



Turkey between Secularism and Césaropapism

Melih COŞGUN*
Çağdaş ZARPLI**

Abstract

This study consists of two main themes. The study primarily focuses on the founding cadres of the Republic, who seemed to have a goal of keeping distance from religion, had the motive of keeping religion under control. In this context, the main claim of the study is that the Republic of Turkey has a "Césaropapist" thought rather than "Secularist" patterns. Even though some practical disengagements regarding to the social life, such as the change of alphabet, regulations for dress, reciting the call to prayer in Turkish, were implemented, administrative staff and institutional structures continued to carry the characteristics of Ottoman Empire. While the existence of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is used to ensure the regulation of religion under the control of the state; On the other hand, this institution is manipulated by the political elites as the "ideological state apparatus" since religious beliefs have the potential to shape social life. The result of the study is that the Republic of Turkey is not secular, on the contrary, Césaropapist, and the Presidency of Religious Affairs has become the "ideological state apparatus", supported by some historical, political and sociological examples.

Keywords: Césaropapism, Secularism, Presidency of Religious Affairs, Ideological State Apparatuses, Turkey.

Article Type: Research Article

Laiklik ve Sezaropapizm Kısacasında Türkiye

Öz

Bu çalışma iki ana temadan oluşmaktadır. Çalışma ilk olarak; din ile arasına mesafe koyma gibi bir hedefi varmış görünen Cumhuriyetin kurucu kadrolarının aslen, dini kontrol altında tutma güdüsüne odaklanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada öncelikle, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin "Laik" örüntülerden ziyade "Sezaropapist" bir düşünceye sahip olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Toplumsal hayata ilişkin bir takım pratik kopuşlar (alfabe değişikliği, kıyafet kanunları, Ezan'ın Türkçeleştirilmesi gibi) sağlansa da asıl olarak yönetim kadroları ve kurumsal yapılar Osmanlı'nın devamı niteliğindedir. Çalışmada odaklanılan diğer kısım bu bağlamda ortaya çıkmaktadır. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın varlığı, bir yandan devletin kontrolü altında dinin düzenlenmesini sağlamak için kullanılırken; diğer yandan bu kurum, dini inançların toplumsal hayatı biçimlendirme potansiyeline sahipliği nedeniyle "devletin ideolojik aygıtı" olarak siyasal elitler tarafından manipüle edilmektedir. Çalışmada varılan sonuç, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin laik değil aksine Sezaropapist nitelikte olduğu ve Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın; tarihsel, politik ve sosyolojik birtakım örneklerle desteklenerek "devletin ideolojik aygıtı" halini almasıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sezaropapizm, Laiklik, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları, Türkiye.

Makale Türü: Araştırma Makalesi

* Asst. Prof., Niğde Ömer Halisdemir University, Vocational School of Social Sciences, Department of Law, melihcosgun@ohu.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0003-0017-0600

** Asst. Prof., Bilecik Şeyh Edebali University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, cagdas.zarpli@bilecik.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0001-8416-7016

1. INTRODUCTION

Turkey is one of the non-Western societies implementing modernization as a project rather than a process. It is a generally accepted idea that it has been quite influenced by French Secularism during the process of becoming nation-states. Secularism, in general, derives from the idea that religion and state should be carried out separately. How much the Republic of Turkey of which social/political life is characterized as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire can manage this sharp divergence is ambiguous¹ (Gevgilili, 2009: 192-195). One of the most important indicators of this ambiguity is the Presidency of Religious Affairs. On one side is the secular Republic of Turkey envisaging the separation of state affairs from the religion, on the other side is the Republic of Turkey trying to keep down the religion. In this context, the argument in the first part of study is that the Republic of Turkey, a nation-state, has the characteristics of "Césaropapism" rather than becoming a secular state (Özipek, 2014: 1). With this argument, the other issue to be discussed in the second part will be the presence of reason and positioning of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. In the third part of our study, the usage forms of the Presidency of Religious Affairs as "ideological state apparatus" by the governments of the Republic of Turkey will be revealed. It is also aimed to present arguments supporting this assertion.

Antonio Gramsci's efforts to make a sense of the situation existing in prison days has become influential in laying the foundations of post-Marxist theory and also has brought with a critique of Classical Marxism. Although the deterministic effect of the base on the superstructure is acceptable until the historical bloc is formed, the base cannot affect the superstructure unilaterally after the formation is completed. In this respect, the fact that the superstructure could affect the base has been revealed by Gramsci. Louis Althusser put forward two different instruments about how this situation, which is called "Hegemony" (Gramsci, 2012) in the Gramscian theory, can be realized. One of them can be described as "Repressive State Apparatuses" (RSA) and the other as "Ideological State Apparatuses" (ISA) (Althusser, 2015).

In a close relationship with Marx's analysis that the base determines the superstructure, it should be noted that social structures are factors mutually determining each other. In fact, the critique of this economic determinism has most been dealt with by Gramsci. He opposes this economic determinism. He is not seen as a completely structuralist Marxist and stands out as a philosopher who has influenced the views of Western Marxism in general and structuralists, particularly Althusser. In doing so, he criticizes Marx, who claims that the existing model of economic production in base is the sole determinant of the superstructure. The assertion that this effect is reciprocal forms the basis of his criticism. In other words, while the model of production in the base determines the superstructure of the society, according to Gramsci, the factors of the superstructure can be effective and deterministic on the base factors. It can herein be asserted that the process of shaping social phenomena can be deterministic with respect to base through the use of political power opportunities and the direction of media, education, culture and even of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. The state makes its hegemonic power felt by using the media, education, culture or religion in order to infuse its own patterns of thought into the whole social sphere. This situation is encountered in similar ways in Turkey as well.

The state generally demonstrates its hegemonic supremacy through the presence of institutional structures. Turkey Radio and Television Corporation, the Ministry of Education, the

¹ It must be noted that this ambiguity is not unique to Turkey. We cannot ignore the formations in "the concrete world of subjects" by ignoring the economic, political, social and cultural accumulations that have emerged in the historical process. It is important not to miss out that these fields cannot be "tabula rasa". It is impossible to change such social formations at once since "the formation processes" are great occasions and take a long time.

Ministry of Culture or the Presidency of Religious Affairs may be shown as examples in this context. These institutional structures are, on the one hand, the physical reflection of the state, but on the other hand they are the means of hegemony over society. These tools have also been used very effectively in the process of becoming nation-states. The nation-state as a relatively new form of political organization has preferred to use the nationalism to ensure social belonging, instead of the religion which is the common feeling of the society. The thought of separating statecraft from religion has led to the emergence of two different concepts. The first is Secularism, which belongs to the Anglo-Saxon world of thought and sets the framework of religion as *forum internum*. The other is Secularism, which mostly reflects French thought and emphasizes the necessity of separating religion and state affairs. Both concepts are very useful instruments for meeting social/political needs depending on the time and place they emerge. The efforts of non-Western societies, which endeavor to implement modernization as a project rather than as a process, to adapt these Western-specific concepts to their own projects raise several problems.

2. THE “SECULAR” TURKISH REPUBLIC VERSUS THE “CÉSAROPAPIST” TURKISH REPUBLIC

The idea that secularism is a necessity in all countries that want to modernize and democratize (Ozankaya, 2012: 399-406) is disputable. In addition, this concept does not seem to be very appropriate to describe the process of democratization in Turkey. Indeed, Turkey's priority was not to democratize in the process of becoming the nation-state. Its focus was a change in management style. It was aimed that the transition from the Constitutionalism in which both the padishah and the parliament were present, to the Republic where monarchic structures were excluded and the assignment of administration to the public was intended. The constituent staff, in fact, had the opinion that it was early for democracy. In a speech he made in 1933, M. K. Atatürk said that “We established the Republic. As it turns ten years, all the requirements of democracy must be put into practice according as the occasion arises” (İnan, 1998: 158-159). It is understood that there were many lacks in democratization of the regime after the tenth year of the Republic. It is understood that there were many lacks in democratization of the regime after the tenth year of the Republic. Professor Arşi Han from Hamdard University in New Delhi claims the necessity that countries that want to be democratic must be secular. He also states that “Turkey is one of the few countries that could manage it”. However, his view is wrong. In fact, Turkey endeavored to impose a new regime rather than democratization concerns in that period. In this context, the relationship of secularism with democratization is not suitable for explaining the process.

It will accordingly be better to focus on the relationship of secularism with the Republic. It is obvious that Turkey was founded on many movements of ideology discussed in the last period of Ottoman by contrary with the belief that it was founded on historical and ideological gap. There has not yet been the discourse of “secularism” in the foundation phase of Turkish Republic having the characteristics of revolutionary and in which Islamism is lost, and Turkism and Westernism are on common ground. Perhaps the most important reason for this was that its implementation in the existing social/political conditions was very difficult. Even Celal Nuri, one of the “fanatical” Westerners of that period, did not have the envisagement of a “secular state”. Similarly, Turkicists, who represent a national renaissance that sometimes approaches the Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism dogmas, did not even think of a “secular state” that is far from religion. In essence, “secularism” is considered as a phenomenon which has begun to be thought, discussed and implemented after the establishment of Turkish Republic. This is the main difference of the Republican modernization from the Ottoman modernization process. The policy of carrying out modernization and religion together in the Ottoman Empire is being abandoned. The most important proof of this and the most striking point is that almost all of the reforms are directly/indirectly related to religion (Kara, 2019). Whereas Islamist Turkicists

approach cautiously to the idea of separating religion from state affairs, Westerners emphasize the importance of positivist-based scientific/rational thinking, which will replace religious thought, in order to achieve welfare of the society (Mert, 2009: 197-199). The explanation of Vasfi Raşid, a strict Westerner, in the way that “Believing the moral and conventional values of rational human being who is the source of science and wisdom; giving credence to human being who is based on discipline and equipped with wisdom are the cores and reasons of secularism” (Raşid,1927) shows the approach to secularism at the beginning of the Republic.

Secularism, accepted as an inseparable part of establishing the modern nation-state, determined the basics of the transformation from traditional society to modern society. The constituent staff who initially envisaged a state separated from religion, aimed to ensure secularism of the "nationalism" that they would use instead of "religion" with this secular move (Mert, 2009: 204). In the last period of the Ottoman, nationalism of which Islamic side is prevailed started to move to a place where the emphasis was put on national identity. It can here be deduced that it is actually aimed to achieve the mindset separated from religious symbols with the beginning the use of secularism in Turkish Republic. Ali F. Başgil who was a liberal-conservative and emphasized on the difference between the real meaning of the concept and its implementation in Turkey claimed that secularism is a necessity of the revolution, but he also stated that time has changed (Başgil, 2016: 170-175). Discussed within the context of separation of state institutions from the religion, secularism has emerged as the separation of the ways of thinking from the religion in Turkey. This distinction is the first factor of differentiation of secularism in Turkey from the French-style secularism. In the first periods of the revolution in France, the church was taken under state control. With the "Church Civil Code", priests are made to swear allegiance to the state and those who do not swear are punished. Especially the status of priests being given the status of "civil servants" and paying them a salary is like the practices in Turkey. But this practice is only for the short-term Jacobin period. The difference in Turkey is that the state's control over religion extends and continues for a long time (Türköz, 2019: 68-72). Another factor is the evaluation of the secularism, which is based on the necessity of distinction between state and religious thought and structures, and equally approach to each religious belief, within the context of getting the religion under control in Turkey. That the constituent staff wants to get the religion under control is not secularism. It is the output of "Césaropapist" management style which Turkish republic inherited from Ottoman and Ottoman had inherited from the Byzantine.

The "two-swords theory", one of the teachings of Pope Gelasius I, is a doctrine developed on the metaphor of God, where it created two swords, one representing spiritual power and the other secular power. This theory, which suggests that both swords cannot belong to only one person but can act together, had been used to legitimize the positioning of the Catholic Church over the secular power throughout the Middle Age (Tannenbaum and Schultz, 2007: 135). Later, the “Césaropapist”² system, which was supposed to be formulated by the Byzantine Emperor Constantine and not only focuses on the secular areas but also incorporates the life of the church into the absolute sovereignty of the emperor, in other words, is based on the thought of "state bound religion", aimed to break the power of the Catholic Church over the secular power (Gündüz, 2018: 10-11). The Ottoman faced many times with Byzantine due to the fact that it was a frontier Seignior. These confrontations enabled the transfer of some material and moral things between the two communities. In particular, it is seen that

² It is a management style based on the thought of uniting both powers in one person by the way that the secular power gets the religious power under control. It is composed of the words "caesar" meaning etymologically king and "pope" meaning religious leader (Bainton, 1966: 119). It is here aimed to state that the King positioned himself over the religious authority by virtue of the conditions of mentioned period. The perception of "King-Churchman" that the concept evokes does not come into question.

after the conquest of Istanbul, a number of institutions from Byzantium also endured to the Ottoman.³ It is here avoided from the statement that the Ottoman learned to act together with religious values or to keep religion under control only from Byzantine. However, drawing attention to the fact that it is a useful argument makes the explanation of Turkey's effort to develop such a "policy" clearer. As stated earlier, there is a continuity relationship between Turkish Republic and Ottoman in terms of such many basic points as both ideology and institutionalism. The motive of “keeping the religion under control” of modern Turkey built on historically/sociologically the same basis with Ottoman is exactly the Césaropapist system, which is also encountered in the examples of Constantine in Byzantine, Henry VII in England, and Petro I in Russia. Here, the motive is concealed under the discourse of secularism having the characteristics of the separation of institutions crowned with the abolition the caliphate from the religion.

In Eastern societies including Turkey, the positioning of religion is the primary one of the problems encountered during the realization of modernization projects. Then, the lifestyle proposed by religion lies behind the cultural accumulation in the historical/social process. In this context, the issues of limiting religion to the forum internum or the separation of state from religion imposed by the modernization process are very complicated problems for modernization projects. At this point, Turkey, on the one hand, supports the secularism that separates the religion and state from each other as a necessity of modernization; on the other hand, it actively uses the Presidency of Religious Affairs as a manifestation of the effort to keep the religion under control. Secularism emphasizes both the separation of state from religion and approach to each religion equally. However, Turkey, in this context, appears as an institutionalized aspect of a stance closer to a certain belief since it has a religious institution called as the Presidency of Religious Affairs managed on the basis of Sunni doctrine. Considering these characteristics, it is quite difficult to define Turkish Republic as a "secular" state. On the contrary, the features mentioned indicate that it has a Césaropapist character.

3. THE PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AS IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS

With the establishment of the republic, the “dominant ideology” had to put some ideological patterns on its opposition to legitimize itself. This case is not only unique to Turkey. It is encountered in all social/political systems so that "dominant classes" can maintain their existing status. These political productions are necessary for the dynamism and continuity of the “political one” (Mouffe, 2018: 26-28) since “dominant classes” and “dominant ideology” must reproduce the material, ideological and political conditions that ensure their existence (Althusser, 2015: 12). There is a possibility that all classes that create social/political life become “power”; take over the cultural sphere or become winner in class struggle in Gramscian terms. In this context, it is possible for the government (power) to maintain its current position by setting new policies and implementing them. Those who possess power naturally also have the apparatus of power. Having this apparatus is one of the important factors that strengthen the existing power.

Apparatus of state are examined under two main titles as RSA and ISA. In the context of study, the ideological state apparatus generates the main starting point. The state’s ideological apparatus, which appear as separate and specialized institutions, are not only in the public sphere, it

³ It is known that institutions such as Harem, Financial Office and Regiment were generated by being influenced by Byzantine and Fatih Sultan Mehmet used the title of “Sultan-Rum (Sultan of Greek)” in a decree. On the other hand, it can be said that the Ottomans adapted several traditions and institutions from the Safavids and Seljuks, both due to the geography in which they were located and interaction (Ortaylı, 2008). A similar practice was in the Russian Empire in 1721 in the Petro era. The Holy Sinod (Ministry of Spirituality) has been institutionalized on the necessity that what is "spiritual one" should not be separated from the power of the sovereign one (Geanakoplos, 1965).

also have some functional characteristics in private sphere, which can be described as social sphere (Althusser, 2015: 50-52). State institutions as primarily "school", media and religious institutions, that do not contain violence and have sanction are the primary tools of the state's ideological apparatus. Religious institutions are places of worship and education as well as the places where relations with the political authority and rules for social life are produced owing to the forms of historically positioning of the Church in the West. Therefore, it can here be claimed that the Church has appeared as favorable apparatus of the state in the context of this historical background. On the other hand, in Eastern societies (Muslim Eastern societies) trying to modernize, the Mosque, Islamic-ottoman social complexes and religious institutions of the state having the historical patterns like the Church in the context mentioned, had similar functions. In other words, religious teachings, as the field where the common historical/social ground is generated, have an important role in ensuring social harmony and reproducing the social one in accordance with the policies of the state. It is important not to overlook the historical background, produced and possessed by the state, at the appearance of religion and religious institutions like favorable tools as the ideological state apparatus.

In societies like Turkish Republic trying to change the former social/political structure in a revolutionary manner, the interpretation of the material and spiritual values that are described as "new" necessitates to establish linkups with the past. As with many other issues, the analysis of the relationships between religion and state must also be considered in this context. In essence, the determination of Republic's points including change and continuity requires to make a comparative analysis Turkish Republic and Ottoman. It can be put forward that the developments in the reform process from the Tanzimat reform era to the Republic and the origins of "secular system" (we prefer to call it as Césaropapist) established afterwards can be associated with the dual structure of the sharia law/customary law existing in the Ottoman Empire (Gözaydın, 2009: 14). The existence of the Caliphate institution and the Ulema class was shaped by the padishah's authority during the Ottoman period. The rules for the appointment of the Ulema class were very strict and under control. Moreover, padishahs became very successful in incorporation of this class into the state apparatus. In fact, H. Poulton claims that the task, about this issue, of Şeyhülislam having the highest degree in the Ulema class is to harmonize between the religious-based sharia and the padishah's edicts (Poulton, 1997: 34-35). In the following period, M. K. Atatürk abolished the Caliphate, which was known as the institution leading the Muslim community and brought Ulema as the religious class under the state's control via the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Zürcher and Linden, 2007: 72, 148).

Historical process institutions, from Ottoman to Turkish Republic, followed by the religious begins with Şeyhülislam. In 1920, Şeyhülislamlık institution, which has some judicial, administrative, scientific and political duties as well as organizing religious affairs, was named at ministerial level as Şer'iye ve Evkaf Vekaleti only responsible for religious and foundation affairs. The constituent staff of the Republic turned the Presidency of Religious Affairs into its current position in 1924 as an administration which is responsible for religious affairs and affiliated to the Prime Ministry. This route is described as "utangaç modernite projesi" in the time interval from Tanzimat to the proclamation of the Republic. This period is defined as the defeat of Pan-Islamism ideology as a result of secularization and secularism through which religious patterns began to weaken. The process from the proclamation of the Republic to the power of the Demokrat Parti is the "köktenci modernite projesi" in which Islam is "marginalized" and positivism is at its peak. The period until the coup in 1980 was called as the "popülist modernite projesi" where the religion, which became an important argument of Turkish political life, was used as a political instrument (Tekeli and İlkin, 2010).

The radical attitude of the Republic's constituent staff against religion actually appears with a number of policies.⁴ In addition, during this period when a radical attitude towards religion was displayed, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was used as an ideological apparatus in the implementation of policies which were the official ideology of the constituent staff. With the official letter⁵ sent by the Presidency of Religious Affairs on July 18, 1932, call to prayer would begin to be recited in Turkish (Gözaydın, 2009: 32). Apart from the main purpose, the use of the Presidency of Religious Affairs by the political authorities which have the power for the state was legitimized in this way. Following this process, which has a more "radical" attitude compared to other periods, the Demokrat Parti power, where the "populist" discourse directly affecting and determining the following process of Turkish political life as the positioning of religion and religious institutions is in the forefront, was in an effort to reorganize the Presidency of Religious Affairs as the ideological state apparatus. Common broadcasts with the Presidency of Religious Affairs on the state radio and discussions regarding the reorganization of the authorities and duties of the relevant institution can be evaluated in this context (Gözaydın, 2008). The main emphasis here is that despite the ideologically changing "sovereign power", the Presidency of Religious Affairs' characteristic of being a useful tool as the ideological state apparatus has not been changed. Two examples aforementioned are also the appearances of the Turkish political life's two main ideological veins. On the one hand, the "left-of-middle" through which the Kemalist ideology is represented; on the other hand, the "center-right", which is described as conservative/liberal manipulated the Presidency of Religious Affairs according to their own worldviews. Envisaged the secularization/secularism of the modern individual/society/state, Western style modernization process (the transition from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*) which is composed of individuals who only have value as part of the whole in the community and do not have an independent value, in other words, the sum of valuable individuals who have their own autonomous area did not reflect to the establishment of Turkish Republic. Instead of implementing policies that include the requirements of creating a Western-type secular society, such as limiting the religion to the forum *internum* and state's approach to each belief equally, the constituent staff of the modernization project, contrary to this, essentially perceived and implemented the modernization process as keeping religion under state control. So much so that unlike Western practices, the Presidency of Religious Affairs was not even given the opportunity to train its own personnel. The Ministry of National Education (Imam Hatip Schools curriculum, personnel, etc.) and the higher education board of the personnel who will take part in religious services are completely under the control of the secular state, as well as the Faculties of Theology are institutions that provide education under the control of the Higher Education Board. The main aim is to raise "enlightened clergy" who are free from the effects of the old regime. This class of enlightened clergy will enlighten the society in line with the new understanding of religion adopted by the state. The basis that makes the Presidency of Religious Affairs important as an ideological apparatus is taken form at this point. The fact that this policy has a historical and social basis has made it inevitable for the Presidency of Religious Affairs to be the "ideological state apparatus". One of the most effective ways of the constituent staff to adopt their "hegemony" in a country where almost all the population is Muslim was to use the existence of places of worship. Hereby, indirect methods that enable to be used the

⁴ Some of the practices that made the attitude towards religion visible in this period are as follows: The abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, being not able to make an answer that the government could not have a religion against the question of "Is there a religion of the new government?" addressed to Atatürk in 1923 under the conditions of the period and then pouring out his troubles about this issue in Nutuk, the statement of "the religion of the State is Islam" was removed from the Constitution in 1928 (TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi), and the characterization of the state as "secular" was included in the Constitution in 1937.

⁵ The role of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is also important in this practice. At that time, there are official articles stating that all religious officials will obey the order to perform the Turkish prayer and that religious officials who react will be punished (Albayrak, 1973: 262).

Presidency of Religious Affairs as a "hegemonic" apparatus are sermon, khutbah, fatwa, publications and religious education (Kara, 2000: 29-36).

4. THE PRESIDENCY OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS AND POLITICS

While the constituent staff of the Republic positioned Islam by the influence of the "positivist" movement, it determined the way of "using" the Presidency of Religious Affairs on this basis. In the first years, Diyanet had the duty to prevent the social reaction that could occur against the revolutions and to soften the reactions. In other words, the duty of the Diyanet is to reconcile the society with the republican ideology and reforms. With the Diyanet, the state aimed to transform the people's understanding of religion and the way of religious life (Kara, 2019: 88-90). Then, with the transition to multi-party system, the religious elements revived with the populist discourses of the Demokrat Parti also caused to change the usage style of the Presidency of Religious Affairs. As mentioned earlier, this divergence regarding the Turkish political life has formed the basis of the political culture until today. The political culture, which is positioned on this basis, has shaped the Presidency of Religious Affairs according to their own perspective with the effect of cyclical changes.

The answers given by the Presidency of Religious Affairs to the religious questions/problems have also characteristics of fatwa. Fatwa is the decretal, given by the mufti or by the Şeyhülislam who served during the Ottoman period, which explains the solution of a problem related to Islamic law on the basis of religion. Fatwa is a guide for Muslims on special issues. In 1972, the answer given by the Presidency of Religious Affairs to the question "Is it permissible to put out the money earned in foreign states to foreign banks at interest?" seems quite political according to the conditions of the period. The Presidency gave the fatwa about that money earned in foreign countries must be imbursed to the banks in Turkey and interest obtained from Turkish banks is permissible. Moreover, it stated that the interest received from the foreign banks is not permissible and this money should be transferred to Turkish banks (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu, 1972). At this point, mentioned years were the times when Turkey needed foreign currency and "import substitution industrialization model" was carried out. In these years when exports did not sufficiently contribute to the foreign currency inflow, the value of the foreign currency sent or would be sent by guest workers who especially went to Germany was very high (Boratav, 2008: 118). Similarly, the Presidency of Religious Affairs which refrained from giving fatwa against the questions asked about the existence of General Directorate of the National Lottery that is among the income items of the state and the legitimacy of the earnings from the games of chance stated that the issue was beyond its authority (Din İşleri Yüksek Kurulu, 1964).

In addition to the fatwas, another important practice that the Presidency of Religious Affairs uses to reach the masses is the Friday Khutbah. It is a form of giving advice to Muslims on the basis of the Qur'an and Hadith. After the United States described Jerusalem as the Capital of Israel in December 2017, the subject of the Friday Khutbah was set as "Jerusalem" in that week. This issue is the subject of a religious concern. At the same time, it is rigorously followed by the government of Turkish Republic. AK Party government's emphasis that the statement US made is "unacceptable" is an indication of the political dimension of the event. On the other hand, without overlooking the importance of Jerusalem in terms of Islamic religion, the subject has shifted from religious to political grounds in order to be parallel with the policies of the government. In Khutbah; the discourse of that "It must be known that such jauntily attempts will turn Jerusalem and its surroundings into a land of restlessness and conflict. Such unacceptable attempts are a major strike to the common sense and the conscience of humanity. It is also a dangerous step towards destroying tranquility, peace and security" (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, 2017) has also the characteristics of a "political" warning.

The politicization of religious issues and the decisions taken according to the conditions of the period clearly reveal the attitude of the governments. This situation is experienced not only with the manipulation of Religious Affairs by governments, but also with legal decisions. According to Althusser, law, another ideological state apparatus, has similarly helped to politicize religion. In a lawsuit filed against the organization of Friday Prayer times in 1976, the court made a negative decision as there was no public welfare. This decision, which damaged the freedom of religion and conscience, revealed the attitude of the dominant ideology at that time (Gözaydın, 2009: 260). In the recent period, that giving permission to the public employees for being able to fulfill the religious duties during Friday Prayer with a circular issued in Turkish Republic is an example of the policies produced by the changing dominant ideology according to its own worldview (weltanschauung).

In 2003, according to the result of a survey conducted to the employees of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the rate of those who think that religion and politics are separate is only 17.3%. In another survey, in which the employees of the mentioned institutions participated, it was concluded that the sectarian-based practices of the Presidency of Religious Affairs only address to some of the Muslims in the country and other beliefs were neglected. In addition, Nosairians state that the Presidency of Religious Affairs is not interested in them (Gözaydın, 2009: 317). Since the beginning of 2000s, the Presidency of Religious Affairs has begun a rapid transformation process. With the moderate Islamic policies of Justice and Development Party (AK Parti), the Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is tried to be given a more autonomous view, follows a “desecular” route (In the openings of big investments, the head of religious affairs together with the President cut ribbons with prayers, read the Qur’an, etc.). Trying to destroy the taboo in which the religion is limited to the forum internum, the Presidency of Religious Affairs endeavors to reach to a quite wide geography with the protocols⁶ it has made with institutions such as especially Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Health, Ministry of National Education, and Ministry of Family, Labor and Social Services. All of these attempts match up with the AK Parti's policy of “raising a religious generation”. In other words, the Presidency of Religious Affairs continues to function as the ideological state apparatus.

5. CONCLUSION

One of the significant conclusions of this study is that discussions about "secularism" are based on a misguided ground. Positioned discussions on the presupposition that Turkey is secular generally ignores the motive of the state to keep the religion under the control instead of that it remains aloof from the religion in terms of state/religion relationships in Turkey. Another important instrument to support this assertion is that it is not focused on that Turkish Republic has the characteristic of “Césaropapism”. Ontological presuppositions also bring about epistemological outcomes associated with it. The main factor tried to be emphasized here is that the description of Turkish Republic having the characteristic of "Césaropapism" as "secular" is incorrect and this causes it to base on a wrong ontological ground. To accept the Turkish Republic ontologically as "secular" has provided a corpus with regard to secularism discussions in the context of epistemology. On the other hand, unlike in this case, the acceptance of Turkish Republic ontologically as "Césaropapist" provides to generate an intellectual field with respect to that the state epistemologically uses the religious institutions as ideological apparatus. In this study, an epistemological route based on the second ontology basis was determined.

⁶ For example, as an international initiative, the protocol between the Turkish Religious Foundation and the Ministry of National Education to support international Imam Hatip High Schools. In 2004, high school students selected from abroad are brought in and religious education is given in Turkey. The main purpose is to ensure that the model here (religion-state relationship model, in a way) is exported abroad. Diyanet TV, Diyanet Children's Magazine, Diyanet Science Journal Publisher are the other examples.

L. Althusser mentions the existence of a 'theoretical practice' field as well as political and ideological practices (Belge, 1977: 16). According to this, theory production creates an autonomous field. In other words, 'theory production' is a process that can be analyzed independently by isolating from the social one to some extent. Despite this, it is not possible to isolate the theory production completely from the social one. In this regard, it is a fact that it should not be forgotten that without overlooking Marx's epistemological break, this break is not an issue that can be considered as independent of the political existence of the working class within the framework of that Marx's thoughts turn into Marxism. Although 'theoretical practice', which was revealed by Althusser and can be regarded as autonomous to a certain extent, is an important field of study, essentially this concept is not entirely outside the political one.

In addition, E. Balibar's emphasis on 'structural causality' should not be overlooked. According to Balibar, the adaptation of historical materialism to the social one is within the framework of 'structural causality' (Belge, 1977: 17). It is a necessity to use this concept when analyzing the historical development in the society. In this framework, the synchronization of the social one cannot be examined through a single factor with a structuralist reductionism. The complexity of social reality is an indication of the fact that many changing dynamics shape the social sphere. Therefore, shaping the social structure can be done by considering many factors together. In Turkey, what the elite constituent staff of the Republic have tried to do has been to shape the field of Religious Affairs at the administrative/institutional framework from the beginning as the changing power structures have tried to do in accordance with their own political purposes. Therefore, it is possible to socially mobilize the social one in this way towards a certain point. When compared to the Western style, the Presidency of Religious Affairs has been the instrument of the secularization policy that the Republic elites tried to implement even though it is deficient/problematic/wrong. In this respect, the field of Religious Affairs was used as an ideological state apparatus. On the contrary, the Ak Parti uses the Presidency of Religious Affairs as an ideological apparatus with the aim of creating a 'desecular' social structure by using sociologically/politically similar instruments that others (Kemalist Elites) have.

Another conclusion reached is that the Presidency of Religious Affairs is described as not a religious organization but is described as an administrative organization in the Constitutional Court decision text (1971) of a case filed on the grounds that it is against secularism. In the same decision, the Court emphasized that the description of Religious Affairs employees of whom a significant part is consisted of clergymen as public employee is a result of the country's conditions. This situation mainly shows that the Presidency of Religious Affairs is an institution dealing with religious affairs of the state and turning into its ideological apparatus rather than serving only Muslims. In addition, the fact that 6 people who worked as the president of the Presidency of Religious Affairs in the past served as members and deputies of the political party is another indication of how politicized this institution. Another example of the politicization of religion is that 53 of 337 deputies were clergymen in the first parliament, which opened on April 23, 1920 (Tunaya, 1958: 230-231). This example is also an important indicator of the progress with regard to the origins of religion/state relations in Turkish political life. At the beginning of the criticisms towards the Presidency of Religious Affairs as an institution quite contrary to the secular political structure, there is an emphasis over the obligations of citizens for the state on the basis of morality and human rights against the effects of radical Islamic groups, and serving to the Hanafi branch of the Sunni sectarian and the ignorance of other groups' beliefs (Çakır and Bozan, 2005: 114) within the framework of a Sunni doctrine (Hollanda Kamu Politikaları Kurulu, 2007). However, the primary purpose of a state that is described as "secular" is to take measures to prevent all attempts and tendencies causing uneasiness on those who do not believe and towards the freedom of believers rather than converging to a certain belief. Similarly, based upon criticisms above, the state should not show excessive interest in religion (Gözaydın, 2009: 244-245).

Beyond that, essentially the existence of the Presidency of Religious Affairs is a phenomenon that should not be encountered in the form of a political organization that claims to be a secular and/or secular state. Even the existence of this structure harms the secular and/or secular characteristic of the mentioned form of organization. At this point, the existence of this institution is encountered as an appearance of the desire to keep religious life under control in the shift from traditional society to modern society, in other words, from *gemeinschaft* to *gesellschaft*. The motive of political authority to keep religious life under control causes the state to take a “Césaropapist” (Byzantinist) character by detracting the state characteristic from secularism and/or secular ground.

As the Ottoman State structure was influenced by Safavids, Seljuk and Byzantine and many other states before it (Ortaylı, 2008), its impact on Turkey is normal and inevitable process. The adoption of Islam as the state religion of the Ottoman significantly increased the influence of Islam during the formation of social and political traditions. Just as in Ottoman, it should not be overlooked the impact of Islamic religion as well as the impact of social and political tradition at that Turkey has the characteristics of Césaropapism. The main determinant of this situation is the fact that Islam has its own teachings/regulatory rules for political, social, scientific and economic life, as well as regulating religious life as a religion. Another indication that the Presidency of Religious Affairs is the “ideological state apparatus” is encountered in this context. Unlike the West, in general in the Muslim East society and in particular in Turkey, the various interpretations of the rules, including the worldly as well as spiritual life in Islam, has led to the emergence of different sectarian, beliefs and congregations. The state uses the Presidency of Religious Affairs to prevent possible conflicts, generation of radical religious groups and the spread of false beliefs. Süleyman Ateş who served as the president of the Presidency of Religious Affairs between 1976 and 1978 states, in an interview published in Vatan Gazetesi in 2004, that "religious organization in Turkey is under the influence of politics." This statement can be evaluated as a summary of the state/religious relationships in Turkey.

Ethical Statement

The rules of Research and Publication Ethics have been complied with during the writing and publication of the study and no falsification was made to the data obtained for the study. Ethics committee permission for the study not required.

Contribution Rate Statement

The authors contributed equally to all parts of the research.

Conflict Statement

This work does not cause any conflict of interest, whether individual or institutional/organizational.

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