

The Role of Social Contract in Kant's Political Philosophy

Abmet Emre DEMİRCİ*

Hüseyin Fırat ŞENOL**

Makale Geliş / Recieved: 11.02.2022
Makale Kabul / Accepted: 24.06.2022

Öz

Kant's views on original contract or social contract seems to be underestimated in the current literature on political philosophy. But, there is a lot to appreciate in his thoughts on this issue. For instance, the original contract being an idea of reason rather than of a historical event, could be considered as Kant's contribution. Moreover, for Kant, consent to the social contract depends on a moral obligation to institutionalize and make peremptory in a social contract property right that in the state of nature have only a provisional character. There are aspects which help us purify Kant's views on social contract from the ideas of Hobbes and Locke; however, his political philosophy is most often claimed to be a part of the social contract tradition which began with Hobbes and was improved by Locke and Rousseau. We would not be mistaken if we disagree with this claim, since Kant has always noted that an ideal state, or a true republic, must conform to the Idea of the social contract.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Immanuel Kant, Social Contract, Original Contract, Political Philosophy.

* Prof. Dr., Anadolu Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, İşletme Bölümü, aedemirci@anadolu.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-8214-2680.

** Doç. Dr., Anadolu Üniversitesi, Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü, hfсенol@anadolu.edu.tr, ORCID: 0000-0002-6024-9073.

Künye: DEMİRCİ, Ahmet Emre & ŞENOL, Hüseyin Fırat (2022). The Role of Social Contract in Kant's Political Philosophy, *Dört Öge*, 21, 53-65. <http://dergipark.gov.tr/dortoge>.

Kant'ın Siyaset Felsefesinde Toplum Sözleşmesinin Rolü

Abstract

Kant'ın orijinal sözleşme ya da toplum sözleşmesi konusundaki görüşlerinin çağdaş siyaset felsefesi literatüründe neredeyse göz ardı edildiği düşünülebilir. Oysa Kant'ın bu konudaki görüşlerinde kendine özgü ve takdir edilebilecek pek çok unsur vardır. Örneğin, orijinal sözleşmenin, tarihsel bir olaydan ziyade aklın bir idesi olması, Kant'ın literatüre katkısı olarak ele alınabilir. Üstelik, Kant'a göre toplum sözleşmesine gösterilen rızanın temelinde, doğa durumunda yalnızca geçici olabilen mülkiyet haklarının bir toplum sözleşmesi altında kurumsallaşarak kesin bir hükme bağlanmasını gerekli kılan bir ahlaki yükümlülük bulunur. Kant'ın toplum sözleşmesiyle ilgili görüşlerinin Hobbes'un ve Locke'unükilerden ayrılacağı pek çok yön olsa da, Kant'ın siyaset felsefesinin Hobbes'la başlayıp Locke ve Rousseau tarafından geliştirilen toplum sözleşmesi geleneğinin bir parçası olduğu iddia edilir. Bu iddiaya katılmak hatalı olur; çünkü Kant her zaman ideal bir devletin, ya da hakiki bir cumhuriyetin toplum sözleşmesi idesiyle uyumlu olması gerektiğine işaret etmiştir.

Keywords: Immanuel Kant, Social Contract, Original Contract, Political Philosophy.

“The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state. In accordance with the original contract, everyone within a people gives up his external freedom in order to take it up again immediately as a member of a commonwealth, that is, of a people considered as a state”

Immanuel Kant

The main idea of the social contract tradition is that consent or agreement can justify basic social and political institutions: just societies are based on the consent of the governed, unjust societies are not. It is already known that the tradition of social contract has many forms, especially in the political philosophy of early modern period and in contemporary contractualism (O'Neill, 2021, p. 25). To summarise the contractarianist views in modern political thought, we can say that there are essentially three different accounts of the conceptual status of the social contract: the actual; the hypothetical; and the ideal. Locke's theory is an example for the first (actual), Hobbes' theory, of the second (hypothetical), whereas Rousseau's and Kant's theories are models for the last (ideal). In each one of the theories, the social contract is expected to guide practice, although the basis of this guidance varies from one theory to another. Locke seeks the renewal of the original contract that bound humans together into civil society; we are to establish that

contract anew by harkening back to the basic principles of that contract, which have become distorted over time. Hobbes, on the other hand, argues that we need to govern ourselves in accordance with the principles of prudential rationality. The social contract is merely a model that enables us to discern the operation of prudence with respect to political affairs and not any sort of actual event, which either has or at least ought to take place. Kant rejects both of these conceptions of the social contract, instead opting for an account of the contract along idealistic lines (Dodson, 1991, p. 80). Although very much overlooked by the current literature, there is much to admire in Kant's views on original contract or social contract. Rawls (1971, p. 252) cites Kant as representing the "the high point of the contractarian tradition". According to Riley (2013, p. 125), Kant's political philosophy is often taken to be a part of the social contract tradition that began with Hobbes and was developed by Locke and Rousseau. Riley (2013, p. 125) suggests that this view is quite correct since Kant always said that an ideal state, or a true republic, must conform to the Idea of the social contract. According to Kant, the sovereign must recognize the "original contract" or social contract as an idea of reason that forces the sovereign to;

[...] give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will (Kant, *Theory and Practice*, 8, p. 297).

This original contract, Kant implies, is only an idea of reason and, as we will discuss later, not a historical event.

In his *Perpetual Peace* (Friedensschrift), Kant tries to offer a project to help human beings in their attempts to achieve perpetual peace. On Kant's view, the (concept of the) original contract is a *conditio sine qua non* for a people (*Volk*) having rights, that is, for a civil constitution where each person is considered a moral being worthy of dignity; hence for a perpetual peace (Kant, 1992b, p. 108). In scrutinizing the project, it is obvious that Kant's theory of perpetual peace is closely linked with the notion of the social contract that deals with those external relations of human beings on the level of intersubjectivity. This level of "intersubjectivity" in the "external relations of human beings" is best understood through refreshing our memories on the fundamental principles of Kant's moral and political philosophy, in relation to his understanding of the social contract: 1. Kant's idea of the social contract explains how individual moral agents can maintain their autonomy in the context of community on one hand, and, 2. seen as a resolver of the conflict between moral autonomy and political authority, by defining a model of civil society in which free, equal, and independent rational agents collectively legislate the public

laws that are to govern their external relations, which are essentially property relations; so, 3. Ideal civil society seems to be a condition of maximum equal freedom for rational agents who interact with one another (Dodson 1991, p. V). Kant assumes that the concept of public right (which includes the ideas of the right of a state, of nations, and cosmopolitan right) is based on that notion of social contract that refers to the concepts of freedom, equality, and independence. It is important to note that the notion of social contract was only given as a theme in his in the essay *Common Saying* (*Gemeinspruch*). However, this notion plays a significant role in Kant's political philosophy (Lowe, 2012, p. 91-92).

For all contractualists, including Kant, political legitimacy is based upon the counterfactual or hypothetical consent of the governed. The differences between them begins to be visible when we question the motivations and considerations that lead to the agreement. For Kant, consent to the social contract neither depends on the considerations of rational self-interest or prudence (Hobbes), nor on the natural right to self-preservation and the guarantee of absolute property rights (Locke), but it depends on a moral obligation to institutionalize and make peremptory in a social contract property rights that in the state of nature have only a provisional character (Baynes, 1989, p. 433). Although Kant's views on social contract departs from the ideas of Hobbes and Locke, his political philosophy is often taken to be a part of the social contract tradition that began with Hobbes and was improved by Locke and Rousseau. It would not be mistaken to assume that this view is wrong since Kant has always noted that an ideal state, or a true republic, must conform to the Idea of the social contract. Kant says:

[...] the act through which a people constitutes itself a state, or to speak more properly the Idea of such an act, in terms of which alone its legitimacy can be conceived, is the original contract by which all (omnes et singuli) the people surrender their outward freedom in order to resume it at once as members of a common entity, that is, the people regarded as the state (universi) (Kant, *Conflict of the Faculties*, p. 186).

[This contract is] a mere idea of reason which has, however, its undoubted (practical) reality: that is, it obligates every lawgiver to promulgate his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of an entire people, and to regard every subject, in so far as he desires to be a citizen, as though he had joined in assenting to such a will (Kant, *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, p. 334-5)

Although, as seen in the given paragraph, there is a certain influence of Rousseau, the concept 'idea' in the given passage separates Kant from the traditional

contractarianism even while linking Kant with it, for in Kant's political philosophy, the very idea of contract becomes hypothetical, as does so much else in his system, including freedom and the will. Thus, social contract is an idea of reason that provides an anchor for judging the adequacy of states and their laws, but it has nothing to do with actual agreement or with an actual promise to obey. According to Riley (2013, p. 125), here Kant means Idea in a very strict sense: as he says in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, the notion of a state that corresponds to the Idea of a social contract "may be called a Platonic Ideal (*respublica noumenon*) which is not an empty figment of the imagination, but the eternal norm for all civil constitutions whatsoever." Thus, according to Kant, it is obvious that this ideal is not meant to require actual consenting and promising Kant makes clear in his important *Theory and Practice*:

...an original contract...is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will.

Thus, it is clear that Kant's conception of social contract is nothing less than a Platonic idea. Although it is one of the many elements of his political philosophy, we could consider it among the most important ones. For Kant, social contract is the glue that holds the state together. Kant says:

The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state (Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, 6, p. 315).

As seen in the paragraph above, there is no room for doubt on the issue that social contract's status as an idea. On the other hand, it is important to note that Kant's social contract idea has a different ontological status than that of Plato's ideas – such as Good. Whereas Plato's idea of Good is presented as primary and underived, Kant's idea of social contract is clearly secondary and derived. This ontological status could be found in *Theory and Practice* where Kant notes that social contract can only arise from the general (united) will of the people. From what Kant says, it could be argued that social contract is derived from the general will of the people. At this point, it is important to note that, like the social contract, Kantian "general will" is also an idea. For Williams, it is given to us a priori, just as all Platonic ideas for Kant, and is present throughout his career, from his *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* to his latest political works (Williams, 2007, p. 475). Williams adds

that general will is the source for more than just the social contract; it is also the source of legislative authority, executive authority, and sovereignty generally. The question here is that if the social contract is not an actual contract – it is rather an idea – then how precisely does it function? Kant answers this question by saying:

It [the social contract] is instead only an idea of reason, which, however, has its undoubted practical reality, namely to bind every legislator to give his laws in such a way that they could have arisen from the united will of a whole people and to regard each subject, insofar as he wants to be a citizen, as if he has joined in voting for such a will (Kant, *Theory and Practice*, 8, p. 297)

Kant claims that the concept of the will that legitimizes the political authority is a necessary hypothesis and the social contract itself is a requirement of reason – not as an account of the origin of political society, but as rational criterion of the just polity (Boucher and Kelly, 1995, p. 8). Furthermore, Kant points a solid distinction between the faculties of reason and understanding that differs from previous uses by Plato and Aristotle. As an “idea of reason”, the social contract could be distinguished from a concept of the understanding. Thus, according to Kant, the idea of social contract is similar to the ideas of God and freedom; all being products of *practical* reason. If the Categorical Imperative (the major principle which tells us to act only in accordance with that maxim through which we can at the same time will that it become a universal law) could be presumed as the supreme principle of practical reason, then, human being is the only one among the creatures, with the ability to form ideas related to objects of experience as well as ideas of pure practical reason. In other words, human beings deserve to be free and autonomous on the condition that they act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative—an imperative for finite beings like humans, whose needs and inclinations mostly are not perfectly rational. The concept of God as a product of practical reason, then, could be considered as an attempt to overcome such an imperfection of reason on the whole.

As mentioned above, the idea of social contract – like the ideas of God and freedom – has nothing to do with the objects of experience. However, it can be thought and is closely linked with morality. As the above quotation notes, Kant employs the idea of the social contract as a test for legitimacy of laws. For example, Kant argues against enactment of hereditary privilege on the grounds that free and equal persons could not agree to such laws (Richardson, 2017, p. 85).

According to Williams (1994, p. 145), Kant’s theory of social contract has four distinctive characteristics. The first, and probably the most well-known, is

that Kant entirely does away with any supposition that a social contract has actually been concluded by the members of any particular society. Kant considers the social contract as an intellectual construct with moral and practical significance. According to Kant, social contract is a notion that should affect our motives and intentions in acting rather than one which arises in observing the world.

As a second characteristic, the notion of a social contract is connected to a programme of political reform which it is incumbent upon the rulers and the subjects of a state to try to implement. In Kant's view there is a certain kind of political system which fits best with the idea of a social contract and as rational beings we have a duty to work peacefully to bring such a system into being.

Third, Kant's conception of social contract moves further beyond the borders of nations. Kant notes that the idea of the state which underlies the social contract has cosmopolitan implications. When establishing a solid domestic order, one cannot overlook the international context into which the state falls. Therefore, Kant unusually tries to operate the idea of the social contract at an international level. He has work for the idea of the social contract in the relations among states as well as in the relations among individuals¹ (Williams, 1994, p. 135). Further, by virtue of the original contract or social contract at domestic level, states can be seen as moral agents in the international domain and not merely as a belonging that can be acquired by other states. The original contract at internal level thus imposes constraints on how states can be treated by each other. Kant notes:

If a public law is so constituted that a whole people could not possibly give its consent to it (as e.g. that a certain class of subjects should have the hereditary privilege of ruling rank), it is unjust; but if it is only possible (*nur möglich*) that a people could agree to it, it is a duty to consider the law just (*für gerecht zu halten*), even if the people is at present in such a situation or frame of mind (*Denkungsart*) that, if consulted about it, it would probably refuse its consent (*seine Beistimmung verweigern würde*) (Kant, *Theory and Practice*, 8, p. 287).

Thus, if the idea of original contract or social contract is that of a constitution that could secure universal consent, then any constitution that exemplifies it must require the freedom of individuals, without which the possibility of genuine consent or dissent is undermined, at least for some, and universal consent

1 It could be argued that the development of Kant's universal perspective was influenced by Rousseau. Ernst Cassirer points that the influence of Rousseau on Kant's ethical and political thoughts cannot be underestimated: After reading Rousseau, says Cassirer, Kant says that he learned to respect human being, and to think further on the generalization/universalization of human rights (Cassirer, 2007, 310).

becomes impossible (Walla, 2018, p. 39). While pointing out to John Rawls as an exponent of Kantian contractarianism, Will Kymlicka (2001) refers to Rawls' views (on Kant) that people are themselves originating sources of valid claims, he implies that in Kant's moral philosophy, people are important not due to the potential of benefitting from or harming each other, but due to the fact that they are 'ends in themselves' (p. 191). Kymlicka adds that this 'ends in themselves' implies a concept of moral equality—each person bearing equal significance, and is entitled to equal consideration (ibid). What has so far been said about Kant's views on social contract is hoped to be better explained in the following step, i.e., the fourth characteristic.

Fourth and the last characteristic of Kant's theory of social contract is that it is forward looking. In use of his approach to social contract, Kant tries to transcend his own time. Obviously, Kant has taken the previous theories of social contract into consideration. However, on the other hand, he tries to anticipate the contemporary developments in social contract theory, particularly in the writings of John Rawls. It would not be wrong, then, to consider Kant's theory as providing a useful point of entry to social contract theory as a whole (Williams, 1994, p. 135). To see better what this 'useful point' refers to, one can track Kant's ideas, conceptualizations and arguments on political philosophy, which lead us to consider a biconditional relation between moral and political issues. Furthermore, the political conditions envisaged by Kant on the idea of social contract-based state are pointed out by Kitcher as follows:

[...]A state is legitimate only if people would so contract. Further, Kant believed that people should contract for a state, because only in that condition can their rights as free, equal, and independent persons be recognised (Kitcher, 2001, p. 252)

Baynes (1989, p. 444) points out another distinctive characteristic of Kant's theory of social contract. According to Baynes (1989, p. 444), Kant offers a theory of the social contract that not only differentiates his views from other contract theorists, but one which more strongly emphasizes the idea of a counterfactual agreement between free and equal moral persons. We could argue that, when referring to being free, Kant implies positive freedom whereby the individual, when (s)he acts with the consciousness that it is no one but herself/himself is the main determining force of her/his freely chosen actions, and that, since every individual person is capable of doing so, (s)he must always have respect for others' dignity and independence. Baynes' views on Kant recalls much of Kant's formula of the kingdom of ends, which was stated in *Grounding for The Metaphysics of Morals* as follows:

For all rational beings stand under the law that each of them should treat himself and all others never merely as means but always at the same time as an end in himself. Hereby arises a systematic union of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e., a kingdom that may be called a kingdom of ends (certainly only an ideal), inasmuch as these laws have in view the very relation of such beings to one another as ends and means (1992a, p. 1021).

It could also be argued that the main root of positive freedom is found in Kant's ethical and political philosophy. Thus, the condition for the recognition of each individual constituting a society as a free and autonomous person worthy of equal dignity and respect turns out to be the establishment of a state (Şenol, 2016, p. 7-8).

According to Kant, the original contract is qualitatively different than all other voluntary agreements. The main difference is that whereas the voluntary agreements and associations in a society presuppose that the parties share certain goals and ends arbitrarily (or by choice), the original social contract contains "an end in itself which they all ought to share," namely the formation of a state or civil society regulated by coercive public laws. In Kant's expression: "A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member when he legislates in it universal laws while also being himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as sovereign, when as legislator he is himself subject to the will of no other" (1992a, p. 1021).

As mentioned above, the main goal of the social contract is the one that all individuals share by virtue of their conception of themselves as free and equal moral persons. Thus, it is obvious that Kant's use of the social contract is completely consistent with his moral theory and with his optimism about the human potentialities to flourish. Kant's political philosophy, like his metaphysics and moral theory, is formulated independently of empirical evidence. In other words, Kant's social contract and cooperation cannot be based on matters of fact – even the most impressive ones. Cooperation and social contract have to be founded on some notion of consent (Williams, 1995, p. 139). Kant notes:

The act by which a people forms itself into a state is the original contract. Properly speaking, the original contract is only the idea of this act, in terms of which alone we can think of the legitimacy of a state. In accordance with the original contract, everyone within a people gives up his external freedom in order to take it up again immediately as a member of a commonwealth, that is, of a people considered as a state (Kant, *Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 315).

Kant also claims that there are three main characteristics of parties who form the original social contract: freedom, equality, and independence. They are free in that they are subject to no other laws than those to which they give their consent and in that each is regarded as having her own conception of the good (Baynes, 1989, p. 445). In a very well-known passage, Kant states that the original social contract is not something that actually took place in history. Kant says:

It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way that they could have been produced by the united will of a whole nation, and to regard each subject, in so far as he can claim citizenship, as if he had consented within the general will (Kant, 1991, p. 79).

As mentioned above, Kant was very explicit that the original social contract is not to be regarded as an historical fact. Instead, Kant suggests that (probably for Humean reasons) that it would be absurd to regard it as such because, even so regarded, it could not perform any useful moral function. This original contract, as mentioned above, is not a historical event. Any rights and duties stemming from an original contract do so not because of any particular historical provenance, but because of the rightful relations embodied in the original contract. No empirical act, as a historical act would be, could be the foundation of any rightful duties or rights (Frederick, 2021). Kant notes:

But it is by no means necessary that this contract (called *contractus originarius* or *pactum sociale*), as a coalition of every particular and private will within a people into a common and public will (for the sake of merely rightful legislation) be presupposed as a fact (as a fact it is indeed not possible) – as if it would first have to be proved from history that a people, into whose rights and obligations we have entered as descendants, once actually carried out such an act, and that it must have left some sure record or instrument of it, orally or in writing, if one is to hold oneself bound to an already existing civil constitution. (Kant, *Theory and Practice*, 8, p. 297)

However, an important question arises at this point. That is question is if the original social contract is not historical, what is it and what role does it play in Kant's political and social philosophy? In order to answer this question, it is extremely important to figure that the doctrine of the original social contract is not for Kant a theory of allegiance and is not an answer to the question "Why do I have a moral obligation to obey the law?". Rather for Kant the original contract or social contract theory provides a way for answering the question "When is a

law just?”. What we find in Kant is the use of the social contract as the basis for a theory of justice (Murphy, 1978, p. 73). Another question that arises is that how does the original contract or social contract act as the basis for a theory of justice? According to Kant, original contract act as the basis for theory of justice as an ideal of reason – as a model of rational choice.

Based on the discussions given above, it would not be wrong to assume that Kant's social contract can serve as a transcendental principle. Because, Kant's notion of social contract can be deemed to be another formulation of the universal law of right. After indicating that “the union of many for some (common) end (that all of them have) is to be found in any social contract,” (Kant, *Common Saying*, 8, p. 289), Kant says:

[...] now the end that, in such an external relation, is in itself duty and even the supreme formal condition (*conditio sine qua non*) of all other external duties is the right of human beings under public coercive laws, by which what belongs to each can be determined for him and secured against encroachment by any other.

According to Lowe (2012, p. 97) dealing with the external relationships of human beings through social contract is a process of building up public law, in order to maintain the compatibility of everyone's *Willkür*; i.e., to protect everyone's freedom, equality and independence. The difference between *Wille* and *Willkür* in Kant's philosophy could best be explained by his following own words, in *The Metaphysics of Morals*:

The faculty of desire in accordance with concepts [Das Begehrungsvermögen nach Begriffen] [...] insofar as it is joined with one's consciousness [Bewußtsein] of the ability to bring about its object by one's action it is called **choice** [*Willkür*] [...]. The faculty of desire whose inner determining ground, hence even what pleases it, lies within the subject's reason is called the **will** [*Wille*]. The will is therefore the faculty of desire considered not so much in relation to action (as choice is) but rather in relation to the ground determining choice to action [zur Handlung] (Kant 2005, p. 13).

It is obvious that the notion of social contract and the universal law of right engage in the same problem which is the compatibility of everyone's freedom. Social contract's function specifies that we behave socially and politically as if we have signed a contract in which we merely obey our own reason rather than any authority, and by which we constrain ourselves voluntarily (Lowe, 2012, p. 98).

Conclusion

As discussed throughout the essay, the notion of social contract plays a significant role in Kant's political philosophy. Although Kant's political theory stands in the social contract tradition, it departs significantly from earlier versions of social contract theory. As a distinctive point, unlike Hobbes and Locke, Kant claims that human beings have not only a pragmatic reason but an obligation to exit the state of nature and found a state; because human being-as a result of having reason-is capable of formulating universal moral laws and obeying those laws. With this claim, Kant implies that freedom is the only right which human beings should possess from birth, and that the rule of law is the only condition under which everyone's rights are equally honored. The justification for this innate right is mostly due to Kant's moral philosophy, especially, to his formula of the kingdom of ends.

References

- Baynes, K. (1989). Kant on property rights and the social contract. *The Monist*, 72(3), 433-453.
- Boucher, D. and Kelly, P. (1995). *The Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls*. Routledge
- Cassirer, E. (2007) *Kant'ın Yaşamı ve Öğretisi*, Turkish trans. Doğan Özlem, İstanbul: İnkılap (3rd Edition)
- Dodson, K.E. (1991). *Kant's Theory Of The Social Contract* (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation). Amherst: University Of Massachusetts.
- Ebels-Duggan, K. (2012). Kant's political philosophy. *Philosophy Compass*, 7(12), 896-909.
- Kant, I. (1900). *Dreams of a spirit-seer (Vol. 13)*. Books on Demand.
- Kant, I. (1991): On the Common Saying 'This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice'. In: H.S. Reiss (ed.): *Kant: Political writings*, 2nd ed., trans. by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.61-92
- Kant, I. (1992). *The Conflict of the Faculties*. University of Nebraska Press, 901 N. 17th St., Lincoln, NE 68588-0520.
- Kant, I. (1992a). Grounding for The Metaphysics Of Morals. In *Classics Of Moral And Political Theory*, ed. Michael L. Morgan, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. (pp. 991-1041).
- Kant, I. (1992b). Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch. In *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, Trans. Ted Humphrey, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. (4th Edition), pp. 107-143.
- Kant, I., & Blaug, R. (2016). 15. On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory but it Does not Apply in Practice'. In *Democracy* (pp. 102-107). Columbia University Press.
- Kant, I. (2005). *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. and ed. M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kitcher, P. (2001). Immanuel Kant. In *The Blackwell Guide to the Modern Philosophers: From Descartes to Nietzsche* (Ed. Steven M. Emmanuel), UK: Blackwell
- Kymlicka, W. (2001). The Social Contract Tradition. In *A Companion to Ethics*, ed. Peter Singer, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Co. (pp. 186-196).
- Lowe, C.Y. (2012). Kant's social contract: a new transcendental principle in political philosophy. *Kant Yearbook*, 4(1), 91-112.
- Murphy, J.G. (1978). Hume and Kant on the social contract. *Philosophical Studies*, 33 (1), 65-79.
- O'Neill, O. (2021). Kant and the Social Contract Tradition. In *Kant's Political Theory* (pp. 25-41). Penn State University Press.
- Rauscher, F. (2021). Kant's Social and Political Philosophy. In *the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL= <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/kant-social-political/>>.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A Theory of Justice*, Harvard Press, Cambridge.
- Richardson, J. (2017). Feminist engagements with social contract theory. In *the Routledge Companion to Feminist Philosophy* (Ed. Garry, A., Khader, S.J., and Stone, A.). Routledge
- Riley, P. (2013). *Will and Political Legitimacy*. Harvard University Press.
- Riley, P. (2013). Kant as the Most Adequate of the Social Contract Theorists. In *Will and Political Legitimacy*. Harvard University Press.
- Şenol, H.F. (2016). Liberty and equality: Mutually exclusives?. *Ethos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences*, 9(1).
- Walla, A.P. (2018). *Private Property and the Possibility of Consent: Kant and Social Contract Theory*.
- Williams, H. (2003). Kant on the social contract. In *the Social Contract from Hobbes to Rawls* (pp. 145-158). Routledge.
- Williams, D. (2007). Ideas and actuality in the social contract: Kant and Rousseau. *History of Political Thought*, 28(3), 469-495.