

Nurettin Topçu: the Reinvention of Islamism in Republican Turkey¹

Michelangelo Guida*

Abstract: *In 1934, Nurettin Topçu returned to Turkey after becoming the first Turkish student to obtain a doctorate in philosophy at la Sorbonne. Strongly influenced by Turkish conservative ideas, in France, Topçu became passionate of Maurice Blondel and Louis Massignon as well as the strengthening European extreme right. Back to his homeland, the Turkish intellectual worked as a publisher and teacher until his death in 1975. His articles and books became very popular among a new religious generation that were disappointed by the Republic and the secular elites. Topçu gave a re-interpretation of nationalism, provided new basis to reconstruct Muslim thought in a secular context, and a methodology to operate without clashing with the secular establishment. Indeed, Topçu is particularly important because he invented a new and peculiar lexicon for Turkish Islamism. Nurettin Topçu is a key author to understand Islamism in republican Turkey as he is the author that contributed most to the shaping of Islamist lexicon and values. The present paper will then try to understand the genesis of his ideas and some aspects of them mainly modernity, nationalism, and state, which characterized his generation of Islamist intellectuals and deeply influenced the following generation.*

Keywords: Nurettin Topçu, Turkish Islamism

* Ass. Prof., Department of Political Science and International Relations, Istanbul 29 Mayıs University, Istanbul, Turkey, mguida@29mayis.edu.tr.

Introduction

| 16

This dream, what we call childhood is the Muslim dream, the one that keeps us united as a nation. Today's Turkish fathers grew up in neighborhoods where soil and air were once full of this Muslim dream. When they were born, the call to prayer was whispered in their ears, in their homes' rooms they saw old ladies standing in prayer, they heard the recitation of the Qur'an in the holy days' evenings. From a shelf they took Kitâbullâh,² with their small hands they opened it, they smelled its yellow pages that have a fragrance similar to rose oil. As their first lesson they learned Bismillah;³ in the holy nights they lighted the oil lamps, before the Bayram⁴ they rejoice when the cannon fired. They accompanied their fathers for the Bayram prayer, in the mosques at dawn they heard the Tekbirs,⁵ passing through the stages of religion they entered their life. They became Turks.

The great majorities of today's children are still born and grow in Muslim neighborhoods. Even if they do not specialize as in the past, they still feel Islam. However, because the sons of too civilized elites are brought up in neighborhoods without the call to prayer and with a Western [alafranga] education, they do not see Turkish children's most beautiful dream. These children's milk must be so clean and their disposition must be so solid that they can remain bound to their nation even after they covered Turkishness with a Western lifestyle. Otherwise, no territory, nor their new life, nor the neighborhood, nor anything else can make Turkishness be felt by these pets.⁶

In his article *Ezans, z Semtler* (Neighbourhoods without Adhan) in 1922, the conservative writer Yahya Kemal (Beyatl.) stressed how a new generation of Westernized youth was emerging in Turkey. It was a generation not properly Turkish because they did not taste Islamic culture. The emergence of Kemalism in the following years strengthened the Westernized and generally positivist generation transforming it in a powerful elite. The feeling of estrangement of Turkish culture triggered an intellectual reaction that gave birth to Turkish conservatism (*muhafazakârlık*) and immediately after of a new generation of Islamist intellectuals. The most prominent Islamist intellectual is Nurettin Topçu, who strongly condemned those foreigners that failed to understand the *national* spirit.

Although Nurettin Topçu is little known outside Turkey and lived through periods of alternative fortunes in his own country, he can be considered one of the main founders and the ideologues of this generation of Islamists. Topçu was representative of a new generation of Islamist intellectuals. The previous generation represented by Mehmed Âkif (Ersoy) and Said Halim Paşa, for instance, shared with all Islamists the contestation of positivism and a process of modernization based on the imitation of the West as well as the firm belief in the superiority of Islam as a source for social and political life. Nevertheless, they were linked to political power, they were sons of a multicultural Ottoman Empire that did not recognize ethnic or cultural borders, and finally their main task was to save the Ottoman State. Topçu, however, represented one of the vanguards of a new generation strongly influenced by new Turkish conservatism that had totally different cultural and political references: he became adult in the newly established *Turkish Republic* and not in the multicultural Ottoman Empire; he was educated exclusively in the modern and secular education system shaped on the Western model; he was more familiar with philosophy and modern sciences than with classical Islamic sciences; he found himself challenging institutional religion, which he saw as exploiting religion for lucre and as an arm of the secular regime; he did not belong to the ruling and cultural elites and he harshly contested the elites' understanding of modernity and politics. Moreover, he operated in a society and a political context that has left officially a Muslim styled life and has severed its links with Islam⁷ a younger Islamist commented. Consequently, rather than defend the state, he wished to re-establish it on new foundations.

When Nurettin Topçu appeared on the Turkish intellectual scene, the country had fallen under the rule of a one-party system and was controlled by the *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (the Republican Peopleø Party) which Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) established in 1923. Until the mid-1940s, Turkish politics might be described as a kind of -Jacobean secularismø⁸ led by the Westernized elite. Any public display of religion was condemned as simply reactionary, and talk of belief in God and the virtues of moral living were not only strictly prohibited but punished often draconically as crimes against the State.⁹

After the establishment of the Republic in 1923, the transmission of religious knowledge could only be facilitated by a variety of primitive publishing houses and private, religious institutions. For instance, handwritten copies of the works of the famous Ottoman scholar Said Nursi were secretly distributed by his followers. Formal religious education was removed from schoolsøcurricula, and membership in mystical confraternities was outlawed in 1925. In their zeal to create an image of a modern Turkey, secular Turkish intellectuals and historians went a long way in the 1920s and 1930s to erase and denigrate the Islamic or religious foundations of Ottoman society which, in turn, led to a profound identity crisis for generations to come.¹⁰ Topçu opposed all of that.

In this paper I will focus on some peculiar aspects of Topçuø ideas. Firstly I will analyse his understanding of modernity and his image of Europe. Secondly, I will investigate Topçuø interpretation of Turkish history and his reformulation of Turkish nationalism. Finally, I will concentrate on Topçuø political ideas, methods of opposition, and his contribution to shape a new conservative elite in the country. These three aspects will help us in understanding a key author in Turkish Islamism but will also give us the occasion to better appreciate the peculiarities of Islamist political movements in the Turkish context. However, to may understand his thought it is necessary first to go through Topçuø intellectual career and to analyse the genesis of his ideas.

Life

Nurettin Topçu was born on 7 November 1909 in Istanbul as Osman Nuri.¹¹ His father was a cattle trader who immigrated to Istanbul from the Eastern city of Erzurum. His grandfather participated to the defence of Erzurum against the Russians, manning a cannon and hence the family name, -Topçuø which means -cannoneerø In 1928, Nurettin graduated from high school and won a scholarship to study philosophy in France. Before enrolling at the University of Strasbourg, he studied at the Bordeaux (probably only for few weeks) and Aix-en-Provence secondary schools. In 1930, he moved to Strasbourg and obtained a degree in philosophy. In 1934, he gained the *Licence èslettres* from Paris University after successfully defending a dissertation, entitled *Conformisme etrévolte* which would be published the same year.¹²

Returning to Turkey in 1934, he accepted a position as professor of philosophy at the Galatasaraylycée and married Fethiye Ula , step daughter of family friend Hüseyin Avnî (Ula). However, because he refused to succumb to pressures to graduate a group of undeserving students, he was transferred to Izmir where he lived and worked for some years. During his stay in Izmir, he established the review *Hareket* and his marriage ended with a divorce.

A controversial article on *Hareket*, though, brought him back to Istanbul in 1939. Four years later he was once again confined to a high school in the provincial city of Denizli where he met Bediüzzaman Said Nursi, who was on trial there from 1943 to 1944 for his religious activities. Because of the state persecution Said Nursi will be one of the -figures on the spiritual frontø together with two of the most influential persons on Topçuø early thought: Hüseyin Avnî and Mehmet Âkif (Ersoy). Hüseyin Avnî was member of the opposition -Second groupø in the first Ankara Parliament and stood trial for an alleged involvement in the Izmir plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in 1926. Eventually, he was acquitted but he had no chance to return to active politics. Despite being a powerful propagandist during the National Struggle and the author of the national anthem, Mehmet Âkif preferred a self-imposed exile to Egypt in 1923 rather than any compromise with and probably persecution by the emerging Kemalist regime.

Another experience that probably influenced Topçu and early Islamists' feeling of persecution by the Kemalist elite is the 1933 University reform. The reform closed the *Dar-ül-fünun* and transformed it in the University of Istanbul linked to the Ministry of National Education. Previously the university was an independent institution and allowed the presence of different voices well after the establishment of Kemalist regime. After the reform, the Ministry of Education purged more than half of the academic staff (157 over 240) and promoted a new academy supportive of the regime at least until the liberalization period in the second half of 1940s. Since the reform all students has been required to pass the *nkilap Tarihi* (Revolution History) that is a class on the Kemalist credo and orthodox understanding of republican history. Very prominent conservative voices such as Baltacıoğlu, Tunç and Aaoğlu lost their positions. After his return to Turkey from France, Topçu had access only to positions in high schools. His valiant attempt at an academic career ran afoul of petty ideological skirmishes inside the Turkish academia. He earned the title of associate professor, though, with an arid thesis on Bergson¹³ but until his retirement in 1974 he would never land a respectable, tenured position. When new universities were opened in Anatolia and positions were available, he renounced to academic career to stay in Istanbul and follow his *eyh* order to remain in the Turkish intellectual capital¹⁴ and to educate and illuminate the young generations.¹⁵

Indeed, Topçu had found spiritual sustenance in the teachings of a *Sufi* master, Abdülaziz Bekkine. Bekkine was a Nakibendi *eyh* inviting his adepts to conduct a modest life of involvement in society. With his charisma influenced an entire generation of well educated like-minded conservatives who eventually become bureaucrats and prominent politicians (like Turgut Özal and Necmettin Erbakan). Topçu recalled that "my master took me from the pit of doubt and guided me to the heights of faith. [...] I found in him what I have not found in Europe"¹⁶ However, his devotion for Bekkine appears perfectly in harmony with his commitment for mysticism, which he met for the first time in the writings of Louis Massignon. Indeed, in the last pages of the thesis, Topçu states that returning to the spirit of early Sufism which goes from Muhammad to Mansur al-Hallaj will help the sons of Anatolia to end their material and moral crisis.¹⁷ Topçu eventually distanced from the confraternity because he did not recognize the authority of Bekkine's successor, Mehmet Zahid Kotku. Topçu thought that Kotku was brought from Bursa to Istanbul by Erbakan's circle, but was not the successor chosen by Bekkine.¹⁸ Kotku, who will be extremely influential among the Islamist intellectual and politicians that emerged after the 1980s, was upholding believers' involvement in economic and intellectual world as well as in religious practices. The *şakender Paşa Dergâhı*, the lodge created around the mosque of Istanbul where Kotku was assigned, constructed a web of economic activities as a religious duty. Kotku even promoted the establishment of an engine factory in 1956 as stimulus for Turkish (Muslim) economy headed by a young engineer, Necmettin Erbakan, who became in few years the most important representative of Islamist political movement thanks also to Kotku's enthusiastic support. An engine factory in Konya, the heart of conservative Anatolia, was something, however, that probably appeared outrageous to Nurettin Topçu, who was strenuously condemning modernity and any attachment to material interest: "You remember there is a *eyh efendi* [a religious authority, here is probably intending Kotku] who opens factories; he even gives religious names to chimneys. This perversion, these bewilderments are opposed to the Islamic cause."¹⁹

By the 1950s, Topçu was actively involved in nationalist associations such as the *Komünizmle Mücadele Derneği* (Association for the Struggle Against Communism), the *Millî Türk Talebe Birliği* (National Turkish Students' Union), and above all, the *Türk Milliyetçiler Cemiyeti* (Association of Turkish Nationalists, TMC) where he defended his vision of Anatolian nationalism, a mixture of strong Islamist religious values and more than a dash of Turkish nationalism.

The TMC was banned in 1953 because of its anti-Kemalist and anti-revolutionary stands. During that decade, what came to be known as "The Malatya Episode"²⁰ seriously damaged relations between Islamists, nationalists, and the ruling Democratic Party (*Demokrat Party*, DP)

which, in turn, led to the creation of separate nationalist and Islamist political organizations. In a statement for the TMC, Topçu wrote:

For the first time in this continent, you imitate Nero. After he burned Rome's Christian neighborhoods, telling to the Romans "the Christians are burning our city" Nero gave to the ferocious beasts of the circus those innocents that for the first time glorified the name of "the only God" We walk on the path of our great Prophet who answered with tears and the lightening of revolt to those who were inviting him to relinquish the holy mission entrusted him by God: "Even if they put the sun in my right hand and the moon in my left hand, I would not abandon it" We gave our promise to people! We gave our promise to conscience! We gave our promise to God! We will not lean, we will not go back and so long as the last cell of our brains survives, we will not relinquish this holy mission.²¹

In 1954, Topçu helped to establish a similar association to replace the TMC, the *Milliyetçiler Derneği* (Nationalists' Association). Many Islamist and conservative intellectuals, such as Ali Fuat Bağı, Peyami Safa, Smail Hami Danişmen, Evket Eygi, Tarık Buğra, Mehmet Kaplan, joined the association and participated to its activities giving public speeches. Topçu's statement had elevated him to a position of leadership within the movement. With his periodical, he promoted a new Turkish nationalism intertwined with Islam and in contraposition to secular Kemalist nationalism. However, by 1964, the national congress in Istanbul distanced itself from the author. In a climate of witch-hunt, Topçu's attempts to harmonize spirituality, nationalism, and socialism sounded then too much like soviet propaganda, so much that he was physically assaulted during the meeting. Even if Topçu appreciated Communism's fight for egalitarianism and against exploitation, he also condemned it as a calamity because it calls for anarchy and materialism.²² After the congress he was left with no other choice and he established yet another nationalist association in November 1964, *Türkiye Milliyetçiler Cemiyeti* (Association of the Nationalists of Turkey) which resumed publication of his periodical review.²³ Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, a contemporary Islamist author, also bitterly criticized him for his alleged sympathies for socialism: "in some conferences I almost felt extreme aversion [for him] and more than a desire to scold him"²⁴ Topçu's disciples attempted a humorous defence of their teacher from Kısakürek's accusations by holding a trial on the pages of *Hareket*,²⁵ which ended with a reprimand for his baseless accuser. However, Topçu's popularity fell irreparably.

Topçu made also some moves in party politics after the 1960 coup d'état. In fact, he joined the ranks of the Justice Party, which was animated by Fuad Bağı, one of the writers of *Hareket* and jurist. In the 1961 election, he accepted to stand as a candidate for the Senate in the unwinnable constituency of Konya. In order to dedicate himself more fully to the business of propagating his Islamist and nationalist ideas, he abandoned politics altogether soon after. After 1964, he dropped out completely from the political scene.

Nurettin Topçu died, prematurely, on 10 July 1975 from the effects of pancreatic cancer.

The French Influences

During his stay in France, the influence of three French intellectuals— Maurice Blondel, Louis Massignon, and Henri Bergson— on Topçu's thinking cannot be underestimated.

Henri Bergson was clearly the philosopher, the intellectual spokesman *par excellence* of the era in the eyes of Europe's educated public in the first decades of twentieth-century.²⁶ Bergson aimed to liberate French intellectual life from scientism, materialism, and positivism of the *Lumières* ideology. Bergson's aim was certainly shared with Turkish conservative authors in the early years of the Republic. World War I marked in the former Ottoman Empire the end of the utopia of the West as a rational civilization. The pro-modernist and pro-West Ottoman

intellectuals were troubled by the dystopian potential of modern Western civilization and its imperialist motivations. Though they had taken the West as a civilizing model for almost half a century, the Ottoman intellectuals began to express their loss of faith in the West after the events of the war. A widespread sense of despair among intellectuals was coupled with heated debates about the future of the Empire, which, as an ally of the Central Powers was defeated and occupied. Bergsonian philosophy was the harbinger of a near and bright future in the spirits of young university students who were walking through Beyazıt Square full of foreign soldiers dressed in strange uniforms.²⁷ Similarly Mustafa İkip (Tunç) probably the most distinguished follower of Bergson in Turkey remembered that rationality was insufficient in explaining his past and his nation's identity, which was shaped by thousands of feelings, dreams and memories. Furthermore,

Completely afar from my spirit, I remained hanged to thought [*mefkûre*] just from one point like a hanging chandelier. During the tensest moments of my condition, the infection of the World War affected us and the most treacherous weapons surrounded our lives. These events demolished the dam between simple rationality and my ego as well as transformed me in a single power while my soul's entire past assaulted my mind.²⁸

Bergsonism, then, found fertile ground and offered to conservative intellectuals a sort of alternative to Western modernization without losing Oriental spirituality. However, Bergsonism soon clashed with Ziya Gökalp's positivist sociology and his mechanical theories as well as Unionist and consequently Kemalist positivist political theory and its positivist civilizing project.²⁹ Turkish Bergsonians shared the anti-clerical republican attitude (Topçu also had a strong anti-clerical approach) and were not politically different from the republicans who were committed to the formal Kemalist principles. What drew them away from the mainstream politics of the day was their challenge of the rationalist foundations of humanist secularism adopted by the positivist republican factions who dominated the single party. Bergsonians tried to provide a new interpretation of the Turkish Revolution and the emerging republican project of modernity by establishing a new communication between the two worlds—the spiritual aspects of the West and the mystic essence of national culture.³⁰

When Topçu arrives in France, he was probably acquainted with Bergson's ideas, already well known in Istanbul thanks to early conservative and Anatolian nationalist writers. Those writers' influence is evident in Topçu's early works (mainly *Ta'ra* and *Reha*). Bergson, however, represented a source of legitimacy and a sort of intellectual Trojan horse rather than a true source of inspiration. Indeed, Bergson's understanding of God as not absolute and not omnipotent is difficult to be accepted by traditional Christianity but also by mainstream Islam.³¹ A Catholic author like Blondel and, as in the case of our author, an Islamist intellectual, who by definition places religion and God at the core of his thoughts and deeds, may be influenced only marginally by Bergson. Bergson's Jewish background also might have influenced negatively Topçu's opinion.

It appears though that Bergson furnished a Western and scientific legitimacy to his ideas alternative to the dominant positivist approaches; from here, maybe, his choice to write a thesis for associate professorship on Bergson. Topçu, as many of the Islamist authors that followed, were committed to vindicate the superiority of Islam. For this purpose he used sometimes instrumentally Western authors to contest materialism and anti-religious feelings inside Turkey because Western authors were considered (are still considered) intellectually superior to Islamic references by the general public and the academia. However, French literature was also much more accessible considering their poor language skills, the difficulty of accessing books in Arabic, and a lack of traditional Islamic education.

Much more influential on the young Topçu were the teachings of Maurice Blondel, Turkish convert and Blondel's godchild Paul Mulla (Mehmet Ali Mulla-zadé) probably introduced him to the Catholic philosopher, already retired from university because of his ill health. Mulla and Topçu met in 1928 introduced by the cultural attaché of the Turkish Embassy in Paris.³² Mulla and Topçu kept writing to each other even after 1934. Moreover, Mulla was a careful reader of Topçu's review *Hareket* and helped Topçu in several occasions; for instance introduced him to Louis Massignon, which Topçu frequented in Paris between 1933 and 1934; they met again in Istanbul in 1940.³³

Between 1896 and 1926, Blondel was philosophy professor at Aix University, because he was discriminated by more prestigious academic institutions because of his religious commitment and social involvement, something that Topçu will experience few years later back home. Moreover, Topçu shared Blondel's commitment to begin a scientific discussion in which religious questions could be aired on the level of ideas, even where oppositions are recognized, instead of just on a level of blind emotions.³⁴ Topçu will import to Turkey this approach and use in circle formed around his journal *Hareket*(action), and later adopted by other Islamist circles. The name of the journal is also redolent of Blondel's most famous work *L'Action*.³⁵ However, if Bergson has been very popular in Turkey, Blondel was essentially ignored and only recently have been translated into Turkish. Topçu did not make any effort to render a so important author more readable to the Turkish reader and apparently ignored his mentor's antifascist and antiwar stands, strongly expressed just before World War II. Topçu, on his side, never made any effort to conceal his sympathies for Nazism; a photograph of Hitler hung on the walls of his home.

L'Action as well as the edited work *Qu'est-ce que la mystique*³⁶ had a huge influence on Topçu's doctorate thesis, which will present the fundamental ideas of the Turkish author's philosophy. On one side, Topçu seems to accept Blondel's Catholic dimension that God is immanent within man and that human action is directed beyond the phenomenal order. Moreover, it is in action that we apprehend God. On the other side, Topçu concentrate himself on one aspect of *action*: rebellion. God instigate in us an act of *rebellion* (*révolte/isyân*) against ourselves and against social serfdom to free us from insufficiency and infirmity owed by our attachment to the material: -True liberty, then, belongs to God; it is the divine liberty realized in us and in a certain measure realised by us. Rebellion is nothing but the affirmation of liberty in our action³⁷ Rebellion brings us to *conform* ourselves to the divinity. This conformism (*conformisme/uysallık*) has been labelled as fatalism yet -in reality is the greatest power of mysticism³⁸ Topçu's mystical model here is al-Hallaj who advocated God's immanence within man and a personal fight to recognize human imperfection and to rebel to this imperfection ascending toward God. However, Topçu knows al-Hallaj only through the works of Massignon,³⁹ he did not have the linguistic skills to read al-Hallaj by himself nor he quoted any literature in languages other than French. Also in later publications, Islamic sources will always be neglected or read superficially. Nevertheless, on one side, Louis Massignon more than other authors made progresses on the study of Islamic mysticism. He also showed how Sufism is essentially of Islamic origin, contrary to many others that tried to prove non-Islamic sources of Sufism. However, the choice of al-Hallaj for his masterwork was due not only for the relevance of the Sufi master, but also the conviction of Massignon that al-Hallaj represented the extreme convergence between Islam and Christianity.⁴⁰

Indeed, Edward Said criticize -the disproportionate importance accorded to al-Hallaj and noticed that -Massignon's al-Hallaj was intended literally to embody, to incarnate, values essentially outlawed by the main doctrinal system of Islam, a system that Massignon himself described mainly in order to circumvent it with al-Hallaj.⁴¹ Elsewhere, Said noticed that Massignon really much represent an example of an erudite scholar where his personal, even his intimate, problems, concerns, and predilections are very much a part of his public work and position as orientalist. That produces, however, an Orientalism blinded by what it perceives: -they [Massignon and Ernest Renan] grasp Islam, they also lose it.⁴² Topçu may have not perceived it, also because he sometimes showed a personal image of Islam. Moreover, Topçu must have been charmed by Massignon's courageous and devoted life, a true model of *action*.

*Hareket*⁴³

| 16

Topçu's periodical review, *Hareket*, published its first issue in February 1939, constituting the first Islamist review to be published after *Sebilâir-Re ad*, banned in the crackdown on Islamist activities and religious associations in 1925. *Hareket* would come under a similar ban after just seven months because of a Topçu article criticizing the one-party regime, but was allowed to resume publishing in 1942 only to be shut down again the following year. With the rise of the multiparty system, things did not improve very much for *Hareket*. With the censure of the TMC and a DP deeply suspicious of Topçu and his journal, it ceased operations again in 1953. From 1966 until 1975 it proceeded unencumbered for the most part enlivened by his closest students, mainly Ezel Erverdi. In 1974, however, Topçu was unsatisfied with the publishing house because it was becoming too sophisticated and academic (but probably also aware of the malady that will kill him in few months). Consequently he asked Erverdi to close it. The *Hareket* publishing house, then, closed and reopened in the same year with the name of *Dergâh*, the mystical lodge but also the same name of the review promoted by Tunç and Baltacıo lu and other early conservative intellectual influenced by Bergson between 1921 and 1924. In this case, the publishing house and the review assumed a position even more marked by religious commitment. The most active writers were trained in the formal (and sometimes also in the informal) religious education system and will be much more confident with Islamic sources; they will then represent a new generation of Islamism in Turkey.

The publishing house printed Topçu's and his pupils' works but also translations of Western authors like Dostoyevsky neglected by the mainstream secular intelligentsia. *Hareket* was certainly a platform for budding conservative writers, academicians, and future politicians. Mustafa and Smail Kara, Mehmet Do an, Süleyman Uluda , Ali Birinci are some of those scholars raised on *Hareket*; Ali Bulaç, Ya ar Nuri Öztürk, Mustafa Kutlu, Tarık Bu ra are some of the contemporary Islamists who worked for the review and were influenced by Topçu in their early career.

In 1969, looking back on his work of the past thirty years, Topçu wrote in *Hareket*:

In the last two centuries, currents of materialism, positivism, sociology, and pragmatism have paralyzed the spirit of entire generations. However, [as we tried] to show that, similarly to the divine intuition of Yunus, who said "there is me and what is inside me"; the mind's sun can also warm the heart, we got inspiration and stimulation from Yunus and Mevlana as well as Pascal and Blondel.⁴⁴

Clearly, the mandate was to harmonize the wisdom of claimed Turkish master-mystics with that of contemporary, Western philosophy. Related to this was a strong undercurrent in *Hareket* circles of Ottomanism, understood as the natural continuation of the universal and interfaith vision of the Prophet and his companions. Consequently, they promoted a process of rediscovery and re-evaluation of the lost Ottoman past through research and academic collaboration. The implication for Turks, according to Topçu, was a new identity and a powerful alternative to Kemalism.

Modernity and Europe

The main aim of Kemalism was to modernize the country. Something, however, that Topçu contrasted ontologically:

Here [in Istanbul] Turkish-Islamic spirits fight with Western technology, which long ago overcame its romanticism. Everywhere the big industry's spiritless empire has flattened Muslim Turk's delicate spirit and taste. In Istanbul, the only

masterpiece that has not been touched by the West is the Topkapı, Palace. The House of Osman has built this temple of Islam with the fringed flag made of silver thread from Domaniç to the shores of the Marmara Sea. Here dominating the city silhouette the palace stands with the nobleness of a *Kaaba* stone, which avoids harming others with its pain, against the Barbaros attack to the city coming from the West. Under this peak of nobility, the life strengths of the entire city apparently joined in the market in search of profit. The profit set two posts at the two extremes of the Galata Bridge⁴⁵ as it was ready for an ambush.

The leaders of these two centres are the Jews, the owners of big trades, the Greeks, the Armenians and some of the men from the shores of the Black Sea. They pour here after they acquired for themselves all existences and strengths of this great nation, which is represented by the people of Anatolia who owns not only this city but this history.⁴⁶

These words were published by Topçu in early 1948 on the pages of his review and summarize the author's image of Europe and modernity. In the quotation, Topçu strongly criticizes modernity as represented by mechanization and capitalist economy. The Turkish author's ideal was a moral society without the inhumanity of machines: "Our era will be the era when hymns [*ilâhi*] will silence machines' creaks"⁴⁷ Moreover, he stresses the prominence of Anatolians who, despite the fact that have a weak national identity, are the people with finest and noblest characters, though polluted by the presence of profit led non-Turkish minorities and by those who misunderstood the nationalism introduced by great Turkish-Muslim leaders like Mehmed the Conqueror.

Topçu was strongly influenced by the European Romantics' vision of modernity and pointed it as one of the main reasons behind the decadence of humanity: "Think what kind of suffering beings you are! In this city mosquitoes and engines without soul are freer than humans. All aggressive powers are free, are free as much as they want; only men have no freedoms"⁴⁸ On the other side, Istanbul and Anatolia represent a symbol of Turkish history's greatness but at the same time is decadence: not only beggars in the streets, but also modern industry that attracts and dehumanizes poor immigrants from Anatolia. The capitalist continuous research for profit has also brought to a loss of spirituality and morality. Istanbul was now representing the Turkish model of modernization, with all its injustice and inequalities. In the short stories written by Topçu and then collected in the volume *Ta ral*, (The provincial), Anatolian peasants escaping from their villages and pouring into the big city thought that

Istanbul was a Hell and everyone here was a *zebâni*.⁴⁹ This is the grave of Anatolia. Destiny drags here the slaves that should receive their pain. Suddenly, she tried to find again the path of the light, which the reading of the call to prayer [*ezan*] opens; she could not find it.⁵⁰

Reading Topçu's image of urbanization we should also remember that Turkey was just starting to experience a dramatic process of urbanization, which will change profoundly social geography.

Ta ral, was one of the two, not really successful, of Topçu's literary attempts. The novel *Reha*, written before travelling to France and completed after his return but published only posthumous, is the expression of spiritual unrest and disapproval of the results of modernity. Very similar to contemporary European works like *La coscienza di Zeno* or Turkish famous novelist Karaosmano lu. Topçu's language, though, is too awkward and his sentences too long to give him fame as a novelist. His second literary attempt is the collections of short stories under the title *Ta ral*, published in 1959 (written between 1952 and 1958). *Ta ral*, is a mimicking of *Memleket Hikayeleri* of Refik Halid (Karay) who presented for the first time the harsh living of villagers of

Anatolia. What is really important in *Ta ral*, is not the condition of underdevelopment of the Turkish provinces, but the loss of morality of the peasants and the abuse of religion by greedy imams and mystics. Again, the corruption of the peasants was brought to Anatolia by the new mode of production introduced by non-Turkish elements. Indeed, in many stories perversion and oppression is brought by Bosnians immigrated from the Balkans as the Empire retreated. Non-Muslim minorities and particularly the Jews that dominated big trade and the banking system were seen as the most important source of corruption, as is also evident from the quote at the beginning of the paragraph.

Anti-Semitism is also something that Topçu acquired from interwar France. Topçu, as many of the French romantics, see in the Jews the worst characters of plutocratic capitalism that is infecting spiritualism. However, French debates and ideas furnished to the young Nurettin Topçu the necessary lexicon to express sentiments of resentment among intellectuals after the Ottoman bankruptcy: anti-capitalism and anti-Semitism.⁵¹

Nevertheless, hostility against capitalism and mechanization did not conduct toward anti-European feelings as well. European societies with their materialism attacked and colonized the Muslim world and Islam, but the æreal Europeø was represented by the Romantic intellectuals that searched for spirituality. Turkish elites that since the *Tanzimat* era have rushed to imitate Europe, Topçu argued, are neglecting the true Europe and forgetting Turkish great past and identity.

Topçuø Historical Rationale for a New Turkish Nationalism

Topçu reinterpreted Anatolian Turkish nationalism stressing on the centrality of Islam and mysticism. According to Topçuø reading of Middle Eastern history, in the eleventh-century nomadic and newly Islamized Turkmen invaded Anatolia, mixing with the peasant Hittite population. The medley gave origin to the Turkish nation. The conditions of nomadic life and harsh living conditions of Central Asia added greatly to the physical strength of the Turkmen tribes. The Hittites, for their part, were a Turcic population with a long agricultural tradition with strong links to the soil. They were subjugated by Hellenism, which kept them in the darkness of submission throughout the Roman and Byzantine periods. It was the light of Islam brought by the Turkmen tribes that gave to Anatolia the strength to recover and rediscover their lost sense of millenarian destiny. øThe entry of Islam into Anatolia÷, he wrote, øannounced the beginning of our national history÷.⁵² More precisely the battle of Manzikert in 1071 C.E. symbolized for Topçu the moral as well as military superiority of Islamic Anatolia over that of the Christian world and thus the beginning of Turkish national history:⁵³ under the leadership of the Ottomans, heroes spread the seeds of nationalism. Later, even without a leadership, the faith of the fighters in the Gallipoli Campaign represented the peak of Turkish nationalism. The same faith was behind the success of the Independence struggle.⁵⁴

One of the harshest criticisms of Kemalism by Topçu concerned its refusal to acknowledge the leading role of religion in shaping national identity and its denial of the importance of Islamic-Turkish experience. Indeed, Islam gave to the Turks the necessary spiritual strength and morality that made them great. On the other side, Turks made Islam more powerful:

For centuries, from the Great Wall of China to the Byzantine Empire, a heroic people on horseback were waiting for heaven to open its doors in a lucky moment. A race that heroically rides and bravely uses his sword, with a heart full of compassion, life and joy, could not fully express itself inside the spiritless and narrow pattern of the sorcerersø cult called Shamanism. It needed the doors of hope to infinity, a faith thirsty of eternity, and an ocean of fulfilling love. The Turks found this ocean in Islam. In Islam Turks found themselves; they found the lifestyle that would express fully their qualities. The union of Islam and Turks gave birth to perhaps the grandest marvel of world history.⁵⁵

For Topçu, then, rural Anatolia represented the salvation of the Turkish nation, because is there that nation is bounded to religion:

Sweetened with love [*a k*], this man [Turkish Muslim] awaits prosperity. Others who realize their work as hand in hand combat with other men or with social institutions, live a life of perpetual politics; it is a life of calculations and deceit. The farmer [by contrast] does not make politics; he works with love. Patience nourishes his love. He gains from his own labour and not from gambling. For this reason, we find in him an abundance of spiritual life, higher than the moral of commerce.⁵⁶

Rural life is free of the moral evils endemic to the modern economic system, and is more in accord with the original, spiritual purity of human concourse: not because the farmer is the first producer, Topçu writes, but because he produces without politics and gambling. In other words because he has morality, he deserves [to be regarded as] the vanguard. For this reason he must represent our model.⁵⁷

Topçu's political ideas and commitment for society

Despite Topçu's attention for the peasants and marginalized groups, he has paternalistic view of politics. Where the state should uphold and teach justice as well as pursue a human and universal mission, above particularistic interests.⁵⁸ Moreover, he criticize democracy because is open to exploitation by its leaders or by the masses. Topçu contested the fact that every citizen—literate and illiterate—have the same power in the decision-making process, and here there is a clear injustice.⁵⁹ The democratic regime then can easily be transformed in a tyranny of the majority over the minority. Moreover, he contested the representative system because representatives will never be able to represent the natural flowing and evolution of electors' opinions. So rather than representation we experience an entrustment of state affairs. Finally, democracy pretends that all citizens are all mature and capable yet this will never be the case. Only who works to establish the state and behave according to God's rule may sustain the responsibility of representing the people.⁶⁰

The most debated and yet intriguing of Topçu's ideas is his notion of a Muslim Anatolian Socialism advocated in the 1960s. Topçu may have been misunderstood by many of his religious and political colleagues, but there is no ambiguity about his anti-capitalist rhetoric and condemnation of big business. However, rather than socialism as commonly understood, his economic theorizing resembles that of the Committee of Union and Progress and Italian corporatism. Indeed, he considered private property to be a holy right, but in moderation, and he thought it a natural role for the state to guard against excess inequality and to regulate the economy to that end: Topçu's socialism has a non-economic function and foresees mainly a romantic *étatisme* that moves from moral motivations. The state would patrol the economic market as a moral police, but by no mean would it be an economic power.⁶¹ Topçu also thought that the old Ottoman guild system (*lonca*) was best equipped to limit the strength of the big industrial capitals, namely by moderating inequality, determining the standard of goods, fixing prices in order to avoid competition, and making sure that all workers benefited equally from the market. Topçu also assumed that industrialization and urbanization ran counter to good moral, Muslim living, and that rural life lent itself to clean living and enlightened spiritual concourse. A system of farmed and industrial cooperatives, for Topçu, was certain to increase a sense of material and spiritual solidarity and thus prevent the amorality of competition.

Despite the difficulties Topçu faced, he avoided clandestine activities and violence. Topçu's attitude toward the law seems similar to that of Abdülaziz Bekkine and the Nakibendi

confraternities of the early Republican era. On 25 November 1925, as law number 677 became legislation, the National Assembly closed *tekke* and *zaviye*, access to the tombs of historical and religious personalities (*türbe*), abolished the employment of religious titles, and prohibited the wearing of clerical garb in public. However, religious movements endured. Abdülaziz Bekkine and his *postni in* Mehmet ZahidKotku remained as local *imams* and employees of the *Diyanet* helped by negligence, disrespect for the law, and connivance among bureaucrats. Today, *eyhs* | 16 also serve as professors in state universities where they enjoy some respect by the secular academy and symbolic capital in Turkish society.

Nak ibendi masters taught ways to live their religion despite the regime restrictions and the cultural taboos of republican Turkish society's elites. For example, one of the eleven principles of the *Nak ibendiye* is the *-halvet der encümenø* (solitude in a crowd), which means that the Nak ibendi believer has to be inwardly alone with God and concentrated on His reality while outwardly immersed in the transactions and relationships that sustain Muslim society. In the words of the *tarikats* founder, "Your hand engaged in work, your heart in love; your hand with profit, your heart with the Loved."⁶² This principle is open to many interpretations, but it militates against the pious withdrawal from the world that is characteristic of parts of Sufism,⁶³ and it can indicate the necessity for political and economic activity. Moreover, it brings the believer to a pragmatic approach toward secular society, keeping his faith and his heart pure even while engaging with an anti-religious society. Abdülaziz Bekkine, noting how his long beard typical of religious scholars is unwelcome in secular circles said:

In order to save others from the quagmire in which they have lost themselves and prevent them from committing big sins, it should be easy for us to renounce some personal rewards [*sevap*⁶⁴], and not hesitate in committing small sins, but only to the extent that these affect only ourselves. We need to consider the possibility of burning a little into Hell so as to may open the path to Paradise for others.⁶⁵

A consequence of this approach is that there is no need to openly attack society and the state. Indeed, as for Bekkine, our author's key plea is for moral values (*ahlak*). For Topçu, three are the fundamental moral values: (1) respect (*hürmet*) for religion, Muslims and the entire humankind; (2) kindness (*merhamet*); and service (*hizmet*) for the sake of God among the society.⁶⁶ To the religious obligation to serve the community he united the nationalist duty. Topçu remembers how the exhortation in Paris of the nationalist intellectual Ar,k influenced him and made him conscious of his role as educated (conservative) elite: "Tell me, tell me! What you thought for Anatolia today? Turkish boy, what you thought for Anatolia today?"⁶⁷

Working to awaken the country, Topçu opted even for a withdrawal from corrupted politics and the instrumental use of Islam by politics. The *-halvet der encümentø* offers also a viable way to oppose the state, but in a way that is difficult to punish by law as well as would be more clear and direct threats to the system. Thus Nurettin Topçu affirmed:

Even the most powerful weapon requires patience in its use. In recent history, those who had believed that this holy struggle [*cihad*] must be fought with politics saw their mistake. Our struggle must be fought on the fronts of ideas and spirit, morality and faith.⁶⁸

In a fascinating short story written after the death of Bekkine, Topçu wrote of an imaginary travel to Bursa (the preferred city of our author) and his dialogue with the founders of the Ottoman Empire. In his encounter with Yıldırım Bayazıt, he complained with the great sultan for the perdition in which his generation was in and the difficulty of his time. Topçu, asking approval for tougher methods against the oppressors of the believers he obtained a negative response:

No, I will never allow that. Nobody shed blood and nobody oppress! Let them show the right way, let them help the oppressors to rid them from oppression. Before everything let them get rid of the crimes and oppressions that they commit against their souls. I cannot order the oppression of the army that followed me in prostration for six hundred years. Tell to my sons who will be soon joined by the angels of mercy: shall patience be their food, zeal their prayer, unity their weapon! I repeat, tell them, if they want my approval they should first free oppressors and ignoramuses.⁶⁹

So the imperative was to propagate moral values and self-conscience, and to avoid clash with fellow Turks. *Sohbets* was a good tool to spread faith but also to avoid state repression. *Sohbet* are ritualized utterance where the master gives talks but also meet his followers and discusses with them. Abdülaziz Bekkine usually held two different *sohbet*, one in the mosque's garden and another in his home: one restricted to the closer and trusty *talebe* (students, followers), the other open to anyone. Topçu will use open conferences to larger publics and meetings at the publishing house to reproduce the *sohbet* system and to promote morality and nationalism particularly among young university students, the future cadre of the state.

Conclusion

Nurettin Topçu with his reinterpretation of Turkish nationalism, critique of modernization, and particularly of Kemalist interpretation of modernization and nation supplied Turkish Islamism with a new lexicon and a new identity. Today's Turkish Islamism is based on Topçu's ideas, even if the economic and political liberalization of the 1980s deeply transformed it. However, he greatly contributed in shaping a generation that distanced Turkish Islamism from other forms of Islamism in the Middle East. The peculiarity is given by his passion for *hizmet* to promote morality (*ahlak*) and a national conscience is transformed in an intellectual opposition to the secular state. Rather than militancy, he concentrated on a new meaning of nationalism, which was reread setting continuity between the great Turkish heritage in Anatolia, leadership of the Islamic world, and the brave defence of Anatolian independence. There is maybe another important contribution of Topçu: the new relation between Islamism and Europe. He avoided to condemn Europe altogether or to minimize its relevance simply to science and technology. He used the contradictions in European cultural debates to appreciate part of it, absorb, and sometimes to use it to legitimate his ideas. However, he also represents the deep problems of Islamism in Turkey (at least until late 1990s). He has a vision of a society with limited freedoms and an authoritarian state as well as he imposes a religio-nationalism constructed on Turkishness that disregards the cultural and ethnic plurality of the country.

NOTES

¹ I would like to thanks the generous Fatih University Research Fund (project P51151002), which partly financed the present research.

²The Qur'an.

³The opening verse of the Qur'an.

⁴The Muslim religious festivals.

⁵ -Allahu Akbar - God is the greatest.

⁶Yahya Kemal Beyatlı., *Seçmeler* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi, 1994), 285.

⁷ Rasim Özdenören, öNecip Fazıl Kısakürekö, in *slamcılık*, ed. Yasin Aktay (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), 143.

⁸ erif Mardin, öKültürel Değişim ve Aydınlanma: Necip Fazıl ve Nakşibendi, ö . Mardin (ed.), *Orta Doğu'da Kültürel Geçişler* (İstanbul: Doğu Batı, 2007), 213. Originally published in English with the title *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East* (Leiden: Brill, 1994).

- ⁹ MustafaMiyaso lu, *Necip Faz,l K,sakürek* (stanbul: Ad,m, 1985), 18.
- ¹⁰ Mardin, -Kültürel De i im ve Ayd,n: Necip Faz,l ve Nak ibendiğ 224.
- ¹¹ On his life see: Mustafa Kutlu, öSuya Hasret,ö *Hece*, X (2006), 7-14; smail Kara (ed.), *Nurettin Topçu* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanl, ,, 2009); and smail Kara, öNurettin Topçu,ö *slam Ansiklopedisi*² (forthcoming).
- ¹² Nurettin Ahmet, *Conformisme et révolte: esquissedünepsychoologie de la croyance* (Paris:LesPressModernes, 1934); republished in Ankara in 1990. Translated by Kök and Do an andpublishedonlyposthumously as *syah Ahlâk*, (stanbul: Dergâh, 1995).
- ¹³ *Bergson* (stanbul: Hareket, 1968).
- ¹⁴ Interview with smail Kara (May 2010).
- ¹⁵ Orhan Gökay, öAbdülaziz Bekkine Ara t,rma üzerine,ö*Zaman* (12/4/1990).
- ¹⁶ Quoted by Ahmet Nuri Yüksel, öMektep nsan Nurettin Topçu,ö *Hareket*, X (1976), 74.
- ¹⁷ Ahmet, *Conformisme et Révolte*, 126. Here Topçu accepted Massignon's opinion that Islamic spirituality after al-Hall never recovered and entered a period of protracted and unrelieved decline. Later, the Turkish author departed from this opinion to harmonize it with his nationalistic ideas and included late *Turkish* great mystics as R m and YunusEmre.
- ¹⁸ Interview with smail Kara (7 June 2011).
- ¹⁹ -Nurettin Topçu'nun ö-VaizlarSemineriöndeki Konu mas,,ö *Hece*, X (2006), p. 426.
- ²⁰ K,sakürek and the TMC were accused by the DP leader, Menderes, and by state officials of instigating the murder of the journalist AhmetEminYalman. The popular journalist Yalman had been the target of severe criticism by K,sakürek's review *BüyükDo u* and by nationalists for his Communist sympathies and for allegedly being a *dönme* or -secret Jew.
- ²¹ Quotedby smail Kara, *Sözü dilde hayali gözde* (stanbul: Dergâh, 2005), 33.
- ²² Nurettin Topçu, *Ahlak Nizam*, (stanbul: Dergâh, 2008), 299-301.
- ²³ Hakk, Öznur, *Ülkücü Hareket* (Ankara:Altenatif, 1999), II, 96-7.
- ²⁴ Necip Faz,l K,sakürek, *Bab,ali* (stanbul: Büyük Do u, 1985), 391.
- ²⁵ -Mahkemeğ *Hareket*, X (1976), 62-82.
- ²⁶ LeszekKolakowski, *Bergson* (South Bend: St. Augustines, 2001), 1.
- ²⁷ ZiyaeddinFahriF,nd,ko lu quoted in Nazim rem, öTurkish Conservative Modernism: Birth of a Nationalist Quest for Cultural Renewal,ö *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, XXXIV (2002), 94.
- ²⁸ Mustafa ekip, *Bergson ve öManevî Kudretöe Dair Birkaç Konferans* (stanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1934), 6.
- ²⁹ rem, öTurkish Conservative Modernismö, 92-3.
- ³⁰ Nazim rem, öUndercurrents of European Modernity and the Foundations of Modern Turkish Conservatism: Bergsonism in Retrospect,ö *Middle Eastern Studies*, XL (2004), 91.
- ³¹ Oliva Blanchette, *Maurice Blondel: A Philosophical Life* (Chicago: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2010), p. 354.
- ³² TuncerEnginertan, öÇa da bir misti in hayat,na dair baz, notlar,ö *Nurettin Topçu*, smail Kara (ed.), 94.
- ³³ Mulla-Zadé and Abd-el-Jalil, *Deux frères en conversion du Coran à Jésus; Correspondance 1927-1957* (Paris: CERF, 2009), 242-4.
- ³⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.
- ³⁵ *L'Action: Essai d'une critique de la vie et d'une science de la pratique* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1893).
- ³⁶ öQu'est-ce que la mystique ? Quelques aspects historiques et philosophiques su problèmeö, *Cahiers de la nouvelle Journée*, III (1925).
- ³⁷ Ahmet, *Conformisme et Révolte*, 129.
- ³⁸ *Ibid*, 152.
- ³⁹ Mainly *La passion d'Al-Hallâj* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1921).Massignon will recognize Topçu's admiration for al-Hall adding his thesis in the *bibliographiehallagienne* in the fourth volume of the new edition of *La passion d'Al-Hallâj* (115).
- ⁴⁰ PierreRocalve, *Louis Massignon et l'islam* (Damas: Institut Française de Damas , 1993).
- ⁴¹ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin, 1979), 272.
- ⁴² Edward W. Said, öIslam, the Philological Vocation, and French Culture: Renan and Massignon,ö *Islamic Studies: a Tradition and its Problems*, ed. Malcolm H. Kerr (Malibu:Undena, 1980), 60.
- ⁴³ On the review *Hareket* see: D. Mehmet Do an, öNurettinTopçu'nun -Hareketiö, *Hece*, X(2006), 360-6.
- ⁴⁴ ö«Hareket»in Otuz Y,l,,ö *Hareket*, IV (1969), 4.
- ⁴⁵ The banksödistrict in Karaköyand the trade centre in Eminönü.
- ⁴⁶ Nurettin Topçu, *Amerikan Mektuplar,, Dü ünün Adam Aram,zda* (stanbul: Dergâh, 2004), 15.
- ⁴⁷ NurettinTopçu, *Ahlâk Nizam*, (stanbul: Dergâh, 2008), 28.

-
- ⁴⁸ Topçu, *Amerikan Mektuplar,, Dü ünen Adam Aram,,zda*, 29.
- ⁴⁹ A demon of Hell.
- ⁵⁰ Nurettin Topçu, *Ta ral*, (stanbul: Dergâh, 2006), 19.
- ⁵¹ See Topçu, *AhlâkNizam,,* 205-223. Strongly anti-Semite words written in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
- ⁵² Nurettin Topçu, *Yar,nki Türkiye* (stanbul: Dergâh, 1997), 114.
- ⁵³ *Ibid.*, 110-4.
- ⁵⁴ Nurettin Topçu, *Büyük Fetih* (stanbul: Dergâh, 1998), 11.
- ⁵⁵ Nurettin Topçu, *Milliyetçili imizin Esaslar*, (stanbul: Hareket, 1978), 24-25.
- ⁵⁶ Topçu, *Yar,nki Türkiye*, 118-9.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 119.
- ⁵⁸ Ahmet, *Conformisme et Révolte*, 55.
- ⁵⁹ Nurettin Topçu, *Sosyoloji* (stanbul:N.e., 1955), 100.
- ⁶⁰ Topçu, *Ahlâk Nizam,,* 21.
- ⁶¹ SüleymanSeyf, Ö ün, *Türkiyeøde Cemaatçi Milliyetçilik ve Nurettin Topçu* (stanbul: Dergâh, 1992), 179.
- ⁶² rfan Gündüz, *GümüshaneviAhmedZiyaüddin, Hayat,, Eserleri, Tarikat Anlay, , ve Halidiye Tarikat*, (stanbul:Seha, 1984), 234.
- ⁶³ HamidAlgar, øPolitical Aspects of Naqshbandi History,ø *Naqshbandis, Historical Developments and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical Order*, eds. M. Gaborieau, A. Popovic, and T. Zarccone (Isis: Istanbul-Paris, 1990), 152.
- ⁶⁴ Keeping the beard is considered to be a source of *sevap*.
- ⁶⁵ øMektep nsan Nurettin Topçu,ø *Hareket*, X (1976), 74.
- ⁶⁶ NurettinTopçu, *slâm ve nsan* (Dergâh: stanbul, 1998), pp. 89-99.
- ⁶⁷ Speech delivered at *Milliyetçiler Derne iø*commemorativeceremonyfor Remzi O uz Ar,k, Istanbul 13 April 1954 quoted in H. R,dvanÇongur, *Profesör Remzi O uz Ar,k* (Ankara: Kültür Bakanl, ,, 2001), 298.
- ⁶⁸ Topçu, *Yar,nki Türkiye*, 13.
- ⁶⁹ Topçu, *Ta ral,,* 249.