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Urban Cultural Identities and Globalization: A Critical Account

Abstract

The author analyses contemporary urban cultural identities from a macro-sociological point of view. The main issues on which this article is built upon are the following: Firstly, the argument that there is a new system of interaction between what can generally be called as 'global' and what has traditionally been identified as 'local'. This new system gives rise to a new cultural identity and a new topology where everything is both 'local' and 'global' at the same time. The interaction of this system with elements that have not been incorporated in its fields is the second major issue that the author uses. Furthermore, it is argued that the built environment has a major influence on cultural identities, as it is not only part of these identities but their mirror as well. Therefore, the latter argument is a third issue as in the text we find many parallel references to aesthetic factors. It becomes evident throughout the whole article that the author applies his arguments to an imaginary globalized society, which is not very far from the urban societies of contemporary developed countries.

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Kentsel Kültürel Kimlikler ve Küreselleşme:

Eleştirel bir Bakış

Özet

Bu makalede yazar çağımızın kentsel kültürel kimliklerini makro-sosyolojik bakış açısı ile inceliyor. Çalışmanın üzerine kurulu olduğu temel tartışma konularının ilkinin, genelde 'küresel' olarak adlandırılan ve geleneksel olarak 'yerel' olarak tanımlanan arasında yeni bir etkileşim sisteminin varlığına ilişkin öne sürülen görüşler oluşturuyor. Bu yeni sistem, yeni bir kültürel kimliğin ve herşeyin hem 'yerel' hem de 'küresel' olduğu yeni bir topoloji ortaya çıkarıyor. Bu sistemin kendi alanına henüz daha dahil olmamış elemanlarla etkileşimi ise yazarın odaklandığı diğer önemli konuyu oluşturuyor. Oluşturulan bu yeni ortam kültürel kimlikler üzerinde önemli ölçüde etkili ve sadece bu kimliklerin bir parçası değil aynı zamanda onların bir yansıtıcısı hitelindedir. Bu son tartışmayla ilgili olarak çalışmada estetik faktörlerin önemine ayrıntılı olarak değiniliyor. Yazar, öne sürdüğü görüşlerde, günümüz gelişmiş ülkelerinin kentsel toplumlarından çok da uzak olmayan hayali küreselleşmiş topluma göndermede bulunuyor.

Urban Cultural Identities and Globalization: A Critical Account

This article examines the contemporary changing condition of urban spaces, places and identities. It primarily uses notions regarding the *space of flows* (Castells, 1996: 376-428) although I have presumed that the reader is already familiar with the general framework of the *information society*. It is by means clear when we talk about the *information society* that we mainly refer to developed -or even developing- countries. In that sense, I would like to stress the attention of the reader, when he/she wants to think of specific examples, to cities like London, New York (and most of the big American cities), Amsterdam, Athens, Hong Kong and other similar urban centers. Nevertheless, there is no conscious attempt to add arguments or to extend existing theories of space and place neither to stress the importance of cultural identity in discussions concerning this subject. The main objective of the following paragraphs is to revisit and redefine the role of cultural identity in urban places and vice versa. In other words, my arguments are set and discussed towards a willingness to demonstrate the milieu of contemporary urban cultural identities. I provide a theoretical framework of the changing interrelation between place and identity *vis a vis* the interrelation between the notion of 'local' and the notion of 'global'. Furthermore, I try to classify urban cultural identities according to their socio-cultural status and role. In fact, I explore in many indirect ways the role of the *new middle class* and through these exploration I try to define the 'fate' of cultural identities when they enter to the broader area of the *space of flows* hence, to the *network society*. Finally, a further objective of this text is to show that

nowadays, a common force causes the changing mode of places and identities. The abstract name that we give to this force is 'globalization'.

If one tries to discuss about a global sense of place, he/she should first have to refer to the rise of advanced telecommunications and services as a core process in the transformation of urban place from an identity-bounded territory to a space where local and global 'images' are passing and interchanging in a very fast rhythm. This will lead to a reconsideration of what is global and what is local. Paradoxically, it becomes increasingly evident nowadays that globalization and localization are not opposed terms as they are approaching the same conceptual meaning. Castells states that "*globalization stimulated regionalization*" (1996: 381) while, I would add that, in the past, regionalization stimulated globalization as an effect of the regional aspirations for a stronger region or, in historical terms, for a stronger empire. In other words, the aspirations -political, social and cultural- of great regions of the past were directed towards the aim to 'reach the world'.¹ On the one hand, this leads us to the argument that globalization is not a new socio-political process as it has become evident in the previous centuries (e. g. Roman Empire, Ottoman Empire, the British and the French colonies in Africa and Asia etc.). On the other hand, globalization, in its contemporary sense, has some profound and historically unique differences from all its previous faces. The changing of the character of place(s) and the consequent notions around the 'sense of place' can be proved as

¹ Colonization is one of the best examples of this process.

² This system could be partly and generally defined by the argument that "the dominant ideology became that of the 'new world order' that we have seen at work in the Gulf, in Somalia or in Bosnia. See Corijn, 1994: 18. I would also add Kosovo in the above list.

catalytic factors in the justification of the latter argument. A further argument that will be explored in this article and is stated here in advance is the following: "The cultural landscape is heavy with contested meanings, with the eddies of memory and desire, well-being and despair; it forms a place within which global flows are localized, and in this lies the possibility of meaning and sense" (O'Connor and Derek, 1995: 75).

The confusing interaction between global place and local place is mainly arising from the neutralization - and in a large extent deprivation - of the 'sense of place'. Today, it is very difficult to distinguish what is local and what is global in urban environments. In short, it could be stated that global signs incorporate local signs and vice versa. Local societies in 'world-cities' are -voluntarily or not- part of the information flows even by merely consuming images - although their 'synergy' usually goes far beyond that. Reactions of the 'local' against the 'global' are relatively tolerated as they are not aimed to change the 'new world order' but, in contrary, to reinforce it. This reflects two incidents, firstly that the process of globalization is based on socio-cultural interactions that stimulate localism through the global order, hence, on socio-cultural actions and reactions. Secondly, that most of these actions and reactions are consciously or subconsciously manipulated by the dominant political system of globalization.² Neither the reactive character of localization is a reaction against globalization of place(s) nor globalization is aimed to annihilate localization. However, both systems proceed against the 'sense of place' regarding its reflection of cultural identities rooted in the human nature. Both systems appear to manifest themselves on places as necessary parts of the global-local interaction in order to establish themselves in the 'new order' of cultural values of intense communication and information flows. In that sense, "places do not disappear but their meaning become absorbed in the network" (Castells, 1996: 412) of communication and advanced technology. An overall statement arising from the above argument is that "'senses of place', [...] may be an important part of the way in which power relations are both reproduced and challenged" (Massey and Jess, 1995: 152).

Therefore, contemporary urban cultures are part of - if not subject to - this interactive system between global and local. This comes to justify Castells' notion of the *network society* if we introduce to our discussion the catalytic role of advanced technology. The condition of the post-industrial era implies the constitution of *technopoles*, which are, in short, cities or 'places' characterized and partly identified by a "high-technology-led industrial milieu of innovation" (Castells, 1996: 390). Moreover, it is not merely the rise of these centers of high technological innovation that define the socio-spatial existence of the term '*technopoles*' but the networks and the information flows they consist of. The structure of these networks is based on the existence of *nodes* and *hubs* of technological innovation and informational flows. Cities of different scale all around the world participate in this system either by hosting technological hubs or/and nodes or by trying to build these centers of technological innovation in order to avoid being disconnected from the world. Moreover, "both nodes and hubs are hierarchically organized according to their relative weight in the network" (Castells, 1996: 413). This system gives rise to a whole new culture and/or cultural identity which has to interact with the local identities in order to establish itself. In that sense, it becomes evident that "the new industrial system is neither global nor local" (Castells, 1996: 392) and "the new industrial space does not represent the demise of old, established metropolitan areas and the rising sun of new, high tech regions" (Castells, 1996: 393). On the contrary, cities, which have become high-tech centers, find the opportunity to strengthen - or even to revive - their local image, which is usually rooted in the 'glorious' past. By doing so they achieve two main objectives: to balance the socio-cultural global dynamics with the local ones and besides to encourage the promotion of themselves in the global competition/market by using abstract historical and cultural local particularities. Castells describes an aspect of this process by saying "the truly exclusive residential areas tend to appropriate urban culture and history, by locating in rehabilitated or well-preserved areas of the central city" (1996: 401). Besides, the

central city is still -as it was always in Europe- the window of the city to the world in terms of identity, history and image. There, we find the highest concentration of dense public places and historical landmarks for and through which one can investigate identities and 'senses of place'.

The paradox of this process reflects the previously mentioned synergy between globalization and regionalization. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the difference between global regionalization and local traditionalism. Regionalization in the *information city* presumes de-traditionalization of the urban structure. Otherwise, the passage from industrial to post-industrial era will be lengthy and distressing. Traditions and folkloric identifications are becoming commodities of the 'globalized regional' and give rise to the 'regionalized global' in order to survive in the global competition of local images. Furthermore, cities enter in the above procedure under the following principle: "The higher their position in the competitive structure of the new European economy, the greater the role of their advanced services in the business district, and the more intense will be the restructuring of urban space." (Castells, 1996: 403)

The new spatial face arising from the previously described interrelation between global and local elements in urban places is characterized by the "separation between symbolic meaning, location of functions, and the social appropriation of space in the metropolitan area" (Castells, 1996: 403). It is argued that urban space becomes a placeless territory under the 'empire of information flows' by losing its meaning as *space of place*. Nevertheless, if "the space of flows is not placeless, although its structural logic is" (Castells, 1996: 413) then this logic does not accept the constitution of any cultural identity but the one of the *information city*. Consequently, the local-global interaction takes place within the above transformation and in many cases appears to be subject to it. This also means that the meaning of 'local' -and 'global'- is changing or, in other words, it is transformed in order

to fit into the logic of the *space of flows*. Issues concerning the globalization of culture reflect the framework of this logic although the role of cultural identities in interaction with places needs to be understood by its primal condition as culture and identity 'in place(s)'.

Furthermore, the built environment not any longer reflects urban identities as such. However, a contrary approach is becoming evident; contemporary 'identities of placelessness' tend to relate themselves to signs and aesthetic values of the past or to recent ones that they produce - or reproduce - in order to express their 'homelessness' no matter if these signs are already -or shortly after- incorporated into the dominant aestheticism of the new spatial logic. Examples of these signs usually vary according to different social/political/gender or other classifications of the symbolically - or even literally - homeless people, meaning those who are alienated from any spatial specificity. For example, working class immigrants and the 'poor' in general may reflect their identity on the abstract aestheticism of ghetto or/and graffiti. The middle and/or upper middle class may relate their cultural identity with analogous housing (e. g. loft living, gardens, postmodern decoration etc.). Finally, upper classes and elites may be keen on expressing their 'homelessness' by relating part of their identity with aesthetic visions of the past (e. g. castles, old buildings, museums, renaissance art etc.) or/and aesthetic signs of wealth (hotels, restaurants, golf-parks, etc.). The common issue in all the above 'aesthetic expressions of homelessness' is that they are all - or almost all - incorporated to the aestheticism of a global culture. In other words, as Zukin argues: "Styles that develop on the streets are cycled through mass media, especially fashion and 'urban music' magazines and MTV, where, divorced from their social context, they become images of cool" (9).

Obviously, the aestheticism of the lower classes seems to be more often part of a reactive dynamism while medium and upper medium class levels seem to be those who are more involved in the active role of the information flows logic. Paradoxically, the

higher classes can be both proactive and reactive in this logic as they find part of their identity to be opposed to the dominant ideology of the society. Although, the latter becomes a confusing issue as their wealth under the umbrella of advanced capitalism does not allow them to escape totally from their 'materialistic' consciousness. In other words, a vicious circle becomes increasingly evident from the above analysis where action, reaction and interaction, place and placeless, home and homelessness or/and aestheticism and anti-aestheticism lead to the same point, which is nothing else but the point of departure of the/ the globalization of places and homogenization of culture. Therefore, 'placelessness' does not mean lack of place but lack of 'sense of place' as in a global places reflect the changing of meaning of their 'sense(s)' or the loss of a 'sense' with deep cultural content, meaning and reflectivity.

At this stage, it is important to mention the socio-spatial fragmentation generated by and within the *information city*. This is indeed an expression of the new spatial logic in *megacities*. The above example concerning the aesthetic signs of place in which different class identities relate themselves may be partly a virtual myth although its social reality could be described as an 'alive' myth. The poor do not relate themselves with the 'ghetto-aestheticism' in order to create a myth around their lives -this is well made by the virtual representation of the signs of this aestheticism when it becomes a commodity- but because the increasingly tight segregation that takes place in the *information city* creates bounded clusters according to the type and level of participation in the production of technological innovation and informational flows. The relatively abstract spatial manifestation of ghetto is an uncovered expression of urban segregation. Castells argues that "within each city, within each area, processes of segregation and segmentation take place, in a pattern of endless variation." (1996: 409). The hierarchical mode of this segregation and segmentation is not necessarily based on class divisions but it is most of the time influenced by that. Thus, a rational order in the degree of involvement or active participation in the production of

flows is not always valid in terms of the traditional class divisions. It has become apparent in the above lines that even if the poor are those who in their vast majority are excluded from the means of production the traditional elites are not always those who are most directly or intensively included. The rise and multiplication of the upper middle class' cultural representation throughout the course of late capitalism gives a new meaning to the role and matter of cultural -and partly social- hierarchies. The sense of global or local places derives its meaning from the interaction between these hierarchies while they are manipulated by the dominant spatial ideology of socio-cultural fragmentation within a broader uneven interaction between the 'local' and the 'global'.

The constitution and the broader cultural milieu of the *megacities* give rise and shape not only to the cultural identity of those who belong to the production of technological innovation and informational flows but also -and perhaps most importantly- to those who are left out of this system although they share the same relative place as those who are included. Yet, there is a broader pattern of cultural identity of those "who fight to survive, as well as of those groups who want to make visible their dereliction, so that they will not die ignored in areas bypassed by communication networks" (Castells, 1996: 404). The cultural identity of the 'poor' of the *megacities* is largely a globalized identity too. The homogenized face of *megacities* reinforces the homogenization of the ironically called 'parasites' of urban life. For example, a homeless beggar in London Underground station who is sitting on the floor under an advertisement of the 'American Beauty'³ looks, feels and behaves in the same way as any other beggar in any underground station throughout the world's *megacities*. Even the title of the above-mentioned film has not been translated in the national languages of most countries. Indeed, words like 'American' and 'beauty' are well -although abstractly- understood all over the world. The contradiction of the main poster of this film -showing a red rose handled horizontally over a white young female abdomen- with the beggar just under it, is conceived as something natural by the identities of the *space of*

³ Feature film directed by Sam Mendes, 1999.

flows. The identities of 'flows' can 'digest' aesthetic paradoxes like that without any crucial disturbance. In reality, the beggar is the logical consequence of the economy behind the Hollywood film when this is regarded as part of the broader globalization of economy circulated through and via the media. The aesthetic combination between the 'semi-alive' poor beggar and the virtual image of a rose on the white female body is so smooth and natural that in fact the identity of the beggar derives some meaning by the poster. The cultural identity of homeless people of the *megacities* - similarly and accordingly to the majority of the rest of the population- is partly -although crucially- related to global signs. Specifically, the Hollywood poster reflects a myth that it is not rationally challenged but passively accepted. Moreover, the beggar becomes an urban sign himself of the 'de-mythologized' reality behind the actual myth by reflecting a global aspect of hopeless exclusion and the fate to carry the worst curse that one can have in the 'global village', to be 'poor' just under a 'virtual beauty'.

Contemporary urban identities cannot avoid encompassing both local and global elements. It is in the nature of the *information city* to create, reinforce and encourage every 'purified' cultural identity to interact and exchange meaning(s) with other identities or even with itself in a profoundly financial based process and cruel commodification of images and signs. The latter happens as cultural identities in *megacities* appear to be alienated from place(s) by being bounded in the new abstract spatial logic of the informational flows. Furthermore, these identities are global in terms of alienation and local in terms of spatial fragmentation. In the same way, the common aspect of the overall cultural identity of contemporary cities is its global continuity and homogeneity in terms of local fragmentation. Therefore, "exclusion is the fundamental political problem of the network society on a global scale with acute local manifestations" (McGuigan, 1999: 120). The dominant cultural identity of *megacities* is constituted by the logic of continuous and increasing informational flows, consumption, technological innovation and capitalist growth. In other words, growth itself is defined by the 'new urban order' as a creation of

endless developing of technological hubs, satellite informational supplements and tourist attractions. The dominant ideology of contemporary western cultural identities is not any longer attached to the national cultural values but to the values of globalization -mostly economic- and the ecstasy of communicational flows. Emergent ideologies hence, emergent forms of cultural identities are partly incorporated in the logic of globalization due to its innovational character especially in the technological field. It is argued that globalization is a continuous social, political, economical and culturally emergent process as its formation seems to be unsettled and changeable -and it is very difficult and subjective to distinguish whether this is an illusion or reality. Under the above consideration, the interaction between an 'informational flows' based dominant cultural identity and an emergent one unifies these two forms. A good reason for that is the fact that cultural globalization is abstractly extended in various dimensions which allow certain marginal, sub-marginal, 'neo-traditional' and other forms of cultural identity to enter and/or be incorporated in its logic and process. A practical example is the Web where one can find any kind of pages, from the Wall Street Journal to the most radical anti-capitalist paper and from religious chat-rooms to the most explicit 'adult-chat'. Moreover, it seems that the process where an emergent cultural identity is challenging -if not threatening- the dominant cultural values of society is cut and notably shorten. In other words, the crucial stage in which this identity would have to confront the dominant values disappears, or becomes smoother and controlled as its manifestation becomes part of the process that is revolting against. Roughly, this can be justified by the decreasing political consciousness in the world and the lack of significant social or cultural movements similar to those that marked the culture of the -at least- last three centuries. Today, an emergent cultural identity is either derived from distinctive global resources or by revived nationalistic moods. As Robins states, "local cultures are over-shadowed by an emerging 'world culture' -and still, of course, by resilient national and nationalist cultures" (36). Therefore, the only substantially alternative socio-

political form of cultural identity today seems to be found in the conceptual space between the dominant ideology and the emergent or/and projective ideological elements that, in many cases, help the ideology of globalization to maintain its innovational character. In this sense, this alternative cultural identity is more diverse than ever before as it is adopted by the most extreme and contradicted socio-political -and spatial- activities and aspirations.

The new face -if not nature- of the dominant urban cultural identity under the conditions of the *information city* has been discussed in the above lines. Now, it would be interesting to see how a basic and general division between two major urban cultural identities can be made. Furthermore, if the dominant spatial logic of western societies is characterized by the notion of the *space of flows* and if its formation "*is not purely structural*" (Castells, 1996: 415) then two major socio-cultural identities become apparent in *megacities*. I would name these identities as 'cosmopolitanism' and 'exclusionism'. However, the condition of an/the upper/new middle class is blurring the spatial classification based on the argument that "elites are cosmopolitan, people are local" (Castells, 1996: 415). I would argue that the easy incorporation of local and cosmopolitan signs and their inter-reflection within a neutral cultural identity makes sense in the context of the 'new middle class' of the *megacities*. Therefore, the *space of flows* reflects more the constitution of a new middle class cultural identity rather than a cosmopolitan one in the traditional sense of the latter term. Alternatively, perhaps we can talk about a 'new cosmopolitanism' as even the incorporated 'local signs' reach -in most cases- the 'cosmos'. John Urry argues that "a 'mundane cosmopolitanism' is part of many people's everyday experience, as they are world travelers, either directly or via the TV in their living room." (167). In other words, our issue is the rise of a new metropolitan elite, which derives its identity as such from its more active and less passive participation in the formation, structure, and progression of the informational flows. In that sense, "contemporary societies have initiated a distinctive kind of

cosmopolitanism, an aesthetic cosmopolitanism dependent upon certain scopic regimes" (Urry, 1995: 167). Moreover, "the development of a comprehensive code and culture among the informational elites leads to the establishing of the 'in' and 'out' boundaries of their cultural/political community" (Castells, 1996: 416). In that sense, resistant and residual cultural elements reject this codification either because their socio-economical condition does not allow them to become an active part of it or because of several political, religious or 'existential' values that they embrace.

As a conclusion I would like to state that the political consciousness of those who hold the means of production has widened and has become more accessible and easily consumed by the aspirations of all the social classes. The greatest achievement of the virtualization of the means of production on behalf of capitalism is its ability to hypnotize the socio-political consciousness of people. In other words, "politics is conducted through the media of communication, which are not themselves the sources of power but, rather, the mediation of power and, therefore, open to tactical negotiation" (McGuigan, 1999: 121). Therefore, the dominant political consciousness in the *network society* seems to be theoretically apolitical and the new dominant class -at least culturally- is the new middle class. Its wide socio-cultural accessibility by both class edges -due to its neutral identity- and its dominant position on the cultural milieu of the *network society* leads to the castration of independence/self-developed socio-political consciousness regarding cultural identity. This comes to fit in my previous argument that the formational type of cultural identity which is more likely to produce/develop 'alternative values' in the *information city* is the one that Manuels Castells would call *resistance identity*⁴ and Raymond Williams would locate it in the *residual culture*⁵. Resistance identity has "less to do with nationhood than with communal identification" (McGuigan, 1999: 116) hence, it is less susceptible to the domination of the ideology of informational flows. Furthermore, I should agree with McGuigan stating that: "Identities are no longer securely place-bound but are displaced

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"That is, the building of defensive identity in the terms of dominant institutions / ideologies reversing the value judgment while reinforcing the boundary." See Castells, 1997: 9.

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"...certain experiences, meanings, and values which cannot be expressed or substantially verified in terms of the dominant culture, are nevertheless lived and practised on the basis of the residue - cultural as well as social- of some previous social and cultural institution or formation." See Williams, 1977: 122.

and reconstituted through the space of a culture of real virtuality. Primary identification with, say, an ethnic group is rendered fragile and identity building becomes a complicated process" (121).

Nevertheless, the arguments developed in this article lead to a conclusion that global and local notions of place are similarly transformed and interchanged with the notions of global and local cultural identities in the *information city* unlike the relative disconnection between place, space and identity.

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Günaydın G-8: Sayısal Eşitsizliği Kapatma Girişimi ve Türkiye Deneyimi

Özet

Makalenin amacı, "bilgi toplumunun" altyapısı olarak tanımlanan etkileşimli iletişim ağlarına erişim için gerekli olan yeni iletişim teknolojilerinin yaygınlığına ilişkin Türkiye'deki son verileri ortaya koymaktır. Böylece bu verileri doğuran bilgi ve iletişim teknolojileri (BİT) ile iletişim ağlarına yönelik politikaların üretildiği ortamı, stratejik ve idealist iletişim yaklaşımları açısından ele almak mümkün olabilir. Türkiye'deki durumu ele alan bu inceleme, ulusal ve uluslararası ölçekte varolan "sayısal bölünmenin" kapanması amacıyla başlatılan uluslararası girişimlerin yorumlanmasında yardımcı bir çerçeve olarak kullanılmıştır. Çalışmanın birinci bölümünde 1997 ve 2000 yıllarında yapılan ve bu metnin yazarının da gerçekleştirilmesine katkıda bulunduğu iki saha araştırması kullanılarak, Türkiye'deki durum ele alınacaktır. Üzerinde durulacak olan teknolojiler; sabit telefon, bilgisayar ve internet olacaktır. Bu teknolojilere sahip olmanın, gelir grupları ve bölgeler açısından bir çözümlenmesi yapılmaktadır. İkinci bölümde, Türkiye'deki iletişim ağı politikalarında görülen değişimle, farklı yerli ve yabancı aktörlerin bu politikaların oluşmasına ilişkin yaklaşımları ele alınacaktır. Daha sonra, zengin ülkeler olarak tanımlanan G-8'lerin, 2000 yılında Okinawa Zirvesi'nde kamuoyuna açıkladıkları ve "sayısal bölünme"nin giderilmesine yönelik olduğu belirtilen girişimler irdelenecek ve sonuç bölümünde kimi öneriler getirilecektir.

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Okinawa Initiative of the G-8 and Digital Divide: Turkey's Experience

Abstract

The issue of "digital divide" has re-emerged in international fora last year following the Okinawa Summit of G-8 countries where an initiative to devise mechanisms to close the gap between the information rich and the information poor, both within and across "nations," was given a green light. The major aim of the article is to investigate the issue, using Turkey as a case in which domestic and international dynamics shape telecommunications and ICT (information and communication technologies) policies and to develop suggestions for international community. In the first part of the article, results of a recent survey will be presented. This survey has shown, the extent of digital divide in Turkey is larger than developed countries and to remedy the situation piecemeal solutions may not work, as may be the case in many other developing countries. In the second part of the article, in order to help to contextualize network policy trends in Turkey, two alternatives, the Idealist and the Strategic, will be considered. In the Turkish case both the Idealist and Strategic models have co-existed. However, Turkish experience with the emerging global governance regime supports research, which question optimistic scenarios.