DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS AND THE MILITARY: EVIDENCE FROM SPAIN AND TURKEY[*]

Yüksel Alper Ecevit[**]

Abstract

Democratic transitions may have unintended consequences. Modes of transition exert significant influence on post-transition outcomes. Here, I focus on two most similar cases; Spain and Turkey, included in the 'Third Wave of Democratization'. After an evaluation of critical junctures by using Croissant, Kuhn, Chambers and Wolf (2010)'s framework, I argue that civil-military relations during transitions are key to explain post-transitional outcomes. The extent to which military power was influential in transitional decision making creates a long-lasting impact for the political regimes. Hereby, I recall the importance of a comparative analysis of historical cases to develop an understanding of emerging democracies in an era of democratic decline.

Keywords: Civil-military relations, democratization, Spain, Turkey, comparative politics

Demokrasiye Geçiş ve Ordu: İspanya ve Türkiye Karşılaştırması

Öz

Demokrasiye geçiş süreçlerinin niyet edilmemiş sonuçları olabilir. Geçiş sürecinin biçimi, geçi sonrası yaşanacaklar üzerinde ciddi bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu makalede 'Üçüncü Dalga Demokratikleşme' süreçlerine dâhil ve birbirine benzer iki vaka olarak İspanya ve Türkiye incelenmektedir. Kritik dönemeçlerde yaşananları Croissant, Kuhn, Chambers ve Wolf (2010)'un temel çerçevesi ile değerlendirdikten sonra, geçiş sürecindeki asker-sivil ilişkilerinin yeni kurulan demokratik yapıyı açıklamak için anahtar olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Askerin geçiş sürecindeki kararlarda ne derece etkili olduğu siyasal rejimler üzerine ne ölçüde kalıcı etki bıraktığı ile doğru orantılı gözükmektedir. Bu vesile ile, küresel olarak demokrasinin düşüşte olduğu bir

[**] Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, *Çukurova Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü*, 01300, Balcalı-Adana/Türkiye, aecevit@cu.edu.tr , Orcid ID: 0000-0002-9267-0962

çağda, yeni kurulan demokrasileri daha iyi anlayabilmek için karşılaştırmalı ve tarihsel analizlerin önemine vurgu yapılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Asker-sivil ilişkileri, demokratikleşme, İspanya, Türkiye, karşılaştırmalı siyaset

Introduction

Democratization in Southern Europe took place in late 70s and early 80s when the number of democracies in the world was in decline. Considered as Huntington's (1991)[1] famous third wave, the fall of military-backed authoritarian regimes in Spain, Portugal, Turkey and Greece provided glimmers of hope for proponents of democracy. Yet, the civilianization of the regimes via competitive elections emerged before modern institutions were established.[2] Under these circumstances Turkey and Spain provided divergent paths despite major similarities. Both states were keen to integrate into democratic and liberal European polities but first had to struggle with their peculiar civil-military issues. In this study, I particularly focus on a comparison of these two cases to inquire into the variation of an important indicator of democracy: the subordination of the military to civilians. I present a historical and comparative account of these two similar cases as a contribution to growing literature on civil-military relations during the emergence of democracy in contemporary and complicated cases, and argue that modes of transitions have lasting impact on new democracies. Therefore, I provide evidence in favour of the scholars who view the transitions as 'the founding moment'[3] against others who claim that transitions reboot the political regime and their impact are secondary to post-transitional arrangements[4].

In both cases, democratic transitions followed a military-backed authoritarian rule, a good degree of prior experience with civilian institutions during the post-WWII period and a revolution-free democratization approach; however, the outcome of each transition for civil-military relations differed significantly. According to Polity IV democracy index, Spain reached a well-functioning democracy by scoring 9 out of 10 in 1978 immediately after the end of the authoritarian rule, joined the European Community, and never experienced a democratic decline. On the other hand, Turkey marked a fluctuating performance by scoring 7 for six years following the transition between 1983 and 1988 before

---

[1] Samuel Huntington, "Democracy's third wave", *Journal of Democracy*, vol.2, no.2, (1991), 12-34.

[2] Richard Rose and Don Chull Shin, "Democratization backwards: The problem of third-wave democracies", *British Journal of Political Science*, vol.31, no.2, (2001), 331-354.

[3] Daniel V. Friedheim, "Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: Pact Making and Regime Collapse", *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, vol.7, (1993), 481-512.

[4] Arturo Valenzuela, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A proposal for a parliamentary form of government", in J.J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (eds.), *The Failure of Presidential Demcoracy: The Case of Latin America.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, (1994), 91-150.

reaching a desirable score of 9. Following relative stability until 1997, democracy in Turkey declined back to 7 and is yet to be consolidated. Challenges towards democratization in Turkey is often associated with military's excessive influence in politics. For at least two decades, the shadows of the military remained a major setback for democratic development and a coup d'etat attempt in 2016 revealed that Turkish democracy still isn't free from potential intruders in the armed forces[5].

Similarities between Turkey and Spain include: a) the military's historical and influential role in politics [6], b) challenges of ethnically motivated anti-regime militant groups (namely ETA and PKK)[7], c) delayed industrialization and thus modernization processes [8], d) intensified relations with a growing regional economic actor as an anchor for democratization, i.e European Community (later to be named as European Union)[9]. These similarities already became a framework for comparative analysis in earlier studies.[10] Both countries currently suffer from contemporary problems of democracy including demands for decentralization, governance of ethnic diversity, and growing populist discourse.[11] However, this article is limited to the early years after the transition to democracy and particularly focuses on the civilianization aspect of democratic politics.

Despite these similarities, the remarkable differences make this comparison even more interesting as Turkey, according to conventional wisdom, possessed more favourable conditions for democratization. For example, Turkey experimented with multiparty politics since the 1950s while political competition in Spain was very restrictive during Franco-era. Turkey was part of the 'democratic' Western alliance as a result of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership since 1952 and intense interactions with European Community were ongoing since 1959 while Spain stalled for these international cooperation until the

---

[5] Ümit Cizre, "Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone", *European Journal of Political Research*, vol.43, no.1, (2004), 107-125. Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü, "Turkey: how the coup failed?", *Journal of Democracy*, vol.28, no.1, (2017), 59-73.

[6] Lauren McLaren and Burak Cop, "The failure of democracy in Turkey: a comparative analysis", *Government and Opposition*, vol.46, no.4, (2011), 485-516.

[7] Ibid.

[8] José Casanova, "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition to Democracy", *Social Research,* no.50, (1983), 929-973. Dankwart Rustow, *Turkey: the modernity of tradition*, Princeton University Press, 1965.

[9] McLaren and Cop, *The failure of democracy.*

[10] Lauren McLaren, *Constructing Democracy in Southern Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Italy, Spain and Turkey*, Routledge, 2008; ibid.

[11] Tim Bale, "Are bans on political parties bound to turn out badly? A comparative investigation of three 'intolerant' democracies: Turkey, Spain, and Belgium", *Comparative European Politics*, vol.5, no.2, (2007), 141-157. Şebnem Yardımcı-Geyikçi, "Party institutionalization and democratic consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in comparative perspective", *Party Politics*, vol.21, no.4, (2015), 527-538. Kürşat Çınar. "A comparative analysis of clientelism in Greece, Spain, and Turkey: the rural-urban divide", *Contemporary Politics*, vol.22, no.1, (2016), 77-94.

end of the Franco's rule. McLaren and Cop argue that two factors explain the divergence of Spanish and Turkish transitions and these are experiences with the authoritarian past and elite settlement during the transitions [12]. This paper particularly focuses on the developments during the transitional period and concentrates on to what extent the military and civilian elites converged despite their initially opposing positions on critical issues. The relative weight of military over civilians, I argue, is the critical factor to determine the post-transitional outcome. As Somer (2016) argues, when preferences of the hegemonic actors prevail during democratization, the transitions are predestined to be demographically, institutionally and territorially partial. [13] The following section explains the theoretical background and a framework for analysis for the civil-military relations during democratic transitions.

Civil-Military relations during transitions

Civil-military relations during the democratization processes operate both as an explanatory factor and as an indicator of democracy. In the latter case, policy-making in democratic states, empirically and theoretically, should be free from the influence of non-elected officials[14]. Elected politicians, in the form of government, should be able to make decisions even if these decisions contradict with the military's views, or other appointed officers'. On the other hand, how transitions take place have implications for the post-transition outcome. Reform, contrary to revolution, brings more moderate changes and favourable outcomes for the ousted regime. Therefore, when the military*, vis-a-vis* civilians, plays an integral part of the transitional process, it implants certain prerogatives into the new regime and this could challenge democracies to succeed in consolidation[15]. The relative importance of bureaucratic-military forces in outgoing authoritarian regimes are significant especially at times of political change and the military is an institution which has the potential to 'walk the tanks into the streets' if it is not satisfied with the change. Therefore, for a successful transition to proceed the support of the military is helpful but the balance between military involvement and diversion from democratic ideals is delicate[16].

Several scholars contested this view with findings from their research focused on Latin America. For example, Hunter (1995) [17] suggested that the enduring weight of these institutional restrictions by historical institutionalists can

---

[12] McLaren and Cop, *The failure of democracy*.

[13] Murat Somer, "Understanding Turkey's democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, vol.16/4, (2016), 481-503.

[14] Robert Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

[15] Alfred C. Stepan and F. Van Oystaeyen, *Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton University Press, 1988.

[16] J. Juan Linz, "Transitions to democracy", *Washington Quarterly*, vol.13, no.3, (1990), 143-164.

[17] Wendy Hunter, "Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Post authorization Brazil", *Comparative Politics*, vol.27, no.4, (1995), 425-443.

be modified by the political agents', or civilians' interactions based on their rational and strategic calculations. Pion-Berlin (1992)[18] acknowledged the potencies of the military in post-authoritarian regimes, but also denied the claim that they are limitless. He believes that the possibility of failing while attempting to intervene in fragile issues shape those limits. The military is rather stronger in pursuing its own corporate interests.

If the role of the military is assessed properly, we can evaluate to what extent the post-transition structure is influenced by the transitional factors. I argue that transitional process provides major uncertainties into the system and the relative weight of civilians to military during this period create major legacies for the institutional system to be established. Transitions should be considered as critical junctures because they trigger mechanisms which reinforce the recurrence of a particular pattern of behaviour among the powerful segments of the political elite. They create a path dependent process where changes at the post-transitional stages are even harder once the democratic system is established. Therefore, it is imperative to focus on the events occurring during the transitional processes to examine the outcome of democratization. While inclusive electoral competition and elected civilian executives are important indicators of emergence of democracy, the influence of military in politics has to be carefully assessed even in the absence of a coup for a comprehensive evaluation.

Croissant et al. (2010)[19] criticize conceptualization of military subordination to civilians as absence of military coup and calling this fallacy as 'coup-ism'. According to them, civil-military relations have a narrow definition as 'the interaction between the leaders of the armed forces and political elites occupying the key national government positions in the state'[20]. They argue that civilian control can be assessed in five policy areas including *elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence* and *military organization. Elite recruitment* is the extent the military is able to exercise influence over the realization and concrete form of the rules and inclusiveness of competition[21]. *Public policy influence* refers to what extent 'the armed forces can assert their interests in the processes of agenda setting, policy formulation, and policy adoption in fields like fiscal, monetary and economic policy, foreign policy, public welfare, and symbolic policies'[22]. The extent of '…civilians to formulate the goals and decide on the measures meant to uphold internal security, and if the civilian agencies charged with upholding

---

[18] David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America", *Comparative Politics,* vol.25, no.1, (1992), 83-102.

[19] Aurel Croissant, David Kuehn, Chambers Paul and Wolf Siegfried O., "Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies", *Democratization,* vol.17, no.5, (2010), 950-975.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

domestic security and law-enforcement are independent from the military' measures the level of military influence in *internal security*. Fourth, the degree of civilian supremacy over the military on *national defence* is assessed by '…the degree to which civilians have effective and ultimate decision-making authority on all aspects of defence politics; and if they are able to effectively oversee the military's implementation of defence policies' [23] . Finally, the *military organization* is an important indicator of the balance in civil-military relations and measured by the degree that civilians have the actual authority to decide on the hard power of the military as well as the ideational underpinnings of the military organization[24].

In this paper, I apply Croissant et al.'s (2010)[25] framework to assess the degree of military influence in Spanish and Turkish transitions to assess whether the military influence during transitions is the determinant factor for the divergent paths. In democratic transitions where civilians' supremacy in the five designated spheres as listed above is preserved, the new regime is likely to sustain itself as a democracy. There is a constant struggle between civil and military forces at times of political change and I hypothese that when civilians cooperate to prevent military influence over important decisions, the likelihood of consolidating democracy increases. When the military dominates the process it inserts prerogatives into the political system. Focusing on historical cases where civil-military relations operated as the major mechanism of political competition would also provide more insight on the appropriateness of Croissant et al.'s (2010)[26] proposition for contemporary and emerging democracies. Following Stepan's (1998) [27] prescription, I find it important to focus on the military components and their position *vis-a-vis* civilians in the comparison of transitions to democracy for both theoretical and empirical reasons.

In a context like Spain or Turkey, where the military exerted a long-lasting institutional influence over politics, transitions to democracy needs to satisfy different pillars of society, including the military, for democratic consolidation. An institution with certain powers already embedded into the political system would peacefully release its privileges only if its interests are guaranteed. Hence, a "positive consolidation" which refers to conscious, long-term efforts by civilian elites to devise policies and strategies aimed at a positive reincorporation of the military into the goals and institutions of the new democratic regime is necessary for proper functioning of consolidation after the transitions [28] . If not, the

---

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Stepan and Oystaeyen, *Rethinking military politics*.

[28] Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective", in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros and Hans-Jürgen

dissatisfied party would disrupt the process towards consolidation and would challenge the functioning of the system in the young democracies.

The Turkish military in the post-transition period exerted influence on issues outside its own interests as a result of the absence of proper civilian resistance. By contrast, the Spanish military made coup attempts for six times all of which failed because of the firm stance of the civilian actors backed by the King Juan Carlos in 1981. This particular difference in the post-transition period provides inspiration for comparative studies of these two states. One may claim that Franco's rule was not a typical military rule as general and colonels did not run the state to a large extent[29]. However, following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the army constituted the centre of gravity and the true support for the regime in place[30]. Additionally, there was consistent military presence in the cabinet through the years and a close interaction among civilian bureaucrats, military officers and political leaders created a unified chain-of-command that emphasized the values of the Francoist regime[31].

To investigate the main research question of this paper, I chose the 'most-similar cases design' as these two cases have major similarities but lead to major differences in the outcome. Overall, this study tries to evaluate to what extent the nature of the dominant elite and the cooperative behaviours of the influential actors played a role in transitions to democracy. First, by collecting data through historical accounts, I separately discuss these two cases by projecting on determinants of civil-military relations during democratic transitions. I consider this approach relevant as historical institutionalism presents a great opportunity to tackle contextual differences while focusing on the events occurring around critical junctures of the transitional events[32]. Then I conclude by critically analysing the Croissant et al. (2010)[33]'s framework being applied here.

The Spanish case

Spain, between 1939 and 1975, was governed by an authoritarian regime under General Franco's rule. Despite major civilian components through the regime, transition to democracy was delayed until Franco's death and a democratic transition led by a monarch, the King Juan Carlos, resulted in, first, competitive

---

Puhle (eds), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 169-195.

29 Zoltan Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, Princeton University Press, 2010.

30 Jose Antonio, Olmeda Gómez, "The Armed Forces in the Francoist Political System", in *Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present*, edited by Rafael Banon Martines and Thomas M. Barker, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

31 Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State.*

32 Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism", in D. Della Porta and M. Keating (eds*), Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: A pluralist perspective*, Cambridge: New York, 2008, 118-139.

33 Croissant et al, *Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism.*

elections and then consolidated democracy in less than a decade. This relatively smooth process was not free from military's negative attitudes towards the transition. The transition experienced six different coup attempts and a recent study reveals how Spanish military hindered democratic development with its 'reactionary' ideas against the liberalization of the regime. However, civilians were able to prevail in leading the transition to a consolidated democracy. [34] When Croissant et al.'s (2010)[35] framework is applied, following results are shown.

Elite recruitment: Before the transition to democracy in Spain, Franco's illness had instigated debates about the succession of the head of state. General Blanco, the right-hand man for Franco and thus a natural successor, was assassinated in 1973 and this left the prince Juan Carlos as the strongest candidate. Thus, with the approval of Franco and the armed forces before Franco's death, Juan Carlos de Borbon was eventually crowned the King of Spain on November 22nd, 1975. His first declaration in favour of the *National Movement* and the armed forces increased popular support for his presidency[36]. In sum, the shift at the head of the state was in conformity with armed forces' preferences.

When the executive office was considered, Carlos Arias Navarro was the first person appointed by the King to form the cabinet. Arias Navarro was the last Prime Minister in the Franco regime and was a moderate reformist. In less than a year in office, he was not able to compromise with the reformist and was replaced with Adolfo Suarez[37]. Suarez was known to be a reformist politician from the Franco's years and was much younger, so he was less affiliated with the Franco regime. The first cabinet formed by Suarez included three service ministers, namely the heads of the army, navy and air force. These places were guaranteed without any proper political competition. The confidence of the military staff in the democratic reform processes' harmless conduct rested upon the three service ministers within the cabinet and the King's strength inherited from the Franco[38].

One important challenge for elite recruitment between the armed forces and the reformists was the legalization of the non-official trade unions who previously aligned with Communists and Socialists. This legalization raised doubts among the military officers about how far Suarez government's democratization reforms could reach. Vice president and former General Santiago resigned and received support from the armed forces. Suarez appointed Lt. General Manuel Gutierrez Mellado, the army's chief of staff to the vice presidency and insisted on the

---

[34] Jose Javier Olivas Osuna, "Revolutionary versus reactionary: contrasting Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations during democratisation", *War & Society*, vol.38, no.3, (2019), 225-248.

[35] Croissant et al. *Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism*.

[36] Victor Alba, *Transition in Spain*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978.

[37] Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, Luis Fernando Medina, "Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination: The Spanish Transition Revisited", *South European Society and Politics*, (2019), 1-22.

[38] Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective*, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

legalization of political groups. However, the military firmly rejected the legalization of the Communist Party. Suarez's main motive behind legalization was to increase the popular legitimacy of the prospective *Cortes* elections which would take place in June 1977. The crisis led to the resignation of the navy minister[39]. The armed forces prevented further resignation of the other military ministers in the cabinet to avoid Suarez to appoint civilians to the cabinet which would totally pacify the military within the executive. Instead, the military issued a strong statement reminding him of his duties regarding the unity of Spain, the crown, and the flag. The Communist Party, in response, issued a conciliatory statement in their first press conference with the leaders appeared surrounded by the Spanish flag and pledged not to oppose the monarchy or the unity of Spain[40]. The legalization of the Communist Party contributed to political pluralism but obviously decreased the level of confidence between the military and rest of the political actors in the Spanish political system. This lack of confidence would stimulate the military to become more proactive and attempt to become aware of the secret agenda of the civilians prior to the realization of the reforms. In addition, that was a signal to the military that even if they firmly opposed, their formal rejection might not affect the outcome. Suarez, though, tried very hard to appease the military by sharing his reformist agenda with the military two days before presenting the first draft to the Cortes. Military's silent consent to this plan, according to some, marks the end of the previous regime based on the Fundamental Law[41].

Overall, the tension between military and the government is visible, however, neither side was fully dominant. Both sides were committed to initiate the electoral competition. While the military preferred a restrictive form of competition, the Suarez government was eager to be more inclusive by the legalization of Communists. Suarez, though, was in complete control of appointments within the first cabinet before the elections.

Public policy: The armed forces' public policy preferences were clear prior to the transition process. They were more persistent on symbolic issues such as anti-Communist stance and national identity formation. The military took a clear stance in highly contradictory issues such as the recognition of the autonomy of the nationalities, the place of the church, or the prerogatives of the monarchy[42].

When we turn into actual policymaking by the executive, the military attempted to exert its power by its members' presence. However, starting with the second Suarez government in July 1977, they were represented with only a single defence minister in the cabinet and their impact on public policy making was severely limited. In addition, the constitutional committee in the Cortes was

---

[39]   Ibid.

[40]   Ibid.

[41]   Sánchez, Medina, "Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination".

[42]   Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy.*

unwilling to discuss the issues with the military representative. Therefore, the military could not influence legitimate constitution making to enforce its preferences.

However, the military was not totally marginalized and was able to include Article 2 into the constitution despite efforts from the ETA members. Article 2 added the following remark to ensure the unity of Spain: "indissoluble unit of the Spanish nation, common and indivisible fatherland of all Spaniards" as a response to the recognition of the right to autonomy of the nationalities.[43]

Therefore, military's influence in public policies during the transition was rather limited and the inclusion of the Article 2 was the major successful outcome of their efforts.

Internal Security: Throughout the democratization period, the Spanish army posed as the staunch supporter of the national unity of Spain and acted against the recognition of nationalities in the Constitution, which would bring the autonomous nationalities, such as Basques and Catalans, back to the Spanish political arena[44]. This issue had been delayed until the mid-1980s as both civilian and military components of the political transformation avoided a confrontation that would disrupt the democratization.

The new openings in the regime in favour of the recognition of autonomous nationalities raised the tensions between the military and the government. The military openly criticized former General and vice-president Mellado and his alignment with the reformists. While the constitutional amendments were being made for autonomous regions, the numbers of ETA activities increased[45]. The military perceived the tension between territorial autonomy and terrorism as a trend toward regional independence and national disintegration. Especially the assassination of the Madrid's military governor by the ETA and increased attacks against military officers stimulated public protests during the funerals, which called for empowering the army[46]. The increasing terrorist attempts and public protests in the funerals encouraged hard-liners to regroup within the armed forces to avoid the threats to the mission and institution of the armed forces. Military intervention started to be discussed among the military members following the unavoidable speed of the reforms and increasing the ETA activities. Therefore, both the military men involved in the abortive coup d'etat of February 23rd, 1981 and *Manifesto of the Hundred* were sharing the perception that the national unity of Spain was under threat by the tendency toward autonomous independence[47].

188

---

43   Ibid.

44   Ibid.

45   Donald Share, *The Making of Spanish Democracy*, New York: Praeger, 1986.

46   Ibid.

47   Hunter, "Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthorization Brazil".

In a nutshell, military officers, did not abstain from voicing their concerns over the internal security issues and reinforced their policy position in favour of national unity and against recognition of autonomies in the Constitution. Even though civilians were steering the decisions, military's presence was also felt.

National Defense: The ability of civilians to determine and monitor the implementation of defense policies is an important component of civil-military relations according to Croissant et al (2010)[48]. The most significant question for national defense during the transition process was whether Spain would join the NATO or not. This question had been resolved in the 1986 Spanish referendum to NATO where the public voted in favour of joining. During Franco's regime, there existed cooperation between the US-Spain that rested on 'mutual assistance' agreements between the US and Spain since the 1953 Madrid Pact. This agreement was due to renew every five years[49]. NATO membership was a source of conflict between civilian politicians where *Union de Centro Democratico* (UCD-Union of Democratic Center) was in favour of the membership and *Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol* (PSOE- Spanish Socialist Workers' Party) was against the membership claiming that Spain's interests rested with the Arab world and Latin America more than the Western Alliance. On the other hand, the Spanish military was predominantly in favour of NATO membership, especially the navy and the air force. The army had some reservations about Western influence in Spanish domestic political life. NATO membership, for some army officials, was seen as part of a general government plan to reorganize the army[50]. For civilian politicians, the military's integration into NATO could mean the army would reorganize its focus away from domestic political issues towards security issues. However, these disagreements among civilian politicians left some room for the military to intervene and take sides in the political debate of NATO membership. To avoid this, especially after the failed coup in 1981, civilians preferred to silence their difference and isolate the military from interfering into politics. This led to a referendum as a campaign promise by Felipe Gonzalez from PSOE prior to the 1982 general elections. Prior to the referendum, Felipe Gonzalez had also changed his resistance to NATO membership and warned society about the disadvantages of staying out of NATO. Then opposition party leader Fraga from UCD, called their constituency to abstain from voting in the referendum as he was neither in favour of the negotiations to be held by PSOE nor remaining out of NATO. This raised criticism toward Socialists for acting like right-wing parties and mainly being infected by the industrial-military establishment[51].

---

[48] Croissant Aurel et al, *Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism*.

[49] P. Hal Klepak, *Spain: NATO or Neutrality*, No. Orae-Extra-Mural Paper-11. Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Ottawa, Ontario, 1980.

[50] Anthony Gooch, "A surrealistic referendum: Spain and Nato", *Government and Opposition*, vol.21, no.3, (1986), 300-316.

[51] Agüero Felipe, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy*.

Overall, the extent to which Spanish civilian politicians were affected by the military's influence is ambiguous. However, lack of a unifying view within the military prevented them from forcing the NATO membership issue onto civilians. Eventually, political elite established a successful coordination to calm their differences and avoided military intervention. Taking the case to a referendum also ensured popular support of the national defense policy and thus the role of military, at least visibly, was minimal. These findings accord with Barany (2010)[52]'s evaluation of civilians' impact on defense affairs as "strong, decisive but considerate"[53].

Military Organization: The government's proposed amnesty law as part of the liberalization process would include former members of the *Union Militar Democratica* (Democratic Military Union-UMD) and reincorporate them into the army. UMD was a clandestine faction within the military during the Franco-era, which pushed for democratic opening [54]. According to the military's view, pardoning previously expelled members of UMD would cause discontent within the army and would encourage the opposition in the military.

The military acted in solidarity against the amnesty law that could include the UMD members and voiced their concerns prior to the decision, so the Cortes had to acknowledge them. The level of consensus in the army around this issue prevented civilians from confronting the military in that manner for a decade on the amnesty of UMD members[55].

One other aspect of military organization was the prospect of NATO membership. During the transition process, membership to the security organization has been delayed until a referendum in 1986. Only then, reforms in the defense sector were realized. During the transition, both size and structure and ideational aspects of the military, referred to as 'hardware' and 'software' by Croissant et al. (2010)[56], remained private to the military institution.

Even though the defense ministry was established in 1977, the first civilian appointment head of ministry was Augustin Rodriguez Sahagun in 1978, which signals military's subordination to the government[57]. For an effective transition to civilian defense ministry, trained civilians were required to take initiative in security issues. Franco's Spain had already educated certain numbers of civilians within the CESEDEN (*Centro Superior de Estudios de la Defensa Nacional*- Centre of Higher

190

---

52 Barany Zoltan, *The Soldier and the Changing State.*

53 Ibid.

54 Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy.*

55 Jorge Zaverucha, "The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentina and Brazilian Transitions", *Journal of Latin American Studies*, vol.25, no.2, (1993), 283-299.

56 Croissant Aurel et al. Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism

57 Rafael Banon Martinez, The Spanish Armed Forces during the Period of Political Transition*,* in Rafael Banon Martines and Thomas M.Barker (eds), *Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present*, 311-355. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988)

National Defense Studies). This was facilitated by the transfer of the defense ministry from military officers to civilians. However, creation of the defense ministry and appointing a civilian was not sufficient to subordinate the military to civilians. Newly established Joint Chiefs' importance increased. In contrast to other transitions in southern Europe, the military in Spain remained institutionally intact and resurfaced with renewed vigor to press its corporate claims[58]. Surprisingly, instead of the weakening of military power in the government after the transition, the slowness of modernization and the blocking of reincorporation of UMD members and assertiveness of the hard-liners increased the military's institutional rigidity until the NATO membership in 1986 when many intra-institutional reforms would be made.

An Overview of Spanish Transition

The military's inability to influence the overall outcome rested on several factors. Agüero argues that those reasons were a) the dominance of civilians in setting the agenda for the transition which helped to pre-empt a stronger military push against democratization; b) the military's excessive and unfounded confidence in influential elites' (e.g. the king and Adolfo Suarez) commitment to Francoist credentials; and c) the high level of coalescence among the civilian elites which was empowered by legitimate public support via referendums and elections[59].

Agüero also argues that the military's internal disunity caused ineffectiveness in the transition process. The UMD crisis and NATO membership had already proven that the Spanish military was not a monolithic institution. The expelling of UMD members moderated internal disunity nevertheless, and at the time of the transition three factions within the military prevailed. Agüero categorizes these factions as the hard-liners, conservatives and liberals according to their tolerance to the limits of transformation and their eagerness to exert influence if the outcome was different than they expected [60]. The internal disunity of the military complicated the formation of a stance to constrain the government's ambitions reform plans and as a result the government always found liberals within the army to cooperate.

The Turkish Case

Turkey was ruled by a military junta between 1980 and 1983. Many factors including rising civil unrest, lack of civilians' cooperation in the parliament, and growing anti-regime movements and the rise of anti-secular political discourse are

---

58   Share, *The Making of Spanish Democracy*.

59   Ibid.

60   Ibid.

suggested as reason for the military intervention[61].

The first action taken by the *Milli Güvenlik Kurulu* (National Security Council-MGK) was to declare their intentions to return the political system back to democracy with a new constitution after the social order was established. A fair evaluation of military rule in the 1980s would reveal that it has been the harshest fist on Turkish political development and its impacts are still felt thanks to the 1982 Constitution which is still the reference point for Turkey's legal and political system.

Elite recruitment: Initial actions of the military coup over civilian elites were harsh. The composition of the MGK was changed in favour of the military. The MGK was comprised of six members including Chief of Staff General Evren (as the chairman) and formerly Commander of the Land Forces (as the Secretary) and commanders of the army, navy, air force and gendarmerie. During the military rule, MGK held all the executive and legislative powers. All the activities of the political parties, and two major trade unions were suspended indefinitely. The leaders of three political parties including Bülent Ecevit of *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, (CHP-Republication People's Party), Süleyman Demirel of *Adalet Partisi* (AP-Justice Party) and Necmettin Erbakan of *Milli Selamet Partisi* (MSP-National Salvation Party) were taken into custody in a military camp[62]. Yet, the MGK was in favour of appointing a civilian cabinet subordinate to MGK during the military rule. The MGK expected moderate members of CHP and AP to take part in the government so that the legitimacy of the government would be increased. Both parties chose not to cooperate as their leaders were not free[63]. Thus, the MGK gave up on establishing a cooperation with civilians. Therefore, an ex-Admiral Bülend Ulusu, who was considered to be popular among both the military and the public was given the authority to form a cabinet[64]. A new cabinet with twenty-seven members, including six retired generals and neutral bureaucrats and academics, was formed. Turgut Özal, who would be the first elected Prime Minister after the transition to an electoral process in 1983, and the chief economic advisor of Demirel before the military intervention, was appointed as Minister of State and Economy. Disagreement over the formation of the cabinet indicated that cooperation between military and ousted political elites for the transition process was unlikely. This has given legitimacy and power to the military to conduct the

---

[61] Sabri Sayarı, "Politics and Economic Policy-Making in Turkey 1980-1988",' in T. F. Nas and M. Odekon. (eds.), *Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization*, London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1992.

[62] William Hale, *Türkiye'de Asker ve Siyaset* [*Turkish Politics and Military*], İstanbul: Hil Publishing, 1996.

[63] Willam Hale, "Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective", in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds). *State, Democracy and The Military*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988.

[64] Gerassimos Karabelias, "The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, 1980-95", *Middle Eastern Studies,* vol.35, no.4, (1999), 130-151.

transformation as President Evren preferred to achieve 'clean break with the past' as he mentioned in his public speeches[65].

On the legislative front, military rule established the *Danışma Meclisi* (DM-National Consultative Assembly) to conduct the constitution-making process. DM was established primarily for drafting a constitution, and in the meantime for performing necessary legislative functions during the military rule[66]. The composition of DM was mainly determined by the MGK's approval where 40 members are directly selected and 120 members had to be approved by the MGK upon a list prepared by provincial governors who were also largely appointed by the MGK. Therefore, the constituent parliament was far from representative[67].

The MGK had the full authority to amend or veto the articles proposed by the DM. The adoption of the constitution was sanctioned by a referendum, however the procedure following a possible "no" vote in the referendum was not mentioned[68]. According to a provisional article of the constitution, the head of the MGK would be appointed as the new president for the next seven years. Prior to the referendum a law obligating the people to vote was also passed in order to provide the popular legitimacy for the constitution. The opposition to Evren's speech in favour of the constitution was also not allowed. Eventually, the referendum was held on November 7th 1982. 91.37% of the voters approved the constitution[69].

The Political Party Law, adopted in March 1983, banned pre-coup political parties and their former leaders. The opening of new parties was conditioned by the approval of the MGK. With the help of martial law throughout the country, the MGK realized strict control over political activity[70]. The Electoral Law adopted in June 1983 included a restrictive national threshold of ten-percent which implied that only the parties which gained more than ten-percent of the votes across the nation would have members in the parliament. The main rationale behind the electoral law was eliminating the minor parties which disturbed the stability of the coalition governments in the pre-1980 period. The military aimed to create a two-party system ideologically closer to center so that the stability would be sustained. Other than the political party law and the electoral law, the Law on Pacts, Strikes and Lock-out and Syndicates Law were widely criticized as including restrictions

---

65   Kenan Evren, *Kenan Evren'in Anilari [Memoirs of Kenan Evren]*, Milliyet Publishing. Istanbul, 1990.

66   Ergun Özbudun*, Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı (Constitution-making in Transition to Democracy)*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

67   Henry Clement Dodd, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, Hull: The Eothen Press, 1983.

68   Karabelias, "The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, 1980-95".

69   Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi [History of a Modern Nation: Turkey]*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.

70   İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds). *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

on political participation in the post-1983 period. The motive behind strengthened presidential powers and restricted political participation was retaining the military's political influence after an eventual transition to electoral politics[71].

Overall, MGK allowed only three of the fifteen parties to enter the elections blaming some applicants for being a continuation of the previous political parties, or being too radical for the new order. Over 700 candidates for members of parliament were dismissed by the MGK. Another restriction during the election propaganda period was a restriction on criticizing the MGK's actions during the military rule. The extended martial law also allowed MGK to monitor political activity very closely[72].

Finally, only three parties participated in the elections: *Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi* (Nationalist Democracy Party - MDP) led by Turgut Sunalp-former general, *Halkçı Parti* (Populist Party-HP) led by Necdet Calp-former member of the CHP and *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party - ANAP) led by Turgut Özal- the minister of state in the early years of junta government. The MDP was claimed to represent the centre right and was favoured by the armed forces. CHP was supposed to form a loyal opposition as a centre-left party. In the meantime, ANAP espoused a commitment to liberal economic policies and conservative cultural values.

Two days prior the elections, President Evren implied his support for the MDP through a TV speech. Evren invited voters to vote for the party which "will continue the success of MGK and will prevent Turkey to fall into anarchy as it happened before the MGK government"[73]. However, the election resulted with ANAP's comfortable win. Even though these elections ensured transition to civilian executive, they were extremely restrictive in almost every sense of democratic competition. The Özal government was formed and obtained a vote of confidence on December 24th of 1983.

Özal was aware that ANAP's majority in the parliament was questionable because of restrictions in political participation. Özal demanded to lift the political bans prior to municipality elections in 1984 but Evren vetoed it. However, the parliament adopted the law with absolute majority and municipality elections were held in March of 1985[74].

Despite the transition to civilian government, the military's autonomy has become more sensible after the 1982 constitution. Cizre-Sakallıoğlu argues that the absence of any alternative power preserving the status quo and the lack of pact-making culture in Turkish Politics left the military unchallenged even after the civilianization of the regime. Additionally, the military rule bequeathed a legacy, the

---

[71]   Sayarı, *Politics and Economic Policy-Making in Turkey*.

[72]   Ibid.

[73]   Ibid.

[74]   George Harris, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.

1982 constitution, including political prerogatives and judicial exemptions for the military[75].

Consequently, the military's project involved prohibition of all existing parties and banning their leaders from political activity for five to ten years. They aimed to promote a new centrist party with close ties to the military and to rewrite the legal, constitutional, and electoral rules governing the Turkish political system. The military also believed that democratic political stability in Turkey required the establishment of a new party system that would be based on two moderate, centrist parties and excluding the extremist parties of the radical left, ultranationalist right, and Islamic fundamentalism. The new party system with changes in the electoral system towards a majoritarian system instead of proportional one would pave the way for a single party government ensuing democratic stability [76].

Public policy: The making of the new constitution was the crucial step for adjusting the balance between military and civilian forces in making the public policy. However, as explained above, the constitution making was extremely restrictive to military appointed DM and like-minded experts. Procedurally, a committee selected by the Constituent Assembly drafted the 1982 Constitution. The draft was open to discussion, but propaganda was strictly prohibited. The procedure of constitution-making was as follows: the draft was first subject to amendments of DM and later to the revision of the MGK. Finally, the constitution had to be approved by a referendum. Therefore, the final document that would be presented to the public had to be pre-approved by the MGK.

Inclusion of the MGK within the institutional design raised doubts over the military's perception of democracy and the reach of the civilianization in the Turkish politics[77]. In a democratic setting, the influence of the MGK would be acceptable within the limits of security policies. However, the definition of national security encompasses more than defense matters. Therefore the MGK, in the 1980s, voiced its concerns on ideological issues, especially on the secularism-Islamism cleavage[78].

When we focus on specific policies, the military agreed with Özal's economic policies. The military had already ceased to adopt an Import Substitution Industrialization policy applied before 1980s and agreed with the interventionist development strategies of Özal[79]. Hence the economic issues would not constitute a source of conflict between the civilians and the soldiers. Even though it is hard

---

[75] Ümit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, vol.29, no.2, (1997), 151-166.

[76] Sayarı, *Politics and Economic Policy-Making in Turkey*.

[77] Ibid.

[78] Metin Heper and Aylin Güney, "The Military and Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience", *Armed Forces & Society,* vol.26, no.4, (2000), 635-657.

[79] Sayarı, *Politics and Economic Policy-Making*.

to determine whether economic measures taken were product of a civilian or military mind set, the choice of Özal as the minister of economics during the military rule was intentional and the outcomes were obvious to the military. Thus, it is fair to argue that economic policies were, to great extent, military-backed. His appointment indicated that the generals entrusted economic policymaking to the principal architect of the stabilization program which was initiated by the AP government with the active support and cooperation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in January 1980.

The first major problem between the government and the military emerged following Özal's remarks over the concept of civil society. Özal referred to transformation from religious communitarianism to nationalism during Atatürk's period and questioned the notion of "people for the state". Özal's remarks raised doubts about his party's fundamentalist wing and their influence. The MGK immediately presented a report concerning fundamentalism in Turkey. Özal responded to comments spread all over the media by implying that the fundamentalism was a problem faced by both sides; the military and the government[80]. Thus, Özal's moderate discourse avoided escalation of crisis. Özal was absolutely aware of the MGK's sensitivities and abstained from raising tensions between his government and the MGK. Therefore, it is arguable that the government conceived the limits of politics and preferred a moderate discourse at critical junctures. This incident reveals that when policies were controversial, the military was able to ensure the government would retreat.

Evren took responsibility over all matters which were considered important by the military such as high political issues and higher education matters. The president and the military were content to leave the economic issues to the government. Evren was also granted a strengthened veto power over constitutional changes which required a three-fourths majority of the Parliamentarians to pass the law[81]. The Government operated strictly according to this division of labor. Özal's consent to this sort of a cooperation raised doubts about the civilian and democratic character of his government during the first term of ANAP's government.

The 1987 elections affected Özal's relations with the military. As the Özal government's power became more visible simultaneously with the military's gradual strategy of civilianization, Özal started applying a policy curtailing the influence of the military on public policy. The government started introducing new legislation allowing collective bargaining, strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, and the right to form associations and to make collective petitions. The military liaison officers in each ministry were lifted, death sentences

---

80   Ahmet Evin, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and after 1980", in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds), *State Democracy and the Military*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988.

81   Karabelias, *The evolution of civil-military relations*.

passed by the military courts were not approved by the Parliament and restrictions on the establishment of new political parties were lifted. Martial law was due to expire in the entire country in July 1987.

Internal security: One of the first initiatives by the military government was to declare a state-wide martial law. As part of the martial law, the Constitutional Order Law aimed at a reduction in the domestic violence. In order to re-establish the impartiality of a politicized bureaucracy, wide administrative and penal punishments were applied to civil servants who had been involved in political activity.

After the civilianization of the regime in 1983, then CGS, General Necdet Üruğ, pointed out that the military would return to fulfilling only its operational duties mainly related internal security matters at the end of 1985. Martial Law was gradually lifted from the beginning of 1984. Therefore, the military's influence over internal security matters continued after Özal government's election.

One peculiar component of new institutional system was the heavy influence of the MGK on internal security matters throughout the1980s and 1990s. National security was defined very broadly by the MGK as "the protection of the constitutional order of the state, its national existence, and its integrity; of all of its interests in the international field, including political, social, cultural, and economic interests; and of interests derived from international treaties against all external and internal threats". Therefore, the military's responsibilities reached beyond external and internal threats, and included also the "promotion of country's ability to achieve its national objectives"[82]. Thus, up until 2000s, internal security was an issue of the Turkish military and MGK more than the elected governments.

National defence: Turkey was a member of the NATO and the Council of Europe prior to the military rule. In alignment with the Turkish foreign policy, the junta government's commitment to stay within the NATO was reassured. Turkey had been immediately suspended from the membership of the Parliamentary Assembly of Council of Europe following the *coup d'etat*. The Turkish Military was committed to maintaining ties with the West, and therefore took Western views seriously presented through trade unions, human rights organizations, and politicians in the European Parliament[83]. Evren also stated that they would be committed to the United Nations charter, NATO responsibilities and good relationships with any organization composed of democratic member countries, particularly the European Economic Community and the Council of Europe.

Disagreement over the role of Turkey in the Gulf War constitutes an example for comparing the power of the MGK and government in the early 1990s. Turkey's foreign policy during the Gulf War was mainly determined by Özal's

---

[82]   MGK-General Secretariat*, Before and After 12 September in Turkey*, Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler Printing House, 1982.

[83]   Sayarı, *Politics and Economic Policy-Making.*

preferences and strategies. One incident was the resignation of Chief of General Staff (CGS) Necip Torumtay in 1990 because of his disagreement with the government on the operation in Northern Iraq. Özal had demanded the military be prepared for an operation, while Torumtay presented his concerns over the policy. This resignation implied changing power relations between the government and the military. Even on a subject where the military's expertise is undeniably necessary for policymaking, the military acted as subordinate to civilians. The military preferred to advise rather than imposing a policy on the debate[84]. Thus, the military drew the lines in foreign policy by keeping its commitment to the U.S and the Europe, but as it approached the 1990s, military's influence in foreign policy was in decline. But, during the initial years of post-transition, national defense was primarily the responsibility of the military rather than the Özal government.

Military organization: The military acted in accordance with lessons derived from their past experiences. The Turkish military, as expected, attached importance to its institutional unity and hierarchical order and had historical references for failure at times of their absence. Evren, after coming to power, warned minor members from attempting a coup within a coup[85]. Evren frequently visited the troops to convince them to support the MGK's actions[86]. Nevertheless, despite all these precautions, the top commanders were aware that interventions would have adverse effects on the military's professionalism and combat effectiveness. In order to strengthen hierarchical decision-making during the military rule, the MGK took control of the state, and CGS Evren became the head of the state with his four force commanders. Evren cooperated with these commanders not to make separate statements on political matters. The concentration of the power at the top level facilitated the implementation of the transitional process. Söyler (2015)[87] assesses that in the professional sphere, the level of military remained very high during the military rule. The General Staff had complete control over junior level personnel decisions[88].

In the post-transition process, the weight of civilians on the military can be elaborated with an example in senior promotions. Özal's government was in charge of the promotion of a new CGS according to the 1982 constitution which stated that the CGS can be elected from among all force commanders and the

---

84 Philip Robins, Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic? in C.H. Dodd (eds)., *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects*, Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1992.

85 Sayarı, *Politics and Economic Policy-Making*.

86 Kemal Karpat, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", in Heper M. and Evin A. (eds), *State, Democracy and The Military*, Berlin de Gruyter, 1988.

87 Mehtap Söyler, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Routledge Press, 2015.

88 Ibid.

tradition was that the chief of staff is appointed from the land forces[89]. Özal replaced General Üruğ with General Torumtay in 1987 instead of General Öztorun who was the favorite candidate of the General Staff. This move required Evren's consent and he endorsed the decision by signing all necessary decrees. That replacement signalled both an increase in the power of civilian governments vis-à-vis the military and the alienation of the state (with the president as its representative) from the military. However, the general cadres rose exponentially in Turkey following the 1980 coup and the level of autonomy in senior promotions, according to Söyler, increased from high to very high[90].

During the initial years of civilianization following the military rule, the defense ministry functioned as the secretary services of the military instead of guiding defense policies[91]. Although Özal promised to change this structure during the election campaign prior to 1987 elections, the results of the elections did not provide him a comfortable majority to amend the constitution. However, the government has been increasingly involved in the defense matters, though, not supreme over the military yet. Conclusively, civilians' power over the military organization was very limited and the military kept its institutional scrutiny.

An Overview of the Turkish Transition: Overall, in all of these five aspects, the military exerted an influential role on civilian politicians. While in public policy issues, the government was given some flexibility; Özal's hands were tied in many issues except economic ones and felt it necessary to compromise with the military to keep them in the barracks. The MGK's presence in the 1980s and 1990s was a constraining factor for the civilianization of the regime. However, the military on the other hand was in favour of civilianization to some extent to ensure legitimacy for the political system and to keep the military in discipline. Yet, except few incidences, civilians have not been able to challenge military influence.

Conclusion

The political role of military in comparison to civilians should be minimal for a regime to qualify as a democratic polity. However, military's historical and contextual role influences this relative power balance. Two cases in this study, Spain and Turkey, experimented with substantial military influence throughout the 20th century but civilian governments ultimately achieved to hold executive positions in the last four decades. Yet, the influence of military cannot be solely assessed by military's direct intrusion to executive office. Turkish military's influence on politics continued and has received criticism in Turkey's path towards EU membership[92]. Spanish case provides a divergent path and the political system

---

[89]   Ibid.

[90]   Ibid.

[91]   Sayarı, *Politics and Economic Policy-Making.*

[92]   Arzu Güler and Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek, '"Motives for reform on civil-military relations in Turkey", *Turkish Studies,* vol.17, no.2, (2016), 251-271.

has largely become civilianized. Several factors, i.e. institutional, cultural or conjuncture, could explain the differing results. Yet, in this study, I focused on the conditions, particularly the civil-military power parity, during the democratic transitions and argue that paths diverged at the very initial stages of democratization period by leaving a major mark on the political outcome.

Table 1: Comparative analysis of the level of military influence according to Croissant et al. (2010)'s criteria

	TURKEY			SPAIN	
Criteria	Major Issues	The level of military influence	The level of military influence	Major Issues	Criteria
Elite Recruitment	• Political Party Law and Electoral Law in 1983 • Military influence in constituent assembly • Composition of MGK in favour of military • Evren's attempt to influence voters' preferences	Very high	Medium	• King Juan Carlos came into power as head of state. • Three service ministers from the military was appointed inside the cabinet. • Legalization of Labour Unions • Legalization of the Communist Party	Elite Recruitment
Public Policy	• Definition of national security • Emphasis on secularism • The concept of civil society • Özal's economic policies • High issues and education	High	Low	• Adoption of Article 2 on national unity • Low representation of the military in the cabinet	Public Policy
Internal Security	• Martial Law • The influence of MGK	Very High	Medium	• Non-Recognition of nationalities in the Constitution • Increasing terror threat • Manifesto of the Hundred	Internal Security
National Defense	• Relations with NATO • Northern Iraq operation and Torumtay's resignation	Medium	Very Low	• Debates over NATO membership • Lack of unity within the army • Referendum on NATO membership	National Defense
Military Organization	• Military's institutional unity • Senior Promotions	Very High	High	• Amnesty Law for UMD members.	Military Organization

Table 1 indicates comparative findings on the role of military in Croissant et al.'s five designated areas. The finding reveal that Turkish military was more successful than their Spanish counterparts in shaping the transition process and leaving lasting impacts on the new political system. This has given them a leeway to interfere with politics in the post-transition period.

Additionally, this study contributes to the civil-military relations literature by applying Croissant et al.'s framework on two historical cases. The framework is useful in defining sub-components of military influence over civilian actors at the absence of military coups and as stated throughout the text, two transitional democracies differed to a great extent when compared in five categories suggested. However, the distinction between those categories gets blurred at two different conditions. First, it is a matter of interpretation whether fighting against terrorism or separatist forces should be regarded as an issue of internal security or national defence. While national defence could be defined as defense against other nations in international politics, ethnically motivated conflict is a potential challenger to national defense as well. In addition to this, in historical cases, NATO membership reveals as an important element for reconfiguration of the military organization and modernization of the military's both organization and capacity along with its

importance for national defense. Therefore, a military that reveals preference for NATO membership for national defense risks institutional re-organization and it is not easy to determine whether they approve this institutional reform or compromise for national defense preferences. Thus, it is necessary to tackle these difficulties in defining the relative power of military over civilians for further inquiry.

The post-transitional shortcoming of the democracy cannot be and should not be restricted to influence of military in politics. Other important factors including elite behaviour, socio-economic inequalities, judicial decisions and international conditions would play a role in the level of democracy. However, civil-military relations posed a great challenge to democratization in both countries and I hereby indicated that its impact owes to the civilian's disunity (or lack of unity) at the transition stage. These findings reinforce the claims made by those who suggest that modes of transition are critical in post-transitions.

References

Alba, Victor, *Transition in Spain*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978.

Agüero, Felipe, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy, Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective,* London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.

———, "Legacies of Transitions: Institutionalization, the Military, and Democracy in South America", *Mershon International Studies Review*, 42 (2), 1998, 383-404.

Bale, Tim, "Are bans on political parties bound to turn out badly? A comparative investigation of three 'intolerant' democracies: Turkey, Spain, and Belgium", *Comparative European Politics,* 5(2), 2007,141-157.

Barany, Zoltan, *The Soldier and the Changing State: Building Democratic Armies in Africa, Asia, Europe, and the Americas*, Princeton University Press, 2010.

Casanova, José, "Modernization and Democratization: Reflections on Spain's Transition to Democracy", *Social Research,* 50, 1983, 929-973.

Cizre Ümit, "Problems of democratic governance of civil-military relations in Turkey and the European Union enlargement zone", *European Journal of Political Research*, 43(1), 2004, 107-125.

Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, Ümit, "The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, 29 (2), 1997, 151-166.

Croissant, Aurel, David Kuehn, Paul Chambers & Siegfried O. Wolf, "Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies", *Democratization*, 17 (5), 2010, 950-975.

Çınar, Kürşat, "A comparative analysis of clientelism in Greece, Spain, and Turkey: the rural–urban divide", *Contemporary Politics*, 22 (1), 2016, 77-94.

Sanchez-Cuenca, Ignacio and Medina Luis Fernando, "Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination: The Spanish Transition Revisited", *Southern Europe Society and Politics*, Advanced online article, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2019.1694282, 2019.

Dahl, Robert, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.

Dodd, Henry Clement, *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, Hull: The Eothen Press, 1983.

Ergun, Özbudun*, Demokrasiye Geçiş Sürecinde Anayasa Yapımı (Constitution-making in Transition to Democracy)*, Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1993.

Esen, Berk & Şebnem Gümüşçü, "Turkey: how the coup failed?", *Journal of Democracy*, 28 (1), 2017, 59-73.

Evin, Ahmet, "Changing Patterns of Cleavages Before and after 1980", in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds), *State Democracy and the Military*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988.

Evren, Kenan, *Kenan Evren'in Anilari [Memoirs of Kenan Evren]*, Milliyet Publishing. Istanbul, 1990.

Friedheim, V. Daniel, "Bringing Society Back into Democratic Transition Theory after 1989: Pact Making and Regime Collapse", *Eastern European Politics and Societies*, 7, 1993, 481-512.

Geddes, Barbara, "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe", *Comparative Political Studies,* 28, 1995, 239-274.

Gomez, Jose & Antonio Olmeda. "The Armed Forces in the Francoist Political System," in *Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present*, edited by Rafael Banon Martines and Thomas M. Barker. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.

Gooch, Anthony, "A surrealistic referendum: Spain and Nato", *Government and Opposition*, 21 (3), 1986, 300-316.

Güler, Arzu & Cemal Alpgiray Bölücek, "Motives for reform on civil-military relations in Turkey", *Turkish Studies,* 17 (2), 2016, 251-271.

Hagopian, Francis, "Democracy by Undemocratic Means? Elites, Political pacts and Regime Transition in Brazil", *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (2), 1990, 147-170.

Hale, William, "Transitions to Civilian Governments in Turkey: The Military Perspective", in M. Heper and A. Evin (eds), *State, Democracy and The Military*, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988.

———, *Türkiye'de Asker ve Siyaset* [*Turkish Politics and Military*], İstanbul: Hil Publishing, 1996.

Harris, George, *Turkey: Coping with Crisis*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

Heper, Metin & Aylin Güney, "The Military and Consolidation of Democracy: The Recent Turkish Experience", *Armed Forces & Society,* 26 (4), 2000, 635-657.

Hunter, Wendy, "Politicians against Soldiers: Contesting the Military in Postauthorization Brazil", Comparative *Politics*, 27 (4), 1995, 425-443.

Huntington, P. Samuel, "Democracy's third wave", *Journal of Democracy*, 2 (2), 1991, 12-34.

Karabelias, Gerassimos, "The evolution of civil-military relations in post-war Turkey, 1980-95", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 35(4), 1999, 130-151.

Karpat, H. Kemal, "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", in Heper M. & Evin A. (eds), *State, Democracy and The Military*, Berlin de Gruyter, 1988.

Klepak, P. Hal, *Spain: NATO or Neutrality*. No. Orae-Extra-Mural Paper-11, Operational Research and Analysis Establishment Ottawa, Ontario, 1980.

Linz, J. Juan, "Transitions to democracy", *Washington Quarterly*, 13(3), 1990, 143-164.

Martinez, Rafael Banon, "The Spanish Armed Forces during the Period of Political Transition"*,* in Rafael Banon Martines and Thomas M. Barker (eds), *Armed Forces*

and *Society in Spain Past and Present*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, 311-355.

McLaren, Lauren & Burak Cop, "The failure of democracy in Turkey: a comparative analysis", *Government and Opposition*, 46 (4), 2011, 485-516.

MGK-General Secretariat*, Before and After 12 September in Turkey*, Ankara: Ongun Kardeşler Printing House, 1982.

Osuna, Jose Javier Olivas, "Revolutionary versus reactionary: contrasting Portuguese and Spanish civil-military relations during democratisation", *War & Society*, 38 (3), 2019, 225-248.

Pion-Berlin, David, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America", *Comparative Politics*, 25 (1), 1992, 83-102.

Pridham, Geoffrey, "The International Context of Democratic Consolidation: Southern Europe in Comparative Perspective", in Richard Gunther, Nikiforos Diamandouros & Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds), *The Politics of Democratic Consolidation*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, 169-195.

Robins, Philip, "Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis: Adventurist or Dynamic?", in C.H. Dodd (eds), *Turkish Foreign Policy: New Prospects,* Cambridgeshire: Eothen Press, 1992.

Rose, Richard & Don Chull Shin, "Democratization backwards: The problem of third-wave democracies", *British Journal of Political Science*, 31 (2), 2001, 331-354.

Rustow, Dankwart, *Turkey: the modernity of tradition*, Princeton University Press, 1965.

Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio & Luis Fernando Medina, "Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination: The Spanish Transition Revisited", *South European Society and Politics*, 2019, 1-22.

Sayarı, Sabri, "Politics and Economic Policy-Making in Turkey 1980-1988", in T.F. Nas & M. Odekon (eds.), *Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization,* London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1992.

Share, Donald, *The Making of Spanish Democracy*, New York: Praeger, 1986.

Somer, Murat, "Understanding Turkey's democratic breakdown: old vs. new and indigenous vs. global authoritarianism", *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 16 (4), 2016, 481-503.

Söyler, Mehtap, *The Turkish Deep State: State Consolidation, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, Routledge Press, 2015.

Steinmo, Sven, "Historical Institutionalism", in D. Della Porta and M. Keating (eds*), Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences: A pluralist perspective,* Cambridge: New York, 2008, 118-139.

Stepan, C. Alfred & F. Van Oystaeyen, *Rethinking military politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone.* Princeton University Press, 1988.

Sunar, İlkay & Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects", in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (eds), *Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Valenzuela, Arturo, "Party Politics and the Crisis of Presidentialism in Chile: A proposal for a parliamentary form of government", in J.J. Linz and A. Valenzuela (eds.), *The*

Failure of Presidential Demcoracy: The Case of Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, 91-150.

Yardımcı-Geyikçi, Şebnem, "Party institutionalization and democratic consolidation: Turkey and Southern Europe in comparative perspective", *Party Politics*, 21 (4), 2015, 527-538.

Zaverucha, Jorge, "The Degree of Military Autonomy during the Spanish, Argentina and Brazilian Transitions*", Journal of Latin American Studies,* 25 (2), 1993, 283-299.

Zürcher, Erik Jan, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi [History of a Modern Nation: Turkey]*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2000.