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Constructivism and Diaspora: Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the United Kingdom[1]

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Abstract

This paper aims to examine the effect of Diasporas in host lands on the formation of national identity in homelands. By applying a constructivist approach, this paper seeks to explain how national identity is socially constructed and/or strengthened in Cyprus with the help of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diasporas in the United Kingdom (UK). To this end, Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the UK were investigated through their NGOs, print media and radio stations and, primarily, through a detailed examination of the Cypriot Diaspora Project. The paper attempts to answer two main questions. Firstly, can Turkish and Greek Cypriots be defined as a single Cypriot community in the UK when they have always sought to separate themselves from each other in Cyprus? Secondly, if they are regarded as a single community, can we expect that the change of attitude within the Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diasporas may lead to a change of attitude towards unification in Cyprus under the influence of constructivist theory?

Keywords: Diaspora, Social Constructivism, Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, United Kingdom

Sosyal İnşaacılık ve Diaspora: İngiltere'deki Kıbrıslı Türkler ve Rumlar

Özet

Yunanca'da 'tohumların saçılması' anlamına gelen diaspora, bir etnik-milli topluluğun anavatanından çıkarak başka ülkelere dağılması demektir. Diasporaların temel özelliği ise anavatanla ilişkisini koparmadan yaşamını anavatan dışında sürdürmesidir. Bu tanımdan yola çıkarak, 1920'lerden başlayarak Kıbrıs adasındaki ekonomik ve politik sorunlardan kaçan Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rumlar Amerika, Avustralya, Güney Afrika ve özellikle de İngiltere'ye göç etmişlerdir. O yıllarda İngiltere kolonisi olan adanın Türk ve Rum sakinleri, iş bulmak için İngiltere'yi seçmiş, bu yüzden göç dalgaları 1970'lerin sonuna kadar sürmüştür. Ve orada bir/er diaspora oluşturmuşlardır.

Kıbrıs adasında, Türkler ve Rumlar kendilerini daha çok dinleriyle tanımlarken, İngiltere'deki diasporalarında Kıbrıslı olmaları ön plana çıkar. Kıbrıs Rum Kesimi'nin 2004'te Avrupa Birliği'ne üye olmasıyla birlikte, İngiltere'deki diasporalarında Avrupalı kimliği de vurgulanır. Diğer yandan, 1983'te bağımsızlığını ilan eden Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti'nin İngiltere'deki diasporası ise kendisini sadece Türkiye'nin tanıması nedeniyle çeşitli zorluklar yaşamaktadırlar.

Kıbrıslı Türk ve Rum toplulukları, çoğunlukla Londra'nın kuzeyindeki Wood Green'de 1984'te kurulan Haringey Kıbrıs Toplumu Merkezi'nde bir araya gelmektedir. Ayrı ayrı kurdukları çeşitli görüşlerden kurumlarıyla, İngiliz hükümetinin de desteğini alarak politik ve sosyal alanlarda çeşitli faaliyetlerde bulunmaktadırlar. Bunun yanı sıra, kendi toplulukları için önemli olan günlerde Trafalgar Meydanı'na yürüyerek çeşitli eylemler yapmaktadırlar. Haftalık gazeteler, radyo istasyonları ve internet aracılığıyla da iki toplum arasındaki ve anavatanlarıyla aralarındaki ilişki devam etmektedir. Sonuç olarak, 23 Nisan 2003'te kişilerin ve

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malların Yeşil Hat üzerinden geçişleri başlamadan önce de İngiltere'deki diasporalarında iki toplum bir arada yaşayabilmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Diaspora, Sosyal İnşaacılık, Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıslı Rumlar, İngiltere

Introduction

This paper will look at the current international relations theory of constructivism in conjunction with the phenomenon of the diaspora. Turkish and Greek Cypriot diasporic populations who have emigrated from Cyprus – constituting the fifth-largest minority group in the United Kingdom – will be examined in the light of several constructivist principles.

First of all, this paper will summarise definitions of the term 'diaspora'. Then, after presenting the major actors in the host land, the place of the diaspora in International Relations (IR) theory will be examined. Constructivism in terms of national identity formation – particularly in London – will be addressed in detail, including when and why the migrants left Cyprus, together with their organisations, newspapers, radio stations and television channels, which affect both the formation of Cypriot identity in the host land and foreign policy in the homeland.

The Definition of Diaspora

According to Shain and Barth (2003), the term 'diaspora' originates from the Greek *dia spora* – 'splitting the seed' – and refers to 'a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland - whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control'.[3] While this has become a common definition of a diaspora, other scholars believe that every migrant or refugee wave constitutes a later diasporic group in the host land. Van Hear (1998) identifies three essential features of a diaspora, 'first, a diasporic population must be dispersed from a homeland to two or more host lands; next, such a presence abroad must be enduring (although not necessarily permanent); and most crucially, exchange and communication must happen between parts of the diaspora itself'.[4]

From these academic definitions, it can be understood that a diasporic population should reside outside its motherland as a minority in host countries while bound by strong economic, political and social ties to the home country. Hence, the ethnic or religious identity of this population abroad can be seen as dedicated to the homeland.

In reality, members of diasporic groups are expected to influence the foreign policies of both their homeland and host land. That is to say, diasporic groups abroad should establish a powerful political lobby for their homeland, attracting the attention of their host land's

[3] Y. Shain and A. Barth, (2003), "Diasporas and International Relations Theory", *International Organization*, Vol. 57, p. 452.

[4] C. Ogden, (2008), "Diaspora meets IR's Constructivism: An Appraisal", *Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 1, p. 2.

politicians as a direct means of improving relations between host and home countries. However, some diasporic groups are passive and do not become involved in this process, attempting rather to be assimilated into the host land's identity. In contrast, other members of the diasporic groups are active in seeking to affect the foreign policy of either their host land or their homeland, to preserve their national identity for themselves and the next generation.

In summary, 'diasporas are increasingly able to promote transnational ties, to act as bridges or as mediators between their home and host societies, and to transmit the values of pluralism and democracy as well as the "entrepreneurial spirit and skills that their home countries so sorely lack'"[5]. Thus, diasporic groups are generally able to democratise their home countries through the transmission of their experience in their host countries.

Diaspora and IR Theory

In the past, the phenomenon of the diaspora was not sufficiently attractive to scholars to prompt an examination using IR theory. However, with the growth of sociological research, diasporic groups are now being defined within the boundaries of IR with a particular emphasis on their importance and power over both home and host countries.

Recent examination of the place of the diaspora in IR theory has found that constructivist and liberal approaches complement one another: on the one hand, constructivism emphasises the impetus that diasporas give to the formation of national identity and the constitution of interests, preferences and practices. On the other hand, liberalism focuses on the domestic politics of a homeland influenced by the already established interests and preferences of the diaspora. As Shain and Barth (2003) note, 'To varying degrees, both constructivism and liberalism acknowledge the impact of both identity and domestic interaction on international behaviour'.[6]

Thus, both IR approaches claim that diasporas are motivated, in particular, by their national identities; their interests are formed by social interaction with each other and their homelands. Furthermore, these diasporas affect their homelands' foreign policies through domestic actors.

We turn now to an in-depth analysis of the constructivist approach towards diasporas since the purpose of this paper is to incorporate the theory of constructivism in the phenomenon of the diaspora. First of all, constructivism and its major principles in IR theory will be summarised and then, the term 'diaspora' will be addressed through a constructivist perspective.

Constructivism in IR Theory

[5] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 450.
[6] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 451.

According to Wendt (1999), constructivism arose, and is shaped within the IR theory, from a belief that the international arena is socially constructed. Constructivism, while combining doctrines from several social theories, including critical theory, postmodernism and new institutionalism, is defined by Wendt as based on two main principles, '(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.'[7]

For Wendt, constructivism is not a theory of international politics; however, it can be utilised and adapted in every political system in which the main actor is the state itself. Wendt uses the term 'state' to encompass any organisation which cannot exist without its relationship to society. In constructivist theory, society is composed of the shared ideas of its members; these shared ideas shape the national identity and national interests of the population both within the motherland and in the diaspora.

Diaspora and Constructivism

Since constructivism accepts that shared ideas shape national identities at home and abroad, it is, as noted by Ogden (2008) a natural starting point in IR for the analysis of the notion of the diaspora.[8] The appropriateness of constructivism in this regard is due also to the multiple identities encompassed within the diaspora, crossing national boundaries and concerned both with domestic politics and transnational relations (Ogden, 2008).[9]

Constructivism's main argument regarding the diaspora is its ability to form a national identity. Thus, the diasporic group's interests and preferences will be shaped according to its identity. However, 'identity does not always determine interests, as constructivism posits; sometimes identity is the interest'.[10] Shain and Barth (2003) concur that national identity is, for some, not merely a means of influencing policy but the end in itself, 'For some diasporas, the people's identity is not the starting point to be captured in order to influence interests, practices, and policies; identity is both the starting and the end point.'[11]

According to constructivists, a population living in its homeland can enjoy its identity in its daily life. However, the diasporic population of this nation in the host land has sufficient encouragement to work hard in order to form and preserve their national identity through which they will gain the right to experience their national interests.

[7] A. Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1.
[8] Ogden, (2008), p. 1.
[9] Ogden, (2008), p. 1.
[10] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 455.
[11] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 455.

Moreover, homelands, broadly speaking, are in favour of active diasporas abroad: if the diaspora is politically and economically powerful in the host land, it can invest in its homeland, bringing financial support and influence in the foreign policies of its host land through the mobilisation of diaspora members, campaigns, demonstrations and lobbies.

Nevertheless, in order to create such an active and engaged diasporic group, there must be motivation and capacity to do so. That is to say, the more democratic the host land, the more motivation and capacity for the diasporic influence exist. Conversely, the weaker the homeland, both economically and in terms of social structures, and the more cohesive the diaspora, in terms of determination to influence policy through a unified voice, the greater the influence the community will exert on its homeland.[12]

In summary, according to constructivism, a diasporic population comprises both active and passive members. In the optimal version of a diaspora, the diasporic group is active in social and political relations, shaping its national identity through its shared ideas. A powerful and successful diasporic population can influence the economics, politics and society of both the home and host countries. Conversely, in the worst version of the diaspora, the diasporic organisation in the host land is passive, including in its political and economic relations with the homeland. This kind of diasporic group wishes to integrate and assimilate into the host country.

The Division of Cyprus

The division of Cyprus into the Turkish north and the Greek south originated in 1964 when the Turkish Cypriot minority was displaced and attacked by the Greek Cypriots and the British commander, Major General Peter Young, first conceived of the ceasefire zone and drew a line – allegedly with a green crayon – across a map of Cyprus, dividing the country into two parts.[13] The process can, however, be traced back to 1960, when the new constitution of the independent country separated the population into two ethnic identities. A further decisive step was taken in 1963, when Makarios proposed to annul the veto power of the Turkish Cypriot minority. The struggle between the Greek EOKA, which wanted *enosis* (unity with Greece), and the Turkish Cypriots who wanted *taksim* (partition) grew. Moreover, according to Innes (2017), the British supported 'Turkish Cypriot police forces to combat growing EOKA militarization, …[and] fostered discord between the two groups'.[14] It may be said that this process was completed de facto in 1974 after Turkey's intervention in response to Makarios's coup.

[12] Shain & Barth, (2003), p. 466.
[13] A. J. Innes, "Mobile diasporas, postcolonial identities: the Green Line in Cyprus", *Postcolonial Studies*, (2017), p. 2.
[14] Innes, (2017), p. 2.

Cypriot Migration to the United Kingdom

The agricultural state of Cyprus and the exploitation of its natural resources by the colonialists forced many Cypriots to seek their fortune in industrially advanced countries,[15] including the USA, Australia, South Africa and, especially, the United Kingdom (UK). The reason for the vast migration to the UK stems from the fact that, when the UK annexed Cyprus in 1914, residents of Cyprus acquired 'a new status as subjects of the British Crown'.[16] From the 1920s, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots left the island for both economic and political reasons. In economic terms, Cyprus was poor, and opportunities for rural Cypriots to find work were rare since unemployment was high at the time. In political terms, the clash between Turkish and Greek nationalists was ongoing, since the Greek part of the island wanted to unite with Greece while the Turkish part desired the partition of the island, with its part uniting with Turkey. The conflict gained another dimension with the British involvement.

In the first wave of migration in the 1920s, the island was under British colonial rule and Cypriots, therefore, migrated to the UK to find work. During the 1930s and 1940s, the UK started to employ Cypriot workers, and approximately 1,000 Cypriots emigrated from the island each year and settled in Britain.

The second wave of Cypriot migration occurred in the 1950s with the escalation of the conflict in the island between the two communities, exacerbated by the events of 6–7 September 1955 in Turkey, mainly in İstanbul and in İzmir, in the form of a pogrom, planned and supported by the Turkish government against non-Muslim minorities and, in particular, the Rum Orthodox minority, attacking them and plundering their properties to seize their wealth and position. These events were reflected in Cyprus and, as a result, Greek Cypriots left the island in increasing numbers, with approximately 3,800 migrants leaving the island each year to settle in the UK.

In 1959, the Zurich and London agreements were signed between Britain, Greece and Turkey, the three 'Guarantor Powers' of Cyprus, the population of which comprises Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Maronite and Latin Cypriots. In reality, Turkish and Greek Cypriots constitute a bi-communal majority, while the other Catholic populations form a minority on the island.

Most importantly, with the support of these three Guarantor Powers, the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960 as a unified entity under equal Greek and Turkish administration, resulting in civil war at that time. Although the Immigration Act of 1962 was

[15] V. Coombe and A. Little, *Race & Social Work*, (London: Tavistock Publication, 1986), p. 80.

[16] T. Küçükcan, "The making of Turkish-Muslim diaspora in Britain: religious collective identity in a multicultural public sphere", *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2, (2004), p. 246.

accepted to prevent an influx of migration from Cyprus, Cypriots continued to leave the island for Britain, and the estimated number of Cypriots in Britain had reached approximately 80,000 by 1964.[17]

The third migration wave came after 1964, with civil war in Cyprus between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot populations, because of conflict between the hyper-nationalist organisations of the two populations, that is, EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters), AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People) and TMT (Turkish Defence Organisation).

The most recent migration wave occurred after the turning point of 1974, when Turkey intervened following an attempted coup d'etat by the Greek junta. Thereafter, the island was separated into two countries: approximately 200,000 Greek Cypriots were forced to leave the North and settle in the South, while around 40,000 Turkish Cypriots were relocated from the South to the North. Because of this chaotic atmosphere, approximately 15,000 Turkish Cypriots and 15,000 Greek Cypriots emigrated from the country and resettled in the UK, and especially in London. By the 1980s, the number of the Cypriot diaspora in the UK was estimated at around 160,000, of which 20–25% were thought to be Turkish-Cypriots.[18] Coombe and Little (1986) reported similar figures.[19] Those Cypriot migrants who later constituted the Cypriot diaspora in the UK emigrated from the island only as married couples. Once in Britain, they sought refuge from friends or relatives, who could also help them find accommodation and employment.[20] By the 1990s, it is estimated that the Greek Cypriots in London numbered around 180,000–200,000 (Christodoulou-Pipis, 1991), while the population of Nicosia was 200,000–250,000 (Department of Statistics and Research, Ministry of Finance, Cyprus).[21] Thus, in the 1980s, the Greek communities in the UK and Cyprus were numerically comparable; this started to change in the 2000s.

Turkish and Greek Cypriot Diaspora(s) in the United Kingdom: Bi-communal or one Community?

In the homeland of Cyprus, 77% of the population are Greek Cypriots, with 18% Turkish Cypriots and the remaining 5% a combination of Armenian, Maronite and Latin Christian minorities. According to the 2011 population censuses held in the Turkish Republic

[17] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 247.
[18] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 247.
[19] Coombe & Little, (1986), p. 81.
[20] Coombe & Little, (1986), p. 81.
[21] P. Gardner-Chloros, L. McEntee-Atalianis and K. Finnis, Language Attitudes and Use in a Transplanted Setting: Greek Cypriots in London", *International Journal of Multilingualism*, Vol. 2, No. 1, (2005), p. 55.

of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and in Greek Cyprus, 667,398[22] Greek Cypriots and 286,257[23] Turkish Cypriots live on the island.

According to the UK's 2011 population census,[24] the Cypriot diasporas are composed of around 300,000 Turkish and Greek Cypriots, including 60,000 Cypriot-born immigrants; the majority live in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Cardiff, Nottingham and Bristol.[25] Approximately one-third of the total Cypriot diaspora in the UK is Turkish Cypriot, with about two-thirds Greek Cypriots, 70% of whom live in London alone.

These data show that nearly one-third of the Cypriot population lives outside Cyprus, and, for this reason, the Cypriot diaspora is an important force for the motherland, both for the TRNC and Greek Cyprus. For the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora in the UK is crucial in terms of the economy, due to the financial problems it encounters because of its lack of international recognition. In contrast, for Greek Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot diaspora plays a major role in terms of political preferences. Due to long-standing British involvement in Cyprus, the two diasporic populations in the UK have both gained importance for their home countries.

In Cyprus, no sole Cypriot identity has emerged among Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Therefore, Greek Cypriots in the UK define themselves predominantly as Orthodox Christians speaking Greek, while Turkish Cypriots in the UK define themselves as Turkish-speaking Muslims, but a majority also emphasise their Turkishness.

Although both Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the UK had felt a historical link with the UK before immigration, after settlement they became an 'invisible population'.[26] Traditionally, neither population shared a feeling of being Cypriot; rather, they separately reconciled themselves to their Greekness and Turkishness.

Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriot diaspora in the UK started to define themselves predominantly with their Cypriot and European identities, especially after Greek Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004. In contrast, some hyper-nationalist groups within the Greek Cypriot diaspora define themselves as Greeks and participate in Greek diasporic organisations. Nevertheless, due to the high numbers in the Greek Cypriot diaspora and the

[22] Population Census 2011 in Cyprus, Statistical Service of Cyprus (CYSTAT), https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition_22main_en/populationcondition_22main_en?OpenForm&sub=2&sel=2

[23] 2011 Nüfus Sayımı, KKTC İstatistik Kurumu, http://www.stat.gov.ct.tr/nufus2011.aspx

[24] Office for National Statistics, https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/datasets/populationoftheunitedkingdombycountryofbirthandnationalityunderlyingdatasheets

[25] https://cypriotfederation.org.uk/ukcypriots/

[26] K. Robins and A. Aksoy, "From spaces of identity to mental spaces: Lessons from Turkish-Cypriot cultural experience in Britain", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 4, (2001), p. 685.

democratic and open-minded nature of Britain, they have established a powerful diasporic group that emphasises first their Cypriot, and then their European, identity.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora is less powerful and effective than its Greek counterpart. In 1983, the TRNC was declared an independent country but only Turkey has recognised its independence to date; as a result, Turkish Cypriots abroad have faced a conflict about their identity. The majority emphasise their Cypriotness, but also define themselves as Turks. As Robins and Aksoy (2001) observe, 'Whilst they clearly have a sense of a culture in common, they have never had an achieved sense of national identity.'[27]

As a result, although both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have respectively attempted to preserve their cultural identities, they can live together in a close environment as if they constitute one single Cypriot diaspora in the UK.

Cypriot Organisations in Britain

The Greek Cypriot case

The earliest established Greek Cypriot diasporic organisations are EKEKA (the Federation of Cypriot Refugees, established in 1974), POMAK (the World Federation of Overseas Cypriots) and PSEKA (the Global Committee of the Cypriot Struggle) which are all members of the Council for Hellenes Abroad (SAE) and are nationalist associations maintaining no communication with the Turkish Cypriots. These organisations lobby the host countries' governments 'in a classic way, by letters, street demonstrations, picketing and events like fund-raising, public meetings, etc. during electoral campaigns'.[28] They are closely involved with the political situation in Cyprus and emphasise international law and human rights' issues in their discourse, including the Greek Cypriot civilians and soldiers missing since the Turkish intervention in 1974 and the Turkish occupation of Cyprus.[29]

In 1974, a non-political organisation – the Christian-only National Federation of Cypriots in Great Britain (NFCGB) – was established, aimed at communication and cooperation with the Turkish Cypriot organisations. Except for the Lobby for Cyprus, almost all the Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK belong to the NFCGB.[30] Lobby for Cyprus was established in 1993 and was highly effective in the New Labour election campaign in 1997. Moreover, AKEL as the communist party of Greek Cypriots has opened a branch in the UK which has been powerful in influencing the policies of the host land.

[27] Robins & Aksoy, (2001), pp. 685–686.
[28] G. Bertrand, "Cypriots in Britain: Diaspora(s) Committed to Peace?", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2, (2004), p. 101.
[29] Bertrand, (2004), p. 101.
[30] Bertrand, (2004), p. 108.

Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (1992) introduced the notion of a Community of Practice with reference to British-born Greek Cypriots. According to their definition, a Community of Practice is 'an aggregate of people who, united by a common enterprise, develop and share ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs and values—in short, practices' (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 1999, p.186).[31] Within this Community of Practice, Greek Cypriots can develop a shared identity in the UK through 'shared stories, insider jokes, knowing laughter, styles recognised as displaying membership, and a shared discourse that reflects a common outlook' as Wenger (1998) argues.[32] Although the second and third generations of British-born Greek Cypriots are criticised for their loss of Cypriot identity and their assimilation into British culture,[33] they have strong ties with relatives in the UK and 'live in a close-knit environment'.[34] In fact, the Greek Cypriots both in Cyprus and the UK have striven to protect their culture and language, faced with mutual political, economic and social concerns.[35] Greek Cypriots in the UK speak three languages: Cypriot Greek, Modern Greek and English.[36]

The Turkish Cypriot case

Like the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots in the UK also have a tripartite cultural reference point in developing their identity: the Cypriot culture, the culture of 'mainland' Turkey and the culture of Britain.[37] Largely due to the non-recognition of the TRNC, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora in the UK has worked hard to integrate into British culture and was, thus, more open to assimilation than the Greek Cypriots. For this reason, the Turkish Cypriot diaspora has been called a 'silent or silenced minority' or a 'lost community with a lost identity' (Aydın Mehmet Ali, 1985, 1990).[38]

However, almost all the Turkish Cypriot organisations focus on the Turkish language because 'assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity'.[39] The Turkish Cypriot identity, thus, comprises language, ethnicity and Islam, which are transmitted to the younger generations in the UK.

[31] K. A. Finnis, "Variation within a Greek-Cypriot community of practice in London: Code-switching, gender, and identity", *Language in Society*, Vol. 43, (2014), p. 289.
[32] Finnis, (2004), p. 290.
[33] A. Papapavlou and P. Pavlou, "The interplay of language use and language maintenance and the cultural identity of Greek Cypriots in the UK", *International Journal of Applied Linguistics*, Vol. 11, No. 1, (2001), p. 105.
[34] Papapavlou & Pavlou, (2001), p. 104.
[35] Gardner-Chloros, McEntee-Atalianis & Finnis, (2005), p. 57.
[36] P. Karatsareas, "Attitudes towards Cypriot Greek and Standard Modern Greek in London's Greek Cypriot community", *International Journal of Bilingualism*, (2018), p. 5.
[37] Robins & Aksoy, (2001), p. 686.
[38] Robins & Aksoy, (2001), pp. 690–692.
[39] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 252.

Just after the partition of Cyprus, the hyper-nationalist organisations 'Relatives of the massacred Turkish Cypriots' and 'Cyprus Before 1974' were founded in the UK. Later, the Council of Turkish Cypriot Organisations (Konsey) was established by pro-Denktaş – pro-TRNC – Cypriots. Almost all the Turkish Cypriot organisations are members of the Konsey, which has been active, industrious and successful in affecting, to some extent, the host land's policies and practices. In order not to become a 'silent community', some of the Turkish Cypriot organisations in the UK prefer to keep the Cyprus issue alive to help revive a collective identity.[40]

In addition, the UBP (the National Unity Party), with about 50,000 supporters in the UK; the Solidarity Association (CTPDD), a relatively passive organisation; the CTP (Republican Turkish Party) and the United Patriotic Movement Solidarity Association (YHBDD) act as the main representatives of the Turkish Cypriots, the latter two constituting the Cyprus Turkish Democratic Association (CTDA). The CTDA has been a conciliatory association between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities and is even in favour of the unification of the two communities on the island. Furthermore, the CTDA has good relations with the AKEL and NFCGB in the UK: the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot organisations communicate and share news and developments from Cyprus with each other. As Bertrand (2004) notes, 'In this sense, Cypriot diasporic organizations by-passed the 'Green Line' which almost totally separated Christian (Greek and minorities) and Turkish Cypriots, until its opening on April 23, 2003.'[41]

YHBDD performs well in terms of being active in Britain but is unable to influence either the host or the home country. The CTPDD, YHBDD and CTDA all advocate that British-born Turkish Cypriots integrate into British society while, at the same time, trying to mobilise them.[42]

The Turkish Cypriot Network (TCN) is a hyper-nationalist, anti-Greek association and supports the conservative government in Turkey. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) notes succinctly that 'TCN calls itself "the voice of Turkish Cypriots" while the Turkish Cypriot Democratic Association calls itself "the voice of the peace-loving Turkish Cypriot Community in Europe."'[43]

In the 2000s, with the opening of the Green Line in 2003 and Cyprus joining the EU in 2004, relationships between Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK have also

[40] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 253.
[41] Bertrand, (2004), p. 107.
[42] Bertrand, (2004), p. 107.
[43] E. Ostergaard-Nielsen, "The Democratic Deficit of Diaspora Politics: Turkish Cypriots in Britain and the Cyprus Issue", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 4, (2003), p. 691.

developed. Several Turkish Cypriot organisations established the 'Peace for Cyprus' platform at the beginning of 2003, in cooperation with their Greek Cypriot counterparts.

Moreover, the Annan Plan, prepared by the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for the re-unification of the island, was supported by the majority of Turkish Cypriot organisations in the UK, except for the hyper-nationalists. A referendum for the Annan Plan was held on 24 April 2004, in which 64.9% of Turkish Cypriots voted in favour, while 75.8% of Greek Cypriots voted against. Despite the Turkish Cypriot diaspora launching a 'policy of lobbying EU states to put pressure on Greek-Cypriots as a sign of the Turks' desire to be a part of Europe', Cyprus joined the EU, leaving the Turkish side behind.[44] In this regard, it is hard to say whether the good relations between the two communities in Britain affected the homeland's policies or vice versa.

The British case

Apart from the above-mentioned Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, three British-supported associations for the Cypriots are also important.

The first is the 'Friends of Cyprus' association which was established in 1974 in London. It includes Cypriot members from both Turkish and Greek sides, but the leading roles are played by British MPs (Members of Parliament) and MEPs (Members of the European Parliament).

Secondly, the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Cypriot Affairs (ACGTA) was formed in 1992 in the UK by students and scholars as an academic organisation. It is a powerful organisation with the capacity to bring British and both Turkish and Greek Cypriot academics together to share ideas for future solutions.

Thirdly, the Forum for Friendship and Cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was established in 1997 in London, also by students and scholars, as another academic organisation.

In summary, while Turkish and Greek Cypriots have formed their own ethnic organisations in the UK in order to play a role in the Cyprus issue, the UK as a former guarantor power, has also established locations to allow interaction between the two communities. Whereas the TRNC and Greek Cypriot governments have been satisfied with the active roles of their diasporas in the UK, British politicians have also used these diasporic groups to gain votes during election campaigns.

Living Centres Established by the Cypriot Diasporas

[44] Küçükcan, (2004), p. 253.

There are two main centres for the two Cypriot communities settled in London. First, in 1984, the major Cypriot community centre was formed in Wood Green, North London, also known as the Haringey Cypriot Community Centre (HCCC). This is more active than the second community centre established in Southwark in 1989 to provide social services for older members of the two Cypriot communities. The administration of these centres has been organised so that the chairperson is elected, by the members of the centres, from either the Turkish or Greek Cypriot community, while the manager is elected from the other community.

The HCCC has played a leading role for many years, organising breakfasts, lunches, dinners, as well as marriages, circumcisions and other social occasions for Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Moreover, in order to integrate British-born children into the Cypriot community, the HCCC arranges Turkish and Greek language classes.

The two communities share the same political activities in London: every year, on 9 July, Greek Cypriots celebrate the anniversary of the 1821 uprising in Cyprus. This celebration should be regarded as a protest the current situation on the island. As Bertrand (2004) notes, 'The Turkish Cypriots might have agreed to protest with the Greek Cypriots about the current situation, but July 9 is a dividing event because it is a purely Greek nationalist event.'[45]

Likewise, every year on 21 July, Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations arrange marches to Trafalgar Square. First, the Turkish Cypriots celebrate the anniversary of the Turkish 'intervention' in Cyprus in 1974; then, some hours later, the Greek Cypriot community marches to the same place to protest Turkey's 'invasion'. Nevertheless, in both demonstrations, Turkish and Greek Cypriot demonstrators can be observed hand-in-hand.

Moreover, both communities share time in social activities: they watch television at the HCCC together, talk to each other about daily issues or news from Cyprus, discuss the politics of the home and host countries, visit each other in their homes, cooperate at work, businesses and in schools. They even marry members of the other community: the marriage of Turkay Hadji-Philippou, the chair of the Turkish Cypriot Community Association (which owns Londra Toplum Postası) to a highly active Greek Cypriot woman attracted attention from both the Cypriot diasporas in the UK.[46]

Weekly newspapers, radio stations and the internet are also crucial and beneficial means for the formation of an ethnic identity among Turkish and Greek Cypriot community members.

[45] Bertrand, (2004), p. 102.
[46] Bertrand, (2004), p. 104.

Four weekly Turkish newspapers are in circulation in London: *Londra Toplum Postası*, *Londra Gazete*, *Avrupa* and *Olay*. While *Londra Toplum Postası* is run by Turkish Cypriots to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, *Londra Gazete* is published by both Turks and Turkish Cypriots. Whereas the two aforementioned newspapers are left-wing, *Avrupa* and *Olay* are Turkish-owned, nationalist, pro-Turkish government publications. In addition, there is a radio station run by Turkish Cypriots – *London Turkish Radio* – who define themselves as Turks.

For the Greeks, *Parikiaki*, the Greek Cypriot weekly newspaper, is dominant in spreading and influencing news and attitudes about Cyprus in London. There has for many years been one radio station for Greek Cypriots, named London Greek Radio. However, in the HCCC, watching television is a popular pastime in both communities, with the Cyprus channel (CBC-SAT), Greek channel (ERT-SAT) and the local Hellenic TV the major channels available throughout the day.

Moreover, currently, the Turkish and Greek Cypriot home pages on the internet are commonly used by both Cypriot communities, especially by the younger generations. The best-known is the 'HADE Bi-communal Magazine of Cyprus' which has managed to bring Turkish and Greek Cypriot youth together through its forums.

Indeed, this Cypriot Community Centre has been a major hub in forming a Cypriot identity among the diasporic populations. Both Turkish and Greek Cypriots use the media in the HCCC extensively and can communicate and interact with each other easily. It is worth emphasising that Greek and Turkish Cypriots share the same space at the HCCC in a way that has not been common in Cyprus for almost half a century.[47]

Questioning the Cypriot Diasporas in the UK: Can Turkish and Greek Cypriots Affect Their Homelands' Foreign Policies?

It should be noted that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities have managed to live together in the two above-mentioned Cypriot centres. This co-existence is considerably more successful than the conditions on the island of Cyprus. However, in order not to lose their historical ties with Cyprus, and their respective cultural identities, both the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities try to pass on features of their respective languages, religions and ethnicities to the younger generations.

When we examine separately the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities and their IGOs and/or NGOs, mass media and political activities, it is clear that the Greek Cypriot community is far more powerful and successful than the Turkish Cypriot diasporic group. Since the ethnic identity of Greek Cypriots has gained far wider acceptance in the

[47] M. Georgiou, "Crossing the Boundaries of the Ethnic Home: Media Consumption and Ethnic Identity Construction in the Public Space: The Case of the Cypriot Community Centre in North London", *International Communication Gazette*, Vol. 63, No. 4, (2001), p. 326.

international arena than the Turkish Cypriot identity, which is recognised only by Turkey, Greek Cypriot organisations in the UK have a more powerful voice in influencing UK foreign policy concerning Cyprus in favour of themselves.

As Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) argues, the Greek Cypriot community's lobby is 'one of the few successful diaspora political lobbies in Western Europe and has strong ties with the Labour Party'.[48] It should be noted that, because the number of registered Greek Cypriot voters exceeds that of Turkish Cypriot voters in the UK, political parties tend to establish stronger relations with the Greek Cypriot diasporic group during election campaigns. Consequently, Turkish Cypriot associations are relatively passive compared to their Greek Cypriot counterparts. This passivity may also stem from the positive or negative attitudes of British politicians regarding the TRNC government. In addition, after the opening of the Green Line in 2003 and Cyprus' EU membership in 2004, Greek Cypriots increased their active role in British politics. The effect was, however, to some extent balanced if a unionist and less nationalist president was elected in the TRNC. Moreover, with the increased number of registered Turkish Cypriot voters in the UK, the Turkish Cypriot lobby has recently started to be used during election campaigns. As Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) notes, 'The TRNC political actors, like political actors in most sending countries, are interested in supportive lobby groups abroad – in particular when they reside in countries like Britain which is relatively influential in international politics in general and in the Cyprus issue in particular.'[49] That is to say, as a former guarantor country, the UK has been a powerful actor in the Cyprus issue in the international arena, and the TRNC government, therefore, would like the Turkish Cypriot diasporic population in the UK to influence the host land's policies and practices in favour of the TRNC.

Conclusion

Currently, debate continues among sociologists and political scientists regarding the meaning of the phenomenon of the diaspora. While some see every migration event as creating a diaspora, the definition produced by Shain and Barth (2003) is the most complex and fully-fledged. Since constructivism and liberalism are both appropriate approaches for the study of the phenomenon, these two IR theories are applied. Constructivism argues that the world is socially constructed. In the international arena, a state should have good relations with society, which is shaped by the shared ideas of its members, leading to the formation of a national identity and national interests at home or abroad.

After the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974, the island was separated into two communities which later formed Greek Cyprus in the South and the TRNC in the North.

[48] Ostergaard-Nielsen, (2003), p. 694.
[49] Ostergaard-Nielsen, (2003), p. 697.

While these two communities live separately in Cyprus, Cypriot immigrants in the UK, specifically in London, have collectively formed a single community centre. This Cypriot diaspora constitutes the fifth-largest minority in the UK. Although these two communities have to face the ongoing problem in Cyprus, Turkish and Greek Cypriots have succeeded in sharing the same social space, schools, work and businesses.

In order to establish a Cypriot identity in the two communities in the UK, both Turkish and Greek Cypriots founded major intergovernmental or non-governmental organisations to help exert influence on their homelands' politics. Since the Greek Cypriot identity is far more powerful and widely approved by international actors than the Turkish Cypriot identity, due to the widespread non-recognition of the TRNC, the Greek Cypriot diaspora has become better-known and more successful in terms of lobbying for Cyprus in its host land.

Indeed, these Turkish and Greek Cypriot organisations cooperate with each other in political and social events in daily life. Although the unification of the two countries within the island of Cyprus remains a well-known and unresolved issue between the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot governments, the problem has already been overcome within the Cypriot diaspora(s) in London, the majority of whom are in favour of the unification. Those who support the unification of the island call themselves Turkish-speaking or Greek-speaking Cypriots, while those members of the Cypriot diaspora in favour of the status quo define themselves as Turkish or Greek Cypriots, or even as Turks or Greeks.

In terms of the diaspora's effect on homeland policies, it cannot easily be claimed that the Cypriot diasporas in the UK influence domestic politics. In the unification referendum of Cyprus in 2004, the shared ideas of the Cypriot diasporas in London had little effect on the views of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot populations on the island. Therefore, the percentage of negative votes outweighed the affirmative ones and the separation of the island continued. In the end, the successful lobbying of hardworking Turkish and Greek Cypriot diasporic organisations in the UK was not able to change attitudes on the island. Could this, however, change in the future?

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