Ortak Kimlik Olarak Vatandaşlık ve İlişkisel Otonomi

Citizenship as Common Identity and Relational Autonomy

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Özet

Kişisel otonomi ve vatandaşlık yakın dönemde önemli ölçüde araştırılmış olmakla beraber aralarındaki bağıntı yeterince incelenmemiştir. Birincisi, kişisel otonomi vatandaşlığa dair olan haklar ve özgürlüklerden yararlanmanın ve görevleri üstlenmenin zeminini oluşturan öz-yönetim kapasitesini ifade eder. İkincisi, vatandaşlığın yasal, siyasal ve kimlik boyutlarının beslediği farklı ve bazen örtüşen aidiyet hisleri pratik bakımdan bireylerin kişisel otonomilerinin gördüğü saygıya ve tanınmasına bağlıdır. Bu makalede usule ilişkin, esasa ilişkin ve ilişkisel kişisel otonomi yaklaşımları incelenmiş ve ilişkisel yaklaşımın kimlik ve adalet taleplerinin sorunsallaştırdığı vatandaşlığın ortak kimlik boyutunun içerici potansiyeli üzerine tartışmalara yeni anlayışlar katacağı öne sürülmüştür.

Anahtar kelimeler: kişisel otonomi, vatandaşlık, ilişkisel, usule ilişkin, esasa ilişkin, kimlik, adalet

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Abstract

Personal autonomy and citizenship have recently separately received substantial scholarly attention, but the relationship between them is relatively unexplored. First, personal autonomy conveys the capacity for self-rule that constitutes the ground for enjoying the rights and freedoms and assuming the duties associated with citizenship. Second, different and sometimes overlapping feelings of belonging fostered by the legal, political, and identity dimensions of citizenship practically depend on the respect and recognition individuals receive for their personal autonomy. This article analyzes the procedural, substantive, and relational approaches to personal autonomy and argues that the relational approach contributes new insights into debates on the inclusive potential of the common identity dimension of citizenship, which has been challenged by identity and justice claims.

Keywords: *personal autonomy, citizenship, relational, procedural, substantive, identity, justice*

Introduction

This article analyzes the procedural, substantive, and relational approaches to personal autonomy and argues for the additional leverage that will be gained in debates on the inclusive potential of the common identity dimension of citizenship, which has been challenged by identity and justice claims based on differences of ethnicity, culture, religion, and social position. Although personal autonomy and citizenship have recently separately received substantial scholarly attention, the possible linkages between them have remained mostly unexplored. For example, respect for and recognition of the personal autonomy of individuals who constitute the citizen body of modern democracies is one of the fundamental ideas that ground the principles of liberal justice. In fact, the foundational idea of political liberalism that the right should have priority over the good is based on the assumption that citizens *qua* individuals are autonomous agents competent to devise their own conceptions of good. Yet, the universal model of citizenship that rests on the idea of equal legal status for all regardless of their particular identities, as well as liberalism and liberal democracy that constitute the broader ideological framework of this model, has received extensive criticism since the 1990s for erasing identity and difference and being too substantive by valorizing certain personality types and social positions. By locating the different approaches to the personal autonomy of individuals in relation to the different conceptions of citizenship, this article contributes to the debate on the tension between the common identity dimension of citizenship and various identity and justice claims that contest the inclusive potential of this dimension.

The first section lays out the challenges posed by the diversity of identities to the common identity dimension of citizenship within the framework of the difference between the universal and differentiated models of citizenship, and discusses how we can approach the relationship between citizenship and personal autonomy. The second section analyzes comparatively the procedural, substantive, and relational approaches to personal autonomy and discusses the main points of contention among these approaches. In the second section, it is argued that while the procedural and substantive approaches have a primarily internalist focus that deals with the internal competency and self-reflection requirements for autonomy, the relational approaches have a primarily

externalist focus that deals with the requirements for the development and exercise of autonomous agency in particular social contexts. The third section analyzes the relation between personal autonomy and citizenship with particular attention to the varieties of liberal approaches to justice and citizenship and their critics who call for difference and context sensitive approaches. In the third section, it is argued that in comparison to the procedural approach to personal autonomy, the relational approach provides additional leverage in analyzing the relation between personal autonomy and citizenship. The advantage of the relational approach comes to the fore when citizenship is conceptualized, from a difference and context sensitive point of view, not only as a legal status but also as an affective relation that is constituted by sharing in both collective political agency and a common identity of a distinct source.

Challenges Posed by the Diversity of Identities to Citizenship as Common Identity And The Personal Autonomy of Citizens

In the most general terms, citizenship is a territorially bounded legal status conferred on individuals that involves a "constitutionally based relationship between the individual and the state" (Delanty, 1997: 285). This basic territorial aspect of citizenship alludes to the fact that citizenship is historically bound up with the processes of state and nation building, and it inevitably connotes a common identity. Hence, in the conventional or universal model, "citizenship is treated primarily as a legal status that is universal, equal, and democratic" (Carens, 2000: 161). In this model, the common identity that citizenship stands for is supposed to be created and forged through institutional and representational processes that direct individuals' loyalties towards an abstract or symbolic national community (Balibar, 1995: 58, 61). However, as the global flows of migration in the late 20th century added to the existing ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity within contemporary political societies, the growing internal diversity and the associated divisiveness of public life brought the identity dimension of citizenship under question. In this respect, the increased scholarly attention to citizenship that we witness since the 1990s has been mostly due to the challenges posed to the common identity dimension of universal citizenship by the growing diversity within contemporary societies. Concomitantly, liberalism and liberal democracy, as they constitute the broader ide-

ological framework of the universal model of citizenship, have been "extensively criticized for erasing diversity and difference" (Phillips, 1996: 139).

Within this context, proponents of a differentiated model of citizenship have criticized the function of universal citizenship in furnishing a sense of belonging and loyalty to a common identity of a distinct source that is beyond the existing differences of ethnicity, religion, and culture. In this view of citizenship, as Iris Young puts it, the assumed link between inclusion and participation of everyone as equal citizens, on the one hand, and sharing in a common identity and being treated in the same way as other citizens, on the other hand, is questioned (Young, 1989: 251). Thus, the array of rights and freedoms that define citizenship as a legal status and the forms of intersubjectivity and solidarity that would convey meaningful and effective forms of political participation have also elicited increasing attention with a view to easing the tension between increasing diversity and waning common identity. In view of these developments, it is more plausible to conceptualize citizenship, as it stands for the membership of a political community, along multiple dimensions. Joseph Carens suggests that such a conceptualization should involve the legal, political, and identity dimensions of citizenship because individual members of the polity may have different feelings of belonging along these three dimensions (Carens, 2000: 162). The legal dimension is connected to the opportunity of having the legal status of citizen that is defined by an array of rights and duties. The political dimension is based on sharing a collective agency through active political participation. Finally, the identity dimension refers to the function of citizenship in creating an emotional attachment to a distinct and common source of identity (Leydet, 2011). Furthermore, from a conceptual point of view, the differences between conceptions of citizenship generally center around the disagreements over the definition of each of these three dimensions, their relative importance, the causal and/or conceptual relations between them, and the appropriate normative standards (Leydet, 2011). For example, while the liberal model puts more emphasis on the legal dimension, within the republican model the political dimension and associated political virtues come forward. Arguably, the liberal model conveys a thinner conception of shared identity while the republican model implies a

thicker one. This distinctive feature of the liberal model of citizenship derives at the most basic level from the centrality and normative priority of personal autonomy of individuals within liberal thinking. Yet, the link between assumptions regarding the nature of the personal autonomy of individuals and conceptions of citizenship has largely remained unexplored despite the substantial scholarly attention that these concepts have separately received. Furthermore, compared to the literature on citizenship and the complex dynamics that shape its relation with particularistic identities grounded in differences of ethnicity, religion, and culture, the literature on different approaches to personal autonomy is less well recognized. Hence, the potential insights that different conceptualizations of the personal autonomy of individuals might bring into the discussion of identity politics and the tension between the universal and differentiated models of citizenship have not been sufficiently considered.

The concept of personal autonomy is employed in a variety of contexts and it is related to a wide range of issues such as free will, paternalism, educational strategies and citizenship education in liberal democracies, medical ethics, women's agency, political agency, and individual rights. Since the concept of personal autonomy is used in multifarious ways, as John Christman suggests, it is important to search for a conceptual core of the idea of personal autonomy. Personal autonomy, at a basic level, refers to the idea of an actual psychological capacity to be self-governing (Christman, 1989: 6). Related to its core meaning referring to a capacity, in many contexts autonomy is also used to cull "a right not to be treated in certain ways" (Christman, 1989: 6). This sense of autonomy as a right includes the cases in which a person's capacity to psychologically govern herself is actually disrupted or undercut by violent acts, threats, or manipulations. Yet, the idea of autonomy as a right also extends to the cases in which a person is treated as if she did not have the psychological capacity for self-government. In these latter cases, a person is treated "without sufficient respect" even though she has the actual capacity to form her own preferences, including those preferences pertaining to her conception of good (Christman, 1989: 6). This kind of violation of a person's right to be treated as an autonomous agent becomes specifically important in a political sense when the preferences in question are those that pertain to the exercise

of political agency and the rights and freedoms associated with citizenship. In this sense, the fundamental link between citizenship and personal autonomy can be summarized in two points. First, personal autonomy conveys the capacity for self-rule and independence in action that conceptually constitutes the ground for enjoying the rights and assuming the duties associated with citizenship. Second, different and sometimes overlapping feelings of belonging and loyalty fostered by the legal, political, and identity dimensions of citizenship practically depend on the respect and recognition that individual members of the polity receive for their personal autonomy. Therefore, it is not only that citizens are granted rights and liberties primarily as individuals competent to manage and direct their own affairs, but also that they claim and contest those rights and liberties as autonomous persons. Given this fundamental link between personal autonomy and citizenship, an analysis of the different approaches to personal autonomy is due before proceeding to a discussion of the role of personal autonomy in different conceptions of citizenship. The following section will discuss comparatively the procedural, substantive, and relational approaches to personal autonomy.

The Procedural, Substantive, and Relational Approaches to Personal Autonomy

Autonomy as a psychological ability for self-government has grown out of the model developed by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald Dworkin that distinguishes between lower-order and higher-order desires. In this model, autonomy is worked out as the authenticity of the lower-order desires with which the person identifies by using those reflective and critical faculties that determine her higher-order desires. While the lower-order desires have as their object actions of the agent, the higher-order desires have as their object the lower-order desires. The autonomy of a person in this sense depends on the authenticity of the lower-order desires and the procedural independence of the process of critical evaluation and reflection that determines the higher-order desires (Christman, 1989: 6-7). The condition of procedural independence, which has recently been developed and defended on different grounds, marks an important difference between the two strands of approaches to autonomy as an actual capacity for self-government. On the one hand, there are procedural or content-neutral accounts that define the

key element of autonomy as "the agent's acceptance or rejection of the process of desire formation" rather than "the agent's identification with the desire itself" (Christman, 1991: 2). On the other hand, there are substantive accounts that define autonomy primarily on the basis of a critical (or normative) competence condition which requires that the agent identifies with her desires for good reasons. In substantive accounts, if the agent's desires and the choices that follow from those desires are influenced by internalized oppressive norms, the agent is not considered autonomous. The reasoning behind the critical competence requirement in the substantive accounts is that oppressive socialization impairs the agent's capacity for critical reflection by restricting the content of her critical powers. Thus, proponents of the substantive view of autonomy claim that even if the agent's process of desire formation is procedurally independent, the content of this process could have been affected by oppressive norms that restrict the agent's awareness of available opportunities. Unlike the substantive view, the procedural view of autonomy is content-neutral and aims at elaborating on a value-neutral assessment of autonomous agency. The procedural view of autonomy allows for the preferences for dependence to be autonomous. Thus, from a procedural point of view, a larger range of different life plans such as remaining a stay-at-home mother or pursuing a life of submission to the norms of religious patriarchy can be chosen autonomously on the condition that the agent does not reject the process of desire formation that has led her to choose these life plans in the first place.

Christman, who is a proponent of the procedural view of autonomy, lists three conditions for autonomous agency. First, the agent is autonomous relative to a desire if she did not resist the development of the desire when attending to this process of development, or she would not have resisted that development had she attended to the process. Second, the lack of resistance to the development of the desire did not take place (or would not have) under the influence of factors that inhibit self-reflection. Third, the self-reflection involved in the first condition is (minimally) rational and involves no self-deception (Christman, 1991: 11). For Christman, these three conditions capture the general requirement for procedural autonomy that "the agent was in a position to resist the development of a desire and she did not" (Christman,

1991: 10-11). In other words, an autonomous agent should "be aware of the changes and development of her character and of why these changes come about" (Christman, 1991: 11). Thus, on Christman's account, autonomy is based on the agent's self-awareness (either actual or hypothetical) of the changes to her character, since this allows her to resist or foster such changes. The second and third conditions for procedural autonomy require that while attending to the development of these changes the agent is not self-deceived or irrational, that is, she is "free from the influence of factors that disrupt these cognitive capacities" (Christman, 1991: 11).

Proponents of the substantive view of autonomy criticize the procedural approach on the grounds that it cannot explain why agents who have internalized oppressive social norms are not fully autonomous. Paul Benson argues that autonomy requires the agent to have critical competence along with the requirements put forward in the procedural account of autonomy. For him, the agent should be aware of applicable normative standards, appreciate those standards, and bring them competently to bear in her evaluations of open courses of action (Benson, 1990: 54). In other words, the agent should have the ability to discern the reasons for her desires and the actions that follow from them (Benson, 1991: 54-55). Benson makes the point that oppressive socialization operates similarly to non-oppressive benign socialization in that it restricts autonomy without impairing the agent's ability to put practical judgments into action. This suggests that the sensitivity of the agent's conduct to critical reflection cannot be the sole determinant of her autonomy. Oppressive socialization constrains the content of the agent's critical powers by systematically misdirecting the substance of her reflection without disrupting the motivational potency of reflection (Benson, 1991: 385, 398). Thus, in Benson's account, the agent's mere self-awareness, that is, becoming aware of the social forces that have shaped her reflective attitudes may not be enough for autonomy (Benson, 1991: 398). The agent's critical assessment of her desires should be effective independent of socializing forces (Benson, 1991: 385).

Natalie Stoljar's feminist critique of the procedural view of autonomy raises a good point against the minimal rationality condition put forward by Christman. Minimal rationality requires that in the process of reflection there are no manifest inconsistencies among the agent's

desires. Stoljar argues that members of oppressed groups attempt to "integrate norms that govern themselves with those that govern a non-oppressed outside world" and, therefore, they inevitably experience certain inconsistencies between different first order desires (Stoljar, 2000: 104). Thus, the agent can endorse two inconsistent desires at the same time. For Stoljar, oppressive socialization hampers the development of the abilities of critical reflection that are essential for achieving a high degree of autonomy. But she also argues that since we can think of autonomy in terms of degrees rather than in absolute terms, oppressive socialization does not completely extinguish the agent's autonomy (Stoljar, 2000: 107).

Both the procedural and substantive approaches to individual autonomy primarily focus on its conceptual core as the psychological ability to be self-governing. Therefore, the debate on the effects of oppressive social norms on the ability to be self-governing turns on elucidating an array of internal capacities that the agent should exercise in order to reflect on her desires and discern the applicable social norms. However, due to its internalist focus, this debate provides only a partial view of what is involved in autonomous agency. The procedural approach can be criticized for having an individualist bias that mostly disregards the influence of oppressive social norms on the formation of an agent's desires. In addition, the role that the social and political structures have in allowing oppressive social norms to be an effective force on the formation of desires remains outside the purview of both the substantive and procedural approaches. Exploring the relationship between personal autonomy and citizenship requires us to look into the role of social and political structures that position some agents differently from others. The relational or socially constitutive models of autonomy address this issue by calling our attention to the multifarious ways in which the development and maintenance of an agent's autonomy is shaped by the surrounding social and political context. Among others, Linda Barclay, John Santiago, Ann Levey, and Susan Brison put forward and discuss the relational or socially constitutive aspects of personal autonomy.

Linda Barclay aims for a middle ground between the ideal of an autonomous self that is atomistic and the notion of a self that is socially constituted. She argues that the ideal of autonomy is compatible with a notion of the self that is social in a weak sense. Barclay criticizes

the ideal of autonomy that focuses on the idea of a core inner self because it denies that the self is essentially social (Barclay, 2000: 52). For her, from a descriptive perspective, the self is socially determined. This argument does not necessarily constitute a threat for the ideal of autonomy, because Barclay claims autonomy is essentially about negotiating the effects of socialization. In other words, the self is social (or socially determined) in a weak sense, because an autonomous self is one that "reflectively engages with the social forces" rather than one that is a "passive receptacle of those forces" (Barclay, 2000: 55). Therefore, negative forms of social determinism can undermine the capacities that the self needs for exercising autonomous agency, while positive forms of social determinism can enhance those capacities. Yet, as long as autonomy turns on reflective engagement with the social forces, for Barclay, "there is no conceptual incompatibility between autonomy and the socially determined self" (Barclay, 2000: 56). Barclay's account is insightful for reaching at a more capacious understanding of autonomous agency to the extent that it does not envisage a socially untainted self theorized in isolation from the surrounding social context. The idea that an autonomous self is one who negotiates the effects of socialization is important for developing a relational view of autonomy that defines the self's independence relative to its attachments and social position. Her discussion of autonomous agency also appeals to the debate between liberals and their communitarian critics as she aims to strike a balance between the atomistic and socially constituted notions of the self. However, the import of Barclay's analysis remains limited to the extent that it does not account for the systemic effects of social and political structures on autonomous agency.

John Santiago argues against the internalist bias of the debate between the procedural and substantive accounts of personal autonomy with a view to developing a socially constitutive model that takes into account the agent's social position. Santiago maintains that the agency expressed relative to our lives cannot be reduced to the formation of desires because theorizing personal autonomy in the direction of an internalist reduction isolates the autonomous agent to an individual psychological profile or process. For him, the problem of socialization shows us that how we come to form and endorse our desires and motives is never purely individualistically established. The social foundation of our de-

sires and the broader social contexts within which we make our choices are important aspects of the agency we express relative to our lives. Thus, Santiago makes the case that personal autonomy is constituted not merely by the internal formation and evaluation of desires but also by "the manner in which the agent engages with and is able to engage with her social world" (Santiago, 2005: 92). On Santiago's account, what impedes an agent's autonomy is not the content of her desires – which is the assumption of the substantive approaches – but her social position. The content of an agent's attitudes and beliefs become a part of the constitution of her autonomy by virtue of the role they play in establishing her social position (Santiago, 2005: 92). Thus, Santiago's analysis calls our attention to how the features of a social organization in which the agents are situated can make some agents less autonomous than others even if the content of these agents' attitudes and beliefs are the same. This is why Santiago emphasizes that autonomy is not only about engaging with one's social world, which is Barclay's claim, but also about the extent to which one is able to engage with her social world given her social position. Ann Levey makes a similar claim in her analysis of fully voluntary gendered preferences of women for becoming nurses rather than doctors or stay-at-home mothers rather than professionals. For Levey, these gendered preferences are not necessarily based on false beliefs about the equal worth of various possible choices and, in most cases they result from internally autonomous value choices. Levey argues that "what is wrong with gendered preferences seems to lie in their distribution" (Levey, 2005: 137). The personal autonomy of the women who make voluntary gendered preferences is truncated "to the extent that social structures are systematically biased against gendered preferences" (Levey, 2005: 140).

Susan Brison's capability-based relational account of personal autonomy represents a more substantial departure from the views of autonomy that focus on internal competency conditions. While Santiago calls our attention to the socially constituted aspects of autonomous agency, Brison argues that autonomy is both causally and constitutively relational. For her, autonomy is "causally relational" for it comes about, or fails to come about, as a result of the agent's relations with others in society. Autonomy is also "constitutively relational" because "it requires the right sorts of ongoing relations with others for it to be

sustained". In Brison's account, the agent's ability to make autonomous choices depends on having a certain "range of significant options to choose from" and, therefore, autonomy is attainable in a social and political context that makes these options possible (Brison, 2000: 283). Brison writes, "our personal, familial, social, political, and economic relations with others are what enable or inhibit our access to a range of significant options" (Brison, 2000: 283-284). Brison maintains that her capability account of personal autonomy is both substantive and normative (Brison, 2000: 285). As such, it is different from the purely procedural accounts of personal autonomy such as that developed by Christman. Brison's account is normative because it requires that the agent live in a particular kind of social and political context. Furthermore, her account has also a substantive aspect because the kind of social and political context conducive to autonomy is one that makes a certain range of significant options possible. However, Brison's approach is also different from the substantive accounts of personal autonomy such as that defended by Benson because it does not require the content of the autonomous agent's choices to be of a certain kind. Rather, Brison's approach requires the content of the range of significant options available to the agent to be of a certain kind or above a certain minimum standard. Given the causally and constitutively relational construal of autonomy in Brison's account, this latter aspect of the normative-substantive import of her account further signifies the substantial departure it makes from the internalist views. Brison maintains, "a capability account of autonomy requires not only a historical approach to studying the process of preference formation but also a normative specification of the capability set essential to autonomy" (Brison, 2000: 285). She claims that the link between procedural and capability approaches to personal autonomy becomes visible "if we look at the cases in which people's expectations are diminished, relative to what we think they ought to be, because of entrenched inequalities (legitimized by social norms) and long-term deprivations" (Brison, 2000: 285).

The preceding discussion of the relational or socially constitutive approaches to personal autonomy shows that these approaches contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of what is involved in the exercise of autonomous agency by calling our attention to its external con-

ditions in addition to the internal conditions explored by the procedural and substantive approaches. While the procedural and substantive approaches emphasize the internal competency requirements for forming, evaluating, and revising one's desires, the relational approaches stress the external conditions that effect the development and maintenance of autonomous agency. As such, relational approaches explain that the agent's autonomy turns also on her personal, familial, social, political, and economic relations with others, which can enhance as well as diminish the agent's autonomy depending on her position in the structures that contain these relations. Therefore, relational approaches, in a sense, indicate that the psychological ability to be self-governing is a necessary but insufficient condition for a robust analysis of autonomous agency. Furthermore, relational approaches give us additional leverage in exploring the link between personal autonomy and citizenship, as discussed in the next section.

Conceptions of Personal Autonomy and Citizenship: Why We Need A Relational Approach To The Personal Autonomy of Citizens

Some prominent liberal thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, J. S. Mill, Kant, T. H. Green and Rawls "assumed that all citizens defined themselves as individuals and that they agreed on the values of choice and autonomy" (Parekh, 1997: 54). Thus, "broadly understood," autonomy of the citizen "is defined by one's status as a bearer of rights under a constitutional regime" and this definition speaks to the idea of "freedom from unwarranted political intervention in one's private affairs" that is "characteristic of the classical liberalism" (van den Brink, 2005: 251). Similarly, for Schuck, the "primary value" of liberal citizenship is "to maximize individual liberty" although different liberal theorists vary over the definition and requirements of liberty, autonomy, and consent to state power (Schuck, 2002: 132). Personal autonomy of the citizen is also one of the fundamental assumptions of political liberalism. The basic organizing idea of political liberalism is that "people are considered ultimately able to [rationally and autonomously] reflect upon and embrace (or reject or revise) conceptions of value". Hence, the concomitant foundational principle of justice in the liberal view is the priority of the right ("protecting the person's [basic] interest in leading an autonomous life") over the good ("promoting any specific conception of what is valuable for people") (Christman, 2002: 96). The

fundamental principle of justice also requires citizens to be morally autonomous in a rather Kantian sense, for each person is supposed to live on fair terms of cooperation with others while pursuing those things she judges to be worthwhile (Waldron, 2005: 317). That is, each citizen is required to distinguish her personal goals and commitments from moral reasons, which concern the relation with one person's pursuit of her own ends and others' pursuit of theirs (Gaus, 2005: 297; Waldron, 2005: 307). Hence, while Rawls associates the "rational autonomy" of the citizen with her conception of the good, he defines "full autonomy" of the citizen as her overall ability and willingness to submit her pursuit of her conception of the good to her pursuit of the conception of justice (Rawls, 2005: 77-81). Furthermore, some perfectionist liberals such as Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka take it that just liberal institutions must respect the personal autonomy of citizens. For example, Will Kymlicka grounds his liberal theory of multicultural citizenship on the insight that individualism, autonomy, critical self-reflection, and choice are central to liberalism (Parekh, 1997: 55). Kymlicka rejects the priority of the right over the good that is definitive of political liberalism and argues that the liberal state should equally promote the ability of all citizens to live good lives (Kymlicka, 1989: 21-43). Kymlicka's rejection of the priority of the right over the good is grounded on his view that the personal autonomy of citizens is central to their ability to pursue valuable ends which constitute their conception of what makes a good life and that this conception of good life is a particular one that is definitive of liberalism. (Christman, 2002: 97). For Kymlicka, autonomous individuals are "the basic moral units of society and the sole bearers of rights and obligations", and culture does not have an intrinsic value for it is "important primarily as a context of choice and a cradle of autonomy" (Parekh, 1997: 101). Thus, Kymlicka asserts, "liberalism rests on the value of individual autonomy –that is, the importance of allowing individuals to make free and informed choices about how to lead their lives– but what enables this sort of autonomy is the fact that [liberal] societal culture makes various options available to" individuals (Kymlicka, 2001: 53). This view of liberalism, which Kymlicka calls the "liberal culturalist position," implies that the kinds of minority rights that "would undermine, rather than support, individual autonomy" should not be supported (Kymlicka, 2001: 21-22).

Thus, personal autonomy of individuals constitutes the ground for citizenship status, and the legitimacy of the liberal democratic political institutions rests on their endorsement by autonomous citizens. However, in circumstances where the organization and institutionalization of citizenship –as distinct from its conceptual and theoretical construction– brings about a set of practices that impart a feeling of being treated without sufficient respect and recognition for one's personal autonomy, citizenship might fail as an affect or a sense of belonging. This point links with the challenges that have been raised against political liberalism and the conventional universal model of citizenship by the proponents of differentiated citizenship. As Christman notes, liberal theories of justice are mostly silent about the particularities of identity and they tend to specify the conceptual conditions of a completely just society while generally being concerned less about the consequences of applying ideal principles to non-ideal circumstances (Christman, 2002: 154-155).

Hence, Carens criticizes the abstract and formal approach to equality that grounds the Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. Carens makes the argument that in a different conception of justice as fairness, which he calls "justice as evenhandedness", treating people fairly requires us to regard them concretely and sometimes to detract from formal equality and a scheme of identical rights. While in Rawls's account "justice requires a hands off approach to culture and identity" out of respect for the fundamental moral equality of individuals in their pursuit of their conceptions of the good, in Carens's account, justice requires institutions and policies to take an evenhanded approach in responding to the claims that arise from different conceptions of the good, including matters of culture and identity. Carens writes, "we may sometimes come closer to equality by adopting practices of differentiated citizenship than by insisting on identical formal rights" (Carens, 2000: 8). Similarly, Young calls for practices of differentiated citizenship since for her the inclusion and participation of everyone as citizens in the universal model of citizenship does not necessarily imply that everyone will share in the common identity that is fostered by this model, or that the difference-blind legal practices will ensure equal treatment of all (Young, 1989: 251). Young argues that the inclusion and participation of everyone "does not imply universality in the sense

of adoption of a general point of view that leaves behind particular affiliations, feelings, commitments, and desires" (Young, 1990: 105). In Young's account, the universal model of citizenship and the difference-blindness of liberalism are problematic primarily from a social justice perspective because for her cultural identity claims are mostly products of social inequalities. She argues that "some groups still find themselves treated as second-class citizens" since "universal citizenship and extension of civil and political rights to everyone has not led to social justice and equality" (Young, 1989: 250). Similarly, Anne Phillips argues that "the promise of democratic equality" that grounds the idea of universal citizenship "continues to be subverted by stark differences in access to income and wealth, and deep structural differences in positions in the social division of labor" (Phillips, 2004: 45). For Phillips, the ideas of democracy and democratic citizenship represent not just a mechanism for generating governments or equalizing rights and access to political influence and power, but in a deeper sense, recognition of the equal standing and worth of each citizen. Once this deeper meaning of democracy and democratic citizenship is recognized, it becomes necessary to address the "tension between the universalism of political equality and the persistence of inequality and domination in social and economic life" (Phillips, 2004: 45).

Underlying the challenges raised by the proponents of differentiated citizenship is the insight that a scheme of formal equality is too substantial as it ends up valorizing certain personality types, value perspectives and social positions over others (Christman, 2005: 330). The critics argue that, given the differences of culture, religion, and gender as well as social-structural position, practices of undifferentiated citizenship that treat persons as abstractly and formally equal may create disaffections. These disaffections are signs of receiving insufficient respect for one's personal autonomy and they become sources of identity and justice claims. For example, "policies requiring separate but equal accommodations for different races" or "policies requiring all to close their shops on the same day, a day that corresponds to the religious practices of some and not others" (Carens, 2000: 168) are likely to create disaffections among those citizens, who feel excluded as result of these policies. These disaffections over time can unsettle citizenship's function in fostering a sense of common identity or inf-

luence citizens' endorsement of the political institutions through their sharing in collective political agency. As Tully puts it, the effect of promoting "a difference-blind liberal identity or a uniform nationalist identity" to overcome internal diversity of identities and fragmentation is "more often than not to incite resistance to the degree of assimilation these policies impose, and so to exacerbate fragmentation rather than create a sense of belonging" (Tully, 2002: 152).

In the light of the discussion presented so far, there is good reason to argue for the additional leverage that the relational approach to personal autonomy would provide in an analysis of the tension between the common identity dimension of citizenship and the disaffections that take the form of identity and justice claims in the public domain. The procedural account of autonomy underlying the conception of citizenship in political liberalism does not normatively limit the content of autonomous choices to those desired for good reasons. From this perspective, the procedural account is compatible with the priority of the right over the good and a non-perfectionist and non-paternalistic approach to the principles of justice. Hence, the procedural account is also compatible with the emphasis on the legal dimension of citizenship in the liberal thinking. However, this approach to autonomy can say hardly anything about the underlying reasons for disaffections that are expressed as identity and justice claims against the inclusionary potential of the common identity dimension of citizenship. This is primarily because the procedural approach is internalist in its orientation. As the arguments raised by the proponents of differentiated citizenship suggest, recognition and respect for the particularities of identity within the practices of citizenship require an awareness of the issues of social inequality and related identity claims in non-ideal real world circumstances. By calling our attention to the role of social positioning and social relations in the formation and maintenance of autonomous agency, the relational account of personal autonomy can potentially say more about the underlying reasons for disaffections that are expressed in the form of identity and justice claims. From the perspective of the legal dimension of citizenship, individuals are granted the rights associated with citizenship status as autonomous persons, that is, the assumption of personal autonomy of individuals is a marker of citizenship status. Yet from the perspective of the political dimension of

citizenship, individuals claim and contest these rights and their formulations in the practices of citizenship as individuals whose autonomous agency is affected by the relations of inequality in the broader social structures. In other words, in contesting and negotiating the ways in which the rights associated with the legal dimension are practically embedded in political institutions, citizens raise identity and justice claims that should properly be recognized as disaffections resulting from receiving less than sufficient respect for their relationally constituted autonomous agency. The legal dimension of citizenship rests on an assumption of the personal autonomy of individuals, but unless their autonomy is understood to be relationally constituted, we cannot adequately assess why some groups are still claiming recognition for their different identities despite the formal equality of all individuals as citizens. Furthermore, just as personal autonomy has a significant relational component, as William Connolly rightly argues, it is also the case that "identity is relational and collective" (Connolly, 1991: xiv). For this reason, receiving insufficient respect for one's personal autonomy in the relational sense presumably constitutes a significant aspect of the process of identity formation. If identity is a socially recognized difference (Connolly, 1991: 64) and identity claims in the public domain reflect "the meaning of politically laden experiences" (Heyes, 2012) to individuals who are positioned differently in the social structures, then the relational account of personal autonomy is essential for a meaningful assessment of how the common identity dimension of citizenship does or does not sufficiently provide an umbrella under which different religious, cultural, and ethnic identities can coexist on fair terms.

Conclusion

This article analyzed the link between personal autonomy and citizenship by exploring some of the recent theoretical debates over different conceptions of citizenship and various approaches to personal autonomy. Although citizenship and personal autonomy have separately received substantive attention, there is relatively less work in the literature on how different approaches to personal autonomy tally with different conceptions of citizenship. It has been argued that the relational approach to personal autonomy provides additional leverage in understanding and explaining the relation between personal autonomy and citizenship. More specifically, the relational account of personal

autonomy helps us in understanding how different and sometimes overlapping feelings of belonging and loyalty fostered by the legal, political, and identity dimensions of citizenship practically depend on the respect and recognition that individuals receive for their autonomous agency. Thus, the relational account of autonomy at the same time provides insights into the discussion of identity politics and the tension between the common identity dimension of citizenship and different identity and justice claims that contest this dimension. While the procedural and substantive accounts of personal autonomy are primarily internalist in their orientation, the relational account puts more emphasis on the socially constituted aspect of autonomous agency. Although the personal autonomy of individual members of the polity is a marker of citizenship status in modern liberal democratic political institutions, hardly any adult citizen is and can be subjected to a test of personal autonomy, which suggests that citizens are assumed to be autonomous agents unless they blatantly act otherwise. Furthermore, calling those citizens who make certain choices regarding those things that they judge to be worthwhile non-autonomous would undermine their status as legitimate members of the polity and consequently their political agency. It might be argued that this problem over time leads liberal theorists such as Christman to conceptualize personal autonomy not only on procedural grounds but also in minimal terms with respect to the requirements of competence and self-reflection (Christman, 2005: 345). Although minimally and procedurally defined, this conception of personal autonomy still retains a primarily internalist focus and does not adequately account for the effect that relations produced by impersonal social structures would have on the multifarious aspects of citizens' identities and their sense of belonging to the political society. A minimal and procedural conception of personal autonomy seems to sufficiently account for the legal aspect of citizenship to the extent that citizenship is a legal status – defined by an array of rights, freedoms, and duties – and personal autonomy is a marker of citizenship status. However, to the extent that citizenship is also a relation that is grounded on sharing a collective agency through political participation and sharing a common identity as fully recognized members of a particular polity, an adequate conception of the personal autonomy of citizens must also account for the external conditions for the development and

exercise of autonomous agency. Furthermore, given that personal autonomy is a marker of citizenship as a legal status and that we assume citizens are autonomous agents without subjecting them to tests of internal competency, accounting for the external relational conditions of autonomous agency becomes even more significant. This is because, given these circumstances, external conditions for the development and exercise of autonomous agency remains as the only appropriate object of policy making from a political perspective. The relational approach calls our attention to the fact that one's autonomy partially turns on personal, familial, social, political, and economic relations with others, which can enhance as well as diminish a person's autonomy depending on her position in the structures that contain these relations. Similarly, exercise of citizenship as a relation that has political and identity dimensions turns on how one is positioned within the web of relations with others, which is primarily determined by the ways in which the elements of citizenship are organized and institutionalized at the level of policy-making. This aspect of the relation between the practices of citizenship and the personal autonomy of citizens reveals to us how receiving insufficient respect for one's personal autonomy in the relational sense may create disaffections, which in turn unsettles the function of citizenship in creating a sense of belonging to a distinct and shared source of identity.

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