

## TECESSÜMÜN ALAGMATİĞİ

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### ÖZET

Tecessüm karmaşık bir *aporia* olarak tanımlanabilir. Bağlamsal niteliği açısından, hayat tecrübesinin cismiyetini olduğu kadar, soyutluğunu da ifade eder. Tecessüm, aynı zamanda, dünya-kuran bir tecrübedir. Tecessüm, varlığın ve var'oluşun tekerrür vasfıdır. Ezcümle;ecessüm, yalnızca özgün-dünya'yı değil, aynı zamanda, birliktelik-dünyası'nı da resmeder. Hermeneutik fenomenoloji ve genel organolojiden hareketle bu çalışmaecessümü; içkinlik, aidiyet ve anlatisallık arası(*nda*) alagmatik bir aktarımlar sistemi olarak yorumlamaktadır.

Bu çalışmada;ecessüm, bireyleşme alagmatığı üzerinden açığa serilen, aktarımsal bir operasyonlar sistemi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Çalışma boyunca alagmatik, psişik ve kolektif bireyleşmenin alternatif bir okumasını oluşturmak için başvuru alan eleştirel bir dayanak olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu makale; *kendi*, *öteki* ve *dünya*'nın hermeneutik fenomenolojisinin kimi öne çıkan argümanlarını, bireyleşmenin genel organolojisi imkânıyla paralel olarak okumayı önermektedir.

Gilbert Simondon'un karşılıklı-bağlantısallık ontolojisi ile bunun Gilles Deleuze'deki eleştirel versiyonu,ecessümün allagmatığını geliştirirken başvuru alan merkezi temalardır. Hilomorfik kesinliğin eleştirisine referansla,ecessümün alagmatığı, oluş olarak varlık okuması sunmaktadır. Simondoncu ve Deleuzcü organolojiyle paralel olarak,ecessümün fenomenolojik ve hermeneutik yorumları açısından öncelik; Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger ve Hans-Georg Gadamer'in pratik felsefelerine atfedilmektedir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Tecessüm, Simondon, hermeneutik fenomenoloji, genel organoloji, alagmatik, bireyleşme, kimlik, metastabilite, *inter*-kinestetik empati.

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## ALLAGMATIC OF EMBODIMENT

### ABSTRACT

Embodiment might be defined as a complex *aporia*. In its contingent contexture, it denotes both the corporeality and abstractness of the lived experience. Embodiment is, at the same time, a world-forming experience. It is thus the leitmotif of being and becoming. In brief, it does canvas not only the own-world but also the with-world. Drawing upon hermeneutic phenomenology and general organology, this paper interprets embodiment as an allagmatic system of transductive dispositions *in-between* immanence, attunement and narration.

In this essay, embodiment is interpreted as a transductive system of operations, which is exposed through allagmatic of individuation. Throughout the study, allagmatic has been taken as a critical leitmotif of generating alternative appraisal of psychic and collective individuation. This essay suggests reading some of the key arguments of hermeneutic phenomenology of *self*, *other* and *world* in parallel paths to the possibility of a general organology of individuation.

Gilbert Simondon's ontology of interrelatedness and its critical version in Gilles Deleuze have been taken as central leitmotifs of enhancing allagmatic of embodiment. By reference to critique of hylomorphic exactitude, allagmatic of embodiment presents a reading of being as becoming. As regard to phenomenological and hermeneutical interpretation of embodiment, in line with Simondonian and Deleuzean organology, the major emphasis is posited on Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Hans-Georg Gadamer's practical philosophy.

**Keywords:** Embodiment, Simondon, hermeneutic phenomenology, general organology allagmatic, individuation, metastability, *inter-kinesthetic* empathy

Embodiment is a complex *aporia*. As a contingent contexture, it denotes corporeality and abstractness of the lived experience. Embodiment is a world-forming phenomenon experienced through the *in-between*. It is thus the leitmotif of being and becoming. In effect, it does canvas not only the *own-world* but also the *with-world*. Embodiment, in its most general sense, does denote an allagmatic *kräfte* and experience. The study of this contingent *aporia*, however, does present its own dilemmas, as it has often been either particularity or universality oriented, which also effectuated the dualism of *res extensa* and *res cogitans*.

Hermeneutic phenomenology is impeccably well known for its focus on the primacy of understanding regarding phenomenal experience. In practical terms, one important contribution provided by hermeneutic phenomenology has been the critical and alternative emphasis posited on understanding, interpretation and application regarding the lived experience. In effect, the central aim of this essay is a hermeneutical engagement with embodiment in terms of its hermeneutic horizons as transductive dispositions. The tenor of this argument is, however, allagmatic. In this sense, this essays aims to gather hermeneutic phenomenology and allagmatic organology of individuation and transindividuation.

A range of questions on the application of allagmatic hermeneutics underpins this essay. For instance, what is the relation between immanent and transcendent permutations of embodiment? Does corporeality and abstractness elide in an organological corpus? How is embodiment experienced through the hermeneutic horizons of the life world? What role do immanence, attunement and narration play in shaping the allagmatic continuum of embodiment? Within which forms of embodiment do individuation prosper? The answers to these questions may affect the ways we interpret embodiment as psychic and collective individuation. By discussing to gather hermeneutic phenomenology and allagmatic organology, the paper interprets embodiment as transductive dispositions of individuation qua immanence, attunement and narration.

This paper does not aim to introduce a principle of embodiment, which might be placed before embodiment, or a theory, an *Idea* of embodiment before it is being actualized. On the other hand, an allagmatic interpretation of embodiment, acceptably, deals with generating alternative meanings of being beyond metaphysics of presence. Conditioning Aristotle, herein, is of critical importance especially as regard to the question of *hylomorphism*. In a Heideggerian corpus of interpretation, the core of Aristotle's argument is based on the "movement of beings (*kinēsis*)" which also marks an "essential structure" (De Boer, 2000: 206). Aristotle's centrality for Heidegger is derived from his interpretation of movement qua *dunamis* and *energeia*, or potentiality and actuality. Yet, the question of hylomorphic presence is the key point of critique. For Heidegger, "Aristotle was the first to understand 'being-moved' as a fundamental mode of being—that is to say, as a mode of presencing" (De Boer, 2000: 206).

Hermeneutic allagmatic of embodiment is closely related with Simondonian critique of hylomorphic interpretation. At this point, it is worth mentioning "what Simondon criticizes the hylomorphic model for is taking form and matter to be two terms defined separately" (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005: 408). Gilbert Simondon's critique of Aristotelian hylomorphism, hence, brings forth the replacement of form with information: "the notion of form

must be replaced by that of information, which presupposes the existence of a system in a state of metastable equilibrium capable of being individuated” (Simondon, 1992: 315). The task of allagmatic is, then, to focus on the system and movement of being as becoming beyond any hylomorphic notion of exactitude. This paper, hence, aims to question possibilities of gathering Simondonian allagmatic of individuation with the corpus of hermeneutic phenomenology regarding the question of embodiment.

### **Allagma of Embodiment**

Embodiment might be best defined as a “complex contexture” inherent to the allagmatic of being as becoming (Zaner, 1981: 98). Allagmatic, herein, is used in Gilbert Simondon’s (1995) sense. It refers, on the one hand, to the living *potentia* or an idea of energy as in its Greek etymological origin *allagma*. On the other hand, allagmatic implies “the theory of operations” which can be defined as “the conversion of a structure into another structure’, such that ‘an act results in the determination of a trace and a trace in the ulterior determination of an act” (Toscano, 2006: 152). In Simondon’s sense, operation is interrelated with designating the structure and convertibility. Hence, as system of operation, allagmatic denotes “conversion of a structure into another structure” (Combes, 2012: 14). In Combes’ (2012) words, “allagmatic is concerned with modulation, that is, with the putting into relation of an operation and a structure” (15). On the other hand, “at the levels of being and thought, the allagmatic involves a double becoming, ontological (or rather ontogenetic)” (Combes, 2012: 15).

Gilbert Simondon’s (1995, 2007) philosophical realism posits its major emphasis on the ontological value of relations. In Simondon’s sense, “psychic individuation is also a social process” (Chabot, 2012: 98). As a transductive system of operations, allagmatic is bound by a central mood of critique, which is posited by Simondon within the context of *the problematic*. Simondon’s concept of problematization or *the problematic*, according to Deleuze (2001b), denotes “a moment of being, the first pre-individual moment” (46). According to Deleuze (2001b), “in Simondon’s dialectic the problematic replaces the negative. Thus, individuation is the organization of a solution, of a ‘resolution’ for an objectively problematic system” (46). Simondon distinguishes concepts of “singularity” and “individuality” through “the preliminary condition of individuation” (Deleuze, 2001b: 44). In this sense, pre-individual is being defined qua “difference, disparity, disparation” (Deleuze, 2001b: 44). The metastable system of embodiment as individuation is bound by Simondonian critical engagement with Aristotelean *hylomorphism*.

Allagma of embodiment lies at the dialectic *potentia* holding between being and its becoming. The critical point of the allagma of embodiment is “to maintain that becoming exists as one of the dimensions of the being”

(Simondon, 1992: 300). Accordingly, Simondon differentiates dimensions of being by regarding their potentiality, movement and mood of *in*-compatibility. Hence, the “*individuation corresponds to the appearance of stages in the being, which are the stages of the being*. It is not a mere isolated consequence arising as a by-product of becoming” (Simondon, 1992: 301). In other words, embodiment “is an aspect of the *internal resonance of a system of individuation*; it is part of a state of the system” (Toscano, 2006: 140). This system signifies, the dialectic process of embodiment in which transductive dispositions *in*-between *self*, *other* and *the world* arise, namely, the allagmatic of individuation.

Allagmatic of embodiment might be understood as a systemic portrayal of *on*-going acts, metastases, mutations, metamorphoses or transpositions of immanence, attunement or narration. First, immanence refers to the contextual ground of the Simondonian *pre*-individual. Embodied *self* marks a particular *ipse*. This immanent void of *pre*-individual is subject to exteriorization that brings forth the locus of adaptation to the other. Second, attunement, as the transcendent orbit of embodiment, refers to the inauguration of abstraction through which the self encounters the other and forms the subject as a reciprocal identity, or *idem*. In its speculative tandem, this corpus of reciprocity unveils the locus of the intersubjective. Through this speculative mood, encounters with the other have become matters of categorical identification, which prosper universality. Transductive exteriorization qua attunement reveals the grounds of similarity or sameness as a matter of identity formation. At the same time it connotes a dialogical corpus of empathy, which is also critical for the ethical consideration of the other. Third, allagmatic ontology of interrelationality brings forth the plasticity of dialectic. This point is bound by the Simondonian locus of *the problematic* and implies a zone of operations beyond immanence and transcendence. The corpus of this zone is ontomythopoetic.

Allagmatic of embodiment, in a hermeneutic phenomenological sense, might be read as a matter of *re*-presentation. The *world re*-presents immanent and transcendental dispositions of embodiment. Therefore, the constitution of the “worldly *being-there*” is a transductive *milieu* of signification. In Martin Heidegger’s (1999) words: “the character of the being-there of this world can be terminologically designated as significance. ‘Significant’ means: being, being-there, in the mode of a signifying which is being encountered in a definite manner” (74). Moments and modalities of significance come to surface through three different ways; first as “disclosedness”; second, as “familiarity”; and finally as “the unpredictable” (Heidegger, 1999: 74). With respect to authentic nature of self’s being-encountered, phenomenon of disclosedness is first articulated within the structure of the “*availability in advance*” (Heidegger, 1999: 74). For, “the temporal particularity from out of a historical

everydayness" is critical to define and redefine the self *via* such everydayness and to disclose the "character of the world's being-encountered" (Heidegger, 1999: 75). The temporal particularity of the self, thus, reflects the condition of "availability in advance". On the other hand, "Heidegger's notion of authenticity in no way signals a retreat from his fundamental understanding of human being as a Being-with-others" (Thiele, 1995: 55). In this regard, as a matter of the "appearance of the *with-world*", the context of the other, which is being encountered via everydayness and averageness, is also designative for the disclosedness of the self. In effect, "the advance appearance of the *factual* lives of others in what is being encountered is more closely defined by the fact that this appearance is 'in a with-world', i.e., the *factual* lives of others are being encountered in a 'worldly manner'" (Heidegger, 1999: 76). The *kategorien* of the other is "encountered in this with-world in such a manner that these others bring with them the one-self" and "one encounters one-self in this being occupied with the world in dealings" (Heidegger, 1999: 76). Allagma of embodiment in a hermeneutic phenomenological sense, therefore, reflects the transductive disposition *in-between* the immanent structure of *ownness* - the realm of the *own-world* - and an abstracting epochē - the realm of the *with-world*.

According to Sparrow (2013), "phenomenology, for all its promise, has trouble handling the non-phenomenal and the non-intentional" (59). Embodiment has a plural epistemic order. It is irreducibly bound by transductive dispositions of sense, intellect, knowledge, consciousness, body, and mind. In its very idea embodiment is affiliated with the movement of being. At this point, the context of the conceptual embodiment might be differentiated from the possibility of the Idea, form, or de/formation of embodiment. Embodiment in this sense refers to allagmatic course of individuation and transindividuation. This point discloses allagmatic of embodiment as a possibility of general organology. Allagma of the body, as a complex contexture of *potentia* connotes the course of transduction. Transduction,<sup>2</sup> according to Simondon (1992), "denotes a process -be it physical, biological, mental or social- in which an activity gradually sets itself in motion, propagating within a given area, through a structuration of the different zones of the area over which it operates" (313). For Simondon (1992) "the transductive process is thus an individuation process" (313).

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<sup>2</sup> Simondon's most known example for a transductive process is the crystal: "the simplest image of the transductive process is furnished if one thinks of a crystal, beginning as a tiny seed, which grows and extends itself in all directions in its mother-water. Each layer of molecules that has already been constituted serves as structuring basis for the layer that is being formed next, and the result is an amplifying reticular structure" (Simondon, 1992: 313).

Transduction characteristically canvases the critical leitmotif of interpreting “the systematic preconditions of individuation, internal resonance and the psychic problematic” (Simondon, 1992: 314).

Toscano underpins the very idea of transduction and its relation with the concepts information and disperation which together form the main aspects of Simondonian critique of Aristotelian hylomorphism: “transduction is thus a ‘physical, biological, mental and social operation whereby an activity progressively propagates itself within a domain’, and ‘the notion of form must be replaced by that of information, which presupposes the existence of a system in a metastable state of equilibrium which can individuate itself: information, unlike form, is never a single term, but the signification that emerges from a disperation” (Toscano, 2009: 386). Deleuze, accordingly, underpins the centrality of “movement” and “differentiation” as markers of transduction and explication.<sup>3</sup> Deleuzian emphasis herein implies not only “differentiation” regarding the actualization of the Idea, but also the “explication in relation to the intensity which ‘develops’ and which, precisely, determines the movement of actualization” (Deleuze, 2001a: 245-246). Deleuze interprets the role of the Other among psychic systems as a critical condition and function of individuation.<sup>4</sup> Individuation is hence guaranteed by

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<sup>3</sup> By following Simondonian allagmatic of individuation and transindividuation, Deleuze posits a major emphasis on the questions of actualization, metastability, disperation and differentiation. According to Deleuze (2001a): “Gilbert Simondon has shown recently that individuation presupposes a prior metastable state -in other words, the existence of a ‘disparateness’ such as at least two orders of magnitude or two scales of heterogeneous reality between which potentials are distributed. Such a pre-individual state nevertheless does not lack singularities: the distinctive or singular points are defined by the existence and distribution of potentials. An ‘objective’ problematic field thus appears, determined by the distance between two heterogeneous orders. Individuation emerges like the act of solving such a problem, or - what amounts to the same thing - like the actualisation of a potential and the establishing of communication between disparates. The act of individuation consists not in suppressing the problem, but in integrating the elements of the disparateness into a state of coupling which ensures its internal resonance. The individual thus finds itself attached to a pre-individual half which is not the impersonal within it so much as the reservoir of its singularities. In all these respects, we believe that individuation is essentially intensive, and that the pre-individual field is a virtual-ideal field, made up of differential relations. Individuation is what responds to the question ‘Who?’, just as the Idea responds to the questions ‘How much?’ and ‘How?’. ‘Who?’ is always an intensity... Individuation is the act by which intensity determines differential relations to become actualised, along the lines of differentiation and within the qualities and extensities it creates. The total notion is therefore that of: indi-differenf/ciation (indi-drama-differenf/ciation). Irony, as the art of differential Ideas, is by no means unaware of singularity: on the contrary, it plays upon the entire distribution of ordinary and distinctive points” (246).

<sup>4</sup> Deleuze defines the central role of the Other by reference to its allagmatic role of functioning in terms of individuation. In Deleuze (2001a) words: “The Other is not reducible to the individuating factors implicated in the system, but it ‘represents’ or stands for them

“the Other-structure”. Hence, for Deleuze (2001a); “it is not the I, nor the self: on the contrary, these need this structure in order to be perceived as individualities. Everything happens as though *the Other integrated the individuating factors and pre-individual singularities within the limits of objects and subjects*” (281). Individuation consists of “fluid intensive factors, which no more take the form of an I than of a Self” (Deleuze, 2001a: 152). In Deleuze’s (2001a) words: “it is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an ‘indistinct’ differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity” (245).

As a central Simondonian marker of “the process of bodying”, according to Manning (2013) “information creates the potential for an immanent organization that activates body’s coming to be this or that and its de-forming into a field of relation, an ecology of a body-becoming” (20). According to Manning (2013), “becoming is not pure continuity...a body does not evolve according to a past becoming present becoming future, nor does it evolve in a pure phylogeny. Force of life creates blocks of becoming–uneasy alliances...Life in-formed is life in-forming, coursing through the ‘between-times’, the ‘between moments’ of its bursts into coupling, in collusion” (20). Manning (2013) mentions that “a life does not come once and for all on the scene of the actual. It resonates on the cusp of the living, affective in tone. A life is experienced as the feeling of life welling across its dephasings” (20). Hence, “life is always about a double-capture–on the one hand, it is the force of life-living that exceeds this or that life, and on the other, it is the monadic event of a singular set of conditions in momentary collusion. Life is always between” (Manning, 2013: 21-22). Regarding this allagma of the *in-between*, psychic and collective individuation are ontologically and ontogenetically interrelated. In this sense, “there is no body that isn’t always already collective, always already active in the relational interweaving of more than one tending, more than one phase, more than one ecology in the making” (Manning, 2013: 27). Allagmatic

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in a certain sense. In effect, among the developed qualities and extensities of the perceptual world, it envelops and expresses possible worlds which do not exist outside their expression. In this manner, it testifies to the persistent values of implication which confer upon it an essential function in the represented world of perception. For if the Other presupposes the organisation of fields of individuation, it is, on the other hand, the condition under which we *perceive* distinct objects and subjects in these fields, and perceive them as forming diverse kinds of identifiable and recognisable individuals. That the Other should not, properly speaking, be anyone, neither you nor I, signifies that it is a structure which is implemented only by variable terms in different perceptual worlds - me for you in yours, you for me in mine. It is not even enough to see in the Other a specific or particular structure of the perceptual world in general: in fact, it is a structure which grounds and ensures the overall functioning of this world as a whole” (281).



of embodiment as a basis for a general organology, or *noösynthesis* might thus be seen as possibility of gathering diverse permutations of individuation and transindividuation. According to Zubiri (2010), in example, “*sentinent intelligence* and *intelligent sensing* are, with all their multiplicity, manifestations of a single phenomenon, namely, the mode of apprehension of reality...the senses are present to us as analyzers of that primary unity in which our turning to reality as such consists” (231). In Damasio’s (2000) words, on the other hand, “mind and behavior are also closely correlated with the functions of the living organisms, specifically with the functions of the brain within those organisms” (13). Damasio’s gathering of these three concepts, also underpins the course of interrelations between philosophy, psychology, biology and neurosciences. Allagmatic, as being introduced by Simondon as a system of operations, might be seen as a possibility for generating alternative means of understanding and interpreting individuation and transindividuation.

### **Embodiment as Immanence**

As a particular reflection of affectivity, embodiment inaugurates an immanent process of perceiving the world. Particularity of embodiment as immanence forms the lived experience of the body and the world as parts of *intra-kinesthetic affectivity*. Within this form of embodiment, particular characteristics of the bodily experience depend on the corporeal kinesthetic affectivity of the self. In fact, this intra-kinesthetic experience of the world denotes particular modes of affectivity; yet, it does also underpin the sensual, corporeal experience of any existent phenomenon that is in the form of the Body-thing. Embodiment as an immanent form and action of the self implies both the corporeality of experience and the constructive role of feelings, emotions as well as desires that influence the process of identification and alteration. At this point, a further consideration is that embodiment as immanence reflects the particular process in which the *ipse* does condition and position itself within the immanent forms of facticity. Facticity, as an immanent perceptual ground of embodiment, herein, denotes the process of self-constitution. In its Heideggerian sense, “the concept of facticity implies that an ‘innerworldly’ being has being-in-the-world in such a way that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the being of those beings which it encounters within its own world” (Heidegger, 1996: 52). Embodiment as immanence indicates centrality of “self-constitution, through a process of self-affirming individuation, culminating in the affirmation of *Selbstsein*, being oneself” (Hodge, 1995: 174).

Embodiment as immanence is bound by the spatiotemporal experience of the world. Saying in Heideggerian sense, “our understanding of Being is possible because we exist as the temporal openness which lets beings (including human beings) be manifest...the real ‘self’ is this temporality” (Zimmerman, 1986: 102). Temporality and spatiality of the lived experience, herein, implies the “equiprimordial structures of being-in-the-world, whose ultimate ontological significance lies in the phenomenon of embodiment” (Cutrofello, 2005: 64). Thus, as a matter of immanent individuation, “Dasein denotes this structure of everyday human experience, but in the course of analysis the everyday is revealed as grounded in the wholly unfamiliar structures of ecstatic temporality” (Cutrofello, 2005: 182). Embodiment as immanence underpins the temporality of the lived experience through which “the singularity of the *I* or the *thou*” is inaugurated as substantive individuation not only in space and time but also in “here and *now*” (Levinas, 1998: 26).

Embodiment as immanence does also refer “heedful being-in-the-world, that is, what that being-in-the-world initially encounters” (Heidegger, 1996: 100). Corporeal spatiality of the lived experience, herein, might be interpreted as a process of “*de*-distancing”. As an immanent *milieu* of embodiment, corporeal spatiality connotes the detail that “Dasein understands its here in terms of the over there of the surrounding world”, accordingly, “the here does not mean the where of something objectively present, but the where of *de*-distancing being with” (Heidegger, 1996: 100). Embodiment as immanence, accordingly, denotes the “phenomenal peculiarity of being-in which has the structure of *de*-distancing”; in effect, “only because Dasein is spatial by way of *de*-distancing and directionality can things at hand in the surrounding world be encountered in their spatiality” (Heidegger, 1996: 100 and 102).

Ontological facticity of embodiment as immanence, consequently, highlights that “my body is an original motility without which there would be neither space nor time” (Cutrofello, 2005: 64). In Husserl’s (2006) sense, immanent embodiment –as a temporal and spatial contextuality– partly refers to “the localization of lived experiences in the lived body” (4). This point underscores the constructive role of perception within the process of embodiment as immanence. In Husserl’s words, “in terms of perception, physical body and living body (*Körper und Leib*) are essentially different; living body, that is, [understood] as the only one which is actually given [to me as such] in perception: my own living body” (Husserl, 1970: 107). Lived body, hence, frames the allagma of the phenomenal *facticity* of being and its relation to change as becoming.

As an allagmatic resonance of signification, perception denotes the correlative structure of the thing that is primarily particular and immanent which “is constituted in the hold which my body takes upon it; it is not first of all a meaning for the understanding, but a structure accessible to inspection by the body” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 373). According to Merleau-Ponty (2002): “in perception the thing is given to us ‘in person’, or ‘in the flesh’”, therefore, “prior to and independently of other people, the thing achieves that miracle of expression: an inner reality which reveals itself externally” (373). In Levinas’ (2007) words, “being is exteriority: the very exercise of its being consists in exteriority” (290). Embodiment here reveals the pre-reflective understanding of the own-world, which is not simply referring to the singularity of sensual experience. Embodiment as immanence rather inaugurates the spatiotemporal resonance of individuation, an intra-subjective *connaissance* of the own-world, in which “knowing is based on ipseity” as the “ontological status of the I” (Levinas, 1998: 26-27). Lived experience does accordingly provide the sense of situatedness and embodiment, in time and space, within the grand-motion of life through which the allagmatic ontogenesis of individuation prospers.

Embodiment as immanence exists *in actu* as an intrasubjective potentia of the ontogenesis of individuation. The immanent resonance of embodiment thus initially connotes the preindividual condition(s) of the *ipse*. With reference to its Simondonian definition, we might mention that the “preindividual being and, in a general way, every system that finds itself in a metastable state, contains potentials which, because they belong to heterogeneous dimensions of being, are incompatible” (Toscano, 2006: 138). For instance, immanence implies ontogenesis of the form (Delanda, 1999). But, the immanent mode of individuation also underlines the *potentia* of self-perceptual grounds of embodiment as the disclosure of the Lacanian concept of *the real*. The *potentia* of embodiment, accordingly, connotes the *allagma* (idea of energy) in which the pre-subjective groundings of affection arise, as an intra-subjective element of the lived body. Embodiment as an allagmatic process reinforces the *metastable* (*pre*)condition of individuation, as in Simondonian *pre*-individual.<sup>5</sup> The question of metastability of system of individuation is first based on the critical role of “disparation”. In Deleuze’s (2001b) words: “a metastable system, essentially, entails the existence of a

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<sup>5</sup> This point unveils a question of ethics in Simondonian interpretation which is mentioned by Deleuze (2001b), “ethics participates in a type of movement that goes from the preindividual to the transindividual by way of individuation... What Simondon elaborates is an entire ontology, one in which Being is never One: as pre-individual, it is a metastable more-than-one, superimposed and simultaneous to itself; as individuated, it is again multiple because it is ‘multiphasic’, it is a ‘phase of becoming that will lead to new operations’” (49).

*disparation* of at least two orders of magnitude, of two disparate scales of reality, between which there is, as of yet, no interactive communication. Therefore, it implies a fundamental *difference*, like a state of asymmetry. If it is nevertheless a system, it is only insofar as difference exists in it as *potential energy*, as a *difference of potential* distributed within certain limits... Like any metastable system, it is a structure (not yet a synthesis) of the heterogeneous” (44). This might also be described as a process unwittingly begins to link up with transduction, which reveals the psychic and collective metastability of Lacanian *Mirror-phase*. Metastability, in this sense, appears in terms of reflection, which might be defined as “the structure and the process of an operation that, in addition to designating the action of a mirror reproducing attention directed upon self” (Gasché, 1986: 17-18). This prudent episode of reflection as metastability moves the discussion into the question of the allagmatic of embodiment as attunement.

### **Embodiment as Attunement**

Attunement connotes the intersubjective domain of the *kategorein*. Embodiment as attunement, the interpenetrative categorical locus of individuation, might first be based on the transposition and grounding of the self in an *abstract* form of *imagination*. This categorical imagination does canvas constructive social and historical context of the self and its encounters with the other by denoting the *in-between* margins of empathy as intersubjective abstraction. In terms of its corporeal function, attunement also denotes a matter of adaptation and impression to/of reality. As regard to “sensible impressions”, i.e., Zubiri<sup>6</sup> (2010) underpins “the totality of the impression of otherness, which is presented to us in a sensible impression. In that otherness, not only are color, sound, temperature, etc., present to us, but so are the colored reality, the sonorous reality, and the thermal reality” (225). The other is thus enhanced qua “impression of reality” (Zubiri, 2010: 225).

Embodiment as attunement might be interpreted as a form of transcendence in which the self is alienated to the realm of immanent affection, which is particular in its very idea, namely, the *own-world*. Within intersubjective horizon of the *with-world*, the self faces the conditions of the

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<sup>6</sup> Xavier Zubiri defines the idea of sensing and sensibility by reference to two major positions. According to Zubiri (2010), sensing has been regarded either as a matter of “intuition” or “impression” (223). Zubiri (2010) enhances reality as “an intrinsic and elementary characteristic of all sensible perceptions” (224). For Zubiri (2010) intelligence should be first read as a matter of apprehending reality: “What is proper to intelligence is not to conceive and judge, but to deal with things as reality, to apprehend them as reality. Only then can also lead to conceiving and to judging” (225).

uncanny. This is where the immanent embodiment is transposed into attunement. Moreover, this also refers to the locus of reflexive consequence of encountering the other in its both familiarity and strangeness. Abstraction, within the dialectic process of transposition underpins the universality claim of identity formation. It is the life experience of the *idem*, transcending the particular by means of embodiment in the categorical form of an abstract *I*, the Subject. This interpenetrative role of transposition from particularity to the domain of the *kategorein*, or in other words, the disposition of the horizon of encountering the other denotes the centrality of consciousness as a reflection of the uncanny. Admittedly, the path of transcendence within this context resembles a course of dualism *in-between res extensa and res cogitans*. However, it is important to point out that such transductive disposition is distilled via interpenetrativeness of particularity and universality, which forms conditions of reciprocity as necessity and empathy. Consciousness and reflexivity of the self, herein, might be interpreted as the interpenetrative processes of the immanent allagma of embodiment where the pragmatic context of the other is categorically (*de*)constructed. However, “since every activity of consciousness is but another expression of its own *être au monde*, reflection is itself such an expression; hence consciousness cannot reflectively withdraw in order to consider itself, just because consciousness *is* just this reflective withdrawal” (Zaner, 1964: 142). The course of transcendence and reflexivity might be seen as modalities of universalizability, which are characteristically bound by particularity, while interpreting embodiment as attunement. What is not so clear here is the intentionality of the subject and the particular condition of the other within the context of attunement.

Embodied experience as attunement reveals conditions and modalities of phenomenal intentionality, which are not only immanent but also interpenetratively transcendent. Hence, intentionality denotes psychophysical, categorical or abstract relationality of embodiment. It is a critical vein of interpreting contingent character of the transductive corporeality and vagueness of embodiment as attunement. The contingency of embodiment as attunement is derived from the spatiotemporal domain of the lived experience. Within this context, “intentionality of embodiment is based on the temporality of the body” (Zaner, 1964: 181). However, intentionality does also denote the spatial situatedness of the self in the life-world while encountering the other. Hence, “to be a body, is to be tied to a certain world, as we have seen; our body is not primarily *in space*: it is of it” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 171).

Embodiment as attunement might be regarded as an intentional constitution. Intentional reflexivity of embodiment, in this Husserlian understanding, inaugurates an interpenetrative process of individuation where *res extensa* and *res cogitans* reinforce each other. This point takes us full

circle back to the definition of perception. It is worth noting immediately that perception, here, is a bodily act and the role of perception within the course of allagmatic of embodiment is the constitutive resonance of encountering the other. In this regard, “the body is our general means of having a world” not only through immanent affectivity but also qua transcendent forms of imagination and abstraction as a reciprocal reflection of the transductive actions of the lived experience (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 169). Such phenomenological caption of contingency connotes both corporeality of transductive actions as intra-kinesthetic affectivity and figurative meaning of these actions in which the categorical frame of the cultural world is projected via empathy and abstraction. This latter figurative meaning of transductive actions as lived experience moves the discussion into the relation between contingency and necessity within the horizon of the *Anerkennung*.

Categorical vein of the *with*-world and its bodily experience vis-à-vis *inter*-kinesthetic empathy inaugurates metastable conditions for “the transformation of contingency into necessity” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 198). This *necessity* reveals the Hegelian emphasis on the “cunning of reason” which does canvas the assumption that “from beginning to end, the subject knows what he wants” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 229). Attunement as necessity connotes kernel of the argument, which claims that “it is desire (*Begierde*) that is given the responsibility for that minimum connexion with ancient knowledge (*connaissance*) that the subject must retain if truth is to be immanent in the realization of knowledge (*savoir*)” (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 229). The experience of partially embodied subject with the Body of the other, hence, underpins the transcendence of the self as an on-going return to the inanimate. This form of transcendence is primarily categorical and being practiced through abstraction. Such transcendence reveals the other, as in the form of the universality of identity via Hegelian *Anerkennung*, or, in other words, by means of the necessity of recognition which is based on the lived experience of the embodied self with the other. This abstraction reflects the *kernel of intersubjective* experience of the self and the other through plasticity, which is defined by Malabou (2009) as “the point around which all the transformations of Hegelian thought revolve, the centre of its metamorphoses” (13). Embodiment as individuation, in this respect, might be seen as a course of articulation and dislocation inaugurated through a kind of “crossing” that “occurs through both continuity and contiguity” (Malabou, 2010: 35). The allagmatic plasticity of being as becoming in its Heideggerian sense might also be discussed at this point. According to Malabou (2010), “the Heideggerian view of change is obviously part of an ontological plasticity” (36).

Embodiment as attunement is subject to “modification”. According to Manning (2013), “modification in the process of becoming” might be seen as “a

multiphasing of potential operative on the strata of co-constitutive individuations" (26). Corporeality of the other body is inaugurated through the transposition of partial identification to alteration via abstraction, which underpins the *connaissance* of the *with*-world. This latter permutation of transposing brings forth the universal disposition of embodiment. Nevertheless, corporeality and abstraction are dialectically interpenetrative categories. These permutations of embodiment together canvas the *in-between* conditions of being in the world, in which self and other are being formed via plasticity. Particularity and universality, in this regard, might also be considered as formative permutations of embodiment. This point basically underpins the course of necessity that arises in societal body, which might barely be differentiated from collective individuation. Regarding intersubjective structure of attunement, the body denotes "the ambient medium of the social" (Jung, 1996: 5). Accordingly, embodiment as attunement brings forth an interpenetrative nexus of situatedness, which modifies psychic and collective individuation.

Regarding the centrality of transposing, embodiment as attunement surfaces in forms of the "spontaneities of consciousness" (Husserl, 1983: 53). According to Husserl (2000), i.e., "consciousness has its own essence, one in flux and not determinable exactly; but to it as an idea an 'exact' essence can be attributed, and with this positing it receives its determinate this" (315). Within this continuum of embodiment, consciousness does canvas the "self-contained complex of being" (Husserl, 1983: 112). This point draws our attention to interpenetration. By following Husserl, at this point, we might note that "we see that consciousness (mental process) and real being are anything but coordinate kinds of being, which dwell peaceably side by side and occasionally become 'related to' or 'connected with' one another" (Husserl, 1983: 111). In Husserl's (2000) words, "the experiences actively performed motivate possibilities for new experiences; the objects for the subject are experienced by it as ones which have their existence, their ontological orders, and their dependencies, all of which can be investigated" (205). Hence, experience in its Husserlian interpretation is also bound by a spatiotemporal phenomenological order. According to Husserl (2000), "in a now which, as intersubjective presence, is *identical* for the different subjects who mutually understand one another, these subjects cannot have the same 'here' (the same intersubjective spatial presence) nor the same appearances. The index of this phenomenological state of affairs is the impenetrability of the different contemporaneous Bodies as such" (216). In Husserlian interpretation of the subjective ground of phenomenology, "different subjects have phenomenal Objectivities that in phenomenal intersubjective time are distinct of necessity and in principle are not even of the same essential content" (Husserl, 2000:

216).

Husserl also critically mentions a “spiritual ego” as the very condition of the modern Subject, in terms of its relation with the regime of exactitude.<sup>7</sup> Husserl underpins the Ego as a form of “individuality” subject to acts and “Bodily accomplishments”. The “spiritual ego” is the basis of transcendental activity of the Ego. Besides corporeality of Ego’s experience, there is also a transcendental formation brought by representation and thought. In Husserl’s (2000) words: “my representing, my phantasizing, my remembering, etc. pertain to my spiritual field, and thereby so does the formation of new apprehensions, etc.” (297). Husserl, herein, signifies a principle of individuation before individuation, which might be read through Deleuze’s critique and replacement of Simondonian *pre*-individual. Deleuze’s “*a life*” is a corresponding term with Simondon’s *pre*-individual: “it is what accompanies, what remains unresolved, in the taking of form, what defies the hierarchy of the organic with respect to the inorganic in the organization of what we commonly understand as life” (Manning, 2013: 19). As “the greatest difference is always an opposition” for Deleuze (2001a), *contrariety* resides at the very core of any “difference that is itself essential [*differentia essentialis aut propriissima*]” (30).

Deleuzian concept of “*a life*” might be thought through Husserl’s emphasis on the phenomenological basis of *the unique*. Husserlian other in this subjective phenomenological formula refers to the particular uniqueness of the *I*. In Husserl’s (2000) words: “The other person is grasped in his Ego-life, his Ego-willing, and his Ego-working, etc. Each Ego has its Ego-life, but each is also a person, is an individuality and a distinct individuality” (399). Husserlian self-manifestation of the Ego is effectuated through the nexus of acts. In this sense, “as the individual person is a unity of absolute manifestation, so also is every kind of social unity manifesting itself as a unity of a higher level in the individual persons founding it as subjects of certain nexuses of acts” (Husserl, 2000: 336). Husserl, herein, follows a combination of Kantian transcendental

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<sup>7</sup> Husserl underpins the “spiritual” subjectivity in order to imply the question of self-completeness of the self qua its acts and lived experiences. In Husserl’s (2000) words: “Let us think of a self-perception as accomplished, but this time in such a way that we abstract from the Body. What we find then is ourselves as the spiritual Ego related to the stream of lived experiences—‘spiritual’ here is used in a mere general sense, referring to the Ego that has its place precisely not in Corporeality; e.g., I ‘think’ (*cogito*), i.e., I perceive, I represent in whatever mode, I judge, I feel, I will, etc., and I find myself thereby as that which is one and the same in the changing of these lived experiences, as “subject” of the acts and states. (This subject has absolute individuation as the Ego of the current *cogitatio*, which is itself absolutely individual in itself)” (103).



critique<sup>8</sup> and Hegelian dialectic speculation and posits reciprocity of negating permutations.

Embodiment as attunement has had a distinctive bearing on the question of empathy. According to Husserl: “concerning the experience of others, every person, in virtue of his Body, stands within a spatial nexus, among things, and to each Body for itself there pertains the person’s entire psychic life, grasped in empathy in a determinate way” (Husserl, 1983: 176). One important implication of this argument is the kernel of the “identification-forming *imago*” (Lacan, 2001a: 10). Image of the body, from a psychopathological view, is an interpenetrative permutation, which “signifies a system of conscious perceptions, emotional attitudes and conceptual beliefs that pertain to one’s body” (Fuchs and Schlimme, 2009: 571). Embodiment as attunement brings forth imagined conditions of intersubjective identification and alteration. The attempt to examine embodiment through the Lacanian mirror stage underpins the argument that “to break out of the circle of the *Innenwelt* into the *Umwelt* generates the inexhaustible quadrature of the ego’s verifications” (Lacan, 2001b: 3). Herein, Lacanian emphasis on mirror disposition inaugurates subject’s on-going transpositions. It also exteriorizes the interplay *in-between* the “uncanny (*Unheimliche*)” and the “familiar (*Heimliche*)” (Freud, 1955). This point does denote the reciprocal and interpenetrative role of the other for the construction of identity.

The prospect for imagination qua abstraction unveils embodied forms of *Anerkennung*, which refer to the reciprocity of recognition as a modality of identity and alterity. Embodiment as attunement is categorically formed by intersubjective structure of the recognition of the other, and the reciprocal conditions of being recognized by the other. The image of the body, from a psychoanalytical view, is a critical resonance of signification. The course of imagination, as a reflexive praxis, denotes “the ecstatically and horizonally founding transcendence of the world” (Heidegger, 1996: 335). Regarding such formation, however, it is worth mentioning that “the ‘problem of transcendence’ cannot be reduced to the question of how does a subject get outside to an object, whereby the totality of objects is identified with the idea of the world” (Heidegger, 1996: 335). For Heidegger (1996), consequently, “we must rather ask what makes it ontologically possible for beings to be encountered within the world and objectified as encountered beings?” (335). Embodiment as attunement, regarding this question, is formed qua *inter-kinesthetic* empathy.

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<sup>8</sup> In Sparrow’s (2013) words, “the price Kant must pay for protecting the freedom of the subject is that he cannot account for how the material of the practical world shapes who we are as individuals” (48).

Attunement, as an intersubjective form of embodiment, refers to interpenetrative role of the other as a self-constituting permutation. Attunement underpins the categorical form(s) of encountering the other. Yet, it is important to underscore the point that “the objective presence ‘in’ something objectively present, the being objectively present together with something having the same kind of being in the sense of a definite location relationship are ontological characteristics which we call *categorical*” (Heidegger, 1996: 50). Therefore, one additional theme to note with regard to *kategorieren* should be that “the characteristic of encountering the *others*, after all, oriented toward one’s *own* Dasein...‘The others’ does not mean everybody else but me-those from whom the I distinguishes itself” (Heidegger, 1996: 111-112).

In its phenomenological hermeneutic context attunement, first and foremost, denotes the imagined basis of embodiment as intersubjective experience. Embodiment as attunement not only refers to the abstract category of individuation but also underpins the categorical means for corporeality. This is where that attunement, Heideggerian *Befindlichkeit*, is transposed into embodiment via *inter*-kinesthetic empathy. Attunement denotes a modality of modification and a kernel of transduction. Accordingly, “in attunement lies existentially a disclosive submission to world out of which things that matter to us can be encountered” (Heidegger, 1996: 129-130). The embodied sense of coherence hence underpins the terrain of the existential solipsism of embodiment “in which a futile struggle takes place on the part of the ego to once more attain an imaginary unity and coherence” (Homer, 2005: 31). The corpus of this *solipsism* might also be seen in Merleau-Ponty’s *chiastic* portrayal of the presupposition of intersubjectivity. According to Barbaras (2004), this “solipsism means that on this level, the identity of sensibility and therefore its solitude as separation vis-à-vis others are unknown, since there is no relationship to a genuine alterity” (239). At this point, a critical consequence flows from this interweaving: “being-conscious, existing in consciousness, being content means once again *being constituted*, being the unity of a manifold” (Heidegger, 2010: 103). *Allagma* of embodiment, herein, is being transposed into the void of an aporetic experience.

Embodiment as lived experience, accordingly, is not only a matter of practical action but also a comprehensive frame of knowing. Embodiment, as an incessantly on-going experience connotes self-referentiality of attunement. In its reflexive ambit this connotation unveils the assumption that “the human being, is experientable as psycho-physical unity only in my lived-body/psychic inner experience” (Husserl, 2001: 544). However, the gist of this argument is also connected to the idea that “I experience alien subjectivity and human beings in the world in the mode of ‘*empathy*’, through the appresentation that

is carried out in the expression, through the appresentation that can never become a presentation for me" (Husserl, 2001: 544). Empathy, as "a meaning-giving act", is a central tenant of embodiment as attunement (Kockelmans, 1994: 280). Saying in Heidegger's (1996) words, "attunement and understanding are equiprimordially determined by discourse" (126). With regard to its intersubjectiveness, hence, *inter*-kinesthetic empathy might be read as a consequence of transcendence, which reflects a discursive aspect of attunement. Transcendence, the critical leitmotif of embodiment as attunement, denotes a form of interpenetration regarding encounters with the other, a "self-giving" or speculative reflection of universality, or, "a *plus ultra* (self-giving is at the same time always anticipation)" (Husserl, 2001: 579). As a result, the comprehensive point of embodiment as attunement is based on the underlining argument inaugurating that "the intersubjective world is the correlate of the intersubjective experience, which is mediated through empathy" (Kockelmans, 1994: 280). Within this context, the course of categorical imagination inaugurates a form of intersubjective abstraction. The centrality of intersubjectivity, consequently, does discursively disclose the horizon attuned to transductive disposition of *inter*-kinesthetic empathy, which "is related to an indefinite plurality of subjects who stand in a relation of mutual understanding" (Kockelmans, 1994: 278).

### **Embodiment as Narration**

The central theme of the previous heading was that embodiment could be interpreted as a contingent contexture of attunement in its phenomenological and organological bases. The following discussion will initially interpret the symbolic structure of embodiment as narration. Lived-experience, accordingly, might be first defined as "an activity and a passion in search of a narrative" (Ricoeur, 1991: 29). Embodiment, in this respect, is interpreted as being symbolically constructed through narrational experience of the world. Narrative capabilities of the self binds two modalities of the lived-experience: immanent and transcendent embodiment. Embodiment as narration, therefore, denotes a discursive and symbolic effectuation of double belongingness in the life-world. With its narrative form, embodiment connotes the symbolic effectuation of the *own*-world and the *with*-world in interpenetration. The major locus of embodiment as narration is dialectic plasticity of being-in-the-world, which is exposed qua transductive dispositions of horizons of individuation. Within the narrative experience of embodiment, "the life of the body, or the flesh, and the life of the psyche are involved in a relationship of reciprocal *expression*" (Merleau-Ponty, 2002: 185). Symbolic and ontomythopoetic effectuation of embodiment denotes a

molecular multiplicity of expressions, re-presentations or significations, through which the motto “the world is my representation” is being actualized (Bourdieu, 1991: 106). The *habitus* of expression does inaugurate the narrative formation of *ipse* and *idem*. Although the course of re-presentation could not be read as a motive of Simondonian *problematic*, a very critical element of hermeneutic phenomenology might be discussed at this point: the course of *unconcealment*.<sup>9</sup> The question of unconcealment is the kernel of the allagmatic of embodiment for phenomenological hermeneutics and for organological and ontogenetic ontologies.

The locus of understanding, in its phenomenological and hermeneutic sense, is the *logos* of the lived experience. Hermeneutic phenomenology of language, accordingly, reveals a very central point of the principle of individuation maintaining embodiment as accessible locus of transductive dispositions and as allagmatic system of operations. In Husserl’s (1970) definition, “the world as the horizon of human existence” refers to the on-going experience of the “linguistic living body [*Sprachleib*]” (358). As a critical motive of *understanding-the-world*, embodiment as narration entails “both for what something is and for its manner, how it is, the manner of its actuality” (Heidegger, 1994: 41). The role of symbolic effectuation regarding this duplication also connotes the function of Lacanian “big Other, the symbolic substance of our lives” which can be seen as the “set of unwritten rules that effectively regulate our speech and acts” (Žižek, 2000: 657). According to Lacan (2001c), “words are trapped in all the corporeal images that captivate the subject” (65). Besides its corporeality, linguistic vein of the lived

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<sup>9</sup> For Gadamer (2004a), “the historical movement of human life consists in the fact that it is never utterly bound to any one standpoint, and hence can never have a truly closed horizon” (303). The horizon, as mentioned by Gadamer (2004a) herein refers to the phase “into which we move and that moves with us” (303). Hermeneutic horizons of individuation are fused qua *movement*. Understanding inaugurates the sense of situatedness and embodiment within this movement, so reveals the *connaissance* and *care* for being-in-the-world. By going through the course of hermeneutic phenomenology, therefore, we might discuss that embodiment as narration connotes the on-going movement of the lived body, and inaugurates the systemic contexture of the horizons of understanding. Within this systemic contexture, lived body is discursively disclosed in terms of an all-encompassing concern for understanding regarding the meaning of being and becoming through worldly experience. Embodiment as narration, in this regard, inaugurates not only the fusion of the self and the other within the life-world, but also the perpetual dialectics of the subject idiom as “the process of subjective becoming [*le devenir subjectif*]” (Irigaray, 1995: 15). Regarding the metaphysical corpus of such presencing, on the other hand, embodiment should also be read as being subject to universalist tendencies of metaphysics of presence. According to Deleuze (1990), “metaphysics and transcendental philosophy reach an agreement to think about *those determinable singularities only which are already imprisoned inside a supreme Self or a superior I*” (106). Embodiment as narration deconstructs *modus operandi* of foundational *subject idiom*.

experience denotes “the *productive nexus of commonality*” (Dilthey, 2002: 13). As a matter of this productive nexus, embodiment arises as a symbolic form in which the *ontomythopoesis* (narrative genre) of subject’s understanding of its own/with-world is experienced.

Language is not merely an apparatus of communication; rather it is the dialectic syntax of generating the *meaning* and *disclosedness* of the life-world as both matters of psychic and collective individuation. For Gadamer (2004a), “language is already present in any acquisition of experience, and in it the individual ego comes to belong to a particular linguistic community” (342). According to Husserl (1970), in the same vein, “language, for its part, as function and exercised capacity, is related correlatively to the world, the universe of objects which is linguistically expressible in its being and its being-such” (359). In fact, what we perceive in language, “...is not merely a ‘reflection’ of our own and all being; it is the living out of what it is with us – not only in the concrete interrelationships of work and politics but in all the other relationships and dependencies that comprise our world” (Gadamer, 2004b: 32).

Embodiment as narration, regarding its linguistic vein, is a critical portion of *Dasein*’s world-forming experience in which “(1) it brings it forth; (2) it gives an image or view of the world, it sets it forth; (3) it constitutes the world, contains and embraces it” (Heidegger, 1995: 285). Accordingly, “the question concerning world-formation is the question concerning the human being that we ourselves are, and therefore the question concerning ourselves, indeed the question concerning how things stand with us” (Heidegger, 1995: 281). In this phenomeno-hermeneutic formula, embodiment as narration thus most definitely underlines the centrality of not only *Erlebnis* (experience), but also *Erfahrung* (historical experience). Within this context, “as a horizon phenomenon ‘world’ is essentially related to subjectivity, and this relation means also that it ‘exists in transiency’” (Gadamer, 2004a: 303). This process of transition resists any form of objectification or concealment. Through this narrative symbolic effectuation, “the life-world exists in a constant movement of relative validity” which is indifferent to objectification and reveals “the infinite progress of human historical worlds in historical experience (*Erfahrung*)” (Gadamer, 2004a: 239). Narrative context of embodiment, in its phenomeno-hermeneutic design signifies the *ontometōnumia* of the lived experience. Symbolic effectuation, therefore, is the *differentia specifica* of embodiment as narration. Embodiment as narration inaugurates the daily signification of on-going symbolic *potentia* which elides corporeal and abstract permutations of the lived experience.

Embodiment as allagmatic process might be read as a system of

transductive dispositions which are being held in “*continual tests*”.<sup>10</sup> As an interpenetrative basis of embodiment, the lived experience of the world underpins a narrative construction. In fact, embodiment as narration does embrace the horizons of both immanence and transcendence within the hermeneutic circle of understanding, interpretation and application. This reflects a discursive praxis of becoming symbolically mediated and circulated via language. Embodiment as narration, therefore, denotes the symbolic efficacy of the lived experience as *disclosedness*. According to Barthes (1975): “to understand a narrative is not only to follow the unfolding of the story but also to recognize in it a number of ‘strata’...to read a narrative (or listen to it) is not only to pass from one word to the next, but also from one level to the next” (243). Narrative vein of the allagmatic of embodiment unveils dialectic plasticity of psychic and collective individuation, which could not be reduced to the centrality of meaning. Allagmatic of embodiment is based on transductions potentialities and actualities, which are being systematically operational on the plastic *milieu* of ontological interrelatedness. For Manning (2013), milieu should be understood as “an affective attunement more than a space, a field more than a form” (26). Embodiment as narration, hence, might first be read as an irreducible locus of *milieus* of ontological interrelatedness. According to Manning (2013) “milieu is not the neutral in-between. A body is not separate from its milieu. Milieu, or the associated milieu, as Simondon calls it, is a relational field activated by the event in-forming” (26).

Embodiment as narration canvases the disclosedness of understanding which is associated with how the meaning of being-together is generated qua transductive dispositions. Besides its phenomeno-hermeneutic interpretation, this necessity of openness does also underscore a Simondonian corpus of plural potentialities. Such locus of disclosedness is the very basis of transductive dispositions and a guarantee of the plurality of potentialities and their capabilities. Simondon, herein, seeks an allagmatic *ethos* of transductive dispositions in order to maintain the disclosedness of information and communication, which enable potential movements from the pre-individual to the trans-individual. According to Deleuze (2001b), in this regard, “the fundamental idea is that the pre-individual is, and must remain, associated to

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<sup>10</sup> By following Scheler; Zaner (1981) argues the “‘emergence’ and ‘awakening’ of self and other self signifies their becoming explicit by way of ‘disenchantment’ or ‘de-animation’”. That ‘way’ is *the way of ‘testing’*: becoming oneself is an ongoing *task*, but this means *strictly* that it is a *work*, an unfolding drama, sometimes a battle and always a hazardous endeavor, an *adventure whose outcome is never sure and whose achievement is always a risk and threatened in unsuspected* (perhaps even unsusceptible) ways. This path of becoming unfolds by enfolding the other in continual ‘tests’” (201).

the individual, as the ‘source of future metastable states’” (48). In this sense, regarding the Simondonian nexus of allagmatic, openness to inter-communicability and the flux of information denotes an ethical tandem of embodiment. As Simondonian allagmatic of individuation is primarily as system of operations, the key to this transductive movement is a binding openness to change. This point unveils Simondonian critique of the Subject, as a foundational idiom of metaphysics of presence. At the same time, it is disclosed as an ethics of modulation, metastability, disparation and differentiation. According to Deleuze (2001b), “the ethics participates in a type of movement that goes from the pre-individual to the transindividual by way of individuation” (49). In this regard, “what Simondon elaborates is an entire ontology, one in which Being is never One: as pre-individual, it is a metastable more-than-one, superimposed and simultaneous to itself; as individuated, it is again multiple because it is ‘multiphasic’, it is a ‘phase of becoming that will lead to new operations’” (Deleuze, 2001b: 49).

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