

## **Political Performance and Provincial Governors' Promotion in China from 1999 to 2007**

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### *Abstract*

This paper mainly focuses on the mobility of the 31 highest Chinese administrative governors from 1999 to 2007, which includes their promotions, remains and literal transfer and so on. Through collecting and analyzing the information of those governors' personal as well as the provincial economic and social development conditions by logit regression model. It shows that the popular theory by Professor Zhou that supports a connection between cadres' promotion and economic performance has its own limited. This paper therefore has given a more comprehensive analysis on the possible factors that influence the promotion of the highest Chinese provincial governors.

*Key words:* Provincial Governors, Promotion, Political Performance

### **Introduction: China's elite politics**

Chinese domestic political structure, to some extent, can be understood as a tight system constructing by several levels of Chinese political bureaucrats. Provincial governors are in the second level of political power systems. Under the logic of government structure copied from the system of Chinese Communist Party, it is well known that the political system includes two lines, which are the party system and administrative system. The core of Chinese politics is just as the famous slogan says, "Keep to the path of political development under socialism with Chinese

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characteristics and integrate the leadership of CCP”<sup>1</sup>, the bureaucrats who worked in the party system therefore usually have much more power.

Many scholars have argued a lot on highest level of Chinese political elites, especially on the cadres in the central government. The researches on the provincial leaders are rare. However, the role of provincial leaders in Chinese political process becomes more important than before. As the statistic shows, the categories of the members in 16<sup>th</sup> Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was changing with a high proportion of provincial leaders. Almost 43% members of CCCPC are provincial leaders, 34% are from the central government and 19% are deputies of People's Liberation Army (PLA). At last 4% are occupied by the leaders from state-owned enterprises.<sup>2</sup> I think it is necessary to start a deep research on provincial leaders since it has played a significant part in Chinese political progress.

### **Problem Statement**

It is well know that personnel control is one of the most important ways for socialist states to govern. Personnel control mechanism, which means the control of cadres' promotion, literal transfer and demotion, help the communist party select and encourage the proper cadres who submit themselves to the party. This partly reflects the political essence of those countries. For example, if a central government officially appointed bureaucrats by one's education and capabilities rather than one's political faith and ethnicity. In the other words, the government function is based on secular and rational way therefore it focuses on the obvious political performance than ideology and faith.

The attempts which try to make a clear picture of what decides the provincial leaders' promotion, on the one hand, would make a clear of the way of Chinese government. The mainly questions are as follow. What are the factors that decide a provincial leader's promotion? Are these the secular and rational criterions or the ideological identity? Through a comprehensive observation on the Chinese provincial governors' mobility, on the other hand, this paper will seek for whether there is a

connection between economic performance and promotion or not. By the logit regression analysis, this paper will answer the two main questions.

It is necessary to define the main target of this research before starting the analysis. Province lies in the second level of China's political hierarchy. As of today, excluding Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau, China has 31 provincial units which include 4 centrally administrated cities, 22 provinces and 5 autonomous regions. As mentioned that Chinese political cadres can be divided into two categories. One belongs to the administrative system while another is in the party system. The former one is called as governors or deputy governors and the latter one often named as secretary or deputy secretary. The provincial leading groups therefore are composed by one governor, one secretary and every two deputy governors and deputy secretaries. Here, this paper is only focusing on the provincial governors in the 31 provinces.

### **Literature Review**

The literatures which studied on the Chinese provincial cadres are different in three periods. Before the economic reform (1978), most of observers focused on the Chinese central cadres, especially interested in the one who occupied an important position in the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPC or in the State Council and the CPC Central Military Commission.

At that time, scholars liked to use the anthropological or historical research method to disclose the experiences and the characteristics of those high-level leaders. Through comparing their distinct dispositions and political attitudes, researches explained the political phenomenon at that period. The book of *Cambridge History of China, The People's Republic* (1987) written by J. K. Fairbank and R. Macfarquhar is one of the most famous one. It is emphasized the different idiosyncrasies between the CPC first generational leaders, especially Mao Zedong (Mar.1943-Sept.1996) and the new generational leaders, as Chairman Liu Shaoqi (Apri.1959-1966) and Deng Xiaoping.<sup>3</sup> In the writer's opinion Mao is like a politician with a strong political faith and lack of the instrumental rationality, whereas Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping are

like technical bureaucrats. As the two kinds of political elites have different opinions on how to govern the new China, an inevitable conflict over power were happened between them. Mao disagreed with the policies which were adopted by Liu and had a feeling of losing power, so he used the culture revolution that he may regain his power.<sup>4</sup> It is obviously that researchers on that period focus on political individuals and the research methods are simply. During the Cold War, Studies at that period, in due course, have great limit both on information and data.

There were no other unique researches on this topic until Paul Wong analyzed the mobility of the Chinese provincial cadres in a quantitative method in 1976. He disclosed that the mobility of those elites is affected not only by the ideology but also the political loyalty, organizational affiliation and local ties.<sup>5</sup>

With big change of Chinese society and politics since 1978, the observers on Chinese political elites were becoming more versatile and richer than before. The reason of those changes is as follow. Since the central government decentralized its power to lower government levels, especially by the reform in the financial and personnel system.<sup>6</sup> Local government therefore took a bigger responsibility and indeed it has made a huge contribution for Chinese economic development. With it, the number of local officials increased. At the same time, local governments became more autonomous than ever. The local cadres, especially the one who worked in prefectural (city) level, were widespread investigated and analyzed by observers. Although there are scholars such as Cheng Li and David Bachman<sup>7</sup> did an excellent research in prefectural (city) level, the papers on provincial elites were still rare.

Thanks to Professor Zang Xiaowei (1991) whose paper focused on the patrimonial relationship refers to the provincial elites' mobility made up the losses. According to his observation, most of the provincial leaders were the children of pre-leaders in central government. For example, the Governor in Henan province was the son of Former chairman Liu Shaoqi at that time.<sup>8</sup> It means that the central government neglected the ancient appointment regulation "hui bi" (withdrawal system) which assured that the relatives of officials were excluded in government

appointments, since the trend of decentralization. The direct result is the localism reappeared in provincial governments. By the way, the new appointed and promoted cadres are more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and professionally more competent than before. Gradually this new criteria let many veteran cadres be replaced by more professional and revolutionary younger cadres who had been educated.

By noticing those changes, some researchers concluded that Chinese bureaucracy has changed to rational bureaucracy, the ideological party hicks were replaced by the technocrats. But those opinions can't convince all the others. Susan Shirk insists that the patrimonial and factional relationship had a great power to decide the mobility of Chinese officials. She thinks "the provincial leaders as part of an electorate that shapes the power and policy considerations of central leadership".<sup>9</sup> But there is still a question that on how much extent the provincial elites were influenced by the patrimonial and factional relationship. As concerns this question, I think it is important to distinguish the provincial governors and provincial secretaries, the criteria to select and promote a cadre should be different in the two systems.

As mentioned the mobility of provincial leaders in China, it is unavoidable to neglect the book *Chinese Provincial Leaders, Economic Performance and Political Mobility Since 1949*, written by Bo Zhiyue. This book provides a comprehensive research on provincial leaders' mobility by quantitative analysis. It finds that "provincial leaders with central origins indeed tend to follow a different path of political mobility from that of provincial leaders with factionalism. This evident by no means supports the factionalism model."<sup>10</sup> Obviously this conclusion is different from Zang Xiaowei (1991). Furthermore, this book shows that economic performance especially revenue contributions are more important than GDP which influence the mobility of provincial leaders.

Last but not least, I'd like refer to a recent research on the promotion of Chinese cadres by Professor Zhou Lian. Compared with Bo Zhiyu's analysis that based on the data from 1949 to 1998. He believes that Chinese provincial leaders GDP

performance is the crucial criterion for their promotion through a quantitative research study.<sup>1 1</sup> In Zhou's papers, he asserts that it has a strong likelihood between the promotions of provincial leaders and GDP (especially the average GDP growth) by the Probit Model. He emphasizes that the huge local economic growth is due to the promotion as a kind of political incentive. To some extent, he explained the reason of Chinese economic miracle, that is, due to the successful personnel control, which brings a kind of political incentives for political cadres to develop the local economy.<sup>1 2</sup>

Zhou Lian's research has a subtle difference from Bo Zhiyue. In detail it is as follow:

- Bo Zhiyue analyzes all kinds of provincial leaders include the secretary and governors and the deputy one from 1949 to 1998. Zhou Lian observes the provincial leaders between 1979 and 1995.
- Compared with Bo Zhiyue's study, Zhou doesn't observe the revenue contribution
- Bo Zhiyue uses the multinomial Logit analysis whereas Zhou Lian chooses the Probit Model analysis.

This paper will continue their studies try to solve those arguments.

### **Method IRB & Research Design**

This paper collects the data of the provincial governors' (administrational leaders) personal information and basic social information in 31 provinces from 1999 to 2007. The data of governors' personal information are downloaded from [www.xinhua.com](http://www.xinhua.com), google and baidu. The data of the economic and social information of each province are from the statistical yearbooks.

The research method adopts the multinomial Logit analysis. The variable Y is categorized into four types, which includes *promotion*, *remaining in office* (still occupying the previous position), *lateral transfer and termination* (includes retirement, demotion or death). At the same time, it is necessary to illustrate the ways

of getting promotion for governors. Approximately, there are five possible positions are higher than provincial governors, which means to get equal-ranking position in ministries or commissions in the center; to be a provincial secretary; to be a member of the politburo or the politburo standing committee; to be vice-premiership; or get into the state council. This paper defines the termination as any departure from the governorship without a lateral transfer or promotion. The categories of Y variable in this paper are different from Zhou Lian's research. The latter defines the Y variable into three: the promotion, the termination and the "same level". Here, the "same level" neglects the differences between governors' lateral transfer and remain.

Variable X which is divided into two categories. One is the governors' basic personal information, which includes governors' gender, age, party-age, ethnicity, educational background, academic majors and working experience. Party age means how long a governor has been joined the CPC that may test the criterion of a loyalty. The connection between the promotion and party age shows whether central government emphasizes the ideological and party loyalty or not. Education background is in an order from lower to higher education: high school; below bachelor; bachelor; bachelor (on-job); Master; Master (on-job). Major is divided into two types, the B.A. Management science and Engineering Management science.<sup>1 3</sup> I think to some extent, this kind of category can distinguish the technical bureaucrat and ideological politician. Generally the one who major in engineering management science is more likely to be a political leader in China. A famous example is the former chairman Jiang Zemin. Working experience is the indicator which may illustrate patrimonial and factional relationships of a governor that mainly has two paths, Worked in the central government or in the Communist Youth League (CYL).

Another type of variable X refers to social and economic development in a province. It includes the revenue contributions and the average GDP within a leader's tenure. Besides that serious accidental losses are also considered in this paper, since it may influence the governors' promotion. For example, the governor in Shanxi was demoted because of a big traffic accident.

The control variables in this paper are per capita incomes and population rate in a province.

### **Research Hypotheses**

According to research design, it proposes some hypotheses as follow.

- ***Age and Party Age***

On the 3rd Session of the 11th CPC Meeting, Deng Xiaoping emphasized that the cadres should be more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and professionally more competent.<sup>14</sup> The CPC abolished the lifetime appointment of party and government officials and installed a mandatory retirement system in 1980. Since then, the younger cadre may have the more political opportunity than veteran cadre.

Party age which shows a political loyalty is also influenced by this policy change. It seems that the one who joined the party earlier has many advantages over others. However, with cadres are becoming much younger, at that moment it may not as important as before. At last, it is better to choose one of them while analyzing, since age and party age are a pair of interaction factors.

- ***Gender and Ethnicity***

It is a generally common sense in China that the minorities and females have a kind of special advantage. This advantage mainly appears in representatives' ratio of the People's Congress and the CPPCC. In my views, it won't be a key factor in the administration branch (for provincial governors) where has different criteria from the legislative body. However since the minority policy, many autonomous minority provinces, such as Tibet, Xinjiang, Guangxi, Yunnan, Ningxia Autonomous Region, all the first governors are minorities compared with the secretaries are often Han.

- ***Educational Background***

According to the basic data analysis as follow, it is easy to see that most governors graduated with bachelor degree. The number of governors who get the master or PHD is highly too, though most of which are on-the-job one. It presumes



that the governor with higher degree tends to be promoted than others, as a quote from the four appointive principles that "the cadres should be more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and professionally more competent."<sup>15</sup> Generally speaking, most of leaders often get an on-job degree in the Party School of the CPC Central Committee before they enter into the high level, so one with on-job degree may get promotion easier.

▪ *Academic Majors*

Most governors major in engineering management science. It seems that this academic major is favorable by the central government. So it presumes that governor who studied in engineering management science is more likely get promoted than in B.A. management science.

▪ *Working Experience*

Professor Zhou Lian and Bo Zhiyue used "worked in central" as an indicator to testify the provincial leaders' promotion. However they neglect the working experience in the Communist Youth League (CYL). Some scholars distinguished two political factions in China, which belong to the CLY or the Crown Prince Party. As the Chairman of PRC Hu Jintao who had worked in the CYL for a long time, many scholars consider that he prefers cadres who worked in the CYL than any other department. In my views, both the working experience in center and CYL are a kind of advantage for governors.

▪ *Revenue Contribution*

As to Bo Zhiyue, the revenue contribution is the most important factor that influences the provincial leaders' mobility. It will be testified whether it is still true between 1999 and 2007.

▪ *Average GDP in a Governor's Tenure*

As to Professor Zhou Lian, a governor's political performance is mainly reflected by the economic development in his province. Although it seems easily understood that a governor who made the highest average GDP in his tenure may be promoted faster than others, it will be test here with other indicators.

▪ ***Serious Accidental Losses***

It is better to begin with a piece of news *China forces governors of Shanxi Province to resign* in September of 2008.

*The governor and deputy governor of Shanxi Province lost their jobs Sunday after at least 254 villagers were killed when their homes were engulfed in a cascade of muddy iron ore waste from the reservoir of an unlicensed mine.<sup>16</sup>*

According to this report, a tremendous devastating accident indeed affects Chinese cadres' mobility. That kind of accidents would make huge economic loss and weaken the legitimacy of governors. It is a new trial to consider the serious accidental losses as an indicator in all kinds of research on governors' promotion.

### **Finding**

Through a binary logistic regression and a multinomial Logit model analysis by SPSS, it represents results as follow.

#### **Model Analysis 1: Binary Logistic Regression**

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	<b>Promotion</b>
<b>Constant</b>	<b>4.470***</b>
<b>Revenue Contributions</b>	<b>.017*</b>
<b>Per Capita Province Incomes (Billion)</b>	<b>-2.576</b>
<b>Population Rate</b>	<b>-12.439</b>
<b>Serious accidental losses</b>	<b>-19.278*</b>
<b>Average GDP</b>	<b>-.137****</b>
<b>Party Age</b>	<b>-.079***</b>
<b>Gender</b>	<b>-21.022</b>
<b>Ethnicity</b>	<b>-.085</b>
<b>Academic Major</b>	<b>-.705*</b>
<b>Education</b>	<b>.399**</b>
<b>Centre Connection</b>	<b>-.159</b>
<b>CYL Connection</b>	<b>-1.485**</b>

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Note :\*\*\*\*<0.001; \*\*\* <0.01; \*\* <0.05; \* <0.10

Binary logistic regression only analyzes the likelihood between the various

variables X (value=1) and the variable Y (=promotion) which isn't compared with other variables Y (=remaining in office, literal transfer, termination). This model shows that the average growth rate of GDP within a governor's tenure (-.137\*\*\*\*) and his party age (-.079\*\*\*\*) have significant relations with promotion.

The results of multinomial Logit Analysis which gives a comprehensive analysis on the likelihood between all possible variable Y includes promotion, remaining in office, and literal transfer and termination (as a reference) and variables X.

**Model Analysis 2: Multinomial Logit Analysis**

	Promoted	Remain	Literal Transfer
Incept	-.510	10.886	-.651
<b>Revenue Contributions</b>	.065****	.029	.082****
<b>Per Capita Province Incomes</b>	4.510	11.364*	2.734
<b>Population Rate</b>	-36.325**	-97.283***	-20.117
<b>Serious accidental losses</b>	-35.185**	58.803**	-49.634**
<b>Average GDP</b>	-26.283****	51.462**	-14.149**
<b>Party Age</b>	-.136***	-.431***	-.084*
<b>Gender</b>			
Male	13.918	-.802	12.381
Female	0 <sup>c</sup>	0 <sup>c</sup>	
<b>Ethnicity</b>			
Han	-.402	-2.969**	-.030
Minority	0 <sup>c</sup>	0 <sup>c</sup>	
<b>Academic Majors</b>			
B.A. Management Science	-.633	-2.784***	-2.358****
Engineering Management Science	0 <sup>c</sup>		
<b>Education Background</b>			
Below Bachelor	-4.426***	-26.565	-1.205
Bachelor	-3.726****	-5.862***	-3.462****
Bachelor(On-Job)	14.126	-4.614	14.952
Master	3.861***	-6.193**	-19.042
Master(On-Job)	0 <sup>c</sup>		
<b>Working Experience</b>			
No Connections With Center	.031	4.996	-1.756**
Connections With Center	0 <sup>c</sup>		

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<b>Connections With CYL</b>	<b>-.451</b>	<b>-3.060**</b>	<b>-2.04*</b>
<b>No Connections With CYL</b>	<b>0<sup>c</sup></b>		
<b>-2Log Likelihood</b>	<b>406.721</b>		
<b>Goodness of Fit</b>	<b>329.935</b>		
<b>No. of cases</b>	<b>472</b>		

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Reference : Others (Retirement, Demotion, Death) .

Note :\*\*\*\*<.001; \*\*\* <.01; \*\* <.05; \* <.10

The second model shows that the revenue contribution as well as promotion (.065\*\*\*\*) and literal transfer (.082\*\*\*\*) have a strong likelihood. The average growth rate of GDP during a leader's tenure is significant but a negative relation (-26.283\*\*\*\*). The likelihood between promotion and party age is (-.136\*\*\*). Gender, race and academic major do not have a significant relationship with promotions. However, specialized in B.A. management science has a strong likelihood which means a governor who majored in that is likely to be remained (-2.784\*\*\*) or be laterally transferred (2.358\*\*\*\*). The former is positive but the latter is negative. It means that a governor who studied in B.A. management science would like to be transferred rather than remained in his position. Education background and promotion have a significant likelihood. The likelihood between Bachelor degree and promotion is (-3.726\*\*\*\*), with master degree is (3.861\*\*\*).

### **Discussion and Implications**

Through describing the model, it will discuss those significant relations between two types of variables in this paper.

- Revenue Contribution, GDP Performance, Accidental Losses and Governor's Promotion

In Bo Zhiyue's book, it uses the multinomial logit regression method as same as I have done in this paper. This paper to some extent is just a further study of his work, since his data are stopped in 1998 and I start from 1999. Although he did a complete research because he focused on all types of provincial leaders including secretary and administration, I only agree with his conclusion partly. He considers the revenue contribution as a crucial factor to affect a provincial leader's promotion. Through my two models analysis, it is found that both revenue contribution and average GDP within governors' tenure, the latter is neglected by Bo, have a strong likelihood with a governor's promotion. Revenue contribution has significant likelihood with promotion and literal transfer, and it influences a governor's promotion (.065\*\*\*\*) and literal transfer (.082\*\*\*\*), but has no significant effect with remain original

position (.029).

At the same time, the significance of average GDP performance as itself doesn't testify Professor Zhou Lian's model which proposes that Chinese central government established a personnel control system because of that urges the local officials to develop economy can conclude that a governor shall get a promotion since he accomplished economic development. Since there is serious loopholes existed in his paper that he didn't observe the type of remain position (variable Y) and revenue contribution (variable X).<sup>17</sup> Compared with promotion, this paper finds that a governor with a brilliant average GDP performance tend to remain in his position. This finding to some extent overthrows the Zhou Lian's conclusion. The data analysis shows obviously that likelihood between promotion and the GDP performance is negative but a strong significant value (-26.283\*\*\*\*), at the same time, there is a relative significant positive value (51.462\*\*) between remain original position and average GDP growth performance. In my opinion, it makes sense that a governor with an outstanding average GDP growth performance has less opportunity to get promotion than remain his title since he had developed the local economy.

As to all the researches on promotion of provincial leaders, the serious accidental losses as a indicator that is analyzed firstly and only in this paper. This indicator has a relative likelihood with promotion that is (-35.185\*\*). It means that a governor has more opportunities to get promotion with less serious accidental losses.

- Personal Information and Governor's Promotion

First of all, party age has a strong likelihood with promotion that is (-.136\*\*\*\*) according to the model. The age and party age as I have mentioned that they have an effect of interaction which means they tend to influence each other. Because of that I only chose the party age and put it into modal analysis. As the final value (-.136\*\*\*\*) shows that a younger governor would get promotion easier no matter his party age. Although this result justifies my hypothesis, it doesn't mean younger age has a definite advantage on governors' promotion. It must be emphasized that governors' promotion as itself is a comprehensive and complex political decision. Furthermore,

the policy of the cadres should be more revolutionary, younger in average age, better educated and professionally more competent that has adopted many years ago is criticized by many observers. Some official website commented that the appointive principles of cadres should be modified by “new cadre policy”, which contended that new principle has to be democratic, transparent, and respect the rule of law.<sup>18</sup> However, the model shows that the four appointive principles still has significant likelihood with governors' promotion. It means that their advocacy isn't adopted. The other principles will be discussed later.

Secondly, gender and ethnicity have no significant likelihood with promotion. Major of B.A. management science has no strong likelihood with governors' promotion. However it has a stronger likelihood with lateral transfer(-2.358\*\*\*\*). It shows that majored in B.A management science won't make any advantage for one's promotion. Under industrialization, obviously there is a great need of technical experts in China. So major of engineering management science seems more practical than another kind of major. It makes sense that provincial governor who majors in engineering management science and also has political experience that is the so-called tech-bureaucrat is needed to the development China. Therefore it provides many opportunities for provincial governors.

Third, as to the education background, master degree (3.861\*\*\*) has a significant positive likelihood with governors' promotion, whereas the latter has a negative likelihood with bachelor degree (-3.726\*\*\*\*). To some extent, it testified the four appointive principles that the better educated younger leaders would like to get appointment as well as promotion.

As mentioned above, on-job education has a stronger likelihood with governor's promotion. However, the data analysis doesn't prove the hypothesis. Therefore, in my views, it is necessary to make a clear of on-job study further. As to cadres, there are two motives for them to start an on-job education basically. One is an active reaction of trying to enlarge their political capitals. The other is a passive activity which is a necessary path for a promoted leader with lower education. Only the second motive

could have a significant likelihood with governors' promotion. It doesn't prove hypothesis since there are some drawbacks on data categorizing. The conclusion here is just that a governor with higher education has advantages no matter the education is on-job or not.

In my opinion, I think a governor who accepts the further education in CPC School may get promotion, although the argument itself needs to be tested. Since provincial governor is a high level leader, the central government needs one with rich experience and knowledge as well as political loyalty. The Party School of the CPC Central Committee is an institution where provides the theory study and bring up political loyalty. Because of culture revolution, the university reenrolled students since 1977. Most of provincial governors who took office between 1999 and 2007 only had a bachelor degree (see graph 1). As to the center that prefers one with higher education and political loyalty in principle. So it is the best way for quasi-governors study in the Party School.

Last but not least, this paper will focus on political network which analyzed by indicators of working experience. The model shows significance of working experience neither in central government nor in CYL. One of explanation is that it means the Chinese political network is turning to a modern bureaucracy with instrumental rationality. It means that central government pays more attentions on one's age and education and political performance than political kinship (*guan xi*). However, I think the indicator (working experience) isn't equal to the political network, and for the latter, it is a huge and difficult work to collect all the governors' kinship. So it is hard to say that there is a strong correlation between political network and governors' mobility but to say governor's mobility has less relation with working either in center or CYL. The labels as faction of CYL and prince party are too exaggerated.

### **Limitations and Directions for Future Study**

This paper in due course has its own weakness. First is the limit of data. Although it is



definitely enough to conduct a model analysis by 472 data, the missing values are too many. In the end there only has 261 valid data. Fortunately, it is a common thing in sociological researches, since it is hard to create a proper indicator, and data in social research are always questionable, besides that it is hard to conduct any experiments as it does in natural science. Governors' personal data are hardly found since the Chinese database isn't mature and sometimes it even has contradiction.

Secondly, it is dissatisfactory that I only take the average GDP within tenure as his political performance, but neglect a comparison with ex-governors' political performance.

At last, as mentioned in last part, in my opinion, the biggest problem here is that there is no proper indicator which would reflect the political network, and many cases show that cadres' kinship indeed plays an important role in China, and it is hard to believe that china has a rational bureaucratic system.

## **Conclusion**

Before tackling with Chinese social and economic issue, politics is the main point. Cadre control is an important way for centralization of authority and macro-control. Some western scholars define a main instrument of party control of leadership and appointment in institution in China as the *nomenclature*. Generally, it can be easily observed by summing up and analyzing the policy of cadres' appointment. However, as to the special Chinese bureaucratic culture and network (Guan Xi), in my opinion, it is hard to make a clear of the system of cadres' appointment and promotion. On the contrary, it is a better choice through observing the cadres' personal information and political performance. Therefore, it takes the provincial governors as a research objective and makes a comprehensive analysis on their political promotion and other mobility through collecting data and model analysis. The conclusions are as follow.


First, it is a re-test of the conclusions of BO Zhiyue and Zhou Lian. On the one hand, it testifies the conclusion that revenue contributions have a significant likelihood with provincial governors' promotion. On the other hand, it doesn't agree

Zhou Lian's theory which takes GDP performance as a key to the governor's promotion and accomplish the Chinese economic achievement in the end. The model analysis here is pointed out that provincial governor with better GDP performance is likely to remain in his original position rather than promotion. As to serious accidental losses that is a new indicator here has less significance but to some extent, its negative value would testified the common sense that it may hinder a governor's promotion.


Second, as to the governor's personal information, both age and education background have influence on his promotion. It shows that the basic principle of cadres' appointment doesn't change at present. Central government still prefers the younger one with better education to others. Unfortunately, because of the data's limit, it doesn't conclude anything about governors' promotion and his political network (Guan Xi).

Last but not least, it should be emphasized that model analysis which is based on actual and concrete data only provides an objective framework of governors' promotion. As to the governor's real political life, there are many accidental and uncertain factors that influence their promotion. So the model results won't be completely testified in the real world.

Graph 1



Pie 2



**NOTES**

<sup>1</sup> The meeting report of the 17th NCCPC on oct.15, 2007

<sup>2</sup> Bo Zhiyue, *China's Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing*, (World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2007), p. 136

<sup>3</sup> It is also named the president of The Central Committee of Communist Party of China (CCCPC)

<sup>4</sup> Before culture revolution there were a “bai hua qi fang movement”, it means let a hundred flowers blossom in English, this movement was launched in 1956, and encouraged the intellectuals to give some comments in every area included the politics and government. It is like a free talk movement. But after this movement, the government stated the anti-right movement, (Mao's purge of 1957).

<sup>5</sup> Paul Wong, *China's Higher Leadership in the Socialist Transition*, (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 3

<sup>6</sup> The decentralization of the financial power and personnel power are by the systems of the contract (flat rate) system (bao gan zhi )and the “xia guan yi ji zhi du ”it means that the upper government manage the direct next tier branches.

<sup>7</sup> Cheng Li and David Bachman selected governors in 247 cities in 1986 and analyzed their personal information.

<sup>8</sup> The data information include 1.age, gender and birthplace ; 2. education background; 3. party-age and position; 4.workingexperience.

<sup>9</sup> Avery Goldstein, *Trends in the Study of Political Elites and Institutions in the PRC*, (The China Quarterly, 1994), p.718

<sup>10</sup> Bo Zhiyue, *China's Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing*, World Scientific Publishing Co.Pte.Ltd, 2007, p.145

<sup>11</sup> Zhou Lian, *Political Turnover And Economic Performance: The Incentive Role Of Personnel Control In China*, from <http://www.jstor.org/>

<sup>12</sup> Zhou Lian, *Political Turnover And Economic Performance: The Incentive Role Of Personnel Control In China*, from <http://www.jstor.org/>

<sup>13</sup> Zang Xiaowei, *Educational Credentials, Elite Dualism, and Elite Stratification in China*,(Sociological Perspectives, Volume 44, NO.2, 2001)

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.sina.com.cn>, see 《论邓小平对确立十一届三中全会路线的历史性贡献》《党建研究》(京)1998年第12期。人民网2004年07月29日

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.sina.com.cn>, see 《论邓小平对确立十一届三中全会路线的历史性贡献》《党建研究》(京)1998年第12期。人民网2004年07月29日

<sup>16</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/14/world/asia/14iht-mud.3.16135933.html>

<sup>17</sup> See Zhou Lian, *Political Turnover and Economic Performance: the Incentive Role of Personnel Control in China*, *Journal of Public Policy* , Volume 30 , Special Issue 01 , Apr 2010

<sup>18</sup> Those comments could be seen in domestic magazine in China. For example, there was an article named “*The Disadvantage of Younger Cadre Policy and the Advantage of Regularization of Cadre Appointment System*” was published on the Academic Forum in 2008.