

**THE IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE: THE CASE  
OF TURKEY**

**Ömer Çaha\***

Jurgen Habermas's book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* has attracted considerable attention in recent discussions regarding the relationship between the public and private spheres. The book was first published in the 1960s atmosphere of political radicalism. In the foreword to the new edition published in 1989,<sup>1</sup> Habermas considers his work a natural outcome of recent tendencies toward democratization. According to Habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere is a development from the bourgeois public, which takes the "homogenous" and "abstract" individual as the focal point, to a "differentiated" public created by civil society in social life.<sup>2</sup>

Indeed, Habermas's emphasis on this point is based on a valid justification. However, today's understanding of public is profoundly different from the one described by Habermas, who discusses the notion of the bourgeois public in the context of the history of seventeenth-eighteenth century Europe. During this period, public allowed the existence of something like publicity, which allowed different tendencies in the private realm and brought them together on common ground. In other words, it was a public where rivers from different basins joined with one another, losing their original riverbeds. Contrary to this, the idea of the public discussed in the 1990s is not a public that harmonizes with the private sphere. This is because the new understanding of the public allows the flow of diverse rivers in their own basins, with unrestricted borders. It is a public in which diverse "identities" that have taken shape over the

course of social history and deep social interactions continue to live on without any assimilation or destruction. Therefore, even though Habermas's stress on the differentiated dimension of the public sphere is significant, it is not enough to understand the recent transformations in this area. The most important development in the realm of the public sphere was Habermas's failure to see the advent of the dissolution of the ideological public sphere at the end of the 1980s. He failed to understand that recent political tendencies towards democratization on the eve of the 1990s, from authoritarian ideologies that attempted to control and prevent the existence of diversity, was the foretold of an "ideological" transformation, not a "structural" one.

The understanding of the public sphere of the Enlightenment period described by Habermas was conceptualized around the "homogenous" and "abstract" individual. It is known that the individual of the public sphere in this period was the Western "white man." Outside of this element, which was placed at the center of the public realm, there were a variety of other elements forced to the private sphere. However, even though the understanding of the public sphere in this period centered primarily on the Western white male, it was still open to individualism and to the differences of this individualism. Such perception provided ground for a private realm open to diversity.

However, aiming to transform the public life in accordance with their totalistic value systems, the ideological regimes in socialist countries have produced the advent of an understanding that allows the complete control and domination of the public realm over the private one. In reality, at the time Habermas wrote a preface to the new addition of his book, the most important development in political theory, especially with regard to the question of the public and private spheres, took place in the transformation of the idea of the public sphere in the socialist world. Such transformation occurred in the socialist countries is also closely related to certain developing countries. This is because even though these developing countries are different from their socialist counterparts in terms of identity, both illustrate great similarities in regard to their understanding of public life.

This study focuses primarily on the "transformation of the ideological public sphere" in Turkey, in reference to political and social changes in the post-1980 world. It emphasizes firstly, on the traditional separation between private and public spheres and secondly, indicates the transition of traditional separation between the two domains by drawing attention to the reactions of modern social groups and the transformation of ideological public sphere in the case of the post-1980 Turkey.

### **The Transformation of the Private into the Public**

It is well known that the use of the term "*publicus*," meaning "people," goes back to as late as ancient Greece. In ancient Greece and Cicero's Roman Empire, the notion of "*res publica*" was derived from "publicus" and gradually came to refer to a type of administrative system with particular laws and rules. Until the Enlightenment, people were the very core of the existence of "*republicus*," which represented both "intolerance" and "liberty." However, during this time the public was viewed as a complete object and the differences within it were not taking into consideration. In other words, the concept of "*publicus*" was based upon a sort of "abstraction" that includes areas perceived to belong to the private sphere today.<sup>3</sup>

The capitalist model of society that developed along with industrialization lies at the basis of the creation of a public life separated from private life. As the industrial society developed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, economic production activities were not the only thing taken away from the family, which also lost its other traditional social functions. In the pre-capitalist society, the family, which was at the center of both farming and other production activities, left such traditional functions to the public life. Once the core of the political life in feudal societies, the family lost this function too in modern societies. The implication of this is that while once the family was considered to be the foundation of cultural, political and economic activities it left such functions to social life in modern society.

While the family was losing these functions, the social life within the public sphere was undergoing other changes in connection with economic activities. In terms of political theory,

the most important development during this time was what Habermas termed "the informative dimension of the public sphere." From the seventeenth century on the closed world of traditional life began to gain publicity. These reserved worlds found the in the large chateaux of the aristocrats, the closed worlds of communities, the backyards of the clerics and the isolated neighborhoods of the proletariat, gradually gained publicity and became a part of public activity. Such developments contributed to the emergence of an open society. The social life not only gained publicity but also became dynamic. In turn, the private sphere founded on feelings and blood was gradually narrowing. The social activities of modern life such as theatre, cinema, entertainment clubs, schools, newspapers, magazines and the arts played a significant role in separating the public sphere sharply from the private realm. In addition, the public realm as an independent realm free of individuals, the family or any kind of economic interference began to be classified by the true definition of "publicity."<sup>4</sup> Likewise, the new characters of modern society including merchants, bankers, publishers, industrialists, artists and the literati dominated the urban culture, ending the hegemony of the upper-class culture developed in the large estates. Thus, these changes have sharply distinguished the notions of the private and public spheres known since ancient Greece in terms of theoretical and practical content.

The private realm, with family life as its foundation, has also had a significant place in western culture, which has its roots in the notion of *pater familias* or family head that formulates the family life as a unique kingdom in Roman law. Yet, the private sphere that includes the family life and means a realm outside the public sphere began to be used only in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This concept initially referred to the realm outside the dynamic or active social life.

This idea of the private sphere outside of the public life and of the center of the private activities have forced some political thinkers to take part in theoretical discussions regarding the separation of the public and private spheres. Three major political thinkers who have clearly

differentiated the public and private spheres from one another are Locke, Rousseau and Hegel. According to Locke, as the foundation of political authority, the social contract emerges outside the family life. Accordingly, the private realm can be defined as the realm of women, symbolized by sentimentality, compassion, love, sympathy and generosity. Contrary to this, the public sphere is the realm of men, dominated by rationality, mutual exchange and observation in every aspect of social life.<sup>5</sup> Despite inspiring the emergence of a state, Locke's understanding of the public sphere continues to live on with different social elements that have their own dynamism. For Locke, therefore, the public sphere has two dimensions: "political" and "social." The objective of the defined political sphere is to protect the freedom of the public along with its life and property rights. This is demonstrated in the *Second Treaties of Government*, in which Locke offers three different realms: the "private sphere" of women, the "public sphere" of men in general and the "political sphere" of state servants such as members of the police, military and judiciary.<sup>6</sup>

Contrary to Locke, Rousseau and Hegel focus primarily on the notion of the public sphere merged with political authority. In this regard, "General Will" dominates public life as the product of men who have gone beyond family life. Such an understanding sharply differentiates Rousseau from Locke.<sup>7</sup> In any case, it was Hegel who laid the foundation for a notion of a transcendental state that overshadows the public life dominated by free men. In Hegel's view, men who make up the differentiating public life outside of family life become the objects of civil society in a transcendental state. This transcendental state, he further argues, first combines all unique aspects and elements of different societal groups within its metaphysical container and then enforces its own ideology in order to claim control over them.<sup>8</sup> In sum, as opposed to Locke, for Hegel and Rousseau there are two opposing spheres: a private realm belonging to women, children and the disabled, and a public life belonging to men who are united to the state structure with compassion and affection. It is thus evident that their conception of the public sphere is intimately connected to the political authority.<sup>9</sup>

Another thinker who has dealt with the question of the public and private spheres is Kant. Looking at the question in terms of equality and freedom and combining Locke and Hegel's views, Kant argues that the search for freedom and equality are the two major reasons behind individuals' obedience to a political authority or state. However, their obedience is not simply a pragmatic expectation from the political authority, rather they consider it as their mandatory and moral duty. How can this be so? Kant emphasizes that the individuals' obedience is based upon the "principle of public" without expectation. The "principle of public" is founded on the "transcendental formula of the public law," which ensures all sorts of public freedoms. In this understanding, public freedom in turn guarantees individual freedoms. Kant further asserts that any action or demand of rights that contradicts the principles of the public is illegal, because such demands are no more than public disturbances. He concludes that the state administrators make decisions and put them into practice not in accordance with the interests of some individuals or groups, but in accordance with the interests of the General Will. Only through this way does political legislation gain legitimacy in the conscience of the public. If an administrator implements a decision that contradicts the benefit of the entire public, his action is considered unethical.<sup>10</sup> In short, according to Kant, the public sphere ensures the freedom of voluntarily submissive individuals under the umbrella of the transcendental state. Accordingly, the public sphere becomes a kind of platform where the individual and the state merge with one another.

In summary, the separation of the public and private spheres, on the one hand, has been crystallized as a result of the rising dynamics of the industrial society, and on the other hand has become a field of intellectual inquiry due to the discussions of some leading modern political thinkers. In modern thought, whereas the private sphere represents the realms of families, individuals and their demands and relations, the public sphere possesses two dimensions: "explicit or public" and "political." While liberal thinkers led by Locke view the public sphere outside the political sphere, others, such as Rousseau, Hegel and Kant, who consider the state a

transcendental authority, define the public sphere as the sovereign space of the state.<sup>11</sup> Locke and other liberal thinkers, including S. Mill, I. Berlin and Hayek, view the differentiated public sphere as a necessary precondition for individual liberty. Despite this, they have been harshly criticized by other intellectuals led by feminists, who have devoted their works to the question of identity in order to question the conventional values of modern thought and to reassert marginalized histories.

### **The Differentiation within the Public Sphere: the Emergence of the Multi-Publics**

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, during which the foundations of modern thought were established, the public sphere was a homogenous public. It was a public sphere in which individuals kept all their personal matters within their private lives, had equal legal status and possessed individual identities before their government as citizens. Rather than being the representatives of a particular religion, community, sect or ethnic group, the individuals were considered merely citizens of a particular state to which they had mutual duties and rights. When entering the public sphere, these individuals left their sociological and political peculiarities and affiliations behind. In Max Weber's conception of bureaucracy as the concrete core of the public sphere, individuals were considered to be the parts of a working wheel in a machine.<sup>12</sup>

Such a conception of the public sphere pushed society to the rear, making it disappear in the public. In such a condition the public sphere becomes an ideal realm, which must absolutely be reached. Accordingly, the public sphere was isolated from social reality by gaining an abstract characteristic. This is because in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries most concepts that made up the basis of the public sphere were abstract ideas rather than concrete facts. The notions of state, nation, sovereignty, individualism, rationality, progress, development and civilization were the best examples of this abstraction. For instance, in Hegel's view, the state is a metaphysical entity deified by individuals rather than a concrete

institution shaped through social life. In addition, according to Rousseau, a nation is an ideal entity that shares the same goals and fate, rather than a real living society.

However, the abstract notion of the public sphere witnessed a radical transformation during the democratization process. The idea of boundless freedom proposed by liberal thinkers freed the public sphere from being the source of authoritarian governments. Taking into consideration the demands of the public as a matter of freedom, a democratic government receives its legitimacy directly from the "real" public. Pushing the idea of more participation forward, the concrete public sphere began to extend its boundaries to include more realms where various diverse groups live side by side. Thus the public sphere of the nineteenth century went beyond the bourgeois public sphere underscored by Habermas. Under the influence of the values and aesthetic understanding of groups representing the Church, labor unions, media, middle-class people, artists, women, proletariat and the members of alternative lifestyles, the public sphere turned into a new sphere open to the diversity of a "real" society. In bringing active political and social participation and throwing open the curtain from public life, democracy opened the way for the appearance of societal elements in the public.

Such a process continued until the 1960s with increasing acceleration. The 1960s witnessed the transformation of the ideological public sphere into a civil one as a result of the private demands of street activism. With the "differentiation," "grouping" and "autonomization," the structural transformation mentioned by Habermas became more evident.<sup>13</sup> In the West, social differentiation that once developed around materialism now began to shape around "post-material" values, to borrow Inghart's words. Indeed, as Inghart has forcefully put forward, the West was experiencing a fundamental and grand "revolution" during this period. This revolution, considered a "silent revolution" by Inghart, put an end to categorization based on social classes that was ideologically motivated by the Marxist interpretation of social and political conflicts in terms of materialist motivations.<sup>14</sup>



The following is a short summary of the major characteristics of this silent revolution: In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the rise of capitalism contributed to the emergence of two opposing classes: bourgeois and proletarian. These classes caused further political and social polarization and conflict, which inspired Marx's utopian interpretation of the historical process. However, due to the growth of economic wealth among people after World War II, the middle-class began to swell and encompass these classes. The "material satisfaction" and "spare time" brought by the welfare states forced individuals to adopt for themselves new goals, life styles and habits different from mere economic motivations. As a result, alternative lifestyles, feminism, environmentalism, anti-nuclear activism, spiritual communion, third-world activism and active political participation mobilized individuals to gather around various non-governmental organizations that helped the transformation of the public sphere into a differentiated public realm. In Jassay's terms, the conventional public sphere turned into a new public realm where "hundred of flowers" can bloom at the same time.<sup>15</sup>

It is thus apparent that this structural transformation of the public sphere had already ended the utopian socialist society proposed by Marxism well before the political dissolution of the former socialist bloc in the 1990s. In the 1960s, a new political process that demanded politics on the basis of claiming rights, reconciliation and legitimacy of the political system replaced Marx's idea of economic conflict between opposing social classes. The new values brought up by Inglehart strengthened values of democracy and civil society. Since the differentiation took place on the basis of demands for rights, rather than on the basis of political conflict and polarization, reconciliation was an easy process.

### **The Reaction of the Social Groups to the Homogeneous Public Sphere**

The new idea of the public sphere has radically challenged the conception of the public of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Feminism, which has paid particular attention to the values of "identity" and "right," has emerged as a major social and political movement and attacked the modernist and positivist understanding of the public sphere the most. This

movement has not confined its criticism to only Hobbes, Rousseau and Hegel, who have promoted the idea of the public sphere embodied with the political authority. Instead, it has gone further to criticize those liberals who have defended the autonomy of the public sphere. For example, attacking the liberal view of the public sphere severely, the feminist thinker Carol Pateman has argued that such an understanding has excluded women from political participation and life because it has emerged as a result of a social contract among fraternal brothers.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, feminists have devoted their intellectual energies to the termination of the separation of the public and private spheres that they have viewed as the basis of modern political thought. By ending this separation, these intellectuals have attempted to develop a new understanding belonging specifically to women in the realms of politics, state, economy and scholarship. For instance, Catherine A. MacKinnon wrote a book entitled *Towards a Feminist Theory of the State*, in which she emphasizes the necessity for women to free themselves from the private realm both physically and emotionally.<sup>17</sup>

Feminist intellectuals have argued that, since it is based on patriarchal culture, the separation of the public and private spheres is no more than the domination of women by men. They explain this on the ground that in modern society the private realm continues to be within the limits of the public sphere, making it impossible to see the patriarchal culture behind it.<sup>18</sup> The separation of the public and private sphere has perceived public life to be identical with "men" and private life with "women," making politics and men closely associated with one another and leaving non-political activities to women.<sup>19</sup> Accordingly, while men create new histories, make treaties and found countries by placing themselves at the center of both political and economic power; women are forced to raise children inside the walls of the family life, do housework and perform other sub-duties of the object of history, men. In addition, the feminists have emphasized that the private sphere has not only excluded women from the public sphere, but also has directly resulted in separating them from one another, hindering their organization

as a political group and power. All this in mind, stressing the idea that "the private sphere is political," they have aimed at destroying the borders between the private and public spheres.<sup>20</sup>

The contribution of the feminists to the decay of the homogenous notion of the public sphere was substantial. More specifically, they have tried to go beyond the ideals of "universality" and "equality" in the public sphere, because both concepts take men as their reference. Whereas the ideal of "universality" aims to enforce man's worldview and patriarchal culture as the main culture in society, the concept of "equality" has a tendency to ignore differences based on competence, culture, values and behaviors.<sup>21</sup> By questioning the concept of "universality" the feminists have attempted to promote women's values in social and political life. Likewise, they have sought to urge women beyond the concept of equality, aiming to create a privileged position centered around women in society.

In addition to feminists, postmodernist and post-structuralist intellectuals' views on the notions of "the other" and "power" have also challenged the privileged position of the public sphere over the private. Lacan, Derrida and Lyotard's discussions on "discourse," "fictional narrative," "deconstruction," "semiotics" and "symbolism" have played an important role in inspiring feminists and have contributed greatly to the private sphere, or "the other," of the public losing its significance in society. Inspired by these postmodernist thinkers, some feminist theorists have sought to advocate a "different" identity, language, culture and understanding within the public sphere.<sup>22</sup> In addition to the feminists, postmodernist theorists have inspired other group-oriented movements that have sought to claim their particular rights in the public realm. The unique demands of these social groups have been the most sensitive subjects of democracy in recent years. Consequently, there have been serious discussions on the sociological and legal foundations of "multiculturalism" in the literature of modern political thought.<sup>23</sup>

## **The Decline of the Ideological Public Sphere**

Another development contributing to the breakdown of borders between the private and public spheres has occurred in the areas of political and economic relations in modern society. It is evident that the modern family has left its traditional functions to the public sphere and other minor social relations of the family have been bound to social regulations. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while drawing the boundaries of the private sphere, women were placed at the center of this realm. Yet today women have indisputably become a part of the public domain. For example, in the Scandinavian countries today women make up almost thirty percent of the parliament.<sup>24</sup> Women are thus closely embodied with all social, cultural, educational, economical and social institutions today. This has contributed to the decline of the understanding of the family centered around women and its social relations, symbols and values.

In the early years of capitalism it was only men who had the opportunity to participate in the public sphere, today both women and children have a similar chance to be active members of this domain. Preschools and nursery schools have taken children away from the family, lessening the role of traditional family in their social life. In addition, many activities once handled by the traditional family have one by one been brought into the public domain, including maternity hospitals, nursery schools, restaurants, schools, hotels, laundry rooms, dry cleaners, bakeries, reading clubs, cleaning companies and tailors.<sup>25</sup> When one sees the broadness and number of these activities once performed by the traditional family, one can realize why modern political thinkers have paid so much attention to the question of the private realm.

When the traditional family has been forced to lose its components and functions to the public domain, it has also been driven to open its doors to the influences, values and regulations of this public life. In the twelfth century, the Western family was like a secret kingdom. However, today's modern legal system has created new regulations and norms defining not only

the relationships between wives and husbands, parents and children and neighbors, but also rules for engagement parties and weddings. This has resulted in the encompassment of the family by modern values and standards. As a result of the means of education and new communicational devices such as the telephone, television, e-mail and satellite, the family has opened its borders to not only national public domains, but also to transnational public spheres.<sup>26</sup> Consequently, in modern political thought the family, once the center of the private domain, has today transformed into a consumer of the public sphere, rather than a producer of private values and relations.

In a similar manner, the idea that considers economic exchange between individuals as the basis of the private realm has also lost great significance. During the heydays of capitalist development, one of the main objectives of the bourgeoisie was to prevent the intervention of the state into economic life. In particular, based upon the principle of compensation, liberal thinkers viewed the economic exchange as a private activity among "rational" individuals. Yet the notion of a "Welfare State," developed since the nineteenth century, has succeeded in forcing the state to intervene in regulating economic life. Accordingly, today the state takes part not only in the services of public improvement and the production sector, but also in the development of regulations and codes in order to avert monopolies in market economy. As a result, with its legal and institutional regulations the state has become a crucial element of today's economic life due to the fact that it plays an important role in protecting consumer rights, encouraging competitiveness and controlling monopolies and cartels. In accordance with this, like the family, the marketplace has moved beyond the domain of private relations, instincts and bargains. Indeed, the marketplace exists naturally in the public sphere. Thus, when it is bound to state intervention, it becomes more closely associated with the political authority.

While opening up to the public domain, the marketplace in a way narrows down the domain of the political authority. This is because the expansion of the marketplace results in

substantial differentiation in social, professional, political and cultural areas. Since these processes are interrelated with one another, the impact of one on another is inevitable. For example, the establishment of new schools, libraries, research centers, newspapers, business companies and television channels contributes cultural differentiation and plays a role in development in other areas as well. On the other hand, the extension of the marketplace also limits other fields of activities of the state, excluding basic fields of activity, such as security, justice and defense. In so doing, this expansion becomes an important factor in advocating the idea of freedom. In this regard, the notion of capitalism defined by Friedman and Hayek is important. According to this concept, the internal dynamics of capitalism such as differentiation, competition, production, profit and investment produce proper conditions of freedom.<sup>27</sup> In other words, the marketplace, on the one hand, enters into the regulations of political authority, on the other hand, it creates a dynamism to surround the very same authority. By doing this, it forces the state to be neutral, impartial, and law-abiding and to treat citizens equally.

Another significant factor that has played a role in loosening the separation of the public and private spheres is the international platform, which has challenged the mere absolutism and authoritarianism of states. International treaties, pacts, natural law, scholarly developments, discoveries, new communication means, international conferences organized by the United Nations (UN) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on environmental issues, democracy and minority, women, religious and human rights have forced states to move beyond being absolute and ultimate political authorities in their national territories. From Bodin to Max Weber the state is defined as an institution that constitutes absolute power in its specific territory. Bodin emphasizes the inalienable, unlimited, and indivisible sovereignty of the state, whereas Weber pays particular attention to the state's exercising force in order to establish and protect its political control when necessary. Yet, in modern society the international platform aims to hinder the state as the ultimate power within its national territory.

As Martin Kohler aptly argues with regard to many issues of public concern including peace, social policy, consumer rights, civic liberties, economic development and environmental issues, individuals or interest groups act together internationally. By doing this, they build transnational networks to disseminate knowledge, to raise awareness, to develop common viewpoints in order to influence inter-governmental decision making in global affairs. In the early 1990s, at a series of UN-sponsored inter-governmental conferences on the environment (Rio, Brazil), human rights (Vienna, Austria), social development (Copenhagen, Denmark), population policy (Cairo, Egypt), gender issues (Berlin, Germany) and human habitats (Istanbul, Turkey) NGOs appeared to have played a decisive role in determining current agendas and offering solutions to them. The informal contacts between governmental authorities and the transnational NGO network have been intensified so that today NGOs are invited to participate in UN "Preparatory Committees" and follow-up working groups. Despite no formal obligations to do so, governments increasingly admit NGOs as legitimate representatives of public interest. Likewise, NGOs consider themselves the direct partners of the UN system and the representatives of the global "civil society."<sup>28</sup>

As a result of the expansion of the international platform in recent years, nation-states have been in a way kept under control. Therefore, while state control of the public domain is getting smaller and smaller, public elements and universal values have united with one another. Similarly, the international platform has ended the hegemony of the authoritarian public domain by helping the awakening of social and civic identities. The acquaintance of civil society's components in former socialist countries with the international platform has greatly influenced the political collapse of the socialist bloc. The members of civil society, including religious groups, labor unions, group of intellectuals, feminists and environmentalists, have had substantial impact in transforming oppressive and ideological public political spheres into democratic public domains in Eastern Europe. More specifically, the spread of communication means and the dissemination of information around the globe have liberated individuals from

being the object of a single public authority. Today a citizen of a particular country may maintain multiple identities, possessing individual, national and international identities.

### **Turkey Between Democratic and Ideological Public Spheres**

From a historical perspective the period, which had a long history and lasted until the seventeenth century, can be defined as the "*process of open public*" period in Turkey. In parallel with the development of capitalism in the West, some colorful waves of public life reached the shores of the Ottoman Empire. In particular, differentiation in the public sphere reflected itself in the clothes imported from the West of women and the upper classes. Since the Ottoman Empire was based on a "nation system" organized around religion, it had a social structure in which social activities mostly took place within the private domain. Each religion and even every sect possessed its own self-sufficient social life like a commune. Social life based on "openness" was not the case in Ottoman society until the seventeenth century, during which time it integrated with the Western economic system. During this century, the dynamism of Western public life began to be seen in Ottoman society due to this economic integration.

Generally speaking, women were the major components of society that reflected the first signs of transformation of the public sphere in Ottoman society. The colorful and attractive clothes imported from the West of non-Muslim minority and upper class Ottoman women were the first evidence of this transformation. Opposing this change, the Ottoman government issued imperial decrees asking women to avoid wearing these conspicuous and elegant clothes. Even though these imperial decrees were initially effective in the following years, the government failed to prevent women from wearing these flashy dresses. This is because the transformation of the public sphere, colored by the way women dressed, was taking place in parallel to other social and political changes in Ottoman society.<sup>29</sup>

Prior to the nineteenth century public life was gaining rapid openness in Ottoman Turkey. Such openness became more evident with the introduction of the newspaper to Ottoman society. With the arrival of printing, information began to reach the people within the



pages of newspapers, journals and books. This resulted in the emergence of a public life shared by all. In particular, beginning in the early nineteenth century, the introduction of a new legal and educational system and administrative and economic reforms forced the public sphere to open its borders to the private realm. For example, as a result of these reforms and developments, in addition to women and other social groups, the minorities of the Ottoman Empire were brought into the public realm. Moreover, at the end of the nineteenth century, a search for a legitimate and legal government under the leadership of modernist intellectuals contributed greatly to the differentiation of political life characterized by the establishment of political parties in the early 1900s.

This illustrates that the transformation of the closed or private realm to the more civil or open society of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries became more evident in the atmosphere of unlimited freedom of the Second Constitutional Period in the Ottoman Empire.<sup>30</sup> With particular agendas and tendencies, the social elements of this period clearly reflected this differentiation of the public life. The economic and cultural developments and intellectual activities of the time brought about the emergence of a rich social topography that went as far as the ideological and intellectual polarization in Ottoman society. Accordingly, in addition to ideological differentiation toward nationalism, Westernism, liberalism, Islamism and socialism, Ottoman society witnessed a serious differentiation in the areas of economy, politics and ethnicity. The last twenty years of the Ottoman Empire witnessed severe political rivalries and polarization, efforts to integrate with the world economy, ideological and intellectual progressions and social and union movements. The liberal and progressive atmosphere of this period would not be seen for another seventy and eighty years in Turkey. This is because during this period, the people of the Ottoman Empire were still liberal-minded as they were acquainted with the idea of "political and ideological crime." Accordingly, in such a liberal milieu, any ideology was admitted, followed and defended readily. Similar progressive milieus not only allowed the existence of diverse ideologies, but also paved the way for the

establishment of political parties in which these ideologies found physical representatives in society.<sup>31</sup>

The years between 1925 and 1980 was the "*process of closed public*" in Turkey. The efforts of the statist elite of the newly established republic to create a new country, government and nation forced the homogenization of Turkish society. Almost all modern and traditional institutions from the Ottoman period were abandoned, because they did not meet the requirements of the new society that these intellectuals were trying to promote. These modern statist elite did not stop by abandoning these institutions; they went so far as to build a barrier between the traditional and modern with the *Takriri Sukun* Law of 1925,<sup>32</sup> which enforced the absolute control of educational activities by the state. The government unitized public life by prohibiting the existence of media, independent organizations, associations, social movements, political parties or an ordinary social organization outside the government structure. During this period, the political authority essentially dominated public life, having absolute control over political, social, cultural and economic life in the country. For example, in the early 1930s, three NGOs, the Turkish Women's Union, Freemasons' Lodge and *Türk Ocakları* were the only non-governmental organizations that existed in Turkey. After a couple of years, the government even outlawed their activities. This was a turning point in regard to the public domain, which simply became an ideological realm constituting all social organizations and their representatives within itself.

Moreover, beginning in the mid-1930s, the same statist elite, not content with controlling society, tried to meld the private and personal within the public sphere by directly integrating every aspect of society into the structure of the state's only political party. Under such conditions, excluding the family, the private realm existed only underground in the 1930s. The political authority under the leadership of the statist elite acquired complete authority over the social, political, cultural, technological, economic, aesthetic and artistic activities of the newly established republic by organizing all cultural and artistic activities and conducting the

economic and technologic development. These elite devoted their energies to the creation of "a single type of people" for the new and modern society. In order to achieve this goal, they founded new schools, Halk Evleri (People Centers) and Köy Odaları (Village Rooms) in which they would educate people all over Turkey. Although the *Tevhidi Tedrisat*<sup>33</sup> Law was issued to modernize the traditional religious educational system, it was manipulated to create citizens of a single type with the same ideology, desires, objectives and physical appearance. Women who were encouraged by the government to take a part in public affairs managed to participate in social and political life only after they left their "femininity" in the private realm. The women of this period's public life, who were classified rightfully as "the masculine girls of republicans fathers" by Nilufer Gole, became active members of the public life only by idealizing the manly appearance of virtuous citizen of the republic.<sup>34</sup>

To sum up, these elite, who regarded society as no more than a human resource, aimed at making the people and state one by integrating all aspects of society with each another. Clearly such ideology reflects their enthusiasm for solidarity and unity among the people of Turkey. Generally speaking, in modern political thought the public sphere is considered an open place, platform and a realm of public openness next to the political authority. In sharp contrast to this, in Turkey the public sphere became a monistic domain in which only the political authority had a right to be active. This implies that despite differences in quantity, there was no substantial distinction between the public sphere of the single party period<sup>35</sup> in Turkey and that of ideologically motivated socialist countries. The primary characteristic of public life in these countries was the expansion of the public sphere under the monopoly of the political authority to surround the private domain completely. Such an understanding of the public sphere considered the state a sort of global god, which dominated public opinion by itself. It is thus evident that, before the transition to a multi-party system in 1950, there was no significant difference between the public life of Turkey and that of socialist countries.

Until 1950, the main purpose of political and social activities in Turkey was to promote official ideology and ideals. Accordingly, the political authority to propagate the official ideology among the public utilized all educational institutions, associations, political parties, radio, television, cinema, theatre, opera and ballet. In developed countries, education is not considered an ideological and political activity to indoctrinate citizens with official ideology. The secular educational institutions in these countries primarily aim to teach individuals responsibility, creativity and job skills. However, the present Turkish educational system considers this understanding of education in democratic countries as its secondary objective. The principle purpose of the Turkish educational system is to train "loyal citizens" in the official ideology.

With the transition to the multiparty system in 1950, societal life in Turkey witnessed a substantial visual or physical differentiation. Beginning in this year, the social and political progressions that emerged in the last years of the Ottoman Empire, buried underground during the Single Party period, began to reappear in the public sphere. Accordingly, the rich and diverse trends of the last period of the Ottoman Empire, including political parties, associations, religious communities and sects, media and workers' unions gradually reappeared in Turkey.<sup>36</sup> Although they did not gain legal legitimacy in the eyes of officials, these societal elements, some of which had deep historical roots and some of which formed a base for a relatively new civil society, opened the narrowing borders of public life. Therefore, one can argue that the period between 1950 and 1980 played a significant and preliminary role in the transformation of the ideological public sphere in Turkey. Yet it was still impossible to see the autonomous or civil aspect of these elements in public life due to the dominant ideological environment of the period.

### **Civil Flowers or the Collapse of the Ideological Public Sphere**

Important developments and transformations regarding the separation of the public/private sphere in Turkey were possible only in the years following 1980. During this

period, the ideological public sphere witnessed a serious crisis. Since the early days of the 1980s, the diverse and varied elements of civil society began to weaken the ideological public sphere severely. A major characteristic of this period under the pressure of the liberal environment of the time was the creation of room for a civil life within the public realm, brought about by the lessening of the political authority's sovereign domain. Discussions led by politicians and intellectuals on privatization, minimum and neutral government and a constitutional state began to question the position of the state in the public life.

The nineteenth century was the most productive and yet the most disturbing, or the longest century, to use Ilber Ortayli's terminology, of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>37</sup> It was during this century that the foundations for cultural, economic, political and social reforms began to take root. Ottoman Turkey also witnessed a serious transformation in mentality, if not a structural change, in this century, during which roots for democracy, a republic, parliamentary regime and constitutional government were established. In the aftermath of 1980, Turkish society witnessed a similar process of mental transformation under the leadership of the liberal-minded Turgut Özal, former Prime Minister and President. The years between 1983 and 1993 opened the way for questioning of various values of the Single Party period of 1925-1950. Numerous civil elements that disappeared under the homogeneous policies of the Single Party government started to blossom again in Turkey. This illustrates that in post-1980 Turkey, there were some extraordinary attempts to lay a foundation for a "civil public life."

Until 1980, the statist mentality was the sole paradigm that dominated political, cultural and social life in Turkey. The state, which controlled most property land and manufacturing production in the country, used its economic might in other areas as well. In post-1980 Turkey, this statist mentality was challenged by a "liberal paradigm." In addition to the political elite, intellectuals and the public also became acquainted with liberal thought. Accordingly, some pro-liberal groups and political parties started to receive substantial attention in the public realm. Moreover, liberal themes became widespread around Turkey with the influence of both

domestic dynamics and the outside affects of the world globalization process. Various groups and individuals devoted their energies to discussing the concepts and questions of freedom, human rights, justice and a small or limited government.

Meanwhile, in post-1980 Turkey the existing tendency towards an ideological focus was challenged by a new tendency to focus on "rights." The groups who claimed rights in the areas of ethnicity, religious freedom, sexuality, politics, culture and aesthetics dominated the public sphere. In the 1970s, protestors and demonstrators who took to the streets of Turkey used the slogan "*kahrolsun*," which literally meant "to hell with him," but connoted condemning opposite political tendencies and the capitalist state. Contrary to this, in the 1980s, the Turkish people began to focus on demands for early retirement, women's and workers' rights, religious freedom, better education, environmental issues and sectarian rights. Thus, rather than fighting the political authority, civil society groups and individuals used a new rhetoric that expressed their demands of it. In this respect, "*hakkimizi soke soke aliriz*" (we take our rights forcefully), became the severest discourse of this period. This discourse expressed in the meetings and rallies emphasized certain rights, but clearly admitted the legitimacy of the political system. For this reason, it is appropriate to regard the period of post-1980 Turkey as a period of decline of ideologies. Hence, since the ideologies challenging the system declined, the ideology of the political system itself began to be questioned.

The public life, which had been considered the carrier of a single ideology and doctrine since the establishment of the Republic, witnessed a significant transformation following 1980. Societal groups with diverse and colorful ethnic, religious, political, sexual, cultural and economic motivations and affiliations radically transformed the public sphere into a multicolored realm in this period. The peaceful dancing rallies of the workers and state servants accompanied by the protests of university students with roses, applause and flowers over the prohibition of headscarves created an entertaining and colorful public domain in opposition to the overly ideological public life of the 1970s<sup>38</sup>. With few exceptions, the civic and peaceful

picture of the public realm did not deteriorate despite the occasional forceful reaction of the state officials to the Turkish people's innocent demands. Several events and rallies organized by some civil society groups and individuals have shown the Turkish public's compromising and reconciling attitude towards the political authority.

An example of this attitude was evident in the rally entitled "One Minute of Darkness for Continuous Light," organized by several civil society organizations to protest the alleged connection between the state officials and the Turkish mafia. This alleged connection between the mafia and government officials came out with the well-known Susurluk incident.<sup>39</sup> Another example is the rather mild and peaceful reaction of the supporters of the Welfare Party to the political authority, which outlawed their political party for petty, undemocratic and unrealistic reasons. Similarly, the ex-major of Istanbul from the same political party protested the government's decision to ban him for life from active politics by handing out flowers and roses to his supporters. The rally "Respect Humanity and Freedom of Thought," organized by female university students to protest the government's decision to prohibit them attend their classes with their headscarves, also reflected the compromising and peaceful manner of civil society organizations with the government. Accompanied with balloons, flags and flowers, people all around Turkey joined hands to criticize such a decision by the government. It is thus evident that in the aftermath of 1980 the peoples of Turkey began to protest the government in a more peaceful and "civilized" way, rather than using violence and threats, as was the case in the 1970s.

Despite some injustices of the government, such peaceful and soft reactions by civil society groups seeking their rights have built dialogue and communication channels among these groups, rather than bringing back the ideological radicalization of the 1970s. The support of leftist students, students with ponytails and others in miniskirts for their fellow students with headscarves is a good example of the new exchange and communication among these groups. Likewise, various groups with different political backgrounds have handed flowers to

"Saturday's Mothers," who have gathered together weekly over the last four years in order to protest the disappearance of their children under police interrogation and draw the public's attention to this issue. The contributions of some Sunni groups to Alawi activities have also reflected the recently established communication and solidarity among civil society groups and individuals in Turkey. Despite various counterattacks by the state elite and other attempts to shape the public sphere in accordance with the decisions of the 28 February Process of 1998<sup>40</sup>, today the civic realm continues to expand its borders and gains more resistance to these counterattacks as time goes on. Moreover, regardless of certain media groups' provocative publications and some politicians' anti-democratic reactions, there has been substantial exchange and dialogue as well as mutual respect among civil society groups in Turkey.<sup>41</sup>

In the aftermath of 1980, in addition to the statism, the political system has itself also lost prestige in the eyes of Turkish public. The unlawful grouping within the state since the 1970s began to come to light due to the privatization of the media. Today the media discloses corruption and illegal actions of politicians and also publishes news regarding the close connection between government officials and the mafia, which extends to the parliament ministries and the former Prime Ministers. Media's coverage and discussion of such issues before the public has been shaking the state myth in Turkish state tradition. Recent empirical researches and polls have shown that state administrators, especially politicians, have lost their trustworthiness and prestige in the eyes of the Turkish public. The mistrust of society for state officials naturally harms the state's mission of guiding and governing the public. In other words, today Turkish society has come to a point that it pays no attention whatsoever to the state's political and economic objectives for the country. The headscarves or veiling which have been targeted by the state for the last fifteen years are becoming more common among the Turkish female population. This illustrates that Turkish society does not follow the directions pointed by the state elite.



As a result of such changes and developments Turkish society has begun to pay attention to references and objectives different from the state's and at the same time started to witness discussions on the transcendental and metaphysical nature of the state since the early 1980s. Rousseau, Hegel and Kant's notion of the state as the representative of the General Will, unquestionable, pure, grand and sacred is closely associated with the traditional Turkish political culture. However, the understanding of the state as the healer of every problem since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey has begun to be questioned due to the recent privatization policies in economics. Recent studies have shown that those state institutions whose credibility has been questioned and whose secret doings have been disclosed are not trusted by Turkish society today.

Since the 1980s the public opinion has also entered a new stage. Today it no longer simply submits to the state elite, but rather is directly determined by society's own preferences. Recently public opinion polls have paid considerable attention to Turkish society's preferences and demands. In the past, these public opinion polls were limited to determine only people's political affiliations. However, recently they have become important means of learning Turkish society's opinions on various societal and political issues or decisions and decrees made effective by the political authority. In the 1920s and 1930s it was not significant to know the public opinion regarding the policies put into practice by the government. Even in the 1970s the government paid little attention to public opinion on its newly approved policies. This is because the political elite believed that they knew best and had a right to direct society in accordance with their projects and policies. Therefore, they did not even hesitate to implement those policies opposed by the public. For example, a few elite, independently from the public, developed the policies of westernization, Islamization, nationalization and socialism and tried to implement them in spite of the public's opposition. It is a fact that in post-1980 Turkey the public has not become a complete reference point for the government. Yet the process started with public opinion polls will ultimately take us to a point in which the government must take

the public demands and wishes into consideration. Today even an ordinary politician admits the necessity of public opinion polls in order to develop his or her own policies to be elected. This shows that public opinion has become a decisive reference in the Turkish public sphere in which the state elite was the sole reference point in the past.

In short, a new period opened in the 1980s that prepared the way for the transformation of the public sphere in Turkey. As a result of the well-known 28 February Process of 1998, the recent official denunciation targeted at the representatives of civil society groups, namely religious groups, has aimed at narrowing the operation of civil society organizations. Such operations by the Turkish government could always be targeted at other civil society organizations, putting their existence in jeopardy. Therefore, those groups who are aware of this situation have become sensitive to others' basic rights. Direct and indirect dialogue and agreement among the civil society organizations occupies a significant place in the transformation of the public sphere into a complete civil domain. To transform the public sphere into a stable and poised domain of freedom is possible only with the lessening of the political authority's activity and involvement in the public sphere. This can be achieved solely with the development of a public sphere in which civil society groups hold mutual respect and tolerance for one another.<sup>42</sup>

## **Conclusion**

Recent political and social changes around the world have forced us to reconsider a number of notions in classical political thought. One of those notions is the question of the separation of the public/private sphere whose roots were laid down in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In particular, two developments related to the question of the public/private sphere are important in this reconsideration. First, the private realm centering around family, its members and functions, is no more a private sphere in modern society. Many functions of traditional family have become parts of activities of the public sphere. Similarly,

women, who were once the main element of the family, have become entities with specific social identities in public life.

Second, contrary to Habermas's argument, the democratic public sphere has reached everywhere around the globe. In the bourgeois world underlined by Habermas, the private sphere, with its subjects and actors, was brought into the public realm where it transformed into democratic claims and the realm of presence. Yet, in socialist countries and "third-world" countries, public life has become an ideological and unitary realm, lasting until the early 1980s. Even today this ideological public sphere still continues to exist in some socialist countries, and in certain dictatorial "third-world" countries.

From the perspective of political history, the collapse of socialism in the late 1980s not only brought an end to the twentieth century, it also put an end to the "transcendental" understanding of the political authority in political thought put forward by Hegel and Machiavelli. With the Beijing Spring Movement in China, the tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe, the ideological public sphere outside the bourgeois public domain has begun to decline today. The globalization process, which gains acceleration every day, and other values developed in connection with it, including individualism, minimal state, democratic participation, basic human rights and liberties and free market economy, have contributed greatly to the decline of the ideological public sphere around the world.<sup>43</sup>

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Trans. Thomas Burger and Friderick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 37-56.

<sup>3</sup> For the historical development of "*republicus*" as emerging from the concept of "*publicus*," see Werner Maihofer, "The Ethos of the Republic and the Reality of Politics," in *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, eds. Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 283-292.

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- <sup>4</sup> Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 74-91.
- <sup>5</sup> For a detailed discussion of Locke's argument, see Kathleen B. Jones, "Towards the Revision of Politics," in *The Political Interests of Gender: Developing Theory and Research with a Feminist Face*, eds. Kathleen B. Jones and Anna G. Jónasdóttir (London, Newbury Park and New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), 14-15.
- <sup>6</sup> For more information, see John Locke "Second Treaties of Government," *Two Treaties of Government*, ed. Peter Laslett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chapter VII.
- <sup>7</sup> Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin and Foundation of Inequality: Second Discourse*, trans. and ed. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York: St Martin's Press, 1964). See also Lynda Lange, "Women and the General Will," in *Patriarchal Attitudes*, ed. Eva Figs (London: Panther, 1972), 105.
- <sup>8</sup> T. M. Knox, trans., *Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (New York, London and Oxford, 1967), 155.
- <sup>9</sup> See Seyla Benhabib, "On Hegel, Women and Irony," in *Feminist Interpretations and Political Theory*, eds., Carole Pateman and Mary L. Shanley (US: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1991), 129-145.
- <sup>10</sup> Werner Maihofer, "The Ethos of the Republic and the Reality of Politics," in *Machiavelli and Republicanism*, 289-291.
- <sup>11</sup> Stuart Hall, "The State in Question," in *The Idea of the Modern State*, eds. Gregor McLennan, David Held and Stuart Hall (Milton Keynes and Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1984), 20-21.
- <sup>12</sup> Martin Albrow, *Bureaucracy* (London: Pall Mall Ltd., 1970), 37-50.
- <sup>13</sup> For a more detailed discussion on this phenomenon, see I. Morion Young, "Impartiality and Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of Moral and Public Theory," in *Feminism as Critique: On the Politics of Gender*, eds. Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
- <sup>14</sup> Ronald Ingelhart, *Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Politics*, (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977).
- <sup>15</sup> Borrowed from Anthony De Jasay, the term "hundred flowers" refers to a neutral public sphere in which various diverse social, political and ethnic groups live side by side without one dominating the others. For further discussion, see Anthony De Jasay, *The State and Choice, Contract, Contest: A Restatement of Liberalism* (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1991), 8-12.
- <sup>16</sup> For a more detailed discussion of Pateman's criticism of liberals, specifically of Locke as one of the predominant figures of this view, see Carole Pateman "The Fraternal Social Contract," in *Civil Society and the State*, ed. John Keane (London and New York: Verso, 1988), 101-127.
- <sup>17</sup> See Catherine A MacKinnon, *Toward a Feminist Theory of the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).
- <sup>18</sup> See, for example, Carole Pateman, "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy," in *Feminism and Equality*, ed., Anne Phillips (Washington and New York: New York University Press, 1987), 107.
- <sup>19</sup> Criticizing Habermas, Nancy Fraser has argued that the definition of the public sphere in modern political theory is based on the linguistic connection between "public" and "pubic," which results in the exclusion of women. For more a more account of Fraser's argument, see "Rethinking the Public Sphere", 114.

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<sup>20</sup> See Mary O'Brien, *Reproducing the World: Essays in Feminist Theory* (Boulder, San Francisco and London: Westview Press, 1989), 78.

<sup>21</sup> For a broad discussion of these notions in modern political theory see I. Morion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship," in *Feminism and Political Theory*, ed., Cass R. Sunstein (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 117-141.

<sup>22</sup> See, for example, Christine Di Stefano, "Dilemmas of Difference: Feminism, Modernity and Postmodernism," in *Feminism/Postmodernism*, eds., Linda J. Nicholson and Nancy Chodorow (New York and London: Routledge, 1990), 63-82.

<sup>23</sup> A more comprehensive analysis of "multiculturalism" can be found in Charles Taylor, *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

<sup>24</sup> Birte Siim, "Towards a Feminist Thinking of the Welfare State," in *The Political Interest of Gender*, 173.

<sup>25</sup> Peter F. Drucker argues that during the early years of the 1900s almost all American babies were born at home while today almost all are born in hospitals. See Peter F. Drucker, *The New Realities in Government and Politics, in Economics and Business, in Society and World Views* (New York: Harper and Row, 1989), 60-85.

<sup>26</sup> For a detailed discussion of the "transnational" characteristic of the public sphere, see Warwick Mules, "Media Publics and the Transnational Public Spheres," *Critical Arts* 12, 1-2 (1998): 24-45.

<sup>27</sup> See Milton Friedman, *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962) and Frederick V. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (London: George Routledge and Sons Ltd., 1944).

<sup>28</sup> Martin Kohler, "Towards a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere," *Peace Review*, 9, 3 (September 1997): 385-393.

<sup>29</sup> For the critical role of women groups in the transformation of the public sphere in the Ottoman Empire see Ömer Çaha, "The Role of Women in the Formation of Civil Society in Post-1980 Turkey" (Ph.D. diss. Bilkent University, 1993), second chapter.

<sup>30</sup> The First Constitutional period was in effect between 1876 and 1878 in the Ottoman Empire. The Second Constitutional period started in 1908 and lasted until the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence in 1918.

<sup>31</sup> For a short account of the political and social environment of the Second Constitutional period, see Ömer Çaha, *Aşkın Devletten Sivil Toplum* (İstanbul: Gendaş, 2000), 183-227.

<sup>32</sup> This law was a turning point regarding civil society in Turkey since it hindered the existence of any alternative entities in the public life.

<sup>33</sup> The law that has regulated national education on the principle of monism which aimed at giving one-typed education.

<sup>34</sup> For a detailed analysis of attempts by Turkish women to take part in the public sphere in Turkey see Nilüfer Göle, *Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme*, İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1992.

<sup>35</sup> Single party rule existed in Turkey between 1923 and 1950.

<sup>36</sup> For a more comprehensive analysis of social change that took place in post-1950 Turkey and the role of various social groups in this change, see Kemal H. Karpat "Structural Change,

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Historical Stage of Modernization and the Role of Social Groups," in *Social Change and Politics in Turkey*, ed. Kemal H. Karpat (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), 227-281.

<sup>37</sup> İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, (İstanbul: Hil Yayınları, 1983).

<sup>38</sup> During 1970s a bloody war continued among leftist and rightist groups and this war, indeed, stood over the ideological stances.

<sup>39</sup> A police chief and deputy were involved in a car crash in a small town with Abdullah Çatlı, leader of a young nationalist group, who was condemned to be the killer of seven leftist students by Turkish court and has been wanted by polis since the mid-1970s. This accident brought into question the relationship between the government and some illegal groups and resulted in protests by society against the Turkish government.

<sup>40</sup> These decisions have been taken by the National Security Committee (in which military officials are dominant to the elected politicians) and aimed at prohibiting the activities of religious groups in public life, restricting religious oriented economic investment and education and dismissing religious staffs from the public employment. In other words, these decisions were taken and imposed upon elected politicians to cleanse Islam from public life by military members. For a recent study see, M.Lutfullah Karaman and Bülent Aras "The Crisis of Civil Society in Turkey," *Journal of Social and Economic Research*, 2, 2, (2000): 39-58.

<sup>41</sup> For example, a group of leftist students supported the protest of religious groups against the prohibition of the head veils at the University of Istanbul in 1998. In other universities similar support exists as well.

<sup>42</sup> Indeed, the participation of various groups in the public sphere on the basis of multiplicity and peace leads to the emergence of a "civil" or "multiple" public sphere. For a more detailed discussion on this, see Frazer, "Rethinking the Public Sphere," 109-142.

<sup>43</sup> For a persuasive argument regarding the crisis of a homogenous or ideological public sphere in "Third-World" countries exemplified by Turkey, see Nilüfer Göle, "The Gendered Nature of the Public Sphere," *Public Culture*, 10, 1 (Fall 1997): 61-81.