Research Article

A Conceptual Perspective on the Neo-Patrimonial Administration Approach of Abdülhamid II's Enlightening Despotism Dichotomy

Tunay ŞENDAL[1]

Abstract

The concept of patrimonialism, which is derived from the Latin word patrimonium (inherited from the father, property), corresponds to the administrative form in which the entire political and social structure is under the personal sovereignty of the monarch, interconnected with the word Patron. The patrimonial administration approach, which also constitutes one of Halil İnalcık's important arguments in the approach to the Ottoman social structure, represents a form of sultanism in which the ruler uses the administrative organization within the state structure as her personal tool. The understanding of patrimonial administration, which began to erode in the Ottoman Empire in the 17th century, was replaced by a neo-patrimonial understanding during the reign of Abdulhamid II, and this new political identity was shaped by the duality of enlightenment despotism, which formed the framework of the political and social-political attitude of Abdulhamid II. This period, which also includes the process of integrating into the modernization necessitated by the age, manifested as the phenotype of the authoritarian understanding of modernity developed by the Ottomans in the 18th century. While following a Western socio-cultural reformist line in this paradoxical political axis, Abdülhamid II wanted to consolidate her authority by exposing a dominant attitude on the other hand. However, the mentality of the reforms brought to life in this period built an order that was taken as an example in terms of form rather than the intellectual dialectic of the West.

Keywords: Abdülhamid II, Neo-patrimonialism, Enlightened Despotism, Ottoman Modernization

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Araştırma Makalesi

II. Abdülhamid Aydınlanmacı Despotizm Dikotomisinin Neo-Patrimonyal Yönetim Anlayışına Kavramsal Bir Bakış Açısı

Tunay ŞENDAL[1]

Özet

Latince patrimonium (babadan gelen miras, mülk) sözcüğünden türetilen patrimonyalizm kavramı, Patron kelimesi ile enterkonnekte şekilde tüm siyasi ve içtimai yapının hükümdarın şahsi egemenliğinde bulunduğu yönetsel biçime karşılık gelmektedir. Osmanlı içtimai yapısına ilişkin yaklaşımda Halil İnalcık'ın da önemli argümanlarından birini oluşturan patrimonyal yönetim anlayışı, hükümdarın devlet yapısı içerisindeki idari organizasyonu kişisel aracı olarak kullandığı bir sultanizm formunu temsil etmektedir. Osmanlı Devleti'nde 17. Yüzyılda aşınmaya başlayan patrimonyalist yönetim anlayışı, II. Abdülhamid döneminde yerini neo-patrimonyalist bir yaklaşımla tazelemiş ve bu yeni siyasi kimlik, II. Abdülhamid'in yürüttüğü siyasal ve sosyal politik tutum çerçevesini oluşturan aydınlanmacı despotizm dikotomisiyle şekillenmiştir. Çağın zorunlu kılmış olduğu modernizasyona entegre olma sürecini de kapsayan bu dönem, Osmanlı'nın 18. Yüzyılda geliştirdiği otoriter modernite anlayışının fenotipi şeklinde tezahür etmiştir. II. Abdülhamid, bu paradoks görünümlü siyasi eksende bir taraftan Batılı sosyo-külltürel reformist bir çizgi takip ederken diğer taraftan da baskın bir tutum ekspoze ederek otoritesini sağlamlaştırmak istemiş ancak bu dönemde hayat kazandırılan reformların mantalitesi, Batının entelektüel diyalektiğinden ziyade şekil açısından örnek alındığı bir düzen inşa etmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: II. Abdülhamid, Neo-patrimonyalizm, Aydınlanmacı Despotizm, Osmanlı Modernizasyonu

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INTRODUCTION

In Max Weber's interpretation, patrimonialism is a traditional understanding of sovereignty generally seen in eastern societies. According to Weber, many of the great empires retained their strong patrimonial character until the beginning of modern times and beyond (Weber, 1978). It is stated that in the Ottoman Empire, which had a developed state mechanism, the state machine was established as a "Patrimonial Officialdom", that is, hereditary-public authority, within the framework of Weberian terms (Tekeli, İlkin, 1993: 5). In patrimonialism state authority, the understanding that the whole of the country, including the people living on it, is the property of the ruler is dominant. Thus, the administrative organization or bureaucratic structure that emerged in patrimonialism did not arise as a result of the political organization of the nation to carry out the common action, and rather patrimonialism is a personal administrative tool (Heper, 1977: 36). Although the patrimonial leader dislikes liberal or independent economic and social forces, she collects legislative, executive, and judicial powers and aims to keep her officials under control through landowners and fiefs in order to maintain her authority (Weber, 1978: II 2; Demir-Acar, 1997: 181-182; Bozkurt-Ergun, 1998: 202). In addition, the administration becomes completely personal, arbitrariness prevails in law and property, there are no mechanisms to protect the governed against the administrator, and all kinds of activities that will change the system are suppressed. However, Weber stated that patrimonialism, like all ideal types, is not a clear equivalent of reality and that patrimonialism remains an abstraction in understanding reality. An ideal type definition is a methodological theory developed to understand how the existing phenomenon is suitable for ideal types in order to reach empirical knowledge of reality. In this direction, a form of government can simultaneously have bureaucratic, patrimonial, and legitimate authority features. Moreover, the pure patrimonial authority has never been seen anywhere or at any time (San, 1971: 97).

In Weber's interpretation, the basic value pursued by social sciences is to identify *"culturally meaningful and unique"* phenomena and try to investigate their stages of occurrence, and patrimonialism is a concept that should be considered in this direction (Dinler, 2003: 19). However, while abstracting patrimonialism, many of the approaches that focus on the Turkish political and social structure do not act as carefully as Max Weber and can equate this concept with reality. In patrimonialism, while the 6-century period of the Ottoman Empire is considered on a single plane, the Ottoman Empire is seen as consisting of a static social structure and an absolute monarchical state that dominates everything. However, it is also possible to see different sociological contradictions and, accordingly, different state policies in different historical processes (Dinler, 2003: 22). Because of XVI. from the XVIII century when we look at the period up to the 19th century, it is seen that the absolute authority of the sultan did not affect the three politically important areas sufficiently (Gerber, 2004: 246). First of all, we see that the sultan appears as the protector of justice rather than an arbitrary autocrat in the administrative field. In the second area, it is striking that the sultan did not have a policy inclined to suppress the local elements in the social mechanism. Because many new autonomous structures were born within the developing Ottoman wheel. In the third area, the rise of the Ottoman State bureaucracy as a cosmopolitan and developing social institution paved the way for the emergence of important groups with clear wishes, which even the sultan could not dominate in the current institution's structure. So much so that one of the frequently made mistakes in Ottoman political and social studies is; has been to define the main conflict as the conflict between the ruling group and the subject, by categorizing it without considering any other intermediate class (Haldon, 1993: 159). There are effective reasons for making this mistake, such as reaching generalizations based on old and crude methodological studies, due to the fact that the data on the cause-effect plane is not adequately looked at by adhering to the distinctions of modern social sciences. Methodological statism in Turkish political life; can be defined as the emergence of the statist tradition as a methodology in the social sciences. Basically, methodological statism is an understanding of taking refuge in the state in the face of the difficulty of taking into account the causal pluralism of various social relations and practices that develop over a wide period and scope. In this sense, the perception that is criticized as the understanding of "expecting everything from the state" forms the basis for the frequent repetition of state-oriented analyzes in the explanations of social sciences studies. This attitude leads to the neglect of the social foundations of political power, namely the relationship of the cosmopolitan, heterogeneous, and diverse form of communication of life outside the state mechanism with the political centre. This methodological approach applied in defining the concept

of patrimonialism manifests itself as neo-patrimonialism as a continuity integration in modernist social structure inferences. In other words, while neo-patrimonialism is conceptualized, methodological statism, which is in question in addition to patrimonialism, is not just focused on the social structure and the state-society relationship; it also reflects this while revealing the process of change and modernization. So much so that the patrimonial state is used both as a means of defining the Ottoman state and as a means of proving the continuity of the new state, whose foundations were laid with the Republic, with the Ottoman state. Most of the time, the approach used when explaining the political modernization process refers to revolution and reforms, while at the same time, it focuses on the continuity of mentality; on the other hand, it presents a model that excludes the contents of the modernization in the mental and cultural fields and the construction that will be developed in the future. Patrimonialism, Weber's each of which is world-systems within its own epoch, express the developed and legitimate political superstructure of traditional empires is doing. Hovewer the concept of patrimonialism, as a state type or regime, is not in parallel with the politics of legitimacy alone. İnalcık did not consider the patrial state only as a political form of government. It includes planning from the economy, from a vital point of view from life, as a whole that is vital in itself (İnalcık, 1992). İnalcık states that the political authority in the Ottoman patrimonial state, the sultan did not give any right to any intermediary institution or authority, and all kinds of savings depend on the sultan's approval. In other words, the patrimonial sultan "Perceives the state-country and the subjects as patrimonial property and does not recognize any other authority between her and the land and the subjects other than her own control." For this reason, the Ottoman sultans, with İnalcık's interpretation; They immediately put an end to the native feudal powers and institutions in the areas they conquered, or they absorbed the feudal families into their fief system and dissolved them (İnalcık, 1992). In this study, an evaluation has been made on the practices in which the legitimacy politics of the Abdülhamid II period approached the borders of patrimonialism. The basis of the study It is the question of how the Ottoman state understanding was carried out during the reign of Abdülhamid. Here patrimonialism as an ideal type, to reiterate, in the rational construction of a complex historical process, The way out and its possibilities are discussed from a leading role perspective.

The Concept of Neo-Patrimonialism

Neo-patrimonialism is a concept developed by S. N. Eisenstadt in 1963, which reveals that the modernization experiences of societies outside the Western world distort modernity rather than producing it, and is widely adopted by Turkish social science circles (Eisenstadt,1963). Approaches that have adopted neo-patrimonialism are generally related to the II. It reflects the modernist understanding based on sociology and the idea of progress, depending on the assumption that the classical modernization theory, which was dominant in social sciences until the last years of World War II, is universal and universal for all societies. This definition of modernization is based on the assumption that the progress experienced in the Western world, which is accepted as the highest known form of civilization, will gain universality in parallel with the spread of modernity (Harrison, 1988: 2). Karl Marx's statement that *"The country that is more advanced in terms of industrialization shows its future image to the less developed country"* summarizes this understanding (Marx, 1990: 91). From this point of view, neo-patrimonialism is a useful abstraction in order to stabilize the universalized legitimacy of modernity, where the ideal understanding of modernity put forward by modernization theory is not fully embodied in non-Western societies. When neo-patrimonialism is defined as the regulation of modernity by falsifying and destroying, it will become unnecessary and illegitimate to go down to the essence of modernity or to criticize it. Thus, the problems that arise in the political culture, democratization, and nation-state foundation processes of the newly built states are not due to modernity itself, but to the erroneous application of modernity by misreading it (Roth,1968: 197). Nişancı, who presents the features of neo-patrimonialism in coordination with the modernization theory, states that 1- The disintegration of the traditional order 2- The inability to replace the old order with a new and more consistent system 3- The patriarchal mentality being a serious obstacle to modernity 4- The modernizing group being an element of modernization. 5- Lists them under headings such as deconventionalization (Nişancı, 2001). In addition, Eisenstadt states that neo-patrimonial structures are more rigid and more autocratic than patrimonial orders (Eisenstadt, 1963: 74-76).

Among the studies explaining the characteristics of state and society relations in the Ottoman modernization process, it is possible to see approaches that adopt similar determinations of neo-

patrimonialism. In Tachau's interpretation, the Turkish modernization movement represents not only modernity but neo-patrimonialism, which can be described as a distorted version of modernity, just as it is seen in the modernization movements of other non-Western societies. According to Tachau, while modernity is a project and points to reflection, modernization points to the institutional-structural evolution that makes this project, reflection possible (Tachau, 1988: 135). In another interpretation, non-Western societies tried to keep up with modernization only with the institutional infrastructure of modernity. Regardless of the names of non-Western societies, the modern practices they encountered could never fully catch up with contemporary practices in a historical sense (Çiğdem, 2002: 68). According to Touraine, who agrees with this interpretation, geographies such as Turkey, India and Mexico where unrealistic political and social forces dominate in the modernization process are examples of regimes where modernization cannot be internalized (Tourain, 2004: 341). While names such as the Japanese Emperor Meiji and the Russian Tsar Peter are pointed out as neo-patrimonial examples of modernization movements under the shadow of the state, the main reason for this situation is that modernization is interpreted and developed through individuals, and is often tried to be implemented with an authoritarian style and anti-democratic methods (Ward ve Rustow,1964: 5). The fact that modernity could not be lived simultaneously with the Enlightenment, that the Enlightenment was associated with the state rather than the individual and society as a concept, that is, the fact that modernization came to life with a repulsive power, not organic as in the West, is shown as the reason for the autocratic and statist modernization in these examples (Sugar, 1964: 147-148).

Ottoman Authoritarian Modernization

The modernization process of the Ottoman Empire did not emerge as contemporary with imperialism, as in the West, and did not manifest itself through a time filter that allowed the traditional agricultural society to evolve into an urban and at the same time secular industrial society, which developed by encompassing the legal and political rights of individuals (Atabaki, 2004: 1). Ottoman Modernization was a defensive and progressive program carried out by the "authority" in order to preserve the continuity and territorial integrity of the empire in the face of Western imperialism. In addition, the innovations of the Tanzimat period, which accelerated modernization, caused important changes not only in the military, administrative and financial fields, but also in the Ottoman social life, especially in the lifestyles and worlds of thought in the cities. While the innovation movements made in this period, where the state's intervention in the public sphere increased, became the subject of discussion by the intelligentsia, new ways of understanding were embodied in various fields. As in many countries where the revisionism process developed "from the top", in the Ottoman Empire, the state played a leading role not only in the administrative, military, and financial fields, but also in the transformation of social structures with its interventionist attitude that formed the basis of the innovation period. Despite the fact that bureaucrats, the elite class, and even the intellectual class are in a very effective position as much as the state at the focal point of the policy carried out in the social change process. Because, in this transformation process, the top-down policy, which was carried out with a "statist-elitist" understanding by using the state authority, started with the Tanzimat period and continued in the Republican period and became one of the clearest features of modernization (Kongar, 2008: 318-321). A society that does not change ex officio or does not have the necessary preconditions and social factor dynamics for change has been changed by institutional reforms, legal regulations in the private and public sphere, and this period has also been defined as "Authoritarian Modernization" (Hülür-Akça, 2005: 311-339).

It is believed that the reforms embodied by the involvement of the state in different areas of social life will bring the desired level of changes in the mental world and lifestyle of the society. In this regard, it would not be correct to go further and claim that statesmen in the Tanzimat period consciously and planned engaged in social engineering (Ortaylı, 2000: 140). Because when we look at that period, it is striking that the Tanzimatists had only one goal, and it was tried to ensure the continuation of the empire by taking the management mechanism of the state under control. On the other hand, the new institutional structuring, which created a necessity to take the central-administrative control under control, has caused the state to take an active role in social transformation in order to revive the state-society mechanism and also with the attempts to create new control mechanisms over the society. Regardless of how it is interpreted as autocratic, elitist, or patrimonial, this political style is essentially a policy of defensive change, with the main aim of defending against European states' attempts to establish hegemony and controlling the wind of change set in motion by European culture.

Ottoman westernization movements are parallel to the knowledge of the codes of the modernization that emerged in the west according to the Ottoman Empire and in the north of Europe according to Europe and the codes of the Western Civilizations that included it. The meaning of the concept of "West" varies in terms of social sciences or according to the geography of those who call the "West". Just as there is no holistic or homogeneous understanding of the "West", as İsmet Özel emphasized, it is not possible to limit the civilization called the "West" to any geography. However, as a source, it can be claimed that the existing civilization took shape in the region east of the Pyrenees, west of the Rhine, and north of the Alps. According to İsmet Özel, the two main incubation places that give the spirit of Western Civilization are London and Paris. In this respect, the "West" is the representative of a mentality and value system. Despite its economic and military power, Europe is considered the representative of Western values, not the USA. For this reason, the Ottoman modernization movement continued its course by turning to Europe, and Europe was seen as a "contemporary civilization level" in the Republican period. Inclusion of the USA in the perception of the "Western" in terms of Turkish modernization, It took place at the end of World War II. After World War II, Turkey's westernization axis followed a US-oriented course both politically and mentally.

İlber Ortaylı, while interpreting the understanding of westernization, asked the question "What is the West?" and stated that the West cannot be explained by geography, industrialization, and religion, and saw Western society and civilization as a society of change. According to Ortaylı, there has never been a society that has awakened to the consciousness of change as early as the ''West''. Ortaylı quotes Mousnier as *"The Paris Academy explains Europe as a continent that is constantly changing and still changing. This change is a product of our developing knowledge and consciousness. According to the Academy, other parts of the world are in a recession."* Statements explain the although the Ottoman Empire underwent many changes during its westernization process, this Western-oriented pace of change of the Ottoman Empire did not allow the narrowing of the gap between the dynamic structure of the West and the backwardness gap (Ortaylı, 1995: 15). Although it is next door to the West, it is seen that the Ottoman Empire could not complete its modernization in terms of westernization. (Berkes, 2002: 34). Therefore, it is an indisputable fact that success cannot be achieved without fully deciphering the mental codes on which both Turkish civilization and the modeled culture stand, and the situation becomes difficult for those who try to understand the situation. When Ottoman modernization is evaluated within the framework of the center-periphery relationship, it is also argued that it followed a different course together with being in the orbit of Western modernization. The modernization movements in Turkish political life, both in the Ottoman and Republican periods, took place in a state of conflict between the center and the periphery. Şerif Mardin, while talking about an important social disconnect underlying Turkish political life, stated that Turkish modernization could be subjected to a critical theoretical investigation (Kaliber, 2002: 109).

After the defeat of Lepanto, the quality and proportion of the modernization movements, which started first in the military field and then continued in other areas, showed de facto continuity. From the Tanzimat period to the Republic, westernization attempts, which were generally embodied in technical fields, later made it necessary to find a place in cultural fields. While the Empire was transitioning from the perception of superiority towards the West to the stage of accepting the superiority of the West, it displayed a separatist attitude and then tried to solve the problems it faced without making systemic and religious concessions. In this direction, the Empire left behind its skeptical attitude towards taking modernity as an example and moved to the stage of implementing westernization policies by reforming itself. Every power that seized the opportunity to implement the modernization policies in terms of Ottoman history tried to westernize on the basis of an area it deems appropriate from its own point of view. For this reason, Ottoman modernization was "different" but continuous in the current renewal process. The Jacobin attitude, which evaluates the perception of modernization as the elimination of tradition, imposed the westernization movement on the society with a monist and top-down discourse. During the 300 years of Turkish modernization, the whole of perceptions expressed with concepts such as eclecticism, metonymy, pragmatism, monism have found a place in all thought and political figures (Yavuz, 2002: 217). While westernization in the Ottoman Empire was handled with a pragmatist approach, westernization was not prepared in the theoretical plan. The most important evidence for this situation is the slow changes in history and philosophy (Ortaylı, 1995: 24).

One of the reasons why the late modernization in the Ottoman Empire could not mature enough is the religious factor. There are epistemological understandings built on civilizations such as the Ottoman

Empire. Heterogeneous structure and hierarchical order in sociological layers are indispensable elements of the social structure in the Ottoman Empire. The religion factor, which is the main dynamo of the patriarchal mentality, plays a role in the basis of these two dynamics. The epistemic structure of this Ottoman civilization, which is the continuation of the concept of Kut that has existed throughout history in the Turkish state tradition, in a sense forms the basis of the legitimacy of communities and sects. In the epistemological climate with these characteristics, the epistemic break that developed in the West caused serious problems in the Ottoman sociological hierarchy, especially in the ulama class, and then the ulama class left this status to the intellectual class.

The Moment of Abdulhamid II's Neo-Patrimonialism: Dichotomy of Enlightening Despotism

The Enlightenment understanding, which offers a philosophical background in the evaluation of history and society, which took place in the Enlightenment thought, and the concepts of despotism, which has been added to its use since the past, have deeply affected the approach to Eastern societies in the 19th century. While the Enlightenment understanding functioned in positioning the modern society form on a world-historical scale within the framework of a philosophy of history, despotism had a fundamental use in the marginalization of Eastern societies. In Enlightenment thought, Europe was portrayed as a "civilization" and its development began to be explained within the framework of the idea of Enlightenment. According to the Enlightenment thinkers, with science and reason, man could reach the advanced stages of freedom and thus perfection (Zeitlin, 1968: 4-6). Enlightenment, depending on the political situation that became evident in the Enlightenment period, is one of the distinctive concepts of modern Western thought. Enlightenmentalists establish a direct link between progress and the accumulation of scientific knowledge. According to this, man's domination of nature and obtaining material savings from there are the main motives of progress. In this context, the use of reason, which is another central concept of the Enlightenment, comes to the fore. As human beings use their minds, scientific knowledge accumulates and thus historical progress takes place. In the Enlightenment period, in parallel with the Enlightenment, another concept, despotism, began to be effective in the evaluation of the East. While the Enlightenment served to define the distinctiveness of the West, the concept of despotism was used to emphasize the otherness of the East. The concept of despotism, which the West brought from Greece, was reintroduced in a stronger way for the political characterization of the East in the context of its emergence as a holistic other with the Age of Enlightenment. Despotism debates first came to the fore regarding domestic issues, but since the 19th century, it has been used as an element and justification for domination (Hentsch, 1996: 10). Although the concept of despotism, whose literal meaning means "the master of slaves" and which has its roots in Ancient Greece, has various uses in different periods, it has always been a concept that is used to define the Western one through the other (Goody, 2006: 99-124). The concept, which was not used much in the Middle Ages, has been re-used as a result of new developments since the 16th century.[1]

Voltaire was a leading Enlightenment philosopher and felt that enlightened monarchy was the only right way for society to progress. According to Voltaire; The people is the one to be governed, to be advanced, indeed to be saved. Under this assumption, Democracy is invalid. Of course, the people may not yet rule themselves, and in the absence of popular political will, the Monarchy may be the only possible form of state. Enlightenment cannot be modern because modernity is essentially born on the condition that your will can think freely. The Enlightenment being on the side of Tolerance seems to be on the side of the freedom of Sensation. But this is an illusion because the Intellectual does not recognize subjective freedom, the freedom of the individual to decide and judge for himself, to act of his own will, because he sees himself as a supra-individual authority and power, and the non-intellectual as involuntary. Enlightenment despotism is a key concept, and it is under this concept that enlightenment is under attack. Although the concept of despotism actually has a negative connotation from a historical perspective, the struggle for Enlightenment Jacobinism, especially used by revolutionaries against reactionaries, also has a structure that advances the history of humanity. Despotism practiced by feudalism and imperialism, the development of the productive forces, the development of science. It has a reactionary, oppressive, and destructive feature that hinders the development and salvation of humanity.

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[1] Although the adjective "Despotic" was widely used to describe governments in the 16th and 17th centuries, "Despotism" was circulated as a noun only at the turn of the 18th century by Pierre Bayle. Rubiés, J.P. Oriental despotism and European orientalism: Boteroto Montesquieu. *Journal of Early Modern History*, 2005, 9(1-2), p.11.

In the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottomans were at the center of European interest in the East.In this period, the efforts to think of the Ottoman sultan as a despot holding all property and his subjects as slaves and to position themselves over this is an important point (Valensi, 1994). When Machiavelli spoke of this for the first time; "The Turkish Empire is in the hands of one person, the others are his servants," he says. Bodin, by giving an example from the tımar system, establishes a connection between land ownership and the absolute sovereignty of the sultan (Bodin, 1967: 48-52). Bacon, on the other hand, attributes the absence of an aristocratic layer in the Turkish Empire to the Sultan's absolutism (Bacon, 1999: 72). By stating that the Indian Mongol Khan was more despotic than the Ottoman Sultan, Bernier broadened the horizon in these discussions and generalized the discussion and definition to the whole East (Bernier, 1914). Traveller Tavernier also traveled to Turkey, India, and Iran in the same period and wrote that there is no more absolute rule in the world than the Iranian king and that most of all the lands in the country belong to this (Tavernier, 1889). Of course, Montesquieu, the leading figure of the Enlightenment, had the biggest share in the spread of the idea of Oriental despotism (Hentsch, 1996: 147). In fact, Montesquieu, inspired by Bodin in many respects, declared despotism to be the main character of the East by making an explanation in terms of climate and geography in his work "The Spirit of the Laws". This is the most important point Montesquieu added to the discussions, and after him, the social structure of the East was constantly evaluated depending on climate and geography. According to him, despotism is the immutable reality of the East, which has deep roots. Similar to Aristotle, according to Montesquieu, the side of despotism that differs from tyranny is that the abuse of power is systematic. Despotism is not an abuse of power or a violation or overthrow of the law like tyranny, but a system of administration in which the ruler puts his own interests and desires above the general interests.

Şerif Mardin, Ottoman administrative and economic reforms, noted that centralized empires such as Ivan the Terrible resembled Enlightenment despotism. By giving a historical perspective to the issue, Mardin stated that the Ottoman secular bureaucracy cooperated with the high-ranking ulama in the preparation and execution of policies, but often disagreed. With the birth of Orientalism in the 19th century, the fragmented and complex Eastern analyzes of the Enlightenment gave way to comprehensive and systematic evaluations. Based on this knowledge and perspective, firstly philosophy of history and then sociology's search for positioning the Western society in world history emerged. Within the framework of these searches, a different view of Eastern societies has been created with the classification of societies in sociology. At the beginning of the 19th century, the secular bureaucracy reached the power to initiate the change and started a program aimed at bringing the administrative institutions and economic reasons that the European enlightenment despotism had used for a while to Turkey (Mardin, 2008: 44).

After the death of Âli Pasha in 1871, there was an explosion in the problems that had accumulated over the years, and when the policies implemented during the Tanzimat period failed to deliver what was expected, bankruptcy flags began to be hoisted in all areas of the state. In this crisis environment, the policies advocated and implemented by the Tanzimat Reformists began to be criticized, and the search for different solutions and new political proposals came to the fore in order to overcome the crisis environment. Especially after 1875, the crisis turned into an environment of chaos. The state treasury went bankrupt because the interest on the debts received since the Crimean War could not be paid; In the Balkan provinces, where great investments were made so that they would not be lost, great revolts broke out one after the other; A diplomatic struggle was entered into with the Great Powers of Europe; As a solution to all internal and external problems, a palace coup was carried out in order to establish a constitutional regime (Çetinsaya, 2016: 356-357).

Abdülhamid II with the title of "legitimate and natural heir", replaced his brother Murat V, who was deposed due to the sharia and also because of his psychological disorders, according to the decree of the fatwa, which was composed of a state dignitary gathered in the Topkapı Palace and read in the presence of the General Assembly. He ascended to the throne as the 34th sultan of the Ottoman Empire in August 1876. The management approach of the Abdülhamid II period was fed by different political channels, both the traditional Ottoman understanding and the pragmatist policies necessitated by the 19th-century political environment. Orhan Koloğlu, while interpreting the reign of Abdülhamid II; The period of depressions (1876-1882), the period of silence (1883-1895), the period of separatist nationalist revolts (1895-1908) and another period of depression (1908-1909) in which the Young Turks movement primarily played a role, in which the Committee of Union and Progress played a role. made a ranking

(Koloğlu, 2006: 125). Kemal H. Karpat, on the other hand, states that Abdülhamid II's management style was shaped in parallel with the personality traits of the sultan, the developments in the world, and the Young Turks opposition, as well as the cultural and demographic changes in the empire (Karpat, 1972: 271).

Abdulhamid II's mission of modernizing and legitimizing can be described with the contradictory dichotomy of "Enlightening Despotism"; because this kind of enlightenment signifies obedience, despotism signifies repudiation enlightenment signifies enlightening and teaching one's path through science, while despotism, on the contrary, implies imposing; therefore, enlightening despotism can be expressed with the phrase "for the people despite the people". This is due to the contradictory logic of modernization and legitimation processes. Because for the survival of the state, the consent of the people is provided later in order for the modernization to be carried out in spite of the people to reach its goal. The despotism of making these reforms in spite of the people when necessary, the rightful acceptance of these reforms by the public in order to achieve their goals, and the attempt to legitimize them means enlightenment.

Considering the political practices of the period, Abdülhamid II's administration, in a sense, has a classical patrimonial image; While incorporating autocratic, paternal, and pragmatist elements, while practicing his power from the other side, he exhibited a neo-patrimonial management approach that created a difference between the classical period and his own period, especially by displaying a modernist attitude in the institutional sense. The aforementioned neo-patrimonial administration understanding gains momentum through the bond in the monarch's relationship with the people. From the perspective of Abdülhamid II, the main duty of a good ruler is to protect his subjects like a father (Koloğlu, 2010: 45). This style of government removed the monarch from the simplicity of the person at the top of the state and granted her a reign loaded with the authority of paternal love. This symbiotic relationship built between the society and the monarch also had a propagandist function in order to ensure the loyalty to the ruler, which she gave a paternal image. In this framework, the duty of the society is to adopt the laws with absolute acceptance and to display the political worship of authority (Koloğlu, 2010: 75). While entering the 20th century, the influence of opportunist groups such as official practitioners and the pro-regime press that took on side roles and supported this understanding is obvious as well as the outdatedness of this management approach, which is quite outdated for a society blended with both Eastern and Western cultures. For example, in some of the caliphate treatises compiled by İsmail Kara, It was underlined that Abdülhamid II was a sultan who had all the conditions, and the people were reminded that they should obey patiently (Koloğlu, 2010: 217). *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* newspaper dated July 4, 1878; While drawing attention to the legitimate relationship between the monarch and the society, Abdülhamid II stated that the law consists of the provisions that are made between a monarch and the people, on the one hand, and the necessary and accepted on the other hand, and that the ruler who practices these provisions also has the supreme title. According to the newspaper; the society that fulfills the orders of the laws is honored with the title of supreme (Tercüman-ı Hakikat, 1878: 7). Likewise, one of the main subjects in the school curricula of the Abdülhamid II period was the subject of obeying orders. With this understanding; while obeying the ruler obeys the prophet, obeying the prophet means obeying God. With the same logic and opposite example, those who rebel against the ruler are rebelling against the prophet and God. In other words, there is a triple hierarchical belief in obedience, which forms the basis of understanding (Alkan, 2006: 388).

While Abdülhamid II struggled to bring the Tanzimat modernization, which he initiated for the future of the country, to the optimal point, on the other hand, he had to deal with the legitimacy crisis created by the aforementioned modernization (Gencer, 2019: 34). Abdülhamid II's paternalist management style; While is based on absolute sovereignty and direct rule, the monarch is in direct contact with the society by pacifying the bureaucracy class between him and his subjects. In Eisenstadt's interpretation, the Ottoman Empire was a "Centralized historical bureaucratic empire" unlike patrimonial empires such as Egypt and Sassanids and feudal regimes such as Japan (Eisenstadt, 1963: 10-11). Some media organs close to the sultanate used a kind of propaganda tool under Abdülhamid's neo-patrimonialist disposition and repeatedly targeted the bureaucratic class between the ruler and the people. The propagandist press, which defended that the sultan made the necessary innovations, accused the bureaucracy group, which it claimed did not fulfill the orders properly, and even pointed out the bureaucratic mechanisms as the main oppressive group. In order to carry out the neo-patrimonial administration, which Abdulhamid II could continue without any intermediary, the bureaucracy that gained power during the Tanzimat period

had to be equalized and the bureaucracy had to be under the control of the sultan, as in other areas. This imperative situation gained absolute clarity with the bureaucratic liquidation that started after Mithat Pasha was exiled to Taif. The sultan, who took the bureaucratic staff under his control, increased his influence on the executive. Contrary to the examples of Mustafa Reşit, Mehmet Emin Ali, Fuat, and Mithat Pasha, who were the protagonists of the periods when the Ottoman bureaucracy was active, the elitist Bab-ı Ali bureaucracy group took a position in the background in this process. When we look at the profiles of the grand vizier during the reign of Abdülhamid, it is seen that the executive power was concentrated mostly in the monopoly of the sultan and 23 changes were made in the 10 years from 1871 to the dismissal of Ahmed Vefik Pasha in 1882, while the grand vizierate turned into only an executive office (Karpat, 1972: 270).[2]

Abdülhamid II, who established an absolute authority with the interpretation of Georgeon, equalized the Ottoman bureaucratic hegemony at the end of the 19th century and reinforced the functionality of the state mechanism with a new controller organization (Georgeon, 2006: 171). While Yıldız Palace was the center of the military bureaucracy in this new state practice, the effort to find solutions to the problems through diplomatic means was insurance for the possible military hegemony in the state administration. While pacifying the bureaucratic hegemony, Abdülhamid II benefited from two basic elements such as the Yıldız Palace staff and the journal system. It was an important step in this sense to establish direct contact with state officials such as the governor, deputy governor, commander, ambassador and consul, as a result of the fact that the official exposure privilege offered to the sultan was freed from the monopoly of the grand vizier and the sheik al-Islam and opened to every department, and thus the grand vizierate and other bureaucratic authorities were eliminated. In addition, the copying of all documents sent to the Grand Vizier's office and sending them to Yıldız Palace brought the habit of contacting the center directly rather than the ministries for which the administrators were responsible (Mardin, 2008: 70).

In this period, Jön Türks took the place of Young Ottomans in the struggle against Abdülhamid II in order to re-enforce the Constitutional regime. The name of the group, which was called "Jeune-Turces" in the West, and "Young Turks" with its Turkish adaptation, was called Jeune-France in France, Jeune-Italie in Italy, Jeune-Allemange in Germany, towards 1830. Inspired by the secret societies founded by some young people who are literary sympathizers. The Young Turk Movement turned into the Committee of Union and Progress, which would gather a large part of it under one roof, and became the pioneer of the 19th-century opposition movement and Ottoman reforms. The Young Turk Movement is basically parallel to the solution proposals and the idea of the Constitutional Monarchy advocated by the Young Ottomans in the years 1860-1870. At that time, there was a political resistance against the rule of Abdulhamid II, consisting of three main factions. The first of these fractions; The rush to establish a secret organization among the young minds studying at high schools, Secondly, secret committees and juntas that recruit members from outside the army as well as many of their members being officers; the third is composed of the groupings of intellectuals gathered in centers such as Paris, Cairo, Geneva (Durukan, 2004: 54).

Another important dynamic in the consolidation of the authority against the active Young Turk opposition in this period was the police organization and the journal system. During the reign of Abdülhamid II, a widespread spy organization was formed under the Ministry of Police and Yıldız Palace became an intelligence center where official or unofficial spies' reports called "Jurnal" were evaluated. In this period, espionage spread to many areas of daily life; all kinds of social relations were kept under strict surveillance. The strict control starting from the palace has found practical opportunities in a wider area over time as career steps that enable civil servants to be promoted or to receive engagements and awards. Huseyin Cahit Yalçın; As for the process after the proclamation of the Constitutional Monarchy, it was as if there was an unknown bogey, a demon ready to devour us all. If we started to use the freedom that we long for, we would be in a fear as if the apocalypse would break made his comment (Yalçın, 1976: 125). This comment by Yalçın sheds light on the effect of the oppression in question on Ottoman society and among the intellectuals. Enver Ziya Karal, who stated

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[2] During the reign of Abdülhamid II, translator Rüştü Pasha (two periods), Mithat Pasha, Ethem Pasha, Hamdi Pasha, Ahmet Vefik Pasha (two periods), Sadik Pasha, Saffet Pasha, Hayrettin Pasha, Arifi Pasha, Said Pasha (seven periods), Kadri Pasha, he carried 17 grand vizier seals, namely Abdurrahman Pasha, Mehmet Kamil Pasha (two terms), Rıza Pasha, Cevat Pasha, Halil Rifat Pasha and Ferit Pasha (Karal, 1988: 278).

that espionage is the spirit of tyranny, said that everyone and everything is the subject of espionage and drew the portrait of this environment that can be considered as a stereotype of a police state (Karal, 1988: 267).

Abdülhamid II's neo-patrimontalist management approach; On the one hand, it has a ground on which various modern institutions are built in order to keep up with the needs of the age and meet the social needs, on the other hand, it represents a strict social design concept that shapes the society socially and according to its own perspective, which is mostly manifested within the framework of the Shari'a provisions contains. Abdülhamid II, who established a more modern autocracy compared to his predecessors, while investing in various schools in education, on the other hand, put many health institutions into service in the social field. In the European press, there are many newspaper articles praising Abdülhamid II and his actions. Many examples can be found to show that Europe was followed in form and principle during the reign of Abdulhamid II. Examples of this situation are the establishment of the Archeology Museum, the opening of the Fine Arts School, the exhibition of Turkish painters in Istanbul, the practice of the metric measurement system in Europe, the spread of photography, the importation of the first bicycle and automobile, the prohibition of slavery, and the freedom to play football constitute concrete evidence. Abdülhamid II's policy during his reign can be summarized as follows: He displayed a centralist, Islamist, or a balanced and reformist understanding centered on Islam in terms of the protection and survival of the country. In short, the period of Abdulhamid is a critical period. Because this period is a period that includes both the years of formation and disintegration, the years when something new was introduced and the years of collapse. This period was a formative year, with the long-term consequences of various policies ranging from education to railways, military reform, and agricultural irrigation, to the first modest beginnings of industrial infrastructure. But the missing part of the Abdülhamid II era's understanding of modernization was its lack of inclusiveness. Because in this period, only the material part of modernization was tried to be taken and the intellectual part was not emphasized.

In addition to the progressive policy followed to meet the needs of the society in various fields during the reign of Abdulhamid II, a restrictive socio-political attitude that determined the dressing styles of Muslim women was also followed. The neo-patrimonialist state structure, on the one hand, expressed the desire to protect moral norms by limiting the style of Muslim women that did not comply with religious rules, on the other hand, it tried to protect its social legitimacy and social obedience to the state by making secret concessions to the conservative environment. Abdülhamid II wanted women to comply with the headscarf rule in bazaars, Beyoğlu and recreation areas, and not to stay until the night in places like Fenerbahçe and Sarıyer, and he was taking precautions against this situation with the warnings announced in the newspapers Cevdet Kudret, who interpreted Abdulhamid's neo-patrimonialist state understanding through the censorship he applied to the press, stated that a rich legacy of past state reflexes was used about Abdulhamid's censorship policy applied to the press, and that the system was developed and all gaps in the law were filled (Kudret, 2000: 5). This attitude was especially seen in the early days of Abdülhamid II's rule. Immediately after the Sultan closed the Assembly, the Council of Ministers issued a martial law decision based on article 36 of the constitution, which regulates temporary laws. With the decree of January 2, 1877, which interfered with both individual and social life, the government; has the right to search the homes of people it deems necessary day and night, to close newspapers that make confusing publications, and to ban all kinds of meetings, boards and associations (Kudret, 2000: 25).

During the reign of Abdulhamid II, the chain change of the Tanzimat continued. Only Abdulhamid II gave this change an Islamic color. Relying on the strict centralization and bureaucratic control mechanisms used by his predecessors, the Sultan tried to revive the old Islamic concepts of state and authority. The changes experienced in this period were identified with positive sciences and technology, and a conservative understanding of modernization was adopted, which was tried to be associated with Islam. Here again, centralization was an aim for modernization. Therefore, according to the Sultan, the adoption of absolutism was both a necessary and a natural principle. Abdülhamid II accused his predecessors, especially the statesmen of the Tanzimat period, of being submissive, and instead of an extreme Western adaptation, he sought a formula that reconciles local conditions with the contemporary world. In this period, on the one hand, a material growth that is incompatible with the principles of the society's belief system was achieved in terms of mentality. On the other hand, a dividing line has emerged between the general Muslim population and bureaucrat intellectuals. The development of a

concept of modernization, which is completely ideological in many aspects, left its mark on the period of Abdulhamid II. Bedri Gencer described the period of Abdülhamid as "from the crisis of legitimacy to the pain of modernity". According to Gencer; As can be understood from the terms "heart attack and labor pain", the crisis is a sign of death, pain of birth (Gencer, 2019: 39). The paradoxical structures of the Abdülhamid II period formed the main elements of the foundations on which the sultan's legitimacy was based. An example of this is that the foreign policy based on the Islamic Union consolidates the domestic policy with its conservative stance, and the diplomacy that develops with Western states by closely following the West constitutes the main route of foreign policy. In addition to the centralist structure, partial autonomy practices, and conservative status quo attitude, taking Western revisionist steps is another paradoxical example and is actually the result of a cyclical necessity.

CONCLUSION

As a subject from the project of modernization of the masses, their exclusion is the regime's choice. The regime's own stability in an organized the neo-patrimonial approach, which he sees as dependent not on participation but on a pacified mass, is a form of role in which the state makes its presence felt in every political and social field in the most effective way. Managers, to the extent that they need to rely on an ideology to justify their power regulatory authority escalates. It should be noted that the obvious contradictions of the modernization process arise from the difference between the state and the style of administration in response to the demands of the state and society. The portrait that the Turkish society draws in the context of the center-periphery distinction; Abdülhamid II made the Turkish regulatory authority in the Ottoman Empire the most sensitive scale of this issue. According to Halil İnalcık, the Ottoman Empire was a patrimonial state and the sultan used the military and administrative organization as his personal tool. However, İnalcık did not consider the patrimonial state only as a political form of government. He described it as a form of political-social organization that encompasses all social areas from economy to religion, from art to culture, from daily life to class relations. In the understanding of the Ottoman patrimonial state, the political authority did not grant any right to any intermediary institution or authority, and all kinds of savings were monopolized. Witnessing the first 7 years of the reign of Suleiman I, Machiavelli was going through a period when the patrimonial character of the Ottoman Empire was consolidated in those days when he was planning to write his work titled "The Prince". For this reason, the Ottoman painting depicted by Machiavelli may contain a certain margin of truth. While the traditional patrimonial understanding lost power after the 17th century, it gained momentum with a new interpretation during the reign of Abdülhamid II in the decadent period. During the years Weber was alive, Abdülhamid II was the owner of the Ottoman throne for many years. Therefore, the evaluation of the Ottoman patrimonial management styles, which Machiavelli and Weber have witnessed over different periods, is of particular importance.

Abdülhamid II's understanding of management; Apart from the traditional Ottoman state understanding, it has a structure in which various modern institutions are built to keep up with the requirements of the age and meet the social needs while developing the legacy of the Tanzimat Period. While this management style was carried out with the understanding of "for the people despite the people", it also represented a rigid, political and social duality that shaped the society socially and according to the perspective of the "Father of the State". The fierce political struggle between the rule of Abdulhamid II and the constitutionalist Jön Türks who opposed him between 1889 and 1908 had a negative effect on the state-run modernity to move forward in a healthier way and the institutionalization of modernity. The political power's desire to control the opposition movements with the regime and the sense of self-preservation has led to the direct prohibition or restriction of some freedoms and activities. While the neo-patrimonialist understanding of the Abdülhamid II period had an Enlightenment-despotic character, the authoritarian consolidation of the period triggered the policy of censorship and pressure on the opposition, especially on the press. In this period, while the society was modernized by the state on the one hand, on the other hand, the society was kept in a certain circle of pressure with the legal regulations put into practice in various fields.

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