

The Effects of Security Problems on the USA- Uzbekistan Relations

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Abstract: *One of the factors effective in determining foreign policies of the countries is the issues of national security. This is especially true of the bilateral relations of countries which experience common security problems and affected by this situation. After its independence the Uzbekistani administration perceived their basic threat as “fundamentalism”. Thus in the first years of independence, Tashkent tried to come closer to The United States of America (USA) so as to overcome this threat. In response to this, the USA, did not develop a comprehensive policy towards Uzbekistan. But the USA faced a similar security threat with September 11th attacks. Along with the increase of the Central Asia’s geopolitical importance following the September 11th attacks, Washington increased its relations with Uzbekistan and bilateral relations reached to the level of strategic partnership. Because of the common threat perception, the USA overcame the Taliban by taking advantage of Uzbekistan's geopolitical position. Meanwhile the Uzbekistani administration largely avoided “radical” movements through this war. However, emergence of the Colour Revolutions in the former Soviet republics, supported by the USA, destructed these relations. But in recent years both Kerimov and Obama administrations have tried to amend Uzbek American relations. Some positive developments have been witnessed since 2011. Because the USA, who has problematic relations with Pakistan administration, needs Uzbekistan’s land again. In this study, the bilateral relations between the US, which became the sole super power in the post-Cold War period, and Uzbekistan, the most powerful country in Central Asia, are analyzed in the context of security issues.*

Keywords: Central Asia, Uzbekistan, Uzbek American Relations, Fundamentalist Organizations, September 11th

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Introduction

15 Republics, gaining their independence in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, took part in the international system as new actors. However, these countries were faced with many problems in the process of state-building. These countries mainly coped with problems alike, getting rid of their dependence on Moscow, switching to market economy, improving their relations with the international actors, institutionalizing public institutions and facing security threats. Security problems in particular have become the fundamental factor in determining both foreign and domestic policies of these countries. In fact, the civil wars that broke out in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan demonstrate how fragile the political structures of the concerned countries were.

Of these countries, Uzbekistan has been different in the Central Asian region in many ways. It has the largest (approximately 30 million) population after the Russian Federation and Ukraine among the ex- Soviet republics. In addition, Uzbekistan is the only country that has the most ethnically-homogenous structure among the Central Asian countries. This country is the only country that is a candidate for becoming the regional power in Central Asia due to the factors such as having the strongest army in the region, many natural sources and a developing economy. In addition, the geopolitical location of Uzbekistan offers it the freedom of action as well. Situated in the hearth of Central Asia, this country shares borders with Afghanistan and other Central Asian countries, while it has no shared borders with the regional powers such as Russia, China or Iran¹.

The domestic and foreign policies of Uzbekistan that followed in the aftermath of its independence were heavily shaped under the influence of its security problems. In particular, the security of political regime, struggle against fundamental activities, and prevention of regional civil wars from spreading over Uzbekistan became the most important political priorities. This policy of the Uzbek administration is clearly observed in the bilateral relations they established with international actors such as the USA, Russia and China. Islam Kerimov's administration presented the idea of collaboration in combat against these security problems as the precondition for improving bilateral relations.

On the other hand, the USA has gradually become a strategic actor in the former Soviet geography in the post-Cold War period. Primarily, having established good relationships with the countries in the region, the USA has begun to compete with Russia in Central Asia and the Caucasus. This power struggle resembles the great game experienced by the United Kingdom (England) and Russia in the same geographical area at the beginning of twentieth century. In the 1990s, the USA followed policies such as supporting the independence of the countries in the region, having a say in the exploitation of energy sources in the region and denuclearizing countries in the region.

The geopolitical importance of the region increased with the September 11th attacks. The USA, planning to interfere in the Taliban administration, started to increase bilateral relations with Central Asian countries. From this period onwards, the US policy regarding the region was not only determined by the low politics of the economic interests but also the security issues considered high politics. So the US became engaged to the developments in the region. As a natural result of this strategy shift, Uzbekistan, the most powerful country in the region, gained importance for the USA. Thus, the relationship between two countries with similar security problems temporarily turned into an allied relationship. In the present study, the relationship between the USA, the unique super power in the world, and Uzbekistan, the most powerful country in Central Asia, will be analyzed in the context of security problems.

Uzbekistan's Main Security Issues: Fundamentalism and Civil Wars in Neighboring Countries

Of the countries of Central Asia, the countries where the impact of religion in social life is observed in the most intense way, are Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Madrassas and Sufi institutions in Uzbekistan have always met the region's need for religious functionary in the historical process. Despite "atheist" propaganda in the period of the Soviet Union, this "religious" structure, in the region were partially preserved. Moscow's more lenient policies towards religions with Glastnost in the 1980s, economic problems, the activities of some radical groups of the Middle East originating in Uzbekistan, and the civil wars neighboring Afghanistan and Tajikistan affected the radical movements in the region. As a result of the repressive policies implemented by the Karimov administration, these religious groups became marginalized and began to carry out terrorist acts.

Two radical groups operating in Uzbekistan come to the fore: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT). IMU was established under the leadership of Tahir Yoldash, who fled Uzbekistan after the movement of suppression and arrest initiated by Karimov in 1992 and under the military responsibility of Cuma Namangani. The organization established links with the Tajik opposition movement and the Taliban, and received military and doctrinal training in Afghanistan. Thus, Islamic movements in Central Asia in ideological and methodological perspectives began to become "radical".

In the second half of the 1990's, terrorist actions, some of which were undertaken by IMU, were committed against the Uzbek administration. Four Uzbek policemen were killed in the city of Namangan in December, 1997². A large-scale attempt to assassinate Islam Karimov was made in Tashkent in February, 1999. 13 people were killed and 128 people were injured in the bomb attack³. Penetrating from Tajikistan into the region of Batken in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999, IMU guerrillas took four Japanese engineers and some Kyrgyz officers as hostage and kept the area under occupation for nine weeks. Indicating that their intention was to overthrow the Karimov administration, the guerrillas passed through Fergana Valley to return to Afghanistan because of winter conditions⁴. In August of 2000, IMU militants clashed with Uzbek armed forces in mountainous district of the Surkhandaria region in the southern Uzbekistan. The clashes, in which more than 100 soldiers were killed, soon spread to the outskirts of Tashkent. A big blow was delivered to IMU by the operation organized after the events of September 11. However, the organization was not completely destroyed. Some members infiltrated Central Asia again and began to wait for suitable conditions. Later, they organized suicide attacks which continued for four days in Uzbekistan in April 2005. In addition, they organized attacks on the embassies of the USA and Israel in June 2005⁵.

Originating in the Middle East, Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) is an organization carrying out its activities on a global scale by peaceful means, without choosing the path of violence. Within the organization, studies concerning the caliphate, jihad and the Islamic state are carried out⁶. HT, which is active in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as well as in Uzbekistan with propaganda techniques, aims to establish a religious state in Central Asia. The strength of the organization is increasing day by day. The number of members only in and around Tashkent is claimed to have reached 60 thousand in the 2000s⁷. The reason for this increase is that the gap after IMU and other radical organizations left Uzbekistan has been filled by HT. Although the organization did not resort to violence, the Karimov administration held HT responsible for the terrorist acts and has launched operations against this organization since 1998⁸. Other developments which became security issues for Uzbekistan in the post-independence period were the civil war that started in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Tajik civil war occurred as the result of a power struggle between the elite of the Communist Party of Tajikistan and the Tajik opposition groups after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Approximately 100,000 people died and 600,000 people had to emigrate because of this civil war. Tajik government began to

take control in and around Dushanbe with the support of Uzbekistan and Russia after February 1993. A cease-fire was signed on 17 September, 1994⁹.

Uzbekistan was influenced by the Tajik civil war in many ways, because a large number of Tajiks live in Uzbekistan and many Uzbeks live in Tajikistan. In addition, close economic relations were established between Uzbekistan and some regions of Tajikistan. The Kerimov administration's most important concern was that if Tajik opposition forces seized power, Tajiks in Uzbekistan and the radical forces would be affected. The leader of IMU had already settled in Tajikistan during the civil war. Afterwards, as a result of the pressures that Tashkent put on Duşanbey, he settled in Afghanistan, in the region of Mazar-i Sharif, densely populated by Uzbeks¹⁰. However, there is still a fragile structure in the political system of Tajikistan. After the civil war, the Kerimov administration started a struggle for influence on this country, which led to competition with Russia from time to time.

After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, the power struggle between the mujahedeen groups turned into a civil war after a short period of time. The civil war was exacerbated when a group of madrasa students who called themselves "Taliban" joined the fight aide by Pakistan. After a short time, the Taliban dominated an important part of Afghanistan. The Taliban forces occupied Kandahar and made it the capital city in 1994. In 1995, they took control of Herat, which is located in western Afghanistan and densely populated by Shiites and of Kabul in 1996. On the other hand, various groups such as Ahmad Shah Massoud and Uzbek General Abdul Rashid Dostum formed the "Northern Alliance" against the Taliban. However, the alliance received financial support from foreign countries, especially from Uzbekistan, but did not succeed against the Taliban. Mazar-i Sharif, the center of the Northern Alliance, was taken over by the Taliban in 1998¹¹. With the removal of the "Northern Alliance" buffer, the Taliban became neighbors with Uzbekistan.

The civil war experienced in Afghanistan, the population of which consists of six percent Uzbeks, became a security problem for Uzbekistan in many respects. Primarily, the theocratic government coming to power in Afghanistan threatened "secular" Uzbekistan and other Central Asian Republics. IMU leaders had already settled in Afghanistan after Tajikistan and organized operations against Uzbekistan from there. These operations increased especially after the fall of Kandahar. The Karimov administration tried to get closer with Russia and other Central Asian republics in order to take measures against the problem of Afghanistan. The Kerimov administration bargained with Taliban authorities in order for some of the members of the IMU to be given to Uzbekistan. However, the Taliban's requirement of "recognition" prevented them from reaching an agreement¹².

September 11th: Security Syndrome of the USA

Throughout its history, the foreign and security policies of the USA were generally shaped through the "other" considered as a threat by the USA¹³. In the nineties when the Cold War ended, Washington began to probe post-Soviet security problems. These problems were then so complex and ambiguous that they could not be simplified into a single state or an ideology. This situation was mentioned in the national Security Strategy (NSS) 1991 as "...*This new era offers great hope, but this hope must be tempered by the even greater uncertainty we face. Almost immediately new crises and instabilities came upon us. ...We face new challenges not only to our security, but the our ways of thinking about security*"¹⁴. Washington was worried about the possibilities that the power vacuum occurring after the dissolution of the Soviet Union might be filled by alternative power or power blocks, and that these powers might control the strategic regions around the world. A report published

by the Pentagon in 1992 indicated that it was necessary to prevent these developments¹⁵. In this context, it is thought-provoking that in the 1991 NSS document there was a title for Germany and Japan, which became the economic rivals¹⁶.

Some officials in Washington, including President Bill Clinton, began to use the concept of "Rogue States" for some states which had problematic relations with the USA of 1994. The following countries have been added in different periods to the list of countries whose most important feature is to threaten international security by providing support for terrorism: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Cuba, Sudan, and North Korea¹⁷. Even though some strategic objectives were set for the American government failed to define "other" in a clear way and accordingly could not develop a comprehensive foreign policy doctrine during this period.

The USA gradually began to face a new version of terror in the nineties. As of 1993, terrorist acts at home and abroad began to be organized by radical organizations against the citizens of the USA. Unlike the previous ones, these acts were organized by fundamentalist movements, not by socialist or nationalist organizations. It is suspected that Al-Qaeda was involved in the attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Hezbollah is indicted for the acts organized in Dhahran in 1995 and 1996. Persons associated with Al-Qaeda organized attacks against U.S. citizens in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and in Yemen in 2000¹⁸.

Bin Laden and his organization were held responsible for the attacks organized after 1995. This organization, whose headquarters is in Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban, was to cause the deterioration of relations between the USA and Afghanistan under the Taliban. This is because Washington supported local insurgents (among them Bin Laden) during the Soviet occupation, and it supported the Taliban, the fundamentalist movement, during the civil war which began after the end of the occupation¹⁹. Unlike the support for the mujahedin, US support for the Taliban was political rather than military. The USA was of the opinion that the Taliban would establish peace and stability in Afghanistan, and unlike Iran, it was trying to create a traditional society rather than exporting the Islamic ideology²⁰. After the attacks organized by Al-Qaeda, Washington put pressure on the Taliban and wanted Bin Laden to be consigned to the USA. As Laden was not consigned to the USA, Taliban bases were shelled by the U.S. air force in 1998-9. The decision of a number of embargoes towards the Taliban was made by the UN Security Council in 2000²¹.

Thus, step by step, the fight against "terrorism" began to be included in the U.S. foreign and security policies. However, terrorism still did not occupy an important place in American politics during this period. Still, terrorism was an international threat and destruction by this threat would be extremely devastating with the spread of nuclear and biological weapons. Multilateral and soft strategies were adopted while fighting the threat²². The NSS made the following statements about the fight against terrorism under the heading of Transnational Threats in 1997: "... (1) *make no concessions to terrorists* ; (2) *bring all pressure to bear on state sponsors of terrorism*; (3) *fully exploit all available legal mechanisms to punish international terrorists*; and (4) *help other governments improve their capabilities to combat terrorism*"²³. The military operations organized were carried out for "deterrence".

Radical changes in the USA foreign and security policies occurred after the September 11th attacks. Terrorism became "the new other" of Washington, something it had been in search so for nearly a decade. President George W. Bush mentioned "state war" in a statement a day after the attacks: "*The deliberate and deadly attacks which were carried out yesterday against our country were more than acts of terror. They were acts of war*"²⁴. He declared the Bush doctrine during his speech at the Congress on 20 October, 2001. In the doctrine, radical methods in the fight against

terrorism forced the nations around the world to make a certain choice: *“We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”*²⁵.

On the other hand, the NSS announced in October 2002 that it was clearly emphasized that "terrorism" was the new "other" of the USA: *“The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorists of global reach. The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The enemy is terrorist.”*²⁶ The other striking issues in the Bush Doctrine and in the NSS 2002 publication were the new military strategies such as "Preventive War" and "Preemptive Strike"²⁷ in the USA defense policies. *According to these strategies, The United States “must be prepared to stop [them-the states that have weapons of mass destruction (WMD)]and their terrorist clients before they are able to threaten or use’ WMD, and to achieve this, it ‘will, if necessary, act preemptively’ ; not only when an enemy attack is imminent (the traditional definition of preemption) but also when ‘uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy ‘s attack’. The greater the anticipated danger, the greater is the need to ‘prevent’ its rising to the level of imminent threat”*²⁸. However, these strategies were criticized in that because, if these strategies were applied, the concept of sovereign states created by Westphalia would be eliminated²⁹ and the first attack would be illegal in accordance with international law.³⁰

Thus, the traditional realist policies of the United States (containment and deterrence) and the policies such as neo-liberalism, multilateralism and globalism implemented during the Clinton administration were abandoned. During this period, the American government was dominated by a neo-imperial sense of security based on supremacy under the name of the fight against "terrorism". Accordingly, the USA was to apply the preemption strategy against developments considered threats to its own security in order to guarantee collective security by acting unilaterally if necessary³¹. After the Afghanistan war, Bush administration declared Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which had been included in the Clinton administration's list of "Rouge States", as "the Axis of Evil". Bush and his team maintained the ongoing charges against these countries, such as producing WMD's and being a sponsor of terrorism. In addition, they put forward the project of "Greater Middle East" and began to mention the goal of democratizing the Middle East. The geopolitical importance of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries, which are Afghanistan and Iran's northern neighbors, increased from the viewpoint of Washington which turned towards a neo-imperial conception of security after the September 11th attacks, and that is more engaged in the Middle East.

Uzbek -American Relations

Period of Restricted Relations (1992-2001)

The improvement of relations with the USA has been one of the foreign policy targets of Tashkent after gaining its independence. This became a necessity for Tashkent, which had been striving to get free from the influence of Moscow in the 1990s in particular. Even though relations were established with the countries such as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, which are located in neighboring regions, emerging Islamic tendencies in the Uzbek Population, fear of the religious threat and Kerimov's government's oppression of all religious groups including the moderate ones harmed the relationships with these states. The authoritarian structure of Uzbekistan government became an obstacle on the way of Uzbekistan's improving its relations with Western European States. So the USA, with the potential of balancing Russia in the regional level, became the sole state that could be ally of Uzbekistan³².

Diplomatic relations between the USA and Uzbekistan were established with the visit of James Baker, then the Secretary of State, to Uzbekistan in February in 1992. Baker, in the explanation he made during this visit, stated that the USA would support former Soviet Republics, including Uzbekistan, on issues such as democratization, human rights and emerging of free markets³³. This explanation of Baker manifested the general characteristics of the USA policy towards the countries in the region throughout the first half of 1990s. Primarily, the “independence” processes of these countries would be supported in the axis of “liberalism and democracy.” The security concerns of the USA in regard to the region included issues such as the situation of weapons of mass destruction remaining from the Soviet Union (the possibility of these weapons being obtained by third world countries and by terrorist groups), Iran’s efforts of exporting its regime to countries in the region and drug trafficking conducted in the region. Later on, the transfer of hydrocarbon reserves to the world markets by US energy³⁴ companies and the integration of regional states to the global economic system became the main parameters of America’s Central Asia policy³⁵.

Accordingly, the Clinton government primarily put a series of economic aid programs into operation intended for countries in the region. Thanks to the Freedom Support Act, adopted in April of 1992, economic aid was made to the countries of Central Asia in such fields as energy activity and market reform, environmental policies and technologies, and the entrepreneurship of the private sector. In addition, in order to promote and support American companies operating in the region, the involved companies and the countries in the region were given credit through American financial institutions within the framework of Commercial Financing and Insurance. In addition to these, countries in the region were provided with economic aid by such means as Cooperative Threat Reduction, Control of Nuclear Energy and Weapons, International Military Exchange and Training, and Disarmament. Within the scope of the aid programs mentioned above, Uzbekistan was given a credit of 1607,55 million dollars³⁶ and was also provided with the economic aid amount to 218, 32 million dollars³⁷. Further the Clinton government encouraged international financial institutions such as World Bank, the International Development Association and the European Bank For Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) the counties of Central Asia. Through the medium of these institutions, World Bank opened a credit of 434 million dollars and EBRD of 394 million dollars to Uzbekistan in 1999³⁸.

The Kerimov administration, aware of new US strategies towards the region such as nuclear disarmament (in line with benefits of the American firms) and the countries in the region carrying out economic reforms, took a step against the aid Washington made. In 1992, Uzbekistan was the first CIS state and participated in international non-proliferation agreements, such as Non- proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In September 1992, it also joined International Atomic Energy Agency. On the other hand, Kerimov administration promoted the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in Central Asia and pursued bilateral cooperation on non-proliferation with the US³⁹. In addition, trade relations of two countries were regulated by a bilateral trade agreement, which came into force in January 1994. This agreement also provided for an extension of the most favored nation trade status between the USA and Uzbekistan. The US side also granted Uzbekistan exemption from many US import tariffs under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP Status). A bilateral Investment Treaty was signed in December of the same year⁴⁰. During this period, the two countries collaborated in the military fields. Uzbekistan joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Within the scope of this program, the Uzbek officers joined Cooperative Nugget in 1995 and 1997, and the peacekeeping exercises in 1996 and 2001 in the USA and Western Europe⁴¹. Additionally Besides, in 1995, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan formed the Central Asian Battalion (Centrabat) as a peacekeeping force within the framework of NATO - PFP⁴².

The developments such as Uzbekistan's pursuing policies that were more independent of Moscow when compared to the other Central Asian countries, making statements against Iran, Fundamentalism and Russia, actively joining the activities within NATO-PFP,⁴³ opposing the attempts of integration within CIS and spearheading the establishment of the Central Asian Economic Union together with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were received with "appreciation" by Washington. William Perry, Secretary of defense for the US, stated that Uzbekistan's foreign policy was supported by Washington and characterized this country as the "island of stability" in Central Asia during his visit to Tashkent in the beginning of 1995⁴⁴.

After the "difference" of Uzbekistan from the other countries of Central Asia "had been discovered" by the USA, Kerimov administration started to adopt a more pro-American foreign policy. Uzbekistan began to support Washington's sanction decisions- which were not supported by the international community- towards Iran and Cuba. In October 1995, a "goodwill memorandum" was signed between the Foreign Ministry of Uzbekistan and the Pentagon, and it was ruled that working groups should be formed. Madeline Albright's advisor, James F. Collins, who was responsible for the former Soviet Republics, encouraged the Kerimov administration for playing a key role in the development of regional cooperation in Central Asia⁴⁵.

In this period, two important developments played a part in carrying USA-Uzbekistan relations further. With the treaty, signed between Russia and Kazakhstan in 1995, Kazakhstan became more dependent on Russia in economic and military fields. Particularly, clauses that included the merger of some armed forces of the two countries caused the USA annoyance. Washington, realizing that Kazakhstan had, structurally, no capability of acting independently of Russia, began to carry out Uzbekistan-oriented Central Asian policy⁴⁶. In addition, in its second office term, Clinton administration began to pursue a more decisive policy towards former Soviet countries by dropping its "Russia First" strategy⁴⁷.

In 1996, Collins stated that the new US strategy towards the region was as follows;

- *to support the independence, sovereignty and security of every Central Asian country*
- *to provide assistance in establishing a free market economy and democratic governments*
- *to integrate these countries into the world community, and to promote their participation in the Euro- Atlantic security dialogue and in joint programs within that structure*
- *to increase the role and scope of US Commercial interest and the exploitation of regional energy reserves⁴⁸.*

These strategic targets Collins emphasized were included in the documents of the National Security Strategies declared in 1998, 1999 and 2000⁴⁹.

The Clinton administration, in line with this new strategy, attempted a series of actions that would include Central Asian countries. Projects of pipeline routes, from which Russia was excluded, were put into operation. Within the scope of NATO-PFP, military relations with the countries in the region were intensified. In order to increase the military capabilities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan (members of the Central Asian Economic Union), the Central Asian Battalion (CENTRASBAT) exercises were increased. The location of the exercises carried out between the

three Central Asian countries and the USA in 1997-1998 and 2000 was that Central Asia. Now, military exercises were being organized in Russia's near abroad. Besides, in 1999, training seminars were held in the USA Central Command Head Quarters for soldiers from involved states⁵⁰. The US engagement towards the region was observed when the Pentagon took Central Asia from the area of responsibility of European Command (EUCOM) and included it in the sphere of Central Command (CENTOM) in 1998. CENTOM'S operations covered the horn of Africa through the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The main reason for this shift was that the Central Asia was experiencing common security matters with the concerned geography- namely Fundamentalism⁵¹.

The Clinton administration, in addition to these steps, took more aimed at improving its relations with Uzbekistan. First Lady Hillary R. Clinton visited Tashkent in November 1997. The President showed the importance he attached to this country by sending his wife, even who though not at diplomatic level, was an influential figure of the period. In February 1998, the two countries formed a joint US-Uzbekistan commission. This commission had four committees; a political committee, a security committee, an investment, trade and energy committee, and an economic cooperation and reforms committee⁵². From 1998, American commando units began to stay longer periods in Uzbekistan to train their army in their struggle against terror⁵³. In addition, Washington put IMU on the list of terrorist organizations⁵⁴. After IMU attacks, US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright visited Tashkent in April, 2000 and donated 10 million dollars for the struggle against terrorism⁵⁵.

The Kerimov administration, whose main foreign policy strategy after the independence was *“to keep Moscow at bay and Washington in, and to increase regional role while avoiding strife on its southern and eastern borders from spreading into the country”*, made efforts to increase relations with the USA to the alliance level, because he was not satisfied with the current level of relations. In fact, Kerimov, wanted to turn Uzbekistan, into a kind of Israel in Central Asia; a leading American supported regional power in the twenty first century. In the second half of the 1990s, rising threat from the “east” and the tension with Russia caused efforts to that end to increase. Kerimov administration focused its attention on these efforts particularly in 1999, when bombings were carried out in Tashkent. Uzbekistan cooled at bay in its relations with Russia, by withdrawing from the Collective Security Treaty in February of the same year⁵⁶. Kerimov went to Washington to participate in the congratulation of NATO's fiftieth establishment in April, 1999⁵⁷.

During this visit, Uzbekistan became a member of GUAM⁵⁸. Thus, Uzbekistan explicitly manifested its foreign policy choice by becoming member of this anti-Russian and pro-American group in the CIS. In addition, Uzbekistan was one of the countries that signed “The Ankara Declaration”, regarding the route of the Baku Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline⁵⁹. Moreover, with the explanations he made, Kerimov tried to get closer to Washington. He supported the expansion of NATO to include Baltic states, and claimed that this did not pose threat to Russia⁶⁰. In addition, he advocated NATO's operation in Kosovo and the US and Britain's operation in Iraq. However, the Kerimov administration, failing to enhance its relations with the USA at the level they expected, turned to Russia in 1999, as IMU attacks intensified and became serious security problems for Tashkent. In addition, along with Putin's coming to power, it became clear that Russia would play a more active role in Central Asia than before. As a matter of fact, in the course of the official visits Putin organized to Uzbekistan in December 1999 and May 2000, a number of economic, policy and defense oriented treaties were signed between the two countries. In addition, Uzbekistan joined the Shangai Five⁶¹.

In terms of the late 1990s, there were different reasons for Washington's not concentrating on Central Asia and not enhancing the USA-Uzbekistan relations to the degree that it would meet Kerimov's expectations. In this period, issues such as “the dual containment strategy” planned to

implement in Iran and Iraq, the Kosovo matter, and NATO's expansion were among the priorities of Washington. The issues mentioned above sometimes gave rise to tension in Russian-American relations. The US adopting a more active Central Asian policy, which threatened Russian interests in the region, increased the tension. Central Asia is one of the double-landlocked regions in the world and considering the fact that the states such as Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan (under the Taliban administration) surrounded the Central Asia, the difficulties of adopting pro-active foreign policy towards the region in favor of the USA became clear. Uzbekistan's poor human rights record was another obstacle in the way of increased relations. The Clinton administration, supporting countries in the region on the issues of liberalism, democracy and human rights, was experiencing a dilemma involving its self-interest to support administrations in the involved countries. In conclusion, the Central Asia did not become a region of "vital importance" for the USA's foreign and security policies in the course of the 1990s. The foreign policy adopted in the second half of the 1990s was mainly based on the US economic interests. In this period the USA-Uzbekistan relations remained limited as a part of the mentioned policies. The conditions the Kerimov administration had been waiting for would occur aftermath of the September 11th attacks.

Period of Strategic Cooperation (2001-2003)

The efforts of Tashkent to come closer to Washington during the 1990's was unrequited to the extent that Kerimov expected. However, in the conditions ensuing after the events of September 11th, Uzbekistan found an opportunity to improve its relations with the USA in a way that they could never have predicted. Improved relations with Washington offered lots of advantages for Uzbekistan. Primarily, IMU, which had become the most important threat in Uzbekistan, would be done away with or at least would be put out of action⁶². In collaborating with the USA, the Kerimov administration would get rid of allegations such as corruption, anti democratic practices and human rights violations. In addition, even though it had been ten years or so since they gained independence, the influence of Russia in Central Asia was pushing the limits of sovereignty of the countries in the region⁶³. Moreover, Tashkent, considering itself as the regional power, found a chance to be the "anchor" state of America in Central Asia⁶⁴. American business world would invest in the Uzbek economy, particularly in the oil and natural gas sectors⁶⁵. Finally, in the event of joining forces in the process of overthrowing the Taliban, General Rashid Dostum, who was Uzbek origin, could take part in the new Afghan administration. Thus, the effect of Tashkent on Afghanistan might increase and the southern borders of Uzbekistan could be secured⁶⁶.

The geopolitical importance of Central Asia for the Bush administration, as it attempted to interfere in Afghanistan suddenly became apparent. In order to both fight with the Taliban and to create an area of influence in Eurasia's inner crescent and to reduce the influence of Russia and China in the region, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia once more came into prominence. Uzbekistan could be a stepping-stone for the USA to be able to establish influence in the region. As a matter of fact, the geopolitical importance of Central Asia and Uzbekistan was highlighted by the opinion of leaders in the USA before the attacks of September 11th took place.

In the project for "New American Century," which they put forward before coming into power in 1997, neo-cons gave some suggestions for the USA to sustain its dominance. Because of this, the necessity was emphasized as to the fact that the USA should control the regions of strategic importance in the world. Therefore that the US soldiers being deployed to anywhere where necessary and should establish superiority there and that the USA should from now on control the main sources of the World so as to prevent the rise of potential rivals⁶⁷. On the other hand, strategists like S. Frederick Starr and Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized the strategic location of Uzbekistan in Central

Asia. Starr stated that this country, which he deemed as the “island of stability,” bore the potential of being the balancing regional power in Central Asia. Yet this was not taken seriously by Washington⁶⁸. Brzezinski, by the same token, claimed that the region of Eurasia was a primary geopolitical reward for the USA by stressing that the path of become a dominant power passed through Central Asia⁶⁹. Brzezinski emphasized Uzbekistan’s location in the region by calling it: “*The most important candidate to play for the regional leadership*”⁷⁰. In addition, C. Bond, who was a counselor for former Republics of Soviet Union under Colin Powell, pointed out in his report he submitted to the US House of Representatives, Committee of International Relations that the Central Asia was one of the places where the US vital interests existed. On the other hand, the Putin administration, coming to power in Russia in the same period, was following active policies in Central Asia and the Caucasus. China also increased its influence in the Central Asia through SCO. This situation was being watched by the Bush administration⁷¹.

Considering the September 11th events an opportunity, Kerimov declared in a speech he made a day after the attacks that his country was “*ready to collaborate with the USA in the war against terrorism*”⁷². Kerimov, in order to soften the warnings from Moscow and the threats rising from Kandahar, stated on the First of October that he opened Uzbek airspace to Americans just for “humanitarian and security purposes”. However, he went on making decisive decisions in cooperation with the USA. During the visit US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld made to Tashkent on the fifth of October, an agreement stipulating bilateral cooperation between the two countries against terrorism was signed. In the joint declaration made later on, it was reported that Uzbekistan had allowed its airspace or one of its airports to be used by the USA for “humanitarian operations”⁷³.

So NATO and the USA acquired basic rights at Karshi-Khanabad, which is at the southeast of Uzbekistan, near the Afghan border and strategically important for operations. Also, the USA acquired rights at airfields and permission for over flights. Thus, the USA secured a base in the former Soviet Union republics. This base became the largest foothold of the US in the region. By mid-October, the number of troops was expected to grow to three thousand. Later on It became a tool for balancing forces with Russia⁷⁴.

In addition, objectives such as fighting against terrorism together and developing qualitatively new relationship for the establishment of regional stability and security were emphasized in the involved agreement. The most important of all was the last clause of the agreement: “*This includes the need to consult on an urgent basis about appropriate steps to address the situation in the event of a direct threat to the security or territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan*”. So, even though it did not constitute a real security guarantee, the USA would at least consult with Tashkent when there was a threat against Uzbekistan’s security and territorial integrity. This was a commitment the US had never made to any former Soviet Republics before⁷⁵. More over bilateral working group was formed by the senior military officials of the two countries in the “technical and military” field. US general Myers stated that they aimed to develop programs for joint exercise and training with the Uzbek armed forces. Thus, the ability of the two countries’ armed forces to act jointly would increase. Besides, that Uzbekistan army would be reequipped. Yet, the quality of this was not clarified⁷⁶.

The relationships of the two countries reached its peak thanks to the “Strategic Partnership” agreement signed during Kerimov’s visit to Washington in March 2002. The areas where the two countries would collaborate, cited denoted in the previous accord, was also reemphasized in this document. In addition, it was guaranteed that Uzbekistan’s territorial integrity would be supported⁷⁷. Furthermore, it was promised that Uzbekistan would be provided with economic assistance. However, this assistance was made conditional on Uzbekistan’s economic and political transformation. In the concerned treaty, the Kerimov administration promised to make reforms in the fields such as “the respect for human rights and liberties,” “genuine multi-party political system,” “fair and independent

elections,” “political pluralism,” “independence of media” and “independence of justice”⁷⁸.

Tashkent attained some of its objectives thanks to the strategic collaboration it established with Washington. In the course of the Afghanistan operation, air attack was executed on IMU’s bases in this country and a considerable number of members of organization were killed. Even though the organization was not completely destroyed, it was considerably weakened. Moreover, it was stated that J. Namangani, the leader of the organization, was also killed during these attacks. Besides that, some members of the organization were extradited to Uzbekistan by Afghan government in May 2002⁷⁹.

During the air attack carried out in the southern regions of Afghanistan in 2004, Tahir Yoldashev, the second leader of IMU, was injured⁸⁰. The economic aids made to Uzbekistan by the USA were about tripled. Total amount of economic aid provided to Uzbekistan was 218,89 million dollars between 1992 and 1999, while between the years of 2001-2003 this amount was slightly rise up to 244,86 million dollars⁸¹.

Separately, the Bush administration condoned the human rights violations of Tashkent despite its promise in the strategic collaboration document. Each year, Human Rights Reports about the countries are published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USA. In these reports

Kerimov administration was criticized abruptly⁸². In reports released in 2002 and 2003, it was stated that there were “constructive” and “ongoing” improvements on the issues of human rights, political participation and economic reforms in Uzbekistan⁸³. The cited “constructive” and “ongoing” improvements consisted of moderating the pressure made to political opposition, the establishment of human rights group and the formation of the bicameral legislature system made up of the senate and lower chamber⁸⁴. However, the human rights violations the Kerimov administration perpetuated would be the excuse for crisis to break between two countries in 2004 and 2005.

Uzbekistan gained freedom of action against countries in the region such as Russia and China through the partnership established with the USA. Kerimov, in the explanation he made in May 2002, stressed that it was out of question for them to end cooperation with the powers outside the region, namely the USA, because this was contrary to the interests of two great powers of the SCO, Russia and China⁸⁵. Eventually, Uzbekistan succeeded in becoming the regional ally of the USA. Kerimov was called “Bush’s Man” in Central Asia aftermath of September 11⁸⁶. Further, Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian state which supported the invasion of Iraq, through Kerimov balked at sending troops⁸⁷. The “honeymoon” between the countries did not last long.

Period of Crisis (2004-2007)

The relationship between of the USA and Uzbekistan reached its peak in 2003. However, a chain of events which began in the same year *brought the relations of the two countries to the breaking point*. The fact that Bush administration put forward the Project of Greater Middle East and even its democratization strategy of the region, including use of force when needed, as had been the case in Iraq of course were discomfoting to the Kerimov administration. Moreover, the governments of Serbia and Lebanon were overthrown by riots through the secret support of the West at the beginning of the 2000s.

Tashkent’s uneasiness turned into serious unrest along with the occurrence of Color Revolutions one after another in the former Soviet Union republics. At the end of 2003, the fact that

Eduard Shevardnadze, who had been close to the US administration but trying to adopt a balanced policy with Russia, was overthrown in Georgia and Mikhail Saakashvili, a politician who was closer to and dependent on the USA, was put into power prompted the Kerimov administration to act. Kerimov, primarily, restricted the activities of all external non-governmental organizations⁸⁸ operating in Uzbekistan. He terminated the activities of those who were deemed dangerous⁸⁹. One of these institutions was “the Open Society Institution,” which was affiliated to Soros Foundation that was the architecture of all Colour Revolutions. This institution refused to provide the Ministry of Justice of Uzbekistan with information regarding employee information, financial sources and activity schedules. As a matter of fact, George Soros was accused the Kerimov administration of “*feeling discomfort from freedoms of speech and press and civil activities*”⁹⁰.

A series of developments witnessed in 2004 caused USA-Uzbekistan relations to become more tense. One of these developments was that, in 2004, a comprehensive terrorist attack was organized in Uzbekistan and, as a result, 47 people lost their lives. A short time after these attacks, for making a diplomatic manoeuvre, Kerimov made an official visit to Moscow. During this visit, the decision to collectively combat against terrorism was made between Moscow and Tashkent⁹¹.

Despite the Strategic partnership agreement signed with the USA two years ago, there are various reasons for Uzbekistan to gravitate towards Russia. Primarily, it is certain that Kerimov felt no confidence in the USA (also in the West) during this period. A similar situation was also witnessed after the bombing attacks carried out in Tashkent in February 1999. Kerimov, who was suspicious of Russia due to these attacks, initially preferred to gravitate toward America. After the attacks of 2004, US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s statement that “*the USA would provide Uzbekistan with all sorts of assistance in view of the terrorist attacks that took place*” did not turn Kerimov towards Russia. In particular, such developments as the Colour Revolutions and Kosovo’s declaration of independence were given as the reason for Kerimov’s moving away from Washington⁹². Even though a great deal of damage done to IMU and similar organizations during the war in Afghanistan, the expectations of Kerimov administration were not fully met on this matter. Because the real target of the USA was Al-Qaeda and its leader Usama Bin Laden, so the operations were mostly carried out in the southern part of Afghanistan, where they were thought to be located. But some of the IMU guerillas, who survived the operation settled in the north of Afghanistan⁹³, another group penetrated to Central Asia.

Washington continually faced a dilemma in the relations they developed with Uzbekistan- to continue to support an authoritarian administration in accordance with their strategic interests or to abide by the principles of freedom and democracy they employed⁹⁴. As a matter of fact, despite the disagreements among the US officials on this matter, the Kerimov administration was criticized for the issues such as repression of domestic opposition and poor human rights record, reportedly including torture and deaths in prison. As a matter of fact, Kerimov promised to make reforms on the concerned issues in the document of strategic partnership. In fact, the real reasons for the criticism was that Uzbekistan came closer to Russia, and the foundations of American origin operating in this country were closed down. As a result, the Secretary of State demonstrated disapproval by withholding around 18 million dollars in financial aid to Uzbekistan. But, some officials assured the Uzbek authorities that the US continue to be interested in the region and cooperation with Uzbekistan⁹⁵. On the other hand, some US officials tried to persuade members of Congress to strengthen US-Uzbek bilateral relations because of strategic importance of this country⁹⁶. As a matter of fact, much more aid than the one disapproved was provided for Uzbekistan from the different channels in 2004⁹⁷.

However, the efforts of some American officials were not sufficient to normalize the relations with Uzbekistan. Colour Revolutions carried out in Ukraine in 2004 also increased Kerimov’s doubts.

Kerimov, in the explanation he made in January 2005, accused Western powers of supporting the opposition in Uzbekistan and stated that they would reconsider their GUUAM membership⁹⁸. A short time after this explanation, with the riots breaking out in Krygyzstan, Colour Revolutions spread over Central Asia. The Kerimov administration, believing that the next country that would face a colour revolution was Uzbekistan, did not participate in the GUUAM meeting held in Moldova in April 2005 in return, and withdrew from the GUUAM at the beginning of May⁹⁹. Yet, the actual crisis was experienced by the fact that the riot that started in Andijan was suppressed in a bloody way by the Kerimov administration on the thirteenth of May 2005. The fact that the riots breaking out in the other former Soviet Republics were organized by US non-governmental organizations caused Kerimov to think that it was the USA that supported the riot in Andijan¹⁰⁰. According to Kerimov and his team, this riot was at least approved by the USA¹⁰¹. The USA, on the other hand, kept its initial reaction at low level at the beginning, but in the following days, reacted more severely. The USA, along with other Western countries, required that events in Andijan to be investigated by an independent committee to be set up by the United Nations. Nonetheless, the USA did not have the intention of terminating the relations with Uzbekistan¹⁰². However, after these developments relations came to the breaking point, because, the Kerimov administration had the intention of completely shield their country from US influence. Accordingly, by getting Russian and Chinese support, it was determined at the SCO summit that the USA should evacuate Karshi- Khanaked Base within six months¹⁰³.

The USA, having evacuated the concerned base, started to improve their relations with other Central Asian countries. Accordingly, the portion of the economic aid related to “security” which were made to target countries were increased. Primarily, Krygyzstan was attached importance and the rent of Ganci Air Base, the US base in this country, was increased¹⁰⁴. On the other hand, the USA and the European Union (EU) decided to implement the embargo including the arm sales to Uzbekistan. In addition, the EU introduced visa ban to the leading eight Uzbek officials¹⁰⁵. Separately, the World Bank stopped lending money to Uzbekistan as a result of US attempts. Kerimov urged the West “not to interfere in our affairs under the guise of promoting democracy”¹⁰⁶.

In response to these developments, Kerimov, burning his bridges with the West, adopted a foreign policy that heavily favored Russia and China again. In fact, Moscow and Beijing supported Kerimov during the Andijan Riot. Right after the Andijan events, Kerimov, visiting China, signed an energy treaty of 600 million dollars. At the end of the same year, it was ruled that a military exchange program be practiced between Uzbekistan and China. Kerimov also met with Putin in Moscow on the fourteenth of November, and, at this meeting, a treaty of allied relationships was signed between the two countries. In the meeting in question, the words Kerimov uttered about the USA showed how Uzbek foreign policy experienced a breaking: “*Their major aims are to make Uzbekistan’s independent policies ineffective, to ruin the peace and stability in the country and make Uzbekistan obedient*”¹⁰⁷. Soon, Uzbekistan increased its activities in the SCO, which is under the influence of Russia and China, and again became a member of the CSTO, which they left in 1999, and of the Eurasia Economic Community (EuraAsec-EEC)¹⁰⁸, which they refused to join before¹⁰⁹.

Period of Normalization (2007-2011)

Even though a traumatic crisis was experienced in the US-Uzbek relations due to the Andijan events, the Kerimov administration mobilized to “normalize” their relations with the USA and other Western countries even though it had not been two years since the Andijan events had taken place. In late 2006, Kerimov removed Andijan governor from power, for neglecting the people’s grievances and being unsuccessful in resolving mounting socio-economic problems. Thus, he tried to propitiate Westerners by putting the “violence” committed in Andijan on other person’s shoulders. In the same

year, Kerimov expressed his interest in joining the BTC gas pipeline project¹¹⁰.

In response to this, the USA and the EU started to ease gradually the embargo implemented on Uzbekistan. In May 2007, the visa ban implemented by the EU to leading Uzbek administrators was lifted¹¹¹. Again, in September of the same year, Richard Norland, appointed to Tashkent as the US ambassador, carried out a series of contacts, including meeting with Kerimov, to simply turn over a new leaf in the relationship of the two countries. This situation was read as the signal that the ices between Washington and Tashkent thawed¹¹².

Kerimov, in the explanations he made to overcome the Andijan crisis, stated: *"Uzbekistan, in its foreign policy, has adhered to mutually beneficial cooperation with and mutual respect for its close and far neighbors, including the United States and Europe. We will never change this policy. Moreover, we can state with certainty that the foundation for equal and mutually beneficial relations that suit our national interests is growing even stronger"*¹¹³. In addition, Kerimov began to keep Moscow at arm's length again because of the improvements its relationships with Western countries. Kerimov suspended their EEC membership at the beginning of 2008¹¹⁴. Kerimov's policies of coming closer to the USA gained speed together with the Barack Obama administration coming into power. Accordingly, in 2009, Washington was offered a chance for US soldiers to use Uzbek air space and the military base in Termez. In February 2009, the Collective Emergency Response Force was formed within the CSTO. However, Uzbekistan did not join this organization. Besides, Uzbekistan did not take part in the military exercises carried out within the framework of the CSTO from 2011 onwards¹¹⁵. This situation meant that Uzbekistan de facto left CSTO. One of the main cause of recent foreign policy transaction of Uzbekistan is the riot that occurred at Krygyzstan in 2009. Kerimov was invited to Brussels by Jose Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission. Kerimov visited Brussel at January 24, 2011 and had a talk with both Barroso and A. Fogh Rasmussen, Secretary General of NATO. This became a turning point in Uzbekistan relations with western world. At least it was clear that EU and NATO were happy with recent development occurred in Uzbek foreign policy¹¹⁶.

In May 2011, the USA-Pakistan tensions were experienced in the wake of Osama Bin Laden being killed in Pakistan¹¹⁷. In fact, there was a conflict experienced between the USA and Pakistan due to drone strikes¹¹⁸. When 26 Pakistani soldiers were accidentally killed as the result of air attacks by NATO on the twenty-sixth of November, 2001, the Pakistani government scheduled the USA to evacuate the country's Shami Air Base in fifteen days¹¹⁹. Thus, Uzbekistan's geopolitical importance showed up again for Pentagon that after it lost its base in southern Afghanistan. Because of this situation, access of the US Air Force to Afghanistan would be provided in the north via Europe and the former Soviet Union¹²⁰. As a matter of fact, Washington was seeking to improve relations with Tashkent in parallel with the increasing tension with Pakistan. In September 2011, the USA took steps to waive sanctions prohibiting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Uzbekistan¹²¹. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, having visited Tashkent in October 2011, stated that the Kerimov administration made progress as regard to "human rights and political liberties". Even though there was no improvement on this issue, apart from Uzbekistan allowing the Red Cross to visit prisons from 2008 onwards, the US Congress, on the sixteenth of December 2011, lifted the "military aid ban" they had been implementing since 2004¹²².

General Evaluation and the Conclusion

In this study, in which the course of US-Uzbekistan relations within the period of some twenty years were discussed security problems are considered as the fundamental element affecting the bilateral relations. In the first years of independence, Tashkent tried to come closer to the USA so as to

overcome the domestic and external security problems they confronted. In response to this, the USA, not considering Central Asia as region of prime importance, did not develop a comprehensive policy towards Central Asian countries, including Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's primary expectation was based on the theses of realist arguments such as powerful state, mighty army, territorial integrity, independence and suppressed opposition. In this period, the USA, also considering the interests of the multi-national companies in the region, tried to encourage the countries in the region to adopt liberal values such as free market economy, democratization, rule of law and human rights. With the end of the bipolar system, the Central Asia was much more a subordinate region for Washington, which was trying to fill the vacuum of power that emerged in the Middle East, the Balkans and Eastern Europe.

Along with the increase of the Central Asia's geopolitical importance following the September 11th attacks, Washington increased its relations with authoritarian administrations including Uzbekistan in particular, by putting its liberal values and ideas aside. In this period, US-Uzbekistan relations reached to the level of strategic partnership. The real factor in forming this partnership is common enemies such as the Taliban, Al Qaeda and IMU. However, emergence of the Colour Revolutions in the former Soviet republics, supported by the USA, turned these relations upside-down. In particular, the acquisitions that the USA obtained in Central Asia aftermath of September 11th, greatly reversed in the wake of the Andijan riot. Particularly, the USA lost power and prestige in Central Asia when its bases closed in Uzbekistan. On the other hand, the regional hegemonic position of both Russia and China increased after these events. Yet, the Russian-centered threats for Uzbekistan administration did not diminish. Threats of Russian origin can be summarized as follows: Russia's interfering in Uzbekistan's domestic affairs, its creating dependence on Moscow and preventing Tashkent's actions to contrast with Moscow's interests. Thus, Uzbekistan tried to emend her relations with the USA and the EU instead of unilateral dependence to Moscow. Even though some possible developments have been witnessed in the recent period on this matter, it seems difficult to reach the strategic partnership level that happened aftermath of the September 11th. In fact, both sides doubt each another. There is only one reason for the relations to be improved partially: Uzbekistan's geopolitical location.

Considering the developments after September 11th, it can be suggested that fundamentalist activities and security problems such, as terrorism in the region, which are Afghanistan origin, are the main factors to determine the shape of US-Uzbekistan relations in the long term. Some scenarios are in question regarding the new policies of the US toward the region, which is preparing to withdraw from Afghanistan. Doubtless, these new policies will affect America's relations with Uzbekistan as well. The first scenario is the US continuing to perceive radical activities as the main security problem. On such an occasion, the USA will follow the developments in this country even if it withdraws from Afghanistan, and accordingly, will try to enhance its relations with Central Asian administrations including Uzbekistan.

The second scenario is that the US will not deal with developments in the region after withdrawing from Afghanistan. The stagnation recently experienced in the foreign policy of the USA, having lost its power and prestige after the invasion of Iraq and having experienced a great economic crisis in 2009, attracts attention. After all, it is a remote possibility for Washington, engaged in the Arab Spring and Iran's nuclear program, to be involved in developments in Afghanistan, so long as they do not pose a direct threat to them. In such a case, the geopolitical position of Uzbekistan will lose its importance for Washington. If this is the case, there will be no option for Uzbekistan, again alone with the security threats from Afghanistan origin, to turn back to Russia and China.

The third scenario is, related to the transformation experienced in the international system. In the post-Cold War period, the USA remained "unrivaled" for a period as sole super power in the world. However, many countries became a potential rivals to the USA in the long run by catching a

rapid growth trend. Of these countries, in view of Russia and China's increasing influence in the Central Asia, it will be possible for the USA to support radical movements (which they fought before) in the region, by implementing a strategy similar to the Green Belt project in the Cold War period. Although such a scenario can seem a distant possibility, it can be suggested that considering the fact that radical movements took part in the Arab Spring and those movements mobilized with the secret support of the USA, a similar situation might be experienced in the Central Asia. In such a case, US-Uzbek relations might worsen. However, Uzbekistan, because of its geopolitical position, will become important again for the USA in the event that a policy like "containment" is implemented together with the international community against Iran, Russia or China.

Notes

- ¹ A. Sait Sönmez, "Özbekistan Dış Politikasını Oluşturan Temel Faktörler", unpublished paper., pp. 1-2.
- ² Mitat Çelikpala, "Sovyetlerden Günümüze Orta Asya Kafkasya'da Vahhabilik ve Siyasal İslam", Yelda Demirağ, Cem Karadeli (ed.), *Geçmişten Günümüze Dönüşen, Orta Asya ve Kafkasya*, (Ankara: Palme, 2006) p. 236.
- ³ Ali Yaman, "Fergana Vadisi Orta Asya'nın Jeopolitik ve Stratejik Merkezi", Kemal İnat et al (ed.), *Dünya Çatışmaları: Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Konuları*, Vol: 1, (Ankara: Nobel, 2010). 3rd Print, p. 603.
- ⁴ Hasan Ali Karasar, "Bağımsızlıklar Sonrası Türkistan'da Rus Siyaseti," *Avrasya Dosyası, Rusya Özel*, 6 (4), p. 237.
- ⁵ Çelikpala, pp. 238-240.
- ⁶ See (<http://english.hizbuttahrir.org/index.php/component/content/category/46-books>) access date: 20 January 2011.
- ⁷ Karasar, pp. 229-230.
- ⁸ Yaman, p. 607.
- ⁹ Mustafa Aydın, Saule Baycaun, "Tacik İç Savaşı Orta Asya'ya Etkileri", Musafa Aydın (ed.), *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya*, (Ankara: Nobel, 2005), p. 384
- ¹⁰ Kamer Kasım, "Tacikistan: Çok Boyutlu Bir İç Savaş", Kemal et al (ed.), *Dünya Çatışmaları: Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Konuları*, Vol: 1, (Ankara, Nobel, 2010). 3rd Print, p. 512.
- ¹¹ Ali Balcı, "Afganistan: Küresel Güçlerin Oyun Alanı", Kemal İnat et al (ed.), *Dünya Çatışmaları: Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Konuları*, Vol: 1, (Ankara: Nobel, 2010). 3rd Print, pp. 391-392.
- ¹² Nermin Güler, "11 Eylül Sonrası ABD ve Rusya Arasında Özbekistan", *Avrasya Dosyası, Özbekistan Özel*, 7(3), Autumn 2001, pp. 190-191.
- ¹³ Ç. Erhan divides the USA foreign policy between the First World War and the 1990s into four periods in the context of "threat perception". "The first period starts in 1930 when ABD tried to limit Japan's expansionist tendencies in the Asia-Pacific region through diplomatic channels and aimed to protect its interests in this region, and the period continued until 1941 when the USA entered the war. The second period covers the years 1941-1945 during which the USA was in the Second World War. In this period, military approaches were ahead of diplomacy and the first signs of some basic conflicts of the Cold War emerged... The third period starts with the end of the Second World War and continues until the early 1990s. This period is the phase defined as the years of the Cold War." Çağrı Erhan, "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası ABD'nin Güvenlik Algılamaları", Refet Yinanç, Hakan Taşdemir (ed.), *Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye*, (Ankara:, Seçkin, 2002) pp. 59-61, The fourth period starts with the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Japanese, German, and Soviet (or Socialist ideology) threats (or the other) have been effective in determining the foreign policy strategies of the first three periods.
- ¹⁴ <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm> access date: 20 January 2011.
- ¹⁵ Murat Yeşiltaş, "ABD'nin Uluslararası Terörizme Yaklaşımı", Kemal İnat (ed.), *ABD'nin "Haydut Devletleri"*, (İstanbul: Değişim, 2004), p. 26.
- ¹⁶ <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/918015-nss.htm> access date: 20 January 2011.
- ¹⁷ Petra Minnerop, "Rogue States – State Sponsors of Terrorism?", <http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=188> access date: 20 April 2011.
- ¹⁸ <http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001454.html> access date: 20 April 2011.

- ¹⁹ Hüseyin Şeyhanlıoğlu, “Usame Bin Ladin ve ABD İlişkileri Tarihi” <http://www.sde.org.tr/tr/haberler/1472/usame-bin-ladin-ve-abd-iliskileri-tarihi.aspx> access date: 20 January 2011.
- ²⁰ Fatma Taşdemir, “Taliban Bağlamında Bölgesel ve Küresel Güvenlik Sorunları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme”, Refet Yinanç, Hakan Taşdemir (ed.), *Uluslararası Güvenlik Sorunları ve Türkiye*, (Ankara: Seçkin: 2002) p. 295.
- ²¹ Balcı, p. 295
- ²² Yeşiltaş, p. 26
- ²³ <http://www.fas.org/man/docs/strategy97.htm> access date: 20 January 2011.
- ²⁴ Dale T. Snauwaert, “The Bush Doctrine and Just War Theory”, *OJPCR: The Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution*, 6(1), 2004, http://www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/6_1snau.pdf p. 12., access date: 20 January 2011.
- ²⁵ Steve Jones, “The Bush Doctrine: A Combination of Unilateralism and Preventive Warfare” <http://usforeignpolicy.about.com/od/defense/a/The-Bush-Doctrine.htm> access date: 20 April 2011
- ²⁶ <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf:5> access date: 20 April 2011.
- ²⁷ Bush gave the tips of the preventive war strategy during the speech he gave on September 20, 2002: “We cannot wait for the terrorists to strike in order to defend ourselves, is the logic; we must act first to prevent the threat.” Snauwaert p.122; Preemption frequently emphasized in the document of NSS 2002, in the fifth chapter titled “Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our allies, and our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.” See <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf>, pp. 13-169 access date: 25 August 2011.
- ²⁸ Donald C. F. Daniel, Peter J. Dombrowski, Rodger Payne, “The Bush Doctrine: Rest in Peace?”, *Defence Studies*, 4(1), 2004, <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/1470243042000255254> access date: 25 August 2011
- ²⁹ Bozdağlıoğlu, p. 218.
- ³⁰ A. Schlesinger, one of the advisers of J. Kennedy, the former president of the USA, states that the strategy in question is immoral and he uses the expression “*certainty about prediction is an illusion*” in his paper of the same name. Arthur Schlesinger, “The Immorality of Preemptive War”, http://www.digitalnpg.org/archive/2002_fall/schlesinger.html, access date: 25 August 2011; *A mistake made when deciding on the existence of an intention to attack, leads to unacceptable hazards in terms of the protection of international peace and security*. Fatma Taşdemir, “Uluslararası Anarşiye Giden Yol: Uluslararası Hukuk Açısından Önleyici Meşru Müdafaa Hakkı”, *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, 2 (5), 2006, p. 81.
- ³¹ Aydın, p. 4
- ³² Leila Kazemi, “Domestic Sources of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy, 1991 to the Present,” *Journal of International Affairs*, 56 (2), Spring 2003, pp. 207-208.
- ³³ Fırat Purtaş, *Rusya Federasyonu Ekseninde Bağımsız Devletler Topluluğu*, (Ankara: Platin, 2005), p.138.
- ³⁴ The vast energy resources in the states of the Caucasus and Central Asia cused a competition among the energy firms. For more information see. Savaş Genç, “The Role of the Caspian Energy Game in Central Asian History”, *Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences*, 1(1), (2008), pp. 9-18.
- ³⁵ Erhan, ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül sonrası Açılımları,” pp. 22-23.
- ³⁶ Erhan, ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül sonrası Açılımları,” pp. 27-29.
- ³⁷ Şatlık Amanov, *ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikaları*, (İstanbul: Gökkuşbu, 2007), p.133.
- ³⁸ Erhan, “ABD’nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül sonrası Açılımları,” p. 30.
- ³⁹ Kholisa Sodikova, “Uzbekistan’s National Security Policy and Nonproliferation”, *The Nonproliferation Review*, Winter 1999, <http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/sodik62.pdf> p. 144 access date: 25 August 2011
- ⁴⁰ <http://www.state.state.gov/r/pa/eilbgn/2924.htm:14> access date: 25 August 2011
- ⁴¹ Mohammad-Reza Djalili, Thierry Kellner, *Yeni Orta Asya Jeopolitiği, SSCB’nin Bitiminden 11 Eylül Sonrasına*, Translated in to Turkish by Reşat Uzmen, (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2009), pp. 354-355.
- ⁴² Shahram Akbarzadeh, “US-Uzbek Partnership and Democratic Reforms”, *Nationalities Papers*, 32 (2), June 2004, p. 227.
- ⁴³ Güler, p. 191.
- ⁴⁴ Amanov, p. 213.
- ⁴⁵ Amanov, p. 213.
- ⁴⁶ Amanov, p. 214.
- ⁴⁷ According to Russia first strategy, Russia was considered as the component of stability in the former Soviet

geography and the Russian interests in the region were taken into account. Thus, in the US policies towards the region, the actions that would cause Moscow to react were avoided. As a matter of fact, in case of attempting such actions, the reforms Yeltsin and his team conducted might be interrupted, and the anti-reformist communist and nationalist opposition in Moscow might become stronger. Thus, as a natural result of this strategy, the region was ignored by the USA. Çağrı Erhan, "ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül sonrası Açılımları," Mustafa Aydın (ed.), *Küresel Politikada Orta Asya, (Avrasya Üçlemesi I)*, (Ankara: Nobel, 2005) p.21. However, from the mid 1990s onwards, Washington gradually left this strategy. The following factors came into play in the alteration of this strategy: I. The rise of Russian military power as a result of Chechnya War (1994-96), Pentagon's giving priority to the region, interests of American energy companies, Svante Cornell, "Uzbekistan: A Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics?", *European Security*, 9 (2), 2000, p. 115, The EU's stepping in the region with the projects such as Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (Traceca) and Interstate Oil and Gas Transport Europe (Inogate), China's increasing effect in the region. İlhan Uzgel "ABD ve NATO'yla İlişkiler", Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt II, (1980-2001)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), 9th Print, p. 278, Besides, M. Albright and his team's role had influence in the US Secretary of State. This team was against the Russian's filling the Vacuum of Power arising in Eurasia in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union.

⁴⁸ Sodikova, p. 148.

⁴⁹ See, <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nssr-1098.pdf> : 41 access date: 25 August 2011.

⁵⁰ Erhan, "ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül sonrası Açılımları," p. 36.

⁵¹ Chris Seiple, "Uzbekistan: Civil Society in the Heartland", *Orbis*, Spring 2005, <http://www.fpri.org/orbis/4902/seiple.uzbekistancivilsociety.pdf> p.255 access date: 25 August 2011.

⁵² Sodikova, p. 149.

⁵³ Djalili, Kellner, p.355.

⁵⁴ Güler, p.194.

⁵⁵ Cengiz Sürücü, "Türkiye-Özbekistan İlişkilerinin Üç Evresi", Mustafa Aydın(ed.), *Türkiye'nin Avrasya Macerası 1989-2006, Avrasya Üçlemesi II*, (Ankara: Nobel, 2007), p. 359.

⁵⁶ On May 15, 1992, Collective Security Treaty was signed in Tashkent among Russian Federation, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan did not renew the Treaty. In May, 2002, Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) was founded by the remaining five countries and Belarus. This organization, founded for the purpose of common defense, is considered as the military and political block of the pro Russian countries within the CIS. Purtaş, p. 269

⁵⁷ Cornell, "Uzbekistan: A Regional Player in Eurasian Geopolitics", pp. 130-131.

⁵⁸ GUAM was founded in 1997 by the countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova adopting pro-western foreign policies within the Commonwealth of Independent States. These countries not only aimed to become closer with the USA but also to develop a strategic partnership with the USA against Russia. As a matter of fact, these countries relied on the western security mechanisms such as "NATO". The USA supported the attempts of collaboration and organization of this pro-western group. In this context, The USA donated 45 million dollars to the countries within GUAM. With the membership of Uzbekistan, GUAM's name changed as GUUAM, and it became institutionalized and officialized. Timuçin Kodaman, Haktan Birsell, "Bağımsızlık Sonrası Özbekistan ve Dış Politikası", *Fırat Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, 16 (2), 2006, pp. 431-432.

⁵⁹ Svante E. Cornell, "Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia", *Perceptions-Journal of International Affairs*, 4 (2), June-August 1999. <http://sam.gov.tr/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/SVANTE-E.-CORNELL.pdf> p. 6. access date: 25 August 2011

⁶⁰ Cornell, "Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia", p. 4.

⁶¹ Purtaş, p. 203; Djalili, Kellner, pp. 355-357, Shanghai Five turned into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the participation of Uzbekistan.

⁶² Güler, p.194.

⁶³ Erhan, p. 38.

⁶⁴ Akbarzadeh, p. 277.

⁶⁵ Sedat Laçiner, "Hazar Enerji Kaynakları ve Enerji Siyaset İlişkisi", *OAKA*, 1(1), 2006, p. 58.

⁶⁶ Güler, p. 195

⁶⁷ Mustafa Aydın, "ABD Dünyadan Ne İstiyor: ABD'nin Yeni Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi ve Dış Politikası", *Stradigma, Aylık Strateji ve Analiz E-Dergisi*, May 2003, No 4. <http://www.stradigma.com/index.php?sayfa=makale&sayi=9&no=60> access date: 25 August 2011

- ⁶⁸Frederick Starr, "Making Eurasia Stable", *Foreign Affairs*, 75(1), January/February (1996). http://www.silkroadstudies.org/docs/publications/OLD/Starr_96.htm access date: 15 March 2011
- ⁶⁹Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Büyük Satranç Tahtası: ABD'nin Küresel Üstünlüğü ve Bunun Jeostratejik Gereklilikleri*, translated into Turkish by Yelda Türedi, (İstanbul: İnkılap, 1997), p. 51.
- ⁷⁰Brzezinski, p. 184
- ⁷¹Erhan, "ABD'nin Orta Asya Politikaları ve 11 Eylül sonrası Açılımları," p. 31.
- ⁷²İrfan Ülkü, *Moskova'yla İslam Arasında Orta Asya*, (İstanbul: Kum Saati, 2002), p. 14.
- ⁷³Djalili and Kellner, p. 358.
- ⁷⁴Zdzislaw Lachowski, "Foreign Military Bases in Eurasia", *SIPRI Policy Paper*, No:18, June (2007), pp. 11-13.
- ⁷⁵Djalili and Kellner, pp. 358-359.
- ⁷⁶Djalili and Kellner, p. 359.
- ⁷⁷Djalili and Kellner, pp. 359-360.
- ⁷⁸Kodaman and Birsnel, pp. 429-430.
- ⁷⁹Djalili and Kellner, pp. 361-362.
- ⁸⁰Jim Nichol, "Uzbekistan: Current Developments and U.S. Interests", CRS Report for Congress, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a486557.pdf>, (2004), p. 4. access date: 15 March 2011
- ⁸¹Amanov, p. 133.
- ⁸²For example, the following statements were included in the report published regarding Uzbekistan in 2001: "The Ministry of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces are responsible for most routine police functions. The National Security Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and narcotics. There is effective civilian control over the military. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human rights abuses... The Government's human rights record remained very poor, and it continued to commit numerous serious abuses. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of several citizens in custody. Police and NSS forces tortured, beat, and harassed persons. The security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, on false charges, particularly Muslims suspected of extremist sympathies, frequently planting narcotics, weapons, or banned literature on them. Human rights groups estimated that the number of persons in detention for political or religious reasons and for terrorism, primarily attendees of unofficial mosques and members of Islamist political groups, but also members of the secular opposition and human rights activists, was approximately 7,500." Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor 2001, "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Uzbekistan", <http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eur/8366.htm> access date: 15 March 2011
- ⁸³Ertan Efeğil, "Orta Asya'da Otoriter/Anayasal Rejimler ve Bush Yönetiminin Orta Asya Devletleri ile İlişkileri", Yelda Demirağ, Cem Karadeli (ed.), *Geçmişten Günümüze Dönüşen Orta Asya ve Kafkasya*, (Ankara: Palme, 2006), p. 121.
- ⁸⁴Nichol, p.6.
- ⁸⁵Djalili and Kellner, p. 366.
- ⁸⁶Laçiner, p. 57
- ⁸⁷Nichol, p.4.
- ⁸⁸Since 1991 at least, to promote transition in the former Communist countries, including Central Asia, some international institutions and Non-governmental organizations began some activities in the region. For more information see, Savaş Genç, "The Role of the OECD and NGO's in Central Asian", *Caucasus Journal of Social Sciences*, 2 (2), (2010), pp. 52-55.
- ⁸⁹Yaşar Sarı, Mahmut Alpay, "Özbekistan: Orta Asyada Demokrasi Korkusu", Kemal İnat et al (ed.), *Dünya Çatışmaları: Çatışma Bölgeleri ve Konuları*, Vol: 1, (Ankara: Nobel, 2010). 3rd Print, pp. 529-530.
- ⁹⁰Kodaman and Birsnel, p. 430.
- ⁹¹Purtas, p.204.
- ⁹²Daniel Kimmage, "Terror in Uzbekistan, The Aftermath", *Central Asia Report*, 4 (14), pp.1-2; Kodaman, Birsnel, p. 427.
- ⁹³Purtas, p. 204.
- ⁹⁴Djalili and Kellner, p.364.
- ⁹⁵Lachowski, p. 53.
- ⁹⁶Tares Kurzio, Sergei Blagov, "GUUAM Makes Comeback Bid With US Support", (July7, 2003) <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav070703.shtml>, access date: 15 March 2011

⁹⁷ Sarı and Alpay, p. 529.

⁹⁸ Rouben Azizian, "Central Asia and the United States 2004–2005: Moving Beyond Counter-Terrorism?", *Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies*, (September 2005) <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA446802> pp. 6-7. access date: 15 March 2011

⁹⁹ Kodaman and Birsell, p. 433.

¹⁰⁰ It would be incomplete to ascribe Andican uprising only to Colour Revolution. Kerimov administration's ruling the country with an iron fist lies behind the background of the uprising. In consequence of the repression politics, the people of Andican became fed up with the administration. Aftermath of the economic crisis that started in 2003, some informal groups got rich by making border trade. Of these groups, the Akramiye Proup, which was regarded as rival by Kerimov, had the leader of the group and his friends arrested. Thus, the people of Andican rioted in May-2005 as a reaction to the conditions' becoming harder. Sarı, Alpay, pp. 522-523.

¹⁰¹ Sarı and Alpay, p. 530.

¹⁰² Sürücü, p. 363.

¹⁰³ Ezeli Azarkan, "The Relations between Central Asian States and United States, China and Russia within the Framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization", *Alternatives, Turkish Journal of International Relations*, 3 (8), Fall 2009, p. 16.

¹⁰⁴ Upon the fact that Bishkek brought some demands to the agenda regarding the length of the base and its activities, the annual rent of the base was increased from 2 million dollars to 150 million dollars. Azarkan, p. 15.

¹⁰⁵ "Uzbekistan Surprised by EU Move to Extend Sanction", <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articleseav111406.shtml>. access date: 15 March 2011

¹⁰⁶ "Uzbek President Complains of Information War By West", <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1066903.html>. access date: 25 December 2011

¹⁰⁷ Laçiner, pp. 59-60.

¹⁰⁸ The Economic Union established by Russian Federation, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Krygzistan and Tajikistan in 2000.

¹⁰⁹ Dina.Roma. Spechler, Martin.C.Spechler, "Uzbekistan Among the Great Powers", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 42 (3), 2009, p.368.

¹¹⁰ Azarkan, p. 14.

¹¹¹ "EU To Temporarily Lift Uzbek Visa Ban", <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1078951.html> access date: 15 December 2011

¹¹² "Uzbekistan Surprised by EU Move to Extend Sanction", <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articleseav111406.shtml>. access date: 15 December 2011

¹¹³ "US-Uzbekistan Relations: Another Step Toward Rapprochement?", <http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012308b.shtml> access date: 15 December 2011

¹¹⁴ "Uzbekistan Suspends Eurasec membership, Moscow Unruffled" <http://en.rian.ru/world/20081112/118264022.html> access date: 15 December 2011

¹¹⁵ Sabir Askarov, "Özbekistan Dış Politikası ve KGAÖ", <http://www.gundem.be/tr/konuk-yazarlar/ozbekistan-dis-politikasi-ve-kgao>. access date: 11 March 2011

¹¹⁶ Seyfettin Erol, "Özbekistan Batı İlişkilerinde Yeni Bir Dönem mi?", <http://www.turkishnews.com/tr/content/2011/01/26/ozbekistan-bati-iliskilerinde-veni-bir-donem-mi/> access date: 15 December 2011

¹¹⁷ Peter Baker et al, "Bin Laden Dead, Obama Says", <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/world/asia/osama-bin-laden-is-killed.html?pagewanted=all> access date: 15 December 2011

¹¹⁸ Jone Perlez, "US Rift with Pakistan Grows Over Drone Strikes", (2011) <http://nytimes.com/2011/04/18/world/asia/18pakistan.html> access date: 30 December 2011

¹¹⁹ Salmen Masood, "CIA Leaves Base in Pakistan Used For Drone Strikes", (2011) <http://nytimes.com/2011/12/12/world/asia/cia-leaves-pakistan-base-used-for-drone-strikes.html> access date: 30 December 2011

¹²⁰ For more information see Andrew C. Kuchins et al, "The Northern Distribution Network and Afghanistan, Geopolitical Challenges and Opportunities", *A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project and the Russia and Eurasia Program*, <http://csis.org/files/publication/091229-kuching-NDNandAfghan-wep.pdf> access date: 30 December 2011

¹²¹ Deidre Tynan, "Uzbekistan: Pentagon Mulls Giving Military Equipment to Tashkent," <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64707>. access date: 30 December 2011

¹²²Joshua Kucera, “Americas Uzbekistan Problem”, (2011)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/29/opinion/americas-uzbekistan-problem.html> access date: 30 December 2011