast from anywhere near the scene of the action. Thus it would be hard to say that Turkish journalists captured information which their Western colleagues did not.

Contrary to Shoemaker and Reese's findings (1996, p. 180) that journalists for the most part favored organizational sources over individual ones in breaking news coverage, this study finds that Turkish journalists favored elite sources over organizational sources in the breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria. Shoemaker and Reese explained journalists' preference for organizational sources by noting that organizations maintain regular office hours and employ full-time personnel, which makes it easy for journalists to access information, whereas individuals often lack sufficient time to be consulted as sources. However, Shoemaker and Reese also left the door open, saying that the “nature of a news event” may also affect whether individual or organizational sources are used. During the breaking news coverage of the 2018 missile strikes against Syria, it was observed that every Turkish news channel had its lineup of experts, academicians, politicians, retired bureaucrats, and foreign journalists whom they regularly consulted. It was also to be observed that some of these sources appeared on the screens of channels with similar standings. At this point, it would not be wrong to surmise that the non-organizational source preference of Turkish broadcasters was largely dependent on the “nature of the news event,” which in this case was a long-anticipated operation and that it is most likely that every channel had prepared their sources beforehand. On the other hand, and consistent with the

findings of Charles Whitney et al. (1989), women rarely (only 2% of the time) appeared as news sources.

Recalling Lorenzo-Dus and Bryan (2011), an eyewitness-captured image was presented by one of the television channels late into the coverage. Contrary to Suzanne Lysak and her colleagues (Lysak et al., 2012, p. 187), none of the anchors used social media as a means of engaging with news consumers; however, the present study was limited to the first eight hours of coverage by design and it is quite possible that such interactions between journalists and social media users did take place later.

Future Research

There is more work to be done in this area of research because breaking news is still the most important type of news in this digital age of journalism. Especially in the case of Turkish breaking news journalism, studies involving Turkish journalists should be conducted, not least because existing research shows that Turkish journalists must contend not just with the same time constraints that all journalists do when reporting breaking news but also with the dual pressure of "media concentration" and highly "politicized media organizations" in Turkey (Bulunmaz, 2011; Çaplı & Taş, 2018; Gül, 2011). Indeed, methods and techniques such as surveys designed for Turkish journalists and focus-group studies involving anchors and journalists could shed much valuable light on the problems that breaking news coverage entails.

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