

SPACE AND PLACE OF JERUSALEM; SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION AND INTER-CULTURAL SOCIOPOLITICAL PEACE AND CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT: *The study presents cultural, religious and peace and conflict discourse on Jerusalem (Israel-Palestine conflict), attempting to remain outside the realpolitik and examine sociopolitical-religious synergy and critical peace and partially integral human securitisation. Interculturalism, multiculturalism, and such notions emerged in the 1970s, emphasising different cultures' equivalence and dialogue. Besides cultural and territorial determinants of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the status quo is conditioned by a religious rather than a secular approach to political organisation. Both civilisations view their inhabit area through religious rights, turning history into theology and different theology into sociopolitics. It presents a human conflict. While religion and nationalism based on power have often contributed to antagonism, and violence, the objectives of the three monotheist religions addressing peace suggest a shift towards mutual compromise from hegemonic visions to practical expectancies. Jerusalem is the holy place where all confessions have the right of residence. Infiltration of faith into this political dispute, Islamism, and Judaism is a religious aspect disputed between Jews and Arabs. Conflicts are mainly due to territory, and religion gives it a higher purpose within narratives regarding supernatural rights. Despite the inter-religious tensions and passions involved in the contradictory faith elevation at this religious source, the internal and external peace is influenced by politics. The holy city of Jerusalem is a perpetual “poor” case-study paradigm. The future sociopolitical life must work around healthy inter-cultural, inter-religious, socioeconomic development, and critical human security. The revenge practice could negatively influence (any) peace process—causes related to social, psychological, historical, cultural, and societal stagnation. Balkans–Bosnia and Herzegovina is a comparable paradigm to the Israel–Palestinian question. Similar policies maintain, clerical, national, and ethnopolitical patterns materialise, i.e., critical peace stalemate persists.*

KEYWORDS: Palestine, Israel, culture, human security, Peace, Dialogue.

INTRODUCTION

Multiculturalism, interculturalism, and interreligious dialogue are vital theoretical and practical sociopolitical approaches to global cultural diversity. Moreover, intercultural dialogue speaks as the key to the future survival of the European Union, EU, which is essential when we know that it is about a supranational

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community of 28 member states or about 500 million inhabitants who speak 24 official working languages. In addition, on the relevance of international discussions, official documents and declarations of UNESCO speak best about cultural diversity and the Councils of Europe dealing with cultural diversity since its inception, in which cultural diversity is promoted as a resource for sustainable development and a factor of integration, inclusion, and peace. Thus, we could implement it in the fragile “Middle East” and the city of Jerusalem. Moreover, the definition of Culture and Religion implies an attitude toward cultural diversity, clarifying the connection between culture, religion, and development. Religion and culture always exist in close relation. Together with aesthetics and ethics, religion constitutes culture. As ethnicity becomes part of the related concepts, the relation with religion needs explanation. Over two centuries ago, people began to believe that the Western democracies were moving toward modern secular democracy and that other societies would undoubtedly follow suit. Although this has not happened, we still implicitly believe in the process of modernisation, and we find various mitigating circumstances, such as poverty or colonialism, to justify this delay. This assumption determines how we see political theology as an atavism requiring psychological or sociological analysis.

The issues of political life occur in the same manner. Political institutions often follow divine authority and spiritual redemption and, on the other, do the opposite. According to many critics, due to the massive role of religion in government and politics, Israel cannot be considered a secular state in the ordinary sense of the word. It is a secular democracy where Judaism is privileged; in reality, many orthodox Jews believe that Israel should be a theocratic state where Judaism is the supreme law of the land. Secular and orthodox Jews are at odds over the future of Israel, and it is uncertain what will happen. The parallels between these ultra-Orthodox Jews and the American Christian Right are strong. Both regard modernity as a tragedy, both lament the loss of power and influence for their respective religions, and both would like to transform society by taking it back several hundred years and instituting religious law in place of civil law. Both are dismissive of the rights of religious minorities, and both would risk war with other nations in pursuit of their religious goals (Cline, 2021).

This long-term conflict's fundamental causes maintain nationhood, religion, and realpolitik values and character. Accordingly, the necessity of rational peace and conflict approach is critical. The religious dimension is primarily related to the central role of the city of Jerusalem and the broader area of the state of Israel in the sacred texts and religious heritage of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. One of the fundamental elements of Jewish religious identity is related to the narrative of the Jewish people as chosen by God and to biblical prophecies that promise Jews to return to the Holy Land. The election of the Jewish people in the biblical tradition is manifested in God's revelation to the Jews - God as such is separated from the material world and unknowable to the earthly creature, ontologically and epistemologically unattainable. The only knowledge, that is, the only method of acquiring knowledge of God is God's revelation of himself, which in the moment

of exaltation destroys the barriers of knowledge and transmits truth in the form of correct knowledge of the divine. The property of the religious is that it is not negotiated or questioned. If the territory of the West Bank is a heritage given by God, then its surrender is not only a pragmatic outcome of the negotiations but a direct renunciation of God's gift. Consequently, there is a massive obstacle to any compromise solutions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Puljic, 2021).

We also find the religious roots of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the Palestinian side. Reading the original Hamas Charter, we come across the same conception of the Holy Land as in Jewish tradition – Palestine is considered an endowment (waqf) given by God, and consequently, the fight against usurpers is a religious duty. The charter explicitly frames the conflict in religious terms and states that *"Israel, Judaism and the Jews are the challengers (..) of Islam and the Muslim people"* and that the state of Israel will exist *"until Islam destroys it"*. This narrative is further reinforced by quotations from the hadith group of Sahih al-Bukhari: *"Judgment Day will not come until Muslims fight the Jews and when the Jews hide behind stones and trees. Trees and stones will say: O Muslims, O servants of God, behind me is a Jew; come and kill him"*. The goal of Hamas is to *"hang the banner of God over every inch of Palestine because (...) in the absence of Islam, conflicts reign, oppression spreads, evil prevails, and divisions and wars will break out"*. It is clear from this that Hamas saw the conflict with Israel as a land conflict in which negotiations and amicable solutions are possible but as a conflict of good and evil – only the final victory of Islam and the destruction of Israel can bring peace, order, and prosperity. Any other outcome was completely illegitimate and unacceptable (Puljic, 2021).

Israel's divide between state and religion has made a robust comeback in the country's two rounds of elections in 2019. With the two major parties sharing many crucial political orientations –ranging from opposition to the JCPOA with Iran to the status quo with the Palestinians– the current political stalemate has thus been increasingly perceived as a cleavage on the state–religion axis. One is pessimistic, foreseeing the imminent disintegration of Israeli society as a "giant with clay feet", a cause taken up by left–wing Israelis: *"Like a bad game of pick-up sticks, so it is in Israel; moving any toothpick threatens to bring down the entire shaky structure of the 'Jewish and democratic state'"* (Ha'aretz, 24 January 2017). The metaphor summarises the resistance of Israeli politicians to embark on any significant debate touching on identity issues, whether related to the Nation-State Law, the Military Draft Law, the Buraq (Wailing) Wall access policy, or any other critical issue potentially triggering civil strife within the three major Jewish subgroups. However, nowadays, and contrary to the recent past, the Haredim are getting closer to the state: 75% declared themselves proud Israelis alongside their religious belonging in a recent poll. They are traditionally concentrated in neighbourhoods in the main cities (Bnei Brak close to Tel Aviv and Mea Sharim in Jerusalem) (De Martino, 2019).

Religion expresses important primordial values in Palestinian society and is often a crucial dimension of collective identity. It is only natural then that

nationalists use religious groups and their symbols as a means in a struggle to achieve their national or state-centred goals (Frisch and Sandler, 2004). In the example of former Yugoslavia, ethnic, national, and confessional affiliations add to political radicalisation thirty years after the wars. Due to new national-state theoretical inadequacy (i.e., nationalism as an ideology), religion is used as an instrument of socialisation and legitimisation of new national-political state subjects. Paradoxically, during Communism/Socialism, there was emphatic contempt for people who went to a church or mosque and who celebrated religious holy days. When nation and religion become "controversial" identification and mark others as potentially dangerous, through a policy that allegedly aims to "affirm" and "protect" its people and their faith, then in local historical and current circumstances, it essentially implies antagonism in the most dramatic conflicts. Historical revisionism and the memory of "evil" developed into a behavioural practice. However, as a form of political power, politicised religions are, psychologically speaking, unconscious non-faith (Hadžić, 2021).

The clash between secularism and Islam in Palestine dates back to the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict many decades ago. Secular political movements and organisations were born from violent political conflict. The eruption of the first Palestinian intifada in 1987 facilitated the spread out of Islamic organisations in Palestine. The Oslo agreement in September 1993 and the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994 created a vacuum in Palestinian resistance against the Israeli occupation, which was filled by Islamic movements and organisations, mainly Hamas (Abusada, 2010). By comparing the two Palestinian movements' ideologies, Fatah and Hamas, there is the question of religious–secular cleavage to explain Palestinian factional politics. Their rivalry is best understood as a competition for the median voter rather than an indication of political polarisation (Lovlie, 2014). Fatah is the secular movement founded in Kuwait in the late 1950s by diaspora Palestinians after the 1948 Nakba. It recognises Israel and wants to build a state on the 1967 borders. Despite the differences between the two Palestinian parties, they have managed to reach an agreement to end their divide. Hamas does not recognise Israel but accepts a Palestinian state on 1967 borders. Hamas defines itself as a "*Palestinian Islamic national liberation and resistance movement*", using Islam as its frame of reference (Al Tahnan, 2017).

The issue of a lively, and sometimes even inflamed, intra–Jewish conflict periodically resurfaces in public debates in Israel. In 2015, President Reuven Rivlin described Israel as no longer consisting of a sound secular Zionist majority, having split into "four tribes" diverging along with the state–religion spectrum (i.e., secular, national–religious, the ultra–Orthodox Jews, and the Arabs). Two rival and opposing viewpoints currently confront each other concerning intra–Jewish social integration. The public perception of the religion–state cleavage is summarised by Yedidia Stern's assertion that, in Israel, "Religion is the mother and the State is the father" and that no healthy identity excludes one of those two

poles is viable. Most Israeli secular Jews would be happy to take a "divided we stand" approach based on religious pluralism (De Martino, 2019).

Most sociological considerations and "conceptual–theoretical" problematisation of the ambiguity of the concept of culture start from Kroeber's and Kluckhohn's text entitled "Culture". Critical review Concepts and Definitions (1952), in which they reviewed the definitions and concepts known until then culture and similarly reduced them to eleven essential conceptual formulations of the notion of Culture (Kalanj, 2006). They collected 163 definitions of a culture known until then, and we will present Kluckhohn's list that synthesises them into: "1) the entire way of life of a nation; 2) the social heritage that is transmitted to the individual by the group to which he belongs; 3) way of thinking, feeling, believing; 4) abstraction performed from behavior; 5) theories of social anthropologists about the way a group of people behaves; 6) a collective storehouse of knowledge; 7) a set of standard orientations regarding current problems; 8) adopted behavior; 9) mechanism of normative regulation of behavior; 10) so do other people; 11) historical sediment, map, sieve, matrix" (Crespi, 2009).

The number of individual needs, and the real impossibilities of their satisfaction, imply the necessary cooperation of the social community members. This willing consent to communion should be manifested in the experimental paradigm of life as solidarity, consent, and cooperation—in short, a crystallised awareness of the needs for joint action (Hadzic, 2021). The interreligious dialogue is the positive and cooperative interaction between people of different religions, faiths, or spiritual beliefs, intending to promote understanding between different religions to increase acceptance and tolerance. Interreligious dialogue brings people of different religious faiths together for conversations. These conversations can take an array of forms and possess a variety of goals and formats. They can also occur at various social levels and target different participants, including elites, mid–level professionals, and grassroots activists. Interreligious dialogue programs may resemble secular peacebuilding programs in some ways. In other ways, religious content and spiritual culture are infused throughout the programs, distinguishing them from their secular counterparts (United States Institute for peace, 2004). By referring to a different notion of religions as forbearers of peace and cooperation, and mutual trust and respect, a solution of the religious aspect could open a different avenue that is hardly present where the Hobbesian vision of the old testament seems to prevail by thinking on a tooth by tooth, action and counteraction, the impossibility for peace without painful sacrifices. This model aims to overcome this fundamental obstacle and open a different road to peace. The future Jerusalem would look much different from the Jerusalem of today. There is still a vast religious, political, emotional, and psychological divide between Muslim and Jewish views on Jerusalem, which makes it extremely painful to have both make historic concessions on the city of Jerusalem (Barakat, 2009).

Ethnicity, nation, and religion are the last and, fortunately, an invincible stronghold of the disputed individual. It ables to provide the endangered

individual with a more or less calming framework of existence. In ancient times, hatred was not racial because races were not even thought of in the modern sense but religious. If a Jew were baptised and began to practice Christianity properly, he would be saved from persecution (but at that time, Jews did not choose in large percentages such output). "Racial" hatred arose only in the centuries when "races" as a biological phenomenon were discovered. With the momentum of science in the 17th and 18th, and above all in the 19th century (Lie, 2011). Early science arbitrarily attributed the mental and intellectual weakness to people of different skin colours and ethnic and geographical roots, declaring the supremacy of the European white and the "Christian" race. These views were shared and developed, though not always by Jews, by many famous scientists, philosophers, and cultural workers of the time, but these details are regularly skipped in their contemporary biographies.

Theodor Herzl understood that anti-Semitism was a problem that the Jews tried in vain to solve by proving themselves to be loyal and diligent citizens of the states globally. As long as Jews live among the non-Jews, they will be the object of their distrust and hatred. As one of the most important goals of gathering Jews in his state, Herzl cites the cessation of anti-Semitism (Herzl, 2011). However, there is no connection between the Palestinian problem and European anti-Semitism. In the course of 20th century European history, Jews and Arabs, Jews and Muslims in general were in the position of a civilizational conflict that was political and quasi-metaphysical. Thus, in recent history, the conflict on the attitudes toward Islamophobia considers Islamophobic implications, which could be seen globally, including in Israel. Both the struggle against anti-Semitism and Islamophobia and the one against the mechanism creating, in certain circumstances, is a kind of negative feedback loop between them requires not only opposing the anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim prejudices but also a profound, critical reconsideration of the concepts of Europeanness that lie at their foundation (Bobako, 2017).

Many historians today agree that Muslims and Christians lived in Jerusalem mostly in unison until the expedition of the crusaders aroused the ultimate revolt and vengefulness. The Crusaders, however, captured Jerusalem in July 1099, to be expelled from there by the famous Muslim military leader, the Kurd of Tikrit, Salah al-Din. To medieval Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike, the Holy Land was a profoundly symbolic and sacred entity, not just a geographical area of the East. For the three faiths, the focus was above all on Jerusalem. For Muslims, Bayt al-Maqdis, with the al-Aqsa Mosque at its centre is considered one of three most holy site worldwide, together with Makkah and Madinah, and a magnet of pious visitation. Islam has further direct links with the Holy Land; Bayt al-Maqdis was the first Islamic direction of prayer, Qiblah, and Muslims believe that the Prophet Muhammad was taken from Makkah to Jerusalem in the Night Journey (Isra) and from there he ascended into Heaven (Mi'raj). For them, it is in Bayt al-Maqdis that the Day of Judgement will take place (Hillerbrand, 1999).

Can Jerusalem, in the collision with its history and such people, be able to survive? The holy city cannot belong to anyone whole and without the rest. It

belongs to everyone, no matter what limits this or that contract sets for him. It has always been the case, although not everyone has ever come to terms with it. For centuries, the "Middle East" has been influenced by conflicts of religion, geostrategic interests of the great powers, water, land, and oil. The most sensitive and delicate issue was and remained the status of Jerusalem. It is not easy to consider Jerusalem impartially and objectively. That is why conversations about this city, with its inhabitants of different origins and religions, as well as flipping through old books, reveal the incredible inability of the human intellect to reach an "objective" level where a possible solution becomes "fair" and "reasonable" for all. A Christian priest in that city said a somewhat blasphemous sentence to Zlatko Dizdarevic: *"There is not enough ecumenism on earth to bridge all the religious and other differences here..."* (Dizdarevic, 2017). At the same time, centuries have shown that not so much exclusive exclusivity would lead to the constant boiling of blood. Everyone there, however, had to admit that the three great monotheistic religions, whose shrines are concentrated on a few square kilometres within the walls of the old city, have equal rights equal to equal claims to the city and the country. People perceive Jerusalem as a standard gate to pass on the path between the present and eternity. The persistent efforts of those who want to close the door for some and open the door for others will continue to fail, no matter how assertive and decisive daily politics may seem from the perspective of ordinary mortals, negligibly small compared to immortal Jerusalem.

All religions in the world attach great importance to a particular city or different cities. The holy city can be the home of a religious mentor, the birthplace of their "god", or where a prominent temple or shrine is built. The conflict in Jerusalem is not classically religious. It is a political dispute over sovereignty. When Muslims, Christians, and Jews agree on Jerusalem, the conflict will be resolved. Each of the narratives is correct and emotional, precisely the essence of this place. All three religions connect to Jerusalem: Jews, Muslims, and Christians. They all call for peace, love, and tolerance. Yet, throughout its history, Jerusalem has proven to be a permanent site of violence that began long ago, in the 4th millennium BC. Thus the holy city of Jerusalem tells the story of the contrast between the actual image of the city and the symbols it bears and tells why this city is marked by religious fanaticism and interreligious hatred. It is indicative that neither politicians today nor religious leaders follow the books of God. It is why there has been no peace in the holy city of Jerusalem. As much as history and religion are the links between most cities in the Holy Land, it is still a land of contrasts in the true sense of the word: whether spoken: climatic, political, religious, or geographical conditions. It is a place of, one might say, eternal conflicts, but it is still a promised land for many, a climate that cannot and will not be given up. The Holy Land possesses "that something" that only the believer can comprehend, the religious identity. Identity is inherent in a person. However, things have no identity. Identity is a set of all elements of a person's recognisability. Peculiarities, physical, mental, and mental, are unique and belong only to us, differentiating us from others.

It should be noted that there is no one-size-fits-all identity. Identity plurality is at the core of every identity. No one is merely male or female, by sex and gender (gender and gender identity), but also young or old (identity by age group); then everyone belongs to a nationally determined group (national identity) or religious (religious identity); some are marked by their historical–social status (social identity). These identities overlap. Sometimes and somewhere between nation and religion. Judaism is a clear example of overlapping identities along ethnic and religious lines. The man is made up of his faith and history, inseparable from the Jewish identity. In the conception of political Islam, such a thing is inconceivable because Islam permeates every pore of Muslim society, or instead, without religion, there is no Muslim society. Political failures of Arab regimes, the conflict with Israel, and the general social crisis in Arab countries are some reasons for strengthening the Islamic movement.

The future of the Muslim-Jewish conflict articulates through historical canonised descriptions associated with resistance movements, determining its continuation. The redemptive Palestinian martyrdom shows a distorted understanding through global left-wing supporters (numerous examples), reducing people to conventional "human weapons" –preferring the crime aesthetics to compromise ethics. It does not offer a sociopolitical, critical security, and inter-cultural peace and conflict approach. For understanding the development of a Muslim religious view of the Jewish state-building project in Palestine, a key factor is the career of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Haji Emin al-Husseini. In addition, the review of early Islamic history and canonised descriptions of Muslim-Jewish conflicts and the Hamas Charter speak to clerics' writings associated with Islamic resistance movements, among the most important Islamic thinkers is Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, one of the spiritual leaders of the Muslim Brothers. After the recent armed conflict, a "paradigm shift" occurred in Palestinian public opinion. There is now growing support for Hamas and its armed struggle (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2021).

Using Durkheim's terminology of anomie (Wickert, 2019), Islamism represents a way out of the socio–political crises into a unique way of life with guidelines from the Quran. Christianity is based on the teachings and actions of the Jewish preacher Jesus. Because of his teaching, Jesus came into conflict with the Jewish religious elders; the Romans ruled the province at the time. According to the Bible, Jesus was accused and condemned as the King of the Jews in Jerusalem. After his conviction, he was taken to Mount Golgotha, where he was crucified. There is still a street in Jerusalem that Jesus used to walk towards Golgotha, called the Way of Tears. After Jesus' death, his body was laid in a tomb. Today, at the tomb site is the Basilica of the Holy Sepulchre, which all Christians consider the greatest shrine. Under their rule came the Jews' space, the Promised Land, and the Christians' Holy Land.

The concrete political consequence of the religious and spiritual transformation was the beginning of the systematic settlement of the war-torn areas, especially the complete "material Hebrewisation" of Jerusalem and its

surroundings. Although secular Ashkenazi authorities initially viewed the Jewish settlement of the conquered areas from a pragmatic rather than a metaphysical perspective, they saw it as a pledge in future negotiations with the Arabs. Over time, a metaphysical perspective prevailed in which the newly conquered areas were seen as part of God's heritage that had finally fallen into the hands of the Jews and should no longer be dropped. After the right came to power in the 1977 elections for the first time in Israeli history, a settlement was no longer justified solely by security and political, but also by ideological and spiritual reasons. The metaphysical perspective has always been characteristic of the Jewish right and is sublimated in the political slogan of Greater Israel (Havel, 2013). Thus, the use of religious charges for political purposes and the idea that the restoration of national sovereignty is, in fact, a sovereign work of God that will then give birth to the piety of the Jewish people. However, a religious Jew may presently belong to almost any political, ideological, and worldview option without being considered inconsistent. In contrast, the pragmatic perspective has been characteristic of left Israel and is sublimated in the political slogan "land for peace". These two perspectives obscured the cultural conflict about Israel's exact national identity.

Finally, it is worth considering the realpolitik dimension of the conflict, i.e., the specific situation on the ground and the interests and incentives of the actors in the conflict. Several factors make the Israeli–Palestinian conflict more challenging to resolve. First, the actions of actors on both sides perpetually fuel the conflict. Israeli treatment of the Palestinian population in terms of police brutality and killings of civilians, targeting critical infrastructure (electricity and drinking water supplies), and disabling and restricting exports and imports, is expected to provoke repeated violent reactions from the Palestinian side fuelled by resentment and feelings of helplessness. Since Israel has neither an optical nor a strategic interest in ending military action against Palestinians but in exhausting Hamas, breaking its command chains, and destroying its stockpile of weapons, this perfidious defence mechanism used by Palestinians will continue to incite and inflame conflict. The political reasons for the likely long–term continuation of the conflict intertwine with religious beliefs and discourses and create an almost insoluble loop in one of the longest–running conflicts in the “Middle East” and the world. Although there is a temporary truce, it is only time before the conflict erupts again. One can hope that there will be a transformation in the set of conditions in the coming years and that, at some point, long–term peace will be possible (Visnjic, 2021).

Critical Peace and Conflict Studies should focus on the quality and character of peace in cultural, religious, social, economic, and political terms, ranging from the global system to the state, civil society, and individuals within the community. Peace and Conflict Studies theory originates from liberal peace. However, Critical Peace and Conflict Studies are inquisitive about local peace agencies and infrastructures of peace and non–violent formation dynamics. Local, transnational, and transversal actors pursue diverse notions of peace and conflict

and may assert critical peace agency. It might include productive capabilities. Those capacities may otherwise be ignored in international peace-building. Similarly, Human security is essential not as a tool for research and analysis but as a signifier of (standard) political and moral values. Moreover, it should focus on social and economic issues because they affect individual security depending on the broad—a diverse network of factors requiring a comprehensive approach. Despite liberal sensibility, the prior conceptualisation of critical security does not provide a theoretical basis for challenging, say, in the former Yugoslavia case when security depends on violently creating an ethically–religiously clean territory. In addition to conceptual controversy, critical security studies have been built on normative and empirical controversies, leading to a controversy over what security studies mean and what they involve. Human security incorporates freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom from indignity. Besides, the paradigm of revenge prolongs violence, maintaining the status quo. It carries several social, psychological, and cultural reasons. The regional and global reasons drive violence (Interpeace, 2017). The violence, conflict, and insecurity have posed risks to Palestinian and Israeli society, particularly the young population. Therefore, within the interreligious, intercultural, and national framework, citizens must collectively identify how these risks affect them and society in general.

The study presents cultural, religious and peace and conflict discourse – on Jerusalem (general Israel-Palestine conflict), attempting to remain outside the realpolitik (as possible) and examine sociopolitical–religious synergy and critical peace (and partially) integral human securitisation. The paper presents a conceptual and theoretical examination of the topics using general scientific methods. The study included an in–depth theoretical literature review and examination of a range of other sources, such as primary documents relating to "social, cultural, religious and political relations" (media accounts and academic reports). The study's interdisciplinary theoretical nature and rational understanding allow for an objective viewpoint–cultural, religious, and political contextual factors in long–term conflict and war–divided societies are controvertible.

RELIGION, CULTURE AND CONFLICT

The topic of secularisation is one of the most important in the sociology of religion in the 60s and 70s. In the 1980s and 1990s, the focus shifted to revitalising religion and changing religious forms and functions. However, the revitalisation debate was dominated by the secularisation debate of the 1960s. The differences in the approach to secularisation became apparent later in the revitalisation of religion. In the modern globalised world, interreligious dialogue is imposed as a necessity and a necessity. However, questions are often asked. What are the risks and expectations of this dialogue, and how do we find ways to meet without simplification, syncretism, and renunciation of one's own identity? Religions offer models for individual behaviour and collective action. We have one factor in history that has been constant for over 2,000 years: religion. Pascal was right

when he said that people in religious ecstasy are ready to do the best things in the world but, at the same time, the worst (Pascal, 1995). Research shows that conflicts involving the religious element last a long time. It is very likely that they will recur in the future and that many civilians will suffer. It is evident in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts and that in the Balkans, former Yugoslavia.

Multiculturalism can be understood as "acknowledging the fact of cultural (ethnic) pluralism and law different social groups (primarily new immigrants) to maintain their specificity. Such a definition of culture allows us to analyse multiculturalism and interculturalism, albeit complementary approaches to cultural diversity, and emphasise the importance of culturally sustainable development. Namely, the semantic difference between the terms multiculturalism and interculturalism is clear from their prefixes "Multi" and "inter," which "cover the very essence of these two terms. The term "multi" (lat. Multus –many) implies only the simultaneous existence of several elements, in a given context – more culture, "and the term" inter "(lat. inter - among)" refers to the dynamics, intertwining and correlation" (Čačić-Kumpes, 2004).

Multiculturalism signifies a noble project to come out of the closure of one's own culture and realise the diversity of cultures and civilisations. That is the meaning built on the old humanistic ideal of wealth and tolerance of diversity. This expression can denote the coexistence of particularism that is mutually ignored; "which are only subject to the rule not to conflict directly" (Kalanj, 2006, 207). Right due to this ambiguity of meaning, the model of intercultural relations is suggested, which emphasises the primacy of the dialogical dimension of the multicultural state "and interculturality", which at the same time encompasses cultural diversity and ongoing dialogue of cultures "seen as a model of sustainable cultural development in a multicultural world" (Kalanj, 2006). And that culturally sustainable development is the "Development of human interests and actions that are less and fewer burdens on the nature reserve fund countries and existing capacities of infrastructure and inhabit space, "and at the same time, they encourage enjoyment of "values that through art, science, education, and cultural games and customs increase attractiveness among people" (Katunarić, 2007). Similarly, respect for cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity, minority rights, cultural rights, and measures against racism and xenophobia is integral in the negotiating chapter on Justice and Fundamental Human Rights.

Several centuries ago, Muslims, Christians, and Jews lived together in Jerusalem. Within the Ottoman system of maintaining peace in the area, the sounds of church bells, call to prayer from mosques, and Jewish prayers have been mixed in harmony for centuries. The story of restricting the teaching of the call to prayer in the Masjid al-Aqsa and other mosques is unacceptable in every sense. It is contrary to religious and other freedoms and is contrary to respect for fundamental rights, Turkish Deputy-Prime Minister Kurtulmuş told reporters ahead of a Turkish government session chaired by Prime Minister Binali Yıldırım (Tosum, 2016).

Religion is, of course, the cornerstone of Jerusalem as it is today and as it has always been. The number of Christian denominations in the holy city is even more noticeable. Recent data say that 32 different Christian denominations are practiced in Jerusalem alone. Walking through the streets of the old city, you meet Greek Orthodox priests with high hats, Armenians with black hoods, members of various Roman Catholic orders in colourful clothes, Ethiopians, Copts from Egypt, members of the Syrian Orthodox Church whose children learn Aramaic – the language Jesus spoke. All of them. Their tandably, they claim more or less the right to the stone under their feet in Jerusalem. Over the centuries, there have been fierce conflicts between priests of various denominations over the right to sacred holy places. In the church of the Holy Sepulchre, the holiest sacred Christianity debates used to end in fights, and murders are remembered. The solutions to the problems were varied. For example, the key to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre has been held by one Muslim family for generations. They opened the main church door every morning, so Christians avoided debating who should care about that key for generations. Despite the differences, members of all Christian churches are united when the calendar brings them to Jesus last walked them. The Mount of Olives, Via Dolorosa, Golgotha, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and the Crucifixion of Jesus are shrines with a unique meaning and significance (Dizdarevic, 2017). Jews have their connections with the holy city, for five centuries they were banished from the city from 132CE and until the arrival of the Muslims, who allowed them back in the city (El-Awaisi, 2016). The mixture of their different liturgies reflects the rich diversity of the Jewish diaspora.

An exceptional treasure bequeathed to Jerusalem by early Muslim rulers is the beautiful Dome Mosque over the sacred rock (Dome of the Rock), which was built in 691 by Caliph Abd-al-Malik. Before which, at this place, the conqueror of Bayt al-Maqdis, Caliph Umar, first cleared the old ruins and ordered the revitalisation of the ancient mosque. The Caliph Umar ordered a wooden structure to be built in the southern area of Masjid al-Aqsa. According to sources, the generous Caliph Umar also visited the Church of the Holy Sepulchre upon entering the city of Aelia/ Jerusalem. Later the dome, an Islamic monument covered with gold tiles, is one of the most beautiful buildings globally and is an architectural symbol and visual decoration of Jerusalem, one of the most significant monuments of Islamic civilisation together with other structures in al-Aqsa Mosque (Dizdarevic, 2017). The built structures can accommodate tens of thousands believers and ten times as many on the plateau around them. Some monuments are related to a description from the Qur'an that tells of Muhammad's miraculous night journey from Makkah to the holy city. Every child there will tell how *"Muhammad was awakened by the angel Gabriel in Mecca and rode with him to Jerusalem on a horse that had a human head"*. Early Muslim rulers' exceptional treasure bequeathed to Jerusalem is the beautiful Dome Mosque over the mentioned rock (Dome of the Rock).

The biblical words from the Babylonian captivity speak of the Jewish lasting desire to return to Palestine. At the end of the 19th century founder of Zionism,

Theodor Herzl, declared the reality of plans to rebuild the Jewish state: "*If you want it, it is not just a dream*" (Herzl, 1956). The withdrawal of Ottoman rule before the end of the First World War was followed by the British administration (the so-called Mandate) in Palestine. The vision of general redemption in which all world nations have the benefits of deliverance from the Jews and the coming age of general peace is replaced by a conception of Israeli redemption by occupying and inhabiting the biblical homeland, even if there are violent conflicts with non-Jewish nations. Admittedly, the state of Israel is not treated as the fulfilment of a messianic promise, but it becomes something that makes it possible (Dizdarevic, 2017).

The Holy City of Jerusalem has special significance for the three largest monotheistic religions, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. It means that peace and tolerance should reign in that city because all these religions, in principle, call for it. However, the holy city throughout history has always been the scene of conflict and bloodshed, with the exception of the Muslim rule with their inclusive vision (El-Awaisi, 2016). Thus, the holy city of Jerusalem tells the story of the contrast between the actual image of the city and the symbols it bears and tells why this city is marked by religious fanaticism and interreligious hatred. The city of great importance to Muslims particularly as their first Qiblah (al-Rabi, 2009) the Qur'an briefly describes the event of al-Isra (Night Journey). It states that the Prophet Muhammad, during one night riding the winged al-Buraq, reached al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.

The political-religious status of Jerusalem in the Islamic world was formed as early as the earlier centuries of Islam. The city and the whole area soon lose their political significance, not religious significance. The Arabic name most commonly used for Jerusalem today is Al-Quds (Holy), but in early Islamic times, the city was known as Iliya' (Aelia) and Madinat Bayt al-Maqdis. The term Al-Quds was first introduced in the Abbasid period in the 9th century (El-Awaisi, 2011). After the Prophet Muhammad's death, his successor caliphs extended their rule and Islam to all three continents of the Old World. The Islamic world is divided into several levels, but the Al-Aqsa Mosque binds the entire Muslim world. It is divided into a thousand things; it is a point of connection that everyone agrees on and probably a key point of discord that spills over into the whole world (Dizdarevic, 2017). Jerusalem is a holy city for Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and in Jerusalem itself, you have a conflict around the al-Aqsa Mosque.

Paradoxically, Jerusalem was more important to European Christians than Jews in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Its division dates back to that time. All the empires of that time, from the newcomers like Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the British Empire, financed their missionaries in the Holy Land, from archaeologists to priests. Jerusalem was not as important as it seems, even seven decades ago, for Jews. Historical anecdote is the evidence. Moshe Dayan, commander of the Israeli army in the Arab-Israeli war in 1948, informed "Father of the Nation" David Ben Gurion that he was in front of the Old City and could easily conquer it militarily. The first Israeli prime minister told him to stop because he did not want to guard the most

important holy places of Muslims and Christians on the shoulders of the newly born Jewish state. At that time, Ben Gurion was also ready to sacrifice the guard state that the Jews had been waiting for two millennia. According to the testimonies of the direct participants, both Jews and Arabs did not intend to conquer the entire city for themselves, but their goal was to divide it (Havel, 2013).

Orthodox Jews are much more like Wahhabis and Orthodox Muslims than secular Jews. In some neighbourhoods where they are the majority, religious and not state laws are in force. Women and men are strictly separated, free clothing is forbidden, and girls or women who are a little more casually dressed risk reproachful looks and severe insults. The most radical representative of religious Zionism among the Jews who shaped the political body of significant influence was Rabbi Meir Kahane (1932-1990 looked and 1984 election and was a racist election anomaly). An Egyptian Arab assassinated Kahane after a speech in New York in 1990, and his party split into several factions. Some authors from the anti-religious camp believe that the most significant religious parties in Israel advocate views of non-Jews, such as Kahane. His basic thesis was that Israel should annex Judah, Samaria, and Gaza, and the Arab population should be evicted with quality monetary compensation; those who refuse such consensual evictions should be expelled (Shahak and Mezvinsky, 2004). Typical speech of Kahane: *"The Arabs are cancer, cancer, cancer in our midst... I tell you what each of you thinks deep in your heart. There is only one solution; there is no other, there is no partial solution: out with the Arabs! Out! Please do not ask me how. Set me up as Minister of Defense for two months, and there will be no more cockroaches around!"* (Sachar, 2001).

The chapter of Hamas declared: *"Israel will rise and will remain erect until Islam eliminates it as it had eliminated its predecessors"*, stated the Imam and Martyr Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt in the 1920s (Israeli, 1995). Many Palestinians, and therefore Arabs, repudiated Jews the right to a state, claiming that they were merely a religious group and nothing more. That, of course, could be debated; since many Jews immigrated to the Holy Land, they are genuinely from entirely different cultures. Of the later primary sources related to the Muslim question, there is documentation of the PLO and militant factions associated with Fatah, especially the Brigade of Martyrs al-Aqsa, seized and published by The Israeli army. The appeal of religious Zionism, apart from a new interpretation of history and some parts of the canon, lies in the hitherto underestimated fact that many predictions and warnings of religious Zionists, even radical ones like Meir Kahane, regarding concessions to the Arabs and the consequences of withdrawing from the occupied position could have for the Israeli community, proved correct. Many noted with regret after the withdrawal from Gaza that concessions were not a way to stop "terrorism", and it was the Gush Katif religious Zionist community pointed this out before the withdrawal (Havel, 2013). Moreover, a brief digression into the Islamic scriptures was needed to demonstrate that Hamas evoked religious commandments and duties directly evoked both the original scriptures themselves and their authoritative and unquestionable commandments. Therefore, deviating from the current activity is

questioned. It should be noted that Hamas issued a new charter in 2017 that is far less explicit in calls for violence and destruction. Palestine is redefined as a Holy Land. The battle will not end until God's promise is fulfilled. The Promised Land means that no part of Palestine will be "compromised or surrendered," and the name of the state of Israel is written under apparent signs (Puljic, 2021). However, religious support for their policy to become uncompromising (Hadžić, 2021).

Israeli Jews are united on the need for that nation to be a homeland for Jews, regardless of their origins. Across the spectrum of religious observance, Israeli Jews almost unanimously (98%) support the right of Jews around the world to move to Israel and receive immediate citizenship (*aliyah*). However, Israeli Jews are far from a homogeneous group. All Jews in Israel identify with one of four major religious subgroups: Hiloni ("secular"), Masorti ("traditional"), Dati ("religious"), and Haredi ("ultra-Orthodox"). Jewish groups consistently disagree on a range of specific public policy issues. More religiously observant Jews say, for example, that Israel should shut down public transport on the Sabbath; secular Jews almost universally say public transport should remain running. Jews of varying levels of religious observance also take *starkly* different positions on some critical aspects of the Jewish state. For instance, in a hypothetical conflict between democratic principles and Jewish law (*halakha*), ultra-Orthodox Jews overwhelmingly say Jewish law should take precedence (89%), while an equally large share of secular Jews say democratic ideals should take priority (Pew Research Center, 2016).

However, nowadays, and contrary to the recent past, the *Haredim* are getting closer to the state: 75% declared themselves proud Israelis alongside their religious belonging in a recent poll. Traditionally concentrated in neighbourhoods located in the main cities (Bnei Brak close to Tel Aviv and Mea Sharim in Jerusalem), they now constitute around one-third of the population in peripheral towns like Arad, Ashdod, and Tiberia as well, having been forced to go out of their neighbourhoods by the combined effect of house-price inflation and demographic pressure. With nearly half of them being below the age of 16 and a community birth rate pegged at 4% (about double that of secular Israelis), they are soon likely to become the majority in those peripheral cities they have come to inhabit, casting a threat to secular coexistence at the municipal level. True, the *Haredim* are increasingly joining the workforce, but they are also primarily illiterate in secular topics, such as maths and science, unable or unwilling to use advanced technology and unhappy mixing with other "tribes." Moreover, by 2030 they are projected to be 53% of pupils entering the first cycle of elementary school, likely becoming thus a *de facto* powerful separatist minority within the state (De Martino, 2019).

About 81% of Israeli adults are Jewish. The remainder is mostly ethnically Arab and religiously Muslim (14%), Christian (2%), or Druze (2%). The Arab religious minorities in Israel are more religiously observant than Jews. These groups are all primarily socially isolated; there are no religious intermarriages, and strong majorities of Jews, Muslims, Christians, and Druze say all or most of their close

friends belong to their religious group. The strongest indication of the significant fractures in Israeli society is that almost half of Israeli Jews (48%) state Arabs should be transferred or expelled from Israel, while a similar share (46%) disagree. In addition, Israeli Jews and Arabs disagree on whether the country can be a Jewish state and a democracy at the same time. Israel and the U.S. are home to about 80% of Jews globally, and there are strong bonds between the world's two most prominent Jewish populations. Israeli Jews are more religious than U.S. Jews, partly because Orthodox Jews make up a more significant share of their population. Israeli Jews also are more religiously polarised than U.S. Jews: They are more likely than U.S. Jews to say they go to synagogue either weekly or never, while Jewish Americans are far more likely to attend synagogue on an occasional basis (e.g., a few times a year, such as for the Jewish High Holidays). Jews in the two countries also have different political ideologies: About half of U.S. Jews (49%) identify as politically liberal in an American context, while only 8% of Israeli Jews place themselves on the left of the Israeli political spectrum. These two political spectrums (liberal/moderate/conservative in the U.S. and left/centre/right in Israel) represent different views on political, economic, and social issues in each country. Nevertheless, religious Jews tend to lean more to the right, while secular Jews are centrist or liberal (Pew Research Center, 2016).

Political Islam (Islamism) refers to the political ideology that has been around in recent decades 20th century, gathered the Muslim masses. It is a framework that represents the dominant Muslim identity and articulation of their political aspirations. Islamism is a common and comprehensive name for politicians' ideologies that hold that Islam is a religion and a political system, emphasising that Muslims need to return to the roots of their faith and unite politically. Islam has its universal principles – applicable in time and place and respectful of human rights, condemning terrorist violence. Religious violence (mostly) does not arise from the moral teachings of religions but from a perverted understanding of religion (Hadžić, 2021). Religion is used as an excuse for violence when the struggle is to defend the essential identity, when it is inconceivable to lose it and when it cannot be won. It is also confident that the Palestinians do not want to become just militantly within Israel and give in to the ever-present rise of Israeli settlements in the West Bank. The Palestinians have a nation, and their country belongs to them. As a condition of coexistence, both have the transcendence of national identities into something higher, into something that is not exclusively for the "other". Over time, each of them has fitted into one nation, which is a fact. Together with Makkah and Madinah, Bayt al-Maqdis is one of Islam's three holiest sites. History, however, has not long remembered the classic "holy war" in Jerusalem.

The complex elements of religion, culture, psychology, and rationality hide the window of opportunity, leading to an imaginative solution *sui generis*. An emotional appeal was voiced to awaken the creative spirit of the decision-makers to strive to build bridges of cooperation and understanding for the sake of future generations so that the city would become a model for coexistence and

cooperation among nations – an oasis of peace in a troubled sea of conflict (Barakat, 2009). With its unfavourable power, such synonymy originates from a theoretical leap under intellectuals who should above all distinguish. In the Holy Land, culture and religion are instruments of enduring conflict, as it was the only way to continue putting pressure on the Palestinians or Israelis and maintain international support. At the same time, the Palestinians have become irrelevant to the Arab leaders who see the Palestinian ideas of freedom and democracy even as a threat to itself.

CONFLICT AND PEACE

There is much talk about religion presently. In the mid–twentieth century, it was generally predicted that secularism was an impending ideology and that religion would never again play a significant role in public or international life. Indeed, we were wrong about that. Over the centuries, members of the three faiths have lived in the city together under Islamic rule. However, some historical events have strongly influenced their relationships. For Jews, Jerusalem is not only the focus of spiritual life but the capital of ancient Israel. In this capital, place, and the heart of the whole world, the Jewish people's imagination perceives our world. According to Jewish tradition, God pulled the world out of non-existence to which Jerusalem would later rise. Jerusalem is the fingerprint of God on earth. Therefore, it is no wonder that the Jewish folk imagination places the biblical story of the creation of man precisely in the space of Jerusalem. From the same point stretched out to Jerusalem, the future Jerusalem was stretched out into the globe. God took the earth from which He created the first man, and thus all humankind. It turns out that both the world and man are "made in Jerusalem." It turns out that both are the DNA of creation. Everything came from Him, and everything kept coming back to Him.

The Roman Empire began the occupation of Jerusalem in 63 BC. Pompey, Hyrcanus II, and Herod take turns as conquerors, ending the construction period, rise, and magnificent luxuries. The walls around the Old Town, as they are today, were rebuilt later by the Ottoman ruler Suleiman the Magnificent. The Christ was rebuilt in Jerusalem and experienced its rise later. Emperor Constantine built houses on Calvary and a magnificent basilica on the Mount of Olives. Empress Eudokia was magnificent in the fifth century, and Justinian in the sixth century completed a magnificent city that became a mecca for believers from all over Christendom. Prosperity, as is often the case, was short–lived. In 614, the Persians invaded the city, killed much of the population, and left behind ruins and burns. Jerusalem was then conquered in 638 by Caliph Umar. The golden age of Islamic Culture and civilisation in the holy city has begun (Dizdarevic, 2017).

As in the "Third World" version (represented by old–fashioned intellectuals such as Noam Chomsky through Edgar Morin), in the more sophisticated one, the intellectual and media left explains that violent acts were out of desperation and that there is only one war, the confrontation of a people who love freedom and Western colonial powers. The victims of suicide bombers are unnecessary, much

less the culture of destruction spreading among the West Bank and Gaza youth. The collective massacres and the redemptive Palestinian martyrdom through often left-wing supporters show a distorted understanding, reducing people to conventional "human weapons". In other words, some preferred the crime aesthetics to compromise ethics. As Albert Camus would say, "it is easy to be generous with someone else's blood". We can problematise and discharge some natives of many left-wing intellectuals who wrote critically about Israel– and the relation between Zionism and Nazism. The philosopher Emmanuel Levinas wrote in 1969: *"Israel did not become worse than the surrounding world, as anti-Semites say, but ceased to be the best. If Jews oppress, they do so as Nazis, faithfully imitating the atrocities they once suffered in Germany and Poland. They were once persecuted and exterminated by the Nazis, which turned them into potential Nazis"* (Levinas, 1969).

In Israel's case, God decided to pass on this knowledge specifically to Abraham as the ancestor and critical figure in the ethnogenesis of the Jews. Thus, to make a covenant with him and his descendants. The conviction of the chosen and the Promised Land is deeply woven into the identity of the state of Israel. Although some religious Jews initially considered the creation of an independent state theologically illegitimate, fearing that the time had not yet come to return to the Holy Land and fearing God's punishment, these fears disappeared with the reoccupation of Jerusalem in 1967 as proof that the state was accepted and adopted by God. Even if the highest political echelons do not honestly believe in the narratives and conceptions described, a significant portion of their population (in other words, voters) believe that a strong incentive is created for strict action and continued conflict. In the Palestinian's case, religious discourse is one of the most robust mechanisms for mobilising Islamic resistance. However, it also limits it. After the conflict, it was defined as a conflict of religious significance through the active invocation of religious tradition and the use of hadith as authoritative records of the works and words of the Prophet Muhammad. It is difficult to deviate from that definition and mitigate the approach to conflict even in a situation where there would be a certain amount of will to do so. A striking example can be found in the statements of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), Yasser Arafat, after signing the Oslo Agreement. Arafat compared the agreement in question to the agreement at Hudaibiyah, the truce that the Prophet Muhammad made with the Quraysh tribe of Makkah (Puljic, 2021).

Often morally questioned, national and religious tribalism is a faithful and apparent servant of political realism. In line with tribalism, any criticism of state policy is often equated with creating an image toward the rest of the world in Israel. A revision of such a constellation would mean a profound re–examination of all previous myths and elements woven into the national identity of both. Israel is exceptionally unpopular worldwide, and its politics harm the country's image, nation, and religion. In one BBC poll of 22 countries, Israel was one of the most disliked nations in the world (Beauchamp, 2018). Though it is the place where the

three monotheistic faiths meet within the realms of a geographically tiny space, the psychological, cultural, and physical barriers between the religions remain seemingly unbridgeable. These barriers are strengthened by a lack of knowledge of the other side's history, religion, and narrative. In order to tear down these barriers and allow Jerusalem to live up to its promise of a City of Peace, it is essential to create awareness of the narratives of the three religions (Barakat, 2009).

Those who support permanent peace with Israel are the minority, particularly the youth. The latest conflict between Israel and Hamas began after the Israeli Supreme Court suspended its anticipated ruling on the eviction of Palestinians from the Jerusalem neighbourhood of Sheikh Jarrah. Instead, attacks on Muslim worshippers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque flared clashes. The planned evictions of the Palestinian population in the Sheikh Jarrah district of Eastern Jerusalem caused the latest outrage. Although the Palestinians make up the majority of the population of Eastern Jerusalem, the relentless attempts by the Jewish population to take over this part of the city through systematic settlement create a permanent latent conflict. According to the Israeli activist organisation *Peace Now*, the state of Israel is actively promoting this settlement process. However, Palestinians make up over 60% of the population in Eastern Jerusalem, and only 30% of building permits issued since 1991 fall on Palestinians, while most are issued to Jews (Visnjic, 2021). Consequently, according to Washington Institute for Near East Policy's Palestinian public opinion polls, the two-state solution is no longer a popular position among Palestinians. Less than 40% of the Palestinian public –in the West Bank, Gaza, and Eastern Jerusalem– supports it over one-state alternatives. Moreover, the support for a two–state solution has declined steadily since 2018. Furthermore, most Palestinians believe that a two–state solution is unlikely to emerge from the conflict. Instead, most say they prefer to reclaim historic Palestine, including pre–1967 Israel. A one–state solution with Arabs and Jews holding equal rights comes in second (Pollock, 2020). Similarly, the latest survey from PCPSR finds that support among Palestinians and Israeli Jews for a two–state solution has dropped to 43% and 42%, respectively (Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 2020). This changed political reality poses threats to peace, stability, democracy, and human rights.

In the current understanding of Israel–Palestine, experiencing the success of one group means the failure of another. As a result, colossal mistrust has developed over the years, even fear that is difficult to erase. Fatah and Hamas united in the latest conflict to offer the Palestinian people a good governance model, establishing a valuable and strategic alliance in danger facing Palestine. In the latest conflict, Hamas is seen as the party that defends Palestinian rights, especially concerning Jerusalem. It supports the Palestinian government's steps on all international platforms in the legal, diplomatic, and political spheres (Biceroglu, 2020). We can problematise that both entities support and maintain the status quo as a counterweight to secular nationalists.

Following the earlier conflict between Fatah and Hamas, Palestinian politics appears to have followed the regional trend where the competition between

secularism and Islamism is developing into a significant political cleavage. However, through comparisons of the two movements' ideologies, there is the question of religious–secular cleavage in explaining Palestinian factional politics. Fatah –the traditional hegemon in Palestinian politics and previously staunchly secularist– has turned increasingly religious in response to the spread of Islamism. Hamas, for its part, has shed its overly religious rhetoric, absolutist territorial claims, and insistence on a violent solution to the Palestinian problem, in tandem with the deradicalisation of the Palestinian population. As a result, both movements have moved toward the centre of the political spectrum to maximise support (Lovlie, 2014). However, based on analyses of the Hamas and Fatah movements' ideologies and nationalist projects, the relevance of the religious–secular cleavage in Palestinian factional politics and nationalism is overrated. It simply cannot account for the current enmity between the two factions, which are not competing along a secular–religious axis but rather engaged in a classic fight for power and positions. However, while the significant markers of Palestinian identity continue to be their exile, the suffering inflicted upon them, and the unresolved conflict with Israel, Islam became an increasingly important part of the Palestinian national identity, first in the wake of the Iranian revolution and even more so after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Fatah has thus been forced to realign its rhetoric and ideology and become more religious to stay relevant as a liberation movement. Hamas has had to shed its most overly religious rhetoric and its absolutist aims and insistence on a violent solution to the Palestinian issue as Palestinians became less radical. As a result, both movements have moved towards the centre of the Palestinian political spectrum to attract the most significant number of voters. The correct way to interpret the rivalry between the two is a regular competition for the Palestinian median voter (Lovlie, 2012).

An essential factor in the interdependence of both nations is the outside world's image. In the case of Israelis, it is a picture of oppressors, thugs, and racists responsible for shelling, killing civilians, and torture. In the case of Palestinians, it is a picture of a militant fighter with a bomb in his hand, often a suicide bomber, and justifiably, as a victim with hundreds of dead civilians on the streets. Both want to show themselves globally as a civilised that resorts to violence provoked by the other side. What is certain is that the Israelis will not give up the land they occupied. Today's situation has further strengthened many smaller but extremely right–wing and religious immigrant parties. Hamas's entry into political life has prompted many Western analysts to predict that the movement will abandon radicalism and violence and embrace the principles of democracy. Hamas's victory in the 2006 election was mainly due to a voter reaction to Fatah's rule, often referred to as "kleptocratic" (Havel, 2013).

The foundation of man's dignity is spiritual freedom, and therefore the man is denied by any regulation that dictates in advance what and how it should be, regardless of whether the party, Church, people, or state has (self) placed itself in the place of the prescriber. Only a free man can recognise and preserve his dignity from your conscience and by your conscience. According to Heraclitus, the

dispute is the father of all things. However, that does not mean that war is the mother of all things. The mother of all things is peace. Heraclitus is famous for saying that "everything flows". It suggests an attractive and familiar thought: everything changes – all is in permanent flux. Friedrich Nietzsche (Aichele, 2000) and even Plato held the same view. Heraclitus is supposed to think that nothing is permanent, only movement. It all sounds very postmodern.

Violence in the Holy Land is a chaotic mixture of pogrom and revenge and poses a constant danger to sensitive Arab–Jewish relations. The violence grows out of the conditions of the power of the populist movements. At the same time, the alienation and the anger of young Palestinians who want to be free and have equal rights and dignity maintain permanent critical human security issues. For decades, a dramatic extent of the desired and projected unsolved absolute, primarily Palestinian socioeconomic and regional critical security and political issues, have been created. Tiny Palestinian Gaza is under siege; restricted people and goods' passage. Two million residents have limited access to water and electricity. There is a lack of adequate infrastructure, education, and health facilities, and the most significant fishing sector is under Israel's blockade. With the highest unemployment rates, more than two-thirds of the population depends on international aid (Hadžić, 2021). The development of fear of each other, the permanent "nurturing" (exclusively) of "our" endangerment imputed by "their" oppose any form of conflict resolution and culture of peace. Every drama (primarily innocent children and women tragedy) has an unfolding epilogue. The social and security humiliation is associated with retaliatory behaviour, even at additional cost to the retaliator. When humiliated, individuals and groups seem to have a particular desire for revenge. The self, it is feared, will never be the same unless such injustice is appropriately addressed. Humiliation is a dangerous source of violence because long-lasting and highly negative emotions often fuel such experiences. The cultural, social, and psychological forces may trigger the fundamentalist mindset (Munster and Lotto, 2010).

Animosity towards entire nations, ethnicities, and religions, no matter how stimulated, cannot be justified; it is always irrational and wrong. We have a similar pattern in the Balkans, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter B&H), the most critical multicultural and religious paradigm of the former Yugoslavia. If religion is privileged after the fall of communism, is it a politically dictated value system or pure ideology? Nationalist sentiments were systematically created, committed to generating conditions in which the manifestation of ethnonationalism was the only desirable public pattern of behaviour. Paradoxically, during communism, there was emphatic contempt for people who went to a church or mosque and celebrated religious holy days. The process of an abnormal nationalisation of religions in B&H occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. The religious feelings and the far-right support resulted in a fighting attitude against socialism and political religion or religious policy development. Spiritual usurpation has moved into the identity. The ideological ethnonationalism has metastasized into a social organisation's daily political discourse that produces

uncritical subjects in all three constitutive ethnic governments in B&H (Hadžić, 2021). What can be done, immediately or in the future, in fragile Israel and Palestine societies? From the perspective of the human individual, limited by time and society, and by himself, the second question is even more critical: at what price can something be done? The answer, of course, depends on specific situations. The third question opens up: what is lost and gained if that price is paid? Sometimes life could be lost because of a different opinion. Today, as a rule, this is not the case. However, the dignity of the vulnerable, marginalised, or affected by violence is lost through inaction. Through inaction, it failed to maintain the existing balance of power in modernism (society) or by applying absence from the obnoxious scene of one's mortification.

The future of the Muslim–Jewish conflict articulates through historical canonised descriptions associated with resistance movements. From the present perspective, it can determine its continuation. Political interaction in the “Middle East” between Judaism, Islam, and Christianity will not abate over time, but its intensity could increase. It is a qualitative argument, moral, cultural, or religious major "Villain" to find a solution to the political situation in this region. However, both nations appropriate the territory of Palestine under their jurisdiction from historically and religiously essential factors. Looking through the history of negotiations that have taken place, Israel and Palestine insisted on specific points without no negotiation. Radical Islamism and radical right–wing Judaism bring indescribable antagonism towards Jews and Muslims, whose conflict solution does not control the end. The radicals in Israel did not recognise, unlike many Israelis, that they were there losing a truly potential environment – critical security. Awareness of civilisational terror, in which Palestinians are pushed into and Israelis into fascism, is weak.

The dissatisfaction of the Palestinians generated by the policies is presented as a threat to the Israelis. The relationship between Israelis and Palestinians is thus maintained in constant spark. Moreover, when needed, each spark can be used to ignite an already started fire. Therefore, any similarity with the policies in the Balkans, former Yugoslavia, from the 1990s onwards, is by no means accidental. On the contrary, it is a similar clerical, ethnopolitical, and national, i.e., human security pattern. Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević abolished the positive energies that arose during the six centuries of encounters between Christianity and Islam in the Balkans, encouraging the negative emotions he used in the war. Serbs instrumentalise the faith in political orthodoxy as a recipe for ethnic mobilisation and homogenisation. Because of the necessary conflict of civilisations, Croatian leader Franjo Tuđman initiated the aggression against B&H, among other circumstances, building a dam of Christianity. He advocated the thesis of the impossibility of the ordinary life of Croatian Catholicism and Serbian Orthodoxy and the necessity of their physical demarcation. Moreover, he called for Islamic fundamentalism, claiming that the conflict in B&H is an integral part of the "conflict between the Islamic and Catholic worlds" and the "confrontation between the Islamic world and the West". Tuđman said he did not insist on a 50–

50 division of B&H. *"Let Milosevic takes the more significant part of B&H; he controls it anyway. We can do with less than 50 percent. We are willing to leave the Muslims in a small area around Sarajevo. They may not like it, but a stable Balkans is possible only if there is a change in B&H's borders, no matter what the Muslims think"* (International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia).

Proposing a relationship between a particular intervention or program in the interreligious dialogue and the desired outcome assumes a theory of change. A logic model, which links outcomes (both short and long-term) with program activities and processes, is one way to clarify the theoretical assumptions behind a particular program design so that it can be shared with all stakeholders as well as with the evaluator. An evaluation must be an integral part of program planning from the beginning and should be an ongoing process throughout the project's life, providing feedback to program managers and staff that enable them to improve their ongoing work. Because change happens over time, it is essential to evaluate the program beyond the completion of the project. The evaluation must include, but not be limited to, personal, face-to-face interviews with program participants. Other outcome measures might include the number and type of participants, program spin-offs, post-program meetings, the amount of media activity, and, ultimately, a demonstrable reduction in violence (United States Institute for peace, 2004).

The central concept around critical security studies is the notion of security around which there is no generally accepted definition and meaning, which is also a nearly politicised concept. The human security agenda has met with criticism from several traditional bases, both from the human security development endeavour and writing strategic or security studies. Existing definitions of human security tend to be unusually expansive and vague, encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, which provides policymakers with little guidance in prioritising competition policy goals and academics have little sense of what needs to be studied (Paris, 2001). Besides, the paradigm of revenge prolongs sustainable peace, maintaining the status quo. It carries several social, psychological, and cultural reasons. The cultural construct that does not accept defeat and encourages revenge, i.e., ignorance and cultural decline (among the most frequently cited reasons by youth). The different forms of violence experienced by young people make them skilled in practicing violence. Raising young children on the concepts of violence, such as: "Never come back home beaten"; Prevalence of violence at the family level to an alarming extent, Feelings of helplessness, frustration, deficiency, and the drive to satisfy one's needs and ego through violence; Failure in self-realisation. Moreover, regional and global reasons drive violence; Disappointment from seeing the UN failing to force the implementation of its resolutions and carry out its duties towards the Palestinian people; Reductions in UNRWA services; Adoption in the West of the Israel-promoted stereotypes associating Palestinians with terrorism; Failure to make use of international treaties in the proper way to support our cause; Denying Palestinians entry to several Arab states; Difficulty for Palestinians to

obtain a visa from various states in the world; Complicated procedures for travel between Palestine and the rest of the world (Interpeace, 2017).

CONCLUSION

While religion and nationalism based on power have often contributed to antagonism, violence, and wars, the objectives of the three monotheist religions addressing peace suggest a shift towards mutual compromise from hegemonic visions to practical expectancies. All above asserted regarding religious determinants of the conflict; the status quo is conditioned by a cultural, territorial, and most significantly religious rather than a secular approach to politics and organisation. Both civilisations, both peoples, view the area they inhabit through religious rights, turning history into theology and different theology into sociopolitics. It presents a human conflict. People are deeply convinced that the same land belongs to them. Considering the situation from the theological side, we can see how important for both people. The question of Jerusalem is one of the significant matters of contention in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and is undoubtedly very difficult to solve. The negative synergy of nationhood, religion, and realpolitik causes this long–term conflict and the lack of mutual inter–cultural and inter–religious consensus. The causes of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remain unchanged and have the potential to generate the conditions for further conflict and casualties. Apart from the political and territorial questions involved, the situation complicates that all three monotheistic religions claim the city. The area of Jerusalem is the holy place where all confessions have the right of residence. The city of Jerusalem has the power of sanctity and strong pillion of the complex equilibrium character of diversity where interculturalism and sacred place and space can create inter–cultural and inter–religious dialogue. Unfortunately, the recent outbreak of violence related to the holy city created a catalyst for conflict. However, in the same manner, Jerusalem must be a catalyst for peace.

Infiltration of faith into this political dispute, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Judaism is a religious aspect disputed between Jews and Arabs. Conflicts are mainly due to territory, and religion gives it a higher purpose within narratives regarding supernatural rights. However, the circumstances take on another dimension when it is propagated. Despite the inter–religious tensions and passions involved in the contradictory faith elevation at this religious source, the peace is influenced by politics. Internal and external. The holy city of Jerusalem is a perpetual “poor” case–study paradigm. Many unadulterated Jews, Catholics, and Palestinians, who desire the city's lasting security, should be more willing to compromise. The future sociopolitical life must work around healthy inter–cultural, inter–religious, socioeconomic development, and critical human security. Balkans–Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) is a comparable paradigm to the Israel–Palestinian question. Similar policies maintain, clerical, national, and ethnopolitical patterns materialise, i.e., critical peace stalemate persists. The revenge practice could negatively influence (any) peace process—causes related

to social, psychological, historical, cultural, and societal stagnation. Moreover, it will sustain violence and hybrid wars.

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