



Involvement of International Organizations for Ending the Syrian Civil War

Abdullah SOYDEMİR*

Abstract

This article has been prepared in the light of a current tragedy with global impact: Syrian Civil War. The rationale and importance of this research lie on the requirement to study the involvement of some international organizations for ending the crisis. This can make a significant contribution to the literature as it addresses a substantial topic in the field. The purpose of this study is to make analyses and assessments about the practicality of some scenarios into the civil war. In this regard, total six scenarios (UN Only, NATO Only, NATO-UN Together, NATO-EU Together, Coalition Forces (TUR, the US, Russian Federation (RF) and Regional Organizations) have been clarified. Upon these scenarios, qualitative research method and comparative design have been followed. Conclusions could be drawn on whether any possible related scenarios would be reasonable, decisive and coherent with regional realities, current capabilities and international dynamics. At the end of the research, it has been concluded that most of these scenarios would not be applicable, reasonable and successful in Syria and could even worsen the current situation and trigger wider conflicts in the Middle East. However, a coalition of Turkey, the US and RF, although it is difficult to establish, comes out as the best scenario to end the civil war. This scenario covers most of the conditions required to end the civil war, establish a unified, democratic and peaceful Syria and restore peace, order and stability in post-civil war environment in the Middle East.

*Dr., Independent Researcher, soydemirabdullah@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0003-4692-640X.

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Suriye İç Savaşının Sonlandırmasına Uluslararası Örgütlerin Müdahil Olması

Öz

Bu makale, küresel etkileri olan güncel bir trajedi ışığında hazırlanmıştır: Suriye İç Savaşı. Bu araştırmanın önemi, iç savaşı sonlandırmak amacıyla izlenebilecek yöntemleri inceleme gerekliliğinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Çalışmanın amacı, bazı uluslararası oluşumların konuya müdahil olmasının uygulanabilirliği, etkinliği ve olası etkileri hakkında analizler ve değerlendirmeler yapmaktır. Bu çalışma, alan içinde bilimsel anlamda yeteri kadar incelenmemiş bir konuyu ele aldığı için literatüre önemli bir katkı sağlayabilecektir. Bu bağlamda, toplam altı senaryo (Sadece BM, sadece NATO, NATO-BM birlikte, NATO-AB birlikte, Koalisyon Kuvvetleri (TUR, ABD, RF) ve Bölgesel Örgütler) belirlenmiş ve bu olası durumlar üzerinden analizler yapılmıştır. Analizler esnasında, nitel araştırma yöntemi ve karşılaştırmalı tasarım kullanılmıştır. Bahse konu senaryolar, bölgesel gerçeklikler, mevcut yetenekler ve uluslararası dinamikler açısından analiz edilmiştir. Araştırma sonunda, bu senaryoların çoğunun Suriye'de uygulanabilir, makul ve başarılı olmayacağı ve hatta mevcut durumu daha da kötüleştirebileceği, Orta Doğu'da daha geniş çatışmaları tetikleyebileceği sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, Türkiye, ABD ve RF'nin oluşturacağı bir koalisyon, kurulması zor olsa da, iç savaşı sonlandırmak ve sonrasında Suriye'de istikrarı sağlamak için, diğerlerine göre daha iyi bir senaryo olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Bu seçenek, iç savaşı sona erdirmek, ardından birleşik, demokratik ve barışçıl bir Suriye oluşturmak ve Orta Doğu'da barış, düzen ve istikrarı sağlamak için gerekli koşulların çoğunu kapsamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *Suriye İç Savaşı, BM Barışı Koruma, NATO Müdahalesi, Koalisyon Kuvvetleri, Karşılaştırmalı Analiz.*

Introduction

This article has been prepared in the light of a current turmoil in the Middle East: Syrian Civil War. After the recent developments in the region, the requirement to study the crisis from all perspectives, regardless of any prejudices,

came to the fore as a crucial requirement. In this rationale, every possible way of de-escalating and, if possible, ending the Syrian Civil War needs further scientific inquiry. The involvement of some international organizations with different combinations and probable positive or negative impacts, is really interesting and compelling. However, a scientific study on NATO or the UN's possible roles for ending tragedy has been neglected so far by many scholars and academicians. Reasonable assessments after academic inquiries should be made in order to pursue a comprehensive approach for the Syrian Civil War. In this framework, the purpose of this study is to make further research and investigate, in a scientific manner, the possible ways of ending humanitarian tragedy in the region.

The rationale and the importance of this research lies on the requirement to study, in a holistic approach, the ways of bringing an end to the tragedy, which has been going on for about nine years. Humanitarian crisis in Syria stimulated a global action whether on humanitarian or political perspective (Sorenson, 2016). NATO took initiative and engaged in many operations. Similarly, the UN has carried out many peacekeeping missions. This article aims to study the practicality, efficiency and impacts of a similar NATO or the UN involvement with different combinations in the Syrian Civil War in order to end the humanitarian tragedy. It is a real tragedy which has displaced over 50% of population with over 25% of having fled the country (İbrahim, 2017). The Syrian Civil War must be ended as it could trigger more tragic events in the Middle East. These conflicts will certainly affect negatively the rest of the world. Syria and the Middle East is a fertile ground for such predictable conflicts. In this context, this article will surely make a significant and substantial contribution to the literature as it addresses a demonstrable gap in the field.

Data of this research is based mainly on the official documents, papers, articles, reports and books. In order to study the case in a comprehensive approach, a smooth and linear study plan has been followed in this research. A comprehensive design, which enables researcher to organize its report according to themes and subjects and which is one of the most widely used methods in international relations for outlining the report, has been followed-up in the study. In the first part, an introduction has been given in order to introduce methodological framework about the research. In the following two parts, *total six scenarios (UN Only, NATO Only, NATO-UN Together, NATO-EU Together, Coalition Forces*

(TUR, the US, RF) and Regional Organizations) have been clarified and studied. In the study, the UN only option or other related scenarios that can involve in the issue under the UN supervision were considered as the unit of analysis. Despite its failure to prevent the Syrian Civil War or previous global crises (Vietnam War (Ağır and Aksu, 2017), Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories (Aral, 2013), Yemen (Rivera, 2016), Bosnia War), the UN is currently the top international organization with no alternative. The UN was established in order to eliminate the destructive effects of wars and to protect peace in the world. The main responsibility in maintaining global peace and security is entrusted to the UN Security Council (Bennet and Oliver, 2015). The UN, of which all independent states are members, is an organization that operates on behalf of the entire international community on almost every issue that concerns them (Arı, 2013). RF wants to influence the Middle East as it did during the Cold War period, while the US continues its efforts to maintain its hegemony. For this purpose, the US and RF are fighting proxy wars in the region (Ağır and Aksu, 2017). The most important platform, where these two global powers in power struggle can solve the problem diplomatically or at least discuss it, is still the UN. The UN at least limits the unilateral action of these two powers within its organizational mechanism. In this context, it has been argued that a formation not included in the UN will not be effective in ending the Syrian Civil War. Therefore, only the UN and possible formations under the UN supervision were discussed in the study. In the third chapter, a comparative analysis among scenarios has been conducted. In the last part, interpretation and conclusion have been shared with the reader. Overall, this study provides an iterative assessment of implications to understand and visualize the nature of a dynamic and complex research topic. Also, it provides a balanced view of a hot topic, not only describing challenges but also identifying potential opportunities.

1. UN Only

International law has always considered its fundamental purpose as to the maintenance of peace (Merrills, 2007). The UN, in its written documents, has given great emphasis on international law and order in the context of promoting international peace and security. Conflict management mainly falls into two categories: diplomatic procedures and adjudication (Shaw, 2008). All these possible methods can be applied only upon the consent of the disputing parties.

Article 2 of the UN Charter states that “all members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered” (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). If the projected means fail to resolve a dispute, the continuation of which is possibly to endanger the preservation of international peace and security, the associated parties shall refer it to the UN Security Council (UNSC). Looking into the details of political methods of a dispute settlement, it is understood that it is different from judicial methods in that judicial methods are those that require the parties to agree to abide by the settlement whereas political methods don’t require such agreement (Charter of the United Nations, 1945). These diplomatic methods can be listed as conciliation, mediation, good offices, negotiation and enquiry (Hamza and Todorovic, 2017), and the UN has a basic role on all these methods. Article 52 (1) of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter asserts that regional arrangements or agencies can also deal with disputes relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as deemed appropriate for regional action (Oellers-Frahm & Wühler, 1984). However, Article 53 (1) also notes the supremacy of the UNSC over regional arrangements and states that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council”. The UNSC possesses “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” in accordance with Article 24.

For liberal internationalists who believe that sovereignty includes responsibilities as well as rights (Doyle, 2011), the crimes against humanity committed in Syria are much more severe than those in Libya, and in this case, the responsibility of international community must be fulfilled quickly and effectively (Slaughter, 2012). In contrast, the realists, who perceive state sovereignty as the main column of international law, argue that a military intervention in Syria would be a violation of international law, and that the sovereign equality and non-responsibility norms of the states should be preserved (Eldem, 2015). Some researchers who look normatively favorable to Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine argue that because of structural reasons, R2P doctrine can not be applied effectively in practice and that the protection responsibility norm loses its functionality and effectiveness with Syria (Morris, 2013). According to this doctrine, which is only formulated by the UNSC and not mentioned in the UN Treaty, in case of grave human rights violations or humanitarian disasters in any

country, the UNSC will be able to take a military intervention decision, if necessary, to solve the problem (Aral, 2013). The main reason why this norm can't be applied in the Syrian Civil War for structural reasons is that there is no consensus among the US, RF, China, the EU and Iran. Especially RF, China and Iran take a negative attitude against foreign intervention by claiming that the crisis in Syria is an internal issue due to their own internal policies (Yazıcı, 2012). After the NATO intervention in Libya, the international community is more cautious about any type of intervention, even in accordance with R2P, in the Syrian Civil War. As a matter of fact, there are concrete examples that this norm will not function in Syria. Syria crisis was first discussed in the UNSC on April 21, 2011 (Saira, 2012). In this meeting and in subsequent meetings, RF and China prevented the decision to be taken on the issue by arguing that the situation in Syria would not pose a threat to international peace and security (Topal, 2014). The vetoes of both RF and China aggravated the crisis in Syria (Adams, 2015). This situation also prevented international community from acting more actively in the crisis (Akgün, 2012). As a result of these disagreements, the international community did not fulfill its responsibility to protect humanitarian rights quickly and effectively in Syria. Thus the tragedy intensified and the terrorist organizations strengthened in the region.

The effectiveness of the R2P doctrine has caused controversy (Paris, 2014) as a result of the failure of the UNSC to intervene effectively and swiftly to the Syrian Civil War. According to the skeptics, R2P doctrine has lost its validity and functionality as an international norm. In fact, geopolitical interests have been decisive in shaping the UNSC's policy on Syria, and the failure in this regard is the ineffectiveness of the UN, not the importance and functionality of R2P doctrine as an international norm (Eldem, 2015). This explains the ineffectiveness of UN's resilience indeed, or more accurately, failure to reach consensus among permanent members of the UNSC. The use of military power is a decision on a case-by-case basis. The question to be asked here is why the UN didn't act in Syria in accordance with R2P doctrine, while it was much more eager to conduct operation in Libya. It has been argued by some experts since the first years of the civil war that the internal conflict in the case of Syria and the nature of the insurgents are different from Libya and that a military intervention in Syria would cause more harm than benefit (Bellamy, 2014). The fragmentation and radicalization of the

Syrian opposition, the support to Assad regime by RF and Iran, weakened the UN's ability to use the initiative and achieve the desired result by the implementation of force. As well as the norms in international politics, the material and strategic interests of the great powers are also important and the importance of a norm in face of these interests might be lessened (Glanville, 2014). R2P doctrine hasn't been put into practice in Syria partially because of variations in the definitions of this doctrine in different perspectives, but mainly because of the lack of consensus among global powers on political interests on Syria. Thus, a UN-adopted military involvement isn't expected in Syria, as long as above consensus has not been reached, especially after the regime has almost declared its victory against "terrorists".

Following the start of first demonstrations and reaction of Syrian regime with military forces to those actions, UN have made some announcements which have criticized the regime for executions, arbitrary arrest, suspected disappearance, torture, violence and violation of children's rights. On 2 December 2011, the UN Human Rights Council issued its first statement to strongly condemn the Syrian authorities for ongoing, widespread, systematic and severe human rights violations and to remind the Syrian regime that it is her responsibility to protect her citizens (OHCHR, 2019). On 16 February 2012, the UN General Assembly condemned the continuous, widespread and systematic human rights abuses in Syria and demanded an immediate end to the violence and invited Assad to resign immediately. The R2P doctrine played an important role in shaping the attitude and policies of most of the international community towards Syria. But, the UNSC, which is the only authority to make a binding decision on R2P issue in accordance with international law, has not been able to resolve the proposals for Syria for a real involvement, which has been on its agenda since the beginning of the Syrian Crisis in March 2011, due to the vetoes of RF and China. During the civil war, the UNSC sometimes took decisions on Syria. The Joint Special Envoy Kofi Annan's plan to stop the violence was unanimously approved by the Syrian regime and the UNSC on April 14, 2012, and 30 unarmed observers were sent to observe the cease-fire plan (Security Council Resolution 2042). This was followed by the Resolution 2043, which was adopted by the UNSC on April 21st. With this decision, it was decided that a 90-day UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) should be sent to observe the ceasefire in Syria. Hostilities in Syria continued and on 15 June

2012, UNSMIS had to suspend its activities because of an increase of armed violence across the country. As the situation on the ground deteriorated, UNSMIS mandate came to an end on 19 August 2012.

On 21 August 2013, when the regime used, allegedly, chemical weapons in the attacks on the rural areas of Damascus, the two-and-a-half-year deadlock status ended in September 2013, the UNSC decided the destruction of chemical weapons in Syria (UN Press Release, SC/11135). The UN, with unanimous approval on 22 February 2014, called for all parties, primarily the Syrian authorities, to end violence immediately and to provide access to the UN humanitarian organizations, while condemning the rise of terror linked to al-Qaeda. The report on the issue criticized the government and the opposition for escalating violence and for preventing humanitarian aid to millions of Syrians.

The UN's involvement into the ending of Syrian Civil War is actually desirable, as UN still stands the sole international organization, which comprise all related countries. In addition, it serves as a broad platform on which all dissident views are shared. However, its efficiency is questionable, both in quickness for decision-making and in effectiveness to attain desirable goals. This inefficiency might be the answer of why the UN has been reluctant to involve actively into Syrian Civil War from the beginning. Although the geopolitical interests and strategic choices played a crucial role in the variations of the UN policies on political and military involvement between Libya and Syria, the perception that NATO exceeded its power in the Libya operation was particularly shaping the attitudes of other powers. This negative perception strengthened the traditional arguments of states such as China and RF, which are suspicious of the R2P doctrine. Criticisms were that R2P doctrine, aimed at protecting the oppressed people, has become the legitimate means of dominating powerful states on weak states in practice after the Libyan Civil War. UN's military involvement is also not efficient in the case of settling international conflicts. UN's involvement into Korean War might be the single example of success in this framework. All other military initiatives of the UN, whether in form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement, or in any other forms, have been rather indecisive in solving the crises. However, the UN is quite successful not in pre-conflict involvements but in post-conflict peace building and normalization process. It encourages all stakeholders to come together and discuss the conflicting ideas in a forum and

come to basic understanding of each other. In order that UN's blue helmets are deployed in conflict ground, hot conflicts should be over or reduced at minimum level, as a concern for safety risk for UN personnel. In the aftermath of 2011 during the Arab Spring while Libya has been intervened on the grounds of serious human rights violations, the deaths of millions of people and refugees in Syria didn't trigger a similar involvement. In that vein, the UN is not expected to deploy any military formations and involve in military or political way in order to stop violence and civil war in Syria. However, once the civil war has ended by means of other factors, the UN might be expected to involve in any peace mission in post-civil war Syria.

2. Under UN Supervision

Although it is acutely criticized for being idle in solving international problems and for being incompetent in maintaining international peace and order, the UN still stands as the most widespread and encompassing international organization in the world. It serves as a common forum on which even the most extreme views have been shared. In addition, it can orientate national or supranational efforts for a specific issue, which might threaten global peace and security. A model, which foresees the UN presence as a moderator on peace process together with other organizations or group of countries under UN umbrella, might be also interesting. On the other hand, it requires detailed planning of working procedures, command and control relations, limitations, responsibilities and desired endstate. This kind of model would be fragile and should be meticulously planned and carried out. Yet, once common understanding and acceptance have been achieved, concentrated efforts might lead to concrete results.

Korean War stands as a perfect example of this model. By means of huge consensus and aspiration, the UN supervised all related political and military activities and desired endstate could be reached. In the First Gulf War, the UN demanded that Iraq evacuate its forces from Kuwait and international society act accordingly in order to free Kuwait. Afterwards, a coalition was established and Operation Desert Storm was executed under the UN supervision. However, current security considerations are different from those previously experienced. Due to RF and China's possible vetoes, it is highly unlikely that the UN might be able play the

same role in Syria. However, once the veto issue has been solved, this option might be considered seriously.

On global perspective, human being have formed a number of international organizations, including the UN, NATO, the EU, and others, in order to support dispute settlement or much clearer, to prevent major clashes and war, which are not lucrative neither for winner and loser. The freedom for decision-making authority in these organizations lies with representatives from national governments. The proliferation of these international organizations has pointed out that nation-states find it increasingly difficult to cope with sprawling networks of social interdependence (Steger, 2003). No single nation or organization can manage, and in broader terms stabilize any future crisis on its own (NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, 2017). NATO collaboration with the UN, the EU, IOs and NGOs requires implementation of “comprehensive approach”. Main regional organizations which have the capability to resolve international or regional disputes can be listed as: the African Union, the Organisation of American States, the Arab League, the European Union and NATO (Shaw, 2008). In the new security environment, a high level cooperation and consultation is required for the maintenance of global peace and security.

Changing nature of global security environment and perception requires, not long lasting and rigid alliances, but more responsive, short-termed and situation-based coalitions. Because of power shift from western states to Asian and non-western states, this type of coalitions are likely to be established with more frequencies in the near future. The countries establishing these coalitions have different motives. For western states, international terrorism is a major threat to their democratic values and prosperity. The Middle East and Syrian ground have been breeding terrorism. Fighting against terrorism, which can target western values, and prevention of mass migration, which threatens their civilizations and social structures, are two major motives, which could encourage western countries to establish or take part in a coalition forces, aiming to stop Syrian Civil War. For other countries, the motives might be diverse in nature. For RF in particular, maintaining and even fostering her position in the Middle East would be the main incentive. There might be many combinations of scenarios under the UN umbrella in the Syrian Civil War, depending on the stakeholders’ interests and their power projection. In that context, under this categorization, there are five main sub-

models which could be figured out for the involvement into Syrian Civil War: NATO only (with/without the UN authorization), NATO-UN together, NATO-EU together, coalition forces and regional organizations. In the following parts, these models under UN umbrella have been explained.

a. NATO Only

Since the creation of alliance, NATO forces have aimed to provide security in the Euro-Atlantic Zone. The fundamental and enduring purpose of the alliance is to protect the freedom and security of all its members by all political and military means (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949). The members of NATO worked hard to develop a common understanding of complex security problems, and promoted conditions of stability all over the related regions. However, the redistribution of strategic power polarity is challenging NATO's cohesion and Euro-Atlantic relations. The distribution of political and economic power is towards Asia, and it will most likely affect the Middle East. Power vacuum created by weak or failed states, like Syria, provides fertile ground for instability, extremism, radicalization, rise of terrorist organizations and criminal activities. All these problems accelerate the destabilization along and beyond NATO's border. Non-state actors exert greater influence over national governments and international organizations. In addition, existing governance structures in failed states haven't been sufficiently addressing the security and safety requirements of their population. In this security environment, while an Article-5 operation, which requires full implementation of military forces on the ground, seems unlikely, non-Article-5 missions, such as humanitarian intervention or non-military operations, could constitute a major test for NATO cohesion.

NATO defined 15 possible instability situations that could result in a decision to employ military forces (NATO Framework for Future Alliance Operations-FFAO, 2018). These areas range from high-end conflict to natural disasters. The possible instability situations which might be related with the topic of this article are threat escalation, hybrid war, irregular war, terrorism, governance challenges and mass migration, each of which could result in an alliance decision to employ forces. All these situations are some way direct or indirect results of the Syrian Civil War. Hostile actors, as in state or non-state form, may use threats or force which can destabilise the security environment. In this context, the escalating

of security situation in Syria and the Middle East is directly a threat to NATO. The alliance's resilience might be challenged by threats originated from civil war or major powers which are eager to fill the power vacuum or to exploit the conditions of uncontrolled sources. Again hostile actors may utilise a combination of both conventional and unconventional means whilst avoiding accountability for their actions (FFAO, 2018). This method of force employment is called hybrid warfare, which involves the use of proxies, lawfare, and information warfare. Although it is not openly stated, examples of hybrid warfare is monitored in Syria, in forms of non-state actors, which can be categorized as proxy groups. Information warfare is also executed in Syria especially among stakeholders, which try to legitimize their political or military moves. In irregular war environment, a violent struggle between state or non-state actors for influence over disputed areas takes place. In this type of war environment, underground, illegitimate, proxy groups might resort to unlawful use of force, resistance movement or insurgency in order to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government. In this vein, an irregular war is currently being fought in Syria and an influential member of NATO, Turkey, is directly affected by the consequences of this type of war. Terrorism is another major side effect of the Syrian Civil War. DAESH exploited the situation of civil war and was a major threat to all civilized world. Related governments of instable environments may fail to provide basic state functions to their citizens, which in turn might threaten internal and external security environment and escalate the situation into wider conflicts. This situation might further be exacerbated by economic and political unrest. Furthermore, ungoverned spaces, in which there is no legitimate state power, whet appetite of some states or non-state actors, which later on aims to exploit this power vacuum. In this case, Syria, or Assad regime, doesn't have control over much of Syrian territory and can be called as a "failed state" in this context. Radically and ideologically motivated terrorist groups can employ a long term and indirect approach. Terrorist groups can also exploit the instable situation and control some parts of this failed state. These places are called as "safe havens", which provide excellent operating ground for the preparation, controlling and coordinating terrorist activities. Because of economic, social and security issues, population of a country may flood toward other countries. Additionally, population flows could contribute to the emergence of governance challenges. For Syrian case, mass migration is a great concern, both in forms of humanitarian tragedy and in the context of economic burden, to especially European countries, most of which are

the members of NATO. As explained above, a combination of all instability situations are experienced in Syria with changing priority. These possible scenarios are like lenses through which to analyse in which kind of environment NATO forces might be operating. Therefore, NATO cannot be indifferent to all these instability situations which directly or indirectly challenge its coherence, resilience and security.

According to NATO Strategic Concept (2010), three core tasks of the organization are noted as collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO should have to accomplish these core tasks as the events unfold in the future. There are also core abilities which are required to perform core tasks, all of which promote measures against instability situations. See Figure 1 showing the interaction of those core tasks and abilities. In the framework of these core tasks and abilities, NATO executes strong deterrence against any possible adversaries, integrated defence of its members, projecting stability in insecure environments (especially for those threatened by terrorism) and close dialogue with partners as well as potential adversaries. The significance of non-state actors is expected to increase as NATO focuses on projecting stability with the help of federated networks. Projecting stability signifies proactive activities aimed at influencing and shaping the security environment beyond the limits of NATO's geographical boundaries, thus increasing regional and global security and reducing threats (FFAO, 2018). In order to face all these threats, NATO tries to apply a 360-degree horizon scanning over all its territories and beyond (FFAO, 2018). NATO forces require great operational capability to fight against terrorism and project stability while maintaining traditional deterrence and collective defence role. NATO is a successful organization which has capacity and desire to adapt new requirements. It always assesses the future operating environment and security situation, follows political discussions and policy development, plans capability and concept development, executes defence planning and scenario preparation and educates, trains, exercises and evaluates all its forces to this end. NATO can work with all relevant organizations, such as the EU, non-governmental organizations, academia, think tanks, industry and other stakeholders as well.




Figure 1. Core Abilities and Tasks

Source: FFAO, 2018.

Future security environments can be defined as dynamic, ambiguous, complex and uncertain for all countries and organizations. The convergence of several political, military, economic, social and technological trends are redefining global security environment with new parameters and considerations. The perception of people is generally negative toward military intervention or engagement. States are generally in favor of curbing military budgets because of mounting public debt and high expenses of any military operations. Similarly, larger states criticize unequal burden sharing, as for the US, which could lessen their support for operational requirements. In this case, not all member states would be eager to involve such a campaign in Syria. Furthermore, long decision-making process of alliance and civil-military disagreements have a potential to negatively affect readiness of alliance and its overall operational effectiveness. This results in longer processes in decision making and thus showing lack of cohesion. In this case, for a possible NATO involvement into the Syrian Civil War, it is highly possible that it would not be easy for internal community of member states to maintain public support during an operation, especially if it continues in longer period. The global power balance is also evolving toward multi-polarity. National reactions and anti-globalization sentiments might surge in case of a NATO involvement. Other major powers, which represent power polars of the world, such as RF, China, Iran will certainly react negatively to this involvement.

Both Libyan Civil War and RF-Georgia Crisis of 2008 have proved the crucial requirement for NATO to predict, response and direct all crisis, in or beyond its border, in a comprehensive manner. Although most of the member states have been reluctant to intervene or involve in any formation into the Syrian Civil War, NATO presumably must have monitored the status in Syria in accordance with crisis response planning. The reasons for this involvement are not narrow. First of all, any instability beyond its borders, which have the possibility to adversely affect alliance is of primary interest for NATO. If it were not, NATO should not have been in Afghanistan. Mass migration is another factor which derived from the Syrian Civil War that is an economic and social threat for especially European NATO members. The instability and power vacuum in Syria also resulted in breeding of DAESH. PYD/YPG, which is also a terrorist organization, also exploited this instability and gained a huge advantage in the region. In addition, Turkey, which is an influential member of NATO, has shared borders with Syria and has to encounter many threats originating from the Syrian Civil War, such as terrorist attacks, mass migration, security threats, economic losses. Considering all these factors, NATO might have monitored, and probably must be also monitoring, the current status of the Syrian Civil War. Despite the redistribution of geostrategic power in favor of Asian countries, especially in economic terms, and challenges over its cohesion, NATO can still influence the future security environment via strategic and reasonable moves. Syria can provide new advantages for alliance to support the establishment peace in the region with the help of other actors. In that perspective, projecting stability beyond the Euro-Atlantic region is a key approach for this end. Syria and the Middle East might be implementation zone for this approach.

However important the stability in Syria is crucial for NATO, such an involvement into Syrian Civil War is far from applicable. There is no UN decision, as in Libya, or an invitation from host nation to NATO in this case. However, NATO conduct its operation also without the UN authorization, as experienced in Kosovo case. Even if NATO could involve in Syria without the UN authorization, it will certainly try to legitimize its campaign with any post-involvement authorization, again as experienced in Kosovo case. NATO shows no concrete cohesion and resolution for any involvement for now. The legal basis of such an involvement would be highly questionable in global public opinion. From realistic

approach, RF, which emerged as one of the major player in the civil war, would show a great reaction once this scenario has been realized. This might lead to increase of local clashes and confrontation, which in turn destabilizes the country to larger extent. In this context, a sole NATO involvement in this phase would not support the ending of civil war and deescalating of crisis.

b. UN - NATO Together

By nature of two international organizations' founding and working principles, UN-NATO synergy come to the fore also as a possible solution. As explained in previous paragraphs, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter makes it possible for the UN and any regional organizations to cooperate on a crisis situation in order to maintain international peace and order. This cooperation and collaboration might take place in a form of simultaneous or consecutive efforts. NATO's normative framework also foresees such cooperation with the UN. According to Strategic Concept (2010:27), "cooperation between NATO and the UN continues to make a substantial contribution to security in operations around the world". In concert with the UN-NATO declaration, which was signed in 2008, NATO attaches importance to "established framework for consultation and cooperation with the UN" (Updated Joint Declaration on UN-NATO Secretariat Cooperation, 2008). In this declaration, political dialogue and practical cooperation include "enhanced liaison between the two headquarters, more regular political consultation, and enhanced practical cooperation in managing crises where both organisations are engaged". The question here stands on how this cooperation might take place.

Not all the countries of the UN are members or partners of NATO. Even, in force projection and preparation processes, some countries of the UN might be assessed as "rival" for NATO. The UN has already a slow decision making and force activation process. From realistic approach, it is highly unlikely that, even if this obstacle is surpassed, a mutual understanding can be reached between these two organizations about how the civil war should be ended, the involvement should take place and the post-civil war Syria should be constructed. However, this scenario is not completely unrealistic. OUP is a perfect example of this cooperation. The UN approved the use of force against the Libyan regime forces on the grounds that humanitarian values were in danger, and subsequently, NATO

took responsibility and executed the operation on behalf of the UN. Whether the same or any kind of similar scenario is applicable in Syria is a matter of question under the decision making system in the UNSC. Two of the permanent members of the UNSC, RF and China would be reluctant and even obstructor for such a cooperation. Both RF and China don't support a possible UN-NATO cooperation (Owen, 2012). RF is eager to widen her area of influence in the Middle East. RF is also concerned with the increased efficiency and force projection of NATO in the Eastern Europe, and would try to prevent similar NATO posture and efficiency in Syria. China shares similar views with RF as regards to the US policies in the region. Actually, China would prefer the US to engage more with the Middle Eastern issues rather than Asian politics, in which the interests of two countries would clash. However, China would probably act with her ally RF against any NATO or the US moves in the Middle East in order to undermine the US foreign policy. As a consequence, a scenario which involves the UN-NATO cooperation in order to end civil war in Syria is really low possibility and difficult realize on the ground.

c. NATO-EU Together

It has been declared in NATO Strategic Concept that “an active and effective EU contributes to the overall security of the Euro-Atlantic area” (2010:28). This theorem seems valid considering the fact that 28 of 30 NATO countries (including Turkey) are also European countries. In addition, 22 of them are also member states of the EU. In spite of some discrepancies, the EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. In addition to having common members, all members of both organisations share common values, such as the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In accordance with the Lisbon Treaty, framework for strengthening the EU's capacities to address common security challenges has been enhanced. NATO and the EU can play complementary and mutually supportive roles in international and regional peace and security initiatives. Both organizations try to enhance practical cooperation throughout the crisis spectrum, in wide array of coordinated military planning to mutual support in the field.

Instability along NATO's borders, as in Syria, might cause severe implications for European NATO allies, such as risks of terrorist activities,

spreading violence (NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, 2017). NATO and the EU recognize the possible implications of both global transition and the situation in Syria in order to develop strategies on impending risks (NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, 2017). Instability originated from Syrian Civil War is currently at alarming level and might increase in coming period. Both these organizations try to come to understand root causes and address the problem together. Core values, which both organizations share in common, such as individual liberty, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, may be the driving factor for a collaborative adaptation and enhancing cooperation in the framework of current international order.

Major government programmes of European countries are under significant stress to keep pace with internal national demands. Political commitment to long-term defence and procurement plans inevitably diverts the funds, which have been generally programmed for social welfare. It is known that most European members of NATO are reluctant to increase their military expenditures. In the Wales Summit, member states decided to reverse the trend in budgetary decline and reach the guideline of a 2% GDP defence spending by 2024 (NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, 2017). Fair burden sharing is another concern within alliance. Even in Brussel Summit of 2018, disagreement about this issue among leaders came to the fore and was revealed in mass media (MacAskill, 2018). Disagreement on financial and fair burden issue and stressed government budgets can limit their mutual moves. NATO's Level of Ambition (LoA) and expectation of more active role in Syria have to align with fiscal constraints of European NATO members.

Although theoretically asserted and stated, the desired level of mutual cooperation between both organizations have not been ensured. The consultation takes place in appropriate forms, however, two separate vision of two distinct organization differs in the end, which deteriorates the joint effort. There can be listed many explanations about this assessment. At first glance, distant stance of European countries to American values and disagreement among the EU and non-EU member allies might be mentioned in the first place in the list.

Increasing polarization and perception of uncertainty in European countries, which have been plagued with a lack of cohesion to address regional and global issues, an example of which is Syria case. Brexit decision of the UK and

possible risk of dissolution of the EU cause the loss of control over common understanding of EU power projection. European member states' military dependency on the US is likely to continue (NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis Report, 2017). In this context, European member states' may have to assume more of the security burden, in economic terms with military expenditure and in military terms with a higher posture in the Middle East. If they do not assume a greater role in economic and military perspective, Euro-Atlantic cohesion could be deteriorated. In addition, the EU lacks fundamental military capabilities, which might impede its involvement. In realistic perspective, a NATO-EU scenario for ending Syrian Civil War seems highly unlikely and even impractical in the field, considering the facts explained above.

d. Coalition Forces

As stated previously, global power interaction moves toward multipolarity. Driven by rapid advancements in communication and transportation technology, the globe is becoming more interconnected. Information society and economic globalizations, albeit some nationalist reactions and anti-globalization sentiments, intensifies this interconnectedness. With these interconnected problems and developments of uncertainty, instability and complexity, not only individual states but also separate institutions don't have capacity to handle all challenges alone. The initiative is to be designed to be regularly updated, collaborative and adequately transparent, which encourages meaningful interaction and an open exchange of ideas amongst participant nations.

As access and control over energy resources are of crucial importance for developed, emerging and developing powers, competition in that term might increase the potential for conflict. The race for natural resources could promote new alliances and temporary coalitions, since nations adjust to their actual and national self-interests. Also, it seems possible to establish a temporary (ad hoc) international organization in order to form a peacekeeping force (Pazarci, 2000). The new coalitions will be likely shaped in accordance with the energy policies of related countries. This phenomenon will most likely to be realized also for Syria as well.

The major stakeholders in Syria, as states, which have the power to create and dominate any coalition efficient enough to end civil war, are the US, RF and

Turkey. A possible coalition should encompass the political priorities of those major powers. Secondary states might be listed as Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UK, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, France, Germany and Qatar. The views of these countries should also be taken into consideration, but in a secondary and supportive role rather than decisive role. As the number of participants of a coalition increases, the likelihood of a reaching a common understanding and a stable coalition decreases. Thus, it is optimal to establish a coalition with the participation of those three major powers while counting other countries' considerations as much as possible.

For the case of local groups, as a participant for a possible coalition, the list is rather longer. Syrian people, being natural representative of the country, should be on the table. Syrian National Army (SNA), which fought against DAESH and PYD/YPG, took control of Jarabulus-Azaz-Al-Bab-Mare-Afrin and Tel Abyad-Ras al-Ayn corridor and represent more moderate wing of opposition groups that should be a part of coalition in Syria. The three groups, which should definitely be excluded from this coalition, are Shiite militias, PYD/YPG terrorists and radical groups. Shiite militia is believed not to respect humanitarian values, which will be a basic principle for restoring order and rebuilding Syria. They represent horror, radicalism and spoiler in Syrian community. Radical groups are also a threat for regional peace and security. They conceive violence and terror as the reason for their existence and survival. PYD/YPG, which is defined as "a terrorist organization" by Turkey, is surely unwilling to reach a peaceful solution in the civil war. PYD/YPG terrorist organization exploited the situation and power vacuum and extended its illegal control over Syrian land. It has utilized the cover of "fighting against DAESH" and has been supported by many western countries. They are not "freedom fighters" or "local partners", as seen by many from the US and western states. In fact, they are just proxies, which follow the agenda of external powers whose aim are not to bring stability and peace in Syria but pursuit their sole, and mainly selfish interests. What is required by Syrian community are not proxies of external powers but conscious peace supporters for their motherland, which aim to maintain political and territorial integrity of Syrian land. PYD/YPG terrorist organization does not actually promote political and territorial integrity of Syria but aspires to the disintegration of the country and declaring autonomous or fully independent state in Syrian Land. They might also camouflage their separatist

ideology using the regime forces as a cover. This kind of destructive and disruptive aspirations and moves would surely not bring regional and global peace and security but cause more intra-regional conflicts, instabilities and tragedies in the Middle East.

e. Regional Organizations

The current international order, the main actors of which are the UN, NATO, the EU, World Bank, IMF, etc, was established after WWII. These organizations have provided the general framework for international politics for following decades. However, this relevance is being questioned and challenged by emerging powers, developing countries and new international formations. These organizations have been lagging behind the rapid and well-entrenched change. They were not able to transform themselves according to new challenges and demands. They have been challenged in addressing complex security parameters. Many emerging powers and developing countries consider themselves, or some group of countries, excluded from decision making processes. Standard-setting bodies of these organizations lack true representativeness and accountability, as in the case of the UNSC. These institutions, which are related to Syrian Civil War and the Middle East and are likely to have an influential posture in the future, can be listed as the BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Arab League, Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the African Union (AU) and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

The lack of effectiveness might deteriorate the roles of these international organizations. Furthermore, due to physical distances and lack of cohesion, none of those regional organizations are expected to show an efficient presence in Syrian Civil War. In Syria, today, these organizations are perceived as supplementary, but their role might evolve into more competitive role with the shift of global power. The only possible regional organization, which is closer to the issue is, for now, Arab League and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). The Arab League suspended Syria's membership on 12 November 2011 and broad economic sanctions were put into practice on 16 November 2011. Throughout the civil war, Arab League has taken similar decisions. Yet, this organization, like OIC, hasn't been resilient enough to take part in this game with their agenda and decisive role. Arab League, instead, has tried to prompt the UN for any possible humanitarian or

military intervention. As Syrian regime took control of lands from DAESH and insurgents lost their fights against territories, the Arab League changed its politics for Assad. Arab states try to emphasize the “Arabian nature” of Syria and they don’t want push the regime to the Iran, which has helped Assad regime so much during the civil war and which is perceived as a threat by Sunni-Arab communities. Also they do not want to miss out on lucrative post-war reconstructive projects. The former Sudanese President, Omar al-Bashir, flew to Damascus in 2018, becoming the first Arab leader to visit Syria since 2011. On Arab World, the discussions have been going on whether Syria’s membership to the Arab League Syria should be activated again. As a result, the most probable and efficient regional organization for ending the civil war is certainly the Arab League. However, their priorities are mainly ideological and economic rather than military involvement. Thus, Arab League is not expected to play a substantial role for ending the Syrian Civil War.

3. Comparative Analysis on Scenarios

The confluence of several political, military, social, technological and economic trends is reshaping the global security environment. The junction of different trends and conflicting interests have created instability, complexity, competitiveness and uncertainty, especially in intersection points like the Middle East, Caucasus, Eastern Europe, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and South Asia, in which interests of global and regional powers clash each other. Emerging and resurgent powers of Asia, which uses both hard and soft power assets to achieve political ends, will likely to challenge the predominance of West. Competition in that term among powers in destabilized regions, like Syrian land, increases the potential for conflict. Syrian Civil War provides a suitable environment for international and regional organizations to project their powers and capabilities.

In this framework, a thorough comparison should be made among the different combination of scenarios according to assessment criteria in order to analyze and evaluate the possibility of success. The units of analysis in this comparison are total six major scenarios identified in order to end the civil war. As for the assessment criteria; organizational cohesion, political capability, military capability, global acceptance, regional acceptance, probability of success, practicability, legal framework and post-war political impact have been specified in

comparison. These assessment criteria are determined on the basis of the author's conceptualization of the research problem in order to make a comparative analysis on structural and methodological domains. Sufficient number of assessment criteria have been identified to enable a comprehensive and consistent comparative analysis. Therefore, the assessment criteria have been determined in quantity and quality that will enable the analysis of the problem and make it clearer to understand. These are novel criteria never used in other study before, which in return, contributes to the originality of the study for the literature. The organizational cohesion criterion regards the adaptation capacity of the formations analyzed under six scenarios for the mission. The probability of success criterion refers to the ability to reach the initially determined goals within the legal framework of the duty. The criterion of success in this study is to end the Syrian Civil War and to ensure stability in the region. The other assessment criteria were likewise determined in such a way that each scenario could be compared and a comprehensive analysis could be made. The number of these criteria could be extended further. However, more criteria don't ensure the comprehensiveness of the study. What is more important is to specify correct and scientific criteria in optimum number, which reveal satisfactory results in the study. Thus, nine criteria totally cover all specified areas of the study topic. The values of the mentioned assessment criteria corresponding to each scenario have been determined within the framework of the author's individual judgment. These values are expressed in appropriate qualitative terminology. These values are determined as a result of judging at what level the relevant criterion has been addressed in each scenario. In other terms, the values are an expression of what kind of a result is expected in the light of the relevant criterion if the respective scenario is applied. At this point, readers may have a question as such: Why the correspondence of the values for each scenario hasn't been expressed with a numerical scaling in quantitative terms? There are mainly three explanations for this approach. First, as stated in the methodological framework, this article is, in essence, a qualitative study and the assessment criteria have been qualitatively evaluated as a consequence. Second, expressing the values in numerical scales would require advanced statistical analysis and this approach could distract the essence of the study. Third, because each of the nine assessment criteria evaluates the respective scenario from a different angle, the evaluation result must also be specific to each criterion and different from others. Expressing the results of nine different assessment criteria in

the same way on the numerical scaling would interfere with understanding the specificity of the criteria and thus complicate the comparison. As a result, the evaluation was determined in qualitative terms rather than common numerical values, so as to be specific to each criterion and scenario, in order not to get away from the essence of the work and to make a specific comparison. These evaluation results are interpreted in detail in the following paragraphs. In this context, the comparison on combination of scenarios is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Comparison on Combination of Scenarios

Assessment Criteria	Combination of Scenarios					
	UN Only	Under UN Umbrella				
		NATO Only (with/without the UN authorization)	NATO-UN Together	NATO-EU Together	Coalition Forces (TUR, The US, RF)	Regional Organizations
Organizational Cohesion	Low	High	Medium	Low	Low	Low
Political Capability	Capable	Capable	Capable	Limited	Limited	Very Limited
Military Capability	Very Limited	Highly Capable	Medium	Very Limited	Highly Capable	Almost None
Global Acceptance	Mainly Accepted	Partially Accepted	Mainly Accepted	Mainly Unaccepted	Partially Accepted	Mainly Accepted
Regional Acceptance	Mainly Accepted	Mainly Unaccepted	Mainly Accepted	Mainly Unaccepted	Mainly Accepted	Partially Accepted
Probability of Success	Mostly Probable	Highly Probable	Highly Probable	Low Probability	Highly Probable	Low Probability
Practicability	Highly Possible	Highly possible	Possible	Low Possibility	Possible	Low Possibility
Legal Framework	Legal	Legal	Legal	Legal	Legal	Legal
Post-war Political Impact	Probably Stable	Probably Instable	Probably Stable	Surely Instable	Probably Stable	Probably Instable

Source: By author

As for “organizational cohesion” criterion, evaluation result for “NATO Only” scenario is “High”, while it is “Low” for “UN Only”, “NATO-EU Together”, “Coalition Forces” and “Regional Organizations” and “Medium” for “NATO-UN Together” scenarios. It is evaluated as “High” because NATO is by far the most integrated international organization in the world today. Naturally, political and military disagreements take place on decision making process. Yet, once a decision has been taken, NATO can fully project its resolution in the field, as experienced in Libyan Civil War. From this perspective, NATO can play a decisive role in ending Syrian Civil War, regardless of other political factors. The evaluation is considered as “Low” for “UN Only” scenario. As discussed in related parts of the study, organizational cohesion is not at desired level in this organization. Different aspects and considerations prevail the organizational working structure of the UN. It is highly criticized because of the fact that it favors the national interest of victorious countries of WWII rather than well-being of majority of world population. For that reason, the UN hasn’t so far and can’t project an integrated and determined stance in Syrian Civil War. “NATO-EU” cooperation has a long way ahead to be developed and need to focus their fundamental working principles and mutual understanding in their primary interest areas before they can establish a collaboration model beyond their borders. Regional organizations can’t show an integrated and resilient approach either, since they are not powerful enough to solve the issue discussed. “Coalition of TUR, the US and RF” scenario is also evaluated as “low” since it is not a permanent structure and an organizational cohesion cannot be guaranteed in the long term. “NATO-UN Together” model might be an option in ending civil war as their unity of purpose is at medium level. They can be successful depending on the mutual consensus of related parties.

As regards to “political capability” criterion, evaluation result is “capable” for “NATO Only”, “UN Only” and “NATO-UN Together” scenarios, while it is “limited” for “NATO-EU Together” and “Coalition Forces”. Political capability of “Regional Organizations” has been evaluated as “very limited”. Political capability of an organization or initiative is directly linked to its organizational structure indeed. Without a political consensus or accord, which depends on mainly mutual interests of member states, a political decision which favors a military involvement in Syria cannot be taken. Both NATO and the UN, though their complicated

decision making processes, could in the end reach an agreement and take some kind of political decisions on Syria. In the past, these organizations were able to have a common attitude and take decisions on similar occasions. Therefore, political capabilities of these organizations, in addition to “NATO-UN Together” scenario, have been assessed as “capable”. As the power share and political responsibilities between NATO and the EU has not been clarified yet and there are not good examples of political cooperation between these two organizations, political capability on this scenario has been considered as “limited”. “Coalition of TUR, the US and RF” scenario is also evaluated as “limited” since political cohesion is difficult to reach in coalitions and there are huge political differences among these possible coalition partners on the case. Rather than a political agreement on the issue, a real rivalry prevails the political atmosphere in the Middle East. “Regional Organizations” scenario has been considered as “very limited” according to political capability criterion. Regional organizations can’t show a political cohesion as regards to Syrian Civil War, which makes almost impossible to show an integrated political approach for the case.

With regards to “military capability” criterion, assessment result for “NATO Only” and “Coalition Forces” scenarios are “highly capable”, while it is “very limited” for “UN Only” and “NATO-EU Together” scenarios. “NATO-UN Together” scenario has been considered as “medium”. Regional organizations do not qualify any military capability alone. NATO, being the most agile and robust standing military organization and having a 72-year experience of operating together, has capable military structure and assets. Though the evolution of world politics and different kinds of crisis, NATO was able to transform itself and adapt to new requirements in both military and political perspective. NATO gives importance to maintain, train, equip and operate an agile, strong and deterrent military capability in order to deploy its forces beyond its borders and execute any mission anywhere in the world. This makes military capability of NATO invaluable for a successful Syria involvement. Military capability of “Coalition of TUR, the US and RF” scenario has been also viewed as “highly capable” since the armed forces of these countries are by far the strongest in the region and they rank also in the top line in order in global perspective. They can technically defeat any rival terrorist organization in Syria totally. Military capability of “NATO-UN Together” scenario has been considered as “medium” as the military arrangements

and responsibilities are not clearly defined and the success stories of this scenario in the history are numbered. The military projection of “UN Only” and “NATO-EU Together” scenarios have been judged as “very limited”. The UN does not have permanent military formations. It heavily depends on the voluntary unit and personnel contribution of member states, specific to each different military mission. A combination of different military formations from different nations make it difficult for the UN to project a reliable and robust military capability. A lack of mutual cooperation and collaboration, which are crucial for military success, might impede the efficient execution of military mission on the ground. For example, the UN was ineffective in the Cyprus Island from 1963-1974 in face of Greek Cypriot attacks on Turkish Cypriot community. A similar assessment can be accepted for the EU, which does not have a standing military capability either. It mainly depends on the military capability of NATO. However, these are different organizations with varied structures and priorities. Member states do not match either in two organizations as explained in related part, which makes it very limited military capability for “NATO-EU Together” scenario. Regional organizations can’t project a robust military existence in Syria either, since their military capability is very limited.

In terms of “global acceptance” criterion, it has been assessed that global acceptance would be positive for all scenarios except for “NATO Only”, “NATO-EU Together” and “Coalition Forces” scenarios. As the worldwide political legitimacy of the UN is apparent, any kind of UN involvement in Syrian Civil War would not provoke any negative reaction in the world public opinion. In spite of the unfair representation in the UNSC, every country has a voice in the UN General Assembly, and therefore, a global acceptance could be reached in some degree in case of a UN involvement in Syria. Similar considerations are also true for other option: “NATO-UN Together”, as the existence of the UN could contribute to the legitimacy and global acceptance of these involvements. Global acceptance for “Regional Organizations” would be also positive. The participation of regional organizations to any kind of peacekeeping mission might provide positive results, since these organizations might have a better cultural and political awareness about the crisis in that specific region. The people of target country might be more welcoming for the involvement of regional organizations, for which they might demonstrate sympathy, which in turn might increase the possibility of

success of the mission. On the other hand, NATO's involvement for the Syrian Civil War might face a global reaction from the world. Being perceived as a western organization and the symbol of western values, global acceptance would be lower for NATO in Syria. NATO would have to face harsh criticism across the world in this scenario, as experienced in the Libyan Civil War. Coalition scenario would probably have to deal with similar negative reactions across the world in a possible involvement in Syria. The global acceptance would be even lower than NATO's global acceptance, since positive political response to the coalition of three countries is limited in the world. The worst-case scenario according to global acceptance criterion is "NATO-EU Together" for Syria. Being a combination of American and European cooperation, this would certainly trigger harshest criticism across the world, which totally endangers the probability of its success in Syria.

Similar considerations can be listed also for "regional acceptance" criterion, in addition to some variations. The worldwide political legitimacy of the UN can also contribute the regional acceptance of this organization in the eyes of the Middle Eastern governments and populations. Regional countries are represented wholly in the UN General Assembly and partially in the UNSC. This could provide enough legitimacy for any UN involvement in Syria. Because of the same point of view, "NATO-UN Together" scenario could be mainly accepted on regional perspective. Different from the "global acceptance" criterion, a coalition of Turkey, the US and RF could be mainly accepted on regional dynamics. First of all, host nation, Syria in this case, has had rooted political and military relations with RF. This country would not cause any disturbance for Syrian administration. In reality, this country has been operating in Syrian Land. The citizens of Syria would also welcome RF, which was their old and trustworthy patron in Cold War. Turkey, being a neighbor, and having comprehensive cultural, historical and economic relations with Syria, could be welcomed by local population. Lucrative bilateral economic relations still prevail in the minds of Syrian citizens. Close relations of Turkey with Turkomen-origin Syrian citizens would be also a promotive factor for this scenario. And the US could be a balancing actor in the eyes of other regional countries, most of which have Sunni-Arab populations and are concerned with the increasing efficiency of Iran power in the region. Considering all these factors, a coalition of three countries could be mainly accepted on regional perspective in the framework of a balanced share of

responsibilities and power. Regional acceptance for “Regional Organizations” would be probably negative. Different from the common citizens of Syria, Assad regime would probably perceive the involvement of any other regional countries, under the umbrella of regional organization, as a threat to his personal and Syrian political interests. The political relations and disputes between leaders and regimes in the Middle East are deeply rooted. They cannot be solved easily and with unilateral approach. Any act of a regional country would certainly demonstrate a negative response from the Assad regime. Therefore, regional acceptance for regional organizations in Syria would be very low. NATO’s involvement for the Syrian Civil War might face a regional reaction in the Middle East. Being perceived as a western organization and the symbol of western values, regional acceptance would be also lower for NATO in Syria. The ancient relations of the regional countries after WWII should not be forgotten. In this era, most of the regional countries were against the US and naturally NATO, and they were showing pro-Soviet tendencies. The US support for Israel is also a dominant factor, which impedes regional acceptance of NATO in Syria. Regional acceptance criterion for “NATO-EU Together” scenario would be also mainly unaccepted for Syria. A combination of American and European alliance would certainly trigger harsh criticism in the region, which totally endangers the probability of its success in Syria.

When the “probability of success” criterion is taken into consideration, highly probable results are foreseen for “NATO Only”, “NATO-UN Together” and “Coalition Forces” scenarios in case of an involvement in Syrian Civil War. Considering the overall organizational structure, political and military cohesion and current capabilities of these mentioned organizations, it can be concluded that these organizations would be highly successful when engaged in the Syrian Civil War. However, it should be kept in mind that this “success” is mainly military focused. The military objective, which is clarified at the beginning of military operation right at the planning process, could be probably achieved at the end of military campaign. The military objectives should be clear and achievable. It should also support overall political objectives. If it does not promote for political end state, the indicator for military objectives could be misleading. Military objective in Libyan Civil War was achieved. However, political objective could not be achieved. Rule of law, stability, peace and order could not be established in Libya. From this

perspective, success of a possible military involvement in Syria should be evaluated as to whether it contributes the overall peace and stability in the country. “Probability of success” criterion, however, has been evaluated only from military perspective. An overall political and military assessment about probability for success will be done at the end of research, comprising all the related factors and parameters. The probability of success for “UN Only” scenario is considered as mostly probable. Considering the military inefficiencies of the UN organization, the ranking for this scenario comes after former scenarios. However, since the leading members of the UN might provide required military assets to the organization, the probability for its success has been evaluated as mostly probable. Ranking for “NATO-EU Together” and “Regional Organizations” stand at the bottom as “Low Probability”. The military inefficiencies and lack of organizational cohesion led to this ranking for these scenarios.

With regard to “practicability” criterion, evaluation result for “NATO Only” and “UN Only” scenarios are “Highly possible”. This criterion for two scenarios has been evaluated “highly possible”, because both organizations have participated or carried out similar military operations across the globe. Since the establishment of the UN and NATO after WWII, both organizations took initiatives in order to solve crisis or establish peace and security and executed different kinds of military operations, ranging from peace support operations to fighting against terrorism, anywhere in the world. Whether these operations were successful or efficient is not the question of this criterion. This criterion states that these organizations practically involved in crisis in their histories. From this perspective, it can be evaluated that similar political or military engagements are also practicable for the Syrian Civil War. The practicality of “NATO-UN Together” and “Coalition Forces” scenarios have been ranked as “possible” in this evaluation. In similar approach, NATO and the UN acted together or the UN provided an overall supervision and responsibility for similar political and military involvements in the past. After the First Gulf War, the international affairs experts and political leaders explored an efficient mechanism in order to intervene any crisis or adversary: coalition. Being a flexible response for building a political and military block against the adversary or intruders to global peace, coalition forces address much of the current security requirements. Forming a coalition on narrow scope, for a limited time period and specific to the mission requirements is an easier and

efficient way of military responses into the regional or global threats. A coalition has fought against DAESH in the Middle East. From this perspective, a coalition of three major powers, which aim to end civil war in Syria and establish peace and security in the region, is considered practicable. The result of evaluation for “NATO-EU Together” and “Regional Organizations” scenarios is stated as “low possibility”. Both of these scenarios have been considered as almost impracticable, as these organizations have not conducted any kind of military or political involvement in a crisis environment, which is similar to the Syria.

From “legal framework” criterion, it can be stated that all of these scenarios are legal according to standing universal legal norms. As described in related parts, the UN Charter authorizes the UNSC for the maintenance of international peace and security. The UNSC, and in specific conditions the UN General Assembly, have the primary responsibility to take necessary measures in order to deescalate any tension, end crisis and establish the peace and security. The UN organization can implement this decision directly with its own assets or authorize any regional or global organization for the conduct of the mandate, in accordance with Article VIII of the UN Charter. Related decision making and authorization mechanisms have been experienced in similar crisis situations. As a consequence, all six scenarios meet the legal conditions, which is basically required for any political or military involvement in the Syrian Civil War.

Since the Syrian Civil War is coming to an end, the question of how a post-civil war Syria could be built on political, economic, military and social ground has been tried to be answered. As for “post-war political impact” criterion, evaluation result for “UN Only”, “NATO-UN Together” and “Coalition Forces” scenarios are stated as “probably stable”. Global acceptance and legitimacy of the UN organization make a smooth transition possible in post-civil war environment in Syria. The UN itself, or any kind of variation in which the UN is included, or in better conditions, the UN supervises, could breed positive results in terms of restoring an integrated, unified, democratic and peaceful Syria, which is the best-case result on regional and global perspective. The UN does not have a real capability to prevent hot conflicts. This reality was experienced in the Cyprus Island. However, once the hot conflicts have been over, the UN can orientate all its assets in order to restore peace and order and encourage the normalization of relations in war-torn countries. The same positive result can be achieved also in

Syria. The effect of “coalition” scenario in post-civil war Syria has been also assessed positive, since the three major countries could synchronize all related restoration efforts. Regional and global acceptance of this coalition would be certainly promotive to positive results. In addition, an integrated, unified, democratic and peaceful Syria would be a real profit for each side. “NATO Only” and “Regional Organizations” scenarios have not been assessed as promotive for an efficient result in post-civil war conditions. Post-war political impacts of these two scenarios would be probably instable in Syria. This reality has been experienced in Libyan Civil War for NATO. For regional organizations, their inefficiency in political and military perspectives and lack of their regional acceptance could deteriorate post-civil war arrangements. Post-war political impact of “NATO-EU Together” scenario would be surely the worst in terms of restoring peace and order, because of its inefficiencies mentioned above.

Conclusion

Those criteria for the comparison between six major possible scenarios can be extended further. However, it is considered that total nine criteria cover the overall considerations for the comparison of six units of analysis and that these provide enough parameters for comparison between six major possible international mission model in Syria. There is not a weight ratio between these criteria. As this research is mainly a social study and in general a qualitative research method has been used, it is not reasonable to determine the best option according weight ratio between criteria. In addition, problems in international affairs are too complicated and multifaceted to be solved via quantitative calculations. Different political and social considerations could affect the solution of problem and finding the best answer from the alternatives. As a result, every scenario has both advantages and disadvantages over one another. In general, in the lights of above assessments, overall practicability and probability of success for “NATO-EU Together” and “Regional Organizations” is considered as “low”. “The UN Only” and “NATO-UN Together” scenarios are hopeful in spite of limited capabilities. “NATO Only” seems to be an efficient scenario, but only in short-termed. The last scenario, “Coalition of TUR, the US and RF”, although it is difficult to establish, seems to the best case scenario, which covers the most of the conditions required to end the Syrian Civil War, establish an integrated, unified,

democratic and peaceful Syria and restore peace, order and stability in post-civil war environment in the Middle East.

According to assessments, it can be drawn conclusion that political or military involvement of NATO or UN in the Syrian Civil War would not end the civil war and even possibly worsen the current situation. The practicality of other related scenarios are also questionable in current parameters. Any of these involvements, regardless of their practicality, could not mainly promote to the ending of civil war and tragedy. Considering the lessons-learned from previous involvements, both NATO and the UN could not probably bring an end to the tragedy. Even worse, their involvement might trigger wider conflicts in Syria and the Middle East. NATO or UN involvement will likely deepen differences between Syrian community and concretize the de-facto internal borders between opposing groups. This signifies continuity of fragmented state structure and territories of Syria, each of which would be ruled by non-state actors. The loyalty and desire of these groups for a unified, integrated, peaceful and democratic Syria are doubtful. And this could breed more radicalism in the Middle East.

The Middle East has been regarded as “the crossroad of civilizations” for centuries. However, recent developments in the region have been transforming it into “crossroad of power struggle and birthplace of new conflicts”. Security and stability in the Middle East, which has an impact on international relations, are directly linked with global peace and security. The conflicts in the Middle East might trigger much more devastating conflicts, proxy wars or even bloodier battles. More global players might engage with regional groups or ethnicities in accordance with their sole interests rather than basic moral values and common good. That could exactly lead the “balkanization” of the region. All humanity should be aware of this possibility and not be dragged into the same tragedies experienced in Balkans. A power vacuum will inevitably be filled by some other unreliable ethnic or local tribes or new terrorist organizations, which means the continuation of bloodshed for the common citizens in another format. The best case scenario would be the protection of the integrity of regional countries under more democratic administrations aligned with international values such as respect for every entity, basic human rights and rule of law. Since no culture and no region has intrinsic resistance to democracy (Zakaria, 2003), constitutional and liberal form of it might be a hope for the peace in the Middle East. With all these democratic trends, the

protection of the political and territorial integrity of regional countries must be a crucial and indispensable necessity.

Genişletilmiş Özet

Suriye İç Savaşı'na bağlı olarak Orta Doğu'da yaşanan son gelişmelerin ardından, bu konuyu herhangi bir önyargıdan bağımsız olarak ve tüm açılardan inceleme gereksinimi ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Suriye İç Savaşı'nı sona erdirmek için mümkün olan her seçeneğin bilimsel yöntemlerle araştırılmasına ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bazı uluslararası kuruluşların konuya müdahil olması ve bu organizasyonların farklı oluşumlarla bir araya gelmesi, olası olumlu veya olumsuz etkileri ile birlikte araştırılması gereken ilgi çekici bir konu haline gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, NATO ya da BM'nin insani trajediyi sona erdirmeye konusundaki olası etkileri üzerine yeteri kadar bilimsel çalışma yapılmamıştır. Suriye İç Savaşı çerçevesinde kapsamlı bir yaklaşım izleyerek, ön yargısız ve makul değerlendirmeler yapılmalıdır. Bu çerçevede çalışmanın amacı, bölgedeki insani trajediyi sona erdirmenin olası yollarını bilimsel olarak araştırmaktır.

NATO, şimdiye kadar inisiyatif olarak birçok kriz durumuna müdahil olmuştur. Benzer şekilde BM birçok barışı koruma görevi gerçekleştirmiştir. Bu makale, BM'nin veya BM gözetimindeki uluslararası oluşumların Suriye İç Savaşı'na müdahil olmasının uygulanabilirliğini, etkinliğini ve olası etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ortadoğu ve onun küçük bir modeli olan Suriye, öngörülebilir çatışmalar için uygun bir zemin oluşturmaktadır. Bu nedenle Suriye İç Savaşı, Orta Doğu'daki kriz ve çatışma ortamını tetikleyici bir fay hattı olma potansiyeline sahiptir. Bu tür bir sonuç, bölgesel ve küresel barış ve istikrar ortamını olumsuz yönde etkileyecektir. İç savaşın sona erdirilmesi, küresel barış ve istikrarın idamesi bağlamında tüm insanlık için kritik öneme sahiptir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, alandaki gözle görülür bir boşluğu ele aldığı için literatüre önemli bir katkı sağlayacaktır.

Araştırmanın verileri esas olarak resmi belgelere, makalelere, raporlara ve kitaplara dayanmaktadır. Araştırma konusunu kapsamlı bir yaklaşımla incelemek için doğrusal ve karşılaştırmalı bir çalışma planı takip edilmiştir. Birinci bölümde, araştırmayla ilgili metodolojik çerçeve tanıtılmış ve giriş yapılmıştır. Müteakip iki bölümde toplam altı senaryo (Sadece BM, Sadece NATO, NATO-BM Birlikte, NATO-AB Birlikte, Koalisyon Kuvvetleri (TUR, ABD, RF) ve Bölgesel Örgütler)

üzerinden ilgili oluşumlar incelenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde, senaryolar arasında karşılaştırmalı bir analiz yapılmıştır. Son bölümde ise sonuçlar ve yorumlar okuyucu ile paylaşılmıştır. Genel olarak çalışma, dinamik ve karmaşık bir araştırma konusunun doğasını anlamak ve görselleştirmek için çıkarımların yinelemeli bir değerlendirmesini sunmaktadır. Ayrıca, senaryoların uygulanmasındaki güçlükleri ortaya koyarak ve aynı zamanda potansiyel fırsatları da tanımlayarak gündemdeki bir konunun dengeli bir analizini sağlamaktadır.

BM senaryosu, küresel anlamda ülkelerin en fazla temsil edilmesi nedeniyle meşruiyeti en fazla olan seçenektir. Bununla birlikte, sahadaki fiili uygulama gücü olan askerî yapısının çok fazla etkin ve caydırıcı olmaması bir dezavantaj olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Nitekim BM'nin barışı koruma misyonları bir başarı örneği olmaktan uzaktır. Ayrıca, karar alma sürecinde RF ve Çin'in olası vetoları, BM'nin iç savaşı sonlandırmak için müdahil olma olasılığını düşürmektedir. Sadece NATO seçeneği, karar alma ve fiili uygulama bakımından, etkin bir senaryo olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ancak, Suriye İç Savaşı'nın NATO'nun birçok üyesi nezdinde ilgi çekici bir konu olmaması, bu senaryonun uygulanma olasılığını düşürmektedir. Sahadaki etkin RF varlığı ve NATO'nun böyle bir müdahalesine şiddetle karşı çıkacak olması, olasılığın fiiliyata dönüşmesine ve müdahalenin meşruiyetinin sorgulanmasına neden olmaktadır. BM-NATO seçeneği, sadece NATO seçeneğinin meşruiyet ve sadece BM seçeneğinin de etkisizlik sorununu dengeleyen bir seçenek durumundadır. Bununla birlikte, her iki örgütün konuya müdahil olma noktasında isteksiz olmaları ve bölgedeki etkinliğini artıran RF'nin olası veto girişimi, bu senaryonun gerçekleşme olasılığını düşürmektedir. NATO-AB senaryosu, çalışma da belirlenen değerlendirme kriterlerine göre en kötü ve başarı olasılığı en düşük seçenek durumundadır. Son KOVID-19 salgınında bile bütünleşik bir strateji izleyemeyen ve etkinliği sorgulanan AB'nin, Suriye gibi zor bir konuya, NATO şemsiyesi altında dahi müdahil ve başarılı olması düşük bir olasılıktır. Bölgesel örgütlerin konuya müdahil olmasının, meşruiyet noktasında bazı avantajları olmakla birlikte, bu örgütlerin sahada fiili bir etkinlik göstermedeki zafiyeti ve kendi iç dinamiklerindeki karmaşık ilişkiler nedeniyle, yine düşük bir başarı olasılığına sahip olacağı değerlendirilmektedir. Türkiye, ABD ve RF'nin oluşturacağı bir koalisyon, kurulması zor olsa da, iç savaşı sonlandırmak için diğerlerine göre başarı olasılığı daha yüksek bir senaryo olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Bu seçenek, iç

savaşı sona erdirmek, ardından birleşik, demokratik ve barışçıl bir Suriye oluşturmak ve Orta Doğu'da barış, düzen ve istikrarı sağlamak için gerekli koşulların çoğunu kapsamaktadır.

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