



# **Islam and Europeanism; Cultural and Historical Critique of the Contemporary Neo-nationalism Matrix**

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## **Abstract**

The study addresses European Islam, Christianity, and contemporary neo-nationalism/neo-radicalism and their political/cultural/religious/historical conflict. First, the paper argues that the intriguing neo-nationalist and neo-conservative "opposition" between Europe and Islam affect sociopolitical stability, and non-epistemological sociopolitical processes manifest various temporal and spatial cultural-ideological positions. Second, a divergence of culture and Religion of Islamic Salafism (comparable to American Protestant fundamentalism and European religious colonialism), and Western Christians' emphasis on the spiritual experience (not an administration), marks a revival of religiosity. Third, opposing historiographical/fictional/literature/political sphere discourses formed and maintained the fundamentals of the Islam and Christianity climate of dispute. The terms "Christian Europe/Christian West" and "Islamic East" are imprecise and conflicting. Cultural perspective activates significant anti-Islam attitudes and legitimizes far-right sociopolitical processes. Considering dissimilar cultures as "adversaries" harming national identity is an illiberal and nationalist approach. In a historical/cultural/sociopolitical approach, the complex debate on violent Islamic extremism manifests a series of stereotypical narratives rather than examining the historical causes of the phenomenon. Promoting and comprehending moderate Islamic representatives, scientific experts, and activists is crucial. The politicization and securitization of Islam adversely impact peaceful coexistence. The discourse of the Islamic Reforms- contemporary Islam, analogized to Christianity's modernization, resulting in secularism and liberal democracy, is an open-minded question. Religious movements, in general, are often neither tolerant nor liberal but based on dogmatism. The European "left-wing" sociopolitical anemia, radical Islamic terrorist organizations, states exploiting disorder, and ineffective international engagement contribute to the European migrant crisis complexity (i.e., from Muslim countries). Such processes are consequential regarding wars and human rights abuse in the Muslim world. Moreover, these conditions affect and increase traditional discriminational patterns concerning European Muslims. The current European "Muslim question" displays a comparable generalization ideology- the historical foundation of Anti-Semitism. A united Europe and anti-fascism are the most significant values that should challenge the critical conflict and assert a persisting peace criterion.

**Key words:** Islam, Christianity, Europe, Neo-nationalism, Neo-radicalism, history, Culture, Religion, Security, Peace

## **Highlights**

1. Islam, Christianity & Europe
2. Neo-nationalism, Neo-radicalism, Peaceful Coexistence
3. History, Culture, Religion, Sociopolitics, Security

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## Introduction

The widespread prejudice of confrontation and disunity between Islam and Europe is inaccurate because Islam has geographical and European historical authenticity. The relationship between Islam and Europe was external because Islam is present in Europe naturally, in the lives of Muslims. Today, Europe is in a state of integration that should lead to unity, not under hegemony but unity against hegemony. In this sense, the character of the presence of Islam in Europe depends on how Europeans understand Europe. The idea of "Christian Europe" originated in the fifth century with the emergence of the Frankish Empire, and in the 11th and 12th centuries, this idea was politically organized in the Holy Roman Empire. However, the Christianization of Europe lasted until the 14th century (ended with Lithuania).

The idea of a "Christian Europe" left no room for other beliefs, which is why persecutions of Jews and Muslims often occurred. This doctrine was and remained a fiction because Europe has never been Christian in this way. Europe encountered Islam four times- in the 8th century by the Arab conquest of Spain; the second encounter took place during the settlement of Muslim Tatars near Lithuania; the third meeting is related to the Balkans; the fourth encounter began in the 18th century with the stay of Turkish soldiers and administration in Prussia, and was significantly intensified in the 20th century with the arrival of guest workers from Islamic countries. In 1741, the first Muslim community was established in Prussia. The negative military perception was primarily due to the Arab military conquests of Spain, although these conquests were not motivated by the Islamization of Christians. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the term "Islamization" and "Arabization." Before the military power of the Muslims, Christians felt threatened and felt that Islam would swallow them up. Even Islamic conquests were considered God's punishment, and Muhammad was often understood as the Antichrist. Consequently, narratives and myths intertwined regarding victories over Muslims have recreated an influential part in the memory of European Christians. "Christian Europe" is the idea of victory over others. It developed mainly after the reconquest. This opinion is based on several myths about the victories of Christians over Islam. (Schreiner, 2012)

Within the broad historical, social, and political process, the economic collapse of the Islamic Empire from the thirteenth century onwards, in addition to the discovery of new trade routes - sea routes to India and America - and internal stagnation. For centuries, Muslims have had a high tolerance for ambiguity. As a result, the sources of Islam can be interpreted differently. When the opinion that all ambiguities had been removed prevailed, economic creativity disappeared; the rulers again intervened in the market. Koehler shows by many examples that early Islam gave, so far underestimated, the impetus for the development of capitalism in Europe. (Koehler, 2014)

Michael von Brück and Whalen Lai (2000) showed that the original Christianity did not originate only based on Judaism and the Old Testament (Jews do not mark their scripture by name). Nevertheless, also based on Indo-European Greekness, which from the Stoics onwards contains several Buddhist (and to a much lesser extent Zoroastrian) components. As a cross-section of Judaism, Greece, and Buddhism, Christianity was not initially directly prone to theocracy. It begins to incline when Judaic monistic elements prevail when the love of the only true God begins to displace the love of neighbor when the first, exclusive commandment from the Decalogue takes over the prominent, exclusive role so that Orthodoxy finally prevails over love. It is no coincidence, for example, that love, agape (Caritas), has no place in the confession of the Christian faith called Credo (I believe) or the Symbol of Faith. "Authentic" Islam is quite akin to Judaism and institutionalized Christianity. It follows theocracy unconditionally. Therefore, it rejects not only the separation of religion and state politics but also theology and doctrine. However, precisely because Islam is not "only" religion in the modern sense of the word but a particular and comprehensive cultural, civilizational, and social model based on religious dogma, Orientalist Wilfred Cantwell Smith and anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss could speak of Islam as a kind of social theory, comparing it in this even with Marxism. In this sense, for example, the statements of the terrorist Carlos (Illich Ramirez Sanchez) are not surprising: "Today, when faced with a threat that oppresses civilization, we are left with one answer: revolutionary Islam! Only men and women armed with complete faith in the fundamental values of Truth, justice, and brotherhood will be able to fight and deliver humanity from the realm of lies. (Kopic, 2011) Dilemmas ordinarily begin with interpreting God's will. The Islamic clergy comes to the fore as with any religion.

The philosophy for a true Muslim is nothing but metaphysical theology. What is the dilemma regarding these issues? In Islamic history, many progressive scientists have offered answers insisting on a metaphorical but "narrow" reading of the Qur'an. However, it is not attentive to values and directives.

Let us analyze various forms of religious fundamentalism in the world historically. We had a transmission of generic fundamentalism, reflecting several issues particular to the religious setting of the United States (US). It originated from complete cultural changes, such as raising awareness of global religions. Thus, knowledge of human evolution and the advancement of biblical criticism. The last confirmed particularly problematic because it implied the lack of the supernatural and the immaculately human authorship—moreover, the social transformations at the beginning of the 20th century brought protests. Attracted mainly from the classes of "old stock whites," fundamentalists regarded displaced by the non-Protestant emigrants from southern and eastern Europe coming to the US. Historical fundamentalism, developed primarily before WW1, supported the massive evangelical, pentecostal, and captivating regenerations after WW2 and the Christian Right in 1970/the 1980s. (Wacker, 2017) Besides, for European growth and the colonial endeavors from the late 15-19th century, Atlantic-world historians have often identified the imperial states as the most influential actors: Portugal, Spain, France, Netherland, and England (after that, Britain). From these empires' viewpoints, colonization was also regarding converting the "infidels" to Catholicism, with the reformation and the progress of different types of Protestantism, to other confessions. At the beginning of the modern era, colonization was as much about religious missions as it was about territorial expansion and economic resources. Lauric Henneton's anointment regarding the "spiritual geopolitics" of the Atlantic world (Henneton 2014) represents an essential aspect of the Atlantic world's colonization. (Lachenicht, 2019)

What is a religion becomes the inquiry of believers in the community. Nevertheless, the society of believers no longer has a cultural foundation and a territorial base. Therefore, we are at the midpoint of a reconstruction effort of a virtual community. The Catholic Church has the considerable benefit of being an institution, maintaining a Pope, a transnational dimension, and supranational. Accordingly, the Catholic Church can persist in the globalization crisis, but other religions, which lack

institutions, are unexpectedly faced with the issue of "What does the norm state or Who is telling the Truth in religious regards?" It creates the paradox that the debate is open. However, it almost always ends in favor of the fundamentalists. They have the most straightforward arguments of what the norm is. (Roy, 2006)

Most hypotheses and theories on religious transformation give some function to the society's dominant religion in which transformations occur. The predominant religious and cultural practices in any society, such as the legacy of Protestantism and Catholicism in Western Europe, affect the transformations. Nevertheless, the Secularization theory does not clarify all differences. In its variant of state deregulation, the religious state theories could clarify the noticeable resurgence of Religion in Eastern European countries. (Perez and Cordero, 2010) However, the increasing levels of religiosity (post-Yugoslavia countries) might also be associated with the "inferior" levels of human development afflicting most post-socialists (Eastern European: Southeastern European countries). Balkan is a unique European place with significant Muslim populations, and traditional "Islam" and "Christianity"- Catholic and Orthodox" contest existed for centuries and was the primary catalyst for numerous wars, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Regarding the ideological and sociopolitical contest, we can observe Western Balkans, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H), Serbian Sandzak, and other post-Yugoslav and Balkans countries where Muslims live; spaces of unique European Islam. In that case, historically, Ivo Andrić's<sup>2</sup> and Petar Njegoš's<sup>3</sup> literary work resonates with the polarization between the "civilized" West and the "despotic" East (Orient), which accompanied the Enlightenment and the rise of European culture and science in the early modern period. Moreover, Andrić and Njegoš form the image of Muslims as "traitors" of the Christian-Slavic race. Since the Balkans found themselves as an intermediate zone between these polarized civilizations, everything related to the Ottoman period was marked as a legacy of foreign and undesirable power and had to be eliminated for European civilization to return to the linear path of progress that had

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<sup>2</sup> Ivo Andrić was a Bosnian and Yugoslav novelist, poet, and short-story writer who won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1961. His writings dealt mainly with life in his native Bosnia under Ottoman rule.

<sup>3</sup> Petar II Petrović-Njegoš, commonly referred to as Njegoš, was a Prince-Bishop of Montenegro, poet, and philosopher whose works are widely considered some of the most important in Montenegrin and Serbian literature.

begun in the classical period. Consequently, eliminating Ottoman tangible and intangible culture took off throughout the Balkans, and the Muslim population was subjected to systematic persecution. (Buturovic, 2019) In Western Europe, numerous contemporary literature actors, i.e., writers (e.g., Susanne Wiesinger, Michael Houellebecq, and others), reported sociopolitical, cultural, and educational issues associated with European Islam and directly stimulated ideological, religious contests, unfamiliarity, instability, and climate of dispute.

Since 2012, new socio-historical trends have emerged in the world. Geopolitical changes have also occurred in the European Union (EU) itself. Under refugee influx from the Middle East and Africa, relations between EU member states have been strained in terms of solidarity for the reception of refugees. Hungary has erected a wall on its borders. A referendum was held on the secession of the UK from the EU, questioning the fundamental multiculturalism paradigm by secessionist political populist cores. It has affected the instability in the functioning of the EU institutions. The refugee crisis has been a failure of the EU's asylum approach. Political factors used negligence, framing the crisis causes as exogenous/endogenous to the EU. Thus, it impacts where the fault is principally attributed. While the European crisis mainly became an ideological struggle of wills (Matthijs and McNamara, 2015), the migrant crisis was structured with geographical matters rather than ideologies. It would be intriguing to investigate whether the Commission's use of a frame founded on the solidarity of Europeans reversed and contributed to the populist and Eurosceptic statements of numerous governments and national parties. (Ripoll, 2019)

The migrant crisis brought more restrictive Balkan right-wing policies, and media narratives reflected the non-muslim entity's actions. It followed the dominant tone of the global media through the concept of mass psychology, indicating a suspicious attitude towards migrants' rationality, regardless of the category of migrants, contributing to dehumanization, loss of identity, and even gender orientation, through the frame of collective illegal border crossing. "The discourse of the loud public within mass psychology is often a reflection of the discourse of the power structures, and this, of course, is aided by the detection, external and internal" (Hadzic, 2020), which became suitable ground in the nationalist, ethnoreligious driven Western Balkans.

During the inauguration ceremony in 2022, Hungarian president Orbán referred to a conspiracy theory popularized by the far right that elites organize the replacement of European populations with non-European immigrants. "This program wants to replace "Christian children" who are on the way to disappearing with Muslim migrants from other civilizations. I see madness theories of that type." (Beta, 2022) Priority theories of the effects of mass communication introduced a distinction between what we think (knowledge) and what we think (opinion and feelings). The theory suggests that mass media can strongly influence the cognitive level without affecting predisposition. Nevertheless, even if this is the only media effect, the consequences of setting priorities are not insignificant. Namely, with their presentation, the media strengthen public views on specific issues, people, organizations, institutions, and changes in media attention can lead to changes in public priorities. Additional difficulties in the functioning of the EU besides the secessionism and migrant crisis are due to the strengthening of right-wing parties and multiculturalism dilemmas. Political globalization in the EU bears a predicament. It has been radicalized to strengthen the xenophobic behavioral practices of anti-immigration political actors.

Muslims are inadequately recorded statistically, and demographic data often depends on unofficial calculations. Thus, according to its founding Council Regulation (EC), No-1035/97 (1997), the EUMC (The European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia) has set up and coordinates a Racism and Xenophobia European Network (RAXEN) composed of 25 National Focal Points (NFPs), one in each EU Member country, selected through open global competition and contracted by the EUMC. The essential mission of RAXEN was to provide the EUMC with objective, dependable and comparable data (with examples of and models for "satisfactory practice") on phenomena of racism and xenophobia. Muslims are often victims of harmful stereotyping, occasionally reinforced through adverse and selective media reporting. Moreover, they are vulnerable to expressions of prejudice and hostility (from verbal threats to physical attacks on people and property). Many Muslims, specifically young people, face limited possibilities and prospects for social progress, social exclusion, and discrimination, which could lead to hopelessness and disaffection. (EUMC, 2006) Intolerance and prejudice against Muslims in Europe have been increasing. In public debates and the media, Islam is portrayed as a monolithic bloc that conflicts totally from or is even hostile to a similarly closed

"West." Over 23 million Muslims live in Europe; if one incorporates Turkey, the figure comes to 100 million. It constitutes Islam-the second-largest religion in Europe. Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde's securitization theory, and Habermasian Dialogue models show the issues deriving from the "Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the Euro/Mediterranean region." The dialogue unintentionally securitizes Islam. Thus, it argues that we face a risky future without dialogue. (Gündüz, 2007)

The right-wing direction is organized and determined in the European Parliament. Right-wing political parties have grown significantly during the financial and migrant crises. There is dissatisfaction with globalization and the anxiety of weakening national identities. For example, the Le pen family party National Rally succeeded in elections in France. For Viktor Orban- Fidesz party, the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers was not a humanitarian issue but a Muslim invasion. Therefore, it intimidates Hungarians' national security, social cohesion, and Christian identity.

However, paradoxically to the actual French politics, in the general commentary on the challenges that radical Islam poses to liberal values, or as some say, to "Western civilization," several voices stand out for their simplicity, scholarship, and common sense. Some of the most convincing belong to the French. France was once ruled by many North African Muslims, whose descendants now live in France. In addition, modern France, more than any other European nation, is based on political ideas.

Practices of Islamic radicalization differ from country to country, town to community, and individual. There are numerous reasons and actors: autocrats, political exclusion, inadequate Western interventions, failing governance, closing paths for peaceful political expression, the distrust of the state in neglected issues, traditional elites' declining authority, and the lack of prospects for growing populations. Consequently, the dwindling appeal of other ideologies, especially the Muslim Brotherhood's peaceful political Islam, are jihadists' main ideological competitor. It had been diminished by President Mohamed Morsi's ouster and the subsequent crackdown in Egypt. Proselyting intolerant strands of Islam has, in places, helped prepare the ground. However, if roots are complex, the catalyst is obvious enough. The collapse of most of the 2011 Arab Spring has opened a tremendous opportunity for extremists and radicals. Movements have gathered force as crises have evolved, like finances, weapons, and fighters flow in as violence escalates. (International Crisis Group,



2016) Today's religious revival among Europe's Muslims does not import religious traditions born in the Middle East or the broader Muslim world. Instead, it reflects many of the dynamics of contemporary American evangelical organizations. It is not surprising that, instead of being tolerant and liberal, it is based on dogmatism, communitarianism, and scripturalism. Salafism (fundamentalist religious extremism), published in teaching networks and usually financed by Saudi Arabia, emphasizes the loss of cultural identity in conventional Islam. Spiritualism is promoted by the return of Sufist communities or even social prediction (e.g., Imams lecture to the youth in deprived neighborhoods to assist them out of delinquency, or American churches preach to young Blacks to resist drugs and delinquency). When young people join neo-fundamentalism and radical dogmas, they enter a universe where they rebuild their religion. It is the experience of the Almighty, an experience of creation. It is also part of Protestant fundamentalists. All these forms of fundamentalism are based on the exact aspects. The loss of explicit cultural identity, individualization, breaking of family and social ties, and politicization are assumed to be positive. (Roy, 2006)

Most Muslims in Europe are immigrants and sons of immigrants. Almost half of Muslims in Scandinavian countries are political refugees. Surveys indicate increasing fear towards European Muslims. Moreover, Muslims believe Europeans caricature/mock Islam. Such a misunderstanding is disturbing. It presents detrimental Islamophobia and, at the same time, radicalization and endangers harmony and cohabitation. Consequently, they have enacted laws to combat extremist forces, curb radicalization and improve Muslims' integration into the receiving countries. However, the situation is not simple. How could European countries promote the integration of Muslims into secular states? Are extreme radicalization correlated to economic marginalization? Are they a product of a narrative that separates the world into two centers? Is extremism only faith-based? If so, why did an extremist Norwegian kill dozens of non-Muslims? European countries persist in with these complex questions without creating a coherent answer. In addition to religious-based radicalization (groups and individuals), there is identity-based extremism (far-right groups). They are no less dangerous. Europe should confront both issues by drying up extremist ideological origins. (Khader, 2016)

In the countries of origin, religion is embodied in culture. It is not uncomplicated for the believer to distinguish between what belongs to the cultural tradition, social convention, and doctrine. The foremost significant aspect of migrations is the separation of religion and culture and the need to define religion based on exclusively religious criteria, entirely inherent areas of religion. Second, it is interconnected to globalization. Globalization means uprooting given societies to create systems of thought that would no longer be tied to a given culture, systems of thought and custom, behavior, preference, or mode of consumption. France has long and widely written about resistance to globalization, such as Americanization (the rejection of fast food), which are perceived as export items of the American culture. In essence, it is not a coincidence. It is just a way of consumption that is not exclusively related to any particular culture and is adaptable universally (the reason for its success). Accordingly, wrong discourses question what conditions Islam can agree with Western values. (Roy, 2006)

The Balkan's lessons in dealing with individuals and movements promoting the "cleansing" of Europe and preserving an "identity" artificially tailored hostility and proactivity of others. (Hadžić, 2020) Far-right extremism is across-the-board in Western Balkans and exists in mainstream political parties, radical and extremist groups, and individuals. Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević destroyed the positive dynamism that arose during almost six centuries of intersections between Christianity and Islam in the Balkans. He encouraged the negative emotions he used in the war, and Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman advocated the thesis of the impossibility of the ordinary life of Catholicism and Islam by perceiving B&H Muslims as a nonautonomous- superfluous colonization remnant of the *Ottoman era*. In the book "Origins of the Catastrophe," the US diplomat Warren Zimmerman, the last US ambassador to Yugoslavia, described the book "Origins of catastrophe-Yugoslavia and its destroyers" and what Tuđman told him about the meetings with Milošević. "Tuđman admitted that he had discussed these fantasies about Islamic fundamentalist B&H with Milošević and agreed that the only solution was to divide B&H between Serbia and Croatia. Tuđman explained that the ordinary B&H Croat preferred the Orthodox Christian Serbs to the Muslims, quoting, "because he is a Christian, after all." (Zimmerman, 1999). Based on political statements, Croatian

fascist history (NDH<sup>4</sup>), and current fascist occurrences<sup>5</sup>, it can be concluded that political structures are returning Serbia and Croatia, during the presidency of Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, to the 1990s and hampering EU and NATO based processes.

The former Croatian President Grabar-Kitarović's enterprises constituted "the return of Croatia to Tuđman's path." The path of historical revisionism, patriotic belligerence, exclusivity towards Islam, and militant nationalism - systematically devours its new generations. The Croatian President presented the B&H as a "security threat to the EU" by Islamic terrorism and radicalization, entering a threatening geopolitical diversion by producing unproved B&H Islamic terrorism. (Danas, 2017) In patten by such, French President Macron stated that B&H is a "time bomb knocking right next to Croatia" (Al Jazeera, 2019), putting an "international political target" on this country and its inhabitants, exposing them to suspicion, contempt, and lynching of the world, excommunicating them from the European civilization context. It further heightens the fear among B&H and its neighbors. (Danas, 2017) It displays Frank Furedis's "Culture of fear" in practice. Thus, Western culture feeds on terror and inadvertently calls on its enemies to be terrorized and insulted. However, in this case, B&H and its people, without any blame, were humiliated. (Hadzic, 2021) However, the numerous reports (e.g., The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and the Global Index of Terrorism) rated B&H as the country with the most significant decline in the terrorist influence of any country in the world. The latest study, Global index of Terrorism (2022), is similar to earlier ones, and put B&H in the last possible level, green color; "zero" influence." At the same time, many western countries are in "orange color," expressing medium danger. (Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index, 2020; 2022) Furthermore, according to the Pew Reserach Center study "The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics, and Society" (2013), which also included Western-world secular Muslims, and my Research (Hadzic, 2022), Bosniaks, an

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<sup>4</sup> Independent State of Croatia (NDH) was a fascist totalitarian dictatorship, a former puppet state created during WW2, influenced by Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, and led by the "Ustahe regime."

<sup>5</sup> The US State Department report on religious freedom for 2018 stated that religious intolerance is rising in Croatia, particularly on the Internet. The Council of Europe had similar warnings of pro-Ustasha "graffiti" intimidating minority religious communities in occasional verbal and physical assault cases. (USDOS, 2019) In 2015, before the Euro 2016 qualifying match between Croatia and Italy's national football teams split, a giant 14-meter Nazi Swastika appeared on the pitch.

autochthonous European Muslims- South Slavs, are one of the most liberal Muslims in the world. American analyst Janus Bugajski stated: "Macron is wrong; B&H is not threatened by jihadists, but by internal ethnic divisions." The main issue of B&H is that the Serbian (Orthodox) and Croatian (Catholic) authorities have not entirely accepted B&H as a legitimate and sovereign multi-ethnic state. (Bugajski, 2020) In such circumstances, from the ideologically designed ethnicity and religion, a territorially insatiable, mass media-incited Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia unstoppably embarked on its aggressive, clerical-fascist, malignant-genocidal wars across Yugoslavia. That historic great-power clerical-ethnic ambition, which lies at the ideological basis of the chaos of war, has significant consequences for Serbian, Croatian, and B&H societies. Thus, the politics of the past bears a tremendous collective responsibility for all wars in the Balkans.

In some cases, nationalism is set up as a pseudoreligion (i.e., the object of the strongest desire and the foundation of the highest trust), while at the same time, it is explicitly non-religious. When monotheism accepts exclusive nationalism, the God of monotheism transforms from the creator of all people and the creatures he loves into a selfish and violent idol of a particular nation. Phrases like "God and the Croats," "heavenly Serbia," "German Christians," and other widespread slogans are forms of religiously infected or legitimized exclusive nationalism. The return of nationalism in Eastern European countries (Hungary, Slovakia, Poland) and the strengthening of right-wing parties in Western European countries (Germany, France, and the Netherlands) is a momentary expression of socioeconomic dissatisfaction and a reaction to the processes of Europeanization and globalization. The policies advocated by right-wing parties such as the German AfD are harmless and resemble the political status in the 1930s. Utterly the "object" of nationalist rhetoric and hostility has changed -foreigners (Muslims) as its enemies. On the day of Brexit, Nigel Farage declared: "This is the victory of the real people," implying that 48% of people who wanted to stay in the EU are inaccurate. It is partially a result of the impotence of the leftist social democracy, which has failed to articulate its policy and make it socially relevant. It is also a consequence of conservative, reactionary church rhetoric in Eastern European countries. Thus, the normalization of massive xenophobia occurred in Europe, which the Western societies must resist, principally leftist sociopolitical anemia.

Religion is the "faith" system of regulations that mark the believers (a community awaiting salvation). Non-believers are separated. Catholicism and Orthodoxy believe religion is deeply rooted in a culture that believers and non-believers cannot share (Pope's call for recognition of Europe's Christian roots have more to do with culture than the existing pattern of faith). Most Christians in Western Europe Today are non-practicing Christians. However, Christian identity remains a meaningful religious, social and cultural characteristic, according to a new Pew Research Center survey of countries in Western Europe. In addition to religious beliefs and practices, the survey explores respondents' sentiments on immigration, national identity, and pluralism and how religion is intertwined with perspectives on these issues. Although many non-practicing Christians in Western Europe say they do not believe in God "as described in the Bible," they often believe in some other higher power or universal spiritual force. By contrast, most church-attending Christians believe in God as described in the Bible. Non-practicing Christians are more likely than religiously unaffiliated adults to adopt spiritual ideas such as having a soul and feeling related to something that cannot be estimated. The Christian identity in Western Europe is associated with more elevated levels of nationalism and negative belief toward immigrants and religious minorities. (Pew Research Center, 2018)

Islamic globalization likewise takes place in orthodox Muslim countries. It involves a movement of people and ideas, cultural implications, and ways of religiosity. Thus, it is the relationship believers maintain with their religion. Crucially, essentially related to the issue of European Islam is the division of Islam on the one hand and given territories and cultures on the other. Religions are permanently constructed into the culture of the countries in which they originated. It is challenging for a believer to distinguish what is part of a cultural tradition, social conventions, and doctrine. The average individual or believer frequently does not differentiate between religion as the completeness of beliefs, theology, and culture. Islam, which considers itself the last great world religion in humankind's history, believes that there will be no more revelations until the end of human history: it is the final, definitive, corrected, and direct revelation. That is why Muhammad as the Prophet is called the "seal of the prophets." According to Islam, therefore, there is only one religion, the Religion of divine Oneness. "Islam" means "surrendering or submitting to the will of the One

God," Allah, lord of the world and life, judge and benefactor. To become a member of Islam, a Muslim, means to declare before two Muslim witnesses: La Ilaha Illa-Allah, "There is no (other) god but God (Allah)." That single expression of confession of faith (shahadah) is fundamental to Islamic revelation. The first article speaks of the unity of the divine principle, and the second of accepting the message of unity by utilizing the person God has chosen as his last Prophet. Based on emphasizing God as One, his Oneness, and the belief in the eternal receptivity of humanity to the One as One, Islam considers itself a religion like things themselves, i.e., as a return to the original religion, the Religion of Oneness. One consequence of such self-understanding is the shaping and development of the Islamic intellectual tradition. Thus, the treasury of most of the wisdom of the ancient world, from the Greco-Alexandrian to the Indian.

The emergence of emigration abruptly raised the contest between religion, societies, and the cultural process to the point that religious beliefs became confusing. Consequently, Muslims in Europe unexpectedly must rediscover or define what belongs to the religious world. Today's revival of religiosity among European Muslims is not the consequence of importing religious traditions from the Muslim world. Evangelical activities or historical colonialism dynamics are also examples. However, frequently religious movements are neither tolerant nor liberal but based on dogmatism. We can problematize that anyone against violent extremism and supporting modest Islam supposes to advocate the Islamic Reforms- contemporary Islam. It is often argued that Christianity likewise had "improved and modernized." The result was Enlightenment, sophistication, secularism, and liberal democracy. The Muslim world, which is in a political, socioeconomic, and religious crisis, needs reforms. Muslims will have to remember their legacy of pluralism, toleration, and reciprocal respect manifested in the Prophet's letter to the monks of the monastery of St. Catherine. Therefore, advocating coexistence in medieval Muslim Spain.

This study addresses European Islam, Christianity, and contemporary neo-nationalism/neo-radicalism and their political/cultural/religious/historical discursive conflict, problematizing a positional research gap within the current EU sociopolitical processes. This paper argues that the intriguing neo-nationalist and neo-conservative "opposition" between Europe and Islam affect sociopolitical stability.

Moreover, the sociopolitical processes that are neither epistemological manifest various temporal and spatial patterns of cultural-ideological positions. Likewise, a divergence of culture and Religion of Islamic Salafism (comparable to American Protestant fundamentalism and European religious colonialism), and Western Christians' emphasis on the spiritual experience than on administration, marks a revival of religiosity. Furthermore, the paper presents insight into the impacts and consequences of these processes for the frameworks most exposed to these changes. Finally, opposing historiographical/fictional/literature/political sphere discourses formed and maintained the fundamentals of the Islam and Christianity dispute climate and potential fragile security and social justice.

## **1. Method and materials**

Both general scientific (method of induction, analysis, and synthesis) and specific scientific methods (comparative) were used in the study. In addition, the study included content analysis, a descriptive method, and an in-depth theoretical literature review. Additionally, the author examined a range of other sources, such as current nominal textbooks related to the topic as primary documents relating to social, cultural, religious, political relations and security discourse. Theoretical knowledge and expertise are drawn from an interdisciplinary approach; political science, peace and conflict studies, sociology of religion, political sociology, critical security studies, international relations, Law, and history, constituting a robust conceptual framework.

## **2. Results and Discussion**

### **2. 1. European Islam and Christian West**

Stefan Schreiner believes that "Christian Europe" is the concept of victory over others. It developed mainly after the reconquest. This opinion is based on several myths about the victories of Christians over Islam. First, the encounter with the culture of Islam in Spain has primarily charted the future picture of Europe, especially by translating the works of Islamic thinkers and scholars. Without this system, European cultural history would have moved differently. For example, the

Renaissance and the Enlightenment would not have happened because there was no Islamic influence. (Schreiner, 2012) It would therefore be wrong to claim that the cultural development of Europe was influenced only by Christianity.

A clear path is evident, i.e., the construction of "Qirada" significantly influenced venture capital companies called "Commenda" in Italian cities. Leonardo Fibonacci from Pisa (1170 to 1240) learned the calculations and calculations of Arab traders in Algeria, so his book "Liber abaci" became a bestseller among Italian traders. According to Koehler, the Templars brought the idea of law schools (madrasas) to London during the Crusades; the Inns of Court, a law school, was founded there. In addition, the Templars introduced Bishop Walter de Merton (1205 to 1277) to the idea of a "waqf,"; and as a mixture of madrasa and waqf, it was founded in 1264 at Oxford by Merton College, one of the oldest British colleges. Europe learned from the Arabs to issue gold coins when the Venetians expelled the Muslims to Palestine and took over their gold coin mint. The stagnation of the monetary economy has ended in Western Europe. Moreover, the Islamic orientation influences the West's development. (Koehler, 2014)

The modernization of Islam (in the Western world) does not inevitably arise via the liberal theologies and theologians. It can even have a fundamentalism character. Contemporary fundamentalism is one of the forms of Islamic globalization, one of the forms of Islamic Westernization. It is what concerns people. However, in Islam, there have been liberal and modern scholars and have always existed. E.g., in France, Mohammed Arkoun was a prominent philosopher of French civilization and a connoisseur of Islam. (Roy, 2006) Does European Islam think- this inquiry puts many delicate themes together? He was an unrestrained critic of traditional Islamic doctrine. His work demonstrated the importance of reimagining the role of religion in modern culture. (Hashas, 2018) The following issue arises: who reads such authors and their impact on Today's Muslim youth? (Roy, 2006) Furthermore, does Islam need the guidance of the West in the vastly advocated Reform, or does Islam need an ideological Reform? Nevertheless, the reformation of Islam according to the Christian model is impossible. In 1517, Luther did not just put ninety-five theses on the church in Wittenberg condemning the misuses of the Catholic Church. He insisted that German peasants and rebellions against feudal lords be killed by



comparing them to angry dogs. In 1543, he documented and wrote about Jews and their falsehoods. He named Jews the devils and called for their destruction. Moreover, historically anti-Semitism was often used in church/religious matters. Holocaust specialist Ronald Berger noted that Luther played a significant role in establishing anti-Semitism as an "essential part of German culture and identity. (Jikeli, 2020) According to Hitler, the Jewish goal was to destroy Germany, especially the intelligentsia. By destroying the patriotic Germans, the Jews would open the way for themselves to conquer the country and hence the whole world. Perhaps that is why the "future Fuhrer" decided to embark on politics- to save the German people from a cunning "enemy."

"Authentic" Islam is based neither on a historical event like Christianity nor an ethnic collectivity like Judaism. However, on the original and universal Truth, which has always existed. Moreover, the whole Islamic world is an ummah, therefore a community of those who are Muslims. However Iranian thinker and expert on Sufism and Hinduism Dariush Shayegan in his book "Qu'est-Ce Qu'une Revolution Religieuse"- Collections Sciences - Sciences Humaines (1991) analyzed this phenomenon, showing that subjecting divine revelation to the philosophy of history and social theory leads to ideological falsification and, in a sense, to the drying up and destruction of Islamic culture. (Shayegan, 1991) However, unfortunately, the public does not comprehend innovative authors. Moreover, it is inaccurate to presume that religious radicalism Salafism and, political radicalism, extremist terrorist organizations, are just imports from the cultures and conflicts of the Muslim world. These phenomena are mainly due to Islamic globalization and western influence. The separation of culture and religion primarily marks Today's revival of religiosity. It clarifies the mutual relationship between American Protestant fundamentalism, Islamic Salafism, and European religious colonialism. Both deny culture, philosophy, and actual theology, in favor of scriptural reading of religious textbooks and direct understanding of Truth through individual faith to the disadvantage of academic and religious institutions. (Roy, 2006) However, Islamist European extremism and radicalism remain marginal. This radicalism is not the result of failed integration. However, it is related to local and global associations tied to identity "break" and the exposure of young European Muslims to the painful images of destruction and violence in numerous Muslim countries. Whether this brutality results from the

Western intervention (invasion of Iraq and the Israel/Palestine enduring violence) or the consequence of the assault of Muslim regimes on their populations (Iraq or Syria) is irrelevant. (Khader, 2016)

Historically, if we observe different forms of religious fundamentalism globally, American fundamentalists opposed social changes in many forms. Intellectually, they defended historic Christian teachings' essences as they described them. Thus they demanded the necessity of a transformation experience through faith in Jesus. Thus, the Biblical accurateness in subjects of science, history, and theology, and the return of Christ to the earth where he would establish a reign of peace and justice. Fundamentalists conveyed their convictions in numerous ways, prominently through the wide dissemination of twelve booklets called "*The Fundamentals*" (1910-1915). However, fundamentalism persisted in growing and ultimately flourished. In the 1930s, it became more secretive and built a system of schools and universities, seminaries, and evangelist agencies. More significantly, the movement shortly established a print and telecast enterprise. It produced semi-church organizations to meet numerous social groups (youth, non-married people, veterans). Thus, fundamentalists found creative ways to address religious concerns. (Wacker, 2017)

Furthermore, Catholic and Protestant institutions helped the imperial powers in colonization. It had agendas of its own, which conflicted with global colonization projects. The most influential religious establishments were Protestant churches, Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, and Capuchins. It is a fact for the 17th/18th centuries with so-called evangelical Protestantism such as Quakers, Halle Pietists, Moravians, and similar. Numerous religious rulings and communities had Atlantic but global networks that stretched from European to African, American, and Asian worlds. In the 19th century, it included the Pacific regions, Australia and New Zealand. Considerable religious minorities were persecuted for their faith in the early modern era. Imperial states arranged to use religious minorities to populate their overseas colonies. Thus, strengthening their power and capital. The tolerance was about "suffering" the "religious other." Thus, utilitarian motives contained colonization schemes. (Lachenicht, 2019)

The victory of numerous formats of neo-fundamentalism is evident and actuality Today. The explanation for such processes is that it paradoxically justifies cultural

identity loss and qualifies pure religion to be conceptualized independently of variations and cultural influences. In nations with an Islamic tradition, believers and non-believers, or not-so-convinced believers, perceive religion as a given of their culture. Thus, in most cases, society offers and manages space for practicing religious ceremonies. Consequently, it is not challenging to fast during Ramadan in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lybia, and Egypt, even when one does not want to. Whoever wants to celebrate Ramadan fasting can do so without any concerns. Societies have been following it for as long as necessary. There are examples of societies, such as, for example, Iran. Very few people practice religious rites, but it is official. Everything is done to encourage the faithful to honor Ramadan fasting. (Roy, 2006)

The man in the street does not usually distinguish between religion as a corpus of beliefs-theology and culture - ordinary believers. Nevertheless, immigration has unexpectedly divided Religion and Society, Religion and culture, to the extent that religious belief is lost. Abruptly, a Muslim living in European countries has somehow to reinvent, rediscover, or define what, to his thought, belongs to the religious scope. Therefore, for a Muslim, being in the minority or an immigrant compels him to think about the fundamental Islamic nature. He is forced to objectify Islam, i.e., to define the nature of Islam as objectively as possible. A European Muslim is in the minority, or an emigrant eventually forces him to think about the elemental Islamic essence. Religious literature is as old as religion itself, and if individual attempts to examine the titles of books on religion throughout history, from ancient times to the present day, he will discover books with very similar titles. Occasionally, these metaphors: "Pearls of the Sea," "Pearls of Knowledge." Recently, however, there have been headlines that have no precedent in the religious literature. "What kind of religion is Islam?", "What indicates to be a Muslim?", "How to experience Islam?". Thus, a quantity of literature attempts to find objectives and define Islam. There is a necessity for such a factual definition, and there is no longer any evidence of religious beliefs. There is no longer mediation by the clerics or legal experts. Every individual is faced with the necessity to find, define, and objectify the religious meaning. (Roy, 2006)

Some scholars have noted that church and religious denomination have left their strength as indicators of rel. The religiosity moved from collective forms of engagement towards a more individual religiosity - exercised in the personal and

private format. The privatization and individualization deteriorate the traditional religious view, resulting in a more abstract personal and private understanding of religiosity. Many authors have pointed to the necessity to use indicators that reflect these changes in personal spirituality, with indicators capable of studying these contemporary religiosity forms. Although not as common as the previous indicators, the variable "importance of God in your life" was considered by publications as an ideal tool to measure these religiosity transformations. Norris and Inglehart (2004) used this variable to measure religious matters. It does not refer to a social form of religion as church attendance or a strictly marking as a religious denomination, but it is more in line with recent Spirituality forms. The variable is also helpful for comparison since the significance of Religion/Faith is valid for various religions, no matter their doctrines. Nevertheless, the question is whether these indicators of religious beliefs and values, which reflect a more personal and individual form of spirituality, have the exact influence on political and electoral behavior. (Perez and Cordero, 2010)

The negative historical attitudes towards Islam in the Balkan region should be considered part of a broader European / Western project to erase centuries-old contacts and coexistence between Christian and Islamic peoples, which have marked joint achievements in science and culture. Of course, not everyone supported such a radical cut. The Austro-Hungarian geologist Ami Boué objected as early as the 1850s that the planned persecution of Balkan Muslims outside Europe would be as tragic as the persecution of Jews from Spain or Protestants from France because Muslims in the Balkans are mostly Slavs and Albanians and therefore have an equal right to their country as their Christian neighbors. Andrić's doctoral dissertation underlines the incompatibility between Islam and Christianity by considering the spiritual development of B&H in the Ottoman period. Although more essayistic than scientifically documented, his thesis continues and concretizes the ideological view that Islam was imposed from outside. Thus, because of Islam, the Christian population in the Balkans was deprived of a connection with progressive European development. (Buturovic, 2019)

In the present context, with growing concerns about Muslims in Europe, which has a "Christian historical and cultural heritage," the question is whether these countries

can be entirely European (B&H, Albania, Kosovo, Turkey). If we examine particular rhetoric, Europe is becoming more secular in many religions and is concerned about Muslims' presence. Not only religious but also highly secular people and considered atheists in Europe suddenly debate "what our values are and who it is us." Suddenly they are addressing the Christian heritage in Europe. Some politicians do not indeed address that in practice. Then the question arises, can a predominantly Muslim country be part of Europe? Can they be entirely Europeans? Also, the difference between European and the United States Muslims is that they came to Europe as a labor force, from the lower strata of society and with more secondary education. The difference in language, culture and education is very noticeable and definite. It should be added that they are not educationally progressing fast, and many still live on social welfare. It is an issue in Europe, and with the economic downturn, many of these workers are "no longer needed," John Esposito, an expert in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies, stated. (Esposito, 2013)

The issue of multiculturalism despair, i.e., Islam, is apparent in Western Europe. For example, people maintain diverse views on whether Islam is compatible with European national values and culture, and most favor some form of religious clothing restrictions by Muslim women. In addition, approximately half or more in most countries state it is fundamental to have been born or have ancestry in a country to share its national identity truthfully. For example, approximately half of the Finnish adults articulated that it is crucial to be born in Finland (51%) - have Finnish family background (51%) - to be authentic Finnish. (Pew Research Center, 2018)

## **2.2. Contemporary European neo-nationalism, neo-radicalism, and security**

Copenhagen School of security studies declared that studying security in speech actions is possible. Undoubtedly, all subjects can be turned into security issues. Security is a social construction and must portray a terrifying actuality. "Islam never belonged to Europe; it was invoked there; spiritually, Islam does not belong to Europe. Hungarian Orban stated that it is a corpus of rules of another world, justifying his opposition to admitting hundreds of thousands of refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from Muslim countries, to "protect European cultural values." Pim Fortuyn, a

former Dutch politician and scholar, made striking public statements on Islam, multiculturalism, immigration, asylum policy, and political rivals. He asserted a demand for a Cold War against Islam because Islam severely threatened society. He considered mosques as "directing organizations in which martyrs are raised" and Islam a "retarded culture." (Douglas, 2017) Besides, the significant differences between Trump and contemporary European radical right-wing parties are structure and ideology. European populists tend to be supported by political forces and comprehensive organizations, united around a coherent global perspective. For instance, the comparison of Trump to France's Marine Le Pen is evident. On the other hand, Trump is essentially solely incoming from a realm above politics, without any noteworthy organization or ideology. He built a right-wing reactionary campaign. However, Trump has nominated advisers who believe that the United States is "fighting for life and death" with Islam, obscuring the difference between ordinary religious members and extreme fundamentalists - terrorist groups. Despite his rise in the United States and worldwide, Trump implicitly neglected right-wing domestic terror in the United States. Far-right groups and individuals caused sixty-six deaths and launched hundred-twenty-seven attacks between 2013 and 2017. Most of the violence was carried out by lone actors with far-right, white nationalist, or anti-Muslim sentiments. (Slobodna Europa, 2019)

Western Europe Christian identity is associated with increased levels of nationalism and antagonism- sentiments toward emigrants and minority religious groups. Church attendants or practicing religious European Christians are more likely than unaffiliated adults to state that "Islam is fundamentally incompatible with European countries' values and civilization." In Germany, as in numerous other European states, general public opinion is divided on whether Islam is compatible with German matters and culture, with 55% of church-going Catholics declaring that Islam is incompatible with German culture, compared with 45% among non-practicing Christians and 32% among religiously unaffiliated adults. Similarly, practicing and non-practicing Christians are more likely than religiously unaffiliated adults to express that their culture is superior to others and favor decreasing immigration from its current status. Aside from religious identity, factors such as education, sociopolitical ideology, and personal understanding of Islam and Muslims are correlated with nationalism, anti-immigrant, and anti-religious minority emotions. For example,

western Europeans with a university education are less likely to state they would not tolerate Jews, Muslims, or Hindus in their family or express that their civilization is superior. Moreover, the citizens who state they know a Muslim privately are less likely to represent these presumptions. Contrarily, Western Europeans on the "right ideological scope" are *more* likely than those on the left not to tolerate Muslims in their family or that it is essential to have been born in their country to belong truly. (Pew Research Center, 2018)

The impression is that liberalism is a more vital dilemma for the left than nationalism. However, nationalism is the most significant problem in Today's world. Nationalism does not allow society to become dynamic. The phenomenon that countries with developed democratic institutions and standards have authoritarianism characteristics are increasing. It directs to a sealed circle of global "legitimate democratic" violence, in which democratic institutions and standards, human and minority rights, and freedoms are disputable. Europe's far-left has rejected social exclusion. There are foundations to look ahead to the disappearance of the violent and radical far left. However, it served a purpose - conducting and maintaining a particular revolt.

The Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic stated that "For Home- Za Dom" is one of the historical variants of the Croatian greeting and shout. Moreover, according to President, "Ready for Home - Za dom Spremni<sup>6</sup>" is the official, compromised greeting of the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), which should be distinguished from the exact shout of members of the Croatian Homeland War units during the 1990s, which is part of their never-banned insignia. (Aljazeera, 2019) However, it is inaccurate. It is Ustasha's fascist ideological salute, combined with Catholic symbolism, used in WW2 and during the Croatian war for independence in the 1990s. Also, the former President Grabar-Kitarovic (formally represented NATO) rejected the ICTY Hague Tribunal ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity verdicts committed against the Bosniaks (B&H Muslims). The Croatian President

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<sup>6</sup> *Za Dom Spremni* was a salutation used during World War II by the Croatian Ustaše movement. It was the Croatian equivalent of the Nazi salute *Sieg heil*. Many concentration death camps (for Serbs, Jews, Roma and others) were organized during the Ustashe regime; the most notorious is "Jasenovac."

presented the B&H as a “security threat to the EU” by Islamic terrorism and radicalization, entering a threatening geopolitical diversion by producing unproved Bosnian Islamic terrorism. (Danas, 2017) In patter by such, French President Macron stated that B&H is a "time bomb knocking right next to Croatia" (Al Jazeera, 2019), putting an "international political target" on this country and its inhabitants, exposing them to suspicion, contempt, and lynching of the world, excommunicating them from the European civilization context. It further heightens the fear among B&H and its neighbors.

However, research suggests that jihadism is a much more serious concern in France than anywhere else in the Balkans, especially regarding the number of terrorist incidents. Moreover, more than 1,900 French citizens went to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq compared to about 300 B&H citizens. Furthermore, Bugajski argued that "the pressure on B&H depends on the extent of nationalist fervor within the Serbian and Croatian capitals, Belgrade, and Zagreb authorities. At the same time, there are favorable international conditions, including the ignorance or naivety of some Western European leaders. Moreover, Moscow plays a significant role in the defense of the "quasi-separatist" entity Republika Srpska (RS) in B&H on the international stage and uses the Balkans as a strategic tool not to prevent the inclusion of the region in the transatlantic security sphere but to undermine the connection of the West. Zagreb is also beneficial for Russia in keeping B&H off balance. HDZ party (Croatian Democratic Union) nationalists in Croatia and B&H see the Russian presence as a chance to support the demand for a third Croatian entity in B&H." (Bugajski, 2020) However, besides numerous reports (e.g., The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) and the Global Index of Terrorism), which rated B&H with "zero" Islamic radicalism and Terrorism influence and as the country with the most significant decline in the terrorist influence of any country (compared to many Western countries) in the world, Bosniaks are one of the most liberal Muslims in the world. The primary reason is the historically distinct Bosniak culture. They are autochthonous European Muslims - South Slavic people practicing very moderate Islam. Moreover, Bosniaks are a potential "link" for peace dialogue between Europe and the Muslim world. (Hadzic, 2022)



Less than two million Muslims live in B&H, almost twice as many as in France, ten times less than they currently have in the countries of the European Union, and twenty times less than there are on the European continent. The statistics themselves show how unfounded the fear of Bosnian Muslims (according to research, one of the most liberal Muslims in the world) who, after the war of the 1990s, live integratively and peacefully in the countries of the European Union. Macron's statement that B&H is a time bomb shows that Frank Furedi is at least partially correct, claiming that Western culture feeds on terror and thus inadvertently calls on his enemies to be terrorized. (Furedi, 2018) At the same time, this policy of fear and intimidation creates an atmosphere in which citizens are afraid of unknown threats, unknown terrorists, and unknown jihadists. According to this sociologist, the fear of terrorism is much greater among political elites than the ordinary population. Wrong politicians do not appreciate their citizens either; they are apprehensive of them, constantly keeping them in psychosis, i.e., the culture of fear.

Paradoxically, to actual French politics mentioned above, French national identity, at least in theory, is not defined by ethnic loyalty but by the political idea of citizenship, which implies acceptance of the French language and culture. It creates a stimulating intellectual environment in which questions of belonging are thought of with an open mind. Jules Keppel and Olivier Roy have educated Western readers about the Islamic world. Both have written scholarly and stimulating books on Middle Eastern politics and the presence of Islam in modern Europe. They agree on many issues, mainly that Muslims can be loyal citizens of a democratic Europe. (Keppel and Jardin, 2015) They disagree only on how to achieve this. Roy is more liberal because he distrusts the state's attempts to impose cultural values on individuals, while Keppel favors a more conventional French belief that the imposition of shared values is the state's duty. (Roy, 2011)

If we partially focus on the Migrant Crisis (since 2015), the Islamic State/al-Qaeda-linked groups/Boko Haram and similar radical groups are protagonists of Today's deadliest crises and complicating efforts. They have exploited violent conflicts, failed states, and geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East to achieve new strongholds in Africa, and become an evolving danger. Reversing their progress requires avoiding the mistakes that facilitated their rise. Islamic State and succor exacerbate the

sectarian forces flowing through the Islamic world. "Jihadists' growth is an instability product than its direct driver. It is due more to radicalization during crises than beforehand and owes more to battling between their opponents than to their strengths." (International Crisis Group, 2016) However, the fact is that only two percent of the total number of refugees in Today's world come to European countries. Moreover, most people in terrible conditions remain near the conflict's site. (IOM, 2020) However, the migrant crisis initiated the growth of xenophobia and the dispersal of anti-immigrant emotions that became an authority - matrix for radical populism. In the era of fundamental significance, the trans-nationality and post-nationality notions are questioned. Thus, the nation-state model has undergone substantial transformations in globalization, becoming less sustainable and critical for cultural, sociopolitical, and economic advancement. Due to the growing socioeconomic insecurity and the fear of losing national identities in an atmosphere of globalized culture, people have perceived multiculturalism as a threat. Despite being defined as a political subject, the EU's cultural integrity remains indistinct, and the migrant crisis has opened up a multiculturalism debate. (Hadžić, 2020) The mistrust of Muslims in Europe has grown since the migrant crisis. For example, a 2017 study revealed that 43 % of the German public desires Germany to ban Muslims from entering the state. Moreover, the European Justice Court has supported bans on Muslim women wearing headscarves (France and Belgium). (More in Common, 2017)

Securitization draws many resources and sociopolitical engagement. However, security is not an unmitigated good, and several topics should not be securitized. Securitization of Islam in this sense is a severe type of politicization. It implicates closure, rigid governmental control, and monitoring while complicating and diminishing the influence of non-governmental associations. It occurred in the "exchange" between Cultures, which has been politicized - often controlled by governments. The prioritization of issues and selection of civil society groups has deterred other groups from expressing their preferences and goals, curtailing the exchange's directness and inclusiveness. It aims to address stereotypes and establish new perceptions in their place. Rather than retaining the public, the discussion primarily consists of intellectual exchanges and dialogues among elites.

Accordingly, the dialogue has to evolve - more open and all-encompassing regarding actors' subjects. (Gündüz, 2007)

If we concentrate on the social policies of right-wing nationalist countries, we see eminent inferior politics. According to the FEANTSA research, the problem of homelessness in Hungary is primarily a lack of cheap and affordable housing. Orban is always ready for symbolic confrontations with representatives of global financial institutions (often wrapped in anti-Semitic and anti-Western demagoguery). However, the concrete results of his economic policy are purely neoliberal - abolishing public goods and enriching a narrow population layer at the top of the social ladder. The only difference is that its economic protectionism gives a minimal advantage to members of the domestic capitalist class and parts of the upper-middle class close to the ruling structures. His "struggle against neoliberalism" is, in fact, a double struggle of the Hungarian capitalist class that uses nationalism and populism for the political mobilization of more comprehensive sections of society. On the one hand, this struggle is a relatively unsuccessful struggle against competitive foreign capital, and on the other, an extremely successful struggle against workers, the homeless, pensioners, Roma, and other marginalized social groups. (FEANTSA, 2011)

The culmination of Islamophobia in Europe further complicates the entry of some dominant Muslim countries (B&H, Turkey, Albania) into the European Union (EU). Former Croatian President Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic has pursued rhetorics as a metaphor for hybrid wars in the Balkan region and nations. Official Brussels distanced itself from the Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović about the alleged radicalization of B&H, Islamic terrorism, and the B&H as a security threat to the EU. Even by the standards of the Western Balkans, the claims are inaccurate and extraordinary. (De Launey, 2019) The President made unverifiable claims portraying the neighboring country as a security threat and haven for thousands of Islamist terrorists. If this is observed at the population level, even many Europeans have intricacies with Islamophobia. Perhaps a minority, but a substantial opposition occurs with these anti-immigration political parties. In addition, they have discriminational patterns and irrational fear. It affects their attitudes to a robust Muslim presence in Europe or even the idea that Europe can have a Muslim country. It increases the anti-immigrant groups, which focus on Muslims because they are the largest group. Research

(primarily proxy data), referring to nationality and ethnicity, indicates that Muslims are often disproportionately represented in places with inadequate housing conditions, and their educational accomplishment is below average. Their unemployment rates are higher than average. Muslims are often employed in positions that require lower qualifications, and as a group, they are over-represented in low-paying economic sectors. Their poor situation in the labor market is a particular reason for worry. Unemployment is a critical factor affecting integration. It was recognized in 2004 by the EU leaders during the Justice and Home Affairs Council<sup>7</sup>, who "welcomed" the employment process as one of the eleven fundamental principles for community and national integration guidelines. (EUMC, 2006)

### **2.3. Islam and European sociopolitical and literature patterns of dispute**

In the novel "Submission," Michael Houellebecq (2016) questions right-wing narratives pointing out that the left will strengthen the Muslim movements of European political Islam because it is inclusive. (Houellebecq, 2016) The reversal of hierarchies and changes in the center is realized in the novel on three levels: the level of intellectual Europe (here the novel is imposed at times as ironic), the level of political realization of Euroarabia (as a spatial phenomenon that includes intertwining Europe and what in colloquial speech France means by Arabia: Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey). Moreover, that is precisely the ordeal of all xenophobes. The third very important is the level of body and gender. First, he talks about "covered girls," who listen to his lectures. Then, as the narration progresses, they will slowly reach its center from the peripheral part of the amphitheater (and the narrative). Here, perhaps best, one sees the Derridian idea of the center as a function. In the simultaneous processes of shifting the center of the narrative and de-centering the European idea, the tension that motivates the novel's action will be situated. The right describes them as xenophobic constructions, proving the complete European antipode. However, reflection could be made on whether the right is spreading self-hatred stereotypes

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<sup>7</sup> Presidency Conclusions - Brussels, (2004). The Hague Programme strengthening freedom, security, and justice in the EU, [http://ec.europa.eu/justice\\_home/news/information\\_dossiers/20052009/docs/presidency\\_conclusions\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/information_dossiers/20052009/docs/presidency_conclusions_en.pdf)

about Islam. Is Islamophobia, which presents Islam as backward and patriarchal in modern Europe, actually schizophrenia of the European right? "Submission" is a novel built on a subtle spatial inversion that reverses the historical hierarchy. It insists that the Maghreb countries conquer France (which, has it, once conquered them). The inversions are segmentally precisely: for example, while the world's famous universities relocate to the East, women with burqas relocate to Paris. Houellebecq shows the fundamental inhomogeneity of his actants, which strives for homogeneity despite this and precisely because of that.

Muslims are divided into the Muslim Brotherhood, which participates in the rule of France, the Arabs who occupy the universities, and the Salafis who are in constant conflict with the Muslim Brotherhood. Europe is divided into leftists and rightists who look like each other at times (the main character in the novel announces the "brutal" death of this opposition) and into members of the identity movement. In doing so, members of the Muslim Brotherhood are close to the European political mainstream, while members of the identity movement are close to the Salafis. The political moment in the novel is when the Muslim Brotherhood has serious political power in France, with a tendency to strengthen.

Nevertheless, doesn't this moment anticipate East and West exchange positions? The "opposition" between Europe and Islam is intriguing: it is neither axiological nor epistemological, not even solely political. It is not the opposition but a difference that is also procedural with constant changes in spatial patterns and ideological positions. The Muslim Brotherhood does not have a solid political or ideological position but simply maneuvers within the political space. Processivity is based on breaking down stereotypes (the only stereotype that is being broken down, others are being imitated because of the functioning of the narrative) about hermetically sealed Islam and an open European society. While Muslims with the Muslim Brotherhood are open, contributing to their strengthening, Europe embodied in its academic citizens is closed, alienated, and self-sufficient. The spatial inversions take place in a fundamental reversal of the novel. The subjugation signifies the process in which Europe becomes colonized by Muslims from outside with all the stereotypical implications.

Susanne Wiesinger (Austrian/Vienna teacher for three decades), has written a book "Kulturkampf im Klassenzimmer: Wie der Islam die Schulen verändert. Bericht einer Lehrerin" (Kulturkampf in the classroom: How Islam is changing schools. Report from a teacher). The book (2019) contends the impact of conservative Islam on her students' everyday lives and teaching. Wiesinger describes the challenges she faces in a school with 21 Muslims in one class of 25 students whose mother tongue is not German. Nevertheless, if her book is read carefully and spoken to, it becomes clear that neither the "left-wing critics," as she calls them, nor the enthusiastic right-wingers are right about her. Wiesinger says, "I am not against Islam!" On the contrary, her critique is directed "against ultra-conservative Islam, which is directed against Western values." Wiesinger is not against her students. "I feel responsible for them! I want these children to have a good future in our common state; I want only the best for them!" She writes: "For me, they belong to us, and that is why a plural society must address their problems." (Wiesinger, 2018). However, the students in the book do not get the word out. Wiesinger justifies this by saying that she did not want to give names. However, there are no anonymized allegations either. Susanne Wiesinger has headed the Office of the Ombudsman for Ethical Issues and Conflict of Cultures at the Ministry of Education.

If we go back in the past and observe the Balkan region, as a result of prosecution, millions were expelled in de-Islamization, which began as early as the early 19th century and continued periodically over the next hundred years. In this atmosphere of polarization, the local population that embraced Islam was the most terrible reflection of contact with the "Turks" because they were seen as arbitrary traitors to the essential Slavic connection with Christianity and therefore had to be either assimilated or eliminated. It should be borne in mind that this worldview was also related to the discourse on racial differences, myths about the natural connection between culture and religion, civilization, and racial characteristics. Petar Njegos talked about cleaning up the "heavy smell of non-crosses that stinks," leaving no room for the compromise Skender-aga offers in Gorski Vijenac. "Not at all," Njegos wrote. Furthermore, Ivo Andrić's literature combined several conflicting discourses on the Islam and Christianity climate, from the fictional to the historiographical and the political, authoritatively enough to be considered an authentic spokesman for everything that has happened (and is happening) in B&H. (Buturovic, 2019)

Milorad Dodik<sup>8</sup> has frequently called and quoted Bosniaks "Muslims" in Balkan media, including in his speech at the European (EU) Parliament in 2022. We can problematize that Dodik aims to articulate that Bosniaks are not a people like Serbs and Croats but a religious group. In addition to insisting on the name Muslims and not Bosniaks and the identification of Bosniaks as Turks ("Bosniaks are converts who were Islamized after Turkey came to the area"), Dodik goes so far as to point out that one who is married to a Muslim woman cannot belong to the Serbian people. Lately, dissatisfied with a decision by the Central Election Commission voted for by Vanja Bjelica Prutina, a member of the Commission, Dodik called her "a lady who presented herself as a representative of the Serb people and is still married to a Muslim in Sarajevo." (Karabeg, 2021) It fits the discursive radical ideology due to ethnoreligious political antagonism and polarization of religious identities. Dodik aims to benefit from the right-wing policies and growing radical populism in Europe that is anti-immigrant and anti-Islam. He undoubtedly follows these sociopolitical and ideological matrices. His politics are proximate to those political networks (i.e., Hungarian Viktor Orban and French far-right politician Thierry Mariani). According to these rhetorics, since Bosniaks often call themselves nation-building people, they should be deprived of that character and reduced to the level of a religious community. Mixed marriages in B&H are a "cancer" on the otherwise clean and healthy ethnic tissue (Perisic, 2012) of all three religious groups. In general, "mixed ethnic marriages" in B&H and region can be observed from the horizon of the dominant ethnonational consciousness and complex mental disorders. (Perisic, 2012)

Unity and harmony are what these stars on the European Union (EU) flag symbolize. They unite people to build a more harmonious society and affirm one of civilization's European principles and achievements to resolve all disagreements and problems by agreement. The European Union (EU) needs to preserve peace in Europe, peace

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<sup>8</sup> He is a B&H Serb politician and current Serb member of the B&H Presidency. Long-period on the USA State Department blacklist, Dodik and the SNSD party have pursued an increasingly nationalist and separatist line. His time in power has been characterized by authoritarianism, repudiation of federal B&H institutions, and closer connections to Serbia and Russia.

among the peoples of Europe, and solve mutual problems through dialogue, adhering to the maxim that it is better to negotiate for a hundred years than to wage war one day. In addition to having the meaning of harmony among community members or symmetry between different societies, *peace* is often defined as a state without war. Furthermore, all the world religions emphasize that peace is appreciation and respect. Therefore, nothing should be unmanageable to perform if we genuinely seek peace, liberalism, equality, equity, and democratic legitimacy.

## Conclusions and Recommendations

The terms "Christian Europe/Christian West" and "Islamic East" are imprecise and conflicting. Europe has never been without Islam in geographical/social/cultural terms and has always benefited from engagement. Cultural perspective activates significant anti-Islam attitudes and legitimizes far-right sociopolitical processes. The process of divergence of culture and Religion of European Muslims, comparable to American Protestant fundamentalism and European religious colonialism, occurred. However, Religious movements, in general, are often neither tolerant nor liberal but based on dogmatism. Nevertheless, on the other hand, Western European Christians' emphasis on the spiritual experience of religion rather than administration marks a revival of religiosity. Opposing historiographical, fictional, literature and political sphere discourses formed and maintained the fundamentals of the Islam and Christianity climate of dispute. Considering dissimilar cultures as "adversaries" harming national identity is an illiberal and nationalist approach. Following and accepting liberal principles, the EU should encourage equality, equity, and "carefulness" for multiculturalism, interculturalism, cosmopolitanism, and society's general plural identity. Nevertheless, minimizing the inestimable Christian identity of Europe is inappropriate. Thus, Muslims must not depreciate the European Christian identification. On the contrary, it is significant and valuable. Muslims need to get to acknowledge it. The European "leftism" sociopolitical anemia, radical Islamic terrorist organizations, state exploiting disorder, and ineffective international engagement contributes to the "Migrant crisis" (from the Muslim countries) complexity consequential with war and human rights abuse in the Muslim world. Moreover, it affects traditional discriminational patterns concerning European Muslims. Therefore,



it requires a different legislative and sociopolitical approach. At the same time, the politicization and securitization of Islam adversely impact peaceful coexistence. The discourse of the Islamic Reforms- contemporary Islam, analogized to Christianity's modernization, resulting in secularism and liberal democracy, is an open-minded question.

Besides political structures, literature actors, i.e., writers, encourage ideological, religious contest, insensibility, sociopolitical instability, and dispute climate by asserting adverse paradigms, often neither epistemological nor exclusively political. Some manifest various temporal and spatial patterns of cultural-ideological positions. Furthermore, in a historical, cultural, and sociopolitical approach, the complex debate on violent extremism manifests a series of stereotypical narratives rather than examining the historical causes of the phenomenon. Consequently, promoting and comprehending moderate Islamic representatives, scientific experts, and activists is crucial. Besides, Muslim immigrants' should simultaneously integrate sufficiently into European societies, and European societies must show directness in that process. Otherwise, a climate of dispute may become problematic. However, the current European "Muslim question" displays a comparable generalization ideology- the historical foundation of Anti-Semitism. Anti-fascism should be practiced at the foundation of today's democratic European order. A united Europe and anti-fascism are the most significant values that should challenge the critical conflict and assert a persisting peace criterion.

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