"By Consent and Management": Aversion to war, innovative thinking and managerial coordination at Utrecht 1713 and Vienna 1815

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Abstract

Following the logic of discovery, I conduct a comparative descriptive analysis of the decision makers who negotiated the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815. The goal is to establish the facts of the two cases concerning indicators of war-weariness and fear of the radical potential of war as motivations for engaging in the negotiations, and of innovative thinking about international relations as reaction to those motivations. These facts are associated with the presence of the practice of managerial coordination among the major powers after Vienna, and its absence after Utrecht. The comparative descriptive analysis leads to four theoretical propositions that can be used to build hypotheses, for future evaluation according to the logic of confirmation.

Keywords: Managerial Coordination, War, Congress of Vienna, Treaty of Utrecht, International Order

Introduction

War can engender peace, beyond the negative peace of the end of hostilities. Research in the study of international relations and diplomatic history has stressed how participation in wars by groups of states might lead to intense post-war engagement in efforts to dampen the likelihood of war erupting among them again. Scholars stress that such activity is the result of war participations generating among decision makers a fear of the consequences of war for their hold unto domestic power (Randle, 1987:61-69,126-129; Schroeder 1994; Miller, 1995:102). But equally important with the motivation for this aversion to war, is the ability of said decision makers to intellectually grasp the need for change, and conceive of alternative practices (Schroeder, 1994).

In this manuscript I conduct a descriptive survey of two exemplar cases of attempts at crafting a post-war system of practices that foster pacific relations among the major powers, with contrasting results. These are the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713, and the negotiations that led to the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815. To structure my survey of the cases I use the managerial coordination conceptual framework developed by Travlos (2014,2016; Geller & Travlos, 2019). Following the logic of description, instead of the logic of confirmation, my goal is to locate hitherto unknown facts concerning the successful or not onset of managerial coordination among a group of states on the aftermath of war. These facts can then be used in theory building, that produces testable hypotheses according to the logic of confirmation[6].

The Final Act of Vienna brought to an end the Napoleonic Wars (1801-1815), and was followed by a period of intensive practice of managerial coordination by the major powers. While the practice did not avert all instances of major-minor power war, between 1815 and 1854 there was no interstate war between major powers, or between minor powers. This empirical fact led diplomatic historian Paul Schroeder, to term the Congress of Vienna a transformative event (Schroeder, 1994).

The Treaty of Utrecht brought to an end the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). It was followed by a period of sustained Franco-British cooperation in international relations, that lasted until 1740 and the War of Austrian Succession. However, this Franco-British accord never extended to managerial coordination among the other major powers. The period 1714-1740 was characterized by multiple complex major power wars, and minor-major wars (on the concept of complex wars see Valeriano & Vasquez, 2010)[7].

My focus is on comparatively describing the thinking of the decision makers that negotiated the peace treaties in the two cases, as captured by scholars, in order to present to the reader how the two cases differ and locate any new facts. I focus on the motivations of decision makers to seek peace, and on whether they exhibited innovative thinking. The analysis can also serve as a pilot study of how to conduct similar future comparative analyses of post-war attempts at managerial coordination according to the logic of confirmation.

The paper is structured as follows. I begin by presenting definitions of key terms, interstate managerial coordination and innovative thinking. I then lay forth the logic connecting war-participations to innovative thinking and managerial coordination. I then explain why the two cases are exemplars and discuss the literature on them. I then proceed to the descriptive comparative analysis. I conclude by noting what new facts were learned.

[6] For an explanation of the logic of description and the logic of confirmation, as well as an application in the First World, Vasquez see Vasquez, J.A. (2019) *Contagion and War,* Cambridge University Press.

[7] The first major-minor war after Vienna took place in 1823, between France and Spain, under the auspices of the Congress System. Interventions in intra-state conflicts had taken place in 1821 in Naples and Piedmont. The first minor-minor war after Utrecht took place in 1714 and was the Venetian-Ottoman War of 1714-1718. This became a major-minor war when the Hapsburg Empire joined in 1716.

What is Interstate Managerial Coordination?

Interstate Managerial Coordination is a practice in which a group of states engage in with the goal of incentivizing equilibrium-perpetuating behaviour (Lascurettes, 2020). The equilibrium-perpetuating behaviour they seek to incentivize is the avoidance of war among members of their group (Travlos, 2014: 59-75, 2016: 35-36; Mitzen, 2013: 49; Geller & Travlos, 2019). The specific war-fostering factors they seek to mitigate is the diffusion or contagion of power-politics behavioural norms from the conflictual interactions of group members with states outside the group, to their interaction among group members (Vasquez, 2019). In another name managerial coordination is what a group of states engage in when they wish to insulate their relations from war-fostering externalities that result from their activity outside their group (Steiner, 2004).

The specific mechanism is the complementary engagement of the member states of a group in three sets of activities. These are consultation (mutually revealing preferences before contemplating action on an issue), multilateralism (seeking either combined or coordinated action on an issue), and avoidance of adversarial coordination (avoiding inter-group groupings that are openly adversarial to other group members) (Travlos, 2016:36-40). When a group of states engages in all three elements their interaction produces what Jennifer Mitzen calls "Public Power". This results from the marrying of collective intentionality to forums of consultation in pursuit of specific goals by sovereign actors in an anarchical environment (Mitzen, 2013: 5-11, 17-18). "Public Power" fosters certain behaviours by actors, due to the self-binding character of publicly declared collective intentions to act in a certain way, and the independence of intentions from beliefs (Mitzen, 2013: 32-37,42-43).

Managerial coordination is not the same thing as order, though one can hypothesize it can be associated with certain types of pacific orders, like Zones of Peace (Kacowicz,1995) or universalism (Wallensteen, 1984). It also is not necessary that the states practicing managerial coordination be committed to very good relations among themselves. As Benjamin Miller noted, even competing major powers may seek to coordinate in order to insulate their rivalry from unwanted influences (Miller, 1995: 38,67; Travlos, 2014:31-33). The main point is that a group of states wish to protect their relations, conflictual or cooperative, from external influences, and engage in managerial coordination to insulate their relations from war-fostering factors that are exogenous to their relations. This means, that managerial coordination even among conflictual groups can have a pacific effect simply because it decreases the number of conflict producing sources, in this case diffusion or contagion (Levy, 1982; Most and Star, 1990; Elkins and Simmons, 2005).

Innovative Thinking and Managerial Coordination

The study of the sources of policy change in international relations has long focused on the role of norm or policy entrepreneurs. These are individuals, or groups of individuals, that conceptualize a novel policy tool and then agitate to have decision makers, or become decision makers in order, to implement it (Goddard, 2009; Keck & Sikkink, 2014). The role of norm entrepreneurs has been noted as crucial for changes in policy outcomes on a number of international issues (Sikkink & Lutz, 2017). There has been less focus on the role of norm entrepreneurs as decision makers attempting to promote alternative practices of international politics concerning the use of force.

When it comes to the study of the question of innovation in the regulation of the use of force, the Congress of Vienna has held a special place in the literature. This started early, when Harold Nicholson wrote a study of the Congress in order to extract useful lessons for the decision makers engaged in negotiations at Versailles in 1919 and Paris in 1945 (Nicholson, 1946). Kissinger also focused on the Congress of Vienna and its aftermath, especially the role of Metternich, in his study seeking to understand the challenges a

conservative political actor faces in a period of radical political ideology (Kissinger, 1956, 1973). Kissinger did not see anything innovative in the policies followed by Metternich, while Nicholson was more focused on the narrative and relating the experience of the Vienna decision makers to his peers. Neither of them tried to account for the context of the previous period, nor did they explore the impact of past events on decision maker views.

This was the task undertaken by Paul Schroeder in "The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848" (1994). Unlike the previous studies, Schroeder sought to trace the development of the thinking of the decision makers at Vienna by going back to the history of European politics since the Seven Year Wars. He showed that the thinking of Metternich and Castlereagh was the result of a harsh learning process by decision making elites, which for the Hapsburgs had started on the day after the end of the Seven Years War, and for the British from the Peace of Tilsit. Both decision makers came to see the practice of European international politics between 1763 and 1814 as one generating never-ending threats to the domestic power structures of their states. This motivated the two conservative decision makers to seek to transform the practice of European international relations.

The arguments of Schroeder led to a spirited debate about the character of the Vienna System, with one side arguing that the transformative character is exaggerated (Jervis, 1992; Kagan, 1997/8), while the other defending variations of the Schroeder thesis (Mitzen, 2013)[8]. Mitzen has made the most sophisticated recent treatment of what happened in Vienna in 1815, arguing for it as an instance of public power (Mitzen, 2013). Mitzen also summarizes the considerable literature on how the enlightenment education of key decision makers may had influenced their approach to the negotiations.

While one can debate whether the decision makers were successful in bringing about a transformation of European politics, the fact remains that the decision makers themselves, in their own words felt that they had wrought something new in international relations. This will become clear later below. As Mitzen pointed out, expressions of transformation, even if just masking cynical intentions, had a constitutive influence on the behaviour of the major powers, a regulatory effect independent of the motivations of those who enacted it. If we add to this the empirical indicators of large-n studies that there was a dampening of conflict occurrence during the Congress period, we are justified to argue that despite many flaws, the decision makers did seek something qualitatively different from the past, and what they created was associated with changes in state behaviour (Wallensteen, 1984; Travlos, 2016; Geller & Travlos, 2019).

The Schroederian thesis, combined with Vasquez's critique of power-politics, was re-interpreted by Travlos into a process of transformation (Travlos, 2014,2016; Vasquez, 1999[1983]). Decision makers of major powers that participate in wars with a high likelihood of generating war-weariness or elite fear of the domestic consequences of war, may come to see war and the power-politics that foster it as a threat. What happens next depends on their intellectual capacity to a) understand that the central security issue they face is not caused by the behaviour of any one state, but the power-politics practices that foster an equilibrium-perpetuating behaviour that fosters war b) are able to conceive of alternative practices that respect the reality of anarchical interstate relations but promote the avoidance of war (Travlos, 2014). It is this innovative thinking that Schroeder saw in Castlereagh and Metternich, and which was missing in pervious major power decision makers.

The Cases

Vienna has become a hallmark in the study of international relations. It is no accident that the major quantitative datasets of interstate behaviour tend to begin in 1816. However, if we wish to cast in stark relief the unique character of Vienna we are better off comparing it with what came before, rather than after. This is because the practice of the

[8] For a full overview of the debate see Kraehe, 2002.

Congress became an endogenous part of the efforts at ordering international relations after it. Instead, I argue that Utrecht makes a good counterpoint to Vienna. The conditions that led to both attempts at pacification share many similarities. Both brought to an end major power complex wars of long duration (13 years for the War of Spanish Succession, 14 years for the Napoleonic Wars). Both wars were among the deadliest in the long 18th century, with the War of Spanish Succession causing 1251000 estimated battle-deaths and the Napoleonic Wars, 1869000 (Levy, 1983: 89-90). They also have close intensity scores, 12490 battle deaths per million European population for the War of Spanish Succession and 16112 for the Napoleonic Wars. These two cases are the deadliest complex wars in the European major power system between 1648 and 1816.

This makes them likely to generate war-weariness among the societies of the major powers engaged (Toynbee, 1954; Richardson, 1960; Rosenau & Hoslti, 1984; Levy & Morgan, 1986). The fact that both wars saw most major powers as participants render their end an opportunity for re-ordering international relations, along the lines of Randle's argument that war-terminating peace treaties can act as the constitutions of the international system and opportunities for peace-building (Randle, 1987:61-69,126-129).

There are differences of course. Unlike the Napoleonic Wars, the War of Spanish Succession was not associated with a radical ideological challenge to the status quo. But that is not to say that the decision makers were not worried about the war intensifying political threats to their regimes. The succession crises of Spain and the UK did interact with the war to create radical dynastic threats (Jacobites, secession of Aragon and Catalonia from Spain). There was thus a political threat that was associated with the war, which decision makers had to manage post-war. But it never had the character of the "Jacobin" threat Napoleonic era decision makers perceived.

Thus both cases had elements of potential war-weariness and fear of the radical consequences of war that could motivate decision makers characterized by innovative thinking to practice managerial coordination.

Comparing the cases, and the linguistic limits of the author, also raises another difference. The negotiations of Utrecht have not received the same treatment as those of Vienna by scholars of international relations. The main reason for this is the lack of an anglo-phone bibliography. The citation in the *Oxford Bibliographies for International Relations* notes nine major works, of which only three are in English, of which one is from 1908, and the only recent one is not an analysis of the treaty and diplomacy around it (Schmidt-Voges & Solana, 2017). Since the study of systemic politics tends to be the most anglo-centric of all strands of the study of international relations the lack of a rich English bibliography in history could be seen as a barrier for its consideration as an event of international relations.

To this we may add the effect of the Whig Interpretation of history. As the dominant paradigm in Anglo-American historiography up to the First World War it probably influenced early attempts at the study of international relations (Guilhot, 2015). As a result, the Peace of Utrecht was homogenized into a narrative of international relations that obscured its unique characteristics. This manuscript is an attempt to rectify this.

Descriptive Analysis: Utrecht 1713 and Vienna 1815.

The difference in results of the two negotiation attempts were captured by Travlos measuring major managerial coordination using IMaC (Travlos, 2016:43). If we take the next 20 years as an adequate period to gauge the robustness of managerial coordination, the period 1713-1733 was characterized by managerial coordination activity that registers on the lowest possible category of IMaC. The post-Vienna period was characterized by managerial coordination activity in 1816-1822 that registers at the highest possible category of IMaC. In 1823-1832 managerial coordination activity registers at the second highest category of IMaC. Having established that they differ in results when it comes to managerial

coordination, we can now describe what differences explain that.

I conduct a descriptive analysis of the motivations of decision makers that participated in the two sets of negotiations, based on the secondary literature produced by scholars of diplomatic history and international relations. Since this is an exercise in the logic of discovery, rather than confirmation, I am not seeking to confirm the findings of the sources, but instead to discover what the sources say about the attitudes of the decision makers. My focus is on indicators that decision makers were worried about war-weariness or the potential radical political consequences of the participation in war, and whether they exhibited elements of innovative thinking.

All of the secondary sources used rely heavily on primary sources, sometimes repeating them in translation. The items reviewed were collected using J-Stor and Google Scholar, as well as Cambridge Bibliographies. For Utrecht I settled on a mix of 14 items, mostly academic articles and some books. For Vienna I settled on 8 items, seven books and one article. You can find the titles consulted in the special section of the References. I excluded the work of Schroeder and Mitzen, since I heavily relied on them for my concepts and argument.

In Table 1, I present the identity of the decision makers I focus on, and what their role was. Decision makers were chosen either because they were directly involved in the negotiations, or because they exercised veto powers over the final results. If agents had the full support of their principals, then the principals were excluded. In similar vein, if agents were totally beholden to their principals, I excluded the agents. If the principals at times contradicted the agents, then both are included. Some decision makers are collective, such as cabinets or teams of agents that worked closely together. I begin my comparative descriptive analysis by focusing on the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Utrecht.

Utrecht 1713, "*The Hope and Happiness of the World*"

For Utrecht the focus is on the decision makers of the United Kingdom and France. This is because it was the Anglo-French peace at Utrecht in 1713 that led the war to an end. The two states concluded peace despite the opposition of their allies. These allies, the Dutch, the Austrian Emperor, and the King of Spain, were dependent on French and British support to sustain their war effort, and despite some initial defiance, had to also come to terms by 1714-1715 (Gregg, 1972: 599;Meerts & Bauweeks, 2008: 162; Pitt, 1970: 438). In another name peace was imposed on Western Europe by France and the United Kingdom.

Table 1 Decision Makers, Utrecht 1713 and Vienna 1815

Decision Makers	State Affiliation	Role
Utrecht 1713		
Viscount St. John Bolingbroke	United Kingdom	Secretary of State of Southern Department 1710-1713, Secretary of State of Northern Department 1713-1714, Exiled1715-1725
Queen Anne	United Kingdom	Monarch 1702-1714
King George I	United Kingdom	Monarch 1714-1727
Harley, Lord Oxford	United Kingdom	Lord High Treasurer 1710-1714. Out of politics after war.
Parliamentary Whigs	United Kingdom	Opposition Party 1711-1714, Government Party after 1714
Parliamentary Tories	United Kingdom	Government Party 1711-1714, Opposition Party to 1711, and after 1714
King Louis XIV	France	Monarch 1643-1715
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis of Torcy	France	De Facto Minister of Foreign Affairs 1696 – 1715. Out of politics afterwards
Vienna 1815		
Lord Castlereagh	United Kingdom	Foreign Minister 1812-1822
Liverpool Cabinet	United Kingdom	Government 1812-1827
Prince Metternich	Austrian Empire	Foreign Minister 1809-1848, State Chancellor 1821-1848
Prince Talleyrand	France	Minister of Foreign Affairs 1814-1815, Prime Minister 1815
Prince Hardenberg and Humboldt	Prussia	Hardenberg-Chancellor 1810-1822 Humboldt-Ambassador to Vienna 1812-1818
King Frederick William III	Prussia	Monarch 1797-1840
Czar Alexander I	Russia	Monarch 1802-1825

There is no theoretical reason to require that managerial coordination regimes begin as multilateral endeavours. The Cold War is an example of the US and USSR finding a modus vivendi and then trying to impose it on the other major powers. But it is also logical to expect that the other major powers are going to chafe under arrangements imposed by the two dominant powers. This was present in the period after Utrecht, when Spain and Austria refused to cooperate with the post-1715 Fleury-Walpole managerial coordination attempt. Franco-British amity and cooperation never translated to a system level managerial regime. The settlement was resented by these states, who were the main revisionist powers in the post-war period, and at the centre of the new major power wars that followed within five years of 1715.

Travlos argued that managerial coordination only makes sense as a way for states engaged in relations of amity to insulate their relations from the negative security externalities of relations with the rest of the system (Travlos, 2016). The Franco-British decision makers failed to insulate their special relationship from the negative security externalities of the activity of the other major powers. The War of Polish Succession led to the erosion of Franco-British amity, and its collapse with the War of Austrian Succession. Part of this failure can be explained by the inauspicious start, as during the negotiations at Utrecht, none of the decision makers exhibited innovative thinking.

In the UK the main decision makers engaged in the negotiations were the monarch (Black, 1987) , the Lord High Treasurer (Prime Minister), and the

Secretary of State of the South.[9] Parliament also took an active part in the negotiations (Turner, 1919). In that period, English political life was characterized by the birth of an acrimonious party system between the Whigs and the Tories. The War of Spanish Succession was partly viewed as a Whig war.

Queen Anne (1702-1714) and King George I (1714-1727) were the monarchs during the crucial periods of negotiations. While George came into power after the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, his attitude towards it may have had an impact on the failure of Utrecht to produce a managerial coordination system. The main negotiators of the treaty were the Tory Lord High Treasurer (1710-1714) Robert Harley, Lord Oxford, and Henry St.John,Viscout Bolingbroke (1713-1714). These men almost completely controlled the negotiations, though Queen Anne closely monitored them (Hill, 1973: 243). For France. King Louis XIV the "Sun King" (1643-1715) and his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, marquis de Torcy, completely dominated the peace process (Lodge, 1923).

Viscount St. John Bolingbroke

St. John Viscount Bolingbroke was one of the main opponents of the war, due to his opposition to the Whigs and King William III (Dickinson, 1968: 43). This opposition has led to questions about his relationships with the Jacobites (enemies of William III and the Hanoverian dynasty), with some historians arguing that he pursued a Stuart Restoration through the peace (Davies G, Tinling M & Brydges, J. 1936: 121). He did support the Jacobites in 1715 (Davies et al, 1936). However, there are no clear indicators of a Jacobite angle during the negotiations. What we know is that by 1709 he had concluded that the war was damaging the United Kingdom, been quoted "*For God's sake, let us be out of Spain.*" (Dickinson, 1968). This was partly due to the Dutch Barrier Treaty of 1709 (Dickinson, 1968: 244). For St.John, peace was driven by fear of a Hanoverian succession or Dutch invasion in support of it, like the Glorious Revolution (Dickinson, 1968: 47-48; Meerts & Bauweeks, 2008: 164). He did not exhibit any innovative thinking on international relations (Maurseth, 1954: 124-125).

Queen Anne

Queen Anne supported the war because she saw it as a defence of the legacy of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 from a Jacobite restoration. She began turning against the war due to a combination of personal animosity with Lady Marlborough, and fear of the increasing war-weariness of public opinion (Pitt, 1970: 173)[10]. By 1710, Whig religious policy, in conjunction with high corn prices and a land tax, had completed this pacific turn (Pitt, 1970: 280, 446, 449, 451-457; Dickinson, 1968: 47; Hill, 1973: 241). Unhappy with the failure of the Whigs to reciprocate French peace offers in 1709, she began to support the Tory peace party (Meerts & Bauweeks, 2008: 163; Pitt, 1970: 457). After the 1710 Tory electoral victory she was one of the main peace advocates (Hill, 1973: 250-252).

King George I

As Elector of Hanover, George I opposed peace and wanted the war to last until after Anne's death and his ascension to the British throne (Gregg, 1972: 591; Hill, 1973: 257). However, he was unwilling to support Marlborough's plans to invade Britain in order to stop a Tory peace (Gregg, 1972: 599). Instead he remained neutral in the Whig-Tory competition so as to maximize the support for his succession to the British throne (Gregg, 1972: 601). Once Oxford and Bolingbroke deserted the Jacobites, George had no use for the war (Gregg, 1972: 611). Peace was useful, as it would deny the Jacobites French support. As King he remained committed to the peace as a way to gain French support in his anti-Russian and anti-Austrian policies, and denying foreign support for the Jacobites (Black, 2003: 309,320-321; Chance, 1902: 445,449,455; Chance, 1907:117-118, 130-131; Gibbs, 1962: 29; McKay, 1971: 368-369).

[9] The UK at that period had two Secretaries of State, one of the North and one of the South. The Southern office was responsible for the Peace of Utrecht.

[10] The recent film "The Favourite" broadly recounts these events.

Harley, Lord Oxford

Harley, Lord Oxford became the de-facto prime minster on occasion of widespread war-weariness and public opposition to Whig religious policy. He was willing to give up personal goals in order to attain peace with France (Hill, 1973: 246). He cited war-weariness as the reason for peace, quoted as saying "*At length the body of the nation awakes and 200 to one declare for peace, approve all the queen has done, are impatient all is not finished.*" (Hill, 1973: 287). Like Bolingbroke he may had been driven to peace by a fear of how the war could affect the succession issue in Britain (Meerts & Bauweeks, 2008: 164).

Parliamentary Parties

The parliamentary Whigs were opposed to peace, as they saw the war as a defence of the Glorious Revolution. Opposition to peace was so vehement, that once out of power, Whig stalwarts like Marlborough were willing to work with the Jacobites in order to violently overthrow the government and avert peace (Greg, 1972: 599, 601-603). The Whigs though had been punished for failing to get peace in 1708-1711 (Meerts & Bauweeks, 2008: 163; Pitt, 1970: 449). The alliance between the Queen and Tory majority defeated their agitation (Turner, 1919: 186). Finally, some of the Whig members had become weary of the war. For example, the Earl of Shrewsbury, while disliking the specific peace negotiated by St. John and Oxford, believed peace necessary due to the economic impact of the war on land-owners and rent-payments (Somerville, 1932: 647). Despite their opposition to the peace, subsequent Whig administrations maintained it in order to deny French support to the Jacobites. Opposition to the Jacobites also animated initial Tory support for the war (Pitt, 1970: 414). However, the increasing partisan identification of the war, led the Tories to become supporters of peace, even at the cost of British alliances (Turner, 1919: 186).

King Louis XIV

Louis XIV considered the war as an affair of honour and a defines of the right of monarchs to choose their successors (since Charles II of Spain had made Louis' grandson his successor). However, the French defeats between 1705 and 1708, and the combination of economic collapse, famine, rural unrest, and further military defeat in 1708-1709, made Louis XIV sue for a conditional peace (Pitt, 1970: 305,322,324,425,430-432, 436). The failure of attempts at separate peace with the Dutch or British, and the defeat at Malplaquet, made him willing to accept peace at any price, except from requiring him to use force to expel his grandson from Spain (Hill, 1973: 245; Meerts & Bauweeks, 2008: 162).

Whig intransigence, and a good crop in 1710, permitted Louis to call on the French public to support a defensive war (Pitt, 1970: 451-456). That said he was now willing for peace at any price, including prohibiting the unification of the Spanish and French crowns, as war-weariness was endemic (McKay, 1971; Hill, 1973: 254; Williams, 1900: 260). Once the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, Louis XIV did everything he could to avoid a new war (Chance, 1902: 461,463,464). He followed a policy of close cooperation with the UK in defence of the Utrecht settlement, something that his heir continued.

Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis of Torcy

The Marquis of Torcy, the *de facto* foreign minister of Louis XIV, mostly formulated policy along the same line as his principal. Like him he was aware of the war-weariness of the French public in the *annus horribilis* of 1708-1709. One possible motivation for the peace negotiations, that may or may not had been shared by Louis XIV, was the possibility that Torcy, during the early secret phase of the negotiations with Lord Jersey, was plotting a Jacobite restoration in Britain (Trevelyan: 1934, 100,103).

Summation of Facts on Utrecht 1713

The theoretically interesting facts from the descriptive analysis of the Utrecht 1713 case are a) the peace was negotiated bilaterally by the two primary antagonists and then imposed by coercion on reluctant allies b) the main motivation of British decision makers was a mix of war-

weariness and fear that the war could provide opportunities for dynastic opponents to launch a coup or revolution. For French decision makers war-weariness was the primary motivation c) no decision makers exhibited any innovative spirit, seeing the peace as simply tool for promoting temporary domestic political goals d) by 1715 all of the decision makers that had negotiated the treaty were out of power.

Vienna 1815, "*By Consent and Management*"

In 1713-1714 France and Britain imposed peace on unwilling allies. That was not the case in Vienna. The negotiations that led to the Final Act of Vienna, had begun in 1813 on the battlefields of the War of the 6th Coalition, and five powers were key to them. These were Russia, Prussia, Austria, the United Kingdom, and France. While asymmetrical relationships were still present, especially Prussia's dependence on Russia, these were not so lopsided that countries could afford to ignore their allies in the peace negotiations. Indeed, even defeated France was considered a necessary part of any settlement. A separate peace by France and any of the other four states thus could not force peace on everyone else, as had been the case at Utrecht.

The main decision makers for the UK were Lord Castlereagh, the foreign secretary, and the Liverpool cabinet. For Austria it was Count Metternich. For Prussia it was Prince Hardenberg and his assistant Humboldt, as well as King Frederick William III. For France it was Prince Talleyrand, and for Russia, Czar Alexander I.

Lord Castlereagh

Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh was the main British decision maker. He was heavily influenced by the Pitt Plan, a program for creating conditions for a lasting peace envisioned by his mentor William Pitt the Elder. Castlereagh sought to restrain the use of force in Europe primarily for political reasons. His main fear was that war would lead to political changes in the continent that might lead to political changes in the UK. This would especially be the case if the UK found itself isolated again as in the 1808-1812 period. His dispatch to the continent was an extraordinary action. It also meant that Castlereagh was given expansive powers for negotiation and could commit the government to a decision without prior consultation (Nicholson, 1946: 66-67; King, 2009: 135; Zamoyski, 2007: 263).

Castlereagh's main goal was to ensure a continental peace in Europe that would not exclude the United Kingdom. That meant that Castlereagh was more willing to support policies of key allies, and unwilling to use the treat of British withdrawal to coerce them. In service of this goal he saw the Congress of Vienna as the foundation for creating a stable peace that would resolve issues "*by concert and management"* (Zamoyski, 2007: 265). The idea of periodic congresses might have been his, and he himself considered the congress a radical innovation in international relations, characteristically noting *"..it is satisfactory to observe how little embarrassment and how much solid good grow out of these reunions, which sound so terrible at a distance. It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the European Government..."*.

His policy during the Saxon-Polish crisis might cast doubt on that innovative spirit. Castlereagh's main goal during the crisis was to avoid the creation of a Russian controlled greater Poland. He was willing to sacrifice Saxony to Prussia in order to gain support against the Czar. This position was extremely at odds with public opinion in the UK and with the Cabinet (Nicholson, 1946: 151-152,173,176). However, the secondary sources disagree on how willing he was to fight over Poland. There are indicators that he was (Kissinger, 1973: 150; Zamoyski, 2007: 342), and others that he was not (King, 2009: 187,197; Jarrett, 2013: 120). That said the fact is that his agreement with Hardenberg and Metternich to oppose the Czar did not entail military action in the case of a refusal by the Czar to negotiate. Instead it called for an appeal to public diplomacy (Kissinger, 1973: 159; Zamoyski, 2007: 324; McGuigan, 1975: 374). The indicators are that once the Czar did not press a claim to all of Poland, Castlereagh was not willing to push things to an actual war and preferred a compromise,

noting "*but an alliance supposes war, or may lead to it, and we ought to do everything to avoid war"* (McGuigan, 1975: 435).

Liverpool Cabinet

Within the Cabinet, Prime Minister Liverpool and Lord Bathurst were supportive of Castlereagh's policies, while the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Vansittart, was opposed. In general, the cabinet wanted a stable peace in Europe, built on the blueprint of the Pitt Plan, accepting the innovations inherent in it. The main fear was isolation. However, Liverpool's ultimate focus was the stability of his government in the Commons and among public opinion. He was opposed to a new war in Europe after Napoleon's first abdication due to economic and domestic political reasons (McGuigan, 1975: 430). Liverpool was also very worried about British "public" opinion which was in general critical of the compromises at Vienna (Zamoyski, 2007: 346). Sometimes this duality would lead the government to undermine Castlereagh's policy.

During the Polish-Saxon crisis this fear of "public" opinion led the cabinet to oppose both Castlereagh's opposition to the Czar, and his attempts to woo Prussia by sacrificing Saxony, though not publicly. The "public" wanted a Russian Poland over no Poland at all and were opposed to the dissolution of Saxony (Nicholson, 1946: 151,173,176; Kissinger, 1973: 165; Jarrett, 2013:105; McGuigan, 1975: 404,414). At all points the Cabinet, and especially Liverpool, likely did not want war and preferred a poor settlement to a war (Nicholson, 1946: 176; Jarrett, 2013: 123,367,373; McGuigan, 1975: 422). The "public" hawkishness during the 1812-1815 period greatly restricted Castlereagh's ability to negotiate peace (Zamoyski, 2007: 157; Nicholson, 1946, 89, 151, 173; Jarrett, 2013: 105; Kissinger, 1973: 179; King, 2009: 64).

Prince Metternich

Interpretations of Metternich as a bearer of innovative ideas are divided. The major work in support of the argument that he was an exponent of innovative thinking is Sofka (1998). However, there are works that present him as an arch-conservative (Zamoyski, 2007: 39). His humanist universalism is not in doubt, but it might have come to characterize him later in life (Kissinger, 1973: 12-13; McGuigan, 1975: 512). That said a conservative disposition in domestic politics can be compatible with radicalism in international relations if the holder of such ideas sees the international system as a threat to the domestic system.

Metternich had the full support of Emperor Francis I (1804-1835), which afforded him great decision-making freedom. The Emperor's high popularity shielded Metternich from the pressures of "public" opinion (King, 2009: 11). Metternich detested war, calling it *" that hateful invention"*, both for its radical potential and due to war-weariness. His life had been threatened by members of the war party in Austria in 1813 (Kissinger, 1973: 62; Zamoyski, 2007: 58; McGuigan, 1975: 28). He was willing to make peace with Napoleon, if Napoleon was willing to accept a new international system that restricted force (Nicholson, 1946: 75; Kissinger, 1973: 121, 134-135; McGuigan, 1975: 39, 79, 104-105). His goal in Vienna was to create a system that restricted the use of force in the resolution of international issues, commit Russia and the United Kingdom to it, and finally find a modus vivendi with Prussia in central Europe that would keep other powers out of it (Zamoyski, 2007: 37, 54).

He is quoted at least once as noting that *"No great political insight was needed to see that this Congress could not be modelled on any that had taken place. Former assemblies that were called congresses met for the express purpose of settling a quarrel between two or more belligerent powers-the issue being a peace treaty. On this occasion peace has been made, and the parties meet as friends who, though differing in their interests, wish to work towards the conclusion and affirmation of existing treaty."*

During the Saxon-Polish crisis, Metternich's main goal was to avert Alexander's plan to create a large Polish kingdom. In service of that goal he was willing to sacrifice Saxony, an unpopular position

both with the Emperor and "public" opinion (Nicholson, 1946: 151; Jarrett, 2013: 105, 109; Zamoyski, 2007: 368; McGuigan, 1975: 385). Above all Metternich wanted to avoid a war over either issue (Kissinger, 1973: 155). This explains the highly conditional support he gave to Prussian claims in Saxony, leaving him free to refuse to use force in their support (King, 2009: 118; Jarrett, 2013: 112) At no point during his stormy interviews with the Czar or the Prussians did he threaten war, even in reaction to their bellicosity.

Prince Talleyrand

Talleyrand, once the foreign minister of Napoleon, was instrumental in the Bourbon Restoration. He correctly gauged the war-weary moods of the elites and people and leveraged it into his preferred transition from Napoleonic autocracy to a constitutional regime (Nicholson, 1946: 85-86,88; Kissinger, 1973: 136). King Louis XVII then chose Talleyrand as his foreign minister at Vienna and as Prime Minister. He was given wide ranging negotiating powers, and came determined to restrict the legitimacy of force as a tool of international politics, party for ideological reasons, and partly because of realpolitik. In service of this goal he developed a new concept of practical legitimacy, very different from *ancien regime* legitimacy (Nicholson, 1946: 157; Kissinger, 1973: 139; King, 2009: 103-104; Jarrett, 2013: 88; Zamoyski, 2007: 179, 270).

On the Saxon/Polish issue Talleyrand's main objective was opposition to any change of borders based on the right of conquest. Instead he insisted in legitimacy as the basis of any change, a call for consultation and multilateralism (Nicholson, 1946: 152,154-157; King, 2009: 93,108,119; Zamoyski, 2007: 291; McGuigan, 1975: 364). In pursuit of this goal, he presented a bellicose attitude, though the sincerity of this is debated, and seen as a ploy to win France acceptance as an equal negotiator by Metternich and Castlereagh (Nicholson, 1946: 178; Kissinger, 1973: 168; King, 2009: 187, 204; Zamoyski, 2007: 380).

Prince Hardenberg and Humboldt

Prince Hardenberg, the chancellor of Prussia, and his assistant Humboldt held strong liberal enlightenment values. Despite those, during the Vienna congress they were the strongest exponents of realpolitik (Jarrett, 2013: 82, 83, 85; Nicholson, 1946: 125). This was partly because of a very bellicose "public" opinion, and partly because of their strong belief that a strong Prussia was necessary for European peace. Unlike Metternich, Castlereagh, and Talleyrand, the two were also forced to work within limits prescribed by King Frederick William III, who was also present in the negotiations (Nicholson, 1946: 150; Zamoyski, 2007: 263). During the 1813-1814 campaign they both preferred a negotiated peace instead of an invasion of France, in opposition to the King and military (Nicholson, 1946: 75, 78; Kissinger, 1973: 117). In the Polish-Saxon crisis both Hardenberg and Humboldt threatened war multiple times (Nicholson, 1946: 177; Jarrett, 2013: 114).

At the centre of Prussian policy was a great contradiction. Both considered the Czar's Polish plans a threat, in light of the 1804 war scare (King, 2009: 90; Kissinger, 1973: 14). Both considered a future war with Russia inevitable, and only avoided advocating one in 1814 because they were unsure of the reaction of France and Austria (Zamoyski, 2007: 358). At another point Alexander and Stein threatened Prussia with war (Jarrett, 2013: 110). Thus there was a spirit of distrust between the two powers. However, they needed Alexander's support for the absorption of Saxony, which meant acquiesce to his Polish plans (Kissinger, 1973: 155).

Hardenberg tried to break this contradiction by allying with Castlereagh and Metternich against the Czar (Kissinger, 1973: 157). This policy failed when the Czar used Frederick William's dependence on him to set the King against his Chancellor (Kissinger, 1973: 159; King, 2009: 120). A result of this defeat was increased bellicosity by both ministers (Kissinger, 1973: 17; King, 2009: 189; Jarrett, 2013: 112, 118, 120-121; Zamoyski, 2007: 369; McGuigan, 1975: 406, 423). That said, there are powerful indicators in the

literature that their bellicosity was an act, partly to placate the powerful war-party in "public" opinion (Nicholson, 1946: 232, 235; Kissinger, 1973: 162; King, 2009: 179).

The argument against the transformative character of the Vienna System was that the Polish-Saxon crisis was resolved by real-politick measures. Essentially Hardenberg and Alexander I retreated in the face of the threat of war by the UK-French-Austrian alliance (Kissinger, 1973: 170). Despite that, there are indicators that the decisions of Hardenberg and Humboldt were not driven by deterrence. First, both decision makers did not want Saxony by conquest, considering the acquiescence of the other powers necessary (King, 2009: 109). Such a consideration of means is compatible with the thinking of the more innovative members of the congress.

Second, the crucial decision to avoid war was taken in the Prussian Cabinet meeting of January 1st 1815. It was here that War Minister Grolman argued against war, and the cabinet followed his recommendations (Jarrett, 2013: 124, McGuigan, 1975: 430). The crucial point is that this was contemporaneous with the signing of the UK-France-Austria alliance. It did not follow it. The rumours of the impending alliance circulating in Vienna did not feature in the arguments of the War Minister, who focused on the lack of preperadence of the Prussian Army.

Hardenberg shared with his monarch the fear of the radical potential of war, personified in his predecessor Stein, now in Russian service (Zamoyski, 2007: 109). While Humboldt considered a second war necessary, Hardenberg understood that Czar Alexander had no intention of fighting over Saxony (Zamoyski, 2007: 378). Without Russia, the King of Prussia could not afford a war, and did not want one due to fear of the radical potential of such a war (Zamoyski, 2007: 390, 402). Thus in the end Hardenberg decided on accommodation, despite Humboldt still wanting a war at least against Bavaria, and personal threats from the military war-party (Zamoyski, 2007: 440-441, 493). Both ministers expected a war in the future.

King Frederick William III

Frederick William III, King of Prussia, was the decision maker with greatest fear of the radical potential of war. In 1813 large swaths of the Prussian administrative and military machine were in mutiny. Radicals like Stein were given by the Czar control of parts of the Kingdom of Prussia, thus placing it out of the King's direct rule. This situation had two contradictory effects on the King. On the one had he feared the escalation or expansion of war because of the potential it had to unleash the radical forces of German nationalism, exemplified by Stein and popular officers like Blucher and Gneisenau. On the other hand, he feared been seen as too opposed to the popular will. Frederick William overcame this dilemma by becoming attached to Czar Alexander, whom he saw as the only person able to rein in the radicals. As a result, Frederick William was bellicose when the Czar was bellicose, accommodating when the Czar was accommodating.

Czar Alexander I

The role of Czar Alexander I in the politics of the Vienna Congress is controversial. Those who criticize the "transformation" thesis focus on his behaviour during the 1813-1815 period (Zamoyski, 2007: 364,406). However, Alexander I is the greatest mystery among decision makers, for he left no written records of his own, and most of what we know about his behaviour was reported by possibly biased sources like Metternich and Talleyrand (Kissinger, 1973: 121; King, 2009: 68, 117, 120).

There is no question that Alexander I in the 1812-1815 period was an exponent of innovative ideas about international relations, the result of his liberal education and the influence of Polish Prince Czartoryski (Kissinger, 1973: 37, 188; King, 2009: 308; Jarrett, 2013: 100, 147; Zamoyski, 2007: 16). His 1814 conversion to Christian mysticism only changed the means, but not the goal of transforming international politics (Zamoyski, 2007: 274). This missionary vision drove his war against Napoleon in 1813, despite the opposition of many of his war-weary military leaders

(Nicholson, 1946: 75, 78; Kissinger, 1973: 47; Jarrett, 2013: 44; Zamoyski, 2007: 27, 47, 61, 100, 125; McGuigan, 1975: 7, 180). It also explained his leniency towards Napoleon and France in 1814 and 1815 (Kissinger, 1973: 121; Jarrett, 2013: 62, 172; Zamoyski, 2007: 523). Finally, it partly explained his pursuit of the Polish plan despite the opposition of part of the Russian "public" opinion (Nicholson, 1946: 106; Jarrett, 2013: 100; Zamoyski, 2007: 315-316, 333; McGuigan, 1975: 328, 396). For realpolitik authors, Alexander was a radical who could only be deterred by force.

At Vienna Alexander "*was his own minister"* (Kissinger ,1973: 99, Zamoyski, 2007: 263). As part of his Polish plan, he supported Prussian demands on Saxony. Prussian bellicosity was partly fanned by him (Zamoyski, 2007: 329). Once the Czar showed that he was unwilling to go to war, Prussian bellicosity stopped. The conventional narrative is that he was deterred by the UK-France-Austria alliance, and had a mysterious change of character (Kissinger, 1973: 167, 170; King, 2009: 196-197; Zamoyski, 2007: 406). Nonetheless, the bias of some of the sources from which we learn about Alexander casts this narrative into doubt. We cannot fully know reality due to the dearth of primary sources from Alexander's viewpoint, but there are some events to keep in mind that may explain his behaviour and choice of a peaceful resolution of the Polish-Saxon crisis.

First, Alexander had a fear of the radical potential of war. He had come to power thanks to a palace coup, which he might have been part of, that killed his father, Paul I. Consequently, he feared a palace coup targeted against him. Alexander was aware of the dissatisfaction of important parts of Russian "public" opinion with his Polish plans and his decision making in 1812-1815. We can see that he was vulnerable to "public" opinion by the dismissal of liberal advisors after the 1804-1805 defeats (Zamoyski, 2007: 19-20). He was aware of rumours in 1812 of a planned palace coup against him (McGuigan, 1975: 67). War might had been too much of a gamble for Alexander, with his foreign policy being a delicate balancing act between opposing internal factions any of which could be the nucleus of a coup[11]. These domestic restraints might explain why Alexander was unwilling to risk a new war, and his accommodation on the Polish-Saxon issue (Jarrett, 2013: 115; Zamoyski, 2007: 277).

Second, Alexander's Polish policy may not simply had been driven just by idealism but also realpolitik, which together with fear of domestic reaction, might explain his refusal to create a Polish state not tied to the Russian dynasty (Jarrett, 2013: 99, 111). His initial maximalist demands may have been part of the bargaining process. Once his freedom to the old Duchy of Warsaw was accepted, Alexander quickly toned down his rhetoric, and reined Prussia in (Jarrett, 2013: 117; Zamoyski, 2007: 377, 390). Alexander for many possible reasons accepted the final compromise in Saxony, even in the face of a bellicose army (Jarrett, 2013: 127; Zamoyski, 2007: 368).

While realpolitik might have been one part of it, an equal part was a commitment to the promise of new politics (Zamoyski, 2007: 391, 396). His policy in 1813 and 1814 indicated that above all Alexander was not willing to rapture the alliance (Kissinger, 1973: 126). Indeed, his idea of Holy Alliance had been formulated during the height of the Polish-Saxon crisis, a possible indicator that the Czar was not seriously considering war against the rulers he wished to ally with for a new world of international and domestic politics (Nicholson, 1946: 249). In the end Alexander made choices that he felt would foster a transformation of European international politics, which would lead monarchs to "*to live like brothers, aiding each other in their need, and comforting each other in their adversity"*.

[11] These were the "Foreigners" and "Russians". The "Foreigners" included many political exiles serving the Czar, like Capodistrias and Czartoryski, who shared the Czar's innovative spirit in international relations (Jarrett, 2013: 185). The "Russians", included the military and more traditional civil servants of the Czarist state. The two groups were generally in opposition to each other on the question of Russian policy in western and central Europe.

Summation of Facts on Vienna 1815

The facts of Vienna 1815 are that a) it was a multilateral effort with the decision makers of the different powers making sure to keep all the powers committed to the negotiations, and supporting each other against domestic opponents of the negotiations b) while coercive policies were present, attempts were made to accommodate all powers to some degree c) war weariness played less of a role among most major power decision makers than fear of the radical potential of war d) Metternich, Castlereagh, Talleyrand and Alexander I all are seen by the secondary literature as expressing a dissatisfaction with the previous way of doing international relations, aversion to war, and belief in the possibility of new politics e) the majority of decision makers remained in power for the decade after the signing of the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna.

Discussion and Conclusion

If we compare the summation of facts for Utrecht 1713 and Vienna 1815 the differences between the two cases are stark. First, Vienna was a multilateral effort while Utrecht a bilateral one. Second, there were more indicators that more decision makers at Vienna were worried about the radical potential of war compared to decision makers at Utrecht. Third, there were at least four decision makers at Vienna with indicators of innovative thinking, while no such thinkers were present at Utrecht. Fourth, the decision makers that negotiated at Vienna remained relevant political actor for a much longer period than those of Utrecht.

These leads to the following theoretical propositions about what war-termination conditions are more likely to foster post-war engagement by a group of states in the practice of managerial coordination:

P1. Increased engagement in managerial coordination is more likely to follow multilateral efforts at peace-making after complex wars among a group of states.

P2. Decision makers engaged in negotiations are more likely to foster increased post-war practice of managerial coordination when war-participation has generated among them a fear of the radical potential of war, compared to if only it generated war-weariness.

P3. Increased managerial coordination is more likely to follow war-termination negotiations were decision makers exhibit innovative thinking about international relations.

P4. Increased managerial coordination is more likely to flow war-termination negotiations if the decision makers that advocated for its practice remain in power in the post-war period.

The above propositions were unearthed by a descriptive comparative analysis of two exemplar cases of war-termination negotiations, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the Final Act of Vienna of 1815. The process used was done with the logic of discovery. Future research should take the above propositions, and the case study analysis framework used here, in order to extract testable hypotheses, and evaluate the argument about the connections between war-participations, innovative thinking, and increased practice of managerial coordination, according to the logic of confirmation.

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Genişletilmiş Özet

Uluslararası düzen ile güç-siyaset ilişkilerinin hâkim olduğu anarşik uluslararası siyasal sistemde savaşa sebep olan unsurların giderilmesine yönelik norm ve rejimlerin oluşturulmasına ilişkin literatüre bakıldığında uzun bir süredir savaş unsuru ile karar alıcıların katılımları arasında yeni bir savaşın ortaya çıkma olasılığını düşüren uygulamaların benimsenmesi bağlamında bir bağlantı olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Bu uygulamaların başında yönetimsel koordinasyon yer almaktadır. Mevcut literatüre bakıldığında, karar alıcıların bir siyaset aracı olarak savaştan korktukları durumlarda savaşı kendi güç hakimiyetlerine bir tehdit olarak algılamaları sebebiyle büyük bir olasılıkla yönetimsel koordinasyon geliştirecekleri iddia edilmektedir. Bu durum ise savaşa karşı isteksizlik olarak bilinmektedir. Bu durumun, savaşın finansal, psikolojik ve fiziksel maliyetleri sebebiyle karar alıcıların savaşa karşı giderek artan sosyal karşıtlık durumuna; diğer bir değişle savaştan bıkkınlığa bağlı olarak ortaya çıktığı düşünülmektedir. Bu durum aynı zamanda, şimdiye kadar geçen süreçte marjinalleşen grupların ulusal güç yapılarına meydan okumalarını kapsayan savaş türlerine yönelik düzeltici etkisi olan sosyal çaba olarak tanımlanabilen savaşın radikal potansiyeline yönelik korku yüzünden de ortaya çıkabilmektedir.

Savaşa karşı isteksizlik yaratma olasılığı olan savaşa katılım durumları, karar vericilerin savaşı daha muhtemel hale getiren eylemler gerçekleştirmelerine yönlendiren güç-siyaset kültürlerini sorgulamalarına sebep olmaktadır. Buna karşın, uluslararası siyasete yayılmış olan güç-siyaset uygulamalarına alternatif olabilecek kavramsallaştırmanın eksik olması, karar alıcıların mevcut uygulamalardan vazgeçme yollarını tasarlayamamalarına neden olmaktadır. Paul Schroeder ve Jennifer Mitzen'in araştırmalarından hareketle bu çalışmanın sorunsalını, karar alıcıların mevcut uluslararası uygulamaları kavramsallaştırma kabiliyetleri, tehlikeli savaşların başlamasını önleyememeleri ve alternatif üretememeleri oluşturmaktadır.

Paul Schroeder, Napolyon Savaşları'nın ardından büyük güçlerin aldığı Viyana Kongresi sistemine katılma kararlarını, savaşa karşı isteksizlik ve yenilikçi düşünmenin bileşimi olarak ifade etmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Viyana Kongresi'ne katılan karar alıcıların tutumları ile Utrecht Antlaşması'nı müzakere eden karar alıcıların tutumları karşılaştırılmaktadır. Bu karşılaştırma; iki vaka arasındaki temel farkın, karar alıcıların savaşa karşı isteksizlik ve yenilikçi düşünmeye yönelik tutumları ile ilişkili olup olmadığını ortaya çıkarmayı hedeflemektedir.

Utrecht ile Viyana arasındaki benzerlikler ve farklılıklar, iki vakanın karşılaştırmasının yapılması için uygun niteliğe sahiptir. Her ikisi de karmaşık büyük güç savaşları sonucunda ortaya çıkmıştır; devam süresine bakımından birbirine benzerdir ve önceki savaşlara kıyasla büyük kayıplarla nitelendirilmiştir. Buna karşın, Viyana Kongresi'nin ardından katılımcılar arasında uzun süren bir barış dönemi yaşanmış; Utrecht Antlaşması ise Avrupa'daki uluslararası ilişkilerin yatıştırılması bakımından yetersiz kalmıştır. Bu uyuşmazlık sebebiyle Utrecht, Viyana için faydalı bir karşıt vaka olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu karşılaştırmanın yapılmasında tarihçiler ve uluslararası ilişkiler uzmanlarına ait ikincil kaynaklar ve yayımlanan birincil kaynaklar sıraya koyulmuştur.

Viyana Kongresi'ni değerlendirirken; Lord Castlereagh (Birleşik Krallık), Liverpool Kabinesi (Birleşik Krallık), Prens Metternich (Avusturya), Presn Talleyrand (Fransa), Prens Hardenberg ve asistanı Humboldt (Prusya), Kral III. Frederick William (Prusya) ve Çar I. Alexander'ın (Rusya) tutumları incelenmektedir. Utrecht için ise, Vikont St. John Bolingbroke (Birleşik Krallık), Kraliçe Anne (Birleşik Krallık), Kral I. George (Birleşik Krallık), Harley Lord Oxford (Birleşik Krallık), Parlamenter Whig'ler (Birleşik Krallık), Parlamenter Tory'ler (Birleşik Krallık), Kral XIV. Louis (Fransa) ve Torcy'nin Markisi Jean-Baptiste Colbert'in (Fransa) tutumları incelenmektedir.

Bu iki vakanın betimsel analizi sonucunda bazı olgusal gerçekler ortaya çıkmıştır. İlk olarak her iki vakada da karar alıcılar savaşa karşı isteksizlik tutumu sergilemiştir. Utrecht'de Birleşik Krallık'ın karar alıcıları; savaş yorgunluğuna ve savaşın radikal potansiyeline yönelik endişe belirtisi göstermiştir. Bununla beraber karar alıcılar, savaşın devam etmesinin sürgün edilmiş Stuart hanedanının İngiliz tahtının Alman varisine karşı meydan okumasına imkan sağlayacak koşulları besleyeceğini düşünmüşlerdir. Öte yandan, Fransız karar alıcılar sadece savaş yorgunluğu tutumu sergilemiş; daha da önemlisi hiçbir karar alıcı yenilikçi düşünce sergilememiştir. Onlar Utrecht'de ve mevcut siyaset yapısında ne yaptıklarını görmüşlerdir. Son olarak1715'den birkaç yıl sonra neredeyse tüm karar alıcılar güçlerini kaybetmiştir. Utrecht'e kıyasla, karar alıcıların Viyana'da savaşın radikal potansiyelinin yarattığı korku belirtisini gösterdikleri görülmektedir. Viyana'da dört karar alıcı yenilikçi düşünme belirtisi gösterirken bu durum Utrecht özelinde hiç görülmemektedir. Daha da önemlisi, Utrecht'e kıyasla karar alıcıların Viyana'daki siyasi ilişkilerinin daha uzun süreli olduğu görülmektedir.

Tespit edilen bir diğer fark ise iki müzakerenin gerçekleştiriliş biçimi ile ilgilidir. Utrecht'de iki büyük güç kendi aralarında sahte barış sağlayarak, akabinde diğer güçleri savaşa dahil olmaya ve bağlı kalmaya zorlamışlardır. Öte yandan Viyana'da tüm Avrupalı büyük güçler müzakerelere katılım sağlamıştır. Bu fark, Utrecht'e olmayıp Viyana'da sağlanabilen barış durumunu açıklayan bir diğer neden olarak gösterilebilir.

Yukarıda yer alan betimleyici karşılaştırmalı analiz çerçevesinde; teyit mantığına bağlı olarak değerlendirilen hipotezlere temel oluşturacak birkaç açıklayıcı öneri geliştirilmiştir. Bunlar arasında; yönetimsel koordinasyonda güçlendirilmiş yükümlülüğün, bir grup devlet arasında ortaya çıkan karmaşık savaşlardan sonraki barış yapımında yer alan çok taraflı çabaları büyük olasılıkla takip edeceği görülmektedir. Müzakerelerde yer alan karar alıcıların ise sadece savaş yorgunluğunun yer aldığı durumlara kıyasla, savaşın radikal potansiyelinin aralarında yarattığı korku durumunda, savaş sonrası uygulaması olarak yönetimsel koordinasyonu teşvik etmeleri olasılığının yüksek olacağı görülmektedir. Bu şekilde güçlendirilmiş olan yönetimsel koordinasyonun, karar alıcıların savaşı sona erdiren müzakerelerde uluslararası ilişkilerle yönelik yenilikçi düşünce sergileme eğilimlerini arttırdığı ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Son olarak, güçlendirilmiş yönetimsel koordinasyonun, karar alıcıların yönetimsel koordinasyon uygulamalarının savaş sonrası dönemde de sürdürülmesini savunduğu durumlarda, savaşı sonlandıran müzakereleri takip etme olasılığı artmaktadır.