

Beyond the Left and the Right: Turkish Football in 1980 and Politics in Turkey

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Solun ve Sağın Ötesinde: 1980'de Türk Futbolu ve Türkiye'de Siyaset

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1970'de Türkiye'de bir sağ-sol kavgası/çatışması yaşandı. Komünizm itici ve yıkıcı, sol fikirler de tehdit olara algılanıyordu. Sağcılar (Muhafazakâr-İslamcı Sağ, Milliyetçi Sağ) sağcı olmayan herkesi komünist, solcular (sosyalistler) ise sağcılarını faşist olarak nitelendiriyordu. Sokak isimleri dahi komünizmi çağrıştırdığı için değişiyor, filmler ise sol, halk, kırmızı gibi bazı kelimeler yüzünden sansürleniyordu. Bu terimlerin tümü komünist amblemler olarak kabul edilirdi. Türkiye'de 1980'lerde başlayan neoliberal dönüşüm futbol sayesinde sağ-sol kavgasının dönüşmesine de etki etmiştir. Bu makalede 1980'lerde cunta yönetiminin futbolu toplum dikkatini dağıtmak için bir araç olarak kullanıp kullanmadığı incelenmiştir.

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ABSTRACT

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Turkey experienced a right-left fight/clash, communism was *a beast*, and the left thought of *treason* in Turkey. Those who were the right-wing (*Conservative-Islamist Right, Nationalist Right*) described everyone as 'communists' who were not right-winged, and left-wings (*socialists*) considered right-wingers as 'fascists.' In so much, street names changed because they evoke communism, and movies censored just because of some words such as the 'left,' 'public,' 'red.' (Yeşil Deniz, 2014) All of these terms are considered communist emblems. The neoliberal transformation in Turkey began in the 1980s, and the impact of football on people has been a notable reality that is likely to continue. From this perspective, the focus of this article will be on whether the junta administration used football as a tool to distract society throughout the 1980s.

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Football in Turkey: An Overview

Football was initially banned from Muslims during the Ottoman Period, and only non-Muslims were allowed to play (Yüce, 2014).

In the first volume of TFF's (TFF web page) Turkish Football History, the developments related to the fate of Black Stocking¹ are explained as follows. The first period (1895-1908) was when the English families settled in the provinces of Izmir and Thessaloniki and started to play the first football matches among themselves. Immediately after these two cities were football players, the first football matches started to be played by the British in Istanbul. Thus, Turkish territory was introduced to football. Second period (1908-1923) it is known as the period which Turkish football was born. In this Period, Galatasaray took the Istanbul Football League championship from the foreign teams that was vital for the development of Turkish football. During this period, besides Galatasaray, other Turkish clubs such as Fenerbahçe, Beşiktaş, and Altınordu started to make their mark in the Istanbul Football League. Third period (1923-1951) Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, and Beşiktaş clubs led by Istanbul clubs due to protracted negotiations the representatives of the first organized institution in the history of sports in Turkey. Turkey Training Community Alliance and Turkey Football Delegation established. In this period Turkish federataion has applied for membership and Turkey officially became a member of FIFA on May 21, 1923. Fourth period (1952-1960) one of the most remarkable events of this period is the beginning of the professionalization phase of Turkish football. With the adoption of professionalism in 1952, a new era began in the country. The establishment of professional leagues in major cities such as Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir led to various leagues in other provinces, and new football teams emerged throughout the country. Turkish teams from Istanbul city participated in European cups in this period.

Talimciler (Talimciler, 2005a) explains the stages of Turkish football and its development process in four periods. Establishment period gained momentum with the matches against minorities and occupation armies, and then continued until 1951 with the national cluster matches played in three major cities in the country. 1951-1980 period, this period was significant because the capitalist influence began to make itself visible in football; moreover, it officially played throughout the country. 1980-1990 period, since the 1980s were the years when the politician's effect intensified, the de-politicization processes gained the current political power actively. Within this framework, investments in football by the state started to increase, especially in the country's eastern provinces. In 1990 and after, with the birth of the broadcasting of private televisions, football-television cooperation has become stable, and football became one of the consumer products. With the change of stadium seating arrangement, in the example of Galatasaray, stadium capacity, which was thirty-five thousand, decreased to twelve thousand. The difference of thirteen thousand people left outside the stadium and condemned to television.² Thus, football development has shifted towards being the sport of the "middle class," and the "other" low-income majority left out of the stadiums by the seasonal ticketing system.

Three Elders (Üç Büyükler)

Beşiktaş, Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe are known as the Three Elders in Turkey. The three most powerful sports clubs in Turkey are Beşiktaş, Galatasaray, and Fenerbahçe. There are various reasons why these three clubs dominate the sports sector, including their sporting history, success, stadium size, and fan base.

¹ The first Turkish Football Club in Ottoman State, founded by Fuad Husnu and Resat Danyal in 1899, closed in the same year.

² Ultraslan Galatasaray Fans Official Website, Retrieved from <http://www.Ultraslan.com/oku.asp?okuID=3821>. on 27.10.2020.

Under special permission, Beşiktaş (Bereket Gymnastics Club) was founded in 1903. Beşiktaş is one of the neat locations of Istanbul. Fuat Balkan, a fencing coach, and Mazhar Kazancı, a wrestler and weightlifter, found boys to be trained together in Serencebey. Fuat Balkan gave the first floor of his house in İhlamur, Beşiktaş, to be used as club headquarters, and the title of Bereket Gymnastics Club modified to Beşiktaş Ottoman Gymnastics Club. Thus, a sports club with gymnastics, track and field, wrestling, boxing, and fencing sections was founded.

Beşiktaş became the registered sports club on January 26, 1911. Although football was overshadowed by other sports in the early period, starting from the late 1910s, the athletes and the gymnasts of the club began to show more interest in football and played matches among themselves. The interest of the youth was about to shift to football, and consequently, football had become the main activity of the club.³

Galatasaray sports club is a pioneer club in Turkish sports history, and this comes from the legacy of Galatasaray High School (*Mektebi Sultani*), a pioneer institution that gave birth to the club. Sultan Bayezid II founded the school in 1481 to educate future statesmen, also called Sultans Schools, and it took its name from the district it founded: "Galata Sarayı" (Galata Palace). The bond between the club and the high school is an undeniable reality and a source of pride.⁴

Galatasaray was far from being public. The club mostly kept itself restricted to Galatasaray school members. This practice continues even today, as not being a Galatasaray High School graduate makes club membership particularly difficult, as non-high school graduates are subject to membership quotas. On the other hand, Fenerbahçe was more open to the public than Galatasaray. Fenerbahçe was equally reserved to a certain elite. Former Fenerbahçe player and historian Rüştü Dağlaroğlu describes the club founders as 'St. Joseph⁵ graduate. Nuri Zade Ziya, Ottoman Bank officer Ayetullah Necip (Okaner); a naval student and the nephew of Sami Paşazade Sezai Bey, and Indian Asaf were the graduates from St. Joseph. As is seen, none of these individuals could be considered to be ordinary people. However, the difference between Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe, considering publicness, Fenerbahçe was open to all elite, whereas Galatasaray was more restricted to the Galatasaray School (Irak, 2019).

Fenerbahçe sports club was founded in the district of Kadıköy in Istanbul. Just the opposite of the Beşiktaş location, and Kadıköy is also a neat location of Istanbul city. Mr Nurizade Ziya Songülen, Mr Ayetullah and Mr Necip Okaner were founders. They kept a low shape and did not become at odds with the strict Ottoman rule, which saw Sultan Abdulhamit II forbid Turkish youths from setting up a club and engaging in the game of football played by the English families. Until a change of legislation in 1908, just like other sports clubs, Fenerbahçe's activities were conducted under strict secrecy. After their legal registration, the club was to take its place amongst the top Turkish clubs and achieve much success.⁶

Football Fans and Identity in Turkey

Eker (Eker, 2016) describes advocacy with two functions. Firstly, it evokes an ide sense of belonging to a group or a place; second, defines as the fanatic word to find a way out and be welcomed under the advocacy identity for behaviors that are not tolerated or accepted by the society when performed in other environments. Identity building is a kind of protection and protection mechanism developed for the attacks people may face. Building this mechanism in a community is more profitable

³ Official Website of Beşiktaş, Retrieved from <https://bjk.com.tr/en/cms/tarihce/2/73>. On 03.07.2020.

⁴ Official Website of Galatasaray, Retrieved from <https://www.galatasaray.org/en/galatasaray-spor-kulubu-1905/3> on 03.07.2020.

⁵ A French school in İstanbul Turkey, like Galatasaray Lycee.

⁶ Official Website of Fenerbahçe, Retrieved from <https://www.fenerbahce.org/club/history>. On 03.07.2020.

than building it individually. When one meets, around common denominators and with the people with whom he/she can speak the same language, he/she will feel safer and will be able to resist the adverse effects of the outside world more easily thanks to the support of his / her group. Moreover, advocacy is a phenomenon of establishing or forming an identity, and one does not need to make great efforts to establish this identity. To support a club means to have values that make sense to a person and can sacrifice several things (money, time) for the sake of those values. This level of self-sacrifice also determines the intensity of his or her level of advocacy (Talimciler, 2005a). Advocacy stands out as an upper value, an ideology, and even a form of belief and devotion; sport can create and unify a real collective identity (Sergei, 2005). Supporting is a phenomenon that requires a minimum organized and shows different features than the classical audience. Regular follow-up of the club's matches is not enough to be a fan. Accordingly, a sociality in which joy, sadness, solidarity are experienced together, and collective memory is seen as one of the most critical advocacy conditions (Aydın, M. Berkay and Hatipoğlu, 2008).

Football is a crazy game (Marcos, 2016) for the Turkish audience, which offers the opportunity to have a pleasant time for the players and the spectators and keeps people away from their troubles, continues to exist as the most enjoyable and popular version of the game today (Ünal, 2007). Football is also a combination of intelligence and emotion, youth and fitness. As a result of cooperation and solidarity, it is a game which cooperatively played, desired together, struggling together, running together, beating and defeating together, loving and grieving together, in short, everything from the beginning to the end experienced collectively (Taşdelen, 2004). It has been perceived as a daily entertainment or game, needs to be viewed from a broad perspective, mainly including political, economic, cultural, and social dimensions. In this context, football involves a process that requires evaluations and discussions beyond leisure activities and body-spirit training. Considering the stages it has gone through, football has many meanings and values such as a religious ritual, a social ceremony, interstate agreement, leisure time, physical training, and the way to make money. Football, which is faced with different goals and forms in different societies, has evolved into a phenomenon that has become globalized and massive with the development of communication and transportation opportunities over time and has to pass through the filter of sovereign understandings all over the World (Doğan, 2008). For Turkish people, football has strengthened its position in daily life since its existence in every society and has become an essential part of social life (Erdoğan, 2008).

In today's sport, fans are a crucial and indispensable asset. It is unclear when and where the first football supporters appeared. As a result, it is possible to conclude that football fandom has existed at the spectator level since the mid-nineteenth century, when football was first played in the modern sense. Since the second half of the twentieth century, football fans have begun organizing themselves. In Turkey, the first fan instances of organization and identification began in the 1980s. Following the government, football has changed and improved in Turkey. Collecting votes from supporters of a club has become trendy. The parties were able to win elections by aligning themselves with the city's team (Karataş, 2014). The number of supporters' groups in Turkey, together with the formation in the lower leagues, has increased since the 1990s (Aydın, M. Berkay and Hatipoğlu, 2008). Hereby, football and football supporters also increased with the de-politicization process of politics. With the popularization of globalizing football, support and advocacy have become a form of belonging that offers a new identity.

In March 2016, Habertürk (Akkoç, 2016) newspaper published a research article about Turkish football fan profiles. Results of research conducted in eighty-one provinces, which was remarkable in terms of reflecting the overall portrait of football supporters and supporters' groups in Turkey. Almost eighty percent of the supporters of a team are Galatasaray and Fenerbahçe. The highest rate of women

among the respondents was in Galatasaray. Accordingly, the most crucial factor that influences a team's support is the family in which an individual is born and raised. It is a well-known fact that most "the father" decides for the kid which team in the family to support (Ergen, 2017). Supporter identity remains with the individual until he or she dies unless this is an exceptional case (Talimciler, 2006); indeed, it can rarely change (Bora, 2001).

Furthermore, it is also related to the family's education, economic status, and friendship circle. To much extent, the football fan culture in Turkey is class-based, though not strictly the truth. It has become a general habit to discuss which team to support during daily talks, marking their identities. Considering the restructuring process of football in Turkey, Three Elders have come to the fore since the first day they played football. Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray, unlike the examples in the world, the distribution of supporters expanded throughout the country. In addition, these clubs witnessed the ending years of the Ottoman State and the beginning of an era in Turkey, and they have contributed to the transmission of social change in society through football (Talimciler, 2005a).

Football is one of the most popular and most common sports activities globally, especially the acceleration of the globalization process since the 1980s; along with the neoliberal change in Turkey, politicians have space to fill and distract the masses successfully. Stadiums morphed into a "political area" where the reactions are shown safely instead of on the streets. In the 1990s, the relationship between politics and football came to a standstill, and in recent years neoliberalism superficialized politics and reduced it to emotional tribune support (Yalçın, 2019). Before the election period, clubs at demand and politicians do not stop at any limits to promise. We see football and politics go hand in hand during election seasons (Yedigün, 2013). Now politicians are in the stadium tribunes in every football match (Akkaya, 2009).

Football entered a new era with the establishment of television and private channels. The first private television station, Star1 (satellite in 1987, terrestrial in 1990), was founded after the ANAP (Motherland party with Özal leadership) won power a second time in 1987. Other private televisions and radios emerged when Turgut Özal was elected president (October 31, 1989). Even though the initial television transmissions were from outside the country, radio broadcasts from domestic transmitters began in 1991, and the number of televisions and radios swiftly expanded. Magic Box, a commercial television network formed by Ahmet Özal (son of Turgut Özal), took over the rights to broadcast major football clubs from the state-run TRT. As a result of this increase, monopolization in the media (newspapers, magazines, television, and radio) and hence globalization begun.

Economy Politics in the 1980s

The severe economic problems disrupted social peace by polarizing society between the right and the left groups engaged in armed guerrilla clashes against each other. Universities forcibly closed, banks robbed, citizens kidnapped, and the elected government was insufficient to control the situation (Fuller, 2016). In the late 70s, devaluation occurred due to significant structural changes⁷ in the economy, and massive unemployment rose. Financial destabilization and devaluation affected people's reactions in the streets. Public protests occurred every day. The import substitution system implemented in 1960 was abandoned and, the transition was made to a neo-liberal economic system, called the Washington Consensus. The economic measures were taken on January 24, 1980, the new economic program prepared by the undersecretary of State Planning Organization Turgut Özal, who became prime minister in 1983, started to expand the country's economy. In the new growth model, banning political and labor

⁷ Structural Adjustment, conditions of the credits given by the IMF and the World Bank within the framework of policies as mentioned earlier is as follows: Liberalisation of imports, devaluation, promoting exports, eliminating or decreasing the support for the agricultural sector, arranging tax system, restructuring, privatization, closing State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), liberalizing interest rates and reorganizing monetary policy instruments.

union activities increased wage demands and caused high inflation. Production costs declined rapidly. Demands narrowed in the broader part of society due to eliminating the elements listed as the fundamental rights of employees, such as strikes and slowdowns. Labor union activities suspended and the lacking environment that can express political views in favor of wage segments. In the 1983-1987 interim period, when the economy traditionally oriented exports, real wages fell an average of 1,5 percent per year in the private and 5,9 percent in public (Erinç, 2000). The financing of public deficits and the tax system has become more and more dependent on the contributions of wage earners and consumers to the income tax with payroll cuts. Economic and political reactions have emerged in large sections of society (Boratav, 2003).

Özal was the primary economic decision-maker during the Demirel government as undersecretary to the prime minister and continued this crucial role in the military junta government as state minister and deputy prime minister (Kösebalaban, 2011). Nine months after the January 24 Decisions, The *Coup D'etat* took place after a period of violent and bloody internal conflicts and confusion. The skirmish was mainly between radical leftists and ultra-nationalist rightists. Militants caused the death of thousands of people. Even today, Turkish politicians discuss that September 12 caused the 'left' almost to end. Unlike other coups,⁸ in Turkey, both the right and the left were the target of the military regime. The military administration tried anyone thought to be related to the right and left movements (Fuller, 2016). While the labor unions and the employees were influential in the left wing, the military government prevented the unions and employees from entering politics. The leaders of the left, workers, officers, teachers, journalists, and politicians, imprisoned. Military administration sent six hundred thousand people to jail, deprived fourteenth thousand people of citizenship, two hundred thousand tried, and executed forty-three right and left-wing people (Taner, 2015).

Taking advantage of the military-imposed political ban for parties, Turgut Özal asked the generals to suspend (Çölaşan, 1983) party-based politics for five years to apply his prescription, January 24 Decisions, to the economy. Suspension of labor union activities, prosecution of DISK⁹ executives, the prohibition of the labor strike, shifting wage setting from collective bargaining order to Supreme Arbitration Board (YHK) (and thus securing real wages) were examples of the military methods. (Boratav, 2003). A new, more oppressive constitution was introduced in 1982. Thus, the army and the security agencies of the state gained broad power over social life (Fuller, 2016). The permanent and violent ideological struggle in Turkish society after 1980 occurred an ideological gap in the country. The top rulers realized that traditional national values that would guide the country, whether secular or religious, must be restored.

During the 1980 coup period, prisons became places of brutality. Prisons were considered as places to rehabilitate terrorist. The military regulations to be implemented here, revolutionary, socialist, patriotic people were tried to be depersonalized, and their resistance to being broken and made into obscure individuals insensitive to the problems of the country. Tens of thousand of people, who were already forced to live in unhealthy and extremely bad conditions, were wanted to be brought into line with the chains put on the way to and from the courts, the compulsory course practices, imposition of uniform and blindfold. Constant beatings, insults, severe torture, and poor nutritional conditions, which were routine practices in prisons, were among the practices of the junta (Mücek, 2009). The intervention was not only against the youth, university students, and workers and to torture them. It is forgotten that tens of young people who were made to hurt each other commit murder or become the victim of murder

⁸ Two coups happened respectively on May 27, 1960, and March 12, 1971.

⁹ Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey], is one of the major national trade unions in Turkey, has a membership of 327,000.

every day by being provoked. The 1980 coup was carried out by the Turkish army within the chain of command and was welcomed by Turkish citizens with joy (Utku, 2020).

Many people died or were maimed in the hunger strikes and resistance against systematic tortures in prisons, which was the center of the 1980 coup practices. Metris, Bayrampaşa, Mamak, and Diyarbakır prisons became the "pilot" places where the junta carried out these attacks (Mücek, 2009). When we look at the death sentences executed during the coup period, there were indeed fifty people until October 24, 1984. But there is a numeral conundrum here. These announcements also included those who had been waiting for execution since 1972. Twenty-four of the fifty executions were not for political crimes, but judicial crimes. In another aspect, the fact that the coup regime turned the country into a bloodbath with extrajudicial executions in the middle of the street and hanged twenty five left and right-wing activists (not students), one of whom was a member of the Asala terrorist organization, while it is very possible, it does not mean that it did not commit crimes against humanity (Utku, 2020).

Junta terror was not limited to prisons. Aiming to create an apolitical mass, the junta formed the basis of this with the economic decisions taken. An atmosphere was created in which all human values were eroded, all kinds of individualism were promoted, and society's belief that they would collectively do something together was lacking. The junta was in an approach that would control the daily life of the society and take everything under its control. As a result, the whole society was affected.

Right-wing and left-wingers were imprisoned with the Kenan Evren method, called mix-make peace (*kariştir barıştır*). Right and left-wing prisoners stayed in the same cells. Kenan Evren thought that they would talk to each other in this way and compromise. Mamak prison was one of the prisons where this practice was carried out.

There was no mention of any dialogue; before September 12 between the different ideological groups. This situation has changed drastically after September 12. Leftists and rightists had an intense relationship when they were imprisoned together. In the first place, daily life began to be shared. The differences in political views gradually lost importance, and cross-group friendships occurred. Some of these friendships developed based on new common ideas, each of which forms part of the daily life of the prison. For example, those who stay in the same ward, share the same bunk bed, are isolated together, stand out together at each census. Furthermore, being a citizen, graduating from the same school, and supporting the same football team became the subject of everyday conversations. Differences in political views between groups had lost their former significance, but at least a coldness was felt among certain groups. Nevertheless, it was often possible to see two Fenerbahçe fans on a Monday discussing the match fiercely the previous day and making a joke about it (Bostancıoğlu, 1993). The coup d'etat of September 12 left its mark on the last forty-one years, and the unlawfulnesses experienced were reflected in all areas of life. The people have not forgotten the pain they experienced in those days. Football gave people a field to breathe.

Football in Political Environment: Junta Government

The concept of ideology, which is one of the most important tools of the state to establish and regulate the individual and society, is an essential concept that Althusser (Althusser, 1994) focuses on in his study of "Ideological State Apparatus" (ISA). Since capitalism is a hegemonic power tool, it justifies the system's validity on society by presenting the ideology that will maintain this superiority through different channels. Althusser stated that each of the tools owned by the government is dependent on the system and lists these tools as education, family, religion, political, trade union, mass media, and cultural devices. These devices are not considered an institution on their own, but they can enter into

the system's practices by establishing their order according to the system that creates its ideology. These devices are arranged to interfere with the individual's leisure time. The government presents its ideology by positioning it into reality and legitimizing its thought within society. Using football in power, the government hides the actual structure of production and social relations in the capitalist system, and the society evaluates the goings-on as if they were natural. Football, which enables the masses to reproduce the dominant ideology, played the most prominent role in accepting life in the capitalist order as the only real and natural world. Thus, individuals are articulated to life with the alienation phenomenon they feel while consuming their labor and the products produced by others in the capitalist order.

Bora (Bora, 2001) indicates that the junta did not touch football and football clubs. Business people were leading the clubs that were not directly related to politics at that time. One of the September 12 junta claims was to end the turmoil environment and "normalize" the country. Factories and other businesses returned to their activities within a few days. Football leagues continued only after a week's break. Football was an essential part of this typical image and had little contact with politics, and their club identities did not include much about society. Football had the apolitical environment that the 1980 junta dreamed of; moreover, it was an excellent tool for manipulating people's emotions, calming, and exciting them when needed. The neoliberal transformation process started during Özal's tenure, the new economic program was implemented, and political reactions were surpassed by football. In Turkey, football identity, which is based on the identification of sports, provided the basis for the instrumentalization of football in this formation. Football became one of the new arenas of identity acquisition in the post-1980 normalization process, especially for huge audiences. The instability of the 1970s demonstrated the ability to move political issues outside the left-right divide, providing additional entertainment and economic interest. In the 1980s, the state's policies shelved mass sports, and football has brought to the forefront (Talimciler, 2005b). Military discourse affected football chants in the stadiums; at the international matches, football discourse was presented in the Turkish nation's mood. The military vocabulary used in league matches more often reinforced the effect of international war: *we are like dynamite, we will destroy Frankfurt, fight to the end, the killing tactic!* Yellow Navy football players say *we will hit sigma with a counter-attack*. Galatasaray and Rome's match presented the Ottoman children colliding with the Roman empire (Bora, Tanıl and Erdoğan, 1993).

Kenan Evren, the Chief of the General Staff of the period, started the football of the 80s with the immediate interventions to football (Kozanoğlu, 1996). Ankaragücü football club was not decisive in leagues but as the junta General ordered the Ankaragücü team to be in the first league during the military regime. Junta backed Özal, like the politicians before him, who discovered the social effects of football and were even more interested in football than its predecessors. Football federation became autonomous, giving an additional three-point decision to the winner, covering all soil football grounds in the country with lush grass, and hundreds of sports facilities have done in his tenure (Turan, 2020). Turgut Özal defined on February 16, 1988, at a discussion about professional football's autonomy, that it was a sport that drew greater attention in Turkey and had a positive influence on people's morale. According to Özal, politicians must be interested in football. In the same speech, he promised to solve the clubs' financial problems, such as tax balance (Sümer, 1990). Kılıç (Kılıç, 2006) indicates that the professional teams were struggling to be sustainable in the league and showing the relationship between football and power; it has moved to the inseparable context. ANAP rallies promised the championship to the people of the provinces in the electoral districts if they voted for them. Thus, during this period, third league was re-established as an election investment. The league and championship struggle caused rumors of match-fixing and brought the events to the legal ground\courts.

The national team is the best example of starting to prevail football all over Turkey. Until the early 1970s, the Turkish national team consisted almost entirely of Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe, and

Beşiktaş teams. It was unlikely to come across other team players in the national eleven. Football began to expand to Anatolia in the 70s. This expansion was due to the tiring effect of the pre-September 12th on society. An example of this is that only one player from the three major teams played in the national team in the match in Bucharest against Romania in 1977 (Kıvanç, 2001).

In the period between September 1980 and September 1982, twenty-nine percent of the national team consisted of the Galatasaray, Fenerbahçe and Beşiktaş players. Its player was in the national team with twenty-six percent representation from Trabzonspor, which was called the fourth biggest of the period. Other teams were at thirty-nine percent. Hereby, the representation rate of other teams in the national team was sixty-five percent (Kıvanç, 2001). The promotion of Anatolian football through national teams is easy to notice. Football is expanded across the country, as seen by the change in player weight in the national squad. Tanju Çolak, a Galatasaray legend and one of the world's forty-eight legends, came from the Anatolian team Samsunspor.

Approaching the mid-80s, the acceleration of the normalization process in politics and the liberal ANAP carried the municipal-football relationship to another dimension. The re-launch of the third league in the 1984-1985 season brought municipalities to transfer funds to local teams whose funds were insufficient. Teams under the municipalities represented the district where the municipality was located, or the teams established directly within the municipalities (Gökaçtı M., 2008). Mayor president trends in the football community continued in the 90s. The extent of public support of the football clubs representing the provinces transformed into an essential political investment that mayors may not overlook in future elections. The first experience in the relationship of the mayors with clubs has developed in the case of Gaziantepspor. During these years, Celal Doğan (Gaziantep city mayor) took over the presidency, this club, which will participate in international tournaments such as UEFA Cup, will also gain a characteristic feature in Anatolian football.

Moreover, concessions were made to the clubs that competed in the lower and upper leagues of professional football and struggled in the championship, and these clubs were able to fight in the desired leagues through direct interventions. Thus, in the third league, Ünyespor and a representative club of Trabzonspor was made a champion at the same time. Zonguldakspor, Boluspor, Kocaelispor, and Bursaspor objected to fall from the second league. Clubs were saved from falling off the league. Thus, the 1987-1988 football season was forced to play with twenty teams (Kılıç, 2006). The third league, which was an essential step in repeatedly popularizing football outside the three major cities, was abolished during the Justice Party.¹⁰ The need for the third league again corresponds to the period of ANAP government set after September 12. This process can be seen as a milestone in terms of football to expanse throughout Turkey.

Municipalities were prevented from becoming club mayors in 2004 after accusations of unfair competition arose from municipal investments in football clubs. However, as evidenced in the example of Ankara Metropolitan Mayor Melih Gökçek, mayors' relationships with clubs remained to be based on the formula "Honorary Presidency" (Kılıç, 2006).

Football as A Political Instrument in Turkey

Football successfully fills the field vacated by politics in the face of problems such as unemployment and the cost of living in a Global environment. Moreover, attracts vast masses can show their reactions on football fields instead of streets. Football as a means to ensure social control by contributing to the maintenance of existing power and power relations (Özyurt, 2010). Turkish people's

¹⁰ Adalet Partisi, a Turkish Political Party, served during 1960 to 1970s. President was Süleyman Demirel.

interest in football and the efforts of politicians to gather supporters paved the way for the interaction of football and politics at all times. Therefore, when we talk about football in Turkey, we also talk about the economy, politics, identity, violence, changes, and social life problems. According to Erdoğan (Erdoğan, 2008) Turkish football cannot be isolated from the economy and politics. Football needs political support for authority, exception, resource, convenience, favorites, and concession. Just as a political ideology can drive millions of people after it, a football club or a football player can do so. Wherefore, football and politics can address the same masses simultaneously; they need the help of each other to change and direct the process in their favor (Parlak, 2013). Politics has benefited from football, and it is suitable for political use and ideological propaganda before, during, and after the match.

CONCLUSION

With the 1980s, Turkey's social and economic structure began to change. Turkey has embarked on the path of integrating into the Globalization economic system. The crisis environment created by the Turkish economy, which fell into an economic depression, caused problems such as inflation and unemployment, and the increase in the conflicts of the right and left political groups caused chaos in the country. Trade unions and political parties were closed, and strike bans were imposed on workers after the September 12 intervention, which paved the way for liberal economic policies known as the January 24 Decisions; one of the means of reinforcing the social conditions of these practices has been football, which served as a distraction tool.

The military administration took advantage of the attraction of football to keep the youth away from terrorism, and football and football pitches were used to ensure the depoliticization process. With a decision that is rare in the world, the football club, Ankaragücü, was promoted to the first division by Kenan Evren's instruction in this period. The effect of the 1980 Turkish coup on the sports media continues today, in the form of news being given using a military language and a militaristic discourse.

As the mid-80s arrived, the normalization trend in politics accelerated, and the ANAP, which had a liberal program, came to power in local elections, bringing the municipality-football relationship to a new level. The re-activation of the third division in the 1984-1985 season resulted in a shift of resources from municipalities to local teams with insufficient financial resources. Municipal teams are teams that represent the district in which the municipality is located, or teams that are founded directly inside the municipalities.

The relationship between politics and football reached its highest levels during the Özal government. Unlike the prime ministers and presidents before him, Turgut Özal did not refrain from using all kinds of activities to attract the public. He went to Germany to watch football and watched the national football match at the cabinet. The first example of the Özal government trying to use football for its political purposes is the establishment of the third league, which was called the 'political league' in those years. In 1987, to support themselves in the voting to be held for the removal of political bans, some teams that fell out of the league were promoted to the league within the framework of the match results. The leagues were suspended for three weeks and Kocaelispor and Bursaspor were taken back to the first league again. The 1980s were the years when politicians from all levels of the state showed great interest in football clubs and were personally interested in all kinds of problems of the teams in their constituencies. Football clubs need these politicians as a way to overcome their problems, and politicians, both increase their recognition through football clubs and convert their support to votes.

Furthermore, politics affects the popularization of football support and prevents political party retention as an upper identity. Politicians managed to use football clubs as a propaganda tool in the elections. On the other hand, football clubs wanted to benefit from the economic, social, and political

power the politicians gave, act in line with their interests. As a result, the club chooses to take advantage of these opportunities by utilizing football environment politics in a variety of ways, including collecting money for players, transferring players, reinforcing the vault, constructing the stadium, and providing state plots to clubs. On the other hand, politics can be seen on every platform where there is competition and strife. Football has a framework that has an impact on and leads the general public. Politicians who see the value of football's mass appeal will continue to use it for a variety of goals, including propaganda, displaying the supremacy of their philosophy, and increasing their political popularity.

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