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Testing of the Washington System with Japan's Initiatives and the Failure of Deterrence in East Asia*

Dođu Asya'da Washington Sisteminin Japon Giriřimleriyle Testi ve Caydırıcılıđın Başarısızlıđı

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Abstract

The study aims to assess the Japanese challenge to the status quo established with the "Washington System" during the interwar period under the American leadership from the perspective of deterrence. Deterrence is based on cost/benefit calculations. When the cost of challenging the status quo is greater than the potential benefit, the challenger prefers to maintain the status quo. At this point, satisfaction with the status-quo and credibility are two determining factors of deterrence success and sustainability of the status quo. The changes in power asymmetry in East Asian regional order since the second half of 19 th century caused the fall of the Chinese Empire, the rise of Japan, and the opening of the regional states to Western-style international relations. However, the Washington system established under the US leadership after World War I (WWI) created a dissatisfied Japan with the status-quo in the region. As its capabilities increased, Japan began to take challenging initiatives shaking the Washington System. Due to the isolationist policy of the US after the WWI, US' responses toward Japanese aggression were minimal and shield away. Thus, it made the US in the eyes of Japan as a status-quo power having retaliatory capacity but not the intention. This study shows that the main reasons for the deterrence failure on the road to the Pearl Harbor attack were the dissatisfaction of Japan with the status-quo and Japan's misperception of American credibility. As a result, the war became a more beneficial option in Japan's eyes despite its unacceptable costs, and deterrence failed.

Keywords: Deterrence, the Washington System, Perception, Status-Quo

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı, iki savař arası dönemde Dođu Asya'da ABD'nin liderliğinde Washington Sistemi'yle kurulan statükonun Japonya'nın girişimleriyle test edilmesi sürecini caydırıcılık perspektifinden değerlendirmektir. Caydırıcılık, kazanç/maliyet hesabına dayanmaktadır. Statükoya meydan okumanın maliyeti potansiyel kazançta göre daha fazla ise meydan okuma niyetinde olan devlet statükoyu tercih edecektir. Bu noktada caydırıcılıđın başarıyla işleme ve statükonun sürdürülmesi için belirleyici olan iki temel kriter statükocu devletlerin sahip olduđu cezalandırma kapasitesinin inanılrlığı ve aktörlerin statükodan memnuniyetidir. 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısından itibaren Dođu Asya bölgesel sisteminde meydana gelen güç asimetrisindeki deđişim, Çin İmparatorluğu'nun düşüşü, Japonya'nın yükseliři ve bölge devletlerinin Batılı uluslararası ilişkiler sistemine girmesiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Ancak I. Dünya Savařı sonrasında ABD'nin önderliğinde kurulan Washington Sistemi bölgede statükodan memnuniyetsiz bir Japonya ortaya çıkarmıştır. Sahip olduđu materyal yetenekler arttıkça Japonya, Washington Sistemi'ni sarsacak adımlar atmaya başlamıştır. ABD'nin iki savař arası dönemde yeniden yalnızcılık politikası benimsemesi sebebiyle bu adımlara verdiđi pasif yanıtlar, Japonya'nın gözünde ABD'yi misilleme yeteneđini sahip ama misilleme yapma niyeti olmayan bir statükocu devlet olarak konumlandırmıştır. Bu çalışma, ABD ve Japonya arasında savařı başlatan Pearl Harbor saldırısına giden süreçte caydırıcılıđın başarısızlıđının temel nedenlerinin Japonya'nın statükodan memnuniyetsizliđi ve Japonya'nın Amerikan inanılrlığına ilişkin sahip olduđu yanlış algı kalıpları olduđunu göstermektedir. Sonuç olarak savař, Japonya'nın gözünde kabul edilemez maliyetlerine rađmen daha kazançlı bir seçenek haline gelmiş ve caydırıcılık başarısız olmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Caydırıcılık, Washington Sistemi, Algı, Statüko

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INTRODUCTION

The concept of deterrence, whose etymological roots are traced back to the word “*dēterreō*” in Latin meaning “to frighten away”, has a history dating back to thousands of years in strategic thinking. Although the concept of deterrence has taken on new meanings with the development of the international system, the constant nature of the concept is that it is based on cost/benefit calculation. Deterrence is a situation characterized by the absence of war between two opponents and involves persuading the opponent not to take adverse action. In other words, deterrence is the potential that a state persuades its adversaries of not using armed forces by convincing them the costs will outweigh the potential benefits (Huth, 1998: 24; Danilovic, 2001:101). It is seen that there are different deterrence classifications such as existential, collective actor, tailored, retired, pivotal or recessed deterrence in the literature (Tanter and Hayes, 2011: 5-11). The point that deserves mention about these classifications is that they are at a micro-level and a kind of strategic designation for specific situations (Huth, 1988: 17). Therefore, this study classifies deterrence based on two criteria: the number of actors and the status of attack. Deterrence is generally a state’s attempt to deter attacks on its own country. This type of deterrence is called central, direct, national, self, or general deterrence. By contrast, extended deterrence is a situation one state attempts to deter another from attacking a third country. Direct deterrence concerns two states, while extended deterrence concerns at least three states. Direct and extended deterrence are classified by the relationship between the defender and the challenger. Regarding the status of attacks, deterrence literature divides deterrence into general and immediate deterrence depending on whether the threat is operational or potential. General deterrence is a frequent situation in international politics and relates to intense strategic competition between states and numerous military disputes. General deterrence is the situation where deterrence overlaps with the traditional balance of power. The attack is not hard-hitting and likely in the foreseeable future but competitive; the “cold war” manifests itself in an arms race and hostility (Danilovic, 2001: 38).

On the other side, Patrick Morgan outlines the conditions of immediate deterrence. Accordingly, first, in the relationship between two rival states, officials of at least one party must be seriously considering an attack on the other or places in the rest of the world to which the other attaches importance. The second condition is that key officials of the state that is the target of the attack must be aware of this. According to the third condition, the target state, aware of the possibility of an attack, must threaten retaliation to prevent the attack. The leaders of the challenger decide to withdraw because of the threat of retaliation. There may be many reasons that will eventually discourage the attacker from attacking. However, if we make mention of deterrence, the primary reason must be the threat of costly retaliation. Morgan argues that the shift from general deterrence to immediate deterrence between rival states means that the form of deterrence has broken down (Morgan, 1988:34). Immediate deterrence occurs when general deterrence fails. In immediate deterrence, if the challenger does not retreat and decides to move forward despite the retaliation threat of the defender, the immediate deterrence has also failed (Morgan, 1988: 33-36). At this point, the question of what determines the success of deterrence is vital. The crucial point of deterrence success is credibility. The credibility of a state’s threat to its opponent depends on its capabilities and intention. (Zagare, 2004: 120-124). While capabilities stand for the material capacity that states have, the intention is closely related to the security dilemma and constitutes the darkest side of deterrence. Although a state has a material capacity, it may not have an aggressive intention. At this point, states’ perception of the status quo is determinative. Robert Jervis (1982/1983: 13-14) argues that when the expected cost of challenging the status quo is greater than accepting and adopting the status quo, deterrence works. However, even if the costs are high, deterrence can fail because of the misperceptions, the incredibility of threats, and the failure of grasping alternatives.

In the light of all these, the main goal of this study is to discuss Japan’s challenge to the US-led status-quo in East Asia in the interwar period from a deterrence perspective. In doing so, the study examines the relationship between the value of the status quo, credibility, and deterrence. In terms of the relationship between actors, this study deals with extended deterrence. This study argues that in the interwar period, general deterrence in East Asia shifted to immediate deterrence with the attempts of Japan, and immediate deterrence failed in the last stage. After World War I, Japan as a dissatisfied actor with status-quo took challenging action against the system over time and received minimal responses from the United States. Japan perceived these minimal responses as a weakness of American credibility. Weakness of credibility caused Japan to misjudge the value of the status quo and miscalculate the cost/benefit analysis. Japan failing to grasp the fact that American interests would require a total war took

steps to establish the "New East Asian Order" but what remained of these steps was the deterrence failure and the greatest drama of history. The study will analyze this relationship between credibility, the value of the status-quo, and deterrence into three phases. First, it will address an issue of changes in power asymmetry in East Asia and Japan's entry into Western-style international relations in the process leading up to WWI. Then, the study will introduce the status-quo called the "*Washington System*" under the leadership of the US during the interwar period and evaluate Japan's perception of this status-quo. Finally, challenger Japan's initiatives testing the Washington System will be analyzed with the key criteria of deterrence.

1. JAPAN'S ENTRY INTO THE WESTERN STYLE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SYSTEM AND THE RISE OF JAPAN

Looking at the historical past of East Asia is essentially equivalent to looking at the history of China. Because the Chinese Empire was the dominant actor in the region until the middle of 19th century. Japan's adventure of becoming an active player that would shape the future of East Asian history began with European states shaking the hierarchical Chinese superiority. The change of power asymmetries in East Asia was a result of the power loss of China and the rise of Japan. Both countries followed a closed policy till the second half of 19th century. While China was forced into an "open door policy" after the Opium Wars as the target of commercial and colonial races among Western powers, Japan was left alone due to the lack of a local product to sell to these countries. Trade and contact with the US ended Japan's isolation and allowed Japan to join the modern system (Holcombe, 2006: 234; Wasserstrom, 2010: 54).

As the commercial rivalry among European powers for access to the regional markets increasingly continued, the security concerns of China and Japan caused by growing European interests in the region forced them to modernize and transform themselves into the "Great Powers". In this process, it is seen that Japan was more successful than China. The US opened Japan to the external world by signing Kanagawa Agreement in 1854. Although there was resistance against foreigners in the beginning, in the 1860s the Japanese gave the green light to modernization by embracing the slogan of *enriching the country, strengthen the army instead of respect the emperor, expel the barbarians*. Moreover, the constitution of Japan published in 1868 during the Meiji period underlined the statement in the Charter Oath that "*Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the just laws of Nature. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule*" (McLaren, 1979).

Fukuzawa Yukiçi, a supporter of Pro-western Japan, also stated that Japan should culturally leave Asia and its backward neighbors, and join Western states (Hopper, 2005: 121-122). The modernization process in East Asia created Japan getting incrementally stronger by imitating the West and China resisting this modernization wind for a while and eventually being late to catch up the speed of modernization so that turned into a "sick man of Asia". Thus, changes in the power asymmetry were the result of three important developments: Sino- Japanese War in 1895, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902, and finally, Japanese- Russian War in 1905.

China granted Britain the most favored nation status at the end of the First Opium War, which started in 1839 and ended with the Nanking Treaty of 1842. Following Britain, the US and France obtained similar concessions from China by threading the use of force. Despite China's shaken prestige, there was no direct threat to challenge Chinese supremacy and the Korean peninsula, a tributary, and the loyal state of China, throughout the 1860s. However, the potential threat to China and Korea was growing Japanese expansionism and its continental interests. Just as America opened Japan to the outside, Japan attempted to open tributary state Korea by imitating the West. In 1866, in the wake of Japan's initiatives, China signed a treaty granting Japan a superior status in Korea. The motivator of the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1871 was China's fear of contingent West-Japanese cooperation. China confronted Japanese actions challenging Chinese supremacy in East Asia between 1871 and 1876. Japan forced Ryukyu to not fulfill her duties towards China, sent troops to Taiwan, and made a treaty with Korea almost at gunpoint. Japan, which was just at the beginning of the expansionist policy, signed the Treaty of Kanghwa with Korea in 1876, also known as the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty. As of this date, the relations in the Korea-Japan-China triangle witnessed rapid changes and developments due to Japan's expansionist policy imitating the West (Kim, 1979: 328-330).

The primary goal of Japanese diplomacy in East Asia was diplomatic and commercial parity with the Western powers. The Meiji-led government aimed to create a new identity for Japan within Western patterns. For Japan, The Treaty of Kanghwa was a formalization of western-style equal relations and an entrance of Korea into the Western international system. Because the two East Asian countries, which until now had been conducting their relations with each other under the traditional concept of East Asian interstate relations and based on a common acceptance of Chinese supremacy, were now struggling to carry out their relations based on Western international law and treaties (Kim, 1979: 328-330). Article 1 of the Treaty stated that Korea is “an independent state enjoying the same sovereign rights as does Japan”. In doing so, Japan sought to provide the legal basis for Korea to leave from traditional Chinese suzerain influence. However, Korea did not attach the same meaning to Article 1 as Japan did (Deuchler 1977: 49; Park, 2013: 292). Korean officials considered the treaty a sign of the re-establishment of relations with Japan. They interpreted the first article consistent with a traditional Confucian principle that tributary states are independent in their political and legal matters with others. Thus, Korea maintained its suzerain-vassal relationship with China regardless of Japan’s expectations. In the following years, Korea turned into a geopolitically strategic vein in the middle of a tug-of-war between Japan and China.

Japan’s recognition of Korea as an independent state referred to Korea as equal with China in the Western international system. This was Japan’s indirect challenge to Chinese supremacy in Korea under the tribute system umbrella. The increasing Japanese and Russian threat to the Korean Peninsula caused Chinese interventionist policy toward Korea that had never applied before. This new policy of China ushered in a new order of East Asia as well as allowing Korea to enter the Western international relations system. The beginning of the largest rebellion in Korea resulted in the outbreak of war between China and Japan in 1894 because both countries sent their troops to suppress the revolt. The war ended with the Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895. As a result of the treaty, China not only recognized Korea’s formal independence but was also condemned to pay compensation to Japan and agreed to grant Japan the most favored nation status. In addition, the treaty forced China to open four ports to Japan and ceded Taiwan an island connected to it. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was an indication of the success of the Japanese westernization process. It was a successful diplomatic and psychological step on the road from a country ignored by the Western powers for the belief that it had no commercial value, to becoming an imperial power (Dillon, 2016: 127-130).

Another step of the rise of Japan and the attempt to become a member of the Western international system was the Anglo-Japan alliance in 1902. Looking at the background of the alliance in 1902, it is seen that the main reason motivating both signatory states to this alliance was the containment of Russian imperialism in the region. While Russia posed a threat trying to gain control over Manchuria and Korea in the eyes of Japan, competition with Russia was a part of intercontinental rivalry for Britain (Nish, 1966). Both countries had different motivations in the alliance, but the threat was common. Britain considered China as an important market for its goods since the mid-19th century. Russia, Germany, and France struggled to put the bite on China such as accessing more seaports and acquiring spheres of influence. The struggle for influence confronted Britain with two options: to accept this struggle or to continue to support the multilateral open-door policy in China (Edwards, 1987:16-27; Otte, 1995: 1157-1179).

Britain negotiated a treaty recognizing mutual influence with Japan. Accordingly, Britain would respect Japan’s interests over Korea, and Japan would also acknowledge British interests in South China and the Yangzi valley. Moreover, the treaty included defending China’s territorial integrity and open-door policy. Thus, the treaty recognized both the territorial integrity of China and protected the right of all powers to equal trade opportunity, as well as the sphere of influence and private interests of the two signatory states (Hunt, 1983: 189-202). For Japan, the open-door policy was not a cause for concern because Japan was directly interested in Korea rather than China’s territorial integrity. The Alliance was defined as a “revolutionary” movement as it brought together two powers, one from Asia and the other from Europe, under the same roof. Japan was an important entity for Western states to establish relations at the diplomatic level anymore. For the Japanese, the alliance was a great sign that they achieved their goal of leaving *degenerate* Asia behind and joining *enlightened* Europe (Oka, 1988: 185-193).

The Japanese-Russian War in 1905 demonstrated that the Anglo-Japanese alliance had not been a deterrent for Russia. In 1904, Russia did not fulfill its promise of withdrawing forces from Manchuria and there was no other choice but to fight in front of Japan, not feeling safe with the presence of a Russia

settled in Northeast Asia. The war ended with the victory of Japan, and the Portsmouth Treaty was signed in September 1905. As a result of this treaty, Russia was forced to withdraw from South Manchuria and renounce its promises in Korea. Japan's victory changed the regional balance of power and revealed the need for renewal and renegotiation of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The revised version of the Alliance, signed in August 1905, just as the Portsmouth conference was about to convene (Best, 2010: 25-27). Japan's success in 1905 was remarkable. Because its increasing influence in East Asia worried the European powers as much as it strengthened the position of Japan in the European states system. This concern resulted from deep suspicion on two issues: Japan could be influenced by Pan-Asian sentiment and encourage other Asian states to disyoke Western colonialism and unite the region under its leadership or Japan could use its new military and political power to achieve hegemonic control in East Asia. Japan also had a concern from its perspective. She was worried about facing a new combination of Europe versus Asian identity (Nish, 1966: 309).

The revised alliance had minimized concerns on both sides and demonstrated that Japan was a reliable partner. With this assurance, France secured its control over Indochina by signing a treaty with Japan in 1907. Thus, the balance of power system in East Asia shifted towards a multilateral international order.

2. AMERICAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE BUILT IN EAST ASIA IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD (1919-1940): THE WASHINGTON SYSTEM

After the war, states have confronted the problem of building a new order instead of order collapsed in the international system. The most important characteristic of relations among states after a great war is the emergence of new power distribution and the creation of new power asymmetries between strong and weak states (Ikenberry, 2001:19). The change in the power asymmetry in East Asia during the period leading up to WWI brought about the question of who would control the region after the War.

Japan participated in WWI by attacking Germany in 1914 and determined Germany's spheres of influence over China as its target. A year later, Japan attempted to dominate China with 21 demand declarations, but partially achieved what it wanted because of the pressures of the US and Britain. Western powers turned their attention to Europe to repair the ruins of the War. Japan tried to take advantage of this situation in its favor in East Asia. Japan filled the trade gap created by the European withdrawal, thus economically came out of the war stronger. However, the entry of Japan into the markets dominated by Europeans while the war was going on, disturbed Britain and the US. American belief in Japan's violation of open-door policy and naval rivalry between them made Japan a target in American eyes (Best et al., 2012: 70-74).

Europeans considered Japan as a country trying to advance its imperial interests in China, due to 21 demands and Nishihara loans. The image of Japan *breaking its chains* not only raised concerns about the future of China but also Japan's potential to use Pan-Asianism as a tool of continental leadership. The different visions of Japan and Britain regarding China's future damaged the spirit of the alliance and became more evident at the end of the Great War. In essence, the German threat disappeared, and Russia was lost in the chaos of its civil war at the end of WWI. For Britain, there was no threat in Europe and East Asia, but Japan. The only motivation for Britain to continue this alliance was to keep Japan under control anymore, whereas Japan realized that the alliance would not protect her against the US (Best et al., 2012: 70-74).

The conditions in 1918 made it clear that the treaty was out of date and should be revised according to new conditions. The key point for Britain and the US was still to maintain stability in East Asia and the open-door policy in China. Japan accepted Britain's reconsideration demand of alliance to not be re-isolated. One of the main reasons behind Japan's acceptance of this demand was Japan's shaking belief of becoming in equal status with the European great powers. Japanese leaders believed that equal status was also accepted by Western countries before WWI. The first case shaking this belief was the rejection of Japan's racial equality proposal at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Thus, the Japanese government faced the fact that their country was not considered to be one of the great powers (Matsuura, 2010: 82-84). US' proposed expansion of the naval forces in the wake of the US Naval Act in 1916 triggered the naval races in the system. Although Japan was one of the countries entering this navy arm race, Japan realized that it could not compete with the United States in this area and could not resist the Anglo-American bloc.

For all these reasons, Japan accepted the revision of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. At the Washington Conference held in Washington from 1921 to 1922, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was replaced by the Four-Power Treaty, a multilateral consultative agreement that did not include any regional security commitments and would ensure the preservation of the status quo in the Pacific. This agreement based on compromise and included not the use of force was signed between the US, Britain, France, and Japan. In addition, Nine-Power Treaty was signed to protect China's territorial integrity and open-door system. Japan also accepted the Five-Power Treaty restricting naval weapons in the region.

The new status-quo in East Asia created by the Four-Power, Five-Power, and Nine-Power Treaties were called *Pax Anglo-American* or more generally *the Washington System*. Because the Washington Conference revealed that the US had a rapid mobilization and a great capacity as one of the leading countries after its short but decisive intervention in the Great War. Almost all actors of the system acknowledged that the US could be a hegemon (Best et al., 2012: 75).

Regional powers Japan, China, and even Korea had great expectations from the *new East Asian order* but none of their demands were accepted. The Japanese senators interpreted the problems left unsolved between China and Japan at the Paris Conference as a conspiracy of the secret Anglo-American alliance. The prescription for the post-war East Asian order created unsatisfied regional actors (Chihiro, 1982: 4-7).

3. THE JAPANESE CHALLENGE TO THE “WASHINGTON SYSTEM”: THE JAPANESE MONROE DOCTRINE AND THE MANCHURIAN CRISIS

The Washington System created *a shaky peace* with the dissatisfied countries left behind. In a system with dissatisfied states, as the capacity increases, the willingness to expand and change the status quo increases. This overlaps with the cost/benefit calculation of deterrence. In this respect, it was inevitable that Japan would erode the system as a dissatisfied actor with a status-quo. The dissatisfied regional actor was not only Japan but also China. The failure of the Washington Conference to meet the demands of China caused the rise of nationalism both in Chinese domestic policy and in the region. In 1921, Communists and Nationalist Parties united under the umbrella of the “United Front” by getting Russian military and economic support (Best et al., 2012: 69-79). In 1926, the United Front brought results by creating pressure on the US and Britain to review their Chinese policy. As a result, the unification of China brought about gains that would reduce their dissatisfaction. So, Japan was the only country that had the potential to challenge the system in the region. The Pearl Harbor attack that started the Pacific War was essentially an outcome of Japan's rip the heart out of the dynamics of the system in East Asia and challenge to change the status quo. The attack can be considered as an outcome of the US's minimal reactions to Japan's expansionist actions aiming to change the status quo. Japan misperceived these minimal responses and miscalculated cost/benefit. At this point, Japan's challenging actions can be listed as follows; the Manchurian Incident, withdrawal of the League of Nations, efforts to unite the region under the Japanese umbrella, also known as Japan's Monroe Doctrine.

Japanese diplomat Viscount Kikujiro Ishii argued that since Japan entered the modern states system in the mid-19th century, it has struggled to achieve two goals: diplomatic equality and security. Although the first one was considerably achieved, the latter was at the top of the agenda of Japanese diplomacy as one of the most vital goals to be achieved, especially in the 20th century. In this respect, Japan proclaimed its special interests and protection in Korea and Manchuria as part of self-defense. According to Ishii, the policy followed by Japan in Manchuria was not a matter of prestige, but a matter of death and life. Manchuria was still a key land for Japanese security (Ishii, 1933).

The effects of the 1929 economic depression led to the rise of nationalist militarism besides a great economic collapse. To overcome the effects of depression, the actors in the international system adopted protectionist policies endangering Japanese exports. Under these circumstances, Japan began to see Manchuria as a vital economic vein. Japan believed that self-help (autarky) was an important factor for survival (Peattie, 1975: 56-58; 96-107).

Although Japan controlled the Russian enterprises in Manchuria after the 1905 Russo-Japan War, Manchuria was a land dominated by the Chinese population. In the late 1920s, Japan perceived Chinese United Front and nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek as a threat to her special rights in Manchuria. For the Japanese, there would be a *Final War* between East and West. In this war, the East would unite under Japanese leadership, while the West would be in the shadow of the US leadership. A strong economy would foster success in the war, and Manchuria was a rich region that would provide the

necessary resources (Peattie, 1975: 120-123). Considering all this background, the Japanese Kwantung Army invaded Manchuria on September 18, 1931.

While China immediately appealed to the League of Nations established by the US proposal but did not include the US, Japan proposed direct bilateral talks between two countries. Indeed, the task of the Council was to find and propose peaceful solutions to conflicts, as stated in Article 11 (FRUS, 1919). Japan's airstrike and bombing were a violation of both the League Agreement and the Nine-Power Treaty. Due to the pro-Japanese tendency in the League of Nations member countries, especially in Britain and France, the West did not respond quickly enough and effectively under the Nine-Power Treaty and League Agreement (Chang, 2003: 48-49).

The US, on the other hand, returned to its isolation after WWI. Throughout the 1930s, the main purpose of US foreign policy was to not drag into international crises. Although Japan's actions in Manchuria were a violation of the open-door policy and territorial integrity of China, the US gave minimal responses to Manchurian Incident. Because American interests and security were not directly threatened. In addition, the US Congress had refused to fund naval forces in the Pacific as a requirement of isolationism, so the US lacked a credible naval force in the Pacific. Moreover, the US had important trade ties with Japan rather than China and did not want to jeopardize it. Ambassador Nelson T Johnson said that the Japanese initiative was an increased opportunity for American industrial plants to sell the needed raw materials and machinery, while Stanley Hornbeck stated that this initiative by Japan did not affect the vital interests of the United States (Boyle, 1993: 79).

Following the ineffectiveness of the League of Nations due to the pro-Japanese tendencies of Britain and France, US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson sent a diplomatic note, known as the Stimson Doctrine, to the Chinese and Japanese governments on January 7, 1932.

"The American Government (...) cannot admit the legality of any situation de facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty or agreement entered into between those Governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy" (FRUS, 1932).

Under the influence of the Stimson Doctrine, the decision opposite to Japan was unanimously taken in the League of Nations. However, Japanese officials formalized their occupation by leaving the League and establishing the Manchukuo state. In doing so, Japan completed the economic step of the Final War with the West. The second and perhaps the most difficult step was to unite the East under her leadership. At this point, the Japanese Monroe Doctrine was a fundamental factor determining the Japanese stance against the Western powers. Although the Japanese Monroe Doctrine applied to the entire Asian continent in the discourse, its special interests were China and particularly Manchuria. The tenets of the doctrine were Pan Asia, Japanese special spheres of interests, leadership, and economic spheres of influence (Blakeslee, 1933). For the Japanese, these discourses were defensive, and their purpose was to protect Asia from attacks by Americans and Europeans. The Pan-Asian discourse was an expansionary initiative of dissatisfied Japan challenging the status quo.

By 1934, Japanese politicians declared *the Monroe Doctrine* and expected to create a commercial and ideological bloc against Western imperialism. It would take the trump card of the West by saving China from Western influence. Japan's autarchy would be incomplete without China. The neutralization of Japan would increase the possibility of China falling into communism and increase the military and ideological power of the Soviets. Therefore, Japan used the Doctrine to keep China on its line with the doctrine (Best et al., 2012: 81-90).

4. JAPANESE DISCOURSE OF "NEW EAST ASIAN ORDER" AND THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR

Japan's actions keeping China under control were followed by an incident that took place on the Marco Polo bridge in 1937, and then Japan's revisionist behavior towards mainland China. Increasing actions of Japan day by day violated the economic interests of the US in China, so the US took a strong attitude towards Japan (Borg, 1964). US protest notes failed to deter the Japanese government. In 1938, Japan's intention to challenge the status-quo established by the Washington System manifested by officially announcing a new foreign policy called *New Order in East Asia*. New Order in East Asia emphasized four important points: to make a permanent stability of East Asia, to make perfect the

common defense against communism, to establish a new culture, and to achieve close economic harmony (FRUS, 1943). Japanese Foreign Minister Arita Hachiro stated that although Japan did not intend to jeopardize American interests in China, it was inevitable that these interests would be damaged by large-scale military actions. Moreover, it would be unthinkable to apply pre-war standards and principles to existence and upcoming situations in Asia (Hosoya, 1968: 98).

The US response to Japan's new order policy was to abolish the Trade Agreement with Japan. The purpose of the US was to restrict the actions of Japan in China and at the same time to give the message that the US could impose economic sanctions. This message would also remind Japan of its economic dependence on the US (Hull, 1948: 6). The Japanese Foreign Ministry misperceived this response of the United States and considered it as a move for domestic politics and the upcoming American elections. Moreover, it was perceived as an American initiative to adopt new order in China. The development that led Japan to reconsider American policy was the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. Japan was afraid of the possibility of revenge of the 1905 Russian Japanese War and therefore, demonstrated its intention to act friendly to the interests of the United States in China. In the meantime, Japan followed a policy to reduce its economic dependence on the US as far as possible. Otherwise, an American oil embargo could paralyze Japan's military and economic activities because Japan could not produce even 10% of its oil needs and imported about 70% of such needs from the United States (Hosoya, 1968: 103).

Japan targeted Dutch East Indies for their oil resources as a substitute for American oil. Meanwhile, Germany's invasions of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg in Europe and the defeat of the Anglo-French army in Dunkirk increased Japanese interest in the Dutch East Indies and French Indochina. The Roosevelt administration tried to use the oil embargo and the threat of military intervention to stop Japanese aggression. However, the US government-backed down the embargo because the embargo could encourage Japan to attack the Dutch Indies. Despite the US abandoning the embargo, regarding American military intervention, Japan continued to believe that the US would be involved in a Japanese action in the south. In 1940, the US ordered its fleet to stay at Pearl Harbor reinforced Japan's fear of military intervention (Sagan, 1998: 898-899).

Japan sought to take advantage of the war in Europe to create a status-quo in Asia that Japan was satisfied with it. Taking advantage of Britain's war with Germany, Japan was planning a surprise attack on British assets in the Far East. The Japanese Navy stated that war in Southeast Asia could not be limited to European powers. Therefore, Japan should have considered the possibility of American military intervention. The basic assumption of the Navy was based on American capabilities, not the intention. It was expected that the US would launch a counterattack through Pearl Harbor, in a surprise attack to be launched by the Japanese Navy to ensure the neutrality of the East Indies. The Japanese Navy calculated their probability of winning the war with the US as zero because of Japan's dependence on American oil. The military's strategic calculation was that if the US stopped its oil exports completely, Japan could not continue the war unless it could neutralize the Dutch East Indies and transport oil from there. Also, if the war lasted for more than a year, there was no chance of winning (Jun, 1980: 247-248). Unlike the army, the Navy advocated not to attack British and Dutch territories without neutralizing the US. According to the military, America was unlikely to go to war for European colonies, while the Navy argued it was very likely. South Asia was not only a vital source of raw materials in Britain's war with Germany but also important for the rearming of the US. With the pressure of Britain, the US started to implement a policy of economic compression of Japan.

While Japan was in negotiations with the US, it was preparing for war on the other hand. Japan established a tripartite alliance with Germany and Italy and signed a Nonaggression Pact with the Soviets in 1941. An embattled Japan showed that American deterrence was lack of credibility. The US' return to isolationism after the WWI and its policy of not dragging into any war in the Pacific, its failure to react effectively to the occupation of Manchuria, and failure of implementing an oil embargo were the reasons why Japan perceived American deterrence lack of credibility. After Germany declared war against the Soviets, the US approved to impose an oil embargo on Japan. Japan had two options: either compromise with the US before its stocks run out or going to war with the US and Britain to get the East Indies and the oil there. As a result, the war broke out with Japan's invasion of Pearl Harbor and Malaya on December 7-8, 1941, and deterrence failed.

CONCLUSION

Since the second half of the 19th century, the changes in the East Asian power asymmetry, such as the transformation of the Chinese empire into the sick man of Asia and the entry of Japan and Korea into the western international system, foreshadowed the establishment of a new status quo in East Asia. Although Japan saw the restructuring of Europe by the Western powers as a window of opportunity to establish a satisfied status quo in East Asia, it faced the veto power of Britain and the US. Realizing that it could not resist the Anglo-American bloc, Japan had to accept the new balance of power created by the Washington Naval Conference. The new order established by the Nine-Power, Five-Power, and Four-Power Treaties represents the general deterrence situation. Japan has challenged the status quo established by the Washington System by invading Manchuria, leaving the League of Nations, and adopting an expansionist policy called the Japanese Monroe doctrine. This challenge was a sign of the transition of the threat from potential to operational, in other words, the failure of extended general deterrence. At this stage, the US as the defender was expected to strengthen its commitments to regional defense or reassure its previous commitments. Thus, the failure of extended general deterrence created a situation where the defender adopted the extended immediate deterrence. However, the US as an architect of the system in East Asia of the interwar period returned to its isolationist policy after WWI and gave minimal responses to the Japanese aggression. This situation, in the eyes of Japan, has made the benefit of challenging the status quo greater than the cost of accepting it. Japan's declaration of a New Order in East Asia in 1938 revealed that Japan would not withdraw. Although the main purpose of the New Order in East Asia was permanent stability in East Asia, it was more than a regional policy. This policy was a sign of the Japanese attempt at hegemony, which includes not only Japan, Manchukuo and China, but also Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies and the South Seas. The collapse of colonial empires in Europe in 1940 offered an opportunity for Japanese expansionism. Thus, the Japanese new order policy turned into a dominance in the continent rather than stability in East Asia.

Japan considered minimal American responses as a loss of credibility. Therefore, extended immediate deterrence failed in 1941, despite the *expected unacceptable war costs* for Japan because the cost of not participating in the war was considered even greater. In addition, it is seen that the main reason for Japan's misperception regarding cost/ benefit calculations was the US's past behaviors. In other words, Japan miscalculated the probability of the United States participating in an all-out war. As a result, this study showed that the general deterrence situation in Asia in the period leading up to World War II has gradually evolved into extended immediate deterrence with the attempts of Japan, and ultimately immediate deterrence has also failed. This failure reveals a direct link between the success and sustainability of deterrence and satisfaction with the status quo.

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