

MAJOR BARRIERS THAT DETERMINE IRAN-TURKEY TRADE AGENDA

Naz TÜRKSÖY¹

Prof. Dr. Erkut AKKARTAL²

ABSTRACT

The present study is a comprehensive analysis of the transformation of Iran-Turkey relationships in a historical framework. For this purpose, the political and economic ties between the two countries are examined in depth by taking into consideration the historical changes in their political attitudes towards each other and the trade ties that are affected by many factors. The study also analyzes any determinants that shape the mutual understanding and economic relationships between them. Moreover, it seeks to evaluate any trade barriers and obstacles that impede the free flow of imports and exports. This study argues that the relationships between Iran and Turkey is mainly informed by their regional and international policies and political attitudes towards each other which fluctuates between rivalry and partnership. Finally, the future prospect of the relationship between them is closely analyzed and some suggestions in terms of economic relations and political considerations are proposed to empower their ties and facilitate their trade transactions.

Keywords: Turkey, Iran, Political Considerations, Economic Relations.

İRAN-TÜRKİYE TİCARET GÜNDEMİNİ BELİRLEYEN BAŐLİCA ENGELLER

ÖZET

Bu alıřma, İnan-Türkiye iliřkilerinin dönüşümünün tarihsel bir çerçevede kapsamlı bir analizidir. Bu amaçla, iki ülke arasındaki siyasi ve ekonomik bağlar, birbirlerine karşı siyasi tutumlarındaki tarihsel deęişimler ve birçok faktörden etkilenen ticari bağlar dikkate alınarak derinlemesine incelenmektedir. alıřma ayrıca, aralarındaki karşılıklı anlayışı ve ekonomik iliřkileri şekillendiren belirleyicileri de analiz etmektedir. Ayrıca, ithalat ve ihracatın serbest akışını engelleyen ticaret engellerini ve engelleri deęerlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu alıřma, İnan ve Türkiye arasındaki iliřkilerin esas olarak bölgesel ve uluslararası politikaları ile rekabet ve ortaklık arasında dalgalanan birbirlerine karşı siyasi tutumları tarafından şekillendirildiğini savunuyor. Son olarak, aralarındaki iliřkinin gelecekteki görünümü yakından incelenmekte ve bağlarını güçlendirmek ve ticari işlemlerini kolaylařtırmak için ekonomik iliřkiler ve siyasi mülahazalar açısından bazı önerilerde bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, İnan, Siyasi Mülahazalar, Ekonomik İliřkiler

¹ Student Of MBA Yeditepe University Social Science/International Trade and Logistics Management, ORCID: 0000-0003-4443-9595, naz.turksoy@hotmail.com

² Yeditepe Üniversitesi, Ticari Bilimler Fakültesi, ORCID: 0000-0002-7090-4447, erkut.akkartal@yeditepe.edu.tr
Arařtırma Makalesi/Research Article, Geliř Tarihi/Received:25/01/2021–Kabul Tarihi/Accepted: 24/06/2021

INTRODUCTION

In the course of history, the relationship between Iran and Turkey has shown great fluctuations. Although this relationship can be characterized by many features, it has always been carried on by conflict and tension, followed by intervals of short and relatively positive atmosphere with increased cooperation and mutual understanding. Economic, political, and military relationships between them have also had great ups and downs, sometimes in favor of one and sometimes in favor of the other. However, in the modern times, the conflicts gradually faded away and a general setting of cooperation established between them. This doesn't mean in any way that the relationship between the two countries grew friendly, but simply means that they came to an understanding that to foster in the region and develop sustainable interactions, both sides need a bilateral rational understanding of each other's national priorities.

Besides their mutual relationships, their regional relationships in a large scale are also of great importance because they play a significant role in regional developments. It is true that they have always had steady economic and diplomatic relationships, they have rarely had mutual efforts regarding their development in the Middle East. This is because of many reasons. Two general factors that determine their regional and mutual relationships is their political system and international perspectives that inform the way they interact with each other as well as other countries in the region for the development of their own interest and that of others. In spite of their two-sided stress on extending their relationships, there seems to be inadequate attempts on either side to develop corporations to enrich the region-wide development level (Noruzi, 2000).

All in all, the most vigorous characteristic that defines the nature of the relationship between Turkey and Iran is rivalry rather than comradeship. Officials and elites in both countries blame their counterparts for many shortcomings they have had in their relationships. Both find fault with the other regarding political and economic plans at domestic and regional levels that negatively impact the other. In this regard, economic relation has always been under the shadow of political agenda. This means that, when the two countries had friendly relations, economic ties between them were promoted but when tension increased between them economy negatively suffered. Especially in the recent century, closer political ties drew the two neighbors to establish more profound trade agreements and free flow of goods (Aras, 2001).

There has been a great deal of studies conducted on the relationship between Turkey and Iran, most of which have explored different aspects of this relation. Their economic, political and cultural bonds have been the topic of scholarly interests both inside and outside these two countries. However, most of these research attempts have focused on only one dimension of this relationship, and have failed to provide a comprehensive analysis. The present study undertakes to analyze political and economic trajectory on the relationship between Iran and Turkey.

Objectives of this study are twofold: on the one hand, it examines the nature of economic ties and trade barriers that characterize mutual business relationships between these two countries, and, on the other hand, it analyzes the political portfolio of Iran and Turkey to show how their political perspectives influence their mutual economic ties.

1. TURKEY-IRAN ECONOMIC PORTFOLIO

A number of international and regional phenomena the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's nuclear dispute and the following sanctions arising from its foreign policies, and the Turkish desire to be the dominant economic and political power in the Middle East, have contributed to worsening or improving the relationship between Iran and Turkey since 2000 which have all been escalated after 2010. In the decade after 2010, the relationship between Iran and Turkey has been greatly informed and intertwined by politics and the political stance they have taken towards international events.

Despite all differences, Turkey has never withdrawn from its commitment towards Iran and has always sustained a close relationship with it, to the benefit of Iran. Nearly one fifth and Turkey's demand for oil and natural gas is supplied by Iran which in turn relies on Turkey as a gateway to European markets and the last resort in which all other trade channels are blocked by international powers. During all hard times and vulnerable periods in the recent history of Iran including the Iraq-imposed War during 1980-1988, and highest level of nuclear sanctions during to ring 2011 to 2013, Turkey has tried to sustain its lifelong link with Iran (Habibi, 2012).

As seen in Figure 1.1, Iran is an important target for Turkish export goods and Turkey has been in the rank 14 of biggest exporters to Iran in 2010s. The volume of exports from Iran to Turkey was \$3.27 billion in this period while the volume of imports was about \$2.31 billion. Information released by the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration on Iran's non-oil trade show that liquefied natural gas, non-alloy zinc, aluminum, urea and bitumen were Iran's main goods exported to Turkey, while Turkey exported mainly cooking bananas, tobacco and fiber during the last years.




Figure 1: Volume of Iran-Turkey Export and Import between 2011 and 2019

(Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Economy)

In the economic relationship between Iran and Turkey in this period two factors are very important. First of all, the two countries tried to manage their commercial relations by focusing on the mutual benefits rather than differentiating rivalries. In this regard, they paid little attention to the geopolitical differences. As in the past, Turkey was in no way ready to cut its energy relationships with Iran because Iran is the closest and the most strategic source for oil and natural gas supply in its proximity and Turkey has the power to negotiate over the price to get that for the lowest possible price. Moreover, Turkey has realized that Iran's growing population can be a great source for non-oil exports, particularly in the tourism sector and textile industry.

On the Iranian side, strategic plan followed by Iranian politicians is that they never want to lose Turkey as a transportation pathway to European and central Asian markets, both for non-oil energy products and raw materials. Kieran was well aware of the fact that Turkish economic backup in times of adversities and financial crisis was a guarantee to its sustainable energy exports. In the early half of this decade from 2010 to 2013, Turkey had a pivotal role in supporting Iran to evade international sanctions by an effective financial mechanism in exchange for the export of natural gas and oil. Figure 1.2. illustrates Iran-Turkey trade in 2010s.




Figure 2: Turkish-Iranian Trade between 2011 and 2019

(Source: Turkey's Global Strategy)

Despite all the problems that potentially arise from engaging in mutual economic relationships with Iran in the face of international pressures and sanctions that are impacted on the stage that deal with Iran, Turkey continued its financial relations to the end of the decade and saw many investment opportunities in its neighbor. In this regard non-oil medium-term exports to Iran were at the agenda of Turkish foreign trade because Turkish government had come to an understanding that Iranian citizens were interested in its real estate sector. A considerable proportion of housing properties in Turkey were sold to Iranians in 2019, and Ioannina citizens ranked the first in opening business companies in the same year, including 600 companies that operate in economically important province of Izmir in Turkey. In 2019, bilateral investment in both countries increased drastically because of their mutual understanding of benefits coming from cross-border financial investment.

Two key factors, among many others, encourage Iranians to invest in Turkish properties and establish business efforts. A large and sizable number of investors are motivated by the fact that living in an economically stable and socially open community Turkey which is advantageous because of its proximity to their home country, and can be a preferred destination for strategic investment plans. The second reason is mostly geopolitical and may be driven by state officials in an attempt to evade us sanctions by developing new business ties and networks in Turkey whose government is willing to do anything to help Iran move out of this unsolvable problem.

But, there was a third factor that contributed to promoting trade exchanges between the two countries and it was imposition of international sanctions from western countries on Iran that had significantly restricted Iran's economic ties and relations with other countries, making it more sensitive to fluctuations in revenue sources and driving it to preserving its tradeties with old-established markets and partners such as Turkey whose partnership has been veryvaluable to Iran and whose unfailing demand was very attractive to Iran's oil-dependent economy (Jenkins, 2012).

After the Nuclear Deal of Iran in January 2016, sanctions were removed and Turkey was able once more to continue imports of natural gas and oil from Iran. In the first half of theyear 2016 alone, 21 million barrels of oil was imported from Iran which nearly doubled in 2017, reaching a record of 52.8 million barrels. Increasingly, Turkey's imports of Iranian oil increased by 50% in 2018. The same was true for natural gas exports to Turkey which increasedby 14% in 2017. In 2018, Turkey won the suit against Iran for overcharging it for natural gas and oil in 2012 and received 8 billion cubic meters of natural gas in the same year. In addition,the two countries agreed on a long-term supply contract by which Iran was supposed to export10 billion cubic meters of natural gas to Turkey until 2026. Table 1.1. briefly shows the volumeof trade between the two countries after sanctions were temporarily lifted in 2016.

Table 1: Bilateral Trade between Turkey and Iran during 2016-2019

	2016	2017	2018	2019
Export	4.96	3.26	2.40	2,31
Import	4.70	7.50	6.90	3.29
Volume	9.70	10.76	9.30	5.60
Balance	0.30	-4.24	-4.54	-0,98

Resource: Turkish Statistical Institute (Billion US Dollars)

2. TRADE BARRIERS

Despite great strengths and advantages that both countries have earned from economic relationships with each other over the course of history, there have always been trade obstacles that impede the free economic activities. The present study analyses some of these obstacles that have negative influences on trade exchanges between these two countries. It also provides some solutions on how to make the future economic relations better.

2.1. Domestic Affairs

The first factor that is identified by many researchers is domestic affairs. Turkey and Iran are multicultural countries in which minority ethnic groups live together and sporadically cause domestic insecurity and governance problems. Near the border of Turkey, some great provinces of Iran are populated by Azerbaijani people who historically belonged to Turkey. Pan-Turkism is a problem that Iranian government faces and seems to have no absolute solution. They make up 25% of Iran's overall population and play a significant role in its economy and politics. Therefore, any upheaval and unrest caused by their separatist activities concerns Iran's government and becomes a big source of problem. For this, Iran blames Turkey for supporting this young Turkish movement in Iran's border (Halliday, 2001).

The same scenario is true for Turkey whose Kurdish population is a serious threat to its national stability. Accounting for 15% of the total population, Kurds are the most problematic minority in the country and have been trying to gain independence since 1920. Turkish government blames Iran and Iraq for their support of Kurdish military forces that challenge national security of Turkey by sporadic attacks and continuous activities near the border. Despite the fact that Iran itself suffers from the danger of these Kurdish minorities inside its borders, the scope of the problem is much bigger in Turkey. Moreover, the Kurdish minority is a complicated issue because it is both a positive and negative concern for the two countries. Sometimes, Iran and Turkey collaborate in combating these militants and sometimes diverge in their political stance against them (Gündoğan, 2003).

The threat of the Kurdish terrorist and separatist activities seriously challenged national security of Turkey and became its top security in the recent decades. The Kurdish separatist movement took best use of instable governing system of Iran after the 1991 war became a security concern for that country. In order to prevent further growth of the Kurdish movement in its territory, the Turkish government started a series of armed activities against PKK both inside its territory and outside its borders in the north of Iraq where the Kurdish movement was operating. Iran and Syria were the two countries that Turkish government always charges for the support of PKK activities.

2.2. Political Disparity

As asserted by Kayaoğlu (2014), there are numerous factors that significantly affect the development of mutual understanding and relationship between Iran and Turkey. One of the most important factors is geographical location. There has always been a competition for gaining more regional power and economic dominance between Iran and Turkey, but they have both been able in maintaining peaceful relations over their long history of rivalry that fluctuate on one side for a while and on the other for another period of time.

But never before had they been challenged by so many external factors that required geostrategic shifts in politics and economic development plans to cope with the changing environmental forces that determined how these two neighbors related to each other and how they could sustain their friendly, or sometimes hostile, relations.

These two countries have large populations and a very big territory, and as two neighbors trying to be the dominant power in the eastern part of the Middle East, both want to gain advantages over the other. However, each has its own advantages over the other in terms of the geographical location. For example, Iran has control over the corridor of oil and gas transport which is a key factor in its economy and which is needed by Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey is the linking point of Asia and Europe and has under its control five key passageways. This is a big root of conflict between these two countries because they both compete to have control and sustain its influence on the region for trade activities (Erhan&Aydin, 2008).

The Islamic Revolution of Iran was a big threat not only for Turkey but also for many regional powers and weaker states that could be the target of its revolutionary ideas driven by Islamic extremists seeking to spread their messages across their borders. Turkey was especially concerned with the issue as it worried that Iran wanted to export the revolution to the Middle East, and deteriorate Turkey's power in the region. What escalated the problem was the fact that during this period considered itself an embodiment of a secular and modern Muslim country while Iran tried to offer an Islamist model for other countries to follow (Bölükbaşı, 1989).

Iran and Turkey are too strong non-Arab countries in the region that share common some geographic and demographic similarities and cultural affinity, and have never fully considered each other as the potential source of threat for their national existence, but have never had a completely friendly brotherhood without any hostility. The political, social, religious, and ethnic differences between them have had different effects on economic trade relations between them. One such factor that has recently influenced their relations in a substantial way is Turkey's relations with the US and Israel which are considered by the Islamic Republic of Iran as permanent enemies to Islamic world.

Although Turkey has its own international policies and never wants to plunge its country into international turmoil problems, it has proved to be a loyal and committed economic partner to Iran, especially in the 21st century and after the Islamic Revolution when the new regime in Iran started radical shifts in its international policies and domestic affairs. For example, shortly after the US imposed tough and heavy sanctions against Iran in 2010, Turkey took steps in strengthening economic dialogues and industrial relationships and technological development.

2.3. Ideological Orientations

There is no denying that sectarian activities in the region arising from the ambition to establish the authority of the Shia and the Sunni Islamist groups have resulted in intensification of regional conflicts and tensions and involvement of many countries such as Iran, Turkey and the Arab world in battles outside their borders. In this regard some have used this weakness to challenge the security and stability of the region. Some people believe that these sectarian movements are backed by Iran in an attempt to guarantee its regional safety and national security by exploiting these forces in its defense system in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen (Nasr, 2016).

The is given impetus by religious differences between them, one being the leading Shiat country whose utmost desire is to increase the number of Shiat followers in other countries, while the other claims to be the leading country that accommodates Sunni Muslims in the region. Surprisingly, none is ready to acknowledge the power and influence of the other and both continue to challenge the authority of the other. This has given rise to a lot of diplomatic rivalry and competition, followed in some cases by military conflicts. While Turkey is always concerned with Iran's role in evoking anti-Sunni activities and its pro-Shiat ambition to be the leading Muslim country in the region, Iran is worried that Turkey will outgrow in terms of Sunni population and influence in Islamic countries. This unending conflict, in particular, significantly affects the economic relationships between the two countries mainly because the atmosphere of mistrust between them prevents them from engaging in mutual trade activities as they believe that their contribution to economic development of the other may finally lead to its growth as the most powerful religious state in the region (Karal & Tavhi, 1988: 126-146).

3. AMENDMENTS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS

Indeed, one of the most important features of the bilateral trade relationships between Iran and Turkey is that there is a big gap between what officials say and what they really do in practice. Surely, the two sides are interested in making and maintaining economic relationships and establishing private sector operations in the short run and the long run. But when it comes to reality, the governments of both countries seem to be taking no appropriate actions in realizing their mutual objectives and any agreement between them remains ineffective in practice because of so many obstacles and barriers that prevent them from engaging in free flow of business exchange.

Iran is well aware of the fact that it is surrounded by Sunni countries and if it wants to pursue its regional economic goals there is no way other than cooperating with other countries that exist in the region and are in many ways different from its ideological orientation.

However, it has always viewed pro-Sunni Turkey as a threat to its Shia Ideological orientation. This is not a good thing for relationships because establishment of a regional partnership for economic purposes is bound to a stable political affiliation between them.

Turkey, like many other actors in the region, is afraid of Iran's military growth this also fearful of the dogmatic religious orientation that Iran wants to impose on the region and share with Turkey the police that they should combat Iran's interference in the affairs of other countries (Dillow, 2016). Therefore, geostrategic and sectarian competition between Iran and Turkey has made the economic ties vulnerable to many external factors that are sometimes outside the control of the two parties and sometimes need little cooperation to be removed forever. Turkey is interested in coming up with an idea or a joint middle ground to put an end to these conflicts. Iran is also fearful of continuous hostile relationship with Turkey because its economy suffers greatly from any unwanted fluctuations with Turkey as one of the largest markets of Iran's energy resources.

It is clear that none of these countries can fully control the sectarian tension between them that has started many years ago. In fact, they need mutual cooperation to deal with such issues in order to establish a stable economic and political relationship. There is a great need for a wide and a reasonable strategy to fight the terrorist activities coming from ambitious Sunni-Shia sectarianism which will bring about more stability to the Middle East and will help regional countries to important issues such as economic ties and the sustainable development. But it seems that neither Iran nor Turkey is willing to abandon its geostrategic competitive policy claiming for a higher position on the agenda. Making the problem more serious, the two countries have tried in recent years to attract the support of the allies in overcoming the regional problems that directly affect their coexistence. For example, the economic isolation of Iran is a big problem that is remedied by economic trades with Russia and China, and the refugee crisis of Turkey is solved by seeking help from European countries.

One effective solution to expand economic ties and evade political conflict between the two countries is to establish a free economic zone near cities to help potential investors from both countries cooperate with each other and contribute to developing commercial ties, especially in non-oil and non-energy sectors. These mutual relationships that are free from any political considerations can be effective measures to be taken by two countries as initial steps for sustain long-term and beneficial commercial ties.

The second issue to be addressed that disturbs the relationship between Iran and Turkey and has a negative effect on economic relationship between them is the interference of foreign and external forces that try to ally themselves with these two countries to gain more power in the region.

Iran and Turkey should beware that the presence of United States and Russia in the region is with the purpose of gaining their traditional influence over the region, the result of which is increased and escalated tension and conflict between regional countries over the last decade.

Regarding ideological and religious issues that affect their relations, Turkey can be a strong model for internal management of Iran's domestic affairs in the future. The secular and liberal model that Turkish government offers Islamic governance has appealed to many elites in Iran that ensures economic development on the one hand and improves the dynamic sociopolitical openness of Iran to other countries that will boost its economy in different ways such as attracting more tourists from other countries.

Ultimately, we should note that Iran and turkey as neighbors will have to face the consequences of the conflicts and friendly relationships that result from their policies. Any viable solution that is offered for this purpose needs to establish a balance between these two regional powers that is tolerable for both sides. This will not be the case unless they collaborate with each other and avoid interfering with the affairs of the others while recognizing national security and interests of the other side in taking strategic steps for developing their own countries. The relationship between Iran and Turkey is the game over power which can be shared between them to the benefit of both or can be owned by one to the detriment of the other with or without direct military involvement or economic isolation. How these two countries choose to deal with each other over the economic and political power in the region will affect their future as well as their neighbors and other state actors in the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

The Turkish-Indian relationship fluctuates between rivalry and partnership depending on various structural and geopolitical considerations in the region. Despite the fact that their bilateral relations have improved significantly in recent years, the nature of this relationship has always been defined by a diplomatic culture which is based on the economic and political power game. Results of this study show that the relationship between Iran and Turkey have experienced difficult times through its development. Most of their economic obstacles that make it hard for the two sides to deal with each other have been summarized in the study, including ideological differences, political disparity, economic priorities, strategic partnership with allies beyond the region, and many other factors significantly affect this bilateral relationship. However, there are some measures that can be taken by the two governments to remove these obstacles and reach the higher levels of economic bond and prosperity in the short-run and in the long-run.

Despite the fact that Turkish Iranian relationship has developed significantly in the last two decades, it has never been free from obstacles and conflicts. The economic and political power game that the two countries have involved themselves in, economic isolation of Iran, foreign policy towards each other, and the Turkish relative's reliance on Iran's energy sector, and the prosperous future of Turkish development that may prove helpful to Iranians have always been sources of tension that escalated their challenges more than ever.

In conclusion, one big advantage of Turkish economy over its Iranian counterpart is the fact that during their long economic relationships Turkey has been able to diversify and promote the volume of its basket of exports to Iran, while Iran has mostly been dependent on exports of natural gas and oil, and raw materials to Turkey. This gives Turkey a great opportunity to seize the moment for increasing its benefits and revenues from exporting industrial products and agricultural commodities to the sizeable population of Iran that demand medium to high quality products and have limited and restricted access to international markets because of international sanctions imposed on their transactions.

REFERENCES

- AHMADI, H., Ghorbani, F. (2014). 'The Impact of Syrian Crisis on Iran-Turkey Relations,' Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs, vol.4, no.1, 2014, p.81. <https://www.haberler.com/irancumhurbaskani-ahmedinejad-konya-yagelmiyor-4175554-haberi/> (accessed on 5 February 2019).
- AMUZEGAR, J. (2001). "Iran's Post-Revolution Planning; The Second Try", Middle East Policy, vol. 8, no. 1.
- ARAS, B. (2001). "Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran: Ideology and Foreign Policy in Flux," Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 18, no.1: 105-124.
- ATTAEI, F. (2000). 'Raghaabat der Mentegha: Barreseye Seyasathaaye Iran ve Torkeye,' Faselnameye Motalaate Rakhbordy, vol. 3, no 3.
- BANIHASHEMI, M. (2014). 'Understanding the AKP's regional policy: An Iranian Perspective,' Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly, vol.10, no.3-4.
- BAHREMANI, A. (2002). "Oil and Gas Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran", Insight Turkey, vol.4, no.1.
- BÖLÜKBAŞI, S. (1989) 'Turkey Copes with Revolutionary Iran,' Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 13, no.1.
- CALABRESE, J. (1998). "Turkey and Iran; Limits of a Stable Relationship", British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, vol.25, no.1.
- CETINSAYA, G. (2002). 'From the Tanzimat to the Islamic Revolution: Continuity and Change in Turkish Iranian Relations,' Turkish Review of Middle East Studies, no.13, 2002.
- DEFNE, A., Pinar, D., and Grady, W, "US-Turkey Relations: From Alliance to Crisis," Energy Source: The Atlantic Council's Global Energy Center, 7 August 2018, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/usturkey-relations-from-alliance-to-crisis>.
- ERALP, A. (1996). "Facing the Challenge; Post-Revolutionary Relations with Iran", in Henry J. Barkey, ed., Reluctant Neighbor; Turkey's Role in the Middle East. Washington DC.: US Institute of Peace Press.

- GÜNDOĞAN, U. (2003) 'Islamist Iran and Turkey, 1979-1989: State Pragmatism and Ideological Influences,' Middle East Review of International Affairs, vol.7, no.1.
- HABIBI, N. (2012). 'Turkey and Iran: Growing Economic Relations despite Western Sanctions,' Brandeis University Crown Center for MES, Middle East Brief, no. 62.
- HALE, W. (2000). Turkish Foreign Policy: 1774-2000, London, Frank Cass, p.127. HAFEZIAN, M. (2007). 'Iran-Turkey Economic Ties: Prospects for Improvement,' Centre for Strategic Research, 1 October 2007, <http://www.isrjournals.com/en/asia-a-eurasia/829-iran-turkey-economicties-rospects-for-improvement.html> (accessed on 5 February 2019).
- HALLIDAY, F. (2001). "Iran and the Middle East; Foreign Policy and Domestic Change", Middle East Monitor, no.220.
- JENKINS, G. (2012). 'Occasional Allies, Enduring Rivals: Turkey's Relations with Iran, Central Asia Caucasus Institute,' Silk Road Paper, May 2012, p.20. http://isdpeu.com/content/uploads/images/stories/isdpeu-main-pdf/2012_jenkins_occasional-allies.pdf.
- KAYAOĞLU, B. (2014). 'The Limits of Turkish-Iranian Cooperation; 1974-80,' Iranian Studies, vol. 47, no. 3.
- KIBAROĞLU, M. (2012). 'Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey' Middle East Policy, vol.15, no.4 (2008); Aylin Gürzel, 'Turkey's Role in Defusing the Iranian nuclear issue,' The Washington Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 3.
- KIREN, A. (2017). 'Iranians in Istanbul and Their Oppositional Activities against the Qajars, 6 February 2017, <https://www.themaydan.com/2017/02/iranians-istanbul-oppositionalactivitiesqajars/> (accessed on 5 February 2019).
- MENASHRI, D. (1998). "Iran and Central Asia; Radical Regime, Pragmatic Policies", in David Menashri, ed., Central Asia Meets the Middle East. London: Frank Cass.
- MOZAFFARI, M. (1999). "Revolutionary, Thermidorian and Enigmatic Foreign policy; Khatami and the 'Fear of the Wave'", International Relations, vol. 14, no. 5.
- NORUZI, N. (2000). "Contention of Iran and Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus", Amu Darya, vol. 4, no. 5.
- OLSON, R. (1998) The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: From World War I to 1998.
- OSMAN, O. (2000). Sınır Ticaretinin Türkiye Ekonomisine Etkileri, Yayın No: 2000-27, İstanbul, İstanbul Ticaret Odası, p. 19.
- PAHLEVAN, T. (1998). "Iran and Central Asia", in Touraj Atabaki and John o'Kane, eds., Post-Soviet Central Asia. London: Tauris Academic Studies.
- RAMAZANI, R. (1990). "Iran's Foreign Policy, Contending Orientations", in R. K. Ramazani, ed., Iran's Revolution. Washington DC.: Indiana University Press-Middle East Institute.
- SARIOLGHALAM, M. (2001). 'Israeli-Turkish Military Cooperation: Iranian Perceptions and Responses,' Journal of Political and Military Sociology, vol. 29.
- SINKAYA, B. (2005). "Turkey-Iran Relations in the 1990s and the Role of Ideology," Perceptions, vol. 10, no. 1.