

Donetsk Remains Under Duress: The Occupation Of Eastern Ukraine

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Abstract



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In the context of an emergent multipolar international system, there is consensus regarding the decline in US hegemony. The period of unipolarity that characterized the immediate decade of the post-cold war is transitioning to one whereby the repositioning of States at the regional and global level is possible. The Russian periphery is the confrontation scene that demonstrates the disputes of interests between the Russian Federation and the western alliance represented by the United States and the European Union. As the leader of NATO, the US has reaffirmed its interests in this vital region that constitutes the post-Soviet space, opposing the re-establishment of Russian hegemony in the Eurasian sphere and encouraging democratic forms of governance. In this sense, Ukraine has become the centre of a geopolitical struggle between pro-European democratic expansionism and Russian attempts to keep a key actor in the authoritarian geostrategic setting of the region under its sphere of influence. This article aims to investigate the territorial dynamics of the conflict in Ukraine within the framework of geopolitical tensions and conflicts of interests between rival power blocs.

Key words: ukraine, geopolitics, donetsk, russia, multipolarity

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Donetsk Hala Baskı Altında: Doğu Ukrayna'nın İşgali

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Öz



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Ortaya çıkmaya başlayan çok kutuplu uluslararası bir sistem bağlamında ABD hegemonyasındaki düşüşle ilgili bir fikir birliğinin olduğu müşahede edilmektedir. Soğuk savaş sonrasında ilk on yılını karakterize eden tek kutupluluk dönemi, devletlerin bölgesel ve küresel düzeyde yeniden konumlandırılmasının mümkün olduğu bir döneme geçiyor. Rusya çevresi, Rusya Federasyonu ile Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve Avrupa Birliği tarafından temsil edilen Batı ittifakı arasındaki çıkar çatışmalarını gösteren bir çatışma sahnesi haline gelmiştir. Bu anlamda Ukrayna, Avrupa yanlısı demokratik yayılcılık ile Rusya'nın bölgenin jeostratejik otoriter düzeninde kilit bir aktör olarak tutmaya yönelik girişimleri arasındaki jeopolitik mücadelenin merkezi haline geldi. NATO lideri olarak ABD, Sovyet sonrası alanı oluşturan bu hayati bölgedeki çıkarlarını yeniden teyit etti, Avrasya alanında Rus hegemonyasının yeniden kurulmasına karşı çıktı ve demokratik yönetim biçimlerini teşvik etti. Bu makalenin amacı, rakip güç blokları arasındaki jeopolitik gerilimler ve çıkar çatışmaları çerçevesinde Ukrayna'daki çatışmanın bölgesel dinamiklerini incelemektir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Ukrayna, jeopolitik, Donetsk, Rusya, çokkutupluluk

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Introduction

The international community continues to witness the occupation of large parts of the Ukrainian territory in the summer of 2021. This long-standing situation can be seen through the lens of tensions and clashes of interests between rival power blocs. Although one can highlight 2013 as the beginning of political tensions in Ukraine, an armed confrontation with diffuse and complex characteristics did precede this time. The conflict in Ukraine, which has witnessed the annexation of Crimea as part of the Russian Federation and the self-proclaimed People's Republics of Donetsk and Lugansk, can be viewed within the context of a struggle for power and interests among the existing and potential contemporary hegemonic powers (Zadorozhny & Korotkyi, 2015, s. 8-18).

The 2008 global financial crisis started a chain of developments that have consolidated a change of course in international relations, characterized by stagnation and the relative decline of the United States (U.S.) and the European Union (EU), the consolidation of China as a new global economic power and the resurgence of Russia on the world geopolitical scene, determined to recreate a sphere of influence as reflected in its greater presence in a region located between Eastern Europe and Central-Eastern Asia (Lukin, 2017). In this sense, geopolitical relations worldwide are transforming, in the context of the strong presence of the BRICS bloc in the international arena, led by China, and supported by Russia. Likewise, the eastern enlargements of the EU and NATO to effectively enclose, or one could even argue to contain, Russia economically and geopolitically contributed to the cooling of ties and the increase in differences between the unipolar power and the aspiring hegemonic powers (Lavrov, 2007; Tsygankov, 2013, s. 179-188).

In the academic world, although with its discrepancies in terms of approaches in social sciences, there are suggestions that a new stage in international political relations has been reached (Kaplan, 2002; Trenin, 2014). This has been termed as a "new Cold War" within the framework of Multipolarism, understood as a scenario characterized by a greater balance in the distribution of power between States, the greater geopolitical presence of the so-called G-20 and the BRICS, as well as the strengthening of global political institutions (Hahn, 2018). The situation in Ukraine can be portrayed in this new geopolitical context, of indirect warlike confrontations between the powers and power blocs. These clashes, not always warlike, also include the typical elements of soft power as the persuasiveness and the imposition of certain conditions and rules for part of the powers (Nye, 2017, s. 1-3).

Geopolitics does provide us with theoretical and epistemological elements that make it possible to approach the understanding of current conflicts in terms of the relationships between the power(s) exercised by different actors - the most important of which remain the nation-states, although they are not the only ones - and the geographical space and its approaches through the concepts of territories and territorialities. This relationship implies understanding that power at the level of international relations is fragmented, although unevenly and unbalanced, in various social and institutional actors (Hoffmann, 1995, s. 212-241). One must recall that these actors are not only states or the world organization that brings them together such as the UN, but also economic agents such as large multinational

corporations, regional integration blocs such as the EU, military alliances - NATO, the group of emerging powers - BRICS, territorialized groups such as separatist sectors, amongst other actors.

The current rivalries not only involve state entities but also new actors, constituted by groups and movements of regional scope that go beyond the borders of states. In such a way, these processes express a greater complexity in the global system of alliances since one must incorporate the political, economic, ethnic, religious and cultural dimensions to the geopolitical factor of international relations (Fuller, 2018). Therefore, this multiplicity and diversity of variables unleash great uncertainty on the world geopolitical stage, two decades into the 21st century.

Geopolitics and Emerging Multipolarity

The concept of geopolitics, in its classical sense, and as such coined in 1900 by Kjellen, has little to do with contemporary geopolitics endorsed by those who carry out their research under the theoretical, methodological and epistemological perspectives of a new paradigm (Rivarola Puntigliano, 2017, s. 478-494). Although it must be recognized that various approaches to what one terms geopolitics as a discipline coexist. Its resurgence in the 1970s has given way to new methods and theories, where one can conceive of geopolitics as a field of problematization that has largely overcome deterministic visions that conceptually brought it closer to positivist geography at the beginning of the 20th century (Tuathail, 1998, s. 1-14). The purpose of this study is not to retrace the conceptual and epistemological genealogy of geopolitics, but rather to present some interpretive elements that provide us with tools to address the conflict in Ukraine within the framework of an evolving process of multipolarity in international relations.

Waltz declared that "in the light of structural theory, unipolarity appears as the least durable of international configurations. This is so for two main reasons. One is that dominant powers take on too many tasks beyond their own borders, thus weakening themselves in the long run....The other reason for the short duration of unipolarity is that even if a dominant power behaves with moderation, restraint and forbearance, weaker states will worry about its future behaviour" (Waltz, 2000).

In a global context marked by the complexity of international relations and globalization, with an increasing incidence of global financial capital in political and economic decision-making, the world is heading towards a state of affairs characterized by the transition from unipolarity towards either bipolarity or multipolarity (Muzaffar et al., 2017, s. 49-61). Under such a scenario, the Russian Federation has gained prominence in recent years beyond the events in Ukraine, based on greater visibility of Putin's Russia in international affairs. It is a truism that the dissolution of the USSR for Russian nationalism was very strong. In 2005 President Putin identified it as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century" (Hill, 2013). The Russian Federation identifying itself as the natural successor to the whole of the USSR had lost almost five and a half million square kilometres of territory from the creation of 15 independent republics, millions of Russian-speaking inhabitants who were left outside

its borders and with a GDP which was halved, plunging into a deep economic, political and social crisis.

Under these circumstances, one of the major concerns of President Putin was levied at the enlargements of the EU and NATO towards the east, in an attempt by the US and Europe to prevent the resurgence of Russia as an aspiring hegemonic actor geopolitically preponderant in Eurasian affairs (Reiter, 2001, s. 41-67). Moscow regarded western involvement as a fact in the "colour revolutions" which took place in Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004 (Ambrosio,

2007, s. 232-252). This expansion was forcefully halted in 2008 through the aggressive policy of Moscow on Georgian territory fearing it would join NATO (Breslauer, 2009, s. 370-376). This successful attempt by Russia to prevent the Atlanticist advance over what is considered to be its sphere of influence was accompanied by calls to demand peoples of Russian origin in Eastern Ukraine to be reunited, by exerting forceful measures such as the temporary cut off of the supply of natural gas to Ukraine (Mankoff, 2014, s. 60).

New Cold War - Ukraine

A new world geopolitical order, characterized at first by unipolarity which followed the breakdown of bipolarity at the end of the Cold War, was progressively consolidated at the beginning of this new century (Krauthammer, 2002, s. 5-18). The post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, have not been able to locate themselves in a stable system that continues to veer towards either a 'Common European Home' idea or of a nostalgic return to Russian polar power (Gorbachev, 1989). It is for this reason, that the expressions of a "new cold war" or a "hot peace" refer to growing complexity in international geopolitical relations that are difficult to unravel due to the manifestation of various political and economic interests (McFaul, 2018).

Ukraine which declared its independence in 1991 was part of the 15 republics which constituted the USSR. Although it had brief periods as an independent entity throughout its history, and endured attacks and made alliances with its neighbours, it underwent a strong process of "Russification" during the Tsarist empire. During the twentieth century, more precisely in 1954, the Crimean peninsula was incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, although this decision taken by Krushchev did not have great significance since the entire territory was under the control of the USSR (Marples & Duke, 1995, s. 261-289).

It is precisely such vicissitudes that make Ukraine such a diverse country, with important ethnic components, among which the Russian and Tatar populations stand out, alongside various minority ethnic groups that by themselves do not amount to 1% of the population (Home Office-U.K., 2019). Historically, the territory under Kiev's rule was notoriously nationalistic in the western part, on the right basin of the Dnieper River. In contrast, the eastern pro-Russian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, richer than the rest of the country and with strong ties to Russia, have a predominantly Russian-speaking population, as in Crimea, where Russian-speaking inhabitants form the majority (Kulyk, 2019, s. 156-178).

Despite the homogenization that the Soviet period had imposed, and the efforts to impose the Ukrainian language since independence, a duality in the use of languages did remain.

From a political perspective, post-Soviet Ukraine went through periods of crisis and alternations. In the decade between 1994 and 2004, Leonid Kuchma presided over the country, whose government ended in the Orange Revolution that brought pro-Western leader Viktor Yushchenko to power, who ruled until 2010 (Yigit, 2011a). In that year, the victor of the presidential election was the pro-Russian Victor Yanukovich. Yulia Timoshenko the loser of that election had emerged as prime minister twice during the Yushchenko government and her policies were close to the positions espoused by the EU and NATO. An active participant in the Orange Revolution of 2004, she was detained between 2011 and 2014, when she was released, following the resignation of President Yanukovich and his departure to Russia, after the Euromaidan protests (Yigit, 2011b).

These extreme political upheavals after independence, a domestic bipolarity in terms of approach and affiliation could be seen in successive presidents. They oscillated between the pro-western electors in favour of a rapprochement and closer relations with the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance alongside the pro-Russian stance which advocated much warmer relations with Moscow.

The Ukrainian situation captured the attention of the world through the demonstrations that took place in November 2013 when protests began in Kiev's Independence Square (Maidan) over the suspension of the signing of the DCFTA between Ukraine and the EU (Shirmammadov, 2015). This agreement had been signed in March 2013 but a series of delays by Yanukovich caused the failure to ratify it and started the protests. Ukraine was enduring a deep economic crisis that manifested itself in poor economic growth, a deficit in its balance of payments and high unemployment. Russia provided massive financial support for the Yanukovich government to offset any pro-European promises. Meanwhile, the demonstrations in Kiev had a marked pro-European character, hence the term Euromaidan (Diuk, 2014, s. 9-16). The pro-western sections of society managed to defend their interests, which resulted in President Yanukovich leaving power and going into exile in Russia, which identified the situation as a coup d'état.

Russia was willing to provide discounts on energy products such as gas and oil as well as loans to smoothly run the Ukrainian economy, but there was a geopolitical element in play. Russia was seeking to consolidate its periphery and reconstruct a post-Soviet space, primarily by focusing on expanding the Eurasian Economic Union idea (Yigit, 2013). The elections held in May 2014 crowned Poroshenko as president and his government faced a severe confrontation with Russia, enduring the loss of Crimea as well as economic difficulties. In such a development neither Russia nor the Western alliance was prepared for the escalation of the crisis. The West did not foresee Russia's annexation of Crimea and Russian President Putin did not anticipate the coup against the Yanukovich government. Ukraine suddenly became as Brzezinski had forecast, one of the five geopolitical pivots of Eurasia (Tierney, 2016; Brzezinski, 1997).

The Conflict In Eastern Ukraine

The current conflict that continues unabated in eastern Ukraine acquires relevance at the international level due to the strong interests shown by global powers in such a vital region.

Therefore, in this conflict, it is not only internal variables that must be calculated but also a series of interrelated external factors which make it a confrontation with strong global geopolitical implications. The annexation of Crimea by Russia, following a referendum which has not been recognised by the international community in March 2014, and subsequent clashes in eastern Ukraine, specifically in the Luhansk and Donetsk provinces, were the most prominent developments that followed a series of events developed in the preceding year (Biersack & O'lear, 2014, s. 247-269).

Euromaidan reflected the rejection of a sector of Ukrainian society to the non-ratification of Ukraine's free trade and association agreements with the EU. In return, the Russian-speaking populations of eastern Ukraine began to demonstrate before the deposition of President Yanukovich, a circumstance that aggravated the situation until the subsequent armed conflicts (Portnov, 2016). As a result, thousands of deaths were reported, a million people displaced from their homes and hundreds of thousands seeking asylum in neighbouring countries, mainly in Russia, in a civil confrontation that shows no signs of ending in the short term.

The pro-Russian demonstrations in eastern Ukraine, consisting of Russophile communities, ethnic Russian populations and those of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, continued to deepen. The new pro-European government in Kiev was ignored by these electors, which unleashed a series of revolts, including those in the Crimean peninsula. The corollary of the protests was the so-called referendum in March 2014 in which 97% of Crimeans voted to change the political status of the peninsula (Podolian, 2015, s. 111-128). As a result, the Republic of Crimea was proclaimed, which days later was annexed as an autonomous republic, which has not been recognised by the international community including the UN (Koelle, 2018; Baar & Baarová, 2017, s. 267-303).

Although the situation of political crisis unleashed in Ukraine began to worry neighbouring countries, the EU and the world's major powers such as the United States and China, this strategic geopolitical move by Russia took the entire world by surprise due to its unforeseen nature and its unforeseeable consequences (Sakwa, 2014). The territorial partition of Ukraine, with the separation of Crimea and its annexation to the Russian Federation, opened a new stage, the tip of the iceberg of a new era of tensions and conflicts in international relations and changes in the world geopolitical order, the expression of which on the European continent today is Ukraine and armed conflict perpetrated and supported by Russia that is raging in its eastern territories.

Russia took advantage of the change in the centre of gravity of US strategy, with Washington pursuing a pivot to Asia approach. The events that occurred in April 2014, approximately one month after the division of the peninsula, were characterized by the start of fighting in the Donbas region (Wilson, 2016, s. 631-652). This area has outstanding economic potential, which had already been developed during the Tsarist era, due to

possessing natural resources such as coal and iron. Historically the steel industry has been dominant in the region establishing two important industrial centres: Donetsk considered the city of steel and Lugansk, associated with railway equipment.

The provinces where the greatest confrontations took place were Donetsk and Lugansk, located in the extreme east of Ukraine. After the fall of Yanukovich in late February the residents of Donetsk and Luhansk, who had been politically dormant throughout the EuroMaidan demonstrations whose total electoral support for the Russian Bloc attracted less than 1% of the vote in 2012 elections held in Donetsk, began to organise a series of escalating demonstrations (Wilson, 2014). After the incorporation of Crimea, local activists of formerly marginal pro-Russian organizations in Donbas gained in popularity (Giuliano, 2018, s. 158-178). Only a year ago these groups were quite passive restricting their activities to publishing brochures, they became far more active taking advantage of the opening provided by the annexation of Crimea.

Activists used force to seize government buildings in April and the armed conflict spiralled when armed separatist factions supported by Russian paramilitaries clashed with the Ukrainian armed forces, declaring themselves the leaders of the self-styled People's Republic of Donetsk (DNR) and People's Republic of Luhansk (LNR), which was not recognised by the international community. They acted fast in adopting declarations of sovereignty and in May, held referenda on state sovereignty. Neither the DPR nor the LPR passed the test for lawfulness as their proclamations were accompanied by numerous violations of the principles of international law, as well as the national legislation of Ukraine (Korotkyi & Hendel, 2018, s. 145-170). Such a move rekindled the historical origins of Pan-Russianism by references to Novorussia (Matsuzato, 2017, s. 175-201; Mykhailenko & Cheremisin, 2020, s. 36-45).

Western and Russian Actions

Based on these circumstances, the EU condemned the annexation of Crimea by Russia and the separatist movements in the east, which led to the establishment of economic sanctions on Russia (Grant, 2015, s. 68-95). For its part, the Obama administration, accompanied the economic sanctions with a policy to exclude Russia from the G-8 (Matera, 2017). A serious incident increased uncertainties further in the region in July 2014, when a Malaysian civilian plane was shot down over the Donetsk region, killing its 298 occupants, allegedly by a missile fired from an area under rebel control (Golovchenko et al., 2018, s. 975-994). In the face of tragedy and international commotion, both warring parties accused each other of shooting down the aircraft.

In September of that year, after international action and pressure to reach a compromise, a ceasefire agreement was able to be signed, which was later violated - known as the Minsk Protocol, because it was signed in the Belarusian capital (Kostanyan & Meister, 2016). Later, at the beginning of the following year, a new agreement known as Minsk II would be signed (Åtland, 2020, s. 122-139). This agreement, signed by Russia, Ukraine and the self-proclaimed republics provided for the establishment of a ceasefire, the maintenance of the

territorial integrity of Ukraine - although Crimea was not mentioned - and constitutional reform whose main commitment would be to decentralization.

NATO's concern was clearly manifested at the Cardiff Summit held in September 2014, where a strong condemnation of Russia was made for its illegal military intervention in Ukraine, for the annexation of Crimea, for the violence and insecurity generated in the region that threatened the rules of world order and Euro-Atlantic security, as well as possessing long-term effects on the stability of the Black Sea region (Studemeyer, 2019, s. 787-810). In this sense, the general perception was of a need to expand NATO's influence in Central and Eastern Europe, among other regions, as well as to have a stronger and more consolidated U.S and Europe providing security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

In response, Putin signed in December 2014 a new military doctrine, which considered the advance of NATO and the deployment in Europe of the United States anti-missile system as one of the main dangers to Russian national security (Putin, 2014). Despite the new challenges involving the geostrategic changes in Russia's environment due to both the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and the loss of former allies such as Ukraine, the doctrine did not include the possibility of a preventive nuclear attack and only contemplated the use of atomic weapons as a response.

Facing a successful fait accompli by Russia in Ukraine, the United States had to decide about intervention in the conflict in Ukraine. Washington desisted from the use of force - as NATO had acted, intervening in Libya 2011 or Syria - to cooperate with the EU primarily engaging in diplomatic offensives and pursuing economic sanctions to weaken the Russian economy (Buckley, 2012, s. 81-104). President Obama viewed Ukraine similar to Georgia as being part of Russia's vital interests, accepting the argument that Moscow had an advantage in that area and that, therefore, the best option for the United States was to reach progressive accommodations by means other than the use or threat of force. President Putin knew that the US would never engage militarily for Ukraine as it was not a NATO member covered by Article 5, and President Obama knew that Russia would not cross certain limits. Europe had already adopted a very prudent attitude towards Kiev, expressly renouncing measures to attract Ukraine towards a European sphere of influence – perhaps within a revamped ENP, ruling out future membership in the EU, or getting involved in providing guarantees for its territorial integrity.

Seven years after the start of the protests, sporadic fighting is continuing in the Donbas region despite the 29th ceasefire coming into force in July 2020, with Ukrainian forces still suffering from combat deaths in November 2020 (Ukrinform.net, 2020). The deterioration and destruction of infrastructure is one aspect of the conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk but it is the civilian population that becomes, as in any warring conflict, the most vulnerable sector, with more than 10,000 deaths, thousands of displaced people so far as refugees (A'Beckett, 2020). These cities in the east of the country have become spaces to be conquered in the framework of the struggle between government forces and pro-Russian militias. Luhansk, Sloviansk, the port cities of Mariupol and Novoazovsk especially Donetsk were some of the main battlefronts with a vehement struggle to ensure control of relevant key infrastructure such as the airport (Fox, 2019).

The Russian periphery, therefore, has become the scene of confrontations that demonstrate the disputes of interests between Russia and the western alliance represented by the United States and the EU. In this sense, Ukraine became the centre of a geopolitical struggle between western support for strengthening democratic government and Russian attempts to keep a key actor firmly within its sphere of influence (O'Loughlin et al., 2017, s. 124-144).

Conclusion

The conflict in Ukraine is currently characterized by long processes of detente and, at times, violent clashes and escalations. In general terms, it should be noted that most current conflicts have an international dimension linked to elements such as population displacement due to violence, arms and resource trafficking, the support of neighbouring countries for one of the parties in dispute, or the participation of foreign paramilitary fighters. In the case of the crisis in Ukraine, its consequences are the increase in tensions between Russia and the West, whose relations have soured to the lowest levels of trust and understanding since the end of the Cold War. Unfortunately, violence continues to manifest itself sporadically. Despite the ceasefire agreement signed in 2015 and the negotiations carried out by the Trilateral Contact Group - OSCE, Russia and Ukraine - fighting continued between forces in the east of the country, which included separatists and government forces (Shumilov, 2015).

With high rates of fatalities, both among the fighting forces and among the civilian population, rising poverty and unemployment, coupled with astronomical food prices, have disrupted the lives of millions of people (Amnesty International, 2018). Also, cases of sexual violence were documented in the context of the conflict, fundamentally carried out against women detained by paramilitary groups. Although there has been a decrease in violence and fighting in the last few years, as a consequence of the fatalities and the number of displaced persons, no progress has been demonstrated in negotiations towards a peaceful settlement, and the threat of violence remains. Finally, in terms of the economy, Ukraine is still far from a return to the path of growth.

From a strictly geopolitical perspective, despite the complexity of the conflict, some dimensions can be discerned to achieve an explanation of events. Ukraine constitutes a strategic state for the Eurasian continent. The Baltic countries, for example, have joined the western alliance. The examples of Georgia in 2008 or Ukraine of today demonstrate strong tensions that led to armed conflict and impeded attempts at expanding Western security guarantees. Furthermore, there has been a forceful attempt to introduce new actors, unrecognized by the international community located on the internationally recognized territories of Georgia and Ukraine, which have received strong support from the Russian Federation in an attempt to increase tensions and consolidate the power grab achieved through military superiority. This is another excellent example of the power struggle that is indicative of the argument that stresses the relative decline of the United States globally and the rise of Russia in its near abroad.

Endogenous factors, derived primarily from the ethnic-cultural and socio-economic diversity of Ukraine, contribute to complicating this vital region in resolving the ongoing violent internal confrontation. Meanwhile, the EU faces the challenge of whether, within the framework of multipolarity, to decide to take on a significant leading role or remain subject to relative subordination to the United States in geopolitical matters. In this vein, one must recall that a new tool in a multipolar potential new cold war scenario is soft power. The EU and the United States are well equipped to fully utilize their soft power resources, although the Russian Federation has demonstrated substantial advances in this field also, especially in the realm of international audiovisual broadcasting.

The Ukraine crisis has, therefore, demonstrated the tensions between the United States as the declining unipolar power leading NATO, accompanied by the EU, new resurgent actors such as Russia, in the process of increasing its status after the collapse of the USSR, with China despite the narrative of a peaceful rise strongly tipped as a potential polar power; are all in today's world protagonists of a potential emerging new cold war which conjures in the mind the symbolism of a global grand chessboard so eloquently expressed by Brzezinski. Such a narrative fits in rather well with a perspective that forecasts ongoing geopolitical tensions. In the final analysis, the conflict in Ukraine, a politically and culturally diverse polarized country, remains in the second decade of the 21st century as an example of fragmented power, as the scene of tensions and belligerence between hegemonic powers that rearrange themselves according to the opportunities and challenges provided by the geopolitical, economic and social developments that characterize the contemporary world, all within the framework of an emerging multipolar international system.

“Donetsk Remains Under Duress: The Occupation Of Eastern Ukraine” Başlıklı Makalenin Araştırma ve Etik Beyanı Bilgileri

Bu çalışma “Araştırma ve Yayın Etiği” değerlerine uygun olarak hazırlanmıştır	
Bilgilendirme	Çalışma herhangi bir bildiri veya tez benzeri çalışmadan üretim değildir.
Yazar Çıkar Çatışması Beyanı	Çalışmada herhangi bir çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır.
Yazar Katkı Oranı Beyanı	Çalışmayı şahsım Süreyya YİĞİT olarak tek başıma hazırladığımı beyan ederim.
Teşekkür	Çalışmayı destekleyen New Vision Üniversitesi’ne teşekkür ederim.
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