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State and Culture in South Korean Development

Abstract

Economic growth in South Korea has been widely examined in the hopes that it can provide a model which can be applicable elsewhere in the world. The article takes an in depth analysis of the developmental state in South Korea and its role in the achievement of growth. It argues that the state's role in bringing about economic transformation was facilitated by a unique combination of state-society relations, international forces and cultural endowments. While neo-classical and market friendly interpretations are influential, neither are congruent with the experience of South Korea whose economic growth has been shaped by a developmental state strengthened by its relationship with society and within the international system. Due to the uniqueness of South Korean development it is not conducive as a model to be replicated in other LDCs. However, South Korean experience can provide some useful insights for other countries: certain states can play a key role in economic growth, their ties to society will effect the ability to effectively intervene in economic affairs, these ties may be affected by the involvement of international actors as well as the unique cultural endowments which exist, the international system must be conducive to growth and above and beyond anything else countries must develop strategies which are unique to their own individual circumstances.

Güney Kore'nin Kalkınmasında Kültür ve Devlet Özet

Güney Kore'nin ekonomik gelişmesindeki başarısı, diğer ülkelere örnek teşkil edip edemeyeceği açısından yoğun bir araştırma konusu olmuştur. Bu makale Güney Kore'de "kalkınmacı devlet" in ekonomik büyümedeki rolünü derinlemesine bir incelemeye tabi tutmakta ve toplum-devlet ilişkisi, uluslararası güçler ve kültürel niteliklerin özgün bir bileşiminin devletin ekonomik büyümeyi gerçekleştirmesinde büyük bir rol oynadığını ileri sürmektedir. Dolayısıyla Güney Kore'ye özgü koşulların diğer ülkelerde tekrar edilemeyeceği sonucuna ulaşmaktadır ki bu da Güney Kore'nin gelişmesini serbest piyasa ekonomisinin bir zaferi olarak gören Neo-Klasik yaklaşımla taban tabana zıt düşmektedir. Ama gene de Güney Kore deneyi diğer ülkelerin dikkate alması gereken şu ilginç sonuçları ortaya koymaktadır. Birincisi bazı devletlerin ekonomik büyümede önemli bir rol oynayabileceği. Ama burda dikkat edilmesi gereken nokta devletin toplumla olan ilişkisinin niteliğinin ekonomik sorunlara müdahalesinin başarısında çok etkin bir rol oynayacağı gerçeğidir. Ayrıca uluslararası ilişkiler ve ulusal kültür yapısı da devletin ekonomiye müdahalesinde bir yerde belirleyici olabilir.

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State and Culture in South Korean Development

1. Introduction

South East Asian Economies have been shaken by a recent financial crisis starting in July 1997. The media has been full of shocking news and pictures of riots, disturbances and looting in countries like Indonesia. The rapid rising of overall prices, unemployment, flight of foreign capital have all been the hallmark of the recent saga of these economies. Yet until very recently economic success of countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong-Kong was considered to be miraculous and their path of development to be emulated by aspiring nations. However the recent crisis has raised eyebrows about the desirability of development path followed by countries like South Korea.

This article concentrates on pre-crisis South Korea and argues that at a particular junction in history the South Korean State was able to effectively intervene in the economy to bring about industrial transformation and that the effectiveness of the intervention is attributable to the unique forces which have shaped it not to the merits of a specific development model which can be used as a blueprint elsewhere. The state has evolved out of unique social, political and cultural forces which have affected both the choice of policies and the strength of the state to effectively carry out industrial transformation. However the specificities of the state and its relation to the economy and society has been transformed by

South Korea's integration into the world economy and by the emerging economically powerful classes in such a way that the unique conditions which brought about the so called "Korean miracle" are no longer in existence. Thus the reasons for the crisis should not be sought in the flaws of the assumed "South Korean model" but in the way in which South Korean capitalists misused the state power to gain ascendancy.

The paper emphasizes that there is no South Korean model of development but historically shaped South Korean experience which cannot be repeated elsewhere. It is maintained that the relative autonomy of the state has been at the core of government intervention which has been the most important factor in the success of Korean economy. A number of factors contributed to the state's relative strength over society in its "developmentalist" behaviour. The autonomy of the state was embedded in a unique state-society relationship which has been shaped throughout history. Not only the internal dynamics of South Korea but also historically specific factors in the aftermath of the Second World War contributed greatly to the strength and relative autonomy of the state. A further contention is that Korean culture has shown a strong influence upon economic development by nurturing the embeddedness of the state. The cultural endowments of the Korean society have been exploited to legitimize the state and to influence its relationship to society. Both during the ascendancy of the economy and during the process of

misusing state power the use of Korean culture has been instrumental in the legitimization of the state. The paper will start with an analysis of culture in order to illuminate how it has enabled the state to act in an authoritarian manner as a developmental state. Having done this we will look at economic performance, specific policies and external influences on the economy.

2. Culture and Development in East Asia

In an attempt to pinpoint an East Asian model and to find explanations for the rapid speed of growth in the region, certain scholars have discussed the relevance of cultural endowments derived from a common "Confucian ethic" (Berger 1987; Berger and Hsiao, 1988). Although culture may not be the most powerful factor in economic growth nevertheless its contribution cannot be ignored. The issue here is to analyse the relevance of Confucian ethic in strengthening the South Korean state and its relationship to society. A critical analysis of the relationship between culture and economic development in Korea as well as its contribution to the "embeddedness" of relationships of exchange between the state and society will be attempted. The aim is to analyse the ways in which a common cultural tradition helped to legitimise the state, how it affected bureaucratic traditions, the education system, business relations and relations between the state and wider society. It will be argued that the influence of a Confucian value system has influenced the nature of the South Korean state and its relations to society, but it will also be suggested that this may have also been used and exploited to legitimise state actions in the pursuit of particular goals.

Although it is difficult to establish a one to one relationship between culture and economic development, there is a strong tendency in the literature to emphasise the relevance of cultural endowments derived from the Confucian

ethic for the economic development of Korea. Our purpose here is, without totally subscribing to a deterministic relationship between Confucian Ethic and economic development, to provide a critical observation and to discover the contributions of Confucianism to the "embeddedness" of the relationship between the state and society.

New interpretations of cultural attributes in Asia are diametrically opposed to that of Max Weber who argued that cultural attributes in East Asia were an impediment to "modernisation." For instance Berger (1987, 1988) suggests that a "second case" of capitalist modernisation in the region is directly linked to cultural attributes and features derived from a "Confucian Ethic". Confucianism is characterised by a strong work ethic, a sense of collective solidarity, a hierarchical society based on filial respect and respect for one's elders and superiors, and a high value placed on education and the presence of meritocratic institutions. Such attributes foster behaviour which facilitates rapid economic growth. However Berger's optimistic view of Confucianism should be treated with caution. Although an important part of Korean Heritage is a long-standing tradition of Confucianism it is inherently difficult to equate South Korean development directly to cultural attributes for the rapid speed of development did not occur until the 1960s. Furthermore, cultural explanations are widely criticised for degenerating into "inverted racism" (Appelbaum and Henderson 1992: 16) and for their non-rigorous and unscientific social science theorising" (Hoogvelt, 1997: 209). Nevertheless, the unique state-society relationship in South Korea has been critical for providing the state with the capacity to carry out its developmental goals. The "embeddedness" of ties which bound the interests of the business class to those of the state (Evans, 1995) were of critical importance to the developmental state. Similarly, Swedberg and Granovetter (1992: 9) argue that economic actions and institutions are embedded in social life and state that "[a]n action by a member of a network is embedded, because it is

expressed in interaction with other people." While relationships between people and between people and institutions will be influenced by perceptions and attitudes which could be effected by culture a "network approach" to embeddedness is able to "avoid ... culture as the exclusive explanation of economic events" (Swedberg and Granovetter, 1992:9). Culture cannot be regarded as the cause of economic growth or stagnation but to some degree it may influence how relationships of exchange occur and it might be relevant to question its effects on the embeddedness of institutions and state- society relations. As Swindler (1986) states "culture influences action not by providing the ultimate values toward which action is oriented, but by shaping a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action'".

2.1. Common Cultural Traditions and National Unity

The fact that Korea represents an "unusual homogeneity of language, ethnicity, and culture" (Amsden, 1989:28) has contributed to national unity and in turn helped to legitimise the state. While religion varies from Buddhism to Catholicism, a Confucian value system has been a part of the society for centuries (Steinberg, 1989) and there is a strong feeling of national unity and of a common "Korean culture" in all its complexities. This racial and cultural homogeneity and a heritage of national unity fostered the view that a government by definition represents the nation" (Kim 1988: 262). Furthermore, symbolic attempts to destroy Korean culture by the Japanese during the colonial era have increased feelings of nationalism with Japan becoming in some senses, a "common enemy" while the division of the country and the treat from the North has also added fuel to the legitimisation of the state as a protectorate of the people. A "sense of nationhood" will affect "the extent to which economic development will be a salient concern of policy makers" as well as "the likelihood that the policy of the government will be accepted as legitimate".

(Dore 1990: 60-61). Although the legitimising strategies of president Rhee and president Park were "articulated quite differently" they both "centred on the imagery of a strong Confucian state: a central ruler, bureaucratic administration, weak intermediate powers and a direct relationship between ruler and subjects based on the subjects unconditional loyalty to the state" (Hamilton and Biggart, 1992: 205).

2.2. Bureaucratic Structures

Korea has had a history of meritocratic bureaucracy whereby "civil service examinations have been used for recruiting incumbents into the Korean state for over a thousand years" (Evans, 1995: 51). According to historical accounts, Neo-Confucianism arrived in 1392 bringing with it the ideology of the "scholar-official" (Duncan, 1994). Traditionally, bureaucrats are hired on the basis of virtue although it is apparent that the virtue of the bureaucrat has changed over time. During the dynastic era, although entrance into the bureaucracy was based on exam performance it was also dependent on hereditary ties and not accessible to all classes (Steinberg, 1991). While colonialism helped to uproot the class system and the state structures became staffed by career bureaucrats it was turned around during Rhee's reign as positions were filled in terms of direct patronage. Necessary changes took place during Park's era as he changed the structure once more back to its earlier dependency on merit and technical capabilities but these were above and beyond hereditary ties. Although the virtue of the bureaucrat has evolved with the changing needs of the state the fact that a traditional element of Korean culture places high value on a meritocratic bureaucracy has helped to legitimise the state apparatus and consequently its actions as only the "best and the brightest" "consider bureaucratic careers" (1995:51).

2.3. Education

A high value placed on education has been another factor attributed to Confucianism (Berger, 1988) and indeed

education is pursued with a frenzy in South Korea. While it was not equally available for all during the dynastic era (1991) in 1990 there was an 82 percent gross enrollment ratio for all levels (UNDP, 1997). Some educational expansion occurred during the colonial era with the goal of indoctrinating Japanese language and history into Korea (Steinberg, 1991). It increased considerably following WWII which worked to provide a feeling of equal opportunity for all, as well as ensuring the provision of a competent bureaucracy and facilitating the demands of labour intensive manufactures and the adaptation of technology for more skill intensive production. While Seth (1997) has argued that the expansion was influenced by societal pressures, the state has continuously been involved in manpower planning, indirectly promoting certain skills which are seen as more viable for economic growth. The education system has served the state well. It has been utilised to create a homogeneous, competitive and diligent society that possesses "a clear and unambiguous sense of national goals" and has promoted a unified national identity through "stressing the evils of communism" (Morris and Marsh 1992). Through the education system the state becomes an active creator of social characteristics, indoctrinating within the classroom characteristics which are often related to a Confucian ethic. The fact that Confucianism traditionally placed such a high value on the obtainment of education may have contributed to the high value placed on it today which has served to strengthen the state in the creation of a competent bureaucracy to formulate its industrial goals, as well as an educated labour force to carry them.

2.4. Business Relationships within Firms and with the State

As one of the institutional pillars of South Korea's economic growth has been the Chaebol, studies have examined the role of culture in these firms (Janelli, 1993; Kim, 1992). While Kim (1992) argues that "unconscious"

Confucianism was the driving force behind the Chaebol of his study, Janelli (1993) has argued that cultural traditions have been reworked to suit specific goals of the structure whereby any resemblance to tradition is "invented". Amsden (1994a: 53) discusses this and states that corporations have behaved in certain ways due to "the self-serving ideology of the bourgeoisie" as traditions are "invented based on the partial truths of Korean history and culture" so that "traditions are not arbitrary but are used by owners to dominate managers and by managers to dominate workers."

Just as traditions may serve to justify the goals of firms they may also be used by policy makers to yield weight over the business class. The special ties which bind business to government in south Korea are based on a "hierarchical society that values complementarity and co-operation among its constituent parts" so that "the efficiency of an institution is not independent of the culture of the society in which it is based" (Lee 1990: 44). This relationship depended on a "smooth operation of exchange over the long run [which] requires the dense, deeply developed medium of trust and culturally shared understandings" (Evans 1995: 26). This has occurred in such a way that the relationship cannot simply be attributable to an authoritarian government (Lee, 1990) although the government may have drawn on certain cultural endowment to facilitate such ties and there has been a long-standing tradition of business serving government as opposed to the other way around (Leudde-Neurath, 1988).

2.5. Influence on Relations with Wider Society - Conformity or Repression?

The Confucian stress on harmony is "translated into a demand for consensus and conformity" (Pye 1988:86). This has been facilitated through the education system and has demonstrated itself in exchange relations in firms and between firms and the state. However, the view which links general societal conformity to the Confucian ethic fails to account for

the massive and sometimes violent worker and student movements which have occurred throughout history (Hoogvelt, 1997). Furthermore it is difficult to justify the previous authoritarian nature of government by a Confucian heritage due to the fact that the school of thought surrounding it "is as rich and diverse as the Western intellectual tradition" whereby opposing schools could just as easily support an "Inclusive democracy" as a "military autarky" (Friedman, 1996: 885). In the process of industrialisation the state has exploited notions of conformity and strong work ethics in order to bolster the support of the population for its developmental pursuits and legitimise its repressive actions. For example, during the 1970s, the Samael Undong (New Community Movement) was formed in order to mobilise the rural sector for the achievement of agricultural self-sufficiency and to improve the standard of living in rural areas, and due to its perceived success, was later extended to the urban sector. Elements of Confucianism like diligence, discipline and co-operation were indoctrinated into the movement and imposed on society in order to harness the mass participation of both the rural and urban people (Brandt and Lee, 1981). During this period the state also implemented the Yushin Constitution which in effect removed most opportunities not to conform with the state's goals. The fact that the South Korean states repressive nature is attributed to Confucianism serves as an "Ideological prop" (Hoogvelt, 1997: 209) whereby the state is provided with an ideal rationale for suppressing any sort of collective action of the population. This can be clarified if another Confucian tradition which is often utilised to "justify government intervention and explain its success: that of an 'ethical - moral basis of government ... that both sets limits on the pragmatic uses of power and requires that authority act with compassion for the people'" (Pye, 1988:86). Such a tradition legitimises government interaction into peoples lives and while it was previously regarded as a hindrance to growth it is now seen as an effective tradition in East Asia (Pye, 1988).

Briefly, throughout the history certain aspects of culture have been utilised to strengthen the state at certain periods of time and have been drawn on to suit the needs of various developmental goals.

It can be concluded that cultural homogeneity combined with the animosity for a common enemy and a threat from the north contributed to a feeling of national unity serving to legitimise the state. Features which have been derived from Confucianism have been influential to South Korean institutions but not absolute. Bureaucracies have evolved and changed to suit the goals of the state, a Confucian stress on education has been beneficial to development and has also served the state to deepen a sense of nationalism and to create a homogeneous, competitive and diligent society. Korean culture has enabled the state to function in an authoritarian manner, but societal conformity cannot necessarily be attributed to culture if schools of thought within Confucianism support democracy and other traditions justify revolt. While national culture will effect the way in which exchange relations are embedded, it is an evolving process whereby traditions can be utilised to suit particular goals at a particular time as policy makers see fit.

3. Economic Development, State Intervention, and Developmental State

We start with a brief analysis of economic growth and the extent of the state intervention in the economy by specifically looking at trade, investment and labour policies which led analyst to label the South Korean state as a "developmental state". Within the space of four decades the South Korean economy was transformed from an agricultural economy to an industrial force to be reckoned with (Hart-Landsberg 1993; UNDP 1997). Economic growth has gone through a variety of stages from its initial period of Import Substitution during the

1950s to a more export oriented approach in the mid 1960s concentrating on light labour intensive manufactures, to a deepening of heavy industry during the 1970s and to a more mature stage in which firms have been successful in the electronics and information technology industry (Evans, 1995).

3.1. Setting the Stage

While the early 1960s is usually taken as the starting point for the beginning of the South Korean miracle (Koo and Kim, 1992), there were some important factors which preceded this juncture. Of crucial importance were land reforms which contributed "to greater equity in the distribution of income" when the majority of the population was rural (Amsden, 1989: 38) and which paved the way for a "fairly open class structure" (Appelbaum and Henderson, 1992: 114). Some infrastructural development and industrial expansion had also occurred so that in a comparison of 36 countries, South Korea had undergone the highest amount of change to the volume of heavy and light manufactures during the 1950s (Amsden, 1989: 41). Educational expansion also occurred so that in the early 1960s "the stock of human capital was comparable to that of much more economically advanced countries" (Kuznets, 1994:63

3.2. Trade, Investment and Labour

After the initial stage of the ISI the state encouraged export promotion.

Subsidies were provided and exporters were rewarded through a liberal exchange rate. Exports became intimately bound to investments as the government adopted policies of tax exemptions, and credit preference, providing rewards in order to promote exports and to target key industries which were seen as viable to the economy (Kuznets, 1994). During the early stages of industrialisation, capital was scarce and was provided to firms on the basis of export promotion. While all firms, large and small were required to export in order to gain

access to credit, a large proportion of growth and economic power became concentrated in the hands of the Chaebol (large industrial conglomerates) who have been "crucially important in the implementation of the government's economic policies" (Gereffi, 1990:97). During the process of accumulation a two way relationship had emerged as the Chaebol depended on the state for scarce capital just as the state depended on the Chaebol for industrial growth (Evans, 1995).

Until 1966 investment was financed by aid from the USA and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency. Investment levels have been high and policies which directed it played a crucial role in leading overall economic activity (Amsden, 1989). When this began to decrease, investment was financed by a high proportion of foreign borrowing in the form of commercial loans as opposed to government or direct foreign investment (Kuznets, 1988: S23). This was stimulated by government backed loans so that risks of default or exchange rate depreciation were eliminated (Amsden, 1989; Kim and Park 1985:61).

Foreign direct investment (FDI) initially played a small role as government restrictions and controls were imposed so that foreign control of the economy and national consumption of international brand name products would be limited (Kuznets, 1994: 45). After the 1970s it began to be solicited but only when "the foundations of the economy were established under the tight control of the Chaebol, supported and guided by the state" (Castells, 1992:39). Even when FDI did occur it was still subject to strong restrictions and aside from the Export Processing Zones (EPZs), the maximum level of foreign equity was set at 50 percent which consequential entailed partnerships with Korean firms (Castells, 1992). The subjugation of FDI to strict regulations has limited it "to certain targeted areas such as activities conducive to export promotion or technology transfer" (Jun, 1994: 141). While it grew substantially during the later half of the 1980s under increased external pressure to "open up" (Koo, 1992), the

selectivity of FDI and the necessity of partnerships has been a key policy in enabling domestic firms to acquire technology and branch into new fields.

Investment strategies were facilitated by the nationalisation of South Korean Banks from the early 60s to the 1980s which enabled "the government to determine where, when, and how much to invest in which industries" (Amsden, 1989: 73).

Some reforms occurred during the 1980s under pressure from the Chaebols, the United States and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to liberalise the financial markets, although the "system continues to operate within the context of industrial policy" (Amsden, and Euh, 1993). While the financing of existing industries was to be left to the market mechanism, industrial policy focuses on "nourishing sunrise industries; adjudicating the demise or restructuring of sunset industries; aiding established industries at critical turning points; and lowering the level of financial costs for a wider and wider circle of firms" (Amsden and Euh, 1993:380). The government relaxed controls on capital flight which had been implemented in the early 1960s' and also moved to privatise banks, but state involvement has been sustained with the Ministry of Finance influencing the appointment of key bank officers.

The state has been extremely meticulous in ensuring a well educated, disciplined and low-cost labour force (Kuznets, 1994:55; Deyo, 1987:182; Castells, 1992:40). In the process of repression, worker resistance has grown and has led to "the formation of the most militant labour movement in East Asia" (Castells, 1992: 40). The fact that exports were initially labour intensive as opposed to capital intensive at the beginning of the model of growth enabled the absorption of labour (McGuire 1994). Because such a strategy "gave employment to persons who might otherwise have lacked it" it contributed to income equity and the reduction of absolute poverty

(McGuire, 1994: 215). When exports shifted away from labour intensive manufactures, investments in human capital and the enhancement of domestic technological capabilities has improved the quality of labour and has facilitated a movement to skill intensive production.

3.3. Intervention and the Developmental State

As a consequence of intervention into export expansion, investment levels and labour it has become increasingly apparent that it was not the free market or free enterprise which led to industrialisation but state intervention in the process. Through such intervention growth accumulated as the Chaebols were able to establish themselves in targeted industries and managed to acquire new technologies which ensured South Korea's competitiveness in the long run and in a global environment where economic growth is often hindered by lack of technology (Evans, 1995). The Chaebol have been "the major vehicles for South Korea's industrial policy" and through the use of "credit policy, loan guarantees, foreign exchange allocation, and import licenses" they were encouraged "to move into industries" that "planners had targeted for export development or import substitution" and were allocated "on the basis of performance rather than patronage criteria" (McGuire 1994: 220). By defying "market logic" Korea has continuously been able to shape and guide its own comparative advantage in targeted industries and form its own "international specialisation" through industrial policy (Evans, 1995: 9).

With increased attention placed on the role of the state in the growth process and the extent and the nature of government intervention recognised, much of the literature has come to define South Korea as a "developmental state." The strong developmental state in South Korea made economic growth its goal and the achievement of such growth enabled it to be regarded as legitimate in the eyes of society (Hoogvelt, 1997).

y 1960 per capita income
was less than \$ 1 00 and
one fifth of the labour force
was estimated to be
unemployed (Amsden,
1989)

4. The Developmental State and its Relation to Society

The question to be tackled is what did provide the state with the strength that it had to successfully intervene in the process of industrial transformation and economic growth. An answer to this question necessitates an examination of the relationship between the state and society in a historical perspective. In the elaboration of South Korean developmental state the main thrust of our argument will be that not only is the South Korean state autonomous but it is embedded (Evans 1995) in a set of unique ties which have evolved over time binding the interests of the state to those of the business class. While this narrow alliance has brought challenges to the developmental state, it has enabled the state to carry out its developmental goals during the period of rapid growth.

Although other states may impose themselves on their economies and societies, the fact that economic growth was the goal of the South Korean state and came to be its legitimising feature led it to be characterized as a "developmental state" as opposed to a rentier or predatory state. Developmental states possess the "strength or capacity to implement economic policies effectively", and a relative degree of autonomy from society enabling these policies to be adopted and implemented without interference from conflicting class interests (Koo and Kim 1992: 121). The bureaucratic structures must be both competent and coherent in order to successfully formulate and implement policies without the interference of particular groups using it for their own individual gain.

In South Korea, the Economic Planning Board (EPB) and other arms of the bureaucracy are both competitive and meritocratic and play key roles "in directing the country's economic growth" (Hart - Landsberg, 1993: 49). The competent and coherent bureaucratic structures upon which the developmental state was based has been forming since the Yi dynasty (1392-1910) through Japanese colonialism until today.

The meritocratic and competitive bureaucracy, including the EPB in South Korea, which plays key roles in directing country's economic growth has been the legacy of South Korean history.

The militaristic Japanese colonial state (1910-1945) co-opted the Yangban class who had become "the decisive force in administration" since the Yi dynasty and used a "formidable array of economic, political and normative resources" (Sateinberg 1991:30). During the Japanese colonial time a modern meritocratic and authoritative set of institutions were laid "for both a relatively efficient bureaucracy and for the authoritarian state forms" which would later emerge (Applebaum & Hendersen 1992:8). The EPB has functioned in many aspects as a "superagency" where the talent and expertise of an elite group of educated individuals provided coherence to economic policy which, "enabled the state to regain its autonomy" during the 1960s (Cheng 1987:203 - quoted in Evans 1995: 52). In terms of state autonomy, it was suggested by Weber that it resulted when the bureaucracy and society were insulated from one another but in developmental states such as South Korea "they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and re-negotiation of goals and policies" resulting in an "amalgam" of "embedded autonomy" (Evans 1995: 12).

Following Japan's defeat in WWII, and the American occupation from 1945-48, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was formed in the South under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. The early capitalists who had established ties with the colonial government and who were regarded as "collaborators" (Hart - Landsberg, 1993:124) and "political sympathisers" by the majority of society (Amsden, 1989:36) were initially represented by the newly formed Korean Democratic Party (KDP). Many of the new "bourgeoisie" (Eckert, 1993:99) from the colonial era, were rescued by the Americans to restructure

a capitalist economy (Amsden, 1989). While the state was establishing close ties with businesses, they were too close leaving the state "poorly insulated from the demands of the private sector" who had established "rent-seeking relationships" with political elites (Haggard and Moon, 1993: 58, 64). This marginalized the "technocratic forces within the bureaucracy" which was increasingly being staffed in terms of "direct patronage" to facilitate "the use of government resources for political ends" (Haggard and Moon, 1993: 63).

After the coup d'etat which brought Park to power the state-business relations were restructured, rent-seeking was reduced, and "the centralisation of political authority was matched by a centralisation of economic decision-making" in the EPB (Haggard and Moon, 1993: 65). It was through the EPB that the new plan of "guided capitalism" was formed whereby the "freedom and initiative of private enterprise" would be observed but the government was to "directly participate in or indirectly render guidance to the basic industries and other important fields" (Haggard and Moon, 1993: 68).

As stated earlier, to fulfill the plans for industrial growth, scarce capital was provided to firms on the basis of export promotion. This relationship "promoted the concentration of economic power in the hands of the Chaebol" but it was a mutually supportive relationship as the Chaebol depended on the state for scarce capital, while the state depended on the Chaebol for industrial growth (Evans, 1995). In establishing and harnessing a strong relationship with private capital that was to a large degree rooted in the past, the state was able to embed itself into societal structures. The founders of some of the bigger Chaebols such as Samsung, Hyundai, and LG (Lucky-Goldstar) had all begun "their entrepreneurial careers during the colonial period" when "sprouts" of capitalism had emerged (Eckert 1993: 99). The interaction between both the government and business is a key factor in explaining state strength as "shared goals and commitments [are] embodied in

the governments development strategy" as formulation of industrial policy involves "both support and discipline" and has "been based on the reciprocal consent of the state and business elites" (Onis, 1992: 507-8). The co-opting of the capitalist class facilitated the achievement of Park's goals and was also profitable for businesses so that "the business class began to identify their own interests with those of the state as an autonomous organisation" (Hoogvelt, 1997: 212).

Through its special relationship to the bureaucracy the authoritarian state was able to maintain its autonomy, while its embeddedness in society was found in ties to the Chaebol. But by pursuing growth strategies through its close ties with the Chaebol it has excluded wider society and has faced challenges from the workers, as well as "industrial capital whose strengthening was one of the states central aims" (Evans, 1995). The big push into heavy industry in the 1970s enabled the Chaebol to become "a formidable power bloc" (Koo and Kim, 1992: 134) and monopolies of international trade (Haggard and Moon 1993: 79). While at the same time small and medium sized firms who "remained central to South Korea's exports of light manufactures" were relatively neglected (Haggard and Moon 1993: 79). In its unfettered pursuit of growth, the state became exceedingly more repressive in the early 1970s with the imposition of the Yushin constitution, and while this may have enabled the state to achieve some of its goals it was at the expense of massive societal repression. However in recent years the state's responses to popular demands to move towards democracy has not undermined the power of the Chaebol.

The South Korean state possessed a significant level of autonomy over society enabling it to construct and carry out its chosen policies in order to pursue its goals of economic growth. But this autonomy was not absolute in that the bureaucracy and society were insulated from one another. The special relationship between the state and the Chaebol enabled

the Park regime to carry out its industrial transformation by providing capital on the basis of performance. By examining the relationship in a historical perspective we see the roots of this relationship during the colonial era but the roots of the Chaebol may have extended back to the Yangban class of the late Yi dynasty as it was part of this class that was co-opted by the colonial regime. The historical links were reformulated when Park came to power, and consequently the authoritarian state was provided with the strength to effectively implement its development policies. However, as a consequence of such a narrow alliance between the state and society various challenges have presented themselves and only time will tell if the combination of autonomy and embeddedness can be successfully negotiated.

5. The International Environment

While it can be argued that the nature of developmental states are a product of the unique way they are embedded in internal social, political and economic structures, this relationship must also be placed within the context of the intentional system (Woo-Cummings, 1996). It will be maintained that South Korea's situation in the international system has provided an enabling environment for the state's strategies and has contributed to the legitimacy of the state and its strength over society.

5.1. Post World War II: The Geo-Political Environment and the Korean War

To gain an understanding, of the geopolitical importance of South Korea following WWII it is important to understand US foreign policy towards East Asia in general. In the aftermath of the Second World War American foreign policy began to be an inextricable mixture of "security and economic considerations" whereby Japan was not to become an international political or military power but a centre "of capital

accumulation and growth" (Cummings, 1984: 17 - citing Maier, 1978:45). In order to facilitate this, a triangular relationship was to develop whereby the United States, Japan and Southeast Asia were to function as a core, semi-periphery and periphery respectively, but it was later recognised that the semi-periphery should also encompass Korea, Manchuria and Taiwan (Cummings, 1983). Accordingly, this relationship was "to contain and where feasible to reduce the power and influence of the USSR in Asia" (NCS 48/1 paper - quoted in Cummings, 1984: 19). Thus, when lines began to be drawn in Korea following WWII, the US rationale for stepping in to first "roll back" but later "contain" communism was in place (Cummings, 1984) and American foreign policy and South Korean development became intimately tied together.

When the Japanese forces retreated from Korea in August 1945, the peninsula was occupied by the Russians in the North and the Americans in the South while Communist ideologies had been gaining widespread support under the influence of the Korean People's Republic (Amsden, 1989: 36). Whereas the KPR was immediately recognised by the Russians, they were not tolerated by the Americans who abolished them in the South "amidst a bloody uprising" in 1946 (Amsden, 1989: 36). Alternatively, the Americans formed close ties with the KDP, which was mostly made up of remnants of the yangban class who had prospered during, the colonial era. This party lacked popular support and Synman Rhee soon came into the picture in an effort to bring "legitimacy to US-KDP" efforts, as he was both anti-Japanese and anti-Communist (Amsden, 1989: 36). When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the two opposing ideologies of capitalism and communism played themselves out with the support of the Americans in the South (under the auspices of UN Security Council initiative) and the USSR and China in the North. Fighting continued until an armistice was signed in 1953 dividing the nation along the 38th parallel which has remained one of the most heavily protected borders in the world. Ideologically, the threat of communism from the

North has "Provided the state with a permanent excuse for violence and repression" (Koo, 1987: 172) and from a security perspective it has "added legitimacy to a military government in Seoul" (Johnson, 1987: 144).

5.2. The Impetus of Aid

Following the Second World War South Korea was to become integrated "into the world capitalist system ... under the aegis of the United States" (Koo, 1987: 166) and established as a "bulwark against communism" (Hoogvelt, 1997: 210). This was articulated through the allocation of American military and economic aid which in effect played a major role in the legitimisation of the state (Hoogvelt, 1997). According to Cummings (1984:24), from 1945 to 1979 "South Korea has received some \$13 billion in American military and economic aid" amounting to roughly \$600 per capita, of which approximately \$6 billion was "in U. S. economic grants and loans" and 59.05 billion in "US military deliveries." On a comparative level with other developing regions, such aid has been greater than what was received in either all of Africa or all of Latin America (Cummings, 1984). The economic aid which was received from 1953 to 1958 (approximately \$270 million per annum) amounted to almost 15 percent of the average annual Gross National Product (GNP), "and over 80% of foreign exchange" (Amsden, 1989:39 -citing Cole and Lyman, 1971). From 1953 to 1962, 70 % of South Korea's imports and 80% of total fixed capital formation was financed by this aid, leading Appelbaum and Henderson (1992:11) to state that "arguably only the most corrupt of political economies could fail to develop in the face of such massive amounts of governmental assistance." Even though Rhee's regime was significantly corrupt - key institutions, infrastructure and links to society were formed and "basic economic and social order" were maintained as a consequence of economic aid (Koo, 1987: 168) while military aid built up South Korean forces so that they became one of the largest outside of the previous communist bloc (Amsden, 1989).

By bolstering the KDP, the Americans affected the continuum of the entrepreneurial class who had profited under Japanese colonialism. Government fiscal policies were used to maximise aid which was then provided to entrepreneurs favoured by the KDP as aid entitlements were provided "in exchange for political campaign contributions" (Amsden, 1989: 39). Firms which had ties to Rhee's government received support in terms of hard currency to finance imports, subsidised loans, tax exemptions and "preferential contracts for large-scale government projects" (Amsden, 1989:39). The formation of the Chaebols had begun as had their unique relationship with the state with the help of American aid, but whereas Rhee's financial support was allocated on the basis of campaign contributions under Park it would be allocated in exchange for the promotion of state directed developmental objectives and would continue on the basis of performance. The choice of Rhee's policies combined with the fact that US economic aid began to decrease, resulted in economic depression by the end of the 1950s (Amsden, 1989). With the economy in a crisis, the legitimacy of the state under Rhee was being called into question. Students, the Americans and the military all had different views on how to proceed with growth, but the coup in 1961 brought Park to power (Amsden, 1989). As long as the military continued to share the American's anti-communism obsession, the latter would turn a blind eye to the way in which this power was held. In a world system where economic growth was regarded as necessary for fending of communism the South Korean state was provided with a relative degree of autonomy from international actors. This is not to say that the Americans did not continue to influence the state and the choice of policies, for indeed they did (Cummings, 1984; Amsden, 1989). More importantly, the state was able to implement the policies and strategies that it chose without interference from Western powers as long as it did it under the auspices of a capitalist economy.

5.3. A Conducive Global Economy

While the geopolitical significance of South Korea gave the South Korean state a large degree of leverage to intervene in the economy as it took place within the context of free enterprise, the general condition of the world economy also provided the state with a certain degree of maneuverability at critical stages in its growth. During the 1960s and 1970s many have noted that the general situation of the world economy was favourable to south Korean exports and conducive to growth. The expansion of world trade was unprecedented and as a consequence Appelbaum and Henderson question whether South Korea "could have made the switch from import-substitution to the export-oriented industrialisation strategies in the late 1950s and early 1960s" (1992: 10) without such an enabling environment. The United States facilitated export expansion in South Korea as they became the "major markets" for exports, "particularly for new skill-intensive, high-volume products" (Kuznets, 1994: 143). Furthermore, during the late 1960s when the export initiative was at its height, the war in Vietnam provided yet another market for South Korean products. According to Evans, South Korea's successful negotiation with FDI and alliances with TNCs "depended on a global environment in which TNCs had become convinced that international alliances, even, with Third World firms, made strategic sense" (Evans 1995: 93). All of this is important to take into consideration in a discussion of what it was that provided the state with its strength for if the state's legitimacy came to be rested on the provision of growth, the world economy at different stages in times may considerably influence the achievement of such growth.

The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing analysis is that following the Second World War, the United States was determined that South Korea was to become integrated into the global capitalist economy due to the country's geopolitical significance. The cold war meant that American foreign policy became more and more concerned with economic issues in

order to fend off communism in East Asia. This was articulated through the massive amounts of aid provided to South Korea during the 1950s. Economic aid affected the continuum of the entrepreneurial class as they became directly tied to Syngman Rhee's government and accumulated wealth in the process which later was utilised under Park to facilitate his economic objectives. Military aid enabled South Korea to establish one of the latest armed forces in the world and the security dilemmas which have remained between the North and the South served to legitimise the authoritarian government. The South Korean state was significantly influenced by the international system which has worked to strengthen the state and contribute to the effectiveness of policies.

6. Conclusion

We are now in a position to answer the question as to why industrial policy was so effective in South Korea and other East Asian countries when it has "proved to be extremely costly and counterproductive in other national contexts" (Onis, 1992: 496). As the South Korean experience has demonstrated, its industrial policies have been effective due to intervention via a developmental state. Not only is the South Korean state an autonomous structure but the strength of this structure is directly related to the way in which it is bound to society through the narrow alliance with private capital. The industrial policies which were utilised were facilitated by the special relationship between the state and private businesses which evolved out of a historical context from its weak ties in the late Yi Dynasty to its strong ties which ensued during Park's Era. However, international forces must be taken into consideration and in South Korea's case they facilitated economic growth under the direction of a strong state and in the process have served to legitimise the state. Furthermore it must be emphasised that while a Confucian value system has deeply affected the nature of the state in South Korea, this has been

used to suit particular goals at a particular time both legitimising the states repressive nature and providing it with strength. While South Korean policies have been effective due to the developmental states involvement, this state is an intricate balance of both autonomy and embeddedness and through this "amalgam" (Evans, 1995) specific institutions have been shaped over time.

If scholars such as Kuznets (1994) characterise high investments, export expansion, labour growth and absorption and to a certain degree government intervention as policy variables, can these policies be replicated in other countries? The answer is no in that the unique state society relationship, specific international forces and cultural endowments have all worked to strengthen the south Korean state which enabled it to effectively intervene and carry out the policies that it chose. Hence, effectiveness at implementing the policies was due to the unique internal and external relationships which provided the state with its strength. "It is unlikely that the East Asian model can be exported in toto" due to the fact that success "rested not only on certain discrete policies but on the particular political and institutional context that allowed the NICs to adopt those policies in the first place" (Haggard, 1990: 21).

The South Korean experience illustrates Evan's (1995) thesis of "embedded autonomy", whereby not only is the state apparatus autonomous but it is "embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies" (Evans, 1995:12). Industrial policies have worked in the past due to the unique relationship which exists between the Chaebol and the government. Evidently these ties to society have also been affected by the involvement of international actors and have been influenced by the cultural endowments of the society. The impetus of American aid provided a notion of continuum to the business class which had prospered during the reign of Rhee Synman as

this class accumulated illicit wealth which was then co-opted by the Park regime to initiate his developmental goals. While it has become evident that South Korean development cannot be explained by a Confucian ethic it is also clear that various cultural attributes have been utilised to suit the goals of the state and industrial leaders. This relationship was also facilitated by national homogeneity which is less common in other LDCs and therefore for similar ties to work elsewhere "the political system may have to be inclusive and participatory" (Kearney, 1990:204). If states can foster relationships to private capital which enable the state to remain autonomous and do not degenerate into rent seeking then it is possible that industrial policy may be able to bring about economic development, but these may remain influenced by the unique relationships which already exist between other states and other societies, the relationship of the state in the international system and the unique cultural endowments which exist elsewhere.

Evidently, the geopolitical significance of South Korea was indeed a key factor in facilitating the economic -growth which occurred to take place, and therefore a replication of the South Korean model would not be possible for these same conditions do not exist elsewhere. However, South Korea's experience demonstrates that not only is a country's position in the international division of labour dependent "on state capacity and the character of state involvement" (Evans, 1996: 266) but it is also dependent on a conducive international environment. The experience of South Korea demonstrates that the international environment must help to foster an environment which allows other LCD's room to manoeuvre.

Embeddedness is multifaceted, it has demonstrated itself in ties to society and in relationships with international forces and has not been bypassed by cultural endowments. In the end, one of the most important lessons to be learned from the South Korean experience is that the best policies which can be utilised and the institutions which can implement these must be

negotiated out of each country's unique circumstances and policies which work in one situation may not in another no matter how much understanding is gained of the factors which were involved. While neo-classical and market friendly interpretations are influential, neither are congruent with the experience of South Korea whose economic growth has been shaped by a developmental state strengthened by its relationship with society and within the international system. Due to the uniqueness of South Korean development it is not conducive as a model to be replicated in other LDCs. However it has been able to provide some useful lessons in that certain states can play a key role in economic growth, that their ties to society will effect the ability to effectively "intervene, that these ties may be affected by the involvement of international actors as well as the unique cultural endowments which exist, that the international system must be conducive to growth and that above and beyond anything else countries must develop strategies which are unique to their own individual circumstances.

While exports, investments and labour have all been key components of the South Korean development model, growth was influenced by government intervention. Due to the way in which the government intervened, and was successfully able to utilise industrial policy, to bring about economic transformation, our contention is that the developmental state must be considered the most important factor in the accumulation of growth in South Korea. While features of the South Korean model may be considered policy variables, and could thus be utilised in other LDCs government, it is important to understand the enabling forces behind the state which facilitated the success of industrial policy.

It should be noted that developmental states possess a relative degree of strength over society which enable them to intervene without interference from conflicting class interests. Not only was the state in South Korea autonomous but it has also been embedded through unique ties to society which

provides channels to implement the chosen policies. These ties were institutionalised through the special relationship which existed between the state and the Chaebol which evolved over time and although this narrow alliance has brought challenges to the state, it facilitated successful state intervention during the rapid period of growth. Furthermore the embeddedness of the state in the international system has also been a key factor in providing the state with its strength. South Korea was to become integrated into a global capitalist economy due to its geopolitical situation. American aid and a global economy which was conducive to export expansion both strengthened the state and enabled the policies chosen to become as effective as they did. Due to the fact that this rapid development occurred in the non-western world, it has drawn attention to the relevance of cultural influences. Without totally subscribing to the argument that, that a "Confucian Ethic" in East Asia has been a key factor in the achievement of development, we can say that cultural endowments may have strengthened the state in South Korea. A common culture has helped to legitimise the state and certain cultural endowments have been exploited by the state to influence its relationship with society. Through the evidence presented it became clear that the South Korean state has evolved out of a unique set of historical circumstances affecting both its embeddedness within society and within the international system.

The crucial role of the developmental state in the South Korean development is a challenge to both the neo-classical and the market-friendly interpretation of the growth. Consequently if the industrial policies which were utilised in South Korea depended on the state intervention which occurred, and this state intervention has been effective due to the unique forces which have shaped it over time then it is unlikely that policy replication could bring similar transformations elsewhere. Nevertheless, while the South Korean experience may not be repeated in other LDCs it still provides some valuable lessons. First of all, it demonstrates

that State's intervention through a competent and coherent bureaucracy can bring about economic growth in a late industrialising nation. Secondly, the effectiveness of government intervention is influenced by the unique state society relationships which exist and such relationships can be influenced by international actors as well the cultural endowments of a given society. Third, national strategies may be considerably influenced by the international system, and a conducive global environment is necessary to bring about economic growth. Finally, strategies which have proven effective for the achievement of one country's goals may not be relevant in other national contexts thus countries must seek to build on the unique conditions which have shaped their relationships to society and to the international system.

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Teknik, Teknoloji ve "Mimari" Yaratıcılık

Bina Üretimine Dair Birkaç Olay ve Örnek

Özet

Yeni ve değiştirme gücüne sahip bir şeyin tasarlanması ve yapılmasını içerebilen yaratıcılık, teknik ve teknoloji ile ilgili olarak ele alınmaya başladığında kaçınılmaz olarak hem bilgi ile hem de üretim biçimi ile ilişkili olmaya başlar. Mevcut bilgi ve üretim biçimine bağlı kalarak yapılan tasarım ve uygulamalar yeni olarak nitelendirilebilir mi? Mevcut olana rağmen yeni bir bilgi ve üretim biçiminin tasarlanması ve hayata geçirilmesi mümkün müdür? Hiç birşeyin çağrıştırmadığı ve benzeri olmayan bir şey, hiç yoktan tasarlanabilir mi? Sorular bunlar olduğunda, verilecek farklı cevap kompozisyonları da çeşitli yaratıcılık anlayışlarının varlığına işaret edecektir. Bu çalışmada, mevcut bilgi ve üretim biçimine bağlı kalarak yapılan tasarım ve uygulamaların nitel bir değiştirme gücü olmadığı, bu nedenle yeni olarak nitelendirilemeyecekleri, mevcut olana rağmen yeni bilgi ve üretim biçimlerinin tasarlanabileceği ancak etkin olarak hayata geçirilemeyeceği, hiç birşeyin çağrıştırmadığı ve benzeri olmayan birşeyin hiç yoktan tasarlanamayacağı düşünceleri benimsenmiştir.

Technique, Technology and "Architectural" Creativity: Events and Examples Related to Building Production

Abstract

When creativity that is strongly tied with design and production of new things having the power to change is handled in relation to technique and technology, it inevitably starts to concern both knowledge and form of production. Is it possible to qualify as new those designs and applications that depend on existing knowledge and form of production? Is it possible to design and apply new and different kinds of knowledge and forms of production, in spite of existence of a dominant one? Is it possible to design from nothing something completely different that is not brought to mind by something that already exists? If such questions are asked, different answers will point to the existence of different understandings of creativity. In this study it is accepted that those designs and applications that are made based on existing knowledge and production forms, lack the power to qualitative change, and for this reason, they cannot be qualified as new, it is possible to design new and different kinds of knowledge and forms of production but impossible to apply them effectively and it is impossible to design something that is completely new that is not reminded by something that already exists.

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