

SPACES OF REVOLT: DWELLING, NATURE, AND RESISTANCE

Başkaldırı Uzamları: Mesken Tutma, Doğa ve Direniş

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Abstract

The later Heidegger, reflecting on his life of thinking, changed his concept of dwelling to find fundamentally that a human being wants to be at home in dwelling. Understanding the concept of dwelling is fundamental to our relationship with nature and resistance. How is it that human beings are to be at home in their surroundings? How can a subject dwell? These questions become explicitly difficult when examining a human being located in the midst of the ever-increasing dominance of scientific and technological rationality. If the late Heidegger is correct in assuming that it is the human being's quest to pass through anxiety in order to return home, then how are we to break through our dominating cultural practices and find sites that truly resist technological rationality and the networks of enframing that pin a subject down to their inauthenticity? Resistance begins in the "return to home". After finding oneself at home, regardless of the human beings' 'authenticity,' one must have in some way resisted the dominating practices of culture and human scientific-technological rationality. The enter into or return to a, what will be called, space of revolt, illuminates ways physical spaces can resist domineering, obstructive, capitalist space and present the individual with forms of spatial revolt (and doubtless other forms as well such as ethical, personal, communal, etc.), thus enriching mind, reflexivity in thought, and a more fundamental connection with human existence, nature, and the world.

Key Words: *dwelling, Heidegger, nature, resistance, authenticity.*

Özet

Geç dönem Heidegger, kendi düşünsel yaşamını değerlendirirken, insanın ikamet ederken esasen evde olmayı istediğini anlayarak mesken tutma kavramını değiştirmiştir. Mesken tutma kavramını anlamak, bizim doğa ve direniş ile ilişkimiz açısından oldukça önemlidir. İnsanlar çevrelerinde nasıl evde olabilirler? Bir özne nasıl mesken tutabilir? Gitgide artan bilimsel ve teknolojik bir rasyonalitenin tahakkümü ile kuşatılmış olan insanı incelerken bu sorular kesin olarak zorlaşır. Eğer geç dönem Heidegger eve dönmek için kaygıdan geçmeyi insanın arayışı olarak ele almakta haklıysa, biz kendi

tahakkümcü kültürel pratiklerimizin üstesinden nasıl gelebiliriz ve özneyi bunların inotantikliğine mecbur bırakan teknolojik rasyonelliğe ve çerçeveleme ağlarına tam olarak direnecek bölgeler nasıl bulabiliriz? Direniş “eve dönüş”te başlar. Bir insan kendini evinde bulduktan sonra, insanların ‘otantikliğine’ aldırmaksızın kültürün ve bilimsel-teknolojik insan rasyonalitesinin tahakkümcü pratiklerine bir şekilde direnmelidir. Başkaldırı uzamı denecek olana giriş veya ona dönüş, fiziksel uzamların, baskıcı, engelleyici, kapitalist uzama direnebilme yollarını aydınlatacak ve bireye uzamsal başkaldırı formlarını sunacaktır (şüphesiz etik, şahsi, komünal gibi diğer formları da). Böylelikle zihni, düşüncedeki dönüşlülüğü ve insanın varoluşuyla, doğayla ve dünyayla daha temel bir ilişkiyi zenginleştirecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Mesken tutma, Heidegger, doğa, direniş, otantiklik.

An unsettled feeling in relation to a place constitutes the early Heidegger’s appropriation of the concept of dwelling. This concept is important in Heidegger’s ontology.¹ The later Heidegger, reflecting on his life of thinking, changed his concept of dwelling to find fundamentally that a human being wants to be *at home* in dwelling. This return to home is a characteristic of Heidegger’s later work. Disregarding some of the ontological aspects of Heidegger’s philosophy, the concept of dwelling becomes even more important in a subject’s relationship with nature. How is it that human beings are to be at home in their surroundings? How can a subject *dwell*? These questions become explicitly difficult when examining a human being located in the midst of the ever-increasing dominance of scientific and technological rationality. If the late Heidegger is correct in assuming that it is the human being’s quest to pass through anxiety in order to return home, then how are we to break through our dominating cultural practices and find sites that truly resist technological rationality and the networks of enframing that pin a subject down to their inauthenticity? Resistance begins in the “return to home”. After finding oneself at home, regardless of the human beings’ ‘authenticity,’ one must have in some way *resisted* the dominating practices of culture and human scientific-technological rationality. The enter into or return to a, what will be called, *space of revolt*, illuminates ways physical spaces can resist domineering, obstructive, capitalist space and present the individual with forms of spatial revolt

(and doubtless other forms as well such as ethical, personal, communal, etc.), thus enriching mind, reflexivity in thought, and a more fundamental connection with human existence, nature, and the world.

1. Heidegger's Conception of Dwelling and Technological Rationality

To begin to explore the spaces of revolt, late-Heidegger's conception of dwelling must be explicitly interwoven with the exposition of his concept of technology and nature. In spite of the common theme of dwelling in the late Heidegger, he offers up a simple explanation of dwelling as a basic phenomenon in *Being and Time*:

The expression 'bin' I connected with 'bei.' 'Ich bin' ['I am'] means I dwell, stay near... the world as something familiar in such and such a way. Being as the infinitive of 'I am': that is, understood as an existential, means to dwell near..., to be familiar with... Being-in is thus the formal existential expression of the being of Dasein, which has the essential constitution of being-in-the-world.(Heidegger, 2010, p. 55)

Even from an early point in his philosophical career, Heidegger defines the human subject as being in the world and thus being-in as a fundamental constitution of subjectivity. Therefore, a human subject always dwells within the world and is an expression of individual subjectivity as well as constitutes his own relationship with the world where the subject finds himself in (at all times). The important distinction here is that dwelling for Heidegger is fundamentally how we exist *in* a given world. We are on earth, consequently, we dwell.

Although there is more to the early Heidegger's conception of dwelling², later Heidegger takes this basic notion of dwelling and expands it in his work titled, *Four Seminars* (Heidegger, 2003). These lectures were given in France by Heidegger in the later years of his life and are comprised of notes from students who sat in on the lecture dates. As well as giving an addendum to his early work, these lectures also provide inspirational sources of Heidegger's thinking in relation to nature and dwelling. For Heidegger, technological rationality covers over being:

...But it is now clear that the various coverings of the originary sense of being maintain an essential relation to what they cover over. The history of metaphysics thus receives, from ground up, another meaning. From now on, its various basic positions can be understood positively as transformations of the original meaning. Each time new, they follow one

another, belonging together in the unity of a single destiny-hence the name destiny of being to indicate the epochs of being. (Heidegger, 2003, p. 43)

Heidegger, here, is preliminarily stating that the history of metaphysics has attempted to cover over the meaning of what it is to be human (a being in general). Consequently its meaning has been conceived differently in every era. Technology and the rationality that is derived from its use instrumentally have become the most obscene and dominating forces prevalent in the twentieth and twenty-first century world cultures. This relationship obscures and covers over our own experience of nature and the natural world. Heidegger continues:

What thinker can ever help us reconcile these two 'realms' that have grown foreign to one another, and which 'with a constant acceleration are racing even further apart': 'the technologically dominable nature of science, and the natural nature of the... dwelling of man.' (Heidegger, 2003,p. 44)

Accordingly, Heidegger examines the ever-separating realms of the technological nature of science and that of *dwelling* man. Science, for Heidegger, has become consumed with technology and the domination of nature by technology and its institutions.

In this examination Heidegger is interested in how technology and science cover over (as a form of metaphysics) the being of man, a man who dwells in the world and with nature. In this covering over, human beings are lost to technological rationality. As Heidegger states, "[t]he scientific interpretation of the world and of natural phenomena brings about a situation where everyday the human loses more and more of an already immemorial naturalness." (Heidegger, 2003, p. 43) The human being is forsaken to the dominating rationality of technology and separated from his homecoming by the mastery of nature by man. This theme has been present throughout the current era manifesting itself in philosophers, scientists, and intellectuals alike:

...this all leads to Max Planck's thesis about being: 'The real is what is measurable.' The meaning of being is thus measurability, whereby it is not so much a matter of establishing 'how much,' but ultimately of only serving to master and dominate the being as object. (Heidegger, 2003, p. 54)

In the modern era, the champion of scientific rationality has come to the forefront of culture. This type of thinking has led to a conception of a subject treating beings as objects to be mastered and dominated (objectification). This relationship was established from an early time in the advent of

scientific domination of nature. Science's fundamental treatment of nature and its consequent domination came to capsule and be intertwined with the culture of modern capitalism. In this way, domination further came to serve in the relationship between not only human and nature but also between human and human.³ Science, by upholding and consuming nature, has become the objective establishment of a reality that is focused on the arbitrary repeatability of experiments, i.e. the method of scientific conquest. This method expands to consume consciousness as a way to define subjects' relationship to their life.

Heidegger continues to elaborate this relationship between culture and scientific rationality by examining the phenomenon of replacement:

One of the essential moments in the way of being of contemporary beings (in disposability according to a plan-driven consumption) is replaceability, the fact that- in a game that has become universal and where anything can take the place of anything else- every being becomes essentially replaceable. The industry of 'consumer' products and the predominance of the replacement make this empirically obvious. Today being is being-replaceable. Already the idea of 'repair' has become an 'anti-economical' thought. It is essential for every being of consumption that it be already consumed and thus call for its replacement. (Heidegger, 2003, p. 62)

Replaceability becomes a general cultural phenomenon that comes to define the relationship human beings have to one another (very similar to the Marxist concept of reification derived from Lukács). Heidegger's imperative is that we move back towards nature only in, as, and through Being and a more fundamental and primal relationship, therefore advancing (whilst simultaneously regressing) towards a time when objects were maintained and considered more sacred and human beings relied on a more intimate dwelling with their surroundings and each other. This advancement constitutes the redistribution of replaceability and the consequent establishment of a different culture of objectification. Modern man has forgotten this relationship and positioned himself in correspondence with exploitation and consumption. This relation still maintains that a human being be in a relationship. Given this, man has forgotten his affinity to *home* or nature and has become instead, a slave to the concealment of his being and primal correlation of being-in-the-world. Heidegger comments on this in relation to his conception of dwelling, "[n]ow is there still, in these times, something like an 'at home,' a dwelling, an abode?

No, there are 'dwelling machines,' urban population centers, in short: the industrialized product, but no longer a *home*." (Heidegger, 2003, p. 74) Dwelling has turned into a habitable machine that must conform to the thinking of the scientific and technological rationality. In these machines, we are consequently forever alienated from true human dwelling and forbidden to enter into our contingency with nature. Scientific rationality has betrayed us in our fundamental connection to nature. In dwelling-astray, we are pushed further from our fundamental affiliation to being. However, Heidegger's early appropriation of dwelling has taken a turn in his later thinking and his lectures. Consequently it is helpful to shed more light on his later thinking on dwelling in general and what gave way to this change in his conceptual framework.

In his work, specifically the essay in "Poetry, Language, Thought" (Heidegger, 1971) *Building, Dwelling, Thinking*, Heidegger addresses the ideal of his conception of dwelling that marks the later period of Heideggerian thought. In this essay, dwelling is a certain, *careful* way of living. To the extent that it has this element of care, it is a life of 'building'. The building activity humans live out is two-fold: it constructs, and it cultivates. Building as 'construction' is something we do, for example, when we build a bridge, but building as 'cultivating' is an act of maintaining something. (Heidegger, 1971, p. 370-374) This mark of maintenance, of preserving, in human living (dwelling) requires that we stand in a certain relation to our environment (or anything). The dweller stands in a way that lends itself to Heidegger's attempt at crafting a thinking to overcome metaphysics, because the dwelling lives in a relation of openness to our world, not in one of mastery. Heidegger calls what I am calling 'openness' here a *free* relation to reality, free in that it *s pares* that to which it relates, or leaves it "in its own essence," on its own terms, in a "preserve of peace" (Heidegger, 1971, p. 351). Letting things be, sparing them, is the essence of dwelling. In his depiction of dwellers as essentially 'open' thinkers, Heidegger describes their efforts at interpreting the world around them as necessarily poetic. Where we see a terrestrial planet, they see an 'earth' and 'sky'. Where we think we live as dying animals, who occasionally feel in the presence of the holy when we feel we thrown into a world with a heritage that is bigger than ourselves, *they* think they live as 'mortals' before 'divinities'. They experience and describe the 'things' around them in an almost holistic fashion, in a gathering place Heidegger calls a 'fourfold'. The poetic character of their

description is, one could say, a showing of what *dwelling* is: it is Heidegger's creative result of, and attempt at, being open to *things* on their own terms. This idealized version of what dwelling should be sheds further light when coupled with Heidegger's critique of technology on spaces where one may attempt to resist: the ideal and critique, placed in tension together, will give a semblance of the idea of *spaces of revolt* in general.

2. Capobianco, the Turn to Home, and Dwelling

To further the argument that dwelling is central to Heidegger's criticism of technology the work of Richard Capobianco, a contemporary Heidegger scholar, will be utilized. Particularly in his book *Engaging Heidegger* (Capobianco and Richardson, 2010), Capobianco deals with Heidegger's conception of dwelling and elaborates the progression Heidegger makes towards home in his texts. Capobianco argues that the emphasis middle-Heidegger makes towards the 'return home' in relation to the his conception of dwelling, plays a seminal place in Heidegger's philosophy in general, as well as the ability to define dwelling and furthermore conceptualize spaces that adhere to this 'path' of thinking. Capobianco begins his argument by explicating the differences between the young Heidegger and late Heidegger's conceptions of dwelling, "Dasein is anxious about nothing, 'nothing' in the world; it is anxious about 'being-in-the-world as such.' Dasein is anxious and unsettled in the face of its radically negative existence, the hallmark of which is death (finitude)." (Capobianco and Richardson, 2010, p.53) This fundamental thinking of the early Heidegger is deeply interwoven with the conception that a subject's anxiety is determined simply by their being in the world. This 'primordially' not-at-home-ness (Un-heim-lichkeit) is characteristic of the early Heidegger and his emphasis on existential angst in the midst of the world.

Angst brings Dasein face to face with its finite existence and the simple fact that someday Dasein will cease to exist. This unsettled subjective feeling culminates in Dasein's relationship to the *world* as always unsettled. Therefore, for the early Heidegger, it is Dasein's basic existential structure to be 'not at home.' However, Capobianco describing the turn in Heidegger's thinking states, "...He works out with great care and subtlety the position that Dasein is primordially *at home* in Being – and it is this theme that we recognize as so prominent in his later work." (Capobianco and Richardson, 2010, p. 57) This change in Dasein's relationship to home primarily

entails that; “[t]he ‘hearth’ is no longer the site of inauthentic Dasein; now it is ‘the site of being-at-home’ in a primordial and authentic way.” (Capobianco and Richardson, 2010, p. 61) This change in Heidegger’s work constitutes the depth of the theme of dwelling. Heidegger began his exploration by conjecturing that dwelling gives rise to angst. However, later Heidegger acknowledges this angst yet seeks to move beyond it in order to return home, to a time where being was more fundamentally authentic in its being-in-the-world. This interpretation points beyond the unsettledness that the Heideggarian subject experiences in his living in the midst of the world. Instead, dwelling is rather the journey towards home and being in general:

The ultimate destination of the human being is home, dwelling near the Source, the Origin, Being as such. Heidegger repeatedly refers to this journey as ‘becoming home in being-not-at-home’. This phrase sums up the lesson of Sophocles’ poetic work, and ‘Antigone herself is the poem of becoming at home in being-not-at-home.’ Again, what is decisively different in his 1942 elucidations of Antigone is this theme of the *(re)turn home*. The human being is primordially at home in nearness to Being, the source of all beings. Even so, it is also true that the human being is ‘unsettled’ and ‘unhomely.’ We might summarize Heidegger’s nuanced position this way: the human being is primordially at home in Being but in the beginning is not aware of Home *as Home*. (Capobianco, 2010, p. 62-63)

The subject is always close to being, to its nature, however, through sources of culture, language, and beyond, the human being becomes unsettled. From a subject comes the alienation of that subject through the covering up of being. This covering pastes together layers and layers that must be broken through in order to return to the original position of being close to home or dwelling near the ‘source’ (of being). In this way the journey is a journey back home, such as Odysseus in the Odyssey. We must brave our way back towards home in order to dwell near the source (of being).

This act (returning home) is the process of re-centering, or of re-turning home in order to authentically dwell in the world. This journey is a necessary passage towards home. As Capobianco states, “[t]he re-centered self finds astonishment, joy, and serenity in dwelling thoughtfully in relation to all that comes to be and ceases to be, what the Greeks called *physis*, and what Heidegger calls the Being of beings.” (Capobianco and Richardson, 2010, p. 64) However, this journey is interrupted by technological and scientific rationality. This type of rationality covers

over being and consequently it is shifting through the moods of scientific rationality that the subject must clear in order to pursue his journey back towards home, and consequently to *dwell* again at the source of the human being and being itself. We must pass through our unsettledness in order to arrive at home. Culture produces this unsettledness, and it is in the journey that, as human beings, we learn to resist⁴. The resistance to the culture industry and all of its components rests in this passage towards home and the return home to dwelling. Therefore, the passage home and dwelling are spaces of revolt. In order to journey towards these revolutionary spaces; it is helpful to illuminate what dwelling entails. Capobianco states:

...Dasein becomes capable of dwelling only insofar as it is able to step back from the illusion of the mastery of the conscious subject (decentering) and sustain a relation and openness (recentering) to Being as physis as dynamic and powerful emerging-appearing. It is in the 'space' of this openness to Being that Dasein is recentered and dwells... (Capobianco and Richardson, 2010, p. 127)

To obtain dwelling, or rather to journey closer to dwelling and become closer to our origin and Being is the step back from the illusion of technological and scientific rationality and to become open to the energy of Being. This space is where the 'recentered' Dasein finds its primordial existence. However, it is the actual *journey* towards this space that constitutes the resistance that is a characteristic of the *spaces of revolt*. It also seems that Heidegger is overly optimistic about the return towards home and leaves out the dimension of power relationships that are inherent in any society. It appears, then, that the utopia being aimed for and the ideal situation is our return to dwelling.⁵ It comprises this journey towards perfection of being-in-the-world that is part and parcel of spaces of revolt, and it is the journey, rather than the destination that is the characteristic of these special revolutionary spaces.

3. Power, Medical Science, and Dwelling

In order to understand how in fact a subject is to return to these spaces of revolt, and consequently to complete the project of enriching mind, reflexivity of thought, and to develop a more fundamental connection with human existence, nature, and the world; power must be examined in relationship to the journey towards dwelling as it is the basis of our relationship with the world. Dwelling is, again, a search towards which we strive to be at home in the world. It is the

goal that may never be achieved, however, that we strive for through the cultural constructs that attempt to hold us back from this scared relationship to the earth. However, every subject is also given in power dynamics in relation to other beings or institutions that prevents one from achieving our natural inclination of dwelling. Power is also a primordial relationship of the subject in the multiplicity of the world of man. For an examination of power concretely, Foucault's early work (as well as his relationship to power in general), *The Birth of the Clinic* (Foucault, 1994) in which he first establishes connections between institutions and power will be explicated.

In the full *oeuvre* of Foucault's work, there are multiplicities of forces that are described and distributed throughout. One force that seems to bear the most weight politically is Foucault's discussion of power. Power for Foucault creates and dissembles; it defines relationships between institutions and subjectivities, between knowledge and visibilities. Power lays down its grid of dissemblances and dialectics in every facet of society and is not isolated in a single entity. It shifts and changes in the relationship between knowledge and visibility and between statements and institutions. In *The Birth of the Clinic*, Foucault explores the relationship between institutions and power by the means of an analysis of the history of the medical clinic that came into being, in its modern form, around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Power pervades every facet of Foucault's work. His conception of power transformed throughout his career, culminating in his later texts of *Discipline and Punish* (Foucault, 1995), as well as *The History of Sexuality* (Foucault, 2010). Power is described as the relationship between two or more forces.⁶ Power is the interplay of forces. It corresponds to the relationship not only between individual people, but also between institutions, knowledge, and visibility. Power runs deep throughout Foucault's canon and in fact describes his hope for politics in a given society and describes certain forms of repression and resistance. Power plays with forces in a distinct way, much like a grid, it maps itself and its evolution and dissolution throughout all of human history given each historical epoch and set of institutional apparatuses. It divides and conquers all at the same time. It is not possessed by some unknown, all-powerful institution but rather is located in select multiplicities of points in all of history. Its transfer and destabilization are historically bound to the period in which knowledge and visibility become possible in a certain way.

Power is a micro and, at the same time, macropolitics placed on a point given in the diagrams of societies bound to their historical period. It is in this way that power transforms and develops different institutions and political ideologies. It is related to the way that individuals deal with each other, individual's deal with institutions and knowledge, and the way that institutions themselves relate to each other. Foucault's conception of power makes available the given way a certain society can possess knowledge and therefore attempts to answer the Foucauldian questions (taking these and adapting them from Kant): what can I know, who can I know, and how can they/I know it? Explored on this foundation, according to the critiques, power becomes a schema that limits and defines. It conceptualizes a period and gives its distinct tables and canons. Although these themes about power are more readily available in Foucault's later works, they nonetheless rear their head into the thinking that he was attempting in *The Birth of the Clinic* (Foucault, 1994).

In the chapter, 'A Political Consciousness,' Foucault takes on one of the first archeological analysis' of power in the institution of the medical clinic. In this work, Foucault traces the birth of the clinic and the way that the epistemological framework of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries gave way to the ability for this institution to formulate itself out of this time period's idea of visibility and the reproduction and 'norm' of its given body of knowledge located in the statements and texts produced in their specific canon. The clinic is born from the gaze of the doctor, as such, this gaze attempted to observe and define the clinic in its representation of the visual field in relation to disease:

Thus, from the discovery of pathological anatomy, the medical gaze is duplicated: there is a local, circumscribed gaze, the borderline gaze of touch and hearing, which covers only one of the sensorial fields, and which operates on little more than the visible surfaces. But there is also an absolute, absolutely integrating gaze that dominates and founds all perceptual experiences. It is this gaze that structures into a sovereign unity that which belongs to a lower level of the eye, the ear, and the sense of touch. (Foucault, 1994, p. 165)

It is the invisible visible (the gaze and death), which gave rise to the modern notion of the clinic. The discussion Foucault attempts in terms of the development of anatomy, in *praxis*, constituted the formation of the institution known as the clinic (this again was a development of visibility in the gaze of the doctor on the patient). The experience of the gaze is being given shape as a

political institution formulated out of the basic human need for health. This experience, however, could only exist through the formation and regulation of a power relationship between people, the state, and medicine:

...In the final analysis, when it is a question of these tertiary figures that must distribute the disease, medical experience and the doctor's supervision of social structures, the pathology of epidemics and that of the species are confronted by the same requirements: the definition of a political status for medicine and the constitution, at state level, of a medical consciousness whose constant task would be to provide information, supervision, and constraint, all of which 'relate as much to the police as to the field of medicine proper.' (Foucault, 1994, p. 26)⁷

The distribution of medicines and the access to the clinic in the political arena led to this experience being regulated and supplemented by a police (i.e. a structure of power in relation to this given historical epoch and the body of knowledge this practical power structure regulated and determined who had access to the specific knowledge [in this case of disease]). This police not only regulated the access to medicine but also determined the standards that determined who possessed knowledge and thereby what education they may attain and be aware of.

Power, and power relationships, become evident in the distribution of the entire medical institution and these local points of power provide medicine with its distinct epistemological definitions and praxis. There is a double system of checks implemented in the formation of the institution: the political authority over the practice of medicine and the privileged medical body over the practitioners and knowledge as a whole. Many of Foucault's later explorations of power are expressed, prematurely in this exploration. Points of multiplicity reproduce the current power schematics by seizing hold of not only the knowledge of the time but also the institutions that regulate and determine the discourse and those who have access to the given discourse:

In the eighteenth century, the fundamental act of medical knowledge was the drawing up of a 'map': a symptom was situated within a disease, a disease in a specific ensemble, and this ensemble in a general plan of the pathological world. In the experience that was being constituted towards the end of the century, it was a question of 'carving up' the field by means of the interplay of series, which, in intersecting one another, made it possible to reconstitute the chain... (Foucault, 1994, p. 29)

Thus, fields of knowledge are being distributed and constituted by institutions that check each other and allow for the inclusion or exclusion of certain bodies of thought and individuals who have access to this knowledge. In this way, power functions as a multiplicity and a grid preventing the individual through the implementations of these institutions from achieving access to a primordially dwelling space. An individual's immersion in this political arena creates oppressive structures that forever separate the individual from the origin. In the twentieth century, these institutional models are fueled by scientific and technological rationality that that disillusions and covers up the original meaning of the being of a human.

Foucault explores power as points of multiplicity, which complement the play of forces in the foundation of history. It is, therefore, the attempt of power structures, at least in the period of time that Foucault was examining, to attempt to close off knowledge from those who were not privileged enough to have access to it. These local points of power serve to describe the way in which power comes from specified localizations into formations that constitute wholes or totalities (histories, geographies, states, etc.).⁸ Therefore, knowledge distributes itself much like a map over an area of the present and gives rise to the formation and deformation of institutions, states, knowledge, and visibilities. What had started off in the clinic as the urge to describe and treat ends up yielding to an entire apparatus that distributes specific knowledge, those who can know, and those who will receive treatment. These individual elements of power become totalized into a system with a central structure and function (at least for a period) to form a norm:

If the science of man appeared as an extension of the science of life, it is because it was medically, as well as biologically, based: by transference, importation, and, often, metaphor, the science of man no doubt used concepts formed by biologists; but the very subjects that it devoted itself to (man, his behavior, his individual and social realizations) therefore opened up a field that was divided up according to the principles of the normal and pathological. Hence the unique character of the science of man, which cannot be detached from the negative aspects in which it first appeared, but which is also linked with the positive role that it implicitly occupies as norm. (Foucault, 1994, p. 36)

Normativity becomes a characteristic feature of the science of man. By using biological terms, this science can now classify what constitutes 'abnormality.' This ability implicates the casting and definition of 'outsiders,' who deviate outside of the normal spectrum of physical human health.

Human health in relationship to nature becomes defined biologically as well as physically and pathologically. In this estrangement, human nature is cleaved through by the diagnosis of the medical field: human beings are coming to be further alienated from their natural countenance and dwelling through the progression of science and technology.

Medicine, in this time period Foucault is examining, provides a microstructure for the overall theme of power that was later to give rise to Foucault's conception of power structures in society. It is from a human need to be healthy that this locus of power gives way to the exercises in which society practices health and constitute the 'normal' human being (which is still a human being alienated from his dwelling and further defined by rationality, technology, and science). These points totalize the general schema and become a part of the linear 'progression' of history. Against this linear conception of history, Foucault argues that these formations are comprised of discursive and non-discursive elements that are ever evolving and devolving in a given specific episteme while dominating and controlling the societies that they are present in. This therefore defines what it is to be known in a given area of knowledge and what it is to be *seen* in a given period of history. Through this sight, the retreat from the medical gaze goes hand in hand as part of the journey of the return to dwelling. Foucault's analysis of the medical institution serves as an example (that Foucault may not have intended but nonetheless gives an excellent analysis of) of the fracturing of human being from his origin and the impending scientific enframing of the human subject.

1. *Breaking Home: Having, Being, and the Psychoanalysis of Dwelling*

To further examine spaces of revolt and consequently turn our analysis to actual physical places, two simple modes of being need to be established to give therapeutic conditions that will enable a subject to resist the institutions of power and begin to practice the journey towards home that Heidegger suggests. If the journey towards dwelling as a practical utopia is to take place, what forms of conscious-altering resistance are available to the human subject? How do we break technological and scientific rationality in order to dwell? The methodologies of Erich Fromm's Marxist and humanist psychoanalysis are incredibly helpful⁹ in shedding light on practical ways to break from institutional power and scientific domination. Fromm's most brilliant exegesis on two

methods of framing our psychological mind, *To Have or to Be?* (Fromm, 2005) was written exploring these two psychological relations to objects. In this work Fromm spells out the prevailing psychological mindset of most human beings (as egotistical) dominated by culture and its institutions:

I can never be satisfied, because there is no end to my wishes; I must be envious of those who have more and afraid of those who have less. But I have to repress all these feelings in order to represent myself (to others as well as to myself) as the smiling, rational, sincere, kind human being everybody pretends to be. (Fromm, 2005, p. 5)

Similar to Heidegger, Fromm is explaining the phenomenon that people in this century, due to the prevailing powers of the culture industry, major corporations, and scientific institutions, have forsaken the fundamental position of Being. Fromm contrapositions Being to Having. Having is the new fundamental role for human beings who exist in relation to one another, their objects, and nature. This practical exploration of the mode of Having explains the day-to-day psychological phenomenon of the covering over of dwelling and the alienation human beings experience in their fundamentally *having* modes of existence in being-in-the-world.¹⁰

Fromm further elaborates the mode of Having by stating that it is primarily the relationship between human beings and their ego:

Our ego is the most important object of our property feeling, for it comprises many things: our body, our name, our social status, our possessions (including our knowledge), the image we have of ourselves and the image we want others to have of us. Our ego is a mixture of real qualities, such as knowledge and skills, and of certain fictitious qualities that we build around a core of reality. But the essential point is not so much what the ego's content is, but that the ego is felt as a thing we each possess, and that 'thing' is the basis of our sense of identity. (Fromm, 2005, p. 59)

The ego builds our sense of identity. The ego is also exclusively related to the way that we *are* in the world. According to the having mode of being, the ego covers up over the areas of life that are essential for dwelling: it wants to possess objects, nature, and other human beings in order to build its identity and establish itself as a part of the reality of having. In its possession, it comes to define relationships as exclusive objects to consume. Capitalist institutions and the scientific and technological rationality of our time are its prominent arguments for consuming identity the way

that it currently functions. The Having mode of being also produces, in the individual, the need for oppressor and oppressed. This dichotomy is essential for the ego in this mode. It is also this function that provides the explanation of the domination of the covering of being and the essential struggle, given this prevailing way of thinking, to return to home towards dwelling. Fromm remarks on this:

The having mode of existence, the attitude centered on property and profit, necessarily produces the desire- indeed the need- for power. To control other living human beings we need to use power to break their resistance. To maintain control over private property we need to use power to protect it from those who would take it from us because they, like, us, can never have enough; the desire to have private property produces the desire to use violence in order to rob others in overt or covert ways. In the having mode, one's happiness lies in one's superiority over others, in one's power, and in the last analysis, in one's capacity to conquer, rob, kill. In the being mode it lies in loving, sharing, giving. (Fromm, 2005, p. 66)

Our selves in the having mode are motivated by a desire to possess objects. In this desire, we are given an everlasting conquest of the possession and domination of others. This forms a hierarchy in which the oppressor and oppressed are distinctly determined and counterpoised. A human in this having mode wants to maintain control and consequently become an empowered individual. This drive is what has come to dominate the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The having mode is supported by scientific and technological rationality, which only feed into the desire to possess thus promoting the violence that this possession carries with it. The institutional constructions of society help to form and reinforce this dominating psychological phenomenon.¹¹

Given Fromm's insight, it appears that he, as well as Heidegger, want us to return to a 'mode' of being closer to the original nature of the human being but surpassing the need for competition and dominance. In the quote above, Fromm briefly characterizes the *being* mode of existence as having the qualities of lovingness, sharing, and giving. These three things (among others) constitute practical ways in which human beings can begin to turn their psychological character from the having mode towards the being mode. This turn and personal journey also constitute the spark and productive thinking that a space of revolt should primarily cultivate.

2. A Place to Resist: Spaces of Revolt and the Passage Home

A *space of revolt* is a physical space with a dimension to turn our thinking outside of the covers that are layered upon being and to dwell within this space. This space, consequently, breaks a person from the having mode of being and encourages and influences reflexivity in thought and more fundamental connection with human nature and nature in general. In these spaces, we find that we, as human beings have the ability to *be* in dwelling, to *dwell*. However, if dwelling is the utopia of this type of thinking, then a *space of revolt*, breaks and redistributes this human psychical constitution and comes close to this utopia but never reaches it. Heidegger's journey to the proximity of Being is itself a form of revolt. This process is turning towards home and resisting the dominating presence of scientific and technological rationality therefore destructing normativity and the domination of nature.

Before exploring specific places of resistance and their characteristics (primarily through an architectural analysis), it is useful to list the practical outcomes of this space, somewhat given to us by Erich Fromm. His outline for the types of practical components and feelings that should break the having mode of being and enable us to dwell (and according to Fromm comprise 'the new man') are great examples of types of thinking that a space of revolt will inspire. Fromm states:

The function of the new society¹² is to encourage the emergence of a new Man, beings whose character structure will exhibit the following qualities: willingness to give up all forms of having, in order to fully *be*. Security, sense of identity, and confidence based on faith in what is, on one's need for relatedness, interest, love, solidarity with the world around one, instead of on one's desire to have, to possess, to control the world, and thus become the slave of one's possessions. Acceptance of the fact that nobody and nothing outside oneself give meaning to life, but that this radical independence and no-thingness can become the condition for the fullest activity devoted to caring and sharing. Being fully present where one *is*. Joy that comes from giving and sharing, not from hoarding and exploiting. Love and respect for life in all its manifestations, in the knowledge that not things, power, all that is dead, but life and everything that pertains to its growth are sacred. Trying to reduce greed, hate, and illusions as much as one is capable. Developing one's capacity for love, together with one's capacity for critical, unsentimental thought. Shedding one's narcissism and accepting the tragic limitations inherent in human existence. Developing an imagination, not as an escape from intolerable circumstances but as the anticipation of real possibilities, as a means to do away with intolerable circumstances. Happiness in the process of ever-growing aliveness, whatever the furthest point is that fate permits one to reach, for living as fully as one can is so satisfactory that

the concern for what one might or might not attain has little chance to develop. (Fromm, 2005, p. 139-140)

These breaks from the dominating culture are all characteristics of the return home and our chance to eliminate the superego's hold on our existence and the having mode of being to become reduced. In order for these characteristics to take place, a significant shift in thinking about everyday life must occur. Fromm's aim in listing these characteristics of 'the new man,' is to describe the relationship in which we become fundamentally, as a community, closer to being and beings. They also cater to the development of human happiness in society and break down the normative social processes of science. In this vein and keeping these characteristics in mind, it is useful to describe physical places that should allow such thinking to occur in the passage towards home.

What is a physical place that encourages the progress towards dwelling? Obviously this seems like a subjective insight into what encourages people to break from their surroundings and become more in tune with nature as well as their 'human nature'. However, there seems to be certain characteristics of these places that would illuminate conceptually the architectural dimension in the return towards home. Spaces of revolt ideally would diminish the hold technology has, although they may incorporate some comment on technology or technology itself. They would ideally be incorporated into a fundamental relationship with nature that would influence the thinking of the subject towards the return to Being.

In order to fully grasp this specific experience, an example may lead to further clarification of the conception of spaces of revolt. In the United States of America, there is one city that stands as a perfect example of the current culture industry and has solidified itself, not as the capital of America, but surely as the cultural capital representative of that nation. This city is New York City. The main area people seem to be referring to when talking about New York, is the center of the city and one of the five Burroughs: Manhattan. When walking through this section of the city, a person cannot help but feel completely immersed in the layout and massive architecture of the high-rise buildings surrounding almost every block on the island. This experience will be captured

from the view of a city-dweller (one who lives or has lived in the city) and not a tourist (who may have a different experience when walking through the city based on cultural exposure).

For the city dweller, grotesque and massive buildings become part of their everyday experience by living there daily. A person is made to feel small, wandering block to block in the seemingly never ending rows of large buildings made of glass, concrete, and brick. The buildings blend together and force a cultural persona of traits characterized by largeness, inadequacy, familiarity, and alienation. While walking uptown in New York City, on Park Avenue, these familiar buildings, one after the other, consume the city-dweller and the familiarity of these buildings become banal. A person experiencing the city streets continually notices that after a long period of time these buildings tend to look the same and create a sense of lost individuality that is ultimately a suggestion these buildings make about the current culture industry in the United States. However, approaching the upper-middle section of Park Avenue on Forty-Second Street the city-dweller is confronted by a standout architectural phenomenon. This point of architectural dwelling is the building and complex of Grand Central Station.

Grand Central Station itself stands out uniquely amongst the other buildings in the city. It is smaller than the rest of the buildings in the surrounding area and offers a unique experience of classical architecture mixed with early twentieth century thematic elements. The building itself is indiscernibly modern and ancient. Its intricate Romanesque architectural elements bring a taste of history and vividly illuminate New York City in contrast to the bleak, massive capitalistic architecture that tends to invade the person in his contact with the culture capital of America. Walking inside Grand Central, one is lost amongst the beautiful marble floors and the immensely detailed lit ceiling in the main area. Grand Central terminal offers a sublime moment of negativity and unsettledness amongst the hustle and bustle of daily working life. It is this negativity that allows us to realize our reflexive situation through the architecture of Grand Central. Grand Central Station embodies our contingent historicity and presents us with a situation where we can abstractly remove ourselves from our own alienation through self-critical reflection about the building and about our daily working lives. It provides a key example for architecture that can

erupt our sense of everydayness and stand out amongst a banal city culture therefore guiding an individual towards home and *dwelling*.

It is spaces of revolt that turn us towards dwelling. They lead us on our journey back home and break through the overwhelming power of the institutional apparatuses that only confirm and reaffirm technological and scientific rationality. Spaces of revolt provide resistance for the individual subject and groups of individuals subjects living in a community. These important physical spaces obstruct capitalist space and the technology of dominance in order to psychically move us from the having mode of existence to the being mode of existence. In this way spaces of revolt promote reflexivity in thought, and basic connections with other human existences (as well as our own), nature, and the world at large. The experience of these spaces at first may seem uprooting, but just as in our journey back home, this up-rootedness constitutes what it means to return to being. The initial anxiety of these moments is productive for an individual consciousness in becoming a better human being and leading towards societal happiness. In order to learn to live fully, we must inhabit these spaces, and forever become closer to what we once lost... home.

¹ For the early Heidegger, authentic anxiety [eigentliche; Angst] is the radical, unsettling experience (he calls it anxiety stemming from an encounter with the Uncanny), of realizing, or coming to terms with the fact that, you are "in-but-not-of-the-world". Because we are subjects with violations and a will to control our lives and environment, it becomes extremely unsettling when we admit that some entities are outside our ability to define them (like nature). But we all feel this "unsettling" way about our place in the world, the difference is that inauthentic people try to flee this feeling through vainly attempting to control all aspects of our lived in environment (whereas those who dwell accept this really uncomfortable Uncanny-ness, and accept their inability to fully objectify nature or be fully a part of the world) Technological enframing, however, reduces all beings (including ourselves) to intrinsically meaningless resources waiting to be optimized. Heidegger claims that technological ways of thinking are accelerating. Technological is believed by him to have dominion over the peoples of this generation and constitutes our relationship to nature. This means that our current way of revealing the world (enframing), is done in such a way that both man and other entities in the world appear only as calculable 'products' which we can manipulate at will. Thus, authentic dwelling comes from a sort of acceptance that we are part of the world, but unable to be totally immersed with it. Technological attempts at "feeling in the face of anxiety" by trying to conquer the world of objects (like our attempts to conquer nature) by imposing 'value' systems.

² This conception and exploration of dwelling in early Heidegger goes beyond the realm and focus of the current study.

³ This relationship is explored by many Marxist thinkers and termed as 'reification.'

⁴ That is, if we ever overcome it wholly.

⁵ Which there is also evidence for in 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking,' as mentioned above.

⁶ Foucault is obviously indebted here to Nietzsche.

⁷ It should be noted here that both are forms of surveillance.

⁸ The reverse phenomena also happens and is typically Foucault's own preferred emphasis.

⁹ Although at times very simplistic: Fromm does not touch on degree but rather relies on stark opposition inherited from Marx and Hegel.

¹⁰ At stake here is possession and greed.

¹¹ Again, it should be noted that there seems to be a sense of *degree* missing from Fromm's analysis.

¹² In our analysis this 'new society' is not so optimistic, rather these guidelines from Fromm comprise what a space of revolt should encourage and cater in the human beings' passage towards home.

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