

# A Dialectical Social Framework for the Analysis of Media Communication\*

Medya İletişiminin Çözümlemesi için Bir Diyalektik Toplumsal Çerçeve

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## Abstract

This article proposes a dialectical theoretical framework for the analysis of media and media communication. The study begins with the determination that a genuine theoretical analysis of media and communication must take into account certain constitutive relations and processes within the social whole, since communication is not part of a single social structure or a distinctive structure within a social system. The article tries to formulate and analyze these relationships and processes in the form of dialectical tensions and patterns created by simultaneous, twin and overlapping dialectic relationships and processes of individualization-socialization and classification-massization. In doing so, the article reinterprets the forms of old and new media and of communication and highlights blogs as they reveal a true communicative media potential; the article also discusses concepts such as “free labor”, which is also used by those who approach communication and media issues from political economy, and proposes new concepts such as virtual class and virtual petty bourgeoisie.

**Keywords:** Dialectics, Dialectical Tensions, Massification, Classification, Socialization, Individualization, Communicative Media, Blogs, Public Sphere

## Öz

Bu makale medya ve medya iletişimi çözümlemesi için diyalektik bir teorik çerçeve önermektedir. Çalışma, iletişimin tek bir toplumsal yapının parçası ya da toplumsal sistem içinde ayırt edici bir yapı olmaması nedeniyle, medya ve iletişimin özgün bir kuramsal çözümlemesinin, toplumsal bütünlük içindeki belirli kurucu ilişkileri ve süreçleri dikkate alması gerektiğini saptamasıyla başlamaktadır.

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Makale, bu ilişkileri ve süreçleri, eşzamanlı, ikiz ve örtüşen diyalektik bireyselleşme-sosyalleşme ve sınıfsallaşma-kitleselleşme ilişki ve süreçlerinin yarattığı diyalektik gerilimler ve modeller biçiminde formüle etmeye ve çözümlenmeye çalışmaktadır. Bunu yaparken, makale, eski ve yeni medya ve iletişim biçimlerini yeniden yorumlamaktadır ve gerçek bir iletişimsel medya potansiyelini ortaya çıkardığı için blogları vurgulamaktadır; makale ayrıca, iletişim ve medya konularına ekonomi politik çerçevede yaklaşanlar tarafından da kullanılan “ücretsiz emek” gibi kavramları da ele almakta, sanal sınıf ve sanal küçük burjuvazi gibi yeni kavramlar da önermektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Diyalektik, Diyalektik Gerilim, Kitleselleşme, Sınıfsallaşma, Toplumsallaşma, Bireyselleşme, İletişimsel Medya, Blog, Kamusal Alan

### **Media and Communication: A Conceptual-Methodological Introduction**

Bennet (1982) argues that a theory of media is based on the social theory chosen. This definition actually implies that a distinctive theory in this area is impossible but can be only an extension of a social theory. However, it is correct in a sense that communication in general is not a distinctive structure of the general social system, but constitutive aspect of all structures.

The idea that a distinctive theory of media and communication is impossible is also seen in Althusser (1970) who sees media and communications as a part of the Ideological State Apparatuses, listed as “the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.)”. However, as stated above, communication as a constitutive element of all spheres of (capitalist) social relations cannot be seen only as a part of a structure like economy, politics or ideology.

If so, since communication as a constitutive element of all spheres of social relations can be seen neither as a part of a structure, nor as a distinctive structure within the general social system, a theoretical analysis of media and communication should consider certain constitutive relations and processes within a social whole which can be formulated as simultaneous, twin and overlapping *dialectical relations and processes: individualization-socialization and classification-massification*. In this article, I employ a dialectical method and logic through which media and communication are analysed by applying to these *relations and processes* as *dialectical tensions and patterns*.

Before proceeding, here some essential information on dialectical methodology and dialectically oriented research must be provided in the context of social sciences in general and communication studies in particular.

**Part and whole:** For a dialectically oriented research, the relation between parts and whole should be established. Hegel followed Leibniz who used “the analytic concept of classes or parts (monads) but had maintained that each part expressed the whole” (Ball, 1979, p. 787). This epistemological definition suggests that the parts (classes) inform us about the whole. Hegel clarifies the relation between parts and whole by seeing that “parts are abstractions from a concrete whole of related expressions and that various aspects should not be understood as effects of some specific causes but as expressions of the same empirical whole” (Ball, 1979, p. 787). If so, poles in a dialectical relation should be seen as abstract expressions of the empirical and concrete whole.

For the relation of the part to the whole, Hegel's connections between human consciousness and nature, and human consciousness and society, are highly useful and can be read for our individual connections to the social contexts we live in. "Hegel's view" on these connections are as follows:

"consciousness has an affinity for the natural world precisely because it is a part of it, having emerged as another aspect of the evolutionary process. Society is understandable because it has been produced by the very beings which seek to understand it"<sup>1</sup> (Ball, 1979, p. 791).

In the context of "interpersonal communication", Baxter and Scharp (2016) also suggest that for a dialectical research, the concept of "totality" (the concept "whole" above) implies interdependence. For example, the subject of "avoidance" cannot be studied without a study of "its interplay with disclosure". Dialectical perspective suggests that "avoidance" is not necessarily "the absence of disclosure". These two phenomena should be evaluated to "determine how avoidance and disclosure function interdependently" (p. 2).

**Change:** Baxter and Scharp (2016) suggest that "an assumption of *change*" is the other necessary concept for the dialectical analysis (p. 2). They state that scholars who use "relational dialectics" see that "change is more often a potentiality than an actuality". It is because "some discourses are so dominant as to foreclose anything other than a reproduction of the existing social order". The reproduction of existing meanings "can constrain the emergence of new, creative" ones (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 2). We see that change will not necessarily happen. Ball (1979) also refers to "Hegelian distinction between manifest and latent levels of reality". This distinction should be seen in its relation to "antithetical forces which represent latent *potentials* which may alter the system". A change occurs since "every empirical system is likely to be composed of internal contradictions which will build up the potential for" it (p. 794). It should be added to "internal contradictions" "the possibility of contradictions between the properties of a system and those of the suprasystem in which it is embedded"<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, an alternative chosen may also contradict another that was rejected (Ball, 1979, p. 794). Here, we are provided with different forms of contradictions: "internal", "between different levels of systems" and "between different choices". Ball (1979) also refers to a process which Marxist generally will understand as examples of "unequal development". For example, he states the following:

"Schneider cites the historical irony that industrial latecomers have advantages over more established competitors; Weber's recognition that the ambiguity of common law makes a more progressive instrument than the strictly codified Roman Law; and Service's Law of Evolutionary Potential as a fascinating recognition of the confounding dialectical paradox that 'success leads to failure' (p. 795).

The world of media and communication often faces such ironies. For example, many societies where telephone communication is not yet fully developed have satellite and internet

1 Ball continues: "This view, too, is essentially sociological; the apparently mystical *Geist* is what we have called the spirit or style of a time or place. For Hegel, consciousness is developed only through human interaction within a sociohistorical context" (Ball, 1979, p. 791).

2 They state, "as is sometimes done in studies of regional socioeconomic change" (Ball, 1979, p. 794).

infrastructure. Many people who could not obtain home phone before can communicate with a smart phone today.

**Process:** The other aspect of dialectics is its emphasis on process. Ball (1979) suggested that dialectics should start “with a processual conception of reality a consisting of relationships” (p. 788). Here we are said that reality is a process composed of relationships. No need to say, this is a process of a dialectical relation, that is, reality itself. If so, we need to define dialectically established relations for a dialectically oriented research.

**Stages:** Dialectics also puts emphasis on the different levels of development. A new level is grounded upon earlier stages. However, “emergent stages cannot be reduced to lower levels, for each emergent level operates in accordance with its own principles of organization, its own modes of expression” (Ball, 1979, p. 791).

**Dialectical Patterns and Tensions:** In this methodological introduction, I should point to relatively the most formalist aspect of dialectical approach. It is the discovery of “dialectical patterns” (Ball, 1979, p. 792). For example, against linear form of development, “systems outside controlled laboratory conditions or spatially isolated, ‘timeless’ societies” follow “a dialectical logic of *multilinear discontinuity*”. Accomplishment of “essentially the same end in the face of varying environmental conditions” is called as “the process of equifinality” (Ball, 1979, p. 792). It is sure that dialectically thinking researchers can suggest many other dialectical patterns for their subject matters. It is already stated that “Although dialectical tensions are usually studied as a system consisting of two incompatible elements, more recent dialectical research considers more complex dialectical systems in which more than two elements are at play” (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 1). Throughout this article, I also take into account more than “two incompatible elements” to see “more complex dialectical systems” as exemplified by twin and overlapping processes: individualization-socialization and classification-massification.

Ball’s “dialectical patterns” are based on the “dialectical tensions”, which are considered by Baxter and Scharp in their article “Dialectical Tensions in Relationships” (2016) in the context of interpersonal relationships and communication and, which correspond to each of my overlapping dialectical processes.

Baxter and Scharp (2016) suggest that there are two conceptions of “dialectical tensions”. One sees “dialectical tensions as conditions, needs, or goals that pre-exist outside of and are independent of communication”. Communication is considered as “a response to contradiction in order to manage it”. An example is the analysis of “the dialectical tension between disclosure and privacy” (p. 1). The other is “relational dialectics theory” which sees “dialectical tensions as competing systems of meaning (discourses) that are constituted in and through communication” (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, pp. 1-2). Here, tensions are “not independent from it, and that the communication process can be understood as the process of interplay between competing systems of meaning (or discourses) out of which meanings are wrought”. In this concept of dialectical tension, contradictions are not simply managed through communication, but “the very act of communication is understood as a contradictory process of meaning-making” (Baxter

and Scharp, 2016, p. 2). I think that in a relational approach, it is assumed that communication system itself becomes another party along with the other parties who communicate. And all parties can change their respective positions against themselves and the others.

The two conceptions are combined in “dialectically oriented research”. Baxter and Scharp (2016) give an example: that people “often refer to their needs, wants, and goals” in their speech is meaningful only within “a discourse of individualism in which persons are viewed as autonomous agents”. However, if somebody says that “I want more time together but I also want time to myself”, his fellow figures out this conversation within a “discourse of community” in its relation to “a discourse of individualism”. At the surface we see “needs, want, and goals”, but “the underlying discourses of individualism and community” are seen to fight each other (p. 2). Here it should be noted that Baxter and Scharp deals with “interpersonal communication”. In this article, I suggest that with or without individual’s self-expressions like them, individuals necessarily live two twin and overlapping dialectical processes: *individualization* and *socialization* and mainly through the dynamics of the latter, *classification* and *massification* processes.

Baxter and Scharp (2016) observes that “Early research on dialectical tensions” focused on “overarching contradictions that generalized across relationships and communication events” (p. 2). It was “an exercise in typology development”<sup>3</sup> (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 2). These typology researches suggested “big three” tensions as follows; “*integration*”, “*expression*” and “*stability*”<sup>4</sup>. Other tensions are “a dialectic of *otherness*”, “a dialectic of *normative evaluation*” and “a dialectic of *rationality*”<sup>5</sup> (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 3). It should be seen that Baxter and Scharp’s exemplary tensions are compatible with their focus on “interpersonal communication”. The problematic here is to establish the necessary conceptual framework for the analysis of media communication according to basic dialectical tensions. For this, it tries to clarify the relationship between individual-society-class and mass in relation to the issue of media communication.

Baxter and Scharp (2016) notes that a critical dialectical research should be aware of the fact that “the dialectical elements/discourses of a contradiction are not equal in their power” and that this power is related with “conditions, needs, goals, or discourses” that interact with each other (p. 4). It is clear that individuals are not equal and their social context is already based on, and produces inequalities.

3 They also warn about that for future, the researchers should be aware of that identification of “dialectical tensions”, which is “only the first step in a dialectically oriented study”, should be followed by “the second step of understanding the play of opposites” (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 4). My article can be seen between these “early” stage and of her more advanced stages.

4 The tensions within these contradictions are determined as follows: “integration” (“variously referenced in the literature as autonomy–connection, integration–separation, dependence–independence, private–public”), “expression”, (“variously referenced as openness–closedness, revelation–concealment, disclosure–privacy, expressiveness–protectiveness, judgment–acceptance”), “stability”. (“variously referenced as stability–change, predictability–novelty, certainty–uncertainty, given–new, old–new, among others”) (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 3).

5 These tensions are detailed as follows: “a dialectic of otherness” (“referenced in the literature as similarity–difference, sameness–difference; self–other”); “a dialectic of normative evaluation” (“ideal–real, conventionality–uniqueness”); “a dialectic of rationality” (“affection–instrumentality, romance–rationality”) (Baxter and Scharp, 2016, p. 3).

***Two Overlapping Dialectical Processes as Patterns and Tensions:*** It is seen that for a media and communication study, various dialectical tensions, to say contradictions, can be suggested. The tensions, suggested by Baxter and Scharp (2016) above, may fit well the study of interpersonal relations and hence, communications. At the social level, main, inclusive and comprehensive tensions can be, this article suggests, established as individual-social, class-mass and as cross-relations between these poles.

A possible question about how and why I choose the poles of the overlapping dialectical processes can be answered, at least by considering the *dialectical logic*, some of its components briefly described above, as follows:

Individuals have class connections that can be objectively defined and form the basis for the development of different forms of class consciousness. However, individuals also form a mass with a unity logic against the division of classes. In reality, the mass is a product of the process of massification and does not eliminate all formal differences, including class differences between individuals, but transforms these differences into simple and visible and usually two or three macro-level segments in the political, economic and ideological sphere. In the process of massification, there is the possibility of new differences emerging, provided that they remain within large parts. My argument here is that mass is the opposite of class because the dynamics of massification work against class divisions. This relationship can be logically said as follows. While the process of classification creates, stimulates, and increases differences and thus causes divisions, the mass moves and unites in the opposite direction and neutralizes differences.

In the logical framework of this article, individualization cannot be understood without socialization just as massification cannot be seen without classification. These twin processes belong to a whole which is called bourgeois capitalist society. In addition, “latent potential” is seen as the possibility of a real and genuine communicative media which can follow the logic of blogs and blogging *among others*. However, we need to be cautious about what happens to contradictory relations and as stated, we must have to “allow for various dialectical processes which mediate between potentials and empirical actualizations”. The question of what kind of syntheses will emerge within these dialectical relations is “an *empirical problem*” (Ball, 1979, p. 796).

This emphasis is important for my analysis of the blogs (see below) which seem to be a new version of the critical intellectual media of the rising bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century. Nevertheless, blogs are part of new, digital, and in many cases, “social” media and there is no rising bourgeoisie as in the past. In making comparisons and observing similarities, according to the dialectic logic, attention should be paid to levels of development and context.

In this article, as stated before, I propose to examine two overlapping dialectical processes as individualization-socialization and classification-massification<sup>6</sup>. However, besides these reasons that can be also constructed at the logical level, I have also other justifications to choose those tensions.

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6 I should also point out that I have not yet named the patterns made up of these dialectical tensions. Perhaps it could be called a “pattern of social communicative tensions”.

First, they are both comprehensive and inclusive to understand social relations and allow dialectical conceptualization. Media communications, in their old and new forms, are full of those kinds of dialectical tensions, and out of which potentials for future communicative media can also be revealed. Second, individual occupies a core position for liberal conception of society while classes are so for socialist theory. In addition, for conservatism, another theoretical line for the analysis of modern society, it is the community, which corresponds to the theoretical statuses of society and class in liberalism and socialism in turn. The concept of mass is highly amorphous and may imply an aggregate, body or block of individuals, communities or classes.

The theoretical and also practical connection between individual and society is seen in the fact that capitalist society has its own form of sociality by which it structurally tends to produce petty-bourgeois individuals. And the connection between mass and class can be revealed in the fact that mass as the aggregate of all ruled classes tend to be formed around the notion of petty bourgeoisie, which is called middle class in sociological theories. Capitalist society as an open society, which means that class positions are not fixed, is based on free individual with private (small for many) property as its constituent unit. It is sure that under capitalism some can be capitalist and many have to be wage-labourer. However, stability and the ideological legitimacy of this form of society need high proportion of petty-bourgeois mass as a buffer zone between poor workers and the rich capitalists.

Therefore, media and media communication under capitalist modernity or post-modernity, like capitalist society as a whole, first produce its individual and its form of sociality based on it; second, it turns these individuals into a mass opposed to classes. While its individual tends to be a petty-bourgeois, its mass follows the same logic to become the aggregate of those petty-bourgeoisies. However, it should be noted that the petty-bourgeoisie is a massive, populous class which has its own various economic, social and ideological stratum, extending from many white-colour workers to the intellectual and bureaucratic sections in society, from small business to the student and housewives.

Media and media communication as a sphere of socialization process apart from family and school and friendship groups have their specificities. First, they address to all classes and entire society and thus assume and tend to produce a homogeneity as regards individuals and classes and thus create a mass out of them and this homogenisation and massification tend to produce more petty-bourgeoisie.

### **Individualization versus Socialization**

Raymond Williams (1985) stated that in the nineteenth century, a new distinction appeared: individuality and individualism (p. 164). He observed that there emerged a “distance from the early sense of active fellowship”, which is related with “social” and the term “social” was used “to contrast an idea of society as mutual co-operation with an experience of society (the social system) as individual competition” (p. 294).



Social did not mean “society as mutual co-operation”, but was used against “an experience of society (the social system) as individual competition”. In socialist theoretical context, social was dialectically put against the bourgeois individualism, whose typical characteristic is competition. Hence, individualization acquires some negative connotations besides its positive conception, which refers to the formation of individuality, individual autonomy and the realization of self.

Adolf and Deicke (2015) suggest that individualization “denotes a historical process that results in increased individual freedom; decisions and actions are increasingly a matter of personal choice and obligation”. The authors also state that individualization is a side of the process of social cohesion and integration and does not imply only “disintegration” of previous social forms. Following Ulrich Beck, they say that this process consists of three stages: First individuals are separated from traditional forms of relations; second, they feel this as an insecurity, and third, they are reintegrated into a new social system.

Regarding our concern here, individuality and sociality, new integration form takes place in “digital networks”, which creates a “networked individuality” and “network sociality”. The latter, as can be surely assumed for the former, is “a technological sociality” so far as it is located in technology of communication and transportation. In addition, Eugenia Roussou (2015) reminds by referring to Vermeer that Durkheimian conception of socialization as “the transmission and internalization of societal norms” is not valid anymore. The process cannot be seen “only in terms of internalization of and adaptation to societal structures” on the part of the individuals.

Roussou (2015) suggests, again by referring to Vermeer that socialization process is seen in relation to “pluralism” and “individualization”. Individuals do not passively adapt to socialization process. As suggested by Adolf and Deicke (2015), if the “emerging mode of social integration may accordingly be termed networked individuality”, we can suggest that media are a socialization space and as Genner and Süß (2016) state, they are “a powerful agent of socialization, responsible for shaping an individual’s socialization process”. They also put emphasis on the interaction between individual and socialization process: “individuals interact with the system of values, norms, and beliefs differently and may even retroact on specific agents of socialization”.

Genner and Süß (2016), mentioning other agents of socialization process, for example, family, school, peer groups, suggest that “it is essential to consider how other agents of socialization interact with the media” for an understanding of the media as a socialization agent.

Here I should state that a theory of media and communication cannot be developed if it is assumed that media socialization can be understood in its relation to other forms of socialization. I suggest that main pillars for the development of such a theory, we need to see the relation between socialization – individualization and mass formation – class formation. Otherwise, such a theory necessarily disappears in the general social theory.

Media’s bourgeois individual side historically starts with the rise of the bourgeois public sphere and reaches its zenith, I think so, with the rise of “social media” of the recent decades. Jürgen Habermas in his “The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)” (Habermas, Lennox, and



Lennox, 1974) gives an explanation of the development of the bourgeois public sphere, therein we see first the emergence of bourgeois individual (“the sphere of private individuals”) with the rise of bourgeois society and its corresponding public sphere in which the most educated and critical sections create critical and intellectual bourgeois media against the state authorities. The debate took place differently in England where the bourgeoisie attacked “the very principle on which the existing power is based” and put forward “the principle of supervision—that very principle which demands that proceedings be made public (Publizitat)” (Habermas et al., 1974). These media communications belong to the rising, revolutionary bourgeoisie who forms its public sphere through which it criticises and attacks the old regime. Habermas et al. (1974) says that “(t)his type of journalism can be observed above all during periods of revolution when newspapers of the smallest political groups and organizations spring up, for instance in Paris in 1789”. Between this first form of individualism, as described by Habermas and the individualism embedded in today’s social media, we will deal with the other main form of social configuration, which is more or less, a simultaneous rise of the classes and the mass below.

It is a fact that *individualism* is one of the characteristics of today’s *social* media. This aspect is widely observed and criticised as well. For example, in Christian Fuchs’ collection of the critiques of the social media optimism (2017), we are given a highly negative interpretation of the social media regarding the blogs: “Blogging is mainly a self-centred, nihilistic, cynical activity ... Social media ‘is predicated on the cultural logic of celebrity, according to which the highest value is given to mediation, visibility, and attention’”. It is sure that in this criticism, socialization side of the process is ignored. The question of which blogs and bloggers are not considered and socialization is unnecessarily opposed to “self”. It is suggested that: “There is, however, also the potential to redesign social media away from ... the self towards a collective ‘we’ – logic, in which individuals encounter each other as partners, friends based on a logic of the commons, community and co-operation” (pp. 35-36).

Social media’s “social” aspects need more theoretical analysis. By “social” it is seemingly and paradoxically meant that “isolated” but dispersed individual users form an electronic network without having a centre and hierarchy and share ideas and data and circulate private ideas and information. As Fuch observes, the terms “social media” and “web 2.0” refers to “World Wide Web (WWW)”, which are related with the new Internet economy that developed as a reaction to 2000’s “dot-com” crisis. Referring to Tim O’Reilly and Battelle, Fuchs (2017) stated that web 2.0 implied that “users, as a collective intelligence, co-create the value of platforms like Google, Amazon, Wikipedia or Craigslist in a ‘community of connected users’ “ (pp. 34-35). This is, of course, the capitalist investment side of the social media’s beginning.

At the outset and at the surface, it seems a perfect democratic medium and communication space for an individual. However, this formal equality and freedom of the users disappear once the nodal points are established. Existence of the nodal points mean that new media too is not immune from the centralization, control and concentration dynamics of capitalist market as well as current community relations in which the users live. They articulate dominant forms of social relations.

It is sure that the so-called “social” media provide opportunities for the *socialization* of all kinds. For example, in politics, which means public decision-making process in general, theoretically all users can participate. At least potentially, political space can involve more than participation to develop a direct democracy. Only in this condition, media and communication become the same and then there can emerge a social and communicative media. However, by its nature, communication and organization through “social” media are contingent, accidental, short-termed and generally reactionary. On the base of the old “media politics”, for two decades politicians have also exploited “social media” for their political campaigns to obtain temporary feedback from the voters. In addition to this electronic media politics, it is argued that political upheavals<sup>7</sup> are also organized through social media.

### **Class Formation versus Mass Formation**

To reach a rich theoretical understanding of media and media communication, the dialectical process of socialization – individualization should be seen with the process of mass formation – class formation.

Classes and class relations are massified with and after the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This process occurs through the formation and proliferation of the worker and petty-bourgeois class positions as the capitalist social system produce more wage-worker on one side and the petty-bourgeoisie on the other side. Both are structural results and necessities while the latter is also needed both for the legitimacy of the basic values of the system such as individual liberty, private property and for the stability of the system whose main structure are based on the two main classes.

Massification and classification are two necessary and opposite sides of the development of capitalist society. At these opposite extremes, society moves and swings between mass society and class society. In the nineteenth century, especially after the industrial revolution, we see a crystallization of classes and class politics, which was observed by Marx and Engels saying in *Manifesto of The Communist Party* that “the epoch of the bourgeoisie” “simplified class antagonisms” (1848). Unsurprisingly and simultaneously mass society and its other aspects such as mass politics, mass media and mass political parties developed. The emergence of mass in all kinds is a *contra* development against the crystallization of class relations.

Modern media and communication reproduce the concepts of modern society and politics. By this, it also necessarily reproduces their contradictions. The terms “social”, “mass”, “people” and “public”, which imply collectivity, commonality or totality of private individual relations are meaningful only as dualities (to say antagonisms or antinomies) in a dialectical framework. Social is put against individual, and mass and people against elite, public against private. As those dichotomies are clearly given by modernity, mass media are actually “elite” media, that is, the media used and controlled by an elite, the professional community of media, which itself

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7 Political organization capacity of the social media is frequently exemplified in the protest movements such as Egypt in Arab Uprisings or the Occupy Wall Street. However, this does not mean that without social media those protest movements could not have been organized.

is employed and controlled by the media capital. To rename it, these media are predominantly professionally operated bourgeois media. Their elitist character comes from the petty-bourgeois characteristics of its professional community that is attached to the capitalists, politicians and bureaucrats through their working contracts, relations and ideologies. Media have their own petty-bourgeoisie, which is a massive class located between the dominant class and the labouring classes and in many cases, as a structural tendency, becomes a part of the ruling class. Because of its structurally *mediating* and hence intermediary position, it looks towards both upper and lower sections of society. This double position makes it a defender of mass, public and democracy whereas it still remains a part of the ruling class.

Structural class characteristics of the media are also clear in its “entrepreneurial” or political creation. The big national or international media need big businessmen or the state. Even the small and local media are financed by the small capitalists or the local elite. It is a fact that history of media is full of examples of the left-wing, democratic, investigative journalism. However, they should be seen only as a part of democracy. This form of journalism locates itself in democratic struggle demanding transparency in the administration of state, public policy decision and implementation process and the political activities. This democratic journalism revives the democratic ideals which were put forward by the rising bourgeoisie against the old regimes before (See Habermas, et.al., 1974 above).

A contradictory unity is seen in the media’s mass and class characteristics. For this reason, opposition within media always exists just as opposition in politics, economy and cultural life exists. Corporate media, in mass or “social” form, can tolerate opposition in a liberal democratic fashion as long as the opposition plays a democratic role.

The need for mass, elite media, appeared in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, when the socialization process of production and politics went further. The enlargement of market was accompanied by the extension of political rights, which would subsequently require social and economic rights. Political parties acquired mass character against class parties that divided social mass into conflicting classes. It is not surprising that the rise of class politics and struggle was accompanied with the rise of popular mass politics. Hence, the interest of the ruling class was towards the formation of mass and mass organizations against the dominated classes, their organizations, their ideologies and ideologues. Massification process in all kinds acts against class formation, to say classification process and historically reaches its climax in the 1960s’ Keynesian *social democratic* welfare state and society which was based on class compromise and thus on the rejection of class struggle. This form of state and society is actually the highest point of massification process against classification dynamics and also shows a perfect crystallization of mass media and communication.

Baudrillard’s media theory and his provocative theses on the relation of the social and society to the development of mass society and mass media fits this stage of development well. As stated by Douglas Kellner<sup>8</sup> (1989), Baudrillard observes that “the media intensify massification by producing mass audiences and homogenized ideas and experience” (p. 69).

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8 In this section of the paper, I will draw upon Kellner (1989), the author of an important reference book on Baudrillard

For Baudrillard, the mass media and television prevent “response” and “isolate” and “privatize” individuals and “trap” them in simulacra (Kellner, 1989, pp. 70-71). In the era of this new media communication, new media society, for Baudrillard, Kellner (1989) says, we see the development of a new “subjectivity” which loses its “interiority”, “meaning”, “privacy”, that all are replaced by the “era of obscenity, fascination, vertigo, instantaneity, transparency and overexposure”. It is postmodernity (p. 72).

In this new era, postmodernity, society becomes cybernetic and main social functions are “total control” and “total organization”. In this perception, Baudrillard’s “masses” or “silent majorities” are passive consumers of “commodities, television, sports, politics, information” to the extent that “traditional politics and class struggle become obsolete”. Due to simulacra and simulation that fulfill main social functions, the concepts of social theory lose their meanings and all related modern dichotomies dissolve into the world of “simulacra” which is “controlled by ‘simulation’ models and codes” (Kellner, 1989, p. 77). Simulacra, as “reproductions of objects and events”, now frame the social life in theory and practice. In history, the signs began to increase. Actually, the world and everything, was re-created. Simulacra are not only “signs” but refers to “social relations and social power” (Kellner, 1989, p. 78).

Simulations mean total control over individual choices and actions (Kellner, 1989, p. 80). On the part of the individuals there are “choices” but “the options” are “pre-determined and pre-coded” (Kellner, 1989, pp. 80-81). From public opinion polls to elections, fashions and media are included to “a system of binary regulation”, which is “stabilised by two political parties, two opposing classes, two hostile superpowers, two (or more) choices at every moment” (Kellner, 1989, p. 81). As Kellner (1989) states, in such a system of total control, there is no way-out. An opposition or external threat are functional for the system (p. 82).

One of the most oft-cited idea in Baudrillard’s social theory is the idea of “the end of the social”. The argument is based on his 1978 study “In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities” where it is argued that “previous theories of the social” together with those of “class, social relations, socialism” lose their meanings in “the society of simulations”. As long as they are attributed a capability of “social action”, old theories of “politics, the social, class conflict, social change” are outdated (Kellner, 1989, p. 84). Under “hyperconformity”, the masses are interested only in “spectacle” (Kellner, 1989, pp. 84-85).

Kellner (1989) states that Baudrillard suggests that “ ‘the social’-with its all resonances of human interaction, communication, civility and the rest – has imploded into ‘the masses’ “. Baudrillard saw this indifference as a behaviour “ ‘absorbing and annihilating culture, knowledge, power, the social’ “. He quotes from Baudrillard saying that “ ‘indifference of the masses is their true, their only practice, ... there is no ideal of them to imagine, ... the brute fact of a collective retaliation and of a refusal to participate in the recommended ideals, however enlightened’ ”. It is this indifference of the masses which ends “the era of ‘the social’”. “The energy of the social”

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as well as a leading media culture theorist, to avoid out-of-context and fragmentary quotations from Baudrillard’s complex theoretical work, thereby saving time and space.

terminated (“reversed”). The social has no longer any “specificity”, “historical quality” or “ideality”. The “political” evaporates and “the social itself no longer has any name”. The masses exist, but “*their representation is no longer possible*”. “They don’t express themselves, they are surveyed. They don’t reflect upon themselves, they are tested” (Kellner, 1989, p. 85).

However, as Kellner (1989) observes that Baudrillard also sees in this condition of the mass “a form of resistance”, which threatens the system and thus requires a sort of “participation, response and activity”. As a result, “the system is desperately driven to try to produce ‘the social’” (p. 86).

How do the masses acquire such an apathetic character? Kellner (1989) suggests that behind this seems to be “the proliferation of information and media”. His following quotations from Baudrillard explains this argument; “information produces even more mass”; “information neutralises even further the ‘social field’ “; And “the final” result” is “ ‘an atomised, nuclearised, molecularised masses’ “. Baudrillard sees this atomization as “ ‘the result of two centuries of accelerated socialization and which brings it irremediably to an end’ “ (p. 86).

The media and information destroy the social and then the mass *reabsorbs* it. Thus, the social as a universal discursive rationale does not indicate or refer to anything. It has no utility and when it is mentioned, “ ‘it conceals that it is only abstraction and residue, or even simply an *effect* of the social, a simulation and an illusion’ “ (Kellner, 1989, p. 87).

Kellner (1989) states that in Baudrillard not only many dichotomic relations such as between “ ‘capital and labour’ “; “ ‘politics and entertainment’ “; “ ‘high and low culture’ “ imploded, but “society overall is imploding into masses, and thus lost its power over them”. Behaviours of the mass reflects an extreme form of “ ‘conformity’ “, which is “ ‘the extreme form of non-participation’ “ (p. 88). Here, I suggest that the term “implosion” does not mean “ending”, and can be understood as “losing significance”.

In Baudrillard we see that “the social” loses its significance and is absorbed into, by the mass. This change is historically related with the development of mass society that replaced the previous forms of bourgeois society and its public sphere and individual. In Habermas’ article *The Public Sphere* (Habermas et al., 1974), this bourgeois society, which is based on bourgeois individual, encounters the emergence of the modern mass society which contains new modern classes. The formation of class relations in a crystallized way and a massification are simultaneous dialectical processes. This social dialectic reflects itself into media and communication too. Habermas’ presentation shows this dialectic well (Habermas et al., 1974). He stated that transformation of the critical and intellectual bourgeois media simultaneously began in England, France and the US in the 1830s. This is the period for the emergence of the mass media. The transition was from “a journalism of conviction to one of commerce”, and similarly, “from the literary journalism of private individual to the public services of the mass media”. The change was mainly caused by the fact that “the public sphere was transformed by the influx of private interests, which received special prominence in the mass media”. That Habermas et al. (1974) used the clause “public services of the mass media” seems that he is not so sensitive for the class characteristics of social system he dealt with. However, he explained that the form of the liberal model began

to change in England with the Chartism and February Revolution in France. The public also included other classes besides bourgeoisie thanks to “the diffusion of press and propaganda”. His presentation has a serious drawback: He uses the terms “bourgeois public sphere” and “public sphere” interchangeably.

Habermas’ model (Habermas et al., 1974) in *The Public Sphere* is based on the division between state and (civil) society and the “principle of public information”, which is required for the democratic control of state. Public opinion which emerges in this sphere presupposes “a reasoning public”. The public sphere is actually the context of the public opinion: From “reasoning” it can be understood that for public to have an opinion, it must be composed of the private individuals who are capable of rational and political thinking. In addition, access to this sphere must be available for “all citizens”. In Habermas, we have private individual citizens forming public opinion and public bodies with full political rights. In this model and for it to operate efficiently, there is no place for class politics. Moreover, even those private individuals, Habermas et al. (1974) suggests, should ignore their “private affairs” (like business or profession) or bureaucratic issues. It is surprising that both Habermas’ public sphere (Habermas et al., 1974) and Baudrillard’s postmodernity (see above Kellner, 1989) pose a contra argument against my dialectical processes of massification-classification. The former seems to say that there should not be any class in a genuine public sphere and the latter says that class had already lost its significance.

Regarding media-communication debate, Tiziana Terranova (2004) refers to “one of Jean Baudrillard’s most unsettling propositions (at least for his critics), that the masses do not need or want a ‘political-intellectual class’ (including activists and critics) to teach them how to avoid manipulation by the media or to coalesce behind another consensus” (p. 135). Moreover, she recalls that, for him, “the media do not manipulate the masses, but it is the masses who ‘envelop the media’ because they are themselves already a medium” (Terranova, 2004, pp. 135-136). She adds to this Baudrillard’s oft-cited term “spectacularization”. It is valid for both communication and politics and is “not imposed on the masses, but demanded by the formation of a mass”. More striking observation on Baudrillard is that “masses are not specific social classes, but more of a generalized dynamics”. This mass is also different from that of the industrial revolution and “a kind of terminal mass – atomized and dispersed at the end of communication receivers, deprived of its revolutionary power in a kind of entropic dispersion” (Terranova, 2004, p. 136).

Above we stated that mass is somehow the reverse of class and a process of massification takes place against *and* in the ground of, classification process. Baudrillard’s understanding of mass is highly useful for our thesis. Terminal mass actually refers to a process of dissolution of mass into new social and political relations and positions. Terranova (2004) sees the problem as being “that of imaging a ‘political without the social’ “ and argues that if the masses are considered as “a nonsociological category, a category that does not possess any social qualifications such as class or gender or ethnicity or even a geographical place”, in other words, “a political entity with no social foundations”, it “appears as an inertial force and a zone of implosion of social energies” (p. 137).

The ideas that the masses are stronger than media and do not need any intellectual class against media manipulation and that masses prefer “the seductive power of the spectacle” are based on the observation that the masses lost connection with “social”, but still potentially remain “political”, paradoxically in the sense of “as an inertial force and a zone of implosion of social energies”. It is a huge, immense amount of silent energy. But we wonder whether the mass, people, the ruled classes have been so throughout history.

Actually, what we see is a transformation of economic class *conflict* (which requires action) into a higher level of class *contradiction* (which does not necessarily lead into action). This is the development of class conflict into a higher potential conflict between the rulers and the ruled. The latter implies a mass while the former always requires the elite in general. Mass can be understood as the ruled classes in general, whose size have continuously increased under capitalism and probably for this reason, it is seen as “a zone of implosion of social energies”.

The ideas of “political without social”, and mass without social class connection can be understood in the context of a need for a new political consciousness and organization so that capitalist economy and society can be changed first within and through politics. This consciousness requires the rearrangement of the relation between dissident intellectuals and the ruled classes, which were turned into a mass and this rearrangement needs the re-conceptualization of the notion “consciousness from without” under the new media and communication conditions. The usage and users of the Internet, new and social media and communications play a decisive role here. Terranova (2004) stated that: “Any judgement on the political potential of the Internet, then, is tied not only to its much-vaunted capacity to allow decentralized access to information, but also to the question of who uses the Internet and how” (p. 81).

### **Class identity of the corporate media’s users**

However, the issue of the users’ characteristics and their usage of the Net are erroneously transferred to the question of what their class positions are. Terranova (2004) stated that:

“The question of who uses the Internet is both necessary and yet misleading. It is necessary because we have to ask who is participating in the digital economy before we can pass a judgement on the latter. It is misleading because it implies that all we need to know is how to locate the knowledge workers within a ‘class’, and knowing which class it is will give us an answer to the political potential of the Net as a whole” (p. 81).

The Internet users (and the so-called commodified audiences, see below) do not form classes but have possibilities of acting together thanks to the platforms and networks they use together. They do not form a class, but some of them, if they are parts of the working class, can do it. Industrial and services workers can use those platforms as a base of class formation, that is, as a base of thinking and acting as a class. The users outside of these classes can be intermediary force in the formation revolutionary class. For this, they can render the corporate media and communication communicative media. The users in themselves do not form a class but many users belong to the already existing classes. Considering the population size of the working



classes, which form overwhelming majority, the majority of users can be seen as the working class in the Net and thus also form their electronic, virtual class society. In terms of class politics, their intellectual revolutionaries as agents of “the consciousness from without” within a sort of Leninist revolutionary strategy and the mass of the working classes can communicate and thus form their communicative media.

Nevertheless, even if the Internet users cannot be considered completely a class, their activity absolutely implies a *labour*. For some socialist scholars of media and communication, the users of the Internet and social media (non-professionals of course) provides a new unpaid form of labour, which is ironically seen as both a new “material” force, and “immaterial”. For them, computer technology, the Internet and the emergence of social media imply a rupture from the so-called traditional Marxist conception of labour, wage-labour, labour power, workplace, productive labour as well as working time and reproduction of labour power. It is argued that the social media, represent ideally all characteristics of new labour and imply the formation of “new classes”. However, we wonder if we have a new productive force or if we simply face new forms of unproductive labour.

In the limited context of media and communication, the question is whether the labour of the Internet users, putting aside its political economy definition, is related with a potential free or spare time for the development of new individual. It is sure that the development of social individual<sup>9</sup>, like individuality in all kinds as well, requires free social time and a sort of communicative media instead of traditional media communication, which still takes place not only in the traditional mass media but also in the current form of social media. Internet-based net-workings seem to be capable of providing some possibilities for the development of this new individual.

However, as Fuchs labelled, social media are “corporate social media” (2014; 2016; 2017) and have not been social yet despite some future potentials which can be revealed. More importantly, their users are subject to process of commodification and exploitation. The data generated about users are “offered as a commodity to advertising clients”. For Fuchs (2014), “the data commodities are offered for sale to advertising clients after the production/exploitation process” (p. 67). Here the data are only a part of the subject, we have a labour issue too. It is so-called “free labour”.

Terranova (2004) defines “free labour” as “excessive activity that makes the Internet a thriving and hyperactive medium” and as “a feature of the cultural economy at large, and an important, yet unacknowledged, source of value in advanced capitalist societies” (p. 73). The Internet shows “the

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9 Here the notion of “social individual” relates to a social context in which human self-actualization is possible, and important exemplary social framework proposals in the history of political theory are as follows: Aristotle’s city-state (here man, as a political/social animal, is expected to acquire moral and intellectual virtues and be happy) Hegel’s modern state, representing the most advanced stage of moral life; and Marx’s communist society where social alienation of man was overcome. For an introductory information on Aristotle’s, Hegel’s and Marx’s idea of self-realization of man, see Williams (1991, pp. 37-39; 134-136; 139) and for the historical continuity of the conception of self-realization, also see Türkyılmaz (2015).

connections between the ‘digital economy’ and what the Italian autonomists have called the ‘social factory’ (or ‘society–factory’). Here, the social factory implies that “work processes have shifted from the factory to society, thereby setting in motion a truly complex machine” (Terranova, 2004, p. 74). In the “overdeveloped countries”, it is suggested that we see “the end of the factory” and “the marginalisation of the old working class” and, emergence of a new sort of workers “as active consumers of meaningful commodities”. Thus, the free labour is not limited to the Internet activity, but also covers all cultural consumption. With it, “knowledgeable consumption of culture is translated into excess productive activities that are pleasurably embraced and at the same time often shamelessly exploited” (Terranova, 2004, p. 78).

In this theorising, free labour is different from that of the so-called industrial, factory worker. The Internet users are located in the sphere of immaterial labour, which “unlike the knowledge worker, is not completely confined to a specific class formation”. Terranova refers to Lazzarato by saying that “this form of labour power is not limited to highly skilled workers, but is a form of activity of every productive subject within postindustrial societies” (Terranova, 2004, p. 83). What is meant is that while knowledge worker is still seen in the sphere of classes and class formation, immaterial labour loses its strict class affiliation and appear in every *productive* activity and in all *active* consumption process.

The idea of the commodification of the Internet users, their activities, which are their free labour, theoretically fulfils same function of the concept of “audience commodity”, which had been suggested by Dallas Smythe as stated by Fuchs (2016)<sup>10</sup>. As Fuchs (2016) recalled, Smythe suggested this concept “for analysing media advertisement models” and meant that “the audience is sold as a commodity to advertisers”. The thing which is produced and sold is “audience power”, which is an “unpaid work time” (p. 537).

Why do people use social media if they are exploited? Fuchs (2014) says that it is “for achieving what Bourdieu ... terms social capital (the accumulation of social relations), cultural capital (the accumulation of qualification, education, knowledge) and symbolic capital (the accumulation of reputation)” (p. 67). But it is already clear from above arguments that social media users want to establish “social relations”, to get something intellectual and cultural and acquire a social standing or maybe fame<sup>11</sup>. Exploitation occurs without direct capital – labour relation. There is no factory or workplace, but society turns into a big factory.

10 Fuchs (2016) said that “Terranova connected the concept of free labour to the Autonomist Marxist concept of immaterial labour, but did not think of the connectedness to Dallas Smythe’s notion of the audience commodity” (p. 542).

11 Anderson and Rainie (2018), regarding the positive impacts of the Internet, observe that the most important aspect of the digital life is the connectivity it provides. “Digital life links people to people, knowledge, education and entertainment anywhere globally at any time in an affordable, nearly frictionless manner”. In economy and politics, it “revolutionizes civic, business, consumer and personal logistics, opening up a world of opportunity and options”. It opens us to all kind of services and “scientific resources”. More important for our thesis is that “Digital life empowers people to improve, advance or reinvent their lives, allowing them to self-actualize, meet soul mates and make a difference in the world”. And with the ever-expanding “focus of digital life; the big-picture results will continue to be a plus overall for humanity”.

Social media user's behaviour, besides these Bourdieuen explanations<sup>12</sup>, have also culturalist and Gramscian<sup>13</sup> explanations. In the latter, de-alienation, participation and some wrong conception of "self-empowerment" are exchanged with and consented for, domination, exploitation and hegemony (Reveley, 2013, pp. 87-89). Exploitation is allowed by the social media users. According to those approaches, Reveley (2013) says, this relation " 'is conditioned by a promise for de-alienation' ". He also correctly states that their conception of alienation is subjectivist and ignores the objective alienation process, which can be seen in economic sphere (p. 89). Subjective form of alienation, I think, along with domination and exploitation, is not completely consented by individuals without facing external and objective forces. Similarly, hegemony cannot be produced and sustained with consent.

### **A New Phase of the Twin Processes**

I suggest that with and after social media, the dialectical processes of individualization-socialization and massification-classification enter a new phase. By correcting Baudrillard we can suggest that only the old "social" has already gone. And it is clear that bourgeois intellectual is no longer the dominant actor of the public space.

Reminding Habermas above and compared with today, we can wonder whether the enormous proliferation of new media sites implies a sort of revolutionary period in history. Similarities with today can be seen in the political, intellectual and artistic forms of blogging as well as in dissident e-newspapers and journals and in the fact that in this form of media, contrary to Habermas suggests, there is not only a business in the picture. There is a commerce, but not yet commercializing. The press is a public institution playing a decisive role in public discussion of "mediator" and "intensifier". It is also not a simple medium for news and not yet, of "a consumer culture". Today's social media and dissident part of the electronic media portals are not yet under the total control of commercialization and commodification processes even if we worry about the "unpaid labour" of the Internet and social media users. However, we said "not yet".

Resemblance of the blogs to "intellectual newspapers" and "critical journals" of the 18. century before the mass media emerged after 1830s as explained by Habermas may be misleading. Ours is not the era of the rising revolutionary bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, the users of the new media are capable of developing a new intellectual, critical and more importantly collective and communicative media against the corporate mass media of the "postmodern" capitalist society. In similar fashion with Habermas who compared the free bourgeois media with the media before ("the earlier news sheets which were mere compilations of notices"), Watson and Hill (2012) refer to Alistair Alexander who saw "blogging as a significant contributor, ... to the dissemination of alternative narratives to those provided by traditional mass media – such narratives serving as 'a tool for mobilizing a global protest movement on an unprecedented scale' ". For him, "

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12 Regarding social, cultural and symbolic forms of capital as suggested by Pierre Bourdieu. See also above Fuchs (2014, p. 67).

13 What is meant here is Antonio Gramsci's theory about the establishment of ruling class hegemony.

'Weblogs,' ... 'provide an open-source platform for engaged individuals to challenge professional journalism on their own terms.' ". They also added that, "professional journalists are themselves writing their own weblogs, 'further blurring the lines between the traditional news culture and the 'blogosphere' ". Again, they refer to J. W. Rettberg and said that "Rettberg refers to blogs... and deems them 'emblematic of a shift from uni-directional mass media to participatory media, where viewers and readers become creators of media' " (Watson and Hill, 2012).

The blog type of media and communication are the embryo of the *communicative* media. They do not only show the difference between the old and new media, but also imply the supersession of the old professional mass media (and their audience), providing a model for the real socialization of media and communication. Habermas' 18<sup>th</sup> century intellectual and critical media, now reappears in a massive and somehow in a popular framework. The bloggers, besides other communicative media agents, seemingly represent the new mass, new people, hence new class relations. However, the so-called immaterial, unpaid, free labour, and the activity of the audience in the mass or social media are not labour, but an activity of the consumers, the Internet users, the spare time used outside of the working process. Their activities in social media may be seen as labour, but this is the labour that is conducted as free time instead of working and mainly takes place in the sphere of the reproduction of labour power.

Class aspect of the new media in general and social media in particular can be seen in their position against the traditional mass media and hence mass society which have been formed in opposed, dialectical relation to classes and class formation as well as in their contribution to the development of new individual and individuality. The latter cannot be clearly and completely defined at the moment. However, it is clear that new individuals are now capable of establishing not only more personal networks, but also national and global relations. Different spatial levels of socialization, which can be diverse, simultaneous and overlapping, is now possible with rising Internet connectivity. The Internet in itself simultaneously enriches individuality and sociality. Individual now can become both local and global, being both a part of concrete communities and abstract global social wholes. In this process, media become more communicative and turn into communicative media through which new public sphere of new class relations will attack "the very principle on which the existing power is based" today, as Habermas said, as the revolutionary bourgeoisie of England in the late 18. century did with its critical, intellectual and political newspapers and journals. Today's critical and intellectual social media, being communicative media, cannot be satisfied with the democratic "principle of public information" and its associated demands for the control of public authority and state activities. This means simply an imitation of the bourgeoisie in its rising revolutionary period. New principle of power should be revealed. First of all, it is in the development of social individual along with the communicative media.

### **Concluding Remarks**

Individualization is a process which develops with and against socialization process. Modern individual is a product of the period after the Renaissance and Reformation era and corresponds

to Habermas' critical and intellectual bourgeois media and related public sphere. Today, out of and against the current capitalist-bourgeois society and its dominant form of individuality, an over-individualised and over-socialised individual, looking like a petty bourgeois social individual, tends to emerge.

Private individuals are now virtually more integrated to each other and look like a kind of petty bourgeois social individuals. Their sociality is mainly virtual and realized in networks through which they try to express, introduce or even expose themselves, wishing to be important. They want to acquire social and public characteristic, to be a kind of celebrity, politician, public intellectual or opinion leader, briefly a socially respected person. For an individual, other individuals are instruments thanks to whom they can express and realise themselves. This fact implies that with social media there emerges an over-individualization process, which is accompanied with over-socialization (above all due to rising social connections).

With the development of networked relations, there emerges a social space in the place of old public space-sphere which has been based on the divisions such as individual-society, private-public, (civil) society-state, with its own public figures and notables in economy, politics, ideology, art and culture. In new open social space, everybody is potentially a public figure. This is an accompanying process of individualization and socialization and implies an emergence of virtual petty-bourgeoisie. However, for a genuine social individual to develop, this form of individual needs to develop or acquire some intellectual, moral and public virtues, for example, in Aristotelian sense: Moderation, wisdom and participation in public life. Aristotle's "political animal" is actually a "social" animal, who can live only in community and city-state and Aristotle suggests that man should acquire intellectual and moral virtues to be good and happy and to make himself "human"<sup>14</sup>. In social media users, we see that they try to be more public and social with more individualistic aspirations. However, we do not see so much moderation, wisdom and responsibility. This is related with over-individualization process, which is accompanied with over-socialization in social media platforms. However, it can be hoped that only under these conditions can a superseded form of the old bourgeois intellectual and critical media develop and lead into a genuine new social and public communicative media.

Baudrillard's spectacularization is nothing but the over-visualization form of over-individualization process and is observed in consumption forms, in cultural and artistic production as well as in politics in its popular forms where it becomes a show while politician a showman. In the visualization process, the body obviously gains priority over mind, temporary on permanent, event on content.

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14 For Aristotle, Williams (1991) stated, "The happy life involves the exercise of virtue"; "Without the full development and exercise of the intellectual and moral virtues – intelligence, practical wisdom, deliberation, and courage, generosity, justice, friendship – an individual cannot be called happy". These characteristics make a man "human" (p. 38). In a happy life, "goodness" and "pleasure", "the moral and "psychological aspects" come together" (p. 38). See also footnote 11 for Aristotle's and Hegel's and Marx's idea of the self-realization of man.

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