

SOME REMARKS ON MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S PATH OF QUESTIONING TECHNOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER'İN TEKNOLOJİ VE FENOMENOLOJİYİ SORGULAMA YOLU ÜZERİNE BAZI DÜŞÜNCELER

Bu yazıda büyük Alman filozofu Martin Heidegger'in fenomenoloji ve teknolojiye yönelik güçlü eleştirileri arasındaki bazı ilgilere dikkat çekilerek ve bu ilişkiden yola çıkılarak bazı noktalar üzerinde durulacaktır. Heidegger, fenomenolojinin, Husserl'de ifadesini bulan ve sosyolojik bir yaklaşım olarak da meşhur olan, bütün önyargılarımızı, kafamızdaki kavram ve düşünceleri "parantez"e alarak, "şeylerin özüne dönmek" formülünün ardında güçlü bir nesnelci, dolayısıyla Kartezyenist/pozitivist iradenin gizli olduğunu göstermiştir. Bunu yaparken o, aynı zamanda, Batılı metafiziğin o herşeyi zaptu rapt altına almak isteyen iktidar iştahına da saldıranın zeminini hazırlamıştır. Oysa fenomenoloji de aynı pozitivistlikte belki de ilk güçlü eleştiri olarak ortaya çıkmıştı. Buna rağmen "şeylerin özüne dönmek" konusundaki iyimser çabası Heidegger'in çizdiği eleştiri yolu tarafından hep bir "batılı metafiziğin/nesnelciliğin" restorasyon çabası olarak görülmüştür. Bu yazıda Heidegger'in fenomenolojiye yönelttiği bu eleştirinin, onun teknolojiye yaklaşımı ve eleştirisiyle aynı yola çıkmaktan dolayı, aynı dosya altında incelenmesi gerektiğine dikkat çekilmektedir. Bu dosyada ise teknolojinin kendisinden neredeyse asla kaçınılamayacak, her şeyi kuşatan, bir insanlık "kaderi" olarak görülmesinin, Heidegger'in bütün karşı çıkışlarına rağmen Hristiyan "Ebedî Günah" ve "kader" arketipleriyle ilginç bir münasebetininin var olduğu görülebilir. Dolayısıyla Heidegger, insanın işlerini kolaylaştıran bir şey olmaktan ziyade kendi hükmünü ferma eden bir çeşit ebedî ceza olarak teknolojiyi sunarken, onu da Spinoza'ya kadar götürülebilecek bir çeşit panteist/paganist tanrısallıkla buluşturarak daha da ilginç bir çok-referanslı-dinsellik yükleniyor. Bu yazının ulaşmaya çalıştığı sonuç da bir bakıma, Heidegger'in de Batılı metafiziğe bütün karşı çıkışlarına rağmen, bir kurtuluş yolu olarak sığındığı entellektüel referansların onu metafizik ötesinde hiç bir zaman rahat bırakmayacağıdır.

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Introduction

Heidegger's treatment of technology and his venture of the way to or from phenomenology seems at first sight irrelevant to each other. My initial aim in this study is to draw attention to their relevances in order to make some other questions about Heidegger's special path of thinking on some issues such as logocentrism, metaphysics of presence, which would later be promoted as a central problem of the Western humanism by Derrida and other poststructuralist thinkers. I will try to open the gate before such a thesis that Heidegger's criticism of or his well-known "way from" phenomenology is very akin to his criticism of technology. As will be elaborated below, technology is taken as a basic mood of the Being. It is the concealment of the Being which excludes any subjective human initiation. Although what makes the concealment of the Being as technology possible is man's delusion of taking something present-at-his-hand, that is his delusion of subjectivity, the fundamental principle of the Cartesian dualism, this takes place without the subjective performance of man. The concealment of the Being is a global process which involves man's participation just in the form of his forgetting of the Being. The concealment of the Being, like its unconcealment or revealing, is a process beyond man's limited world. Undoubtedly, here the challenge of Heidegger to the idea of subject or to the Cartesian dualism has very close ties with or roots in some religious ideas. In spite of all his objections to Christian theological conception, I will try to show that, as much as I can in the limits of this study, such Heidegger's pessimistic conceptions excluding any subjective initiation, have their roots in the Christian idea of original sin. And to avoid some misconceptions I should remind that this is a paradoxical connection, because Heidegger charges all the responsibility of the Cartesian idea of subject to the Christian notion of the World mastery, of the representation of God in the World. Notwithstanding, Heidegger, rejecting any version of voluntarism in the movements of the Being, in fact, follows Spinoza's pantheism which had arisen by way of a radical criticism to Descartes. To be conscious of the range of his references, it should be kept in mind that this path of Heidegger's thinking reproduce some mystical traditions going beyond

Christianity or Judaism (through Spinoza), such as paganism and some other Asian religions.¹

¹For a good illustration and analysis of religious origins of Heidegger's path of thinking, Caputo's work is very good example. He makes an elaborate comparison of Heidegger's Thought with Meister Eckhart's thought (Caputo, 1986).

Then, the task that this study will aim to perform is rather different than giving a summary of the "Question Concerning Technology" and some writings on phenomenology by Martin Heidegger. The relevant articles, like most of his studies are really striking, and require profound thinking and elaboration to be caught. It is, perhaps the most interesting and powerful criticism against technology without falling into the position of rejecting it with ignorance of its weight in our lives. Rather than falling into the comic position of improving solutions to the technology he tries to understand its essence, so that to be able to reflect on its role and its possible appearances in the Being. This, of course makes him quite interesting and rather important in any context concerning technology, so that the study can not be ignored in any attempt to frame the possible approach to the essence of technology. On the essence of technology there occurs rigid polarisations of the approaches. My aim however is not to give its summary but to make some remarks on technology and on the nature of possible attitudes taken against technology through the connotations awakened by Heidegger, especially by his basic articles as "The Question Concerning Technology" and the "Science and Reflection".

A Historical Contextualisation of Heidegger

Basically, as a statement of the capacities of man, it potentially consists of variety of attitudes and approaches. There have always been the believers of the history which has expressed them a tendency of itself toward exploring or revealing the human capacities as contribution to the accumulation of knowledge, power, confidence and experience, all which are considered to function against nature. On the other hand, there have again always been some other tendencies against the issue, which have constituted a strong tradition of the esteem to nature and to the man himself as a part of the nature. Undoubtedly such a tradition has been rooted in various kind of Asian religions as Zen Buddhism and Taoism through which Heidegger tries to find various connotations for his alternative suggestions against the dominance of Western metaphysics which potentially has to produce modern kind of the technology.

The contemporary vision of those tendencies are reflected in the attitude against technology that makes us able to talk on at least the strongly fans of technology and strongly enemies to technology. Heidegger's position in such a crude classification is, of course, not so easy to be determined, and perhaps this would be very simple frame into which Heidegger could not be placed. We can not maintain to argue that Heidegger is, for example, against technology at the final point, in spite of all of his radical treatment of

the question concerning technology. Ultimately what he says is not but we can not live without technology, because technology is part of our destiny. "It is our being, in a sense: what we are as modern human beings is in part what we are through technique" (Maggee, 1978: 91).

If we are to begin with locating Heidegger in his historical context, the context one would choose would be the epoch of modern philosophy as a whole, beginning with Descartes in the seventeenth century. Descartes was one of the founders of the New science and his schema for launching it involved a peculiar split between consciousness and the external world. The mind schematises nature for quantitative purposes -for measurement and calculation, with the ultimate purpose of manipulating nature. Furthermore, the consciousness doing all that, the human subject, is set off against nature. Therefore, there emerges a very striking dualism between mind and the external world. Nearly all philosophy in the subsequent two and a half centuries accommodated itself to this Cartesian framework.

Heidegger goes further to find the Greek origins of this unique kind of thinking, as he always does. And concludes that the essential quality of the technological thinking is its insistent aggressiveness. This quality is originated from the human-centric supposition by which the modern science propose the man as *hupokeimenon*, that is the basic Subject who determine the nature of the Being (Alderman, 1992; Heidegger, 1977). This feature of man becomes indispensable, given the effective idea of Plato who assumes that the real Being can be exactly known only through the light of reason. According to Heidegger this idea has at least the following implications:

1. It gives to the Being a mathematical rationality, and thus, it assumes definite calculability to the Being.

2. Because the criteria of the Being is its calculability, the being should be in connection with the human reason whose light is mathematics, and since the features of the mathematical systems are identified as the features of the Being, they eventually becomes dependent to reason.

3. The result of this is an aggressive mode of thinking marked the entire thought of the West.

The Christian Origins of Some Techniques of Protesting Technology

The most important emphasis of my study will be that there is high degree of connection between the pessimist position against technology, which is significantly related with the radical objections raised against modernism, and the Christian notion of the Original Sin. It is, furthermore, highly paradoxical, because, all those philosophers like Nietzsche, Foucault

and Heidegger have tried to reveal the Christian origins of the on-going modernism, and the deep mental elements associated with this modernism.²

We know Foucault who has considerably contributed in discovering the deep influence of the Christian Confession in the daily life of the Western society. Thus, he has very surprisingly tried to explain the proliferation of the words on almost every aspect of our sexuality, which had earlier been thought as an expression of the freedom of sexuality. We were inspired by Foucault to think this free-speaking as mostly because of the need to confess a crime, rather than being just an expression of freedom. And such a need to confess, in turn, was not but a reproduction of the power with the same origin of the one which was functioning as a limitation on the utterance of the sexuality (Foucault, 1978). But, again, Foucault himself produces such a way of analysing the power, in other more appropriate sense the power relations, that nobody could save himself from being the subject and the Subject (with the capital S) of power. For, it begins to work as anyone tries to know.³

That is not but a scientific expression of the admission that man had been charged with an eternal, original sin. Because it is so indispensable that to nobody is promised a way to go out of the power. Man is pictured as having been thrown in the world, perhaps without any explanation of why he has been thrown but with the full efforts of the depictions of that rushing out. Thus, the name of the freedom of sexuality, or the consequences associated it, is given originally by Foucault as "incitement to the discourse" which is also the name of a chapter in Foucault's book (Foucault: 1978). The underlying idea here is that man is subjected or incited to participate in a discourse, just as he is incited to confess his sin, by some discursive conditions.

Among all other so-called Postmodernist or poststructuralist thinkers, another example of this tendency is Jacques Ellul's study (Ellul, 1964). His study is important because of its direct speaking on technology in terms of man's destiny in the world, so that his portrayal may open some issues to be arised about the religious origins of Heidegger's treatment of technology.

²The well-known references to the Messianic character of both Hegel and Marx, in this context, have been emphasised enough. The tradition of the constitution of the correlation between Capitalist enterprise and the Protestant ethics, inspired by Max weber, undoubtedly, has provoked this comparative outlook to the Christian origins of various elements of our modernity. I want to mention a recent one that has provided a good example of this kind: Louis Dumont, 1986.

³These are his own words in persisting in the handicap of the existence of men as a knowing subject against the power: "We are subjected to the production of truth through power, and we can not exercise power except through the production of truth." M. Foucault, 1980.

Ellul is important in this context because of his double aspect: he is both a good Christian and perhaps the strongest analyst of technology. Neither of these two features, however, are so important as his strong pessimism regarding the existing of men with technology, which is really very interesting. He explains that the modern *homo technicus* is manipulated by an evil spirit the previous generations have not exercised and known. But Ellul's privilege lies rather in his awareness of the influence of the Original Sin. Apart from the case that the very idea of original sin works in his underconsciousness, he admit it plainly. He makes even comparisons between the position of being fallen into the original sin in modern times and the classical ages, and he concludes that in the classical ages there had always been a way to be purified from the Original Sin, but in the modern technological case there is no even such a way to go out of the Sin. Therefore, the contemporary technology and the Original Sin it has created becomes worse than the Original Sin itself. Defining the technique as "the whole of the methods in every domain of human activity derived logically and giving absolute efficiency", Ellul labels the technology as morally dirty. Indeed, thus, he prepares for it a way of penetration into every sect of the human existence.

That is, perhaps because of his theologian identity that he don't suffices with a sociological explanation alone. He approaches to technique as a way of thinking, not just as a universal category but also an ontological order which is certainly human. That is the strongest but at the same time the weakest point of Ellul. Since he successfully unites the scientific, sociological and philosophical points of view in one domain of intellectual research, his concept of technique hitherto is attractively universal. But consequently he becomes submerged with theology and metaphysics.

As a universal and independent reality, technique, is explained as the technical society itself in which man is just an integrated and bound element. More important than all these is the ethical autonomy of the technique. Since it locates itself beyond the evil and the good, it doesn't feel any fear whatever limitation may occur. For a long time it has been claimed that technology was unbiased. Today there is not anything valuable in being unbiased. Because the autonomy of technique and its power is so sound that it becomes the judge of what is ethical and the creature of a new ethics. It would be necessary to reduce man to a level of technical animal, because wherever man is free there can not be technique. Here comes the traditional conclusion of Ellul: there can not be human autonomy against the technical autonomy.

Considering his argumentations from Muslim point of view, S. Parviz Mansour concludes that "If an Islamic criticism is required, the Muslim has no other alternative than leaving Ellul together with his anxieties... A Muslim might be influenced by Ellul's intellectual genius and analytical skill and can admit and exalt the understanding and compassionate humanism relying on its perception. But he can not share the despising approach of the French Theologian to the human nature... A Muslim never becomes hopeless about his ability of shaping his future and he doesn't resist against the partial measures taken against the illnesses of the technique. His belief in the God doesn't permit to despise the man and his collective enterprises" (Mansour, 1992: 151).

As for Heidegger, his etymological analysis of technology arrives at such a point to think that it is an ontological order. He again makes the distinction of the old technology and the modern one. He characterises the former as *physis* that is the free revealing of the being that characterises the work of craftsmen, who don't apply an aggressive way of revealing the causes in the being. It is a bringing forth, *poiesis* and the arising of something from out of itself. Thus, it is *poiesist* in the highest sense. Like many words under his use, by the word cause, too, he goes in detail of the morphological analysis of its original usage by the Greeks. Thus, he documents four kinds of causes which only all together might be meaningful in explanation of the instrumentality in the being:

1- The *cause materials*, the material, the matter out of which, for example, a silver chalice is made; 2- the *causa formalis*, the form, the shape into which the materials enters; 3- the *causa finalis*, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which the chalice required is determined as to its form and matter; 4- the *causa efficiens*, which brings about the effect that is the finished, actual chalice, in this instance, the silversmith (Heidegger, 1977: 8).

Thus, technology is defined as a means but not mere a means. Technology is also a way of revealing. It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth.⁴ It comes to presence in the realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where *aletheia*, truth, happens. Heidegger here distinguishes the modern technology. It too is a revealing. And yet the revealing that holds sway

⁴"The word "technology" stems from the Greek *Technikon* means that which belongs to *techne*. We must observe two things with respect to the meaning of this word. One is that *techne* is the name not only for the activities and skills of the craftsman, but also for the arts of the mind and the fine arts. *Techne* belongs to bringing-forth, to *poiesis*; it is something poietic" (Heidegger, 1977: 12-13).

throughout it doesn't unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of *poiesis*. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. He remind the possible question would be raised here "But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well?" and answers:

No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it. In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and core. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit (ibid.: 1977: 14).

The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of a setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth. Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. Heidegger calls it the standing-reserve. Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, no merely human doing. Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man to order the real as standing-reserve in accordance with the way in which it shows itself. That challenging gathers man into ordering. This gathering concentrates man upon ordering the real as standing-reserve.

Saving Power

Here, very definitely see that technology is, in Heidegger, again something beyond man himself although it is completely human. Man is subordinated to a kind of technological mode of thinking, which produce technology. That is the very point where Heidegger refers to the common danger which connotes not but an original sin. Furthermore, Heidegger is very aware of the fact that had been uttered by Hölderlin:

But where danger is, grows

The saving power also (Heidegger, 1977: 28).

Heidegger, reminds the danger of producing a new power in showing the radical solutions to our ways out of our destiny. In spite of all optimistic aura of this verse he quote from Hölderlin, in fact, he reminds us that the power

emerges together with the activity or the will to save.⁵ In spite of all of his shyness from proposing an alternative, Heidegger at the end of his study, brings his partial solution, without suggesting any radical rejection:

Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it... Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part doesn't shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are *questioning* (ibid.: 35).

What makes Heidegger emphasize what is akin to technology but fundamentally different from it is the fact that there was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name *techne*. Once that revealing that brings forth of the true into the splendor of radiant appearing also was called *techne*. Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into a beautiful was called *techne*. And the *poiesis* of the fine arts also was called *techne* (ibid.: 34).

Then, I want to repeat his ending words of his article which might be a good motto of the purity of being of the piety of thought:

The closer we come to the danger, the more brightly do the ways into the saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. *For questioning is the piety of thought* (ibid.: 36, emphasis mine).

The Way to Phenomenology

Now, there remains the task of emphasising some points regarding Heidegger's views on phenomenology through some concepts as *logos*, *phenomenon* and the theme of "the forgetting of Being". Undoubtedly within the limits of such an article I would have to be quite humble in connecting Heidegger's treatment of technology with criticism of phenomenology. It may be both because of some personal reasons, as well as of the nature of Heidegger's views. Any study of Heidegger's view begins with a bewilderment because of his very complicated network of his ideas. And as an initial impression, I should report that one can not be sure of his temporary conclusions about these ideas except that at every stage one begins to be opened to various terms of the being as imposed by Heidegger.

⁵Undoubtedly the poetry has other connotations, both in Heidegger and in Hölderlin also than my specification of the danger as the "emergence of power" which is a specific kind of reading inspired by Foucault and Nietzsche.

It is thus really difficult to arrive at a final point in asserting anything about Heidegger's any view on anything. It should be noted that this is not only my personal impression from his works. As a result of various readings, I realised that it has almost been the widespread impression resulted from Heidegger readings in various circles. He has had a great influence on many academicians or intellectuals without being subject to their discourses. Foucault, to illustrate, is one of the farest ones of this kind. Although he has never written anything about Heidegger, he confessed that Heidegger was, indeed, the underlying agent of all his writings. So that he felt so close to Heidegger that, as he tells us, he thought from within him and could not write about him:

"But I've never written anything on Heidegger ... I think it is important to have a small number of authors with whom one thinks, with whom one works, but on who one does not write."⁶

Now, what I want to do in the limited boundaries of this article is to think on some sociological and philosophical issues as phenomenology and Being from within the ground opened by Heidegger. In other words, having read something from Heidegger and having influenced, no matter in true or false way, from himself I want to retreat some classical philosophical and sociological issues.

Now my contention is to make some remarks on phenomenology, and to follow the course of the Heideggerian line in this subject.

Phenomenology from Husserl to Heidegger

In Edmund Husserl's study, the term "phenomenology" has corresponded to his great project of a "returning to the things themselves!" To speak crudely, for Husserl, the concepts through which we think and perceive the reality, the theories we have constructed for measuring the reality, indeed, remove us from the essence of the reality. We began to think and organise the reality in our minds in accordance with these theoretical and conceptual constructions. In other words, we become subject to think the reality with the concepts, theories and some other socially given

⁶Of course, Foucault is not the only one thinking from within the space opened by Heidegger. Early in his career Jacques Derrida doubted that he could write anything that had not already been thought by Heidegger. Pierre Bourdieu says that in philosophy Heidegger was his "first love." His own important concept of the social field is indirectly indebted to Heidegger by way of Merleau-Ponty. Even Jürgen Habermas... and so on. The kind of the encountering of all these names with Heidegger, either as critical or as defender has been preceded by the very difficulty of talking about Heidegger. For his influence on the contemporary masters of philosophy and for the quotation from Foucault cf. Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (eds.), 1992.

procedures. Then we come collectively to think that the things are not to be conceived of in other way than they appear to us, while the things, in fact, do not appear but only through these mental procedures. These procedures shared in a collective participation of a given community are called "life-worlds." Apart from the fact that the "life-worlds" are collectively constituted, they rely on the individual fiction of the collectively. For they are not but something taken-for-granted. We think that we are living within the same world with our partners. We often ignore the very fact that we all carry our biographical background in our communicational activities. Therefore we often fail in realising the individual differences in receiving the communicational signs, arisen from the biographical differences in question. Attacking on the positivist perception of reality in such a way, Husserl has asserted that in positivism the real world, the nature and its all contents are taken for granted, so that what remains for us is to discover it. Husserl, thus, draws the attentions to the constitutive attribute of the mental procedures apart from the taken for granted world that would be discovered. What we think of as the picture of the outside world is not the mere product of the outside world, but it is the mental procedure that makes the appearance of this world possible. In other words, what we think as reality is not but a product of our mental procedures. We never perceive of the reality with its full nakedness. What we see in our contact with reality is rather the appropriate stage of our mental procedures.

This is in one sense the reproduction of the Kantian distinction of *numen* and phenomenon on the one hand, and of a kind of idealism on the

other hand. For in this conception the all problem is occurring in the mind and not in the concrete world of the reality. That is why the phenomenological problem has remained rather as a philosophical one without achieving a sufficient sociological version of its own.

With the phenomenological program Husserl thought that he could be able to exceed the problems of misconceiving the phenomena by applying the method of taking our prejudgements, concepts, theories into the parenthesis. As a result we could be able to achieve a radical return, for Husserl, to the "essence of the things."⁷ Thus we see the point where later Heidegger would base his rupture from the Husserlian phenomenology. Husserl is found very naive in proposing a way as taking some concepts, theories and other mental procedures to overcome the distance between us

⁷For a good summary of the phenomenological discussion as a sociological program cf. Tom Bottomore & Robert Nisbet, 1978.

and the "essence of the things." For Heidegger this, at least, might be seen not but as a reproduction (although Heidegger would not be enjoyed from the term reproduction) of the positivist perception of reality. For, the "essence of the things" is formulated in rather perfect way, and as a result the search for discovering it becomes no more positivistic than the positivists. Again very naively Husserl ignores the role of the language in our being in the world through our construction of the world.

Nevertheless, Heidegger challenged the idea that we use a language -the idea that underlies all positivist paradigms to Husserl. Apart from his emphasis on the impossibility of putting any one of our ideas, concepts and any other mental procedures in a parenthesis, Heidegger, adds to this discussion the linguistic emphasis. That is, we can never leave our ideas, and concepts aside. For we think with them. We don't think through them but we think together with them. Furthermore, any human experience, either linguistic or practical, can never be extracted mathematically from the total sum of the human experience.

In his famous article on "Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry" (Heidegger, 1988) commenting the poems of Hölderlin as "Writing poetry: "That most innocent of all occupations / Therefore language, most dangerous of possessions, been given to man ... so that he may affirm what he is. / much has man learnt. Many of heavenly ones has he named, since we have been a conversation, and have been able to hear from one another." Heidegger argues that on the contrary of the widespread misconception the language is not a tool at man's disposal, rather it is that event which disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence:

"We -mankind- are a conversation. The being of men is founded in language. But this only becomes actual in conversation... We are a conversation -and that means we can hear from one another. We are a conversation, that always means at the same time; we are a single conversation. Nevertheless the latter is not merely a manner in which language is put into effect, rather it is only as conversation that language is essential." (EB: 276, 277)

What we usually mean by language, for Heidegger, namely a stock of words and syntactical rules is only a threshold of language. But what is meant by "a conversation", now, is the act of speaking with others about something. That is the point where he arrives at the convergence with the term "logos" as the derivation of the word "*legein*". For "...speaking also brings about the process of coming together" (ibid.) because of its very character of making manifest the ability of men "to hear from one another" (Hölderlin). By speaking and therefore by language we are brought together.

That is what the word "*legein*" means. As we learn from various questionings by Heidegger in *Being and Time* (pp. 55-58) and *Was ist das - die Philosophie?* (Heidegger, 1990) it is through the "legein"ing character of the logos that we are brought together into a conversation.

The nature of this hearing from one another and of the naming of the things of men is another important question to be asked in this context of phenomenology. Because, it is just here that the phenomenological question i.e., the covering or the concealing character of the words arises. Then, what is the difference of the unconcealment of the being through logos from the project of the return to "the things themselves!" as formulated by Husserl, which was found a new version of positivism by Heidegger? This is, I think, a vital question to be asked in making Heidegger's position against phenomenology clear. But before this question, further remarks on the essence of language in Heidegger would be useful. As we mentioned above, Heidegger do not think that language is not a tool at our disposal, but it is that event which disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence. In other words we are not thinking *through* language but *with* the language. thus the language is not the tool present at our hand, but we become, perhaps, the children, the products of the language. When we speak we are by no means in the position of using the language, but then it is the language that disposes of the supreme possibility of human existence. For language is the dwelling of the Being and the Being makes itself manifest through language. And this manifestation is assured by poetry. The poetry is the last stage to explain the human character of dwelling in the earth by Heidegger. Against the Cartesian approach to language and to understanding, Heidegger emphasis the poetical character of our being. In contrast to the widespread conviction:

"...poetry never takes language as a raw material ready to hand, rather it is poetry which first makes language possible. poetry is the primitive language of a historical people. Therefore, in just the reverse manner, the essence of language must be understood through the essence of poetry." (*Existence an Being*: 283-284).

Relying on Hölderlin's poem as "Full of merit, and yet poetically, dwells / Man on this earth" (EB: 282) he comments that "to "dwell poetically" means: to stand in he presence of the gods and to be involved in the proximity of the essence of the things. Existence is "poetical" in its fundamental aspect - which means at the same time: in so far as it is established (founded), it is not a recompense, but a gift."

In his questioning of the phenomenological phenomenon in *Being and Time*, Heidegger chooses morphological analysis of the related words in

the Greeks. He insists, thus, on clarifying the meaning of the term phenomenon and also the term logos as functional in making the sense more clear.

The phenomenological way is required by Heidegger because with the question of philosophy, which requires to be treated phenomenologically. The expression phenomenology, here, signifies primarily a methodological conception, which does not characterise the what of the objects of philosophical research as subject-matter, but rather the how of that research. Here, still, Heidegger agrees with Husserl in the definition of the term phenomenology in the search for its maxim which can be formulated as "to the things themselves!" But he goes further to the rupture point with phenomenology by going back to the Greek rendering of the 'phenomenon' or 'logos'. Taking superficially the term phenomenology as the science of phenomena as the "science of God", "Science of life"; "Science of social" in theology, biology and sociology, he sets forth the preliminary conception of phenomenology by establishing the meaning of the name in which these are put together (Heidegger, 1962: 50).

The original expression of the term phenomenon in Greek as derived from its verbal version means "to show itself", so phenomenon is that which show itself, the manifest. The expression 'phenomenon' signifies that which shows itself in itself, the manifest. Accordingly the "phenomena" are the totality of what lies in the light of day or can be brought to the light.

However it is possible for an entity to show itself as something which in itself is not. When it shows itself in this way, it 'looks like something or other'. This kind of showing itself is what is called "seeming". Thus he insists on the akin meaning of he appearance as 'semblant', 'semblance' in the sense that something good which looks like, but 'in actuality' is not, what it gives itself out to be. For further understanding of the concept of phenomenon, everything depends on our seeing how what is designated in the first signification, of phenomenon (as that which shows itself) and what is designated in the second (as semblance) are structurally interconnected:

"Only when the meaning of something is such that it makes pretension of showing itself -that is, of being a phenomenon- *can* it show itself as something which it is *not*; only then *can* it 'merely look like so-and-so'. When *phenomenon* signifies 'semblance', the primordial signification (the phenomenon as the manifest) is already included as that upon which the second signification is founded. We shall allot the term 'phenomenon' to this positive and primordial signification of *phenomenon*, and to distinguish "phenomenon" from "semblance", which is the privative modification of "phenomenon" as thus defined. But what *both* these terms express has proximally

nothing at all to do with what is called an 'appearance', or still less a 'mere appearance'. (*Being and Time*: 53).

Then, Heidegger makes a distinction between the showing-itself, announcing itself through what shows itself, and the mere appearance in clarifying the meaning of the phenomenon. As he explores, appearance, as the appearance of 'something', does not mean showing-itself; it means rather the announcing-itself by (von) something which does not show itself, but which announces itself through something which does show itself. "Appearing is not a *not-showing-itself*. But the 'not' we find here is by no means to be confused with the privative 'not' which we used in defining the structure of semblance. What appears does not show itself; and anything which thus fails to show itself, is also something which can never seem. All indications, presentations, symptoms, and symbols have this basic formal structure of appearing, even though they differ among themselves" (ibid.: 52).

Heidegger (perhaps phenomenologically), thus, seems to problematise the concept phenomenon by making unclear the meanings of the term. For him, if one defines "phenomenon" with the aid of a conception of 'appearance' which is still unclear, then everything is stood on its head, and a 'critique' of phenomenology on this basis is surely a remarkable undertaking. If the phenomenological conception of the phenomenon is to be understood at all, regardless of how much closer we may come to determining the nature of that which shows itself, this presupposes inevitably that we must have an insight into the meaning of the formal conception of phenomenon and its legitimate employment in an ordinary signification. From this point Heidegger find an entrance to the term 'logos' so as to make clear in what sense phenomenology can be a 'science of' phenomena at all.

In any way, rendered as 'reason', 'judgement', 'concept', 'definition', 'ground' or 'relationship' and 'discourse', the term logos lead in Heidegger to the way, I think, again to phenomenology. By founding an harmony between the Greek words and the things they claim to correspond he seems to fall into a new metaphysical position. For he, in one sense, claim an Harmony of the words with the things in Greek and only in Greek, where he thinks that the words were the immediate names of what were named. And that was what was meant by the term 'logos' (*Was ist das-die Philosophie?*: 20). 'Logos' thus, appears as the essence of the things, the ideal of phenomenology which sought the way to "the things themselves". The Greek language is founded by Heidegger as the logos itself. And only the Greek language is founded by Heidegger as the logos itself.

Now, it can be said that the way phenomenology has followed in turning back to the things themselves could be seen as an attempt to making the things present-at-hand in the full sense of the technological attitude. From this phrasing of the "present-at-hand" we know there arises almost all criticisms of the metaphysics of presence. Metaphysics of the presence, in turn, is the other word of the chronicle logocentrism of the West holding sway from Socrates to present. The metaphysics of present, as was formulated by Derrida, is to suppose, or even to make, the possible meaning of the word ready-here. It is the boldly underlying idea of the Cartesian objectivism. As it seems, Heidegger's way out of phenomenology passes from such a criticism. For Heidegger, phenomenology has been submerged with the logocentrist metaphysics of presence which had been promoted by the Cartesianism and the positivism of the nineteenth century. The metaphysics of presence, potentially is the ground unto which the technological will arises, i.e., where the openness of the being becomes concealed. What is concealed through the technological action of man is the awareness of the Being

The Being, here, and evreywhere in Heidgger's treatment, is not something to be caught or to be present at man's hand as standing reserve. It is concealed or unconcealed depending on man's opening his eyes and ears to see its revealing and to hear its voices. It is a gift by the gods as a reward for man's piety in thinking and questioning. But more importantly it is not at man's disposal but an event which disposes of the supreme possibility of all human existence. As it seems, Heidegger's all vocabulary is fully religious without appealing to any theological discussion. Being as disposing of the supreme possibility of human existence recalls Spinoza's pantheism which encompasses man in itself. Spinoza's ontology excludes man's voluntary will in the participation to the world. Instead, man is drawn into a series of existential events without knowing where he is going to, just as he doesn't know where he had been thrown from.

Indeed, while Spinoza is a rationalist and having asserted the absolute infinity of God or Substance, Heidegger has always insisted on the infinite of Being. In spite of the *prima facie* differences between Spinoza and Heidegger, Brent A. Singer, argues in his article (1990: 265), that Heidegger's views in his 1929 lecture, *Was ist Metaphysik?* are both consistent with, and supplemental to, the basic premise of Spinoza's ontological argument in Part One of his *Ethics*. According to this view, being held out into the nothing, in Heidegger's sense, is a condition without which substance can not be adequately conceived, while at the same time, being

held into the nothing does not preclude the possibility that substance, defined as an infinite being without negation, does exist.

However, although it was not well-elaborated, the postmodernist criticism against Heidegger as pronounced by Derrida in his discussions with Gadamer, should be repeated (Behler, 1991; Michelfelder & Palmer, 1989). That is, alongside with his very concept of Being, his return to the term *logos* as a special peculiarity of the Greeks where also the term truth gains its correspondence, Heidegger begins to share the very metaphysical conceptions of phenomenology. We know that he had criticised phenomenology for not experiencing a rupture from positivist conceptions of the reality, which was rooted in Cartesian approach to knowledge.

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