Islamic Movements and Their Role In Politics In Turkey

Nezir AKYEŞİLMEN*
Arif Behiç ÖZCAN**

ABSTRACT

Various opinions, institutions and individuals have influenced the political life in Turkey which constructed on a parliamentary democracy. Developments and refracting in the process of democratization and modernization have changed the roles, quality and quantity of the elements in Turkey's political life. The affects of these elements increased and decreased in time. In this context, the role of Islamic movements in politics cannot be denied in Turkey, particularly in the recent years. Starting with the development of multi-party democracy, after the 1950's a number of developments greatly advanced Turkey's democratization and modernization. These same events also transformed politics in Turkey which provided the environment for the growth of Islamic parties in Turkey. First, this paper, regarding these developments, discusses how to make a clarification of Islamic movements in Turkey as they are the parts of Turkey's political life. Secondly, we try to demonstrate how different Islamic movements determine the political behaviors in their groups if they really do that. After discusses Islamic movements during one-party rule up until 1950, the paper focuses on the transition to multi-party democracy and then the resurgence of those movements. In the last part, just before the conclusion, electoral behavior of Islamic movements will be analyzed one by one. In this paper, we examine some main stream Islamic movements' structures and effects in Turkey's political life like Nurist Movements (Nurcu Hareket), Gulen Movement (Gulen Hareketi), New Asia (Yeni Asya), Suleymanists (Suleymancilar), National Sight (Milli Gorus), Nakshibendi Order (Naksibendiler), Iskenderpasha Order (Iskenderpasa Cemaati) and Menzil Movement (Menzilciler). We will consider the table which developed by authors based on data gathered from different sources. The analysis depended on this table shows political behaviors of these Islamic movements in the general elections between 1950-2011. Of course, a different analysis could develop our results or reach different results anytime.

Keywords: Islamic movements, politics, tariqas, jama'ats, political parties
The Type of Research: Research

Türkiye'de İslami Hareketlerin Siyasetteki Rolü

ÖZET

Parlamenter bir demokrasi anlayışı üzerine inşa edilen Türkiye'nin siyasal hayatında bu zamana kadar birçok fikir, kurum ve bireyler etkili ola gelmiştir. Türkiye'nin demokratikleşme ve modernleşme sürecinde yaşanan önemli kırılmalar ve/veya gelişmeler çerçevesinde bu aktörlerin rollerinde, sayısında ve niteliğinde farklılıklar meydana gelmiştir. Zamanla bu aktörlerin sahip olduğu etki bazen artan bazen de azalan bir niteliğe sahip olmuştur. Bu bağlamda özellikle son zamanlarda Türkiye'de İslami hareketlerin siyaset içindeki etkisinin varlığı yadsınamaz. 1950'lerde çok partili hayata geçişle birlikte yaşanan birtakım gelişmeler Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi ve modernleşmesi anlamında önemli bir değşim sağlamıştır. Bu çalışma, ilgili gelişmeleri de dikkate alarak, öncelikle Türkiye'deki siyasal yaşamın bir parçası olarak bu İslami hareketleri nasıl sınıflandırabileceğimizi tartışacaktır. Özellikle bu hareketlerin tanımlanmasında kullanılan, cemaat, tarikat, hareket gibi kavramların aralarındaki farklılıkları da bu bölümde inceleyeceğiz. İkinci olarak, farklı İslami hareketlerin, kendi grupları içinde siyasal davranışlara nasıl karar verdiklerini ortaya koymaya çalışacağız. Bu hareketlerin grup davranışı ve grup içi hiyerarşi bağlamındaki farklılıkları ortaya konması, bu hareketlerin siyasal davranışlarını anlamamız açısından oldukça önemlidir. Tek parti döneminden 1950'li yıllara kadar geçen dönem süresince İslami hareketler hakkındaki tartışmaları yaptıktan sonra makalemiz çok partili döneme geçiş sürecine ve daha sonra da bu hareketlerin yeniden güçlenmeleri üzerine odaklanacaktır. Tek-partili dönemden çok partili döneme geçişte bu hareketlerin kendilerini genel olarak nasıl konumlandırdıkları, onların siyasete bakış açıları ve iç yapılanmalarında gösterdikleri özellikler çerçevesinde ele alınacaktır. Sonuç bölümünden önce, İslami hareketlerin seçmen davranışları birer birer analiz edilecektir. Bu hareketlerin içerisinde çalışmamızda Nurculuk hareketi, Gülen hareketi, Yeni Asya, Süleymancılar, Milli Görüş, Nakşibendiler, İskenderpaşa Cemaati ve Menzil hareketi incelenecektir. Bunu incelerken yazarların farklı kaynaklardan topladıkları bilgilerden hareket ederek oluşturdukları tablo esas alınacaktır. Bu tabloya dayanarak yapılan analiz, Türkiye'de çok partili döneme karşılık

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* Assoc. Prof. Dr., Selçuk University
** Assist. Prof. Dr., Selçuk University

gelen 1950-2011 yılları arasında yapılan genel seçimler bağlamında, ana İslami hareketler ve onların kendi içindeki farklı gruplar açısından yapılacaktır. Elbette başka çalışmalarda bu tablo geliştirilebilir ve/veya tablonun gösterdiği genel çerçeveden farklı bakış açıları ortaya konabilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İslami hareketler, siyaset, tarikatlar, cemaatler, siyasi partiler

Çalışmanın Türü: Araştırma

Introduction

The role of Islamic movements in politics cannot be denied in Turkey, particularly in the recent years. With the establishment of the modern republic, a radical laic regime was applied under one-party rule from 1923 till 1950. Yet starting from 1950 general elections onwards votes of Islamic movements have always been considered by political parties, mainly the right-wing parties. Onder Aytaç in *"Neden?"* discussion program on NTV, quoted from former president Demirel that Islamic movements in Turkey overwhelmingly have supported the strongest right-wing parties in all the elections (Aytaç, 2008).This reality is also verified by the table on following pages. Resurgence in religious activity became particularly evident in 1980s, with an apparent shift in government attitudes and a remarkable proliferation of pro-Islamic newspapers, periodicals and other literature (Tapper, 1991; 2-3).

Nilufer Narli also summarizes the resurgence of Islam and emergence of Islamic parties in the last several decades by stating that "Beginning in the 1950s and peaking in the 1980s, a number of developments greatly advanced Turkey's modernization. These same events also transformed politics in Turkey which provided the environment for the growth of Islamic parties in Turkey taking votes away from their center-right competitors" (Narli, 1999).Turan supports Narli's view that the reason behind the resurgence of Islam in Turkey is modernization and economic change (Turan, 1991; 45).Despite the existence of some fears among the militant laicists due to the rise of Islamic movements in Turkey, Kimmins argues that Turkey remains the most secular of Muslim states (Kimmins, 1991; 27-28).

After discusses Islamic movements during one-party rule up until 1950, the paper focuses on the transition to multi-party and then the resurgence of those movements. In the last part, just before the conclusion,electoral behavior of Islamic movements will be analyzed one by one.

1. One-Party Era and Islamic Movements

Until 1946 Turkey had a single-party system. The ruling Republican People's Party (CHP) was fiercely secular (Liel, 2001; 10). Thus,Yucekok claims that the Islamic movements were against all the governments until 1950s (Yucekok, 1999; 61).Having a positivist world view Kemalist elite approached religion as the scapegoat for the backward of the Ottoman Empire. Thus relationship between new Republic and Islam was not friendly, in fact conflictive.Richard Tapper claims that since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, Islam in Turkey has been redefined. Laicism (radical secularism) emerged as one of the key principles of the Kemalist state and religious expression came under strict government supervision and control (Tapper, 1991; 2).

Donald Smith has defined five types of secularization process that a society can experience. Four of these had been taking place during the Ottoman Empire. The common rationale of these four types was to secularize the state. Yet the fifth type, the one currently applied in Turkey, is the initiation of an open governmental attack on the religious basis of general culture and the forcible imposition of secular ideology on the political culture (Turan, 1991; 33). Mustafa Akyol supports the view that laicism is a radical secular form by claiming that the secularizing reforms of the early Republic, carried out by the "Single Party regime", came as a shock to Turkey's conservative Muslims. Unlike the Ottoman reforms, which were focused on secularizing the state structure, Kemalist reforms were focused on secularizing the society. No wonder they faced strong reaction, and were implemented only under the Kemalist motto, "for the people, in spite of the people" (Akyol, 2008).

In order to remove the Islamic influence from the society laicists applied some secular and nationalist reforms in 1920s and 1930s; abolishing of caliphate in 1924; the fez and other religious garment were outlawed in 1925; Islamic law, Sharia'a was rejected in 1926; in 1928 the article in the constitution that declared Islam to be the official religion of the state was dropped; the Arab alphabets were replaced by

Latinized one in 1928 and lastly Sunday replaced Friday as the mandatory rest day in 1935 (Liel, 2001; 8).Thomas Smith supports this argument when he claimed that;

> Turkish identity (Türkçülük) was defined in opposition to the rest of the Islamic world, and Turks remain cool toward pan-Islamic movements. The mechanics of nation-building – rehabilitating the 'Turk' (which had been a pejorative under Ottoman rule), closing the Caliphate, Turkifying the history of Anatolia, the Turkish language of Arabic and Persian words ,adopting the Roman alphabet in place of Arabic script, banning the fez and other manifestations of 'the Orient' – distanced Turkey from the Arab world in particular (Smith, 2005; 307-325).

One-party period novelist and politician Yakup Kadri's portrayal of "reactionaries" in *Ankara* is quite telling*:* "Black Terror, black terror! Our enemy is not only Europe, but also these, as well. The day will come when it will be necessary to fight against them" (Karaosmanoğlu, 1999; 51). Islamism's portrayal as an internal "Other" by the *hegemonic* secularist discourse manifests itself at many different levels. First, indefinite and indiscriminate use of terminology, that characterizes both the secularist discourse and Western Orientalist discourse, appears as part of "exercise in power" through essentialization of complex phenomena. This more or less dominates the discourse, notwithstanding the admission that "Turkey's Islamic society is hardly monolithic, ranging from mystics who oppose involvement in politics to politicians determined to restore *Sharia*" (Howe, 2000; 10).

2. Transition to Multi-Party Democracy

In Turkey, the Islamic movement failed to gain wide support and was crushed by the authorities in 1920s and 1930s. Thus, Islamic groups stayed underground during the era of one-party rule, between 1923 and 1946 (Narli, 1999). In 1946 Turkey shifted to a multi-party democracy when political attitude towards religion started to change gradually. Being liberaland newly foundedthe Democrat Party (TheDP) had more sympathy towards religious demands. The 1950 elections brought in the DP in place of Ataturk's CHP (Tapper, 1999; 9).From 1950 elections until the military intervention of1980 political ground was disputed between the CHP and the Democrat Party (DP) and its successor the Justice Party (TheAP).

The DP was more conservative, centre-right, economically oriented to Western capitalism, more progressive while being more supportive of religious freedoms (Tapper, 1991; 8). Therefore, in 1950s when the DP was in power, Islam reestablished itself in Turkey's cultural life. Some religious improvements were allowed including public calls for prayer in Arabic and religious education in high schools (Liel, 2001; 10). Indeed, already before 1950s, there were some tendencies and changes in politics. For instance, religious courses were back into education, support for hajj was restored and training for religious officials was restarted (Tapper, 1991; 9).

During the 1950s, the DP, in opposing the centralist elite represented by the CHP, represented the people of the periphery, including peasants and provincial bourgeoisie as well as the discontent of Islamic and religiously conservative people dissatisfied with secular policies. In the 1960s and 1970s, its successor, the Justice Party, was also sensitive to Islamic demands in the electorate, while representing newly emerged bourgeoisie elements agrarian capitalists, big capital, and the provincial bourgeoisie as well as peasants and petty traders. Islamic movements supported the Justice Party which was the continuation of the DP in the 1965 elections. When the Justice Party came to power, these movements find an environment to work with less risk (Calislar and Celik, 2000; 12).

Various religious orders have played a major role in the resurgence of Islam in Turkey. Since 1960 they have been insinuating themselves into political activity as well and have set up or acquired newspapers and other mass communication media (Liel, 2001; 8-9).The most active in politics was the Nakshibendi Order, which was also the largestmovement till 1990s. Also influential are Nurcu movements, Suleymanci and MilliGorus (National Sight) (Liel, 2001; 9).

> With the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, Islamicgroups formed covert and overt alliances with the ruling center-right Democratic Party (1950-1960). After the Democratic Party won the 1959 elections, it softened secularist policies. Until Necmettin Erbakan established the National Order Party (NOP), the predecessorof the three succeeding Islamic parties, in January 1970, had either formed conservative factions in a center-right party or had remained

underground. With the NOP, however, the Islamic groups for the first time had an autonomous party organization through which they could campaign for their agenda. Since the NOP's founding, the same Islamic party has endured, albeit under different names: the NOP (1970-1971), theNational Salvation Party (NSP) (1972-1981), the Welfare Party (1983-1998), the Virtue Party (1997-)(Narli, 1999).

The NOP largely represented cities controlled by religiously conservative Sunnis, and the small traders and artisans (esnaf) of the hinterland. The NOP was shut down by the Constitutional Court on May 20, 1971-after military pressure-on the grounds that it violated the principles of laicism laid down in the Constitution and in the Law of Political Parties . As a result, the National Salvation Party (NSP) was founded in October 1972. With support from provincial merchants, and informally-organized religious groups, the Nakshibandis and other groups, the NSP achieved a surprising electoral success in the 1973 general elections, obtaining 11,8% of the total vote, mainly in central and eastern Anatolia.After its solid showing in the 1973 general elections, the NSP became a coalition partner in successive governments. First, it formed a government with the radical secularist CHP, led by Bulent Ecevit. Yet the Ecevit's coalition government collapsed following Turkey's 1974 military operation in Cyprus. The NSP then became a coalition partner in a new "National Front" government in 1975, formed under the premiership of the center-right Justice Party (JP), led by Suleyman Demirel (Narli, 1999).

3. The Emergence and Growth of Islamic Movements

After the military coup of 1980, the environment was not so harsh against Islamic movements as it was in previous decades. When the Motherland Party (ANAP) came to power some amendments were made in the Panel Codes that even softened the situation in which Islamic movements could act more freely. Especially in 1990s, the Islamic movements become more active in social, political and economic spheres.

Ayata argues that there are three features of Islamic revival in 1980s in Turkey. There was an increase in the number of publications, mainly the monthly journals, emergence of religious networks associated with local power centers and a shift of emphasis within the Islamic movement in favor of traditional sufi orders (Ayata, 1991; 223). However, it can be claimed that the accuracy of the last feature counted by Ayata is questionable. In our observations, not traditional sufi orders but the jama'ats or movements were given credit at that time.

In the post-coup period, the ANAP came forth to represent the center-right. The liberal and export-oriented economic development model adopted by then Prime Minister Turgut Ozal gave birth to new business elite originating from periphery. Ozal also changed two articles, namely 141 and 142, of Turkish Panel Code that prohibit Islamic activities. With the abolishing of these articles, Islamic movements faced with a freer environment. Although their existence was still illegal, they could survive without imminent threat.

The ANAP was able to keep such an ideologically diversified electorate together until the late 1980s when the True Path Party (DYP), challenged its base. In addition, the ANAP was subverted by the Islamic and ultra-nationalist parties. Consequently, the ANAP electorate was fragmented. The culmination of this political change came in the 1999 election with a reduced the ANAP and the DYP vote, and a strengthened pro-Islamic Virtue Party (FP), ultra-nationalist MHP, and a small but growing pro-Kurdish HADEP (Narli, 1999).

As a result of different developments which built a base for Islamic politics, the Welfare Party (RP) obtained 21,4 percent of the votein 1995 general elections, gaining seats in parliament.If 9/11 sparked an explosion of the literature on Islamic fundamentalism in the English speaking world, the Welfare Party's rise to power in 1995 made the same effect on literature in Turkey (Although it is difficult to grasp the whole literature, for some representative studies, see, David Shankland, 1999, Çiğdem, 2001, Göle, 1997).This interest poses a contrast to the general indifference to the influence of religion on politics that had characterized the academia in Turkey for a long time.

Instead of fighting against "the Republic", practicing Muslims have preferred to vote for conservative parties that would soften its autocratic nature. Some of them hoped to bring an "Islamic rule" via elections, while others only demanded a democratic rule which would respect their religious freedom. A very prominent name in the latter camp would be Said Nursi (1878- 1960), the founder and leader of

Nurcu groups, namely Gulen Movement, Yeni Asya (Neo-Asia), Writers and Zehra Foundation (Akyol, 2008).

4. The Electoral Behaviors of the Religious Orders and Movements

Turkey has a large network of Islamic movements, orders and associations that has a strong impact on politics. The movements' leaders sometimes lead their followers to vote for the political party of their choice which traditionally meant center-right parties. Politics today cannot be understood without considering the political role of these religious forces (Krepsin, 2009).

Since it is illegal to establish an Islamic movement or gather people under the name of traditional religious orders in Turkey, it's impossible to talk of real data about Islamic movements in any area. Whatever said or claimed are based on observations, rumors and speculations.

Despite the absence of correct data about the Islamic movements in Turkey, it can be claimed that they have a considerable vote potential and thus political parties have to care about them. Yes, we cannot talk about the ratio but their power sometimes can affect the results of elections, particularly locally, at the sub-provincial levels.

5. Conceptual Clarifications

Because the terms used for religious movements may mean different things to different people it is important to set up a working definition or a conceptual definition here. Without such a definition we would be unable to discuss Islamic movements in Turkey. Thus, in this piece of work, for the sake of clarification the concept of "*Islamic movements*" is used for all kinds of Islamic organizations. "Orders" covers tariqas, sufi orders or traditional religious organizations while "movements" is used for religious communities, groups and modern communions.

Islamic movements in terms of organization, functioning and other basic characteristics can be roughly classified into two groups: Religious orders (tariqas) and movements (jama'ats). Orders or tariqas (the way, philosophy, school etc.) are more hierarchical and traditional. Mysticism or Sufism is a very important feature of them. They have a long history and tradition. It addresses more to ordinary people and leadership is based on family ties. While jama'ats or movements (group, religious community, communion etc.) despite the existence of a sort of hierarchy, have a loose organization.They are modern phenomenon with a relatively short history. They address educated, urbanized people and have an economic and intellectual power.

The followers of traditional tariqas are called murid yet the followers of jama'ats or movements define themselves as the students. For instance, Suleymanists called themselves as "the student of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan", while Nurists called themselves as "shakird (means student in Persian) or student of Risale-I Nur (writings of Bediuzzaman)". The followers of jama'ats or modern movements do not want to be associated with the followers of tariqas-murids. Because, they claim that jama'at is not a tariqa.

Islamic movements in Turkey deal with politics mainly for pragmatic reasons:First, security against the radical laic regime and the second obtaining legitimacy at the political level. These organizations are claimed to have social legitimacy but do not have it at political or state-level.

The Islamic movements in Turkey were characterized and dominated by religious orders or traditional tariqas till late 1980s. Yet, afterwards the modern Islamic movements or jama'ats took the lead and started to dominate. Of course this is a perception; the reality might be quite different. Nakshibendi order was perceived to be the biggest till recently but Gulen movement seems to be stronger now, at least the perception is so, because they dominate an important portion of media and also have a considerable economic power in Turkey. Other movements such as Suleymanists and Yeni Asya movements also have grown and expanded in recent years. The traditional orders on the other hand, seem to loose ground. The table below shows the electoral behaviors of Islamic movements in Turkey. The table is provided by the authors based on consultations with different people from different backgrounds. Yet the table could be different if consultation was done with different people. Therefore, it is based on observations of the authors, the views of the people consulted and guesses. The table might get some criticism from some

people yet, unfortunately, we have no concrete data to rely on. The table shows electoral tendency of the groups's followers. It does not explain anything about their vote potential or political power.

Table-1: Electoral Behavior of Islamic Movements from 1950-2011											
	1950-19	1973	1977	1983	1987	1991	1995	1999	2002	2007	2011
Nurist Groups	**DP/AP**	**AP**	**AP**	**ANAP**	**ANAP**	**ANAP/DYP/RP**	**RP**	**FP**	**AKP**	**AKP**	**AKP**
Gulen Mov.				ANAP	ANAP	ANAP/RP	RP	FP/DSP	AKP	AKP	AKP
Yeni Asya		AP	AP	---	DYP	DYP	DYP	DYP	AKP/DP	AKP/DP	AKP
Writers	Small group their political tendency does not exist or unknown										
Zehra Foundation	Mostly Kurdish Nurcu group also less interested in elections if not politics										
Nakshibendi	**DP/AP**	**MSP/MHP**	**MSP**	**ANAP**	**RP**	**RP/MHP**	**RP**	**FP**	**AKP**	**AKP**	**AKP**
İskenderpasha		MSP	MSP	ANAP	RP	RP/ANAP	RP/ANAP	FP	AKP	AKP	AKP/MHP
Menzil		MHP	MHP/M	ANAP	RP	RP	RP/BBP	BBP	AKP/BBP	AKP	AKP
Kadiri	fragmented into small groups and their political tendencies vary										
Suleymanist		**AP**	**AP**	**ANAP**	**ANAP**	**ANAP/RP/DYP**	**RP/DYP**	**FP**	**AKP/DP**	**MHP/DP**	**MHP/SP**
Milli Gorus		**MSP**	**MSP**	**ANAP**	**RP**	**RP**	**RP**	**FP**	**SP**	**SP**	**SP**
Others	**DP/AP**	**AP**	**AP**	**ANAP**	**ANAP**	**ANAP/DYP/RP**	**RP/ANAP/DYP**	**FP/ANAP/DYP**	**AKP**	**AKP**	**AKP**

CHP	Republican People's Party			
DP	Democrat Party	**AP**	Justice Party	**DYP**	True Path Party
MSP	National Salvation Paty	**RP**	Welfare Party	**FP**	Virtue Party
MHP	Nationalist Movement Party			
ANAP	Motherland Party			
BBP	Grand Unity Party			
AKP	Justice and Development Party			

Reference: *Developed by authors based on data gathered from different sources.*

6. Islamic Orders and Movements: Who are They?

There are numerous Islamic movements in Turkey ranging from several followers to big groups that consist of thousands of followers. Some are called tariqas(the ways, philosophies, schools or religious orders) and some are called as jama'ats (groups, religious communities, communions or religious movements).There are so many groups that it is beyond the scope of this paper to mention all. Yet, some of these movements and orders are going to be discussed briefly in the following section.

6.1. Nurist Movements

The movements or groups that follow Bediuzzaman Said-iNursi (1873-1960) are called Nurcu or Nurists. Said-i Nursi is accepted as Bediuzzaman, the beauty of the time, not only by his followers but also by other Islamic groups due to his deep knowledge in different sciences. Bediuzzaman Said-i Nursi was educated in local madrasah in Kurdish region. After completing a traditional madrasah education at the early age, he studied natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy. Soon he would become convinced that the traditional madrasah education was inadequate. Thus he thought of planning a new curriculum for the Islamic educational system.

He was planning to establish a madrasah in Van, called *Madrasatuz- Zehra* that teaches not only Islamic sciences but also other social and natural sciences. And the medium language would be Turkish, Arabic and Kurdish. In order to have such a modern madrasah he needed funding and permission from the authorities. Thus he went to Istanbul at the very beginning of 20th century. He found quite a political environment in Istanbul. He joined several political formation including the Young Turk movement and Kurdish Teali Community. Nursi was arrested for the rebellion of 1909. He delivered a speech at his trial "defending the virtues of constitutionalism and freedom." Nursi was writing for newspapers in Istanbul and his writings were in favor of constitutionalism and freedom. These would be the principles that he would also defend in the Republican period, when his writings ("Risale-iNur") would become the basis of Turkey's largest religious movement (Akyol, 2008).

Bediuzzaman's life is divided into two periods. The first one is political Said lasted till 1920s while the second one is religious leadership from 1920s onwards. In his second life he prayed that "O my Almighty,keep me away from politics and Satan." Since he considered politics and Satan equally, some of his followers such as Writers, Zehra Foundation and to some extent Gulen movement strongly refrain from politics. Yet, since he supported and even sometimes advised the DP in 1950s, Yeni Asya (neo-Asia) has almost always supported DP-AP-DYP political line.

It's claimed that since Bediuzzaman was given importance to education, Gulen Movement, the biggest Nurist group, also has focused on education and today they have hundreds of education facilities in all over the world.

After the death of Nursi in 1960, his followers divided into several groups with differing views on how to interpret his legacy and, also, how to engage with politics. Among them are Gulen Movement, Yeni Asya, Zehra Foundation and Writers.

6.1.1. Gulen Movement

Gulen movement are those who follow Fethullah Gulen, whose popularity and influence would soon exceed those of all other Islamic movements in Turkey. It's claimed by some that this is the largest and strongest Islamic community in Turkey, as well as the most prominent representative of the Nur movement of Said-i Nursi. Ozdalga claims that one of the most powerful and controversial Islamic movements in Turkey is the Gulen community (Ozdalga, 2003; 61). She continues saying that "Elsewhere I have analyzed the character of Gulen's worldview, arguing that, rather than advancing political ambitions, his objective is to foster an ethic that comes very close to what Max Weber described as 'worldly asceticism,' an activist pietism with a tendency toward the rationalization of social relationships" (Ozdalga, 2003; 62).

Gulen movement decided to engage with society and create publications and institutions that would appeal to people from all walks of life. The movement has several TV channels *STV, STV Haber, Mehtap TV, Yumurcak TV*, one of the biggest newspaper, *Zaman,* and English paper *Today's Zamana* news agency *Cihan* and several magazines. They are also powerful in economy. Two of the biggest business organizations in Turkey -*Tuskon and Asia Bank* -belong to them. They have hundreds of schools and private courses in all over the world and in Turkey. Their schools, which are famed for their high education quality and moral integrity, have students with diverse backgrounds. The movement also emerged as the champion of interfaith friendship and dialogue.

Gulen Movement emerged in 1970 and gradually grown and reached its peak in 2000s. The movement's organization is rather loose and followers have relatively freer environment comparing to other Islamic movements. Followers are mostly educated and middle class. The movement is basically not political but in recent years they started to involve in politics via media and publications. Instead they have been infiltrated into bureaucracy - both civil and military ones - for long time. Thus, they started to shape politics, influence and even lead the country's internal and foreign politics via bureaucratic channels. This infiltration and making a draft on it caused an ongoing political conflict between Gulen movement and Justice and Development Party (AKP) government very recently (Bilici, 2013).

They did not support Islamic political partiesin the past but in recent years they have supported AKP in the last few elections. In the past they supported ANAP, RP and even DSP in 1999 elections. Of course the movement does not lead or force the followers to vote for specific parties during the elections. But the tendency of the movement's publications influences most of the followers, if not all of them. The political tendency of the movement can be seen in the table-1 above.

In the local elections of March 2014, it is estimated that some of them have voted for MHP and BDP and even CHP. Yet in our view a small proportion of their supporters might shift to MHP and BDP but hardly to CHP. Because of CHP's one-party rule experiences and its militant laicist character we do not think that the supporters of Gulen movements will vote for it.

6.1.2. YeniAsya

After the death of Bediuzzaman in1960 a group of his students or followers started to publish a daily paper called *Zulfikar*. It was closed down by junta regime, and then the closedown of *Uhuvvet* and *Ittihad* had followed. Lastly *Yeni Asya* was published and it continues till today. This is the group gathered around the daily *Yeni Asya* paper. Unlike other Nurist groups they have been very active in politics. Since Bediuzzaman was supporting DP, Yeni Asya has always supported the parties that follow the DP political line. Rusen Cakir claims that Yeni Asya movement has always involved in politics and has also always supported DP-AP-DYP political parties (Çakır, 1990; 90). Yet in 2002 and 2007 and recent local/general elections some of sub-groups of Yeni Asya supported the AKP.

6.2. Suleymanists

Followers of Suleyman Tunahan, a preacher in two important Istanbul mosques, who expanded his community through his then Koran-study courses. The supporters of the movement called themselves as "the students of Suleyman Hilmi Tunahan"(Kirman, 2006; 152). The Suleymanists are now divided under the leadership of two brothers, both Suleyman's grandsons: Ahmet Arif Denizolgun, a former minister from the Motherland Party (ANAP) government and Mehmet Beyazit Denizolgun, who is one of the founder of the AKP.

6.3. Milli Gorus (National Sight)

National Sight is an organized group that follows Islamic MilliGazete (National Newspaper) and MSP-RP-FP-SP political path of Erbakan. It is accepted as a kind of jama'at. The leader was Erbakan, a political leader and former Prime Minister. The only group that act as a block and has supported Erbakan and political parties founded by him. Yet in the last two elections it's claimed that some of them have supported the AKP.

6.4. Tariqas

As it was mentioned above, tariqas comparing to jama'ats are more traditional, mystic and are sufi orders. Their roots go back centuries. Yet we will mention their relatively newly established branches in Turkey. Nakshibendi and Kadiri are the two leading traditions or orders. Nakshibendi followers are relatively more political.

6.4.1 The Nakshibendi Order

A large Islamic orderwhich emerged in the 14th century and spread to Anatolia and the Balkans, gaining much power in the 19th century. The Halidiye branch lives today in the influential Iskenderpasa, Ismailaga, Erenkoy, and Kashgari communities. Here we will mention two groups: Iskenderpasa and Menzil Order.

6.4.2 The Iskenderpasa Order

This order has been founded by Mehmed Zahid Kotku and according to Rusen Cakir it has been one of the most famous and effective Islamic movements in Turkey (Çakır, 1990; 17). It currently led by Sheikh Nurettin Cosan, openly supported the AKP during the 2002 elections and MHP in 2011 elections (Cosan, 2011). They had supported Erbakan parties but in 1990 there was a disagreement between Erbakan and the Order's leader. Thus some of the followers started to support ANAP. MSP-RP-ANAP-FP, the AKP and MHP are the parties they have supported.

6.4.3 The MenzilOrder

An Adiyaman-based Nakshibendi Order. First led by Muhammed Rasid Erol, the order emerged in the village of Menzil, and is now found in almost every part of Turkey, except for East and Southeast Anatolia regions. Niyazi Usta claims that politics is a passive realm for the Menzil order. Politics is never talked about in the order's meetings. There are people from different political parties among Menzil followers. But general tendency is that young murids (supporters) support nationalist while old ones support pro-

Islamic parties. For Menzil, national unity is an important phenomenon (Usta, 2006; 41). Thus their voting behavior goes sometimes with nationalist parties. Maybe that is why although this Order is founded in Southeast, it has no supporters in the region among the Kurdish population. Menzil has voted mostly for nationalist MHP and the BBP and also sometimes for MSP-RP of Erbakan and lastly the AKP.

Conclusion

The radical positivist worldview of the laic regime in Turkey has developed a conflictive relationship with the Islamic movements. During one-party regime, Islamic movements were harshly suppressed, banned and outlawed. Their activities were harshly panelized. Yet with the emergence of multi-party democracy, they found an environment to act relatively freer.

The appearance of Islamic movements at the social and political levels has increased with the parallel to modernization and urbanization in Turkey. It's very difficult to guess their real power in either sphere, yet it can be claimed that the political parties have to take their votes into consideration. Particularly the right-wing parties have always sought to make implicit coalitions with different Islamic formations.

This paper have discussed how Islamic movements in Turkey have influenced the political life of the country. As it's been shown during the paper, there are many types of these movements and each movement have been a part of political processes between 1950-2011. Further research should be held to demonstrate this effect more clearly in the future.

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