

Analysis of the Competition Between China and the US in the 21st Century from the Perspective of the Concept of Hybrid Cold War ¹

Hüseyin KORKMAZ² - İdris TURAN³

Submitted by: 23.02.2021

Accepted by: 17.05.2021

Article Type: Research Article

Abstract

In the 21st century, there has been complex competition among states for global power. In this regard, states are often observed to confront each other. Globalization in the post-Cold War era led to technological transformation, which brought along radical changes in the competition for global hegemony. In the context of competition for power, the relations between the US and China as two world powers have remarkable characteristics. From this perspective, this study is designed to understand the recent competition between the US and China in comparison with the classical competition during the Cold War. In this vein, the study introduces the concept of Hybrid Cold War and focuses on conventional and non-conventional factors that stand out in the US-China competition. The qualitative research method is adopted in the study and document analysis is used as a data collection technique. In addition, content analysis is benefited as a data analysis technique. In addition to propounding the concept of Hybrid Cold War, the study endeavors to define the ambiguous features of the new era in a conceptual framework. In consequence, this research argues that the US-China competition has entered a new era where conventional and non-conventional methods are used together, increasing the probability of conflict.

Keywords: US, China, Cold War, Hybrid Cold War

Atıf: Korkmaz, H. ve Turan, İ. (2021). Analysis of the competition between china and the US in the 21st century from the perspective of the concept of hybrid cold war. *Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 21(2), 367-390.

¹ This study does not require ethics committee permission.

² Independent Researcher, Turkey, 58huseyin@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0001-6345-7655

³ Hakkari University FEAS Political Science and International Relations Dep., turan.idris@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-8184-0110

Melez Soğuk Savaş Kavramı Ekseninde 21. Yüzyılda Çin'in ABD'yle Rekabeti Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

Hüseyin KORKMAZ⁴ - İdris TURAN⁵

Başvuru Tarihi: 23.02.2021

Kabul Tarihi: 17.05.2021

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

Öz

21.yüzyıl küresel güç rekabeti açısından karmaşık ve çatışmalı bir sürece işaret etmektedir. Soğuk savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan küreselleşme ile beraber teknolojik kökenleri öne çıkan bir dönüşüm küresel hegemonya rekabetinde farklılaşmalara ve bununla beraber köklü değişimlere neden olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda öne çıkan iki güç ABD ve Çin'in ilişkileri söz konusu rekabetin işleyişi hakkında dikkat çeken özellikler taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı ABD-Çin rekabetini Soğuk Savaş ya da klasik güç rekabeti dışında bir bağlama yerleştirmeyi denemektir. Bu kapsamda Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramını ortaya atan çalışma, ABD-Çin rekabetinde öne çıkan geleneksel ve geleneksel olmayan faktörlere yoğunlaşmaktadır. Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemi benimsenmiş ve veri toplama tekniği olarak doküman incelemesi, veri analiz tekniği olarak ise içerik analizi kullanılmıştır. Çalışma, Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramını ortaya atarak yeni dönemin gri özelliklerini kavramsal bir çerçevede tanımlamaya çalışmaktadır. Sonuç olarak çalışma ABD-Çin rekabetinin yeni dönemde geleneksel ve gelenek dışı yöntemlerin bir arada kullanıldığı ve çatışma olasılığının arttığı yeni bir döneme girdiğini savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: ABD, Çin, Soğuk Savaş, Hibrit Soğuk Savaş

⁴ Bağımsız Araştırmacı, Türkiye, 58huseyin@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0001-6345-7655

⁵ Hakkâri Üniversitesi İİBF Siyaset Bilimi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü, turan.idris@gmail.com, ORCID: 0000-0002-8184-0110

Introduction

This study is designed to define the US-China competition in the 21st century based on a conceptual framework shaped by the concept of Hybrid Cold War (HCW). In this line, this conceptual framework is considered to be useful in understanding the complex nature of the current competition in global politics, contributing to the literature of international relations. In this context, it can be observed that analyses on classical power competition and economic factors generally exclude the instruments of competition between the US and China. However, it is seen that the military, economic, political and technological instruments that have influenced the competition between US and China have had a transforming effect over time. Although this transformation process has recently been described as the new Cold War, it is doubtful whether this term fully refers to the concept in categorical sense. Therefore, there is a need for a contextual understanding to differentiate between what is cold war and what is not.

With this purpose in mind, the presidential terms of Trump and Xi will be analyzed to understand the US-China relations within a conceptual framework throughout the study. The research question is as follows: What are the characteristics of the US-China competition in the 21st century and what conceptual framework can be used to evaluate it? Does Hybrid Cold War (HCW) offer a conceptual framework for this elaboration? The qualitative research method was adopted in the study and document analysis was used as a data collection technique in addition to benefiting from content analysis.

The study is built around the concept of Hybrid Cold War, which has both differences and similarities with the cold war. In this vein, Hybrid Cold War first demonstrates multipolarity that moves towards bipolarity. Similarly, the Cold War era was significantly marked by bipolarity. However, the fact that the concept of bipolarity did not fully form after 30 years from the end of the Cold War has led to the emergence of the concept of Hybrid Cold War in 2020. On the other hand, the concept of “new world disorder” (Buzan, 1997) can replace the concept of Hybrid Cold War. In the new era, the existing system has started to erode while there have been efforts to consolidate approaches towards the multipolar world order. Therefore, there is a need for a contextual framework for an accurate understanding of the “disorder” that has recently emerged. The study consists of three chapters. The first chapter elaborates on the concept of Hybrid Cold War. The second chapter elaborates on the concept of Hybrid Cold War during the Trump-Xi era. The third chapter focuses on the findings on China’s competition with the US. It is suggested in the study that the ongoing competition between the US and China is expanding with conventional and non-conventional means. Thus, the conceptualization of Hybrid Cold War is considered as functional and contributing to the literature in terms of understanding the existing competition.

Hybrid Cold War

This study is designed to understand the concept of hybrid war, which has both differences and similarities with the Cold War. At the time when the Cold War prevailed in the international system after 1945, the unipolar system of states formed after the dissolution of the USSR and the fragility of this system caused systemic uncertainty. This unipolar period dragged into more intense “uncertainty” due to the global security crisis in 2001 and the global financial crisis in 2008.

One of the most important systemic characteristics that stand out during this period of uncertainty is the asymmetric power balances formed as a result of technological development. This new security structure in the international system paved the way for the “Hybrid Cold War” period by replacing the logic of the classical Cold War.

Before further elaboration, it is necessary to look at the origins and definitions of the concept of hybrid war. The most commonly accepted definition is that hybrid war is a complex type of war requiring the use of a combination of different types of war strategies. In this vein, hybrid war essentially requires the use of both traditional and irregular troops to achieve the political goals of a particular actor. Throughout history, various actors such as Mongolians, American Revolutionaries and the Vietminh had used what we today call hybrid war strategies and tactics (Baker, 2020).

According to Hoffman, hybrid war includes various modes of war such as traditional capabilities, irregular tactics and terrorizing acts involving indiscriminate violence, coercion and criminal disorder (Hoffman, 2007, s. 14). Hoffman suggested that states, like non-state actors, can be involved in hybrid wars (Najžer, 2020). Hybrid war can be described as an approach that blends conventional and non-conventional, military and non-military means to undermine a target and achieve the perpetrator's political and strategic goals (Speranza, 2020, s. 2).

The key word defining hybrid war at a strategic level is "concurrency". In this sense, hybrid war requires the ability to use interoperability, i.e. the simultaneous use of different military and civilian elements. The purpose of hybrid war is to deceive the opponent by combining both traditional and non-traditional operational elements in gray regions thanks to its flexible structure.

In fact, many studies refer to the intertwined nature of traditional and non-traditional warfare throughout history (Murray and Mansoor, 2012). In this regard, hybrid war is an extremely complex structure that is inherently nonlinear. It includes a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic, traditional and non-traditional tools (Mumford, 2020, s. 3). However, hybrid war does not form only by the combination of irregular tactics. It stands out thanks to the combination of advanced technological capabilities and the use of habitual irregular tactics.

Nemeth describes hybrid war as a type of conflict where both modern technology and mobilization methods are used (Nemeth, 2002, s. 29). In this approach, Nemeth focuses on non-state actors (Nemeth, 2002, s. 29). The US Joint Combatant Command defines hybrid war as a form of conflict conducted by state and/or non-state actors, using multiple methods of war involving conventional capabilities and irregular tactics (GAO, 2010, s. 18).

Hybrid war is also used to describe certain "intense and far-reaching conflicts" emerging in the new era that are difficult to understand. This concept can be understood by means of three factors: The first is the use of sophisticated weapons and irregular methods of warfare. This stands out as the most important characteristic of the concept of hybrid war. The second is to use both traditional and irregular warfare methods on the same war field. The third and final characteristic is to subject military methods to strategic communication (Aoi, Futamura and Patalano, 2019, s. 5-6). Using information-based deception methods such as disinformation can be considered as an example of a strategic move in this regard.

Considering the origin of the concept, it can be seen that Hoffman referred to the term "hybrid war" in his analysis of Hezbollah between Israel and Lebanon in 2006 (Hoffman, 2007). Hoffman tried to fill in the gap between war methods showing regular or irregular characteristics in the operational context of the 21st century (Fridman, 2018, s. 17). According to Hoffman, the blurring of war modes reveals a broad spectrum that is not clear who is fighting who and which technologies are used. This includes the diversity and complexity of what we call hybrid war (Hoffman, 2007, s. 14). One of Hoffman's most important contributions to understand the

concept is the use of elements such as terrorist organizations and criminal organizations in hybrid warfare. Therefore, Hoffman underlined the combined use of hybrid war particularly by non-state actors.

Although the concept is defined with various words such as “4th Generation War” (Hammes, 2006), “Combined Wars” (Huber, 1996) and “Unlimited War” (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999), it seems that the term that is catchy and best describes the situation in question is “hybrid war”. In such conceptualizations, it is important to note the dilemmas that sometimes arise between the characteristics of the concept of hybrid war. For instance, the combination of irregular forces and tactics has been observed to reveal the problem of command and coordination. However, the concept of hybrid war has expanded over time, including the coordination or synchronization of military operations via strategic communication.

In this context, the expansion of irregular tactics combined with advanced technological features and the emergence of a system including non-state actors have come to the fore as other important features of hybrid war. In the future, hybrid war is expected to be used to create both tactical and operational surprises with the impact of innovative and new combat tools provided by artificial intelligence (Yan, 2020, s. 16). The concept of hybrid war has been officially adopted in the main strategic documents of NATO, the EU and many countries, and the term has been the subject of many articles and policy documents (Çalışkan, 2019, s. 1). Therefore, many states and international organizations have adopted the concept of hybrid war and have been forming a strategic structure in this direction.

The combination of “regular and irregular” forces, which stand out as the most common characteristic of hybrid war, has also been deeply embedded in classic post-Cold War forms of war. In fact, it would not be wrong to identify the form of war that emerged after the end of the Cold War with the concept of hybrid war. Indeed, the use of the term hybrid war also transformed the characteristics of the Cold War concept. The transformation of these characteristics led to the diversification of the actors involved in the war as well as the emergence of a very wide range of combat methods.

In this regard, the tension between the United States and China in the 21st century turns into a Hybrid Cold War with all regular and irregular elements, rather than a classic Cold War. One of the main considerations behind the introduction of this concept in the study is about the contribution of technological capabilities to war methods. Artificial intelligence, computers capable of quantum computing, and their effects in a wide range of fields from nuclear technology to cyberspace, are driving great power competition towards a new normal. This new normal should be conceptualized by taking into account all the features of the new era, rather than considering only the classical conceptual context.

As stated before, relations between the United States and China have shifted towards an intensified Cold War setting from 2016 to the present. However, this new form of relations is different from the Cold War era, gradually evolving into a ‘hybrid approach’ where traditional and non-traditional means are simultaneously used. Instruments of hybrid war include disinformation operations, political-economic pressure, cyber operations and low-intensity conflicts through proxies. There are efforts to institutionalize and practice these subjects. Thus, the US Department of State has set up the Global Engagement Center to counter disinformation campaigns originating abroad.

Analyzing the characteristics of Hybrid Cold War, it stands out that a new Cold War era is under way (Schoen & Kaylan, 2015, s. 3). This new era can be referred to as the Hybrid Cold War (HCW) period. It is hybrid because, contrary to the Cold War era, this type of war involves hybrid features such as cyber warfare, artificial intelligence, struggles in space as well as the technology race. There are also blocks of states that are not yet

fully formed. In this context, the US-China rivalry in the context of the Hybrid Cold War will be examined in detail in the next chapter to further detail the concept.

Trump and Xi Era from the Perspective of Hybrid Cold War

According to the Western Bloc, the Cold War began on March 5, 1946, with Winston Churchill's "Iron Curtain" rhetoric. According to the Eastern Bloc, however, it began in January 1918 with western intervention against the Bolshevik Red Army in the Russian Civil War (Lightbody, 1999, s. 1). At that time, the international area was dominated by the bipolar system (US, the United States of America – USSR, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). In this vein, there were two super powers (US-USSR) in economic and military terms. Moreover, the world was divided into two in ideological terms: The liberal and communist worlds. The Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc represented two different values marked by NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the Warsaw Pact. Both blocs had nuclear weapons.

The internet and other communication technologies were not very advanced. Although there was economic interdependence, it was not at a high level. Proxy wars were quite common. In addition, there were identity-based conflicts among states. Eastern Europe had been under the influence of the USSR. There had been struggles not only in military but also ideological, social and economic terms (Buzan, 1997). The UN (United Nations) had 51 founding members in 1945, while it encompassed 159 nation-states in 1990 (UN, 2020). In other words, the UN had 51 member states during the emergence of the Cold War. These figures manifest that former colonies had strived to gain independence during the course of the Cold War.

In this context, neo-realism and constructivism are the theories that can best explain the Cold War era, since neo-realism provides sufficient means to explain power distribution while constructivism accounts for the cultural, civilizational and ideological developments. Looking from the perspective of neo-realism, the bipolar world order was determined by the material power distribution. On the other hand, a constructivist point of view suggests that there were two different ideologies, civilizations and cultures (West and East). In this context, national security was the key word during the Cold War (Buzan, 1997).

However, there was a third bloc referred to as the Non-Aligned Movement. The world was shared between two blocs. On the one hand, there was a relatively richer, mostly democratic bloc of countries led by the US, and on the other hand, there was the block of communist societies under the leadership of the USSR (Huntington, 1993). These countries were observed to wage ideological, political, economic and sometimes military conflicts (Huntington, 1993) — via proxy wars. In this line, there was a liberal economic and political order under the leadership of the United States (Ikenberry, 1996). On the other side was the communist order led by the USSR. As stated before, globalization, transportation and communication technologies were not very advanced during this period.

Former US president Ronald Reagan called the USSR an "evil empire" (Lightbody, 1999, s. 97). NATO continued the project Star Wars initiated by Reagan and came close to fulfilling their objectives by establishing a defense shield in Europe in the 21st century. Thus, the Cold War did not end but evolved into Hybrid Cold War. Whether it began in 1918 or 1946, the Cold War was unfinished but only changed shape. When we take a careful look at today, there is China on the one hand, and the US on the other hand, as well as other states that indefinitely cluster around them.

Nonetheless, the US military, diplomatic, political, economic and ideological influence worldwide is declining (Schoen & Kaylan, 2015, s. 306). Indeed, the US is increasingly isolating itself (Schoen & Kaylan, 2015, s. 307). There is a bipolar international distribution of power (bipolarity with the United States on the one side and China on the other). Since it is not yet clear which countries are siding with which of the poles, it can be said that bipolarity is still in the process of forming. Yet, the US hegemony in the post-Cold War era has now declined. The US seems to be in the position of a military hegemon due to its military bases in various parts of the world.

However, the experiences with Afghanistan and Iraq in the 21st century have shown that the US will no longer be involved in similar adventures⁶ since it cannot handle its economic and political burden, thus, the US position as a military hegemon is now not so strong. Furthermore, its economic hegemony has been declining as well. However, it can be stated that the US has hegemony in the military field, while China has hegemony in the economic field, despite the US influence in the international area has been decreasing (Huntington, 1993). Without any physical war, the Cold War ended and the Hybrid Cold War era began, although the US was the only hegemon until 2001.

While the hegemon position of the US continues in the military sense, China rises as an economy hegemon in the world. Western civilization is led by the US and Eastern civilization by China. However, the influence of ideologies has decreased in the 21st century. The dominant character of capitalism has emerged. Yet, with the global economic crisis of 2008, economic liberalism, i.e., capitalism, has also been questioned.

NATO has remained the only security unit of the Western world, while the Warsaw Pact disappeared and there has not been any other organization to replace it and provide security. Although the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conducts joint military operations, it is not yet in an active role as NATO. Although the USSR dissolved, Russia has continued to improve its military capabilities (e.g., nuclear weapons) (Duffield, 1995). Both groups — the US and China — have nuclear weapons. China and US are also leading a struggle in the field of cyber warfare (Schoen & Kaylan, 2015: XVI).

In this context, it is important to note that globalization, transportation and communication technologies are advanced. The Internet and social media spur the world and human relationships and communication are at a very high level. There is a great level of interdependence in economic terms as well. However, there are not many proxy wars. There are identity-based conflicts among states. Eastern Europe joined the Western bloc with the expansion of NATO. Although the ideological struggle is behind us, the military and economic struggle continues.

In 1992, the number of nation states increased to 179 with the states that had disintegrated from the USSR (UN, 2020). In 2011, there were 193 nation-states with the addition of South Sudan after its declarations of independence (UN, 2020). There are no colonial states left to fight for independence. Nevertheless, intra-state conflicts — often identity-based — are common. Today, we can say that there are two poles in the system. Due to material power distribution, the system can be explained by neo-realism. From the perspective of culture and civilization, this era can be approached from a constructivist point of view since there are two different cultures and civilizations (East and West).

⁶ If the US could embark on such adventures, they would have been directly involved in the crisis in Syria since 2011. However, they are trying to be permanent in the region by indirectly supporting the YPG/PKK terrorist organization (AA, 2018).

There is no third bloc that resembles the style of the non-aligned movement. Instead, there is a distribution of power in a world divided into two poles (US-China). This period can also be explained by the thesis of clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993). There is a liberal economic and political order, albeit on shaky ground, but not under US leadership as it was during the Cold War. According to Schoen and Kaylan, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a formation that could be an alternative to NATO of some kind, was founded in June 2001 (Schoen & Kaylan, 2015, s. 12). Vladimir Putin called the SCO “the rebirth of the Warsaw Pact” (Schoen & Kaylan, 2015, s. 12).

The formation process of the two ambiguous poles creates power inequality and increases the distance between existing powers. As the distance between powers increases, so is the possibility of war (Mearsheimer, 1990). According to Mearsheimer, the bipolar Cold War was more peaceful than the multipolar world (Mearsheimer, 1990). Hence, it is necessary for a more peaceful world that the poles around China and the United States form as soon as possible. As a matter of fact, there is a tension created by uncertainty.

China’s “one belt, one road” project could play a role in connecting the Far East to Europe, creating profound changes similar to the impact of the Silk Road in history. China has also started to be active on the African continent by making economic investments. Given these developments, there seems to be polarization with the United States on one side and China on the other. Europe is also divided.⁷ In addition, the situation in the Middle East is similarly divided.⁸ The United States has withdrawn from the Middle East and set its sights on China with its discourse of “Pivot to Asia”. The reason for this is that the US approach to the latest Syrian crisis has been abstentionist. It can be said that the US started to withdraw from the Middle East — which they entered with the 1956 Eisenhower Doctrine — with the new “Pivot to Asia” doctrine.

The ongoing competition between the US and China is taking place within a broad spectrum of low-intensity conflicts that fit the definition of hybrid war. As a matter of fact, the “form of conflict” in question continues in a hybrid character in different areas and fronts. China will inarguably be the most likely state to adopt a hybrid conflict approach in the near future. Long-term disputes over the islands in the South China Sea provide China with the perfect space to implement its own hybrid strategies (Najzer, 2020, s. 6-7).

In 2016, NATO and the EU (European Union) signed a historic joint declaration to enhance cooperation despite long-term political and bureaucratic obstacles. This declaration includes articles that draw attention to the fight against hybrid war (NATO, 2018). NATO and the EU have jointly supported the establishment of a “European Centre of Excellence for Combating Hybrid Threats” in Helsinki, structurally independent of institutions and supported by twenty-seven Transatlantic countries (Speranza, 2020, s. 10). However, there is no clear information about how efficient all these centers are and whether they are used effectively.

If a regional assessment is made in terms of the competition between the two countries, it can be seen that the United States is considered a “defensive revisionist” while China is considered an “offensive revisionist” (Vannak and Kimkong, 2020). China has created more than 3,200 acres of new land in the region, with islands it has built in the South China Sea (CSIS, 2017). China’s ambition to own lands at this level can be explained in two ways: The first would have created a means of influence in the region that could reflect its military power. The second would be to obtain access to natural resources in the region, especially fish and oil. These islands, which have long airfields, can easily become military transfer centers (Najzer, 2020, s. 156). China is alleged to have deployed a variety of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles on the island of Woody, part of the

⁷ While the United Kingdom and France are sided with the US, Germany has come closer to Russia. Turkey’s stance is mostly shaped by a balance policy similar to the last period of the Ottoman Empire.

⁸ Iran is close to Russia and China while Saudi Arabia is sided with the US on the other end of the pole.

Paracel group of islands, including an advanced HQ-9 anti-aircraft missile similar to the Russian S-300 system (Najzer, 2020, s.157).

The form of conflict in the seas generally differs from conflicts that take place on land or air. In this regard, the speed of operations and maneuver areas in the seas are extremely large. The hybrid war put forward by China includes methods that use conventional forces (navy), irregular units (maritime militias) and “legal disputes” such as building islands. All these methods melt in the same pot in a “non-transparent” way.

From this perspective, maritime militias operating in the South China Sea can be considered as a kind of hybrid force. Different from the Chinese Army or the Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), these militias do not act within an official structure. They can be described as “irregular forces” designed only for use in wartime. These units are established by fishing companies acting within the commercial framework, however their activities on the ground are carried out in coordination with the Chinese Army (Najzer, 2020, s. 159). Looking at the literature on hybrid wars in China, the book “Unrestricted Warfare” published in 1999 by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, two colonels in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, defines war as “using all means, including the armed forces”.

Some of the methods proposed in the book include cyber hacking, attacking financial institutions, terrorism, influencing the media and conducting urban war (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999, s. 2). The two authors analyze the transformation of war in the context of globalization and claim that “a key” is needed to overcome all challenges coming along with globalization (Liang and Xiangsui, 1999, s. 2). This key must also be in line with all levels and sizes, from strategy and operational techniques to tactics, and at the same time align with politicians and generals. Since the book came to the conclusion in 1999 that this key was “unrestricted warfare”, it shows that China is trying to adapt to changing conditions in terms of strategy.

This book, *Unrestricted Warfare*, mentions the concept of a people’s war in which China spreads its military efforts to all areas (Korkmaz, 2020a). Furthermore, the book stands out as an important source for China as it proposes a whole set of tactics that compensate for the military inadequacies against the United States. In fact, many recent assessments underscore that China has adopted the concept of an “unrestricted warfare” against the United States. According to some experts, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been quietly and secretly conducting a military strategy for a long time — described as “unrestricted war” — against the United States, in order to gain global dominance (Xiao, 2020).

Areas where China has been gaining strength with its hybrid warfare as well as its activities in the South China Sea present the doctrine of “warrior wolf diplomacy and cyber warfare”, which have been attracting great attention in the recent Chinese diplomacy. China is using the legal situation in the region as an element of conflict by building artificial islands, thus strives to increase its influence through a non-traditional method. It is also possible to argue that China aims to benefit from unequal trade relations with foreign countries, make large foreign direct investments in strategic sectors and prioritize investments that would enable China to access Europe through its hybrid warfare instruments (Speranza, 2020, s. 6). China is also alleged to use “debt-trap diplomacy”, which usually involves lending large loans to vulnerable countries to support major projects while estimating that they cannot fulfill their payment obligations (Speranza, 2020, s. 6).

The apothegms of Sun Tzu, renowned strategist who had an important place in Chinese history, that refer to “breaking the resistance of the enemy without fighting” (Tzu, 1910, s. 6) significantly influenced China’s military literature as well. In 2003, China published a document called “*Principles of Political Work of the People’s Liberation Army*”, which describes the so-called “three wars” (“*san zhong zhanfa*”) to be implemented

both in peacetime and wartime (Livermore, 2018). The concepts set out in this document aim to “achieve Chinese national goals without any armed conflict at all”. In addition, this document focuses on gaining advantages without armed conflict with Strategic Psychological Operations, Overt and Covert Media Manipulations, and Abuse of National-International Legal Systems. Here it is important to focus on two basic Chinese strategic principles: The people’s doctrine of war (人民战争 - *renmin zhanzheng*) and civilian-military fusion (军民融合 - *junmin ronghe*). The areas where these efforts are put into practice cover a wide spectrum from China’s Belt and Road Initiative to cyber space.

Daniel Russel’s report titled “*Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative*” (Russell and Berger, 2020) published by the Asia Society Policy Institute highlights China’s potential military and geostrategic advantages in the region. Stating that the Belt and Road is a “multipurpose platform”, the report underlines that Beijing is provided with a multifaceted toolkit to support its foreign and economic policies thanks to this initiative. In light of this information, it can be observed that China is working on a civilian and military fusion effort with this project. Furthermore, the report also mentions that the Belt and Road initiative is being built in line with a “port-park-city” development model that supports industries such as shipbuilding and resupply services (Russell and Berger, 2020). China’s use of this power allows Beijing to take advantage of it as a hegemonic tool and therefore benefit from this tool as a Hybrid Cold War element against the United States.

Looking at the cornerstones of the Belt and Road initiative, it is seen that the famous strategies of H. John Mackinder and A. Thayer Mahan were synthesized to provide a “balance” in the face of the US-based counter-alliance in the region. In this sense, Mackinder’s approach that “Whoever rules Eurasia (the heartland) rules the world” and Mahan’s approach that “Whoever rules the waves rules the world” seem to be compatible with the land and sea line defined within China’s Belt and Road initiative (Korkmaz, 2020b). This gives a strategic advantage in the context of the concept of hybrid war, increasing the likelihood that this will turn into a gain in the geopolitical future.

Another important aspect that stands out about hybrid war is the military modernization of the Chinese Army. The report (DOD, 2020) submitted by the US Department of Defense to the US Congress, contains important data such as “China’s military development”. According to the report, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) aspires to make the Chinese army a practical tool of state administration for China’s global interests and objectives to revise the international order (DOD, 2020, s. 2). China supports its military modernization not only by allocating large defense budgets, but also through initiatives such as Belt-Road and China 2025 and its national industrial and technological efforts (DOD, 2020, s. 11).

The report notes that China is trying to develop a Military-Civilian fusion strategy to build an integrated national strategic system and “combine” its own economic and social development strategies with security strategies (DOD, 2020, s. 18). In addition, the report states that China uses operations to influence cultural institutions, media outlets, business, academic and political groups in the United States to achieve results in accordance with its overall strategy. According to the report, China’s long-term goal is to create a fully confident defense industry sector that can meet the needs of the Chinese Army for modern military capabilities, fused with a strong civil industry and technology sector (DOD, 2020, s. 5).

Moreover, China aims to lead key technologies with military potential such as artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, quantum⁹ and biotechnology (DOD, 2020, s. 11). The Chinese Army considers emerging

⁹ The fact that it will take only 200 seconds for a quantum computer produced by China to perform a calculation that will take more than two billion years using the fastest super computer that exists today seems to have put China ahead in the tech race (Tennenbaum, 2020).

technologies to be a transition from today's war style to "smart" warfare. The report further suggests that Chinese strategists define "smart war" broadly as the operability of artificial intelligence (AI) and the use of technologies such as cloud technology, big data analysis, quantum information and unmanned systems for military applications (DOD, 2020, s. 6). In light of all this information, the following can be uttered: With all these efforts, China has been acting in accordance with Mao's concept of extended war within the framework of a military-civilian fusion from the national to the global level.

The struggle in cyber space, on the other hand, stands out as the most prominent feature among the non-traditional methods. China is thought to have carried out numerous operations against civilian and military technology manufacturers producing aerospace, semiconductors and information technology, using hacking and cyber attempts in intellectual property and advanced technology (Speranza, 2020, s. 8). The struggle in this field has been reflected to the field of intelligence as well. According to certain claims, China has reached the capacity to monitor the US intelligence activities in Europe and Africa as a result of a long-term efforts (Dorfman, 2020). Moreover, after a recent cyber-attack on the systems of the US Federal Reserve, information from the US state representatives shows that China and Russia are pointed to as the usual suspects (Beer, 2020). However, not any finding has yet been put forward as evidence on this issue (Beer, 2020).

The military and technological transformation we have been witnessing all over the world shows that China sees hybrid war important regarding its geopolitical future. Indeed, Beijing's military operations, ranging from maritime to cyber, will have unforeseen consequences in the strategic interactions of states in the future (Miracola, 2018). Perhaps the most famous practitioner of hybrid war is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP and Mao Zedong are famous for successfully using a combination of conventional and irregular troops to defeat the Nationalists under General Chiang Kai-shek¹⁰ (Baker, 2020).

CCP's secret weapon is its mastery of propaganda, diplomacy and information warfare (Baker, 2020). In the short to medium term, this moderate trend is likely to continue, but in the long run it is highly likely that the balance in China's hybrid war will shift from predominantly non-kinetic to kinetic, as it will actively try to rebalance the regional dominance. In fact, there are some contradictions in presenting hybrid war as a new concept by separating it from other types of conflicts. Hybrid war is essentially low-intensity conflict. It is also partly a reflection of the complex nature of the global order. At this point, hybrid war will continue to be a powerful tool for forces that feel weaker than hegemon power within the system. It is possible to say that in the foreseeable future, China will show a tendency towards hybrid war, based on its historical and local sources. Although hybrid war can be used as an instrument in this context, the concept of Hybrid Cold War is thought to be more descriptive to understand the conceptual ambiguities.

The United States, on the other hand, has recently been unable to handle the economic burden of any formation of massive armed forces in a conventional sense. When the damage caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is taken into account, it is possible to utter that the US will be more sensitive about military expenditures in the following period. Even the US Chief of General Staff has been advocating that the United States should shrink its military presence in some regions (O'Hanlon, 2020). With more interest in the Asia-Pacific, the US is shifting a significant portion of its military presence to this region.

¹⁰ He became leader of the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) after the death of Sun Yat-sen, China's founding father, in 1925. In 1918, he joined the Chinese Nationalist Party (known as the Kuomintang, or KMT). Chiang's government focused on fighting communism within China and combating Japanese aggression. When the Allied Powers declared war on Japan in 1941, China took its place among the Big Four. Civil war broke out in 1946 and resulted in the creation of the People's Republic of China with the victory of Mao Zedong's Communist forces. Chiang had to move to Taiwan. He advocated from 1949 until his death that China's legitimate government was the KMT government in Taiwan (History, 2009).

Nevertheless, it needs the help of its allies in the region to fight China — as a rising power — more effectively and strongly. In a sense, the US might transform them into “proxies” against China. They will try to extend their fight against China by fortifying institutional security structures such as the Quartet Dialogue (Quad) involving the region’s powerful states such as Japan, India and Australia. In this context, it may include elements that are traditional, as well as non-traditional methods. It is seen that an effort towards this in both economic field and diplomacy is becoming increasingly prominent while the commercial and diplomatic rifts between these countries and China are growing.


Data on Military and Economic Competition Under Trump and Xi

The 2016 presidential elections in the United States showed that the country is becoming increasingly polarized and this is reflected in the global relations of the country. The Trump administration’s win of the election with the slogan “America First” (BBC, 2017a) followed by several moves that quickly undermined international cooperation (House, 2017) both weakened the ties of the US with its allies and caused it to confront China. This development has made a significant rise in global power competition over the past four decades. This approach by Trump is assumed to harm the position that the US has adopted in the global order and thus, China has risen by taking advantage of the gaps this administration has caused. China, on the other hand, consistently states that they are not looking for hegemony (China Daily, 2017) and have no “projections” of dismissing the United States from global leadership. In fact, Chinese president Xi Jinping mentioned a “new type of international relations” (FMPRC, 2013) and stated that they are envisaging a multipolar international system.

In this context, the character of the US-China competition in the new era shows an increasingly complex “conflict”. Although this pattern of conflict is called a “new cold war” (Rachman, 2020), it is seen that it has some features that go beyond being merely a cold war. From trade wars to the Taiwan issue, from the COVID-19 pandemic to the developments in Hong Kong, this new form of conflict reveals that traditional and non-traditional methods are intertwined. In Trump’s presidential term, the struggle that began especially with the “trade wars” (Wolf, 2018) continues to spread to different and specific areas. As a matter of fact, the US National Security Strategy Document, issued in late 2017, included serious indications of the US approach to contain China (NSS, 2017). In this document, China and Russia were described as “revisionist forces” challenging the United States (NSS, 2017). Accusing China and Russia of building a world contrary to American values, the document also claimed that China was trying to get the United States out of the Indo-Pacific region (NSS, 2017). In the National Defense Report published in 2018, it was stated that China’s short-term goal was to become a “regional hegemony” and emphasized that China would try to achieve “global superiority” in the long term (US Department of State, 2018).

President Donald Trump, who took office in 2016, first withdrew from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP), which the Obama administration joined with great courtesy (BBC, 2017b). The US administration later withdrew from the Paris Climate Agreement as well, and put its allied countries in difficulty while opening up a significant maneuvering ground for the states the US considers rivals. While this approach has drawn a huge response from allied countries and provoked criticism (Nye, 2020), figures such as US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo argued that President Trump was building a new liberal order that highlighted national sovereignty (Pompeo, 2018). In his inaugural address when he became President, Trump said, “From this moment on, it’s going to be America First. We will bring back our jobs. We will bring back our borders. We will bring back our wealth. And we will bring back our dreams” (Trump, 2017) and the statement “America’s First” became one of the most important principles he followed throughout his administration.

One of the most notable moves during Trump’s presidency was that China was directly considered the target of the US in the context of global hegemony competition. China was described as a strategic competitor and revisionist force (NSS, 2017), and books published in the United States on China consistently elaborated on the theory of the “Chinese threat”¹¹. Trump focused on trade disputes in the US’ relationship with China. Indeed, Trump had a zero-sum diplomatic understanding where he believed he could win by constantly making fixing deals and always starting negotiations with high demands (Trump and Schwartz, 2004). Trump aimed to make diplomatic gains by imposing major sanctions and tariffs on other countries since he thought that the US trade agreements with other countries caused them to lose. Starting trade wars against China exactly at this time (Franck, 2018), Trump focused on closing the trade deficit between the United States and China by placing high taxes on many products imported from China. While these moves pushed China to advocate for globalization and free trade (Anderlini and Feng, 2017), Trump was dragged into a position of advocating “protectionism” (Lim, 2018) contrary to the global experience of the US.



Source: Adapted from (Bureau, 2016-2020) by the authors.

Figure 1: Trump and Xi Period US-China Trade Relations (2016-2020)

When Trump took office, the trade deficit between the two countries was about \$600 billion. Among the reasons why this deficit has grown steadily since the Obama era can be especially the effects of the global financial crisis in 2008. When Figure 1 is examined, it can be seen that during the Trump period, China’s export figures have decreased significantly since 2018, when the US began to impose tariffs. On March 22, 2018, Trump ignited the fuse of the trade war by imposing a 25 percent tariff on Chinese products worth \$50 billion (Lawder and Blanchard, 2018). China responded with the same tariff rate against US products worth \$50 billion (Biesheuvel, 2018). This complex trade war shows that non-traditional forms of conflict are involved in the process of competition for great power.

While the US did not have any “economic” relationship with the USSR during their confrontation in the Cold War, today the US and China have immense economic dependency, thus, showing that the new process has quite different characteristics compared to the past. Trade wars between the US and China have calmed down after a while with ceasefires and pauses, but have remained intact. On June 29, 2019, the country leaders encountered at the G20 summit in Osaka (Wu and Wong, 2019). During these talks, Trump agreed not to impose new tariffs and reduce sanctions on Huawei, while Xi Jinping indicated that they would purchase more US farm products (Rosenfeld, 2019). Although the two countries then tried to manage the process with the Phase-1 Trade Agreement (USTR, 2020), they could not achieve a consistent and efficient result.

¹¹ Examples of such works include “The China Fantasy” written by James Mann (Mann, 2008), “Death by China” by Peter Navarro (Navarro and Autry, 2011) and “The Hundred Year Marathon” by Michael Pillsbury (Pillsbury, 2016).


With the onset of a global pandemic in the world, an economic recession has started and both the United States and China have been significantly affected by this pandemic. China's economic growth in the first quarter of 2020 decreased to 6.8 percent (Nagarajan, 2020). The increasing death toll due to the pandemic in the US and the following economic shrinkage further fueled the competition between the two countries. In particular, Trump administration's rhetoric of accusing China of the outbreak of the pandemic (VOA, 2020) has caused worsening of the relations. The shift of the majority of the US navy to the Asia-Pacific and the strife in almost every area shows that the US has been trying to strengthen its "intensified containment" strategy.

During this period, the United States made a serious move, renamed its largest military command in the Indian Ocean as the "US Indian Pacific Command". The command is home to 375,000 military and civilian personnel (BBC, 2018). The use of the concept of "Indian" instead of "Asia" highlights that the region does not belong to China. Indeed, it is remarkable that the "Indo-Pacific Strategy" report published by the United States in 2018 stated that the Indo-Pacific was "the most critical region for the future for the United States". The Indo-Pacific region, which harbors sixty percent of global trade, shows that India is a key country in the US strategy. The report described China as a revisionist force and emphasized that one of the most important developments of the 21st century has been the rise of China (Department of Defense, 2019a).

In this context, the fact that the US will sell weapons worth \$3 billion to India should be evaluated within the framework of this strategy and in terms of its interest in proxy subjects (SCMP, 2020). In 2018, the "Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement" (COMCASA) was signed, facilitating communication and equipment exchange between the two countries (Panda, 2018). In addition, the United States and India signed another important military agreement on the sharing of sensitive satellite data in 2020 (DW, 2020). At a time when China and India had border problems, this support of the United States to India in the fields of military and intelligence was due to the fact that the US was using this country against China. The fact that the defense agreements between the United States and India exceeded \$15 billion in total from 2008 to 2019 (Lu, 2020) can be demonstrated as evidence to this argument.

The ongoing tension between the United States and China has a similar effect on Taiwan, which has long been a crisis center in the region. The US approval of the sale of military equipment to Taiwan, including 60 F-16s (Capaccio, 2020) has severely strained US-China relations. While China demanded cancellation of this sales and announced that it would otherwise respond, the gradual disappearance of the "strategic uncertainty" (Dalei, 2020) rhetoric on Taiwan indicates that the US is trying to make Taiwan a useful and active proxy subject.

The United States also tried to use NATO as a tool in its containment efforts against China. At the summit held in London in December 2019, China was also raised as an issue and identified as a threat. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated that China's increased military capabilities could have "implications for all allies" and that they should focus on the opportunities and challenges presented by China's rise (Stoltenberg, 2019). In the closing declaration of this summit, article 6 particularly underscored the issues regarding China: "We are aware that China's growing influence and international policies present opportunities and challenges that we must address together as an alliance" (NATO, 2019). Article 7, on the other hand drew attention to the emerging strategic environment and called on "to strengthen the political dimension of NATO" (NATO, 2019). With this summit, the US clearly revealed that NATO needed an update where China is seen as a threat.



Source: (SIPRI, 2020).

Figure 2: Trump-Era Military Expenditures by Years (2016-2020)

Military expenditures in the Trump era have increased compared to past periods. It seems that Trump has failed to keep his promises such as complete military withdrawal from the Middle East and Afghanistan that he made when he took office. Another important reason for the increase in military expenditures is the ongoing global competition with China. Deploying a significant portion of its navy to the Asia Pacific region, the United States feels it has to prepare for this great competition for power rather than cutting the expenditures. However, selling military equipment to the allies of China shows that the US is planning to tackle the issues by means of proxy states.

The ongoing problems between the two countries include the South China Sea. US Secretary of Defense Mark Esper stated that “Beijing has made illegitimate maritime claims” and threatens the sovereignty of its neighbors in the “South China Sea”, adding that “China has become the top military priority and rival of the United States by overcoming Russia” (Esper, 2019). While the Commander of 7th US Fleet said, “Illegal and extensive maritime claims in the South China Sea pose a serious threat to freedom of navigation”, Wu Qian, spokesman for China’s Defense Ministry said that China was “closely monitoring” the activities of the US and Australian armies and had “reached the high alert level” (Wong, 2020).

As can be seen, the United States is careful to use both traditional and non-traditional methods against China. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s statement that Australia will increase its defense budget by \$270 billion over the next decade due to the Chinese threat is another important data (Macmillan and Greene, 2020). Meanwhile, it should be underlined that the United States sent two aircraft carriers, the USS Reagan and USS Nimitz, to the South China Sea for drills at the beginning of July 2020 (Jakes, 2020). The US has not been conducting a military exercise of this magnitude in the region for a very long time, and this manifests that geopolitical competition is deepening and expanding through various means.

It is worth noting that during this period, the United States approved the sale of 105 F-35s worth \$23 billion to Japan (Insinna, 2020) and \$620 million of “missile improvement packages” to Taiwan (Reuters, 2020). Looking at the military expenditures made by the United States during the Trump administration’s period, it can be observed that the expenditures reached \$649 billion in 2018. US spending account for 36 percent of the world’s military expenditures, 2.6 times more than the next highest-spending which is by China (SIPRI, 2019, s. 7). Considering that during the Trump era, the United States heavily sold weapons to its allies in the region, it seems that the US has been trying to overcome its economic weakness since the Iraq and Afghanistan wars by strengthening its proxies in the region.

One of the untraditional fronts of the ongoing competition between the US and China stands out as “technology”. The US identified Huawei, one of China’s state-funded companies, as a “national security threat” (Reuters, 2019) and blacklisted this brand (Bloomberg, 2020). Indeed, blocking this company from doing business caused great outrage by China. One of the reasons why Huawei is particularly accused is that it can access the private information of countries using networks such as 5G (Hamilton, 2020). The US has put significant amount of pressure on the UK to ensure they do not accept the 5G networks, stating that a serious intelligence-related risk has arisen (Wintour, 2020).

More and more experts are noting that the pattern of conflict between the two countries is becoming increasingly complex and spreading into cyber space. In addition, the findings in this direction have started to increase as well. According to Roubini (2020), the global virus outbreak strengthens the position of those who advocate ‘containment of China’ in the US, underlining that the conflict can be carried into the cyber space considering the conventional power asymmetry of the United States and China.

European Central Bank President Christine Lagarde has issued a serious warning that a cyber-attack on European financial markets could cost \$645 billion (Winder, 2020). The two countries are also in strict competition over artificial intelligence. China’s artificial intelligence power appears to be part of a coordinated initiative on the construction of a new world order led by its political administration, while in the United States, the artificial intelligence sector is led by private enterprises. In a 2019 report, the US National Security Commission specifically emphasized that developments in artificial intelligence cannot be separated from the emerging strategic competition with China and developments in the geopolitical field (National Defense, 2019b).

Conclusion

The aim of this study was to define the ambiguities in the current international relations within a conceptual framework. In this line, it is argued that the US-China competition has entered a new era where conventional and non-conventional methods are used together, increasing the probability of conflict. The study focused mainly on China’s competition with the US. The research question of the study was based on the conceptualization of the term Hybrid Cold War. As a result, the concept of Hybrid Cold War was introduced to describe the existing competition in the global field.

The Cold War period and the current Hybrid Cold War (HCW) period have many differences and similarities. The following points stand out as the differences and similarities between the Cold War and HCW:

While there was no economic interdependence between the USSR and the United States during the Cold War, there is economic interdependence between China and the United States in the new Hybrid Cold War period. In addition, there are trade wars. The United States and NATO have deployed navies to the Asia-Pacific and are making moves for the containment of China. China has a significant economic rise compared to the United States. US military expenditures increased by 25% from 2016 to 2019. As a matter of fact, the United States accounts for 36% of the world’s military expenditures.

The United States is using traditional/non-traditional methods simultaneously against China. One of the untraditional fronts is technology. China is more prone to a hybrid warfare style by standing out in areas such as cyber technology. This becomes even more complicated when combined with an unlimited competition for

global hegemony. Regarding trade, the Belt and Road initiative is a project that will take China into Europe and weaken the hand of the United States.

Evaluating the issues listed above and described in detail in the study, it may well be uttered that the 21st century has been marked by the entrance into a period of Hybrid Cold War particularly after September 11, 2001, when the US-China blocs became apparent but not fully formed. This period shows that the ongoing struggle for hegemony between the United States and China can be understood through a new conceptual framework.

The ongoing struggle in almost every field, from technology to space weaponry, from economy to military engagement, shows Cold War-like characteristics, but also tends to show the features of a hybrid war. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the United States and China will largely continue their competition for being a great power in the 21st century within the limits of Hybrid Cold War. Aiming to contribute to the literature in this regard, this study will hopefully lead to different theoretical approaches with new findings in the future thanks to the conceptualization of the concept of Hybrid Cold War.

References

- AA. (2018, 12 February). Pentagon seeks to invest \$550M in PYD/PKK. Retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/pentagon-seeks-to-invest-550m-in-pyd-pkk/1061319>
- Aoi, C., Futamura, M. and Patalano, A. (2019). Introduction 'Hybrid Warfare In Asia: Its Meaning And Shape, *The Pacific Review*, 31(6). 693-713. DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2018.1513548
- Anderlini, J. and Feng, W. (2017, 1 January). Xi Jinping delivers robust defence of globalisation at Davos. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/67ec2ec0-dca2-11e6-9d7c-be108f1c1dce>
- Baker, B. D. (2015, 23 September). Hybrid warfare with chinese characteristics. Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2015/09/hybrid-warfare-with-chinese-characteristics/>
- BBC. (2017a, 20 January). Donald Trump: America first, America first. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-38698654>
- BBC. (2017b, 24 January). Trump executive order pulls out of TPP trade deal. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-38721056>
- BBC. (2018, 31 May). US military renames Pacific Command. Retrieved from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-44312024>
- Beer, T. (2020, 19 December). Trump still won't criticize Russia: Claims massive cyber hack "may be China" but offers no evidence. Retrieved from: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/tommybeer/2020/12/19/trump-still-wont-criticize-russia-claims-massive-cyber-hack-may-be-china-but-offers-no-evidence/?sh=127cc4a708a9>
- Biesheuvel, T. (2018, 4 April). As China fires back in trade war, here are the winners and losers. Retrieved from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-04/as-china-fires-back-in-trade-war-here-are-the-winners-and-losers>
- Bloomberg. (2020, 7 January). Trump's blacklisting of Huawei is failing to halt its growth. Retrieved from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-06/trump-s-blacklisting-of-huawei-is-failing-to-halt-its-growth>
- Buzan, B. (1997). Rethinking Security after the Cold War. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 32(5), 5-28. doi: 10.1177/0010836797032001001.

- Capaccio, A. (2020, 15 August). U.S. formalizes F-16 jet sale to Taiwan with China tensions high. Retrieved from: <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-14/u-s-formalizes-f-16-jet-sale-to-taiwan-with-china-tensions-high>
- Census. Trade in goods with China. Retrieved from: <https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c5700.html#2012>
- CSIS. (2020). Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Retrieved from: <https://amti.csis.org/island-tracker/china>
- Çalışkan, M. (2019). Hybrid warfare through the lens of strategic theory. *Defense & Security Analysis*, 35(1). 40-58. doi: 10.1080/14751798.2019.1565364
- Dalei, J. (2020, 16 October). How China sees the U.S. policy of 'strategic ambiguity' in the Taiwan Strait. Retrieved from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/16/how-china-sees-us-policy-strategic-ambiguity-taiwan-strait/>
- Department of Defense. (2018). Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge. Retrieved from: <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>
- Department of Defense. (2019a, 1 June). Indo-Pacific Strategy Report preparedness, partnerships, and promoting a networked region. Retrieved from: <https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jul/01/2002152311/-1/-1/1/DEPARTMENT-OF-DEFENSE-INDO-PACIFIC-STRATEGY-REPORT-2019.PDF>
- Department of Defense. (2019b, May). National Defense Budget, US Department of Defense. Retrieved from: https://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2020/FY20_Green_Book.pdf
- Department of Defense. (2020). Military and security developments involving the people's republic of China 2020. Retrieved from: <https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF>
- Deutsche Welle. (2020, 27 October). US, India sign defense pact on sharing satellite data. Retrieved from: <https://www.dw.com/en/us-india-sign-defense-pact-on-sharing-satellite-data/a-55404974>
- Dorfman, Zach. (2020, 21 December). China used stolen data to expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe. Retrieved from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/china-stolen-us-data-exposed-cia-operatives-spy-networks/>
- Duffield, J. S. (1995). NATO's functions after the Cold War. *Political Science Quarterly*, 109(5), 763-787.
- Esper, M. (2019, 14 December). Pentagon head says China has become top US military priority, moving past Russia. Retrieved from: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3042083/pentagon-head-says-china-has-become-top-us-military-priority>
- Franck, T. (2018, 2 March). Trump doubles down: 'Trade wars are good, and easy to win'. Retrieved from: <https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/02/trump-trade-wars-are-good-and-easy-to-win.html>
- Fridman, Ofer. (2018). *Russian Hybrid Warfare Resurgence and Politicisation*, Oxford University Press
- Government Accountability Office. (2010, 10 September). National Defence: Hybrid Warfare Retrieved from: <https://www.gao.gov/assets/100/97053.pdf>
- Hamilton, I. A. (2020, 12 February). The US says Huawei has been spying through 'back doors' designed for law enforcement — which is what the US has been pressuring tech companies to do for years Retrieved from: <https://www.businessinsider.com/us-accuses-huawei-of-spying-through-law-enforcement-backdoors-2020-2>
- Hammes, Thomas. (2006). *The Sling and The Stone: On War In The 21st Century*. Minneapolis: Zenith Press.
- History. (2009). Chiang Kai-shek. Retrieved from: <https://www.history.com/topics/china/chiang-kai-shek>

- Hoffman, F. (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies
- Huber, T. (1996). *Compound Wars: The Fatal Knot*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College.
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). If not civilizations, what? paradigms of the post-Cold War world. *Foreign Affairs*, 72(5), 186-194.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (1996). The myth of post-Cold War chaos. *Foreign Affairs*, 75(3), 79-91.
- Insinna, V. (2020, 9 July). US gives the green light to Japan's \$23B F-35 buy. Retrieved from: <https://www.defensenews.com/smr/2020/07/09/us-gives-the-green-light-to-japans-massive-23b-f-35-buy>
- Jakes, L. (2020, 4 July). With Beijing's military nearby, U.S. sends 2 aircraft carriers to South China Sea. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/04/us/politics/south-china-sea-aircraft-carrier.html#click=https://t.co/M8hVjvSQoN>
- Jinping, X. (2017, 18 October). China never seeks hegemony, expansion: Xi. Retrieved from: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-10/18/content_33404757.htm
- Jinping, X. (2013, 23 March). Xi Jinping Calls for the building of new type of international relations with win-win cooperation at the core in a speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. Retrieved from: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpcf1_665694/t1024781.shtml
- Korkmaz, H. (2020a, 2 July). Hybrid warfare and maritime militia in China. Retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/analysis/analysis-hybrid-warfare-and-maritime-militia-in-china/1897259>
- Korkmaz, H. (2020b, 21 December). Kuşak ve Yol girişiminin geleceği: Çin karakterli bir küreselleşme mi? [Future of Belt and Road initiation: A globalization which is characterized with China?]. *Anadolu Agency*. Retrieved from: <https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/analiz/kusak-ve-yol-girisiminin-gelecegi-cin-karakterli-bir-kuresellesme-mi/2083696>
- Lawder, D. and Blanchard, B. (2018, 15 June). Trump sets tariffs on \$50 billion in Chinese goods; Beijing strikes back. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-china-ministry/china-promises-fast-response-as-trump-readies-tariffs->
- Liang, Q. and Xiangsui, W. (1999, February) *Unrestricted Warfare*, Beijing: PLA Literature and Art Publishing, translated by FBIS, Retrieved from: <http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>
- Lightbody, B. (1999). *The Cold War*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Lim, L. (2018). Trump's Protectionism: method to the madness? Retrieved from: <https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10356/88322/1/CO18047.pdf>
- Livermore, D. (2018). China's "Three Warfares" in theory and practice in the South China Sea. Retrieved from: https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2018/03/25/chinas-three-warfares-in-theory-and-practice-in-the-south-china-sea/#_edn5
- Lu, M. (2020, 23 February). China should not blithely ignore US overtures to India. Retrieved from: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1180513.shtml>
- Macmillan, J. and Greene, A. (2020, 30 June). Australia to spend \$270b building larger military to prepare for 'poorer, more dangerous' world and rise of China. Retrieved from: <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-06-30/australia-unveils-10-year-defence-strategy/12408232>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (1990). Why we will soon miss the Cold War. *The Atlantic Monthly*, 266(2), 35-50.
- Miracola, S. (2018, 21 December). Chinese hybrid warfare. Retrieved from: <https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/chinese-hybrid-warfare-21853>
- Mumford, A. (2020). Understanding Hybrid Warfare, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 33(6), 824-827. doi: 10.1080/09557571.2020.1837737

- Murray, W. and Peter R M. (Ed.), (2012). *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting complex opponents from the ancient world to the present*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nagarajan, S. (2020, 17 April). China's economy suffers its first contraction in 28 years, shrinking 6.8% in an 'extraordinary shock' to the global economy. Retrieved from: <https://www.businessinsider.com/china-economy-falls-first-quarter-2020-after-half-century-growth-2020-4>
- Najžer, B. (2020). *The hybrid age international security in the era of hybrid warfare*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- NATO. (2019, December). London Declaration. Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_171584.htm
- NATO. (2018, July). Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation. Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156626.htm
- Nemeth, W. (2002). *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare* (Unpublished Master Thesis). Naval Postgraduate School, California. Retrieved from: <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36699567.pdf>
- NSS. (2017, 18 December). National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Retrieved from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>
- Nye, J. (2020, March). The Dangers of Westlessness. Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/the-dangers-of-westlessness/>
- O'Hanlon, M. (2020, 23 December). Russia, China, and the risks of war: My conversation with General Mark Milley. Retrieved from: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/12/23/russia-china-and-the-risks-of-war-my-conversation-with-general-mark-milley/>
- Panda, A. (2018, September). What the Recently Concluded US-India COMCASA means. Retrieved from: <https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/what-the-recently-concluded-us-india-comcasa-means>
- Pompeo, M. (2018, 4 December). Trump is building a new liberal world order, says Pompeo. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/dec/04/us-president-donald-trump-is-building-a-new-liberal-world-order-says-mike-pompeo>
- Rachman, G. (2020, 1 October). A new cold war: Trump, Xi and the escalating US-China confrontation. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/7b809c6a-f733-46f5-a312-9152aed28172>
- Reuters. (2019, 16 May). Trump administration hits China's Huawei with one-two punch. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trump-telecommunications/trump-administration-hits-chinas-huawei-with-one-two-punch-idUSKCN1SL2QX>
- Reuters. (2020, 10 July). U.S. approves \$620 million missile upgrade package for Taiwan. Retrieved from: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa-defence/us-approves-620-million-missile-upgrade-package-for-taiwan-idUSKBN24B024>
- Roubini, N. (2020, February). The White Swans of 2020. Retrieved from: <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/white-swan-risks-2020-by-nouriel-roubini-2020-02>
- Rosenfeld, E. (2019, 29 June). Trump says he agreed with Xi to hold off on new tariffs and to let Huawei buy US products. Retrieved from: <https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/29/us-china-trade-war-trump-and-xi-meet-at-g-20-summit-in-osaka.html>
- Russel R. D. and Berger H.B. (2020). *Weaponizing the Belt and Road Initiative*. Asia Policy Society Institute. Retrieved from: https://asiasociety.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Weaponizing%20the%20Belt%20and%20Road%20Initiative_0.pdf
- Schoen, D. E. and Kaylan, M. (2015). *Return to Winter: Russia, China, and the New Cold War Against America*. New York & London: Encounter Books.
- SCMP. (2020, 24 February). India pours on pageantry with raucous welcome for Donald Trump. Retrieved from: <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3052068/donald-trump-arrives-india-expecting-biggest-event-theyve-ever>

- SIPRI. (2019). Yearbook 2019. Retrieved from: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf
- SIPRI. (2020). Yearbook 2020. Retrieved from: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/yb20_summary_en_v2.pdf
- Speranza, L. (2020). *A Strategic Concept for Countering Russian and Chinese Hybrid Threats*. Atlantic Council.
- Stoltenberg, J. (2019, December). Doorstep statement. Retrieved from: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171552.htm
- Tennenbaum, J. (2020, 13 December). China's quantum computer a step, not a leap, Retrieved from: <https://asiatimes.com/2020/12/chinas-quantum-computer-a-step-not-a-leap/>
- Trump, D. (2017, January). The Inaugural Address. Retrieved from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/the-inaugural-address>
- Trump, D. and Schwartz, T. (2004). *Trump: The Art of Deal*. New York: Ballantine Books.
- Tzu, S. (1910). *Art of War: The Oldest Military Treatise in the World*. (trans. Lionel Giles). London.
- UN. (2020, September). Growth in United Nations membership, 1945-present. Retrieved from: <https://www.un.org/en/sections/member-states/growth-united-nations-membership-1945-present/index.html>
- USTR. (2020, January). Economic and Trade Agreement Between the Government of The United States of America and The Government of The People's Republic of China. Retrieved from: https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trade_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf
- Xiao, B. (2020, 6 July). Communist China's Silent War Against America. Retrieved from: https://www.theepochtimes.com/communist-chinas-silent-war-against-america_3412704.html
- Vannak, R. and Kimkong, H. (2020). China's Asian dream: Geo-economic strategy (Khmer version). Retrieved from: <https://bkupdates-kh.com/article/2610?fbclid=IwAR1nQGgfnK0-Vby0NYct7Q32pS3QiRzi3Py9K7olPi4mGK mz8yNtBmq4SqU>
- VOA. (2020, 22 September). At UNGA, Trump Blames China for Pandemic. Retrieved from: <https://www.voanews.com/episode/unga-trump-blames-china-pandemic-4427801>
- White House. (2017, June). Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord. Retrieved from: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/>
- Winder, D. (2020, February). "\$645 Billion Cyber Risk Could Trigger Liquidity Crisis", ECB's Lagarde Warns. Retrieved from: <https://www.forbes.com/sites/daveywinder/2020/02/08/645-billion-cyber-risk-could-trigger-liquidity-crisis-ecbs-lagarde-warns/#147a7a747ca8>
- Wintour, P. (2020, 14 February). US urges Britain to take another 'hard look' at letting Huawei into 5G. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/feb/14/us-urges-britain-to-take-another-hard-look-at-letting-huawei-into-5g>
- Wolf, M. (2018, 1 May). Donald Trump declares trade war on China. Retrieved from: <https://www.ft.com/content/dd2af6b0-4fc1-11e8-9471-a083af05aea7>
- Wong, C. (2020, 30 April). China on 'high alert' as 'troublemaker' US patrols South China Sea. *SCMP*. Retrieved from: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3082376/china-high-alert-troublemaker-us-patrols-south-china-sea>
- Wu, W. and Wong, C. (2019, 29 June). Xi-Trump summit in Osaka brings trade truce, more talks and hope for Huawei. Retrieved from: <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3016636/xi-trump-summit-osaka-brings-trade-truce-more-talks-and-hope>
- Yan, G. (2020). The impact of artificial intelligence on hybrid warfare. *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, 31(4), 898-917. doi: 10.1080/09592318.2019.1682908

Genişletilmiş Özet

Amaç

Bu çalışmanın amacı ABD-Çin rekabetini Soğuk Savaş ya da klasik güç rekabeti dışında bir teorik bağlama yerleştirmeyi denemektir. Bu kapsamda Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramını ortaya atan çalışma, ABD-Çin rekabetinde öne çıkan geleneksel ve geleneksel olmayan faktörlere yoğunlaşmaktadır. Hibrit Soğuk Savaş (HSS) kavramının şekillendirdiği kavramsal çerçeveden hareketle 21. yüzyılda ABD-Çin rekabetini tanımlamak ve detaylandırmak hedeflenmiştir.

Bu doğrultuda, uluslararası ilişkiler literatürüne katkıda bulunarak, küresel siyasetteki mevcut rekabetin karmaşık doğasını anlamada faydalı olacağı düşünülmektedir. Günümüzde küresel ölçekte gerçekleşen keskin rekabetin ne anlama geldiği ve soğuk savaşın ne olup ne olmadığı konusunda kavramsal bir ayırım yapmak için bağlamsal bir anlayışa ihtiyaç vardır. Bu çerçevede ABD-Çin ilişkilerini anlamak için ABD Başkanı Donald Trump ve ÇHC Devlet Başkanı Xi Jinping'in başkanlık dönemleri analiz edilmiştir.

Çalışma; 21. yüzyılda ABD-Çin rekabetinin özellikleri nelerdir ve bunu değerlendirmek için hangi kavramsal çerçeve kullanılabilir? Hibrit Soğuk Savaş (HSS) bu detaylandırma için kavramsal bir çerçeve sunuyor mu? şeklindeki araştırma sorularına cevap aramıştır.

Tasarım ve Yöntem

Çalışmada nitel araştırma yöntemi benimsenmiş ve veri toplama tekniği olarak doküman incelemesi, veri analiz tekniği olarak ise içerik analizi kullanılmıştır. Nitel araştırma özellikle sosyal bilimlerde daha detaylı ve derinlemesine bilgilere ulaşmak için öne çıkan bir araştırma modelidir.

Nitel araştırmalar daha çok veriler üzerinde ölçüm yapan ve ölçmeye dayanan bir model kullanmaktadır. Nitel araştırma ise daha çok tanımlamaya dönük teorik bir zemin üzerinde çalışmaktadır. Teori oluşturmayı hedefleyen bir çerçevede sosyal olguları bağlı oldukları çevre içerisinde anlamayı deneyen bir araştırma yöntemidir. Algılardan, fikirlerden, izlenimlerden ve görüşlerden oluşan bir araştırma yöntemi olarak bilinmektedir.

Nitel araştırma yöntemleri arasında en yaygın veri toplama tekniği olarak gözlem, görüşme ve yazılı dokümanların incelenmesi kullanılmaktadır. Bu çalışmada da veri toplama tekniği olarak doküman incelemesi kullanılmıştır. Bu dokümanların belirlenmesi ve tasnifi sırasında iki ülkenin resmi kurumları tarafından yayınlanan birincil kaynakların söz konusu kaynakçada yer alması için özen gösterilmiştir.

Çalışmada öncelikle teorik bir çerçeve inşa edilmiş ve Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramı hem Hibrit Savaş hem de Soğuk Savaş kavramları çerçevesinde incelenmiştir. Bu inceleme sonucunda Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramı ileri sürülmüş ve teorik bir zemin üzerinde söz konusu kavramın ana hatları ortaya konmuştur.

Bununla birlikte ABD Başkanı Donald Trump ve ÇHC Başkanı Xi Jinping dönemleri birincil kaynaklar üzerinden doküman incelemesine tabi tutulmuştur. Bu çerçevede iki dönem karşılaştırılmış ve ekonomik ile askeri verilerin analizi sonucunda çıkarımlar yapılmıştır.

Çalışma üç bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüm, Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramını detaylandırmıştır. İkinci bölüm, Trump-Xi döneminde Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramını incelemiştir. Üçüncü bölüm, Çin'in ABD ile rekabetine ilişkin bulgulara odaklanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede bu bölümde bulunan ekonomik ve askeri veriler çalışmanın temel analiz kaynağını oluşturmaktadır.

Bulgular

Verilerin analizi ve kavramsal arařtırmalar sonucunda ulařılan bulgular alıřmanın blmleri erevesinde incelendiĐinde;

alıřmanın ilk blm Hibrit SoĐuk Savař kavramını incelemiřtir. Yapılan kavramsal arařtırma ve modelleme sonucunda SoĐuk Savař dnemi ile mevcut Hibrit SoĐuk Savař (HSS) dneminin birok farklılıĐı ve benzerliĐi olduĐu ortaya ıkmıřtır. SoĐuk Savař dneminde SSCB ile ABD arasında ekonomik bir karřılıklı baĐımlılık yoktur. Fakat yeni Hibrit SoĐuk Savař dneminde in ile ABD arasında ekonomik bir karřılıklı baĐımlılık sz konusudur.

Bununla beraber iki lkenin birbirlerine ynelik rekabetleri erevesinde geleneksel ve geleneksel olmayan yntemleri birarada kullandıkları grlmektedir. Geleneksel olmayan cephelerden biri teknolojidir. DiĐer bir cephe ise ticaret iliřkileri zerinden kotarılan keskin rekabettir. Bu kapsamda kresel hegemonya leĐinde srdrlen rekabetin hibrit bir leĐe doĐru kaydığı grlmektedir. Bu kapsamda teknoloji ve ticaret alanında ortaya ıkan sz konusu bulguların bu lek deĐiřimine iřaret ettiĐi deĐerlendirilmektedir.

İkinci blmde ise ABD Bařkanı Donald Trump ve HC Devlet Bařkanı Xi Jinping dnemleri erevesinde Hibrit SoĐuk Savař kavramı detaylandırılmıřtır. ABD'nin SoĐuk Savař sonrası tek kutuplu kresel dzen ierisindeki konumu 2001 yılında yařanan 11 Eyll saldırları ve 2008 yılında yařanan kresel finansal kriz sonrasında ařınmaya bařlamıřtır. Afganistan ve Irak savařlarının ABD'ye toplam maliyeti trilyonlarca doları bulurken finansal anlamda savunma cephesinde konvansiyonel seeneklerini azaltmasına sebep olmuřtur.

Bu kapsamda OrtadoĐu ve Afrika gibi blgelerde bulunan askeri varlıklarını azaltan ve tm odaĐını Asya-Pasifik'e kaydıran ABD'nin ticaret savařları gibi geleneksel olmayan alanlarda in'e ynelik bir rekabet srdrdĐu grlmektedir. in de aynı řekilde son dnemde yayınladıĐı gvenlik ve strateji raporlarında yapay zeka, otonom sistemler, kuantum ve biyoteknoloji gibi askeri potansiyele sahip kilit teknolojilere nclk etmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu bulguların gsterdiĐi gibi geleneksel seenekleri tek bařına deĐerlendirmek yerine gelenek dıřı yntemlerin de kresel rekabet konusu edildiĐi grlmektedir.

nc blmde ise in'in ABD ile rekabetine iliřkin bulgulara odaklanılmıřtır. Bu blmde in ve ABD arasında devam eden ekonomik ve askeri rekabete ynelik ayrıntılı veriler ortaya konmuřtur. zellikle resmi kurumlar tarafından yayınlanan strateji ve gvenlik belgeleri, askeri yapılar ile ilgili ayrıntılı raporlar ve baĐımsız arařtırma kuruluşların verileri kullanılmıřtır.

Bu veriler ıřığında iki lkenin de yapay zeka ve kuantum teknolojisi gibi alanlarda arařtırmalarını yoĐunlařtırdığı ve dolayısı ile savař kavramı erevesinde geleneksel olmayan bir leĐe kaydıkları deĐerlendirilmektedir.

Sınırlılıklar

Arařtırmanın zaman sınırlaması bulunmaktadır. alıřma, ABD Bařkanı Donald Trump ve HC Devlet Bařkanı Xi Jinping dnemleri ile sınırlandırılmıřtır. Bunun nedeni iki lke arasındaki kresel rekabetin bu dnemde alevlenmesi ve zellikle hibrit alana geiřin bu devirde yařanmasıdır. Dolayısı ile optimize edilmiř bir alıřma elde etmek iin yeni dnemde ortaya ıkan bulgular 21. Yzyıl leĐinde nasıl bir eĐilim gsterebilir sorusunun cevabı nem kazanmaktadır. alıřma bu soruya kavramsal ve teorik bir ereve ierisinde yanıt aramayı hedeflemiřtir.

Öneriler (Teorik, Uygulama ve Sosyal)

Küresel hegemonya mücadelesi savaş alanında yaşanan teorik ve pratik dönüşümler eşliğinde giderek gelenek dışı alanlara yayılma eğilimi göstermektedir. Çin ve Rusya gibi küresel aktörlerin özellikle Soğuk Savaş sonrasında bu eğilimi dikkate aldığı ve gelenek dışı alanlarda teknolojik, askeri ve ekonomik kapasite geliştirmeye gittikleri görülmüştür. Bu bağlamda söz konusu eğilimi teorik bir zeminde realize etmek için kavramsal çalışmaların artması ve küresel hegemonya mücadelesine daha teorik bir perspektiften bakmanın gerekliliği kendisini öne çıkarmaktadır.

Özgün Değer

ABD ve Çin arasında devam eden rekabet teknolojiye uzay silahlarına, ekonomiden askeri angajmana kadar hemen her alanda kendisini göstermektedir. Bu rekabet Soğuk Savaş benzeri özellikler göstermekle birlikte, hibrit savaşın özelliklerini de gösterme eğilimindedir. Dolayısıyla ABD ve Çin'in 21. yüzyılda büyük güç olma rekabetini Hibrit Soğuk Savaş sınırları içinde büyük ölçüde sürdüreceklerini söylemek mümkündür.

Çalışma Hibrit Soğuk Savaş kavramını tanıtmakta ve ABD-Çin rekabetinde öne çıkan geleneksel ve geleneksel olmayan faktörlere odaklanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede literatüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlayan bu çalışma mevcut uluslararası system içerisindeki belirsizlikleri kavramsal bir çerçevede tanımlamış ve ABD-Çin rekabetinin konvansiyonel ve konvansiyonel olmayan yöntemlerin bir arada kullanıldığı yeni bir döneme girdiğini ileri sürmektedir.

Yeni dönemde çok kutuplu dünya düzenine yönelik yaklaşımları pekiştirme çabaları mevcut sistemde aşınmaya neden olmuştur. Bu nedenle, son zamanlarda ortaya çıkan “aşınma döneminin” doğru bir şekilde anlaşılması için bağlamsal bir çerçeveye ihtiyaç vardır. Bu doğrultuda, bu kavramsal çerçevenin, uluslararası ilişkiler literatürüne katkıda bulunarak, küresel siyasetteki mevcut rekabetin karmaşık doğasını anlamada faydalı olacağı düşünülmektedir.

Araştırmacı Katkısı: Hüzeyin KORKMAZ (%50), İdris TURAN (%50).