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

Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

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Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

Semine Seray GÜLDANE*
Ahmet ATEŞ**

Abstract

This article analyzes the transformation of Israeli security organizations after the Yom Kippur War. As the result, it is argued that the Yom Kippur War was considered an intelligence failure by Israelis, and the main reason for the transformation was the motivation to eliminate social trauma and failure. Additionally, contrary to the common view in the literature, the transformation in Israeli military institutions took place in a hybrid manner, both top-down and bottom-up. It also concludes that, given the military, political and strategic conjuncture not only during the war but also before and after, the change in question arising from the failure of the intelligence was various transformation factors. Finally, it was found that the transformation in Israeli intelligence has two stages, individually and structurally, in line with the recommendations of the Agranat Commission established in 1974.

Keywords: *Intelligence, Israel, the Yom-Kippur War, MOSSAD, AMAN*

Yom Kippur Savaşı Sonrası İsrail Güvenlik Kurumlarının Dönüşümü

Özet

Bu makale, Yom Kippur Savaşı sonrasında İsrail güvenlik kurumlarında yaşanan dönüşümü analiz etmektedir. Araştırma sonucunda, Yom Kippur Savaşı'nın İsrail politika yapıcıları ve kamuoyu tarafından bir istihbarat başarısızlığı olarak değerlendirildiği ve yaşanan dönüşümün temel sebebinin sosyal travma ve başarısızlığı giderme motivasyonu olduğu tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, literatürdeki yaygın görüşün aksine, İsrail askeri kurumlarında yaşanan dönüşümün hem yukarıdan aşağı hem de aşağıdan yukarı olmak üzere karma bir biçimde gerçekleştiği sonucuna varılmıştır. İstihbarat başarısızlığından doğan söz konusu değişimin, sadece savaşın gerçekleştiği tarihler arasında değil öncesi, savaş süreci ve savaş sonrası askeri, siyasi ve stratejik konjunktür göz önüne alındığında farklı dönüşüm faktörlerini kapsayan, hibrit bir şekilde gerçekleştiği değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak, İsrail istihbarat örgütlerinde yaşanan dönüşümün ise 1974 yılında kurulan Agranat Komisyonu'nun önerileri doğrultusunda bireysel ve yapısal olarak iki aşamalı olduğu tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *İstihbarat, İsrail, Yom-Kippur Savaşı, MOSSAD, AMAN*

1. Introduction

1973 was the year when the disentanglement of the glorious and triumphant Israeli Defense Forces surprisingly began. Fought between Arabs and Israel on October 6, 1973, Yom

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Kippur War marked a vast number of lessons to learn for both intelligence and military communities of the relevant parties.

With the defeats following in succession during the Six-Day War in 1967 when Israel captured the control over the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights and the controversial War of Attrition in 1970, to compensate for the losses, Egypt carried out an unexpected yet conclusive attack, in coordination with Syria, on Yom Kippur –a Jewish day of 1973. The operation shared similarities to Soviet doctrine and policies as a result of Egypt's ties with the USSR at the time, which came with advantages to launching an adapted and authentic doctrine for "liberation". Following the surprise attack, the "over-the-moon" Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had no more encouragement for hubris and underwent a radical process, the results of which reached the present day and restructured the IDF.

This study aims to unearth the driving factors that led to the IDF's long-term change as well as the lessons derived while reshaping military and intelligence communities. In doing so, it seeks to apply fundamental schools of military change to the 1973 Yom Kippur War and thus, reveals to what extent the IDF was subjected to new input. Further, it also shows how an intelligence failure can be a facilitator of structural change in intelligence communities. We argue that Israeli policymakers perceived Egypt's surprise attack on Israel as an intelligence failure. Therefore, they were compelled to reorganize the Israel Defense Forces and intelligence organizations to improve the analytical and organizational capacity of Israeli security organizations and to prevent other surprise attacks in the future. The changes stand for graduality and cannot be confined to the days when the war erupted and was waged. The aftershocks damaged IDF's prestige and the need for reinvigoration accelerated the process of learning. Just as the Agranat Commission's finding that there was a lack of communication and consenting between military and politicians also reveals[1], the IDF's default of appearance at the right time first cracked the shells of tactical plans and then a tactical adaptation followed. The material inadequacy was compensated by the US and the aid was not just one time: it resulted in a long-time convergence of both armies. As the war ended, the IDF also incorporated operational, strategic, and organizational changes, all of which created a stronger army in the years following the war.

[1] Uri Bar-Joseph, "Israel's 1973 intelligence failure.", *Israel Affairs* 6, no.1, (1999): 17.

2. Literature Review

To understand the transformation of Israeli security organizations after the Yom Kippur War, it is vital to explore, at least, two kinds of literature: literature on military change and change in intelligence organizations. Hence, we first survey the fundamental schools of military change to explore whether the transformation that took place within the Israeli army was bottom-up or top-down. Then, we examine the literature on change in intelligence organizations to analyze the transformation of Israeli intelligence organizations thoroughly.

2.1. Fundamental Schools of Military Change

The literature on military change is dispersed around the debates regarding whether it comes top-down or vice versa. The generally-accepted factors are grounded on international order, military organization, and civilian intervention. In recent years, unit-level developments have also been converted into military innovations as militaries have tended to derive lessons from their mistakes while engaging in conflicts and rapidly adapting to the circumstances.

Searching for innovation within a military organization first sparked off with *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars* by Barry Posen and his probe into military doctrine through organization theory and the theory of balance of power. In nature, organizations wish mise en place and do not favor any outsiders in order not to risk survival in such an insecure international environment and maximize military superiority, thereby preferring more enterprising military doctrines.[2] Doctrines shall meet the expectations of a grand strategy that is stipulated by civilian policymakers. Indeed, military innovation is ensured by the coherence between civilians and military –with the intervention of whom Barry Posen calls 'mavericks'- and such coherence yields a preventive doctrine against uncertainties, especially during wartime. [3]

According to Stephen Peter Rosen, in Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, not just the point of view of a military organization towards innovating but also being in the state of inner conflict, by all manner of means, has a bearing on innovation. A military force and units or branches affiliated with the force engage in rivalry even under the same roof and regulations and changes may be underway as either the participation of new

[2] Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990), 40.
[3] Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 52-53.

concepts or the establishment of new units. [4] The innovation in question must receive approval from senior ranks, the assistance of whom removes the blockage and clear the way for promotion of younger officers as innovation may span over a long period like the assigned class.[5]

Constructed upon and by people, each military puts a premium on its traditions and culture, all of which directly relate to the acceptance of innovations. The traits of a military organization can be deemed essential for validating innovation. Supportive of paying a great deal of attention to military organizational culture, Elizabeth Kier discusses that military organization unifies the sheer number of views atop its doctrine that is adjusted according to the domestic issues and all these views echo across the organization, choosing what sort of doctrine will be sustained rather than leaving it to its fate.[6] Kimberly Zisk also finds that the stubbornness of military organizations against innovation and the requirement of civilian intervention is not to be in the combination all the time, if there ever appears a need for innovation, all rivers will fall into the sea of it.[7] Organizations do not make decisions based on a set of specified rules but the general perspective of the organization is determined by the way that military decision-makers perceive threats by prioritizing those against the organization- and getting prepared to counter them.[8] Testing institutional theory to make conclusions about military innovation, Avant finds out that political leaders do not leave the circle of political opportunities and act in a restricted way to seize those.[9] Their choices are generally proportional to military goals and this is a bi-directional relation always affecting each other within the same range as civilian leaders 'delegate' their power to military institutions and both establish a mutual ground on which grand plans are based for the sake of a country, which means that civilian intervention is neither compulsory nor optional due to the diversity of reasons for comprehending politics for each state and doctrines.[10]

[4] Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 7.
[5] Rosen, *Winning the next War*, 58.
[6] Elizabeth Kier, "Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars.", *International Security* 19, no. 4 (1995): 67-68.
[7] Kimberly Marten Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955-1991*. (Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University Press, 1993), 4.
[8] Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy*, 27.
[9] Deborah D. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars*, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 5.
[10] Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, 138.

Following the harshness of doctrine-focused explanations of how militaries change, cultural trends were expanded to identify, and indeed, this put the revelation that bottom-up changes may as well kick-off change and eliminated the strict view that change takes place from bottom to top. Analyzing how culture shapes innovation and does not conflict with the previous and hierarchical ideas for innovation, Farrell and Terriff posit that innovation is far more complicated and should not be molded into absolute criteria and change will not come to fruition unless it, as hoped, contributes to the overall aims of a state. As a consequence, change is multidimensional and inclusive of both top-down and bottom-up shifts.[11] In other words, the strategic situation on which states are inevitably dependent, along with a variety of factors such as technology, culture, and politics, can be a reason for innovation as well as possibly cause otherwise.[12] Innovation is one of the steps of an overall combination: the others being adaptation and emulation. When combined, they can ignite a change. Innovation is far closer to developing while adaptation is not developing but enhancing. On the other hand, emulation is the leveraging of another country's innovation or system.[13]

Dominated by the approval that innovation occurs "top-down", scholars on military change have also observed a reverse-commute change, "bottom-up". The debut of precision-guided weapons for casualty aversion, which has come with the Revolution in Military Affairs, shrank the size of weapons and thus, units which are now more dispersed and, particularly, within sight as forces have combined their capabilities and specializations due to the irregularity and complexity of modern warfare.[14] Explanatory though the RMA is for technology-based innovations, it still lacks the ideal that the RMA has the desired extent of content to encompass other sociological, political, or technological aspects and is criticized for not being as comprehensive as top-down approaches.[15] Today, technology is one of the determinants in scaling up changes; however, the exaggeration of technology does not make the underlying findings into account and remains a constraint.

With a vast number of cases each of which has a particular type of innovation, the

[11] Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 5.
[12] Farrell and Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change*, 275.
[13] Farrell and Terriff, *The Sources of Military Change*, 6.
[14] Elinor C. Sloan, "What Is Military Transformation?", *Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook*, (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008): 1–15.
[15] Eliot Cohen, "Change and Transformation in Military Affairs.", *Military Transformation and Strategy*, (2008): 27–38

debates over how militaries innovate are still ongoing and even there are combined suggestions for analysis. Where the advantage of top-down approaches is that such innovations are easier to elaborate on, the bottom-up approaches are disadvantageous as what happens at the bottom may generally stay at the bottom unless indoctrinated. For that reason, it is crucial to not confine the driving factors to one specific factor and make a thorough examination of the process.

As a milestone in the history of the Israel Defense Forces, Yom Kippur War is self-referential in many aspects and encapsulates two-way change: While the changes also started at the bottom, there was quite an evidence that the deficiencies and incapabilities at the bottom level, to a great extent, initiated a form of change and enabled IDF to revise its disunity from the echelon. For that reason, this study claims that despite the general perspective of seeking changes as a process developing top-down and defining them within a limited duration, IDF's changes can be traced back to the pre-1973 era and it is the following dynamism with its two-way developments that created the cornerstones of the IDF.

2.2. Change in Intelligence Organizations

There is no robust literature specifically focusing on change in intelligence organizations. Rather, the transformation of intelligence organizations is frequently studied under two kinds of literature. These are organizational and bureaucracy studies and intelligence studies.[16] While research on intelligence studies commonly focuses on historical cases[17], an evaluation of organizational and bureaucracy literature shows that there are two main trends in researching the transformation of intelligence organizations. On the one hand, several studies focus on the organizational merits of intelligence agencies or communities. For instance, Robarge[18], Stimson and Habeck[19], and Lederman[20] analyze the organizational strengths and

[16] Ahmet Ateş," *Understanding the Change in Intelligence Organizations: An Institutional Framework*", (Doctoral Dissertation, University of Delaware, 2020): 20-21.
[17] For a couple of examples, please see. Kenneth L. Lasoen, "185 years of Belgian security service.", *Journal of Intelligence History* 15, no 2 (2016): 96-118.; Victor Madeira, "'No Wishful Thinking Allowed': Secret Service Committee and Intelligence Reform in Great Britain, 1919–23.", *Intelligence and National Security* 18, no 1 (2003): 1-20.; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, "The Rise and Fall of the CIA.", *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* eds. Loch K. Johnson, (Oxford University Press, UK, 2010): 122-137.
[18] David Robarge, "Leadership in an Intelligence Organization: The Directors of Central Intelligence and the CIA.", *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence*, eds. Loch K. Johnson, (Oxford University Press, UK, 2010): 485-504.
[19] Charles Stimson and Mary Habeck. "*Reforming intelligence: A proposal for reorganizing the intelligence community and improving analysis*.", The Heritage Foundation, 2016, https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/reforming-intelligence-proposal-reorganizing-the-intelligence-community-and (03/02/2022).
[20] Gordon Nathaniel Lederman, "Restructuring the intelligence community" in *The Future of American*

weaknesses of the US intelligence community. Likewise, Lahneman[21], Maras[22] , and Marten[23] explore the role of organizational culture(s) in the transformation of intelligence agencies.

On the other hand, other studies mostly revolve around intelligence failures and reforms that occur afterward. It is important to note that many of these studies were conducted on intelligence failures of Western agencies, particularly the US agencies. For instance, Zegart[24]and Garicano, and Posner[25] examine 9/11 as an intelligence failure thoroughly. Also, other studies in this literature explore the reform processes after an intelligence failure. The research of Hulnick,[26] Matei, Brunei,[27] and Matei and Kawar[28] highlights the key differences between the reform processes and their effectiveness.

The theoretical standpoint of this article also overlaps with the hybrid military change approach and literature on intelligence failure. In other words, we argue that the transformation of Israeli security organizations is a result of intelligence failure during the Yom Kippur War. However, the military change literature focusing on one specific theory and variant for analysis does not shed enough light on the entire process. In Yom Kippur, the failure does not relate to a typical causality: the failure stemmed from overconfidence and with the failure disclosing the flaws of IDF, the ongoing process ended up involving a two-way street of change flowing from top to bottom and vice versa.

Intelligence, eds. Peter Berkowitz, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2005): 65-102.

[21] William J. Lahneman, "The need for a new intelligence paradigm.", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 23, no 2, (2010): 201-225.

[22] Marie-Helen Maras, "Overcoming the intelligence-sharing paradox: Improving information sharing through change in organizational culture.", Comparative Strategy 36, no 3, (2017): 187-197.

[23] Kimberly Marten, "The 'KGB State' and Russian Political and Foreign Policy Culture.", The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 30, no 2, (2017): 131-151.

[24] Amy B. Zegart, "September 11 and the adaptation failure of US intelligence agencies.", International Security 29, no 4 (2005): 78-111.; Amy B. Zegart, "An empirical analysis of failed intelligence reforms before September 11.", Political Science Quarterly 121, no 1, (2006): 33-60.; Amy B. Zegart, "9/11 and the FBI: The organizational roots of failure.", Intelligence and National Security 22, no 2, (2007): 165-184.

[25] Luis Garicano and Richard A. Posner, "Intelligence failures: An organizational economics perspective.", Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no 4, (2005): 151-170.

[26] Arthur S. Hulnick, "Does the US Intelligence Community Need a DNI?.", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no 4, (2004): 710-730.; Arthur S. Hulnick, "US intelligence reform: Problems and prospects.", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no 2, (2006): 302-315.; Arthur S. Hulnick, "Intelligence Reform 2007: Fix or Fizzle?.", International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no 4, (2007): 567-582.

[27] Florina Cristiana Matei and Thomas Bruneau, "Intelligence reform in new democracies: factors supporting or arresting progress.", Democratization 18, no 3, (2011): 602-630.

[28] Florina Cristiana Matei and Jumana Kawar, "Tunisia's Post–Arab Spring Intelligence Reform.", International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 33, no 1 (2020): 135-158.

3. Transformation of Israeli Security Organizations after the Yom Kippur War

Leading up to grand changes within the IDF, the Yom Kippur War must be analyzed, to clarify the gaps and capture the mindset behind the decision made during and after the war, through 1967 experiences and the misperception of "invincibility" framed then to the IDF. In 1967, the IDF engaged in hostilities against an Arab coalition consisting of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. The hostilities ended with the victory of Israel due to the success of aerial and tank supremacy for maneuvers as well as outstanding improvements in intelligence subsequently, all the investments from 1967 through 1973 were allocated based on these pillars, which misled to an uppish understanding pendant to how powerful and impassable IDF was. This arrogance also caused a repetitive pattern during the October War and raised several doubts regarding the overall capabilities of the IDF.[29]

IDF is reported to have previously been aware of the deployments but preferred to remain deaf to them before the joint attack by Egypt and Syria carried out on October 6, 1973, as the IDF was suffocated by superfluous self-sufficiency and supremacy in every aspect, the most prominent of which could be observed in Israel Air Forces since IAF proved highly efficient with a proper amount of time for warning during the Six-Day War in 1967 against Egypt-Syria-Jordan. Yet, the detachment of other forces or units as well as this arrogance demonstrated otherwise during the Yom Kippur War. [30]

The elements that support IDF's estimate for absolute gain in any conflicts stem from the trust planted in the early warning systems that help detect any kind of threat 48 hours before it occurs and earns the army some time for making preparations,[31] the discipline which IDF was absent from in 1973 as a result of turning a blind eye to the evidence as plain as day and traces of deployments. Further, the IDF was forced to stay within the limits of a small number of military personnel on active duty and overdependence on reserve forces due to demographic figures, and the doctrine required reserve forces to be called to action when that early warning system was activated. [32] The military intelligence organization, AMAN, failed to comprehend

[29] William Forkner et. al., *Transformation Déjà Vu? A Comparison of Military Improvements of Israel (1967-1973) and the United States (1990-2002)*, (Norfolk, Virginia: Joint Forces Staff College, 2002), 25.
[30] David Rodman, "The Israel Air Force in the 1967 and 1973 Wars: Revisiting the Historical Record.", *Israel Affairs* 16, no. 2 (2010): 224.
[31] Moni Chorev, *Surprise Attack: The Case of the Yom-Kippur War*, (Fort Mcnair, Washington, D.C.: The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1996), 4.
[32] Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War.", *World Politics* 28, no. 3, (1976): 348.

the extent of imminent danger despite wrong-scheduled warnings and the mobilization could not be provided as desired. [33]

The IDF's loss in the October War can be attributed to a series of strategic, operational, and tactical errors. In addition to the erring assessment of intelligence and the unpliant result that no one had the 'guts' to plan any attacks on Israel with new so-called strategic depth and quantitative superiority in particular following the Six-Day War, another failure was because of the false certainty that IAF could vanquish all the attackers at once.

The prewar doctrine of the IDF supported air superiority, ruling out combined arms warfare. CAS was in general discarded as it accommodated a great degree of risk for costs and losses and the weight was on IAF's shoulders since 1967.[34] Along with the efficacy of tanks, IAF abode by the doctrine and became the first to counter the attack by the adversaries. Indeed, IAF had been under intense preparations for a possible conflict and devoid of the chance for a preemptive strike for the fear that the only ally, the USA, could reprimand Israel and it could end up being wrong although being right as Moshe Dayan also voiced the concern that Israel would be condemned by the world. [35]

The beginning of the hostilities without preemptive measures was exacerbated by the shady preferences of positioning: the defensive strikes with an unbalanced proportioning of air forces and armored units to ground forces stirred up the expectations and caused a stalemate and thus, many losses from IDF. Indeed, all that happened resulted from the intelligence failure at the onset of the war.

On the Sinai front, the deployments were delayed or did not even occur to the minds of the decision-makers. [36] Indeed, the IDF was caught unprepared by Egyptian air defense systems and anti-tank missiles. Mentored and equipped by the Soviets, Egypt introduced weary tactics to corner IAF to overcome IAF's air superiority and take over anti-aircraft systems.[37] A similar mistake was also committed on the Golan front: IDF's already-existing plans and operations in

[33] Shlaim, *Failures in National Intelligence Estimates*, 353.
[34] Mark Nowland, "*Eliminating the Rhetoric: An Evaluation of the Halt Phase Strategy*." (MA Thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1999): 57.
[35] Yaron Druckman, "Morning of Yom Kippur War: Cabinet Rejects Call for Preemptive Strike.", *Ynet News*, June 10, 2010. https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3965041,00.html. (03/02/2022).
[36] Uri Bar-Joseph, "Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? the Sources of Israel's Military Defeat at the Beginning of the 1973 War.", *The Journal of Military History* 72, no. 2 (2008): 519.
[37] Uri Bar-Joseph, *The Watchman Fell Asleep the Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 22.

case of any imminent Syrian attacks apart from those during the Yom Kippur War were not implemented. Dependence on less experienced ones and the fragile decision mechanisms pre and during the war made it evident that intelligence failure stormed what IDF was to put into action in case of any full-scale engagements. [38]

Despite the contingencies at the beginning, IDF rapidly adapted to the ongoing clashes and used combined arms tactics, and focused its attention on deploying the necessary units –in delay- and weapons at the spots where urgent intervention was required. Following the defensive, IDF took an offensive position, and to compensate for the losses thus far and on both fronts, the offensive position was settled and IDF counter-attacked both sides. Tanks were not compounded with sufficient aid from artillery or infantry due to the delayed mobilization of reserve forces and while the deployments of armored units along the Sinai line were ensured, logistical setbacks came to light, which would be corrected later on.[39] Still, these immediate executions did not prevent the heavy losses inflicted by the repercussions of the decisions.

Throughout and even at the beginning of the war, had more proper coordination been provided among the air, ground, and naval forces –one that allows adequacy for attacks directly supporting each other and following a linear command-, the losses would have been lessened or prevented sooner. [40]

3.1. Changes in the IDF

With all the technological shortfalls, following the war –about whose victory scholars have still been skeptical-, Israel was involved in a great change: the deterrence and thundery look of IDF were destroyed when the October War ended. The call for help by Israel –one that Europe remained silent to – was met by the US airlift in Operation Nickel Grass that helped temporary compensation of losses and conveyed to the world the message of the US's existence.[41]

The aid tightened the bounds of the US and Israel and the post-1973 era was abound with military procurements. Further, all these changes had to be aligned with political as well

[38] For detailed information please see Eitan Shamir, "Moshe Dayan in the Yom Kippur War: A Reassessment.", *Intelligence and National Security* 36, no. 7 (2021): 1035–52.
[39] David Rodman, "Combined Arms Warfare: The Israeli Experience in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.", *Defence Studies* 15, no. 2 (2015): 169.
[40] Rodman, *Combined Arms Warfare*, 174.
[41] Arnon Gutfeld and Clinton R. Zumbrunnen. "Fromnickel Grass to Desert Storm: The Transformation of US Intervention Capabilities in the Middle East.", *Middle Eastern Studies* 49, no. 4 (2013): 626.

as expectations as confined by international order. In the aftermath of the war, the US took Israel under its wings: many initiatives were launched to support and uphold Israel's legitimacy in the eyes of the other states. An example of such protection would be that the US, as a token, hastened the delivery of the fighter jets requested by Israel F-14 or F-15 according to the examinations and probe into what Israel may need-. Following the arrival of a delegation of relevant technical and authorized personnel in the US in 1974, the final decision was made on the F-15, costing less and having more pros compared to the F-14.[42] Israel became the first to acquire F-15 jets, the first one landing in the state in 1976.[43] New batches of aircraft were also followed by the introduction of more accurate targeting and intelligence capabilities, communication lines for faster command as well as stand-off weapons for IAF.[44] All the improvements led to the air superiority against irregular warfare in Lebanon and Palestine, prevailing for many years.

Numerically speaking, Israel also had the biggest share of aid from the US in 1974 and the numbers peaked. The total sum of aid was 492.8 million dollars in 1973 and the same total sum of aid increased almost five times more and rose to 2,621.8 million dollars.[45] This five-times-higher aid only one year later demonstrates how stronger the ties between the two states grew.

As the victim burdened with the responsibility of protecting Israel first, IAF also underwent some major changes. The air forces of Egypt and Syria were far more influential than IAF could overhaul and to counter them more in the future, dogfighting capabilities were optimized. [46] In the post-1973 era, IAF added many more US-made aircraft and weapons to its inventory. According to the hearing by Harold Brown at the Congress, then US Secretary of State, with the growth in both new procurements and modernization programs and soldiers at disposal, IDF's growth reached %150 percent only a few years after the defeat when compared to the prewar situation. [47]

[42] Shlomo Aloni and Chris Davey, *Israeli F-15 Eagle Units in Combat*, (Osprey Publishing, 2006), 12.
[43] David R. King, and Donald S. Massey, "History of the F-15 Program: A Silver Anniversary First Flight Remembrance", *Management Faculty Research and Publications*. 49, (1997): 14.
[44] Kenneth S. Browser, "The Israel Defense Forces, 1948-2017". *Ramat Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies*, (2018): 36-37
[45] Jeremy Sharp, *U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel. Congressional Research Service*, (2009): 22.
[46] Avi Jager, "Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces.", *International Institute for Counter-Terrorism* 74, (2021): 10.
[47] Committee on Foreign Relations, Middle East Arms Sales proposals: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-fifth Congress, Second session. (1978): 20.

As for the armored units, the lack of communication between the armored and ground units caused great damage to the IDF. The disorganized layout of tanks without infantry support during the battle facilitated the defeat on both fronts and sped up the process of producing an indigenous tank: the prototype of Merkava tanks was introduced in 1974. [48]Another enhancement was the night-vision systems assembled in the tanks.[49]

There were also some organizational changes: Planning Department was reorganized as a Branch of General Staff [50] –one that also embodied the Strategic Planning Department [51] and began to be commanded by Major General Avraham Tamir, who spearheaded the process.

What makes Israel's innovation unique is that civilians who have even a slight share in innovation are former members of the army. The leaders are members of a military-civilian generation and their views are influential in earning the political and military spheres some credit for achieving goals. With Rabin taking the seat of PM upon Golda Meir's resignation in 1974, Israel prioritized the elimination of grave concerns regarding its existence. [52] Rabin viewed the US as the sole partner, which explains the aids and enhancements, and until Begin took the power in 1977, IDF had already been both qualitatively and quantitatively superior to ever before. Begin's administration held the belief that this superiority would deem IDF a "deterrent" against as it was in 1967. [53]

With the 1975 Sinai Agreement II, a buffer zone was formed and the possibilities of any surprise were reduced to an extent that would allow some time for intelligence gathering and evaluation. [54]

As the victim of the war overburdened with the responsibility of protecting Israel first, IAF also underwent some major changes. SAM missiles were countered and posed great risks to IAF to escape. For a while, IAF attempted to preserve air superiority as it did before yet the trajectory of the war turned out to be a fight against SAM missiles and it resulted in a

[48] Anthony Tucker-Jones, *Armoured Warfare in the Arab-Israeli Conflicts: Rare Photographs from Wartime Archives*, (South Yorkshire, England: Pen &; Sword Military, 2013): 1.
[49] Ibid, 87.
[50] Martin van Creveld, "Two Years after: The Israel Defence Forces, 1973–75.", *The RUSI Journal* 121, no. 1 (1976): 30.
[51] Assaf Orion and Udi Dekel. The Planning Directorate in "Momentum": "Tnufa" the New IDF Multi-Year Plan, (March 5, 2020): 1. https://www.inss.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/no.-1266.pdf. (03/02/2022).
[52] Efraim Inbar, "Yitzhak Rabin and Israel's National Security.", Journal of Strategic Studies 20, no. 2 (1997): 28.
[53] Efraim Inbar, "Israeli National Security, 1973-96.", *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 555, no. 1 (1998): 67.
[54] Efraim Inbar, "Israeli Strategic Thinking after 1973.", *Journal of Strategic Studies* 6, no. 1 (1983): 42.

momentary adaptation to the new doctrine, which previously did not encompass any training for such a tactical requirement. [55] In this manner, Tactical Air Command[56] received the relevant IAF personnel in the US for F-4 training, transferring the knowledge.[57] Thus, the success of IAF's close air combat maneuvers –dogfighting- was boosted.[58] Whereas the leap of IAFs following the war through new aircraft procurements from the US cracked the door open for the inventory, the damage to the economy made a hash of periodical modernizations and US aid to Israel, due in part to the fear of harsh criticisms, was supplied as the initiatives for more indigenous products. As an example of this new concept, Lavi (meaning "lion" in Hebrew") program was launched by Israel Aerospace Industries in cooperation with US aid to be able to produce a true "escapee" with stealth features. [59]

The intelligence failures, deficiencies in close combat maneuvers, unbalanced combined arms, and lack of control as well as other tactical problems of ground forces revealed that the prewar doctrine had to be instantly adapted to the newly emerging threats by Egypt and Syria. Similarly, the obvious trickles of the conceit of the IDF to be the one who used to take the offensive first proved futile when overwhelmed by surprise and the offensive doctrine evolved into reactive defense, requiring more precise weapons. Still, it is not an uncommon assumption that RMA had been "unconsciously" applied, in particular, during the following years after 1973 as the results drawn from the 1973 war unveiled how fragile the armies could be on the battlefield.[60] Israel lost some soldiers to its adversaries and the purchase of precision-guided weapons and intelligence technologies for accurate information after 1973 –though this trend had no name then- symbolizes in part the seeds of a change towards unconventional issues planted in the mindset of the organization.[61] While the improper working of seniors circumvented the tactical and operational level, it was the on-site personnel who geared up and

[55] Shmuel L. Gordon, "The Air Force and the Yom Kippur War: New Lessons.", *Israel Affairs* 6, no. 1 (1999): 226.
[56] This unit is currently inactive within the USAF.
[57]History, Tactical Air Command (TAC), July 1973 to July 1974, Vol 1: 121. cited in Joseph S. Doyle, *The Yom Kippur War and the Shaping of the United States Air Force*, (Air University, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, United States, 2016): 50.
[58] Avi Jager, "The Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces", *Naval War College Review* 74, no. 2, (2021): 10.
[59] Gerald M. Steinberg, "Large-Scale National Projects as Political Symbols: The Case of Israel", *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 3 (1987): 335.
[60] Dima Adamsky, *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2010): 94.
[61] Raphael D. Marcus, *Israel's Long War with Hezbollah: Military Innovation and Adaptation under Fire*, (Georgetown University Press, 2018): 128.

could reverse the situation.[62]

To sum up, the literature on military change sought the innovations at the senior level but more recent studies show that bottom-up innovation can be also attributed to Yom Kippur warfare. The IDF's experiences in 1973 and the aftermath are intertwined with each other and must be analyzed with the pre-1973 era. The deceptive image of an invincible IDF during and post-1967 resulted in an "overemphasis" doctrine, negligent in the enhancement of ground forces and reserves. Central to the subsequent changes was a far more proper application of combined arms and more straightforward command to avoid jeopardizing communication skills among the personnel.

3.2. Changes in the Israeli Intelligence Organizations

The Yom Kippur War was an intelligence failure since Israeli intelligence failed to prevent a strategic surprise. Therefore, Israeli intelligence organizations, particularly the AMAN, were fiercely questioned by Israeli policymakers and the public after the war. Further, a national commission namely, the Agranat Commission was established in 1973 to investigate the role of not only the Israeli army but also intelligence organizations in failing to inform policymakers beforehand.[63] Also, the Commission published a classified report in 1974.[64] During the inquiries of the Agranat Commission, it was determined by the committee that even though Israel's leading military agency AMAN had intelligence on Egypt's plan to attack Israel, its analytical branch overlooked this information based on their previous analytical reports on the military capabilities of Egyptian and Syrian armies.[65] Therefore, it failed to provide a timely warning to policymakers. It should also be noted that AMAN's record of providing timely and accurate analysis was not solid as well. As Bar-Joseph[66] explains in detail, it failed to provide a prior warning to policymakers in 1955 (Egyptian-Czech arms deal), 1960 (Rotem Crisis), and 1970 (Soviet intervention).[67]

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[62] Murray Williamson, *Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change*, (Cambridge University Press, 2011): 303.
[63] Uri Bar-Joseph, "Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era", *Israel Affairs* 14, no 1, (2008): 77.; Rami Rom et. al., "The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun.", *International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence* 31, no 2, (2018): 358-359.
[64] Rom et. al, *The Yom Kippur War*, 354.
[65] Uri Bar-Joseph, *Israel's 1973 intelligence failure*, 17.
[66] Uri Bar-Joseph, *Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era*, 75.
[67] Shlomo Shpiro, "Soviet Espionage in Israel, 1973–1991.", *Intelligence and National Security* 30, no 4, (2015): 494.

After an investigation, the Commission's report highlighted two main flaws in the Israeli intelligence community on personal and organizational levels. First, the Agranat Commission found the top cadre of military intelligence responsible for the intelligence failure and recommended firing Chief of Staff David Elazar.[68] After this recommendation, Elazar immediately resigned from the IDF.[69] On the organizational level, on the other hand, the report recommended the inclusion of analytical branches in MOSSAD, the Foreign Office, and local IDF branches to reduce the monopoly of AMAN on intelligence analysis.[70] Based on the report's recommendations and to prevent strategic surprises in the future analytical branches were founded not only in MOSSAD and the IDF but also in SHABAK until the 1980s.[71]

In a nutshell, AMAN's failure to provide timely warning to Israeli policymakers of Egypt's army maneuvers and decision to go to war with Israel and the trauma of the first days of the Yom Kippur War led Israel's policymakers to rethink the efficiency of the Israeli intelligence community. Then, the resources were relocated among the intelligence organizations and new analytical branches were formed to avoid another intelligence failure in the future.

4. Conclusion

With the entire organization being able to seize the opportunities converted from the missed ones, Yom Kippur War is a testament to how revolutionary IDF can be and go to great lengths under extreme circumstances for victory. The stagnant and separate mindset of security organizations and partly presumptuous behaviors of the IDF aggravated the situation when the war broke out. Though the IDF is acknowledged to have won the war, it was the first compelling phase that forced the IDF to change. Yet, unlike what many scholars have for long sought, this change is not to be subsumed under specific variants. It is certain that there were tactical adaptations during the war in the aftermath of which these adaptations turned out to be indoctrinated.

[68] Rami Rom et. al., "The Yom Kippur War, Dr. Kissinger, and the Smoking Gun.", 359.; israeled.org. *Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April 1974)*, (2015) https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1974.4-Agranat-Commission-of-Inquiry-Interim-Report.pdf (02/02/2022).
[69] Israel Defense Forces official website, *Lt. Gen. David Elazar*. (2017). https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/past-chiefs-of-staff/lt-gen-david-elazar-1972-1974/ (02/02/2022).
[70] Bar-Joseph, Uri. "Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era.": 72; israeled.org. *Agranat Commission of Inquiry Interim Report (April 1974)*, (2015) https://israeled.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/1974.4-Agranat-Commission-of-Inquiry-Interim-Report.pdf (02/02/2022)
[71] Uri Bar-Joseph, Lessons not Learned: Israel in the Post-Yom Kippur War Era, 72.

Another outstanding result of this process was that civilian intervention was evident. With the power delegated to Rabin in 1974 and Begin three years later in 1977, the political view of Israel became more inflexible and was shaped by the new leaders who had also military roots in the past and it was the awareness of these new leaders that solidified the new acquisitions from the US and more investments into indigenous products in the defense industry to counter the existential threat.

The IDF's open culture was a catalyst for rapid adaptation. Such openness helped cloud up the mistakes and facilitated the absorption of changes. What began at the tactical level then spread across operational and strategic levels. The capabilities for combined arms were enhanced through more balanced procurements from the US as well as the increase in the number of reserves and soldiers. The ties between the two states reinforced and, in part, culminated in Israel emulating the USA's type of applying tactics on the battlefield, which may be delved into more deeply in further studies on how the US and Israel have converged due to their unique relations. In other words, the new IDF was a result of civilian intervention by ex-military people who resorted to emulation.

At the organizational level, new branches were established and the efficacy of the forces was augmented through either new leaders appointed as the head of new branches or new investments at the tactical level impacting the organizational level. For instance, the pre-emphasis on IAF and armored units continued after the war ended yet ground forces and logistical support were also involved in the allocations or plans.

The overall intelligence failure originating from the monopolization of intelligence under one organization and stagnancy of communication also prevented one-organization regime and intelligence community from transformed into a more mobile and effective body, the benefits of which can be derived in the further analysis regarding IDF and intelligence organizations' successes in the following wars or conflicts.

In conclusion, IDF's change is a multifaceted one along with both top-down and bottom-up interventions. Remarkably, what the lower echelon started was indoctrinated in the future and thus, scholars do not fail when seeking the seeds of RMA in 1973. The real change is not what happened when the war erupted; in fact, it is a cycle of change encompassing a variety of factors all at once. On the other hand, what the higher echelon ignited was also applied on the battlefield. As such, Agranat Commission exemplifies how the IDF does not hesitate to learn

from its mistakes. When the culture, experiences, openness, and alliance are combined, it can be concluded that the nascent IDF in the post- 1973 era is a complicated achievement of long-term efforts, not just one specific case depending upon specific factors.

To further this complication, more research can be carried out to understand the nature of 1973 and its effects on other wars IDF had to experience new threats. We agree that studying changes originating from specific experiences should be analyzed with a holistic approach that allows the incorporation of the previous findings of military change literature -focused on top-down- and the more recent type of it -focused on bottom-up- to detect organizational, cultural, political, military, tactical or other types of changes which may be borrowed from other fields. If applied, an unlimited detection of changes would lead to preventing stagnancy and arrogance and learning more from mistakes for military organizations due to the hybrid environment of warfare where anything can do a 180-degree turn.

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