

The Circassian-Polish-Hungarian Alliance Plans Against the Russian Empire in the Final Days of the 1848-1849 Hungarian Revolution

György Csorba*

Abstract

During the last months of the 1848–1849 Hungarian War of Independence, Polish immigrants in Constantinople elaborated a large-scale cooperation plan against Russia. According to two letters found in the archives of the Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, a would-be Circassian–Polish–Hungarian cooperation and alliance would engage considerable Russian forces in the Caucasus, dividing thus the country’s power. It would effectively support the Hungarians’ fight, give the Circassians the opportunity to attain their freedom, the Ottoman Empire would considerably strengthen its position in the area, and it would eventually help to restore the independence of Poland. The late and bold plan however contained too many obstacles. The Porte’s extensive support would have been by all means necessary, but at that time the Ottomans, considering the political and military circumstances, did not dare to go into a confrontation with Russia yet. At the date of the documents the Hungarian War of Independence was nearing to defeat. Circassians were weakened by tribal, religious and political conflicts; and though they scored numberless tactical victories over Russians, they were unable to inflict strategic defeat on the Tsar’s battle-hardened troops.

Keywords: Circassians, Hungarian emigrants, Polish emigrants, Hungarian Revolution, Zankó Sefer Bey

* Independent researcher, Budapest, gyorgycsorba@gmail.com

1848-49 Macar Devrimi'nin Son Günlerinde Rusya İmparatorluğu'na Karşı Çerkes, Leh ve Macar İttifakı Planları

Özet

Macar Bağımsızlık Savaşı'nın yaşandığı 1848-49 döneminin sonlarına doğru İstanbul'da bulunan Polonyalı siyasi mülteciler, Rusya'ya karşı geniş çaplı bir ittifak kurmak için planlar yaptılar. Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi arşivinde bulunan iki adet mektuba göre, kurulacak bir Çerkes, Leh ve Macar birlikteliği ve ittifakı, Çarlık Rusyası'nın Kafkasya'da bulunan askeri birliklerini yorucu bir çatışmanın içerisine çekerek Rusya'nın gücünü bölecekti. Böyle bir plan, Macar mücadelesini destekleyecek; Çerkeslere özgürlüklerini yeniden kazanma fırsatı verecek; Osmanlılara bölgedeki konumlarını güçlendirme fırsatı sunacak, ve Polonya'nın bağımsızlığına yeniden kavuşmasına yardımcı olacaktı. Bu cesur fakat gecikmiş plan birçok engelle karşılaşacaktı. Bu planın hayata geçmesi için Osmanlı desteğine kesinlikle ihtiyaç varken, Osmanlı Devleti dönemin askeri ve siyasi koşulları içerisinde henüz o tarihte Rusya ile bir çatışmayı göze alacak durumda değildi. Sözkonu mektupların yazıldığı tarihte Macar Bağımsızlık Savaşı mağlubiyetle sonuçlanmak üzereydi. Kendi aralarındaki siyasi, dini ve kabilesel farklılarla mücadeleden zayıf düşmüş Çerkesler ise elde ettikleri bazı taktik zaferlere rağmen savaş tecrübesi ve motivasyonu yüksek Çarlık ordusuna nihai darbeyi indirerek onu yenebilecek durumda değildi.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Çerkesler, Macar mülteciler, Polonyalı mülteciler, Macar Devrimi, Zanoko Sefer Bey

In the summer of 1849, the Hungarian government, which was fighting a war first of self-defence then of independence against the Austrian court, succeeded, after a long time, in sending diplomatic agents to Constantinople. They managed to establish relations - though informal, due to lack of international recognition - with the Sublime Porte and the foreign embassies operating in the Ottoman capital. Even then nations fighting for their independence sought connections with each other. It is not surprising after all that in July-August 1849 the Hungarian cause raised the attention of another fate-stricken people, the Circassians.

Diplomatic Background of the Hungarian Government in 1849

On 15 March 1848, a so-called 'lawful revolution' took place in Hungary, called as such because its achievements were codified by the last Diet of Hungary and ratified by the emperor. This legal basis enabled the setting up of a new system of government, and facilitated the reforms, which had been at issue for decades. This lawfulness provided the basis for the sustained revolution. Thereafter Hungary acted as an independent part of the Habsburg Empire with its own government responsible only to the Hungarian parliament. Only the person of the emperor and the joint interests formed the bond between the country and the empire.

However, the Habsburg court was striving to re-establish the old order. The multi-ethnicity of Hungary offered an excellent opportunity to destabilise the achievements of the revolution. Vienna took advantage of the dissatisfaction of the nationalities, and instigated, even partially organised the outbreak of a civil war against the Hungarians first in Délvidék (Southern Reaches) then in Transylvania. After repressing the Italian uprisings, in September 1848 the Viennese court decided that the time had come to find a military solution to the Hungarian problem. To their surprise, however, the Hungarian army set up from scratch repelled the first attack resulting in a sustained war of self-defence.¹

¹ For the overall history of the revolution and war of independence see: Deák, 2001. On the detailed history of the war see: Bona, 1999.

As early as in 1848, the Hungarian government made an attempt to initiate an independent Hungarian foreign policy, which of course the Viennese court tried to impede by any means. As far as foreign policy was concerned, with the fall of the European revolutions the Hungarian government became isolated. Its diplomats were either not received by foreign governments or could only establish informal relationships with them. Following the breakout of the military conflict, the borders were practically closed because of the Austrian army attacking from various directions and the insurgent nationalities supporting it.²

The Hungarian government considered the establishment of relations with the Ottoman Empire particularly important. They believed that Russian superpower policy was threatening both the Ottomans and the independent Hungarian state and thus they regarded the Porte their natural ally. In the summer of 1848, they pressed Vienna to let the Hungarian government open consulates in Constantinople and in other Ottoman cities. However, the imperial court played out the time masterfully to postpone the decision until the question became moot due to the outbreak of the war. During its desperate fight the Hungarian government could not deal with the issue for a long time. (Csorba, 2015: 131-144.) In the winter and early spring of 1849, after some significant military successes of the Hungarian army, the government renewed its attempts to establish diplomatic relations. However, the western powers were reluctant to recognise the Hungarian government even though their domestic public started to become more and more pro-Hungarian. At the same time, in the shadow of their military failures the Habsburgs turned to the Russian tsar for help.

When in the spring of 1849 it became evident that the Austrians could be defeated and expelled from the country – resulting in the partial restoration of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country –, the Habsburg dynasty was dethroned (14 April, 1849). Simultaneously, a possible Russian intervention became a real threat, therefore the Hungarian government focused on establishing good relations with the Ottoman Empire. It is clear that the

² A detailed analysis of the Hungarian foreign policy in the period: Kosáry, 2003.

Hungarian politicians mistakenly believed in the ability of the Porte to hinder a Russian military operation or the further extension of the tsarist sphere of interest. Nevertheless, many agents were sent to Constantinople in many waves and from different directions, some of which were not even lucky enough to enter the Empire. Beyond doubt, Gyula Andrásy, future Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the most successful among them, even though he was only able to make informal contact with the Ottoman political elite, and could not achieve spectacular results.³ The Hungarian aspirations were defeated by the Austrian protests, the aggressive Russian policy, the lack of British and French support, not to mention the fact that the Russian intervention soon put an end to the war and decided Hungary's fate.

Recently, newly discovered Turkish sources have shed more light on the history of Andrásy's mission. They revealed that both the Hungarian government and the Hungarian agents working in Constantinople in the summer of 1849 had a wider sphere of operation than supposed. In the face of the threat of an upcoming Russian intervention, Andrásy offered an anti-Russian Ottoman-Hungarian military alliance to the Porte on behalf of the Hungarian government, but under the circumstances the Ottoman leadership understandably could not deal with the issue seriously (Csorba, 2007: 47–60). The hitherto unknown sources introduced below fit into this historical framework.

The Struggle of the Caucasian Peoples Against the Russian Empire

The region never played a significant role in international politics up until the second half of the 16th century, as neither did the neighbouring countries show any particular interest in it, nor were there conflicts serious enough to turn the mountains into a military zone. However, when Ivan IV occupied the Astrakhan Khanate in 1556, sweeping changes occurred: the Caucasus gained more prominence in the eyes of the neighbouring countries such as the Ottoman Empire, the Crimean Khanate, Turkestan, Russia, the Nogay

³For Gyula Andrásy see: Simányi, 1990; For the 1849 mission to Constantinople see: Hermann, 1990: 43–55.

Horde and Persia. None of these powers were interested in the mountains so poor in mineral resources, but rather in the many important trade and military routes crossing the territory. For Moscow the conquest of the Caucasus meant that they were able to exercise stricter control over the Black Sea and open new routes to the Persian markets, and to India. Therefore, Russia tried to gradually seize control over the Caucasus from that time on. They employed various means to achieve their goals: military actions were combined with the construction of lines of new forts; settling people in the area; involving the local elite in the administration, and supporting Christian missions. All these resulted in a slow but steady advancement.

At the turn of the 17th and 18th century the Caucasus temporarily fell out of the focus of great power politics, for Russia had turned towards Europe while their main enemies with interests in the region, the Ottomans and the Crimean Tatars, had lost strength. No serious military operations took place in the mountains. At the same time, a rivalry between the Russians and the Ottomans for the Northern Caucasus started to take shape. While Christianity was losing prestige with the mountain tribes, Islam was spreading quickly in the western and central parts of the region laying the foundations for future religion-based wars. The other main characteristic of the period was the establishment of Cossack colonies at an increased pace at the eastern foot of the mountain range, thus ensuring a sustained Russian rule over the occupied territories.

The end of the 18th century witnessed new changes. With the fall of the Crimean Khanate (1783) the road to the Caucasus opened up, while the very same area became the main line of defence for the Ottomans against Russian advancement. Tsarist troops systematically invaded the plains in the forefront of the mountains and penetrated deeply into the valleys. The linguistically, socially and religiously heterogeneous tribes were unable to put up serious resistance, and what is more, following the end of the Napoleonic wars Russia was able to send exceptionally experienced troops and generals against them.

The Russo-Ottoman Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833 was an important turning point because it made the British aware how

threatening the situation was in the Middle East. The British government made every effort to regain and strengthen its weakened position in the Ottoman Empire and along the route to India. This policy included monitoring the regions in the scope of the Russian expansion (the Caucasus among others), and both open and covert political agitation in the area. The Russians were able to pacify the region only in 1922 after decades of war (Broxup, 1996: 1–4; Forsyth, 2013: *passim*; Puryear, 1935: 11–23).

From the beginning of the 19th century, the Northern-Caucasian tribes were going through a full-scale transformation. Simultaneously with the dissolution of the traditional feudalistic tribal society, Islam was gaining grounds also due to the adversary feelings towards the Christian Russian conquerors. The modern history of Circassian-Russian conflicts, relevant to the topic of the current paper, started in 1763 with tsarist troops setting up an outpost in Mozdok, and ended in 1864 with the deportation of the almost all Circassian population. The Russians pressed forward gradually in the Caucasus and established a governorate in the area in 1785. The Ottomans also tried to fortify their position by the construction and extension of the Anapa fort, which had become the starting point of the political and trading relations in the north-west Caucasus.⁴ In the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus from Anapa to Poti was transferred into Russian sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the Circassian territories had never been under direct Ottoman rule, and the Circassians always claimed that the Ottomans did not have the right to hand over these lands to a third party. The British diplomats were of the same opinion (King, 2008: 52; Puryear, 1935: 28–29). Nevertheless, the Circassians immediately took steps to alter the clauses of the Treaty of Adrianople that concerned them. In November 1830 they decided to send a delegation led by Sefer Bey Zanoko to Constantinople. The Sublime Porte instigated them to resist the Russians, but the Circassians did not get anything apart from high-sounding words. Later fifteen old cannons and some gunpowder arrived with a couple of artillery

⁴ Forsyth, 2013: 285–286. Fedakâr, 2009: 46–48. The Anapa fort changed hands several times during the forthcoming Russo-Ottoman wars.

officers to teach the Circassians how to handle the cannons. Sefer however remained in the Ottoman capital and became the leader of the Circassian diplomacy.⁵ The Circassians sent another delegation to Constantinople in 1833, which also made a visit to the British embassy. From then on the Circassian-British relations started to intensify. In 1838 even Queen Victoria and the British parliament received a Circassian delegation, which showed that the British started to recognise the possible consequences of the occupation of the Caucasus by the tsarist troops: the Russian advancement opened up the road to Persia and India (Köremezli, 2004: 21-36.)

At the beginning of the 19th century the Russians had gained significant strategic advantages in the Caucasus. Several forts had already been built earlier along the coast of the Black Sea, but by that time they had succeeded in setting up such a strong military line that enabled them to isolate the Circassians from the other states (the Ottoman Empire and England) on the sea. Thus the coastline got under their control, rendering trade more difficult. The Circassians kept trying to break through this line in the following years, and indeed managed to occupy and hold some of the forts for longer periods of time (Forsyth, 2013: 291; Yediç, 1991: 55–91; Köremezli, 2004: 41–44).

The Activities of the Polish Émigrés in the Caucasus

Not surprisingly, the Polish emigration was not indifferent to either the region or the struggle of the various tribes against the Russians. They considered them natural allies. On the one hand, it was believed that the fighting in the region could bog down significant forces in case of an armed rebellion in Poland. On the other hand, 25 to 30 thousand Polish soldiers might have been in the service of the tsarist army in the Caucasus due to forced recruitments following the 1830 Polish uprising (*Widzsal passim*). It was one of the reasons why Count Adam Czartoryski, leader of the Polish emigration, turned his attention to the Caucasian mountaineers from 1834 onwards. He realised that the freedom fight of the

⁵ Mufti, 1944: 204–205; For Sefer Bey and the delegations see: Khoon, 2014: 74–94, Köremezli, 2004: 21, Yağcı, 2016: 60–68.

Circassians and other peoples not only tired out and divided the Russian military forces but also strengthened the base of the emigration with the mass desertion of the Polish forced recruits. That is why in 1835 a Polish delegation made contact with the Circassians in the Caucasus. This co-operation outlasted even Czarotorski's death (Kukiel, 1955: 235; MNK Czarotorskich Ew. 1257; Köremezli, 2004: 39).

Initially the locals treated the deserted Poles the same as other prisoners of war and sold them as slaves. The first agents of the Polish emigration in Paris handled these incidents trying to pay ransom for them (Kukiel, 1955: 248). However, soon the mountaineers also realised that the Polish officers, especially those with engineering and artillery skills, were able to contribute greatly to the improvement of the less-organised tribal troops; hence they accepted their services. In addition, the deserters provided immensely valuable information about the position and reinforcements of the Russian army, and the weak points of the forts. (Köremezli, 2004: 36–39; Temizkan, 2009: 88–93; Captain Jesse, 1841: 272–273). In 1836 Spencer noted that hundreds of Poles were fighting on the side of the Circassians. The Poles were so popular that several of their national songs had been translated into Circassian, and the locals sang these songs with enthusiasm similar to their own war chants (Spencer II, 1837: 417–418). Even the Ottomans themselves sent many Polish emigrants to Circassia, who - already ardent Turcophiles behaving and dressing in oriental style - also strengthened the resistance (Brock, 1956: 450).

The new Polish Caucasus policy started in 1841 with the arrival of Michael [Czajka] Czajkowski⁶ in Constantinople. It was planned that

⁶ Czajkowski, [Czajka] Michael (1804–1886). Emigrated after the suppression of the 1831 Polish uprising and joined Count Adam Czarotorski's camp. From 1841 to 1850, he was the count's agent in Constantinople, and joined in 1850 the Turkish service, converted into Islam, and changed his name to Sadık Pasha. Broke with Czarotorski due to personality differences during the Crimean War, he surrendered himself to the Russian Tsar Alexander II in 1873 and settled down in Ukraine. See Pekacz, 2006. In the Hungarian sources Czajkowski's name is used in the shorter form: Czajka.

at the time of the outbreak of the Polish uprising, one part of the Dobrujan Cossacks would have been pulled back to Podole and the other to the Caucasus to fight against the Russians. They believed that the Caucasian peoples and the Cossacks together would be able to occupy some parts of Russia, and launch sweeping changes in the country. All these were intended to be arranged by a Polish mission in the Caucasus. After the war the Cossacks would have established an independent state along the Don, which would have supported the Polish freedom fight. Also, several independent states could have been born in the Caucasus. However, these grandiose and unrealistic plans were not supported by the Porte, if they even knew about them at all (Widerszal).

In 1843 the delegates of Count Czartoryski carried out successful negotiations with Imam Shamil, legendary leader of the North-eastern Caucasian resistance, which resulted in the improvement of the conditions of the Polish war prisoners and deserters (MNK Czartoryskich Ew. 1257). There is a well-known account from 1846 of a serious Circassian attack against a Russian fort led by a Polish officer, which resulted in the decoration of every surviving Russian soldier by the Russian Army. According to the Circassians, the Polish officer died due to the failure of the attack – it was not revealed who killed him (Ditson, 1850: 195). In 1847 another Polish agent tried to gather information about the situation in the region. It was when the idea of sending military experts of different fields to the Caucasian region to help the local forces was proposed (MNK Czartoryskich Ew. 1257).⁷

At the end of the 1840s Circassia witnessed important changes. In 1846 Shamil sent one of his right-hand men, Muhammad Amin to the Circassians to help unite those tribal forces which were fighting against the Russians. At the end of January 1849 Muhammad Amin conferred with the Circassian chieftains, who then declared their main aim: the unification of all Circassians under the flag of Islam. As a result, serious conflicts broke out between Muslim and non-Muslim tribes, but finally Muhammad Amin succeeded in achieving the co-operation of the various tribes. Although he could not

⁷ On the more detailed history of the Polish activities on the period see: Temizkan, 2010: 365-380.

practice full control over them, he led the Circassian resistance for a decade (Mufti, 1944: 206–211; Köremezli, 2004: 46–48; Yediç, 1991: 91–93). They launched more than a hundred raids against the Russian forces in 1849, and led several attacks on the forts of Anapa and Soğucak but lacking heavy artillery they realised they had no chance to capture them, they pulled back. Nevertheless, they kept on trying to disturb the Russian supply lines (Taştekin). On one occasion in 1849, more than two hundred soldiers escaped from the Russian army to join the mountaineers, taking cannons with them (Temizkan, 2009: 89). According to Czajka, in May 1849, twelve thousand Circassian horsemen attacked and captured the fortress of Sotcha Kale (Soğucak) under the command of Shamil and Sefer's two agents. The death toll was one hundred on their side, while the Russians reportedly lost 3.700 lives, but there is an obvious exaggeration. Besides, the Circassians seized 160 guns and several other armaments. Czayka noted that if the information was true, the Russians were forced to send significant reinforcements to the region (MNK Czartoryskich 5426/IV. No. 17; and 5372. No. 72).

It is noteworthy that in Hungary there was knowledge about and reaction to the anti-Russian fights of the Circassians. This is attested by the letter of Colonel Josef Kohlmann written to Kázmér Batthyány, Minister of Foreign Affairs on 3 June 1849:

Hearing that Russia is mobilising against Hungary, the Turks sent agents from Ferbisont [correctly: Trebizond, today's Trabzon –Gy. Cs.] to the Circassians, and the [Circassians] started rioting. They laid a successful siege to the fortress of Solcha, 1800 Russians remained and 60 fell prisoner to the Circassians. If this diversion becomes more serious, Russia will be forced to send its best forces there (Füzes, 1999: 227).

Kohlmann might have received the information from the Polish agents operating also in Délvidék (the Southern Reaches) about a month after the occurrences. Also, the papers of the period were eager to publish any news about the Circassians since any event, which might weaken the Russian influence - and indirectly that of Austria's, gave hope to the Hungarians.

The Plan of an Anti-Russian Alliance in the Caucasus in 1849

The above-mentioned two letters, which are kept in the archives of Topkapı Palace Museum in Istanbul, shed light on the events. The dating of the first one is a bit confusing in the sense that the letter in the Turkish archives is dated 3 September, however, the same document in the Polish emigration archives bears the date 1 July, 1849 (TSMA Fr. E. 263; MNK Czarторыських rkp. 5427/IV. No.30). The latter also reveals the person of the author: Czaykowski, Count Czartoryski's representative in Istanbul, who offers an opinion about the Hungarian question. We also learn that that the letter arrived in Paris on 4 August. It is possible that Czayka passed this letter to the Ottoman authorities later, and thus he dated it closer to the submitting.

In Czayka's opinion, the Ottoman foreign policy had to be influenced in a way that it supported the Hungarian cause. Russia was the enemy of both countries and an eventual Russian victory might have led to the invasion of the neighbouring areas of Hungary, and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. While England and France were neither capable of nor willing to support the Ottomans, those two hundred thousand Hungarians striving for their independence were also fighting for the Ottoman Empire. Instead of offering a mere nominal espousal, he encouraged the Ottomans to remain officially neutral and thus recognise the Hungarian government. This step could be well explained with the necessity of maintaining the safety of the Empire.⁸ At that time the only way for Hungary to have contact with the outside world was through Turkey, which could consider supporting Hungarians in secret. The letter also touches the issue of the revitalisation of the Circassian movement to assist the Hungarians and Poles, and helping the preparations for a Polish uprising. These two manoeuvres should be carried out carefully without discrediting the Porte - however they could not be implemented without the knowledge and tacit approval of the Ottoman government. Czayka opined that any money invested in this way served the empire's interests better than financing the

⁸ According to international law, neutrality can only come in force if the given party recognises the warring sides. Kardos, 1997: 533.

maintenance of the Ottoman troops in the occupied Principalities. Finally he declared that acting accordingly the Sultan would not only be an active ally of Hungary, Poland and the Caucasus but also their guardian (TSMA Fr. E. 263).

The other letter dated 10 August about the revolutionising of Circassia is actually a proposal for a Circassian-Polish-Hungarian cooperation. The address is missing from the copy of the document but most probably it was also written by Czayka. Its contextual references explain the dating problem of the first letter. The author was visited by three Circassian men who told him that the total lack of leadership and organisation was making the Circassians' fight useless. They did not trust in the British and French help any more, but the Hungarian revolution had raised hope in them and in case some conditions were fulfilled, the Circassians could be called to arms. The plan was to send Sefer Bey to Circassia together with a Hungarian envoy and ten Polish officers. There he would unite all Circassian tribes under his command. The Hungarian delegate would address the Circassians and the Tartars on behalf of his own nation, while the Poles would lead the military operations, and - at the same time - try to convince their compatriots and Cossacks fighting in the Russian army to desert. It would serve the Hungarian cause effectively, facilitate the break-out of a Polish rebellion and provide the Ottoman government with serious benefits in the region.

Sefer Bey was to be spirited out without compromising the Ottomans' precarious diplomatic position, similarly the foreign officers were to avoid using Ottoman documents and travel with their own passports. The meeting point must be somewhere on the coast of the Black Sea where light ships could be built. The letter also gives details about the costs: 60 thousand piasters for the purchase of 3 ships, 12 thousand for the payment to three Circassians, 18 thousand for the wages of the 18 sailors, 6 thousand for 6 chasers, 15 thousand piasters for purchasing 100 rifles, 100 thousand piasters for the costs of Sefer Bey's men and finally 200 thousand piasters for the equipment, journey and wages of the Polish officers, including 18-22 thousand piasters for the purchase of maps, books and other equipment. According to the calculation of the Circassians, the total

sum would add up to 600 thousand piasters,⁹ but in exchange 60 thousand Circassians would stand in arms to prevent the Russians from accomplishing their plans in connection with the Ottoman Empire. For the sake of success, taking immediate action was of paramount importance, even without waiting for the outcome of the Hungarian-Russian fight (TSMA Fr. E. 262).

To sum up, at an alleged Polish suggestion, some Circassians - in return for serious financial support - were willing to unite all Circassian tribes (60 thousand fighters) under Sefer Bey's command who would hold up and divide the Russian forces with the help of the Polish officers. Thus the Hungarians would get the chance to successfully hold against the common enemy, the Tsarist troops. Also, it would enhance the settling of the Polish question, while the Ottoman Empire could strengthen its position against the Russian expansion.

However, this idealistic plan was doomed to failure for many reasons right at the moment of its birth. The Hungarian army had already been defeated by the Austrian and Russian forces at the time of the second letter. Therefore, by the time the action could have been started, the Circassian leadership might have been informed about the fall of the Hungarian war of liberation. Without an external ally, it would have been even more difficult to unite the already divided tribes to enter into a fight together. It is doubtful whether the Ottoman leadership could have been convinced to support the idea of a Caucasian action, risking serious conflict with Russia. Considering the antecedents, the answer is probably no, though there are currently no known resources on the Porte's standpoint. Also, the promise in connection with a 60 thousand strong army seems to be exaggerated. Similarly, they underestimated the capability and skills of the experienced Russian troops. Some years later during the Crimean War, these troops were able to keep the Caucasus under control effectively and to win in offensive operations over the Ottomans who greatly outnumbered

⁹ Pamuk, Ş. Prices and Wages in the Ottoman Empire, 1469–1914. For reference, the daily wage of an unskilled worker in Istanbul was on average 717.2 akçe between 1840-49. This equals to roughly 6 kuruş (piaster) [1 kuruş = 120 akçe].

them (Allen and Muratoff, 1953: 57–102; Badem, 2010: 99–288). Moreover, we should not overlook the conflicts among the Circassian tribes, which were not only about religion (Muslim vs non-Muslim) but - in addition to the former –but also about power (Muhammad Amin vs local leaders & Sefer Bey). The appearance of a handful of Hungarians and Poles would not have settled this question.

Considering the reality and logic of the plan, the insightful comment of the Serbian historian Milorad Ekmečić has to be quoted here: “the Poles had eyes for a single European issue in which there would be only two significant factors. One was always the Polish, and the other, whichever nation had momentous events going on at the time”(16).

Although the planned cooperation was not realised in 1849, during and after the Crimean War several Hungarian emigrants of 1848-1849 fought on the side of the Circassians against the Russians. Bu this would never amount to what the grandiose plans for an alliance would entail.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allen, W. E. D. and Muratoff, P. (1953), *Caucasian Battlefields: A History of the Wars on the Turco-Caucasian Border, 1828–1921*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Badem, C. (2010), *The Ottoman Crimean War (1853–1856)*, Leiden: Brill.

Bona, G. (ed.) (1999), *The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence, 1848–1849. A Military History*. Highland Lakes, New Jersey: Boulder, Atlantic Research and Publication.

Brock, P. (1956), "The Fall of Circassia: A Study in Private Diplomacy". *The English Historical Review*, 71. 280, 401-427.

Broxup, M. B. (1996), "Introduction: Russia and the North Caucasus". In: *The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World*. Ed. Broxup, Marie Benningsen. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Captain Jesse (1841), *Notes of a half-pay in search of health: or, Russia, Circassia, and the Crimea in 1849–40*. London: James Madden and Co.

Csorba G. (2015), "Kísérletek az önálló magyar konzulátusok létrehozására Keleten 1848-ban", *Keletkutatás, ősz*, 131–144.

.....(2007), "Egy török–magyar szövetség ajánlata 1849-ből", in Róbert Hermann and Péter Zakar (eds), *A források bővületében. Ünnepi tanulmányok Katona Tamás 75.születésnapjára*, Szeged: Belvedere Meridionale, 47–60.

Pekacz, J. T. "Czajkowski, Michal Sadyk Pasha.", *Encyclopedia of 1848 Revolutions*. <http://www.ohio.edu/chastain/ac/czajkow.htm>. Web. 06. January 2016.

Deák, I. (2001), *The Lawful Revolution: Louis Kossuth and the Hungarians, 1848–1849*, London: Phoenix Press.

Ditson, G. L. (1850), *Circassia: or, a Tour to the Caucasus*. New York: Stringer & Townsend.

Ekmečić, M. (1987), "Garašanin, Czartoryski köre és a magyarok 1848–1849-ben", in István Fried (ed.) *Szerbek és magyarok a Duna mentén II. Tanulmányok a szerb–magyar kapcsolatok köréből 1848–1867*, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. 13–111.

Fedakâr, C. (2009), "1787-1791 Osmanlı-Rus Savaşı Öncesi Kuzey Kafkasların Tahkimi: Anapa Kalesi", *Karadeniz*, 1. 4, 43-51.

Forsyth, J. (2013), *The Caucasus. A History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Füzes, M. (1999), Batthyány Kázmér gróf dilemmája (A magyar külpolitika alternatívái 1849 április–júliusában), *Baranya, Emlékszám az 1848-49-es forradalom és szabadságharc tiszteletére 1998–1999*. Pécs: Baranya Megyei Levéltár, 203–235

Hermann, R. (1990), “A szép akasztott” Andrassy Gyula 1848–1849-es szerepéről”, *Hadtörténelmi Közlemények*, 103. 4, 3–55.

Kardos, G. (1997), “A semlegesség jogának változásai”, *Jogtudományi Közlöny*, 52. 12, 533–539.

Khoon, Y. (2015), “Prince Of Circassia”: Sefer Bey Zanuho and the Circassian Struggle For Independence, *Journal of Caucasian Studies*, 1. 1, 73-97.

King, Ch. (2008), *The Ghost of Freedom. A History of the Caucasus*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Kosáry, D. (2003), *Hungary and international politics in 1848-1849*, New York: Columbia Univ. Press.

Köremezli, İ. (2004), *The Place of the Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Circassian War (1830–1864)*. MA Thesis. Ankara: Bilkent University.

Kukiel, M. (1955), *Czartoryski and European Unity 1770–1861*, New Jersey: Princeton.

Muzeum Narodowe w Krakowie Biblioteka (MNK) Czartoryskich Ew. 1257. Copy in National Archives of Hungary (MNL OL), Budapest Mf. 8370; 5426/IV. No. 17, Copy in MNL OL Mf. 8851; rkp. 5427/IV. No. 30, Copy in MNL OL Mf. 8852; 5372.No. 72, Copy in MNL OL Mf. 8372.

Mufti, S. (1944), *Heroes and Emperors in Circassian History*. Beirut: Librairie du Liban.

Pamuk, Ş. (2016), *Prices and Wages in the Ottoman Empire, 1469–1914*. pierre-marteau.com. 3 January.

Puryear, V. J. (1935), *International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East*, London: Humphrey Milford.

Simányi, T. (1990), *Julius Graf Andrassy. Baumeister der Doppelmonarchie, Mitstreiter Bismarcks*, Wien: ÖBV.

Spencer, E. (1837), *Travels in Circassia, Krim Tartary, &c including a steam voyage down the Danube, from Vienna to Constantinople and round the Black Sea, in 1836*. London: Henry Colburn, II.

Taştekin, F., *Kafkasya'da nüfus savaşları*. http://www.circassiancenter.com/cc-turkiye/tarih/074_kafkasyada_nufuz_savaslari.htm Web. 06. Jan. 2016.

Temizkan, A. (2009), "19. Yüzyılda Çarlık Rusya'sının Kafkas Ordusu'nda Lehistanlılar", *Karadeniz Araştırmaları*, 20. Kış, 73-95.

Temizkan, A. (2010), "Lehistanlıların İstanbul'da lobi faaliyetleri ve Kafkasya'ya lejyon gönderme girişimleri", *Türklük Bilimi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 28, Güz. 363-393.

Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi Arşivi, İstanbul, Fransız Evrak 262, 263.

Widerszal, L. (2009). *19. yüzyıl Kafkasya Direnişinde Avrupalıların rolü*. Çev: Kumuk, C. (Bu kaynağa http://www.bkd.org.tr/tarih_ac.asp?id=1 adresinden erişilebilir), 28 October.

Yağcı, Z. G. (2016), "Kuzey Kafkasya'nın Uluslararası Lideri: Sefer Zaniko", *bilig*, 76. Kış, 59-85.

Yediç, B. Ö. (1991), *Çerkesya Kronolojisi*, Ankara.