

-RESEARCH ARTICLE-

**THE EU'S "DEMOCRACY PROMOTION" POLICIES IN UKRAINE AND GEORGIA: IS IT A NORMATIVE COVER IN FRONT OF THE EU-RUSSIA TUG-OF-LOVE?\***

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**Abstract**

*The EU democracy promotion literature mainly focuses either on its ways and tools in promoting democracy with successes and failures, or on the role of authoritarian actors with countervailing measures in impeding on the democratization paths of target states. Yet, a rare of studies examines what the EU actually promotes and with which underlying motivations. This article suggests that the EU democracy promotion is not just an outcome of bilateral relations between the EU and target states but an outcome of interdependent strategic interests of the EU, target country and illiberal regional power. Thus, it is shaped by not only the EU's normative ideals and local needs as it declared but mostly the interrelated clash of interests between different actors in the region. The main argument of this study is that the EU's differentiated democracy promotion agendas in target countries, which are very similar in terms of their local contexts or in the same region, stems from the presence of illiberal regional power(s), who has certain actorness in that region. Based upon this argument, this study explores the EU's differentiated democracy promotion agendas in Ukraine and Georgia and the role of illiberal regional power -here Russia-, who has certain leverage over these states. By examining the periodical differentiation in the EU's democracy promotion agendas towards Ukraine and Georgia, it concludes that the EU has changed its democracy promotion agendas depending on the changes in bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine/Georgia.*

**Keywords:** *EU Democracy Promotion Policies, Ukraine, Georgia, Russia, Illiberal Regional Power.*

**JEL Codes:** *C12, C80, F5.*

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## AB'NİN UKRAYNA VE GÜRCİSTAN'DAKİ DEMOKRASİ TEŞVİKİ POLİTİKALARI: AB-RUSYA VELAYET SAVAŞLARI ÖNÜNDEKİ NORMATİF KILIF MI?<sup>2</sup>

### Öz

*AB demokrasi teşviki literatürü, esas olarak, demokrasiyi teşvik etme yollarının ve araçlarının başarı ve başarısızlıkları ya da hedef devletlerin demokratikleşme yollarını engellemede otoriter aktörlerin rolüne odaklanmaktadır. Ancak, AB'nin gerçekte neyi desteklediğini ve altında yatan motivasyonları inceleyen çok az sayıda çalışma vardır. Bu makale, AB demokrasi teşviki politikalarının yalnızca AB ile hedef devletler arasındaki ikili ilişkilerin bir sonucu olmadığını, aynı zamanda AB'nin, hedef ülkenin ve liberal olmayan bölgesel gücün birbirine bağımlı stratejik çıkarlarının bir sonucu olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Bu nedenle, demokrasi teşviki politikaları, sadece AB'nin deklare ettiği gibi normatif idealler ve yerel ihtiyaçlar tarafından değil, aynı zamanda bölgedeki farklı aktörler arasındaki çıkar çatışmaları tarafından da şekillenmektedir. Bu çalışmanın temel argümanı, AB'nin yerel bağlamları açısından birbirine çok benzeyen ya da aynı bölge içindeki hedefülkelerde farklılaştırılmış demokrasi teşviki politikalarının, o bölgede belirli bir güce sahip liberal olmayan bölgesel güçlerin varlığından kaynaklandığıdır. Bu argümana dayanarak, bu çalışma AB'nin Ukrayna ve Gürcistan'daki farklılaştırılmış demokrasi teşviki politikalarını ve bu devletler üzerinde belirli bir etkisi olan liberal olmayan bölgesel gücün -Rusya'nın- rolünü araştırıyor. AB'nin Ukrayna ve Gürcistan'a yönelik demokrasi teşviki politikalarının dönemsel farklılaşmasını inceleyerek, bu farklılaşmanın, Rusya ile Ukrayna ya da Rusya ile Gürcistan arasındaki ikili ilişkilerdeki değişikliklere bağlı olarak değiştiği sonucuna varıyor.*

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** AB Demokrasi Teşviki Politikaları, Ukrayna, Gürcistan, Rusya, Liberal Olmayan Bölgesel Güç.

**JEL Kodları:** C12, C80, F5.

“Bu çalışma Araştırma ve Yayın Etiğine uygun olarak hazırlanmıştır.”

### 1. INTRODUCTION

Following the end of the Cold War, the EU has emerged as one of the leading democracy promoters in the world. While in the very beginning, democracy promotion has only been achieved through annexation of democracy clauses in treaties with third parties as conditionality and as a part of its development aid strategies, the scope of democracy promotion policies has expanded over time. Indeed, the EU's institutional transformation due to deepening and widening processes has also contributed to the expansion of the scope of democracy promotion policies. Yet, the turning point has been realized immediately after the largest round

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<sup>2</sup> Genişletilmiş Türkçe Özet, makalenin sonunda yer almaktadır.

of enlargement –called as “big-bang enlargement”- in 2004. The successful transition of the Central and Eastern European countries to democracy/democratic institutions during their accession process and adoption of the EU *acquis communautaire* has increased the EU’s commitment in democracy promotion policies across other contexts and regions. Yet, at the same time, the need to construct more coherent regional policy has become turned an imperative and the ensuing EU democracy promotion policies and tools have been transformed in parallel with the developments in the EU Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)<sup>3</sup> in 2003.

On the one side of the coin, commonalities of the partner states in the framework of ENP such as high degree of instability, their transition path to democracy and less developed economies, have paved the way for constructing democracy promotion policies in more comprehensive and institutionalized framework with the aim of building a “ring of friends”<sup>4</sup>. By tying political reforms with economic, financial and trade incentives such as increasing funds, deepening trade relations with several sectoral support, and visa liberalization, the EU aimed to promote democracy, respecting human rights and the rule of law in its neighbourhood countries. On another side, new borders and the neighbourhood have posed new security challenges such as terrorism, organized crime and illegal trafficking, which limited the EU’s normative commitment to promote democracy. Thus, the EU must change its democracy promotion policies in which these security perceptions would be at the center. Since then, not only normative ideals to export these European values, but also geostrategic and security considerations have been built into the EU democracy promotion policies.

In this new context, the EU has declared that it would start to apply “tailor-made”<sup>5</sup> democracy promotion agendas towards different countries depending on local needs and interests of target state. Yet, empirical evidences have revealed that the EU has applied different democracy promotion policies towards the target countries even with very similar domestic political, historical and social backgrounds in the same region. Thus, this research has arisen out of the question: Why does the EU democracy promotion agendas differ for target countries in the same region with similar domestic conditions?

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<sup>3</sup> ENP includes the EU’s Eastern neighbours – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine- and Southern neighbours – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. For further information, please see: "European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)". EEAS - European External Action Service - European Commission. Accessed 23 February 2022. [https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp\\_en](https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en).

<sup>4</sup>Speech by Dr. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy at Press Conference to launch first seven Action Plans under the European Neighbourhood Policy, Brussels, 9 December 2004. Accessed 13 June 2021. [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH\\_04\\_529](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_04_529)

<sup>5</sup> “Tailor-made” instruments were first mentioned in *Council Conclusions on Democracy Support in the EU’s External Relations* with this statement: “Locally driven processes can be supported by an appropriate mix of financial and political instruments tailored to the specific situation of each country.” *Brussels*, 17 November 2009, available at: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/111250.pdf)

To answer this question, two steps should be taken: first, it is necessary to grasp what the EU promotes and with which underlying motivations. When examined the studies in the EU democracy promotion literature, it is clear that studies on the substance of EU democracy promotion are very rare<sup>6</sup>, while a bulk of works mainly focuses on either comparative analysis of democracy promoters' tools and strategies or the impact of these policies on the target states' democratization paths as evaluation of possible outcomes (Carothers, 1997; Ayers, 2008; Risse, 2009). In a same line, recently, some groups of scholars analyze how authoritarian states possess challenges on democracy promotion efforts and democratization process in the region on which they have interests and certain presence (Ambrosio, 2009; Babayan, 2015; Tolstrup 2014; Chen and Kinzelbach, 2015; Vanderhill, 2015; Yakouchyk, 2015). Second, the research should have at least two very similar target countries examined in the same framework or in region towards which the EU differs its democracy promotion policies. To reveal the variation among the EU democracy promotion policies, this study has chosen two country cases from post-Soviet space: Ukraine and Georgia for following reasons. First, the EU's approach for democracy promotion toward cases can be examined into the same framework "Eastern Partnership"<sup>7</sup>, which determines the policy framework of relations. The EU has similar instruments -carrots and sticks- and similar objectives in terms of democracy promotion for these countries. Second, there is at least one strong illiberal regional power -Russia-, who has certain leverage over Georgia and Ukraine. Lastly, these cases are so similar in terms of their historical background, Soviet legacy, domestic conditions and so on.

The following sub-sections first re-examines the conceptual and theoretical background of EU democracy promotion by specifically focusing on key questions of what/why the EU promotes. Second, it focuses on Wetzel and Orbie's model of embedded liberal democracy as the main conceptual framework chosen for this study to understand the variation in the substance of EU democracy promotion. Yet, it discusses some shortcomings, which are to be dealt with the adaptations offered. Lastly, based on analytical eclectic standpoint, it develops a set of hypotheses, which are tested throughout this study.

### **1.1. Literature Review: Re-examining the Conceptual and Theoretical Underpinnings of EU Democracy Promotion**

The principles of human rights and democracy have always been intrinsic values of European project since the inception of European integration. The EU has always been keen to promote these so-called "European values" within and outside its borders. Yet, unlike the concept of human rights identified within the framework of

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<sup>6</sup> Some studies on the substance of EU democracy promotion are: Anne Wetzel, Jan Orbie and Fabienne Bossuyt, "One of What Kind? Comparative Perspectives on the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.28, No.1, 2015. Vera Axyonova and Fabienne Bossuyt, "Mapping the Substance of the EU's Civil Society Support in Central Asia: From Neo-liberal to State-led Civil Society", *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 3, September 2016.

<sup>7</sup> The EU has differentiated its policy framework for Eastern partners i.e., Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan included in the ENP.

international human rights law<sup>8</sup>, the notion of democracy has remained vague and ambiguous in the EU context. Indeed, this ambiguity manifests itself even in the individual member states' approach for democracy promotion such as while Sweden gives short and concise definition of democracy identified as a kind of representative democracy in policy documents, France and Germany present no clear description of democracy but instead use the notion of governance (European Partnership for Democracy, 2019:10). These different and inconsistent visions of member states on democracy and democracy support may impede on the construction of clear and single definition of democracy at the EU level. That's why there are different visions on what the EU promotes abroad as some scholars argue that the EU's democracy promotion strategies are technocratic (Youngs and Pishchikova, 2010; Hout, 2010), others claim that the main thrust for these activities is for the promotion of market economy (Wetzel and Orbie, 2012:2). In addition, it is suggested that lack of concrete definition of democracy enables the EU to pursue more flexible democracy promotion agenda that can be shaped in accordance with the specific circumstances and strategic interests (Wetzel and Orbie, 2012:3). It seems that the EU has intentionally maintained the concept of democracy vague. As Kurki (2012:3) argues, the EU recognizes the multiple models of democracy and does not choose a specific kind, which makes its democracy promotion policies as "diversity-accommodating and complexity-appreciating." Yet, this blurriness in the conceptual framework of democracy promotion policies is criticized as a challenge to understand what the EU promotes and to measure how these policies are effective.


As scholars in general have agreed upon that the EU promotes "liberal democracy" abroad (Carothers, 1997; Ayers, 2008; Risse, 2009; Kurki, 2010), we need to have all-encompassing definition of liberal democracy, which makes the analysis of EU democracy promotion policies more structured. One of the most prominent works is the study of Linz and Stepan (1996) titled as "Toward Consolidated Democracies". According to Linz and Stepan (1996), there are three minimal conditions i.e. stateness, a completed democratic transition and a government that rules democratically, for new political systems to be considered as consolidated democracy. Following this study, Wolfgang Merkel (2004) introduced the theoretical framework of "embedded democracy" by adding new defining features of consolidated liberal democracies - embedded democracies as he calls- such as electoral regime, civil rights, political liberties, horizontal accountability and effective power to govern. By adapting the model of Linz and Stepan (1996) and Merkel (2004), Wetzel and Orbie (2015) developed a new all-encompassing framework titled "model of embedded liberal democracy" including five partial regimes: "a democratic electoral regime, political rights of participation, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and the guarantee that the effective power to govern lies in the hands of democratically elected representatives" and four external conditions that shape the environment for enabling and stabilizing democratic governance: "stateness, state administrative capacity, civil

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<sup>8</sup> Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 was a milestone document to set a common standard for all peoples and nations.

society and socio-economic requisites.” Table 1 below illustrates the main components of model of embedded liberal democracy.

**Table 1. The Concept of Embedded Liberal Democracy**



**Source:** (Wetzel and Orbie, 2015:5)


As the main component of embedded liberal democracy, Wetzel and Orbie (2015) puts electoral regime in the center. Yet, the scholars underline that right to vote is crucial but there should be other political rights and liberties that make a political regime liberal democracy such as freedom of speech, press freedom, the right to association and so on. In addition, civil rights are also considered as crucial in this framework as it is an important component of the rule of law, that is, to limit the exercise of the state power, and the equality before the law. Another partial regime is defined as horizontal accountability, which means that the actions of elected

authorities are defined constitutionally and checked by autonomous institutions. The last partial regime is effective power to govern, which implies that elected representatives are subject to democratic accountability.

Furthermore, there are also external conditions illustrated in the periphery of the partial regimes that shape the “environment that encompasses, enables, and stabilizes the democratic regime” (Merkel, 2004:44). The first external factor that enables the consolidation of democracy is stateness defined as “the ability of the state to pursue the monopoly of legitimate physical force” and the “monopolistic control in a basic military, legal and fiscal sense” (Wetzel and Orbie, 2015:7). The second external condition is state administrative capacity, which implies that capable administration including the component of good governance. The third one is the presence of civil society, which is highly critical for democracy consolidation and the effectiveness of EU’s bottom-up democracy promotion policies. Socio-economic context is another external condition based on studies emphasizing the relationship between economic development and the democracy (Ingelhart and Welzel, 2009).

According to the different emphasis on these partial regimes and conditions, Wetzel and Orbie suggest that the EU has five different options of democracy promotion agendas. These five options are titled as full agenda, broad agenda, narrow agenda, shallow agenda, and empty agenda that are illustrated in the Figure 1 Each conceptualization of agendas signifies that the EU focuses on different components of embedded liberal democracy in its democracy promotion strategies. Nevertheless, it should be underlined that, as the scholars did, the terms “narrow” or “shallow” do not necessarily imply that such EU agendas are worse than the others. Rather, it implies that EU ignores or does not prefer to focus on partial regimes in democracy promotion agendas. For example, in some countries where democracy or at least partial regimes of democracy is advanced such as in Brazil or in Israel, the EU prefers to follow shallow agenda rather than broad agenda.

**Figure 1. EU Democracy Promotion Agendas**



**Source:** (Wetzel and Orbie, 2015:9)

Among these five possible types of democracy promotion agendas, broad agenda signifies the situation that the EU supports all partial regimes as well as external

conditions mentioned above. The EU's democracy promotion agendas toward countries in its enlargement process are given as examples to this category, as shown in the EU's democracy promotion in Turkey and Croatia starting from the 1990s until 2011. Full agenda, on the other hand, indicates the agenda in which the EU promotes all five partial regimes except the context conditions. The EU's democracy promotion in the Eastern enlargement is given as an example of liberal democracy promotion strategy since most of Central and Eastern countries had the basic criteria of liberal democracy when the EU had started to engage with them in the framework of enlargement. (Ridder 2015: 71-84) The third possible type – narrow agenda (Type III)- is “partial liberal democracy promotion” in which the EU focuses on some parts of partial regimes by neglecting the others, for example ‘electoralism’. The fourth possible type – shallow agenda (Type IV)- is defined as “external conditions democracy promotion” or “output oriented” in which the EU pays an attention to the improvement of external conditions while ignoring the partial regimes. Most of the studies on different country cases show that the “default substance” of EU democracy promotion is output oriented. The EU's democracy promotion in Tunisia and Egypt is given as an example of this type because the EU has focused on external conditions such as state administrative capacity and socio-economic development rather than partial regimes. (Reyneart, 2015:149-161) The last possible type – empty agenda (Type V)- is when the EU has no democracy promotion activity either for the partial regimes or for the context conditions. For example, some activities would not be considered as democracy promotion even though the EU prefers to label those activities as a part of its democracy promotion agenda. According to Wetzel and Orbie (2015:2), the EU's differentiated democracy promotion agenda among target states is based on four factors: i) the differences in power between EU and a target country; ii) EU internal institutional factors; iii) differences in the target countries' domestic contexts; iv) differences in the inter-organizational field in the third country.

As Wetzel and Orbie's model of embedded liberal democracy proposes both eclectic and comprehensive framework to understand and to compare different democracy promotion agendas, this study chooses to use it as an analytical framework. Yet, this model has certain limitations, which this study aims to overcome and fill the salient gap in the EU democracy promotion literature. First of all, scholars using this model have made a comparative analysis of 22 country cases and they have given a single title of EU democracy promotion agenda toward these country pairs in that study. However, there is one critical issue that should not be ignored: the EU democracy promotion policies differ not only between countries but also within one country at certain critical time periods (over time). One significant example is the EU's differentiated democracy promotion policies towards Tunisia before/after Arab Spring period. Therefore, by refraining to give a single title to the EU democracy promotion agenda toward a target state, this study tries to explore the timeframe in which there have been certain changes in agendas. Second limitation is that these four factors above that the scholars argue, are not capable enough to explain the substance of EU democracy promotion agendas towards the country cases with similar power asymmetries with the EU, similar domestic conditions, or in the same region. Considering these limitations, this study proposes a new argument and a variable on

this model. As the EU's normative practices are tied in a complex way with the interests of actors within and outside the EU system, the differentiated democracy promotion agendas are not only dependent on the four factors above but also on the presence of illiberal regional power. Thus, the main argument of this study is that illiberal regional powers affect directly/indirectly the substance of EU's democracy promotion.

Based on this assumption, this proposes two interrelated hypotheses:

*H1: The lower leverage that illiberal regional power has on the target country, the more the EU uses broader democracy promotion agenda or vice versa the higher leverage that illiberal regional power has on the target state, the less the EU uses broader agenda (or more shallow agenda).*

Dependency of target state on illiberal regional power may limit the EU's actorness or agency. Aid mechanism can be given as an example of similar logic. To what extent that illiberal regional power's leverage over target country is high, the EU's democracy promotion policies become as shallow. Because the EU tends towards more shallow democracy promotion policies such as supporting or improving the external conditions to facilitate the democracy consolidation in that region rather than implicit political engagements/interventions in domestic politics of target states such as observing elections.

Related to the first hypothesis, when the bilateral relations with target country and illiberal regional power deteriorates and turns into the conflicts due to clash of interests, the EU may benefit from political vacuum in the region since illiberal regional power becomes opponent now and target state is open and dependent to all EU incentives and support. Therefore, immediately after the conflicts between target states and illiberal regional power, the EU uses broader democracy promotion agendas.

*H2: When the relations with target country and illiberal regional power deteriorates and turns into the conflicts due to clash of interests, the EU uses broader democracy promotion agenda toward the target state.*

## **2. METHODOLOGY**

To test these hypotheses above and to reveal trilateral role of target country, the EU and the illiberal regional power in shaping the substance of EU democracy promotion policies, this study has used qualitative research methods yet predominantly focusing on content analysis as a methodological tool. Content analysis is a method designed to identify, to interpret meaning from the data collected and to draw realistic conclusions on it. Three key steps have been determined as a path of analysis. The first step was to examine critical turning points in the domestic politics of each country case i.e., Ukraine and Georgia, which have had certain imprints on their democratization process. The main goal was to find out whether the local conditions of target states shape the EU democracy promotion agendas. By using Bertelsmann

Transformation Index (BTI) data, democracy situation of each case was determined based on the path followed by Wetzel and Orbie (2015). Accordingly, the following items and questions of BTI surveys have been used to assess the single components of democracy.

- For ‘electoral regime’, the value of Q2.1,
- For ‘civil rights’, the value of Q3.4,
- For ‘political rights’, the average value of Q2.3 and Q2.4,
- For ‘horizontal accountability’, the average value of Q3.1 and Q3.2,
- For ‘effective power to govern’, the value of Q2.2,
  - o For ‘stateness’, the average value of Q1.1 and Q1.2,
  - o For ‘state capacity’, the average value of Q1.4 and Q15.3,
  - o For ‘civil society’, the average value of Q5.2 and Q16.4,
  - o For ‘socio-economic development’, the value of Q6.1

Based on the results of those questions above in BTI surveys, changes in values of partial regimes and context conditions over time were gathered. These values are important not only for the fact that indicates each state’s position in the democracy-autocracy spectrum, but also for enabling to test the argument whether the EU democracy promotion agendas is driven by local needs and deficiencies or not.

The second step was to examine bilateral relations of Ukraine and Georgia with Russia. Here again, the main intention was to analyze how Russia as an illiberal external actor affected both the internal and external affairs of these countries during period under analysis. The last step was to analyze the relations of each country case with the EU by specifically focusing on democracy promotion policies. In that part, an exhaustive qualitative assessment of the EU’s democracy promotion policy by focusing on key documents touching one or more parts of democracy promotion was concluded. Content analysis of key treaties, EU Strategic Papers towards Ukraine and Georgia since 1990s, Council Resolutions, Council’s and Commission’s Progress Reports, relevant communications, reports from EP officials, EU official statements as primary sources have been done with the support of qualitative data analysis software programme called Nvivo. These documents were categorized yearly and evaluated according to their focus on each component of embedded liberal democracy. Firstly, values were assigned regarding the EU’s implementation activities or declared objectives in those key documents analyzed in terms of each component of embedded liberal democracy (partial regimes and external conditions) on a scale ranging from ‘no or very minor attention’ (–), through ‘some’ (+) and ‘focused’ (++) , to ‘major’ (+++) attention. Then, the general framework indicating general tendencies over years in the substance of EU democracy promotion toward one target state was created. These country-specific frameworks facilitate not only to evaluate the differentiation of the EU democracy promotion toward a country over a

time span but also to compare two cases and to understand the role of Russia for these sharp changes in the EU democracy promotion policies.

In addition, news including critical statements of officials from both EU, target country and Russian side during and post-events (Rose Revolution in Georgia, Orange Revolution in Ukraine, August 2008 War between Georgia and Russia, Euromaidan events and so on.) and EU Parliamentary debates were also analyzed. This research was also supported by all indices such as Freedom House index, World Bank's Governance Indicators, BTI (Bertelsmann Transformation Index), the Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe (CoE) and other indices used in democracy promotion literature. These indices informed us about the specific features of domestic context such as socio-economic situation, the degree of freedom as well as democracy (-non) in each country, the level of stability of democratic institutions, rule of law and political participation. All these data enabled to test the main argument of this study that EU follows democracy promotion agenda depending on not the local needs and political will of the target country but rather the changing leverage of illiberal regional power over the target country. The following section discusses the main findings of this qualitative analysis.

### **3. RESULTS**

This section is divided into two parts in which main findings for each country case is shared.

#### **3.1. The EU- Ukraine Relations: Between Norms-Values and Pragmatic Interests**

As one of the EU's largest and politically one of the most important direct neighbours, relations with Ukraine have been pursued in a delicate balance. It is safe to assert two facts on the EU-Ukraine relations: first, relations can be described as a pendulum, which swings on each side of spectrum based on either norms and values or pragmatic interests depending on the geopolitical realities; second, since the independence, the EU- Ukraine relations have been dominated by the EU's reluctance to offer Ukraine a membership despite Ukrainian officials' insistence on being a fully-fledged EU member albeit varying degree from time to time. These two facts have certain implications on each time-periods of democratization process in Ukraine. Indeed, both Ukrainian domestic politics and relations with Russia have certain connection on these two facts mentioned above. Domestic politics is mainly shaped by regional divisions of national identification among Ukrainians depending on whether it is from the Eastern or Western Ukraine and the voting pattern of Ukrainians during parliamentary and presidential elections. Strikingly, during the political history since independence, the election turnout in Ukraine symbolized the country divided between east and south in favor of candidates with pro-Russian leanings and west in favor of liberal and Western-oriented candidates. Thus, depending mainly on different foreign policy perception of elected president, Ukraine- Russia relations have been shaped. This has had implications on the relations with the EU, but more importantly on the EU democracy promotion agendas.

By conducting content analysis of all EU official documents regarding the democracy promotion policies toward Ukraine mentioned in methodology section, this study constitutes the general framework of EU democracy promotion agendas toward Ukraine between the years 2007-2016, illustrated in Table 2 below.

**Table 2. The EU's Different Democracy Promotion Agendas Toward Ukraine (2007-2016)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Types of Democracy Promotion Agendas</b>
<b>2007</b>	narrow agenda
<b>2008</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2009</b>	narrow agenda
<b>2010</b>	narrow agenda
<b>2011</b>	narrow agenda
<b>2012</b>	full agenda
<b>2013</b>	full agenda
<b>2014</b>	<b>broad agenda</b>
<b>2015</b>	narrow agenda
<b>2016</b>	narrow agenda

**Source:** Author compilation.

It is clear from the table that until 2012, the EU has applied narrow democracy promotion agenda toward Ukraine except the year 2008. It is highly striking that in 2008, the EU has never referred the democracy promotion in all agreements with Ukraine. Yet, all funding was allocated within the framework of ENPI Annual Action Programme 2008 with the aim of removing technical barriers to trade between the EU and Ukraine. What matters for this research is that the EU focused on improving state administrative capacity but no other components of the liberal embedded democracy model. The year of 2008 is also critical to grasp the potential impact of Russia on the EU's chosen democracy promotion models since Ukraine-Russia relations soured due to Putin's accusation that Ukraine supported Georgia through selling weapons during Russo-Georgian War in August 2008. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine increased gradually in the beginning of 2009 when Russia cut off all gas flows to Ukraine due to the failure to reach an agreement on gas sales-purchase price. Yet, before that, there is another important turning point at which the European Commission submitted its proposal (COM(2008)823) for an "Eastern Partnership" on 3<sup>rd</sup> December 2008, upon the request of the Extraordinary European Council of 1<sup>st</sup> September 2008<sup>9</sup> to show the EU commitment in enhancing cooperation with its

<sup>9</sup> "7. The European Council notes with concern the impact which the current crisis is having on the whole of the region. The European Union considers that it is more necessary than ever to support regional cooperation and step up its relations with its eastern neighbors, in particular through its neighborhood policy, the development of the "Black Sea Synergy" initiative and an "Eastern Partnership" which the European Council wishes to adopt in March 2009; to this end it invites the Commission to submit proposals in December 2008." European Union: The Council of European Union, *Extraordinary European Council, 1 September 2008: Presidency Conclusions*, Brussels 6<sup>th</sup> October 2008, available at: [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf](https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/102545.pdf)

“Eastern Partners”<sup>10</sup> following the conflict in Georgia. This attempt is significant because deterioration of relations between Russia and “Eastern Partners” has opened a space for the EU to take an active stance and to implement its policies in the region smoothly.

Starting from mid-2012, because the need for “differentiated” democracy promotion approach came to light in the aftermath of Arab Spring, the EU has changed its democracy promotion model toward Ukraine to the one, which focuses more on the political rights, rule of law, good governance, and horizontal accountability. Domestic conditions and defects at this period during Yanukovich presidency of 2010 such as high level of corruption, declined press freedom, corrupted judicial system may have an impact in shaping the EU’s democracy promotion policies. Yet, this does not explain why the EU has changed its democracy promotion agenda considerably from full agenda for the years 2012-2013 to broad agenda for the year of 2014.

In 2014, the EU has applied “broad democracy promotion agenda” by focusing on both partial regimes and external conditions of liberal democracy. Public demands for the EU values i.e., democracy, human rights, rule of law during Euromaidan events may have triggered the EU to take pro-active stance in this manner.<sup>11</sup> However, it is not easy to directly link the transformation of democracy promotion policies from top-down to bottom up to the domestic conditions since as indicated above, such conditions remain more or less similar in these two country cases. Investigating the role of Russia as an illiberal regional power on the changes in EU’s democracy promotion models necessitates looking closer to another country case –Georgia– which has very similar historical processes with similar domestic features such as Soviet legacy, oligarchic groups, state-business links etc.

### **3.2 The EU-Georgia Relations: Standing Desire for the EU Membership**

Until the end of 1990s, the EU had been reluctant to take an active role in the post-Soviet region considered as Russia’s periphery as studies show that the EU had pursued “Russia-first” policy due to special bilateral relations of some member states with Russia. Over time, the EU faced with the necessity to transform its strategy and to define a new framework in which the EU differentiated its tools and approaches towards post-Soviet countries. Among these countries, some has chosen pro-Western/pro-European foreign policy direction, some others followed pro-Russian side with historical Soviet legacy. From Georgian side, it is apparent that Georgia has always been striving to join the European Union since very first day of its independence. Unlike the Ukrainian case, which indicates changes in foreign policy direction depending on the incumbents in power, every government and ruling party

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<sup>10</sup> Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

<sup>11</sup> For further information on Ukraine crisis and its consequences, please see: Ozelik, Sezai and Soner Karagül (2015). “Ukraine Crisis and Turkey’s Policy toward Crimea”, in Karol Kujawa ve Valery Morkva (eds.), 2014 Crisis in Ukraine: Perspectives, Reflections, International Reverberations, Poland: Aslan Press., pp. 43-56.

in Georgia have declared that integration into the EU -and also Western-oriented security architecture- would be main priority of the country.

Not only Georgia's standing pro-European / pro-Western foreign policy direction since its independence but also its national self-identification as European dated back 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> centuries, has certain implications on the country's relations with the EU and Russia. The EU's democracy promotion policies have also been shaped in accordance with these domestic political, social and cultural conditions. Yet, it does not necessarily mean that these policies have been solely determined according to these local conditions. This study shows that as in the case of Ukraine, the EU's democracy promotion agendas have changed depending on Georgia's relations with Russia and changes in Russian leverage over Georgia. Table 3 below indicates the EU's different democracy promotion agendas toward Georgia yearly.

**Table 3. The EU's Different Democracy Promotion Agendas Toward Georgia (2003 and 2016)**

<b>Years</b>	<b>Types of Democracy Promotion Agendas</b>
<b>2003</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2004</b>	broad agenda
<b>2005</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2006</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2007</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2008</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2009</b>	broad agenda
<b>2010</b>	broad agenda
<b>2011</b>	broad agenda
<b>2012</b>	<i>shallow agenda</i>
<b>2013</b>	narrow agenda
<b>2014</b>	full agenda
<b>2015</b>	full agenda
<b>2016</b>	broad agenda

**Source:** Author compilation.

As indicated in the table, there are three certain time periods in which the EU has applied "broad democracy promotion agenda" toward Georgia: in 2004 immediately after Rose Revolution, between 2009-2011, in 2016 (with increasing focus on partial regimes of liberal democracy starting from 2014). In the aftermath of Rose Revolution and with the inclusion of Georgia into the framework of the ENP, the scope of the EU-Georgia relations has expanded, which in turn increased the EU's leverage over Georgian politics. The EU welcomed the non-violent political change after Rose Revolution even there are some kind of criticisms over whether this revolution is democratic or not started. At this critical time, the EU aimed to support the strengthening of democratic institutions to consolidate emerging democratic steps of Georgia. That's why it is not surprising that the EU chose all-encompassing democracy promotion agenda called "broad democracy promotion agenda".

The second turning point is the period between 2009-2011, which is emphasized frequently as the situation of Georgia-Russia relations has affected the EU's foreign policies toward Georgia in terms of democracy promotion. Compatible with the illiberal regional power hypothesis in the analysis, at the time periods when the relations between Russia and Georgia deteriorated and turned into the conflict, the EU has found enough space to intervene in Georgia via various democracy promotion policies and tools. As assumed, security threats coming from Russian aggression in the aftermath of August 2008 war, pushed the EU to take an active stance to control its neighbourhood, which was possible through the EU's normative power. As indicated in Evaluation Final Report of European Union's co-operation with Georgia (2007-2013), the EU responded flexibly and at scale to the needs that arose in the aftermath of August 2008 War (EU Commission, 2015). It is stated that the EU adapted broader framework for relations with Georgia and focused much more on political aspects of the ENP reform agenda related to the EU values, human rights, conflict resolution and the rule of law along with sector specific cooperation such as Public Finance Management (PFM), Criminal Justice and Agriculture and Regional Development (EU Commission, 2015).

The third critical time is between 2014 and 2016, which starts with the Russian annexation of Crimea and increased concerns over the Russian aggression in the region. Another critical step taken by Russia is the signing of treaties with both Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2014 and 2015 to protect them from "Georgian aggression".<sup>12</sup> The September 2014 agreement on "Alliance and Strategic Partnership" with Abkhazia and the March 2015 agreement on "Alliance and Integration" with South Ossetia are important as they provided a comprehensive legal framework of Russian military assistance and economic integration. As a response to these attempts, the EU chose the way of integration with Georgia from all aspects. The EU's increased leverage over Georgia since 2014 can also be seen in the share of EU assistance to Georgia in overall aid disbursements. The EU aid to Georgia since 2014 has increased considerably that surpassed the level of USA, which was the second largest aid donor until that time.

#### **4. DISCUSSION**


This study has revealed that the EU has changed its democracy promotion agendas towards Ukraine and Georgia at certain time periods at which relations between target countries at stake and Russia has evolved into a positive or negative side. In accordance with the main hypothesis of this research, the EU has implemented broader democracy promotion agenda towards target state i.e., Ukraine/Georgia when Russia as an illiberal regional power has had lower leverage, whereas it adopted shallow democracy promotion agenda when Russia has had higher leverage over

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<sup>12</sup> This terminology is used by Russian side. "Russia-Abkhazia Agreement On Alliance And Strategic Partnership Submitted To State Duma", President Of Russia, accessed 20 December 2020, <http://en.kremlin.ru/catalog/countries/XA/events/47288>

them. Figure 2 below presents the general picture of the evolution of EU democracy promotion policies at critical turning points towards Ukraine and Georgia from the EU side with its declared reasons and intentions for these changes. While the lower side of the figure defines the specific democracy promotion agenda towards Ukraine and Georgia, the upper side underlines the changes and critical turning points in relations of Ukraine/Georgia with Russia.

**Figure 2. Timeline of EU Democracy Promotion to Ukraine and Georgia (2004-2016)**



**Source:** Author compilation.

Starting from the introduction of ENP in 2004- coincided with Colour Revolutions i.e., Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, this study has tried to analyze the EU democracy promotion policies towards Ukraine and Georgia until 2016 when bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreements with the EU was ratified. As Figure 2 illustrated, between 2004 and 2016, seven critical turning points in which the substance of EU democracy promotion towards Ukraine/Georgia changed considerably, were propounded.

First turning point happens immediately after ‘Rose Revolution’ in Georgia in 2003, ‘Orange Revolution’ in Ukraine in 2004, when the EU’s interest over the region has increased due to not only apparent public demands for democracy in those countries but also the EU’s increased concerns for peace and security and need for taking more active role in the region.

Second turning point is the period of the years 2005-2008 when Russia applied trade embargoes on Georgian products for politically motivated reasons since Saakashvili’s

pro-European foreign policy direction was regarded as threat for Russian interests in the region. As numbers indicated, share of food products exports in total Georgian manufactured exports was considerably high, which clearly manifests that any ban over exports of food products could damage heavily Georgian economy. Indeed, data showed that Russia had substantial economic and energy leverage over Georgia during this period.<sup>13</sup> Strikingly, in line with the hypothesis of this article, the EU followed shallow democracy promotion agenda towards Georgia between 2005-2008 by only focusing on the improving context conditions of embedded liberal democracy. Lack of membership perspective in the framework of relations with Georgia despite consistent demands of Georgian political elites on this, hindered the EU leverage against Russian leverage over the country.

Third and fourth critical turning points start with August 2008 War between Georgia and Russia, which necessitated the EU take a more active role in the region. The EU officials declared that the EU would offer not only political support to secure a peaceful solution to the conflict in Georgia, but also economic support for reconstruction and state-building. Therefore, the conflict between Georgia and Russia paved the way for the EU to strengthen its presence on the ground through comprehensive policy program. Indeed, during the post-war period, the EU applied broad democracy promotion agenda toward Georgia with increased amount of funding as in line with the hypothesis of this article. For Ukraine, on the other hand, Russia used its energy leverage over the country between 2006 and 2009 through increasing gas prices and cutting off the gas supply. In 2008, the relations between Ukraine and Russia deteriorated due to Russia's accusation that Ukraine supported Georgia through selling weapons during Russo-Georgian War in August 2008. Critically important, in such an environment and time period when Russian leverage over Ukraine was high, the EU tried to increase its presence in Ukraine through improving economic and trade relations not through democracy promotion. In that era, the EU applied shallow democracy promotion agenda toward Ukraine, which also supports the hypothesis of this study.

The fifth point refers the period when Georgia-Russia relations started to be normalized following Georgia's 2012 parliamentary elections, which brought the Georgian Dream coalition to power. The normalization policy of new government updated the trade relations with Russia. Indeed, Moscow's decision to remove trade ban Georgian products in the late 2012 not only made Russia again as one of the major trade partners but also renewed and increased Russian leverage over Georgia. In line with the hypothesis of this research, the EU applied shallow democracy promotion agenda in Georgia in 2012 when Russian political and economic leverage over Georgia was significantly high.

The sixth turning point is the period of Ukraine-Russia crisis and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. As happened in Georgia-Russia war in August 2008, the EU

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<sup>13</sup> For further data on Russian leverage over Georgia, please see: Transparency International Georgia. (2020). *Georgia's Economic Dependence On Russia: Trends And Threats*. Retrieved from <https://transparency.ge/en/blog/georgias-economic-dependence-russia-trends-and-threats>

attempted to increase its presence on ground not only through mediatory efforts to propose solutions for the crisis but also through huge amount of funding allocated to Ukraine. Indeed, the EU officials declared that it offered the biggest support package in the EU history. The crisis between Russia and Ukraine became an impetus for the EU to speed up the strengthening the political association and economic integration with Ukraine. As in line with the hypothesis of this research, the EU applied broad democracy promotion agenda toward Ukraine in 2014 when the relations between Ukraine and Russia were turned into the conflict.

The last turning point refers the new period of both countries with signing Association Agreements with DCFTAs. This signifies the beginning of the period not only legal approximation of countries to EU standards, rules and regulations but also increasing EU presence in these countries. Through DFTAs, Russia's place in Ukrainian and Georgian market has been superseded by EU member states, which is key to decrease Russian leverage over the countries at stake.

## CONCLUSION

This article tries to analyze the EU's differentiated democracy promotion policies toward Ukraine and Georgia by specifically concentrating on the role of Russia as an important illiberal regional power, who has leverage over the region. Strikingly, it indicated that the substance of EU democracy promotion policies is shaped not only by bilateral relations between target country and the EU itself but also by the presence of illiberal regional power(s). To carry this one step further, it is safe to say that the illiberal regional power(s) have a non-negligible impact on the effectiveness of EU democracy promotion policies in target states. By sharing the views of Margrietus van den Berg, rapporteur of European Parliament, that "responsibility for good governance and effective aid is shared by the donor community and the developing countries themselves; 'it takes two to tango'," <sup>14</sup> this study revealed that there is one more player -illiberal regional power-, who shapes the conditions of scene, where 'tango is played.'

Two conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, as a geopolitical motive, it is clear that the EU has benefited from the political vacuum due to the crises between Russia and Ukraine or Russia and Georgia and tried to fill this political vacuum via democracy promotion policies. Since the EU is able to manifest its actorness abroad through generally two ways i.e. either via economic and trade policies as being the largest market or model of political reforms and democracy promotion policies with its soft power, the EU has used both ways to strengthen its presence in these countries. When Russian leverage over these states decreased due to clash of interests, the EU chose to strengthen its presence through broader democracy promotion agendas with increased funding and more meaningful "carrots" for Ukraine and Georgia. Second,

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<sup>14</sup> EU Parliamentary debates on "Aid effectiveness and corruption in developing countries," 6 April 2006, Strasbourg, Margietus van den Berg (European Parliament), available at: <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20060406+ITEM-005+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN&query=INTERV&detail=4-026>

as a normative motive, the EU implemented democracy promotion policies in order to prevent the possible damage to the institutions of these countries at the stage of democratization in the face of Russian aggression, democracy backsliding of these countries and surely to avoid the negative consequences for the security and stability in the EU.

One of limitations of this research, which needs to be considered is the difficulty to put some EU policies and projects under the specific component of embedded liberal democracy concept while constituting general framework of the substance of EU democracy promotion within the model of embedded liberal democracy. In other words, it is not easy to draw boundaries that determine the extent such EU policy focuses on that specific component unless it is not indicated with emphasis as determined and declared objective of that EU policy/programme. Thus, this study did not consider those policies with no/very little focus on democracy promotion.

This study has contributed to existing knowledge in the EU democracy promotion literature on many levels. First, on the empirical level, it has offered a comprehensive mapping of the variation in EU democracy promotion agendas to Ukraine and Georgia yearly/timely. This is significant in terms of revealing the changing of the EU democracy promotion policies rather than putting one general label for democracy promotion agenda toward case for the whole period analyzed as done in previous studies. In other words, it underlines explicitly the fact that the EU's democracy promotion policies are not rigid and same over time. Second, it has provided a new insight into the importance of geopolitics on the substance of the EU's differentiated democracy promotion agendas. It has departed from the previous studies, which have focused only on the agencies of the EU with its member states and the target states in determining the substance of EU democracy promotion policies. Rather, this study has improved our understanding on the role of illiberal regional actors on the EU's way of conducting its democracy promotion agendas.

## **AB'NİN UKRAYNA VE GÜRCİSTAN'DAKİ DEMOKRASİ TEŞVİKİ POLİTİKALARI: AB-RUSYA VELAYET SAVAŞLARI ÖNÜNDEKİ NORMATİF KILIF MI?**

### **1. GİRİŞ**

Bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle birlikte başlayan ve 2004'teki en büyük genişleme dalgasının etkisiyle değişim ve dönüşüm geçiren AB demokrasi teşviki politikalarını Ukrayna ve Gürcistan örnekleri üzerinden incelemektedir. "Büyük patlama genişlemesi" olarak değerlendirilen bu dönemin sonrasında, AB'nin yeni sınırlarının istikrarsızlığın ve çatışmaların hakim olduğu sorunlu bölgeye çekilmesi, normatif hedeflerle kurulan demokrasi teşviki politikalarının merkezine güvenliği alacak bir düzenlemeye ihtiyacı ortaya çıkarmış ve akabinde AB, hedef ülkelerin yerel ihtiyaçlarına ve çıkarlarına bağlı olarak "ülkeye özel" (tailor-made) demokrasi geliştirme politikalarını uygulamaya başlayacağını ilan etmiştir. Ancak ampirik kanıtlar, AB'nin aynı bölgede ve çok benzer iç siyasi, tarihi ve sosyal geçmişlere sahip

olan hedef ülkelere bile farklı demokrasi teşviki politikaları uyguladığını ortaya koymuştur. Dolayısıyla, bu makale şu sorudan yola çıkarak ortaya çıkmıştır: AB'nin demokrasi teşviki politikaları, aynı bölgede ve benzer iç koşullara sahip hedef ülkeler için neden farklılık göstermektedir?

## 2. YÖNTEM

Avrupa Birliği'nin farklılaşan demokrasi teşviki politikalarını anlamak, açıklamak ve kıyaslayabilmek için geniş kapsamlı ve eklektik bir yaklaşım ortaya koyan modellere ihtiyaç vardır. Bu çalışma, bu modeller arasından, Wetzel ve Orbie'nin (2015) "yerleşik liberal demokrasi" modelini seçmiş ve modelin kendi içindeki eksikliklerini yeni argüman ve değişkenlerle desteklemiştir. Model başlıca, AB'nin sahip olduğu 5 farklı demokrasi teşviki politikasından bahsetmekte ve bunları a) tam (full) ajanda b) geniş (broad) ajanda, c) dar (narrow) ajanda d) sığ (shallow) ajanda ve e) boş (empty) ajanda olarak tanımlamaktadır. AB'nin "yerleşik liberal demokrasi" kavramında sıralanan farklı öğelere (partial regimes and context conditions) yaptığı vurgulara ve atfettiği öneme göre bu 5 farklı politika programından birini seçtiğini öne sürmektedir. Bu seçim yapılırken, hedef ülke ile AB arasındaki güç asimetrisi, AB'nin kendi iç kurumsal süreci, hedef ülkelerin yerel bağlamlarındaki farklılıklar ve ülkedeki demokrasi teşviki politikaları yürüten üçüncü aktörlerin varlığı gibi faktörlerin etkili olduğunu savunurlar.

Ancak modelin eksik kaldığı iki temel husus bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki, araştırmacılar söz konusu ülke karşılaştırmalarını yaparken araştırdıkları yılları genel bir bütün olarak ele alıp AB'nin o ülkelere yönelik demokrasi teşviki politikalarını tek bir başlık altında toplamışlardır. Burada özellikle dikkat edilmesi gereken bir husus vardır ki; AB'nin demokrasi teşviki politikaları sadece ülkeler arasında değil, tek bir ülke içerisinde belirli dönemler arasında da değişiklik göstermektedir. Buna en güzel örnek, Arap Baharı öncesi ve sonrası dönemde Tunus'a yönelik yürütülen demokrasi teşviki politikalarında değişim/ dönüşümdür. İkincisi ise, bu modelin, ülkeler arası karşılaştırma yapıldığında, bahsettikleri faktörlerin eşitliği durumunda, yani iç faktörleri tamamen benzerlik gösteren iki hedef ülkeye uygulanan farklı demokrasi teşviki politikalarını açıklamaya yeterli olmadığını göstermektedir.

Tüm bu eksiklikleri ve literatürdeki farklı teorik yaklaşımlar göz önünde bulundurularak, bu çalışma yeni bir argüman ileri sürmektedir. AB'nin demokrasi teşviki politikaları sadece hedef ülke ve AB'nin karşılıklı çıkarları bağlamında değil, aynı zamanda bölgedeki liberal olmayan bölgesel gücün etkisiyle açıklanabilir varsayımından hareketle birbiriyle ilişkili iki hipotez ortaya koymaktadır. Bunlardan ilki;

*H1: Liberal olmayan bölgesel gücün o hedef ülke üzerindeki etkisi/nüfuzu ne kadar yüksek ve fazlaysa, AB'nin o hedef ülkeye yönelik uyguladığı demokrasi teşviki politikaları o kadar sığdır (shallow agenda).*

Bunun olası nedeni olarak, hedef ülkenin illiberal bölgesel güce olan bağımlılığı, AB'nin o ülkedeki aktörlüğünü (actorness) kısıtlar. Buna yardım mekanizmaları da örnek verilebilir. O bölge üzerinde liberal olmayan bir gücün varlığı aslında AB'nin politik manevra kabiliyetini kısıtladığı için bölgesel gücün etkisi ne kadar fazlaysa AB'nin uyguladığı demokrasi teşviki politikaları sığ bir görünüm alır. Çünkü AB siyasi müdahalelerden ziyade, demokrasinin oluşumunu ve yerleşmesini kolaylaştıracak dış faktörlerin vurgulandığı –örneğin; sivil toplum örgütlerinin desteklenmesi gibi- politikalara yönelir.

Bununla ilintili olarak, hedef ülke ile bahsedilen liberal olmayan bölgesel güç arasındaki ilişki çatışma boyutuna dönüşecek kadar gerildiğinde ve kötüleştiği dönemlerde ise AB mevcut durumdan yararlanarak bölgedeki varlığını nüfuzunu arttırmaya yönelik politikalarının kapsamını da genişletir. Çünkü bu dönemlerde liberal olmayan bölgesel güç artık rakip konumundadır ve hedef ülke AB'nin vereceği tüm teşviklere açıktır. İkinci hipotez ise;

*H2: Hedef ülke ile liberal olmayan gücün arasındaki ilişkinin kötüleştiği ve çatışmaya döndüğü dönemlerde, AB mevcut durumdan yararlanarak daha geniş kapsamlı (broad) demokrasi teşviki politikaları izlediği beklenmektedir.*

AB'nin demokrasi teşvik politikaları arasındaki farklılığın nedenlerini ortaya çıkarmak ve yukarıda bahsedilen hipotezleri test etmek için bu çalışma, post-Sovyet coğrafyadan iki ülke örneği seçmiştir: Ukrayna ve Gürcistan. Bu ülkelerin seçiminde üç temel neden bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak, AB'nin bu ülkelere yönelik demokrasi teşviki politikaları aynı çerçevede –“Doğu Ortaklığı” çerçevesinde- incelenebilmektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, AB'nin demokrasi teşviki politikalarında hem Ukrayna hem de Gürcistan için aynı teşviklere -havuç ve sopalara- araçlara ve hedeflere sahip olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. İkincisi, Gürcistan ve Ukrayna üzerinde belirli bir etkisi olan en az bir güçlü liberal olmayan bölgesel güç –Rusya– vardır. Son olarak, her iki ülkede gerek tarihsel geçmişleri gerekse yerel durumları ile oldukça benzerlik göstermektedir ki bu farklılaşmanın yerel sebeplerden olmadığını ancak liberal olmayan bölgesel gücün etkisinin test edebileceğini sağlamıştır.

AB'nin bu iki ülkeye yönelik uyguladığı demokrasi teşviki politikaları içerik analizi yöntemiyle ve nitel veri analiz yazılımı desteğiyle incelenmiştir. Burada söz konusu olan veriler, temel anlaşma metinleri, AB Stratejik Belgeleri, Konsey Kararları, Konsey ve Komisyon İlerleme Raporları, ilgili yazışmalar, AP yetkililerinden gelen raporlar, AB resmi açıklamaları gibi birincil kaynaklardan toplanmıştır.

### **3. BULGULAR**

Genel olarak, yerleşik liberal demokrasi modeli çerçevesinde AB demokrasi teşviki politikaları, Ukrayna ve Gürcistan'ın Rusya ilişkilerinin olumlu ya da olumsuz yönde geliştiği kritik dönemlerde değişime uğramıştır. 2004 ve 2016 yılları arasında kapsayan bu çalışma Ukrayna/Gürcistan'a yönelik AB demokrasi teşviki politikalarının önemli ölçüde değiştiği yedi kritik dönüm noktasını ortaya koymuştur.

#### 4. TARTIŞMA

Bu yedi kritik dönüm noktası, yukarıda öne sürülen hipotezlerin doğruluğunu destekler niteliktedir. Bunlardan ilki liberal olmayan bölgesel gücün hedef ülke üzerindeki etkisinin azaldığı dönemlerde AB'nin daha kapsamlı demokrasi teşviki politikaları izler hipotezi doğrulanmıştır. İkinci olarak, liberal olmayan bölgesel güç yani Rusya ile Ukrayna/Gürcistan arasındaki ilişkilerin bozulduğu çatışmaya ve hatta savaşa döndüğü dönemlerde AB mevcut çatışma durumuna bazen arabuluculuk rolüyle müdahale etmesinin yanı sıra hedef ülke ile hem siyasi hem de ekonomik entegrasyonu geliştirecek adımlar attığını ve çok daha kapsamlı demokrasi teşviki politikaları izlediğini söylemek mümkündür. Son olarak, AB'nin Gürcistan ve Ukrayna'ya yönelik yürüttüğü demokrasi teşviki politikalarındaki farklılaşma, Rusya'nın her ki ülke üzerinde farklı nüfuza (leverage) sahip olmasına bağlanabilir.

#### SONUÇ

Bu çalışma, AB'nin Ukrayna ve Gürcistan'a yönelik farklılaştırılmış demokrasi geliştirme politikaları üzerinde liberal olmayan önemli bir bölgesel güç olarak Rusya'nın etkisini analiz etmeye çalışmaktadır. Çarpıcı bir şekilde, AB demokrasi teşviki politikalarının özünün sadece hedef ülke ile AB arasındaki ikili ilişkiler tarafından değil, aynı zamanda liberal olmayan bölgesel güçlerin varlığı tarafından da şekillendiği ortaya konulmuştur.

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Fikir veya Kavram / <i>Idea or Notion</i>	Araştırma hipotezini veya fikrini oluşturmak / <i>Form the research hypothesis or idea</i>	Tuğçe YILDIZ
Tasarım / <i>Design</i>	Yöntemi, ölçeği ve deseni tasarlamak / <i>Designing method, scale and pattern</i>	Tuğçe YILDIZ
Veri Toplama ve İşleme / <i>Data Collecting and Processing</i>	Verileri toplamak, düzenlenmek ve raporlamak / <i>Collecting, organizing and reporting data</i>	Tuğçe YILDIZ
Tartışma ve Yorum / <i>Discussion and Interpretation</i>	Bulguların değerlendirilmesinde ve sonuçlandırılmasında sorumluluk almak / <i>Taking responsibility in evaluating and finalizing the findings</i>	Tuğçe YILDIZ
Literatür Taraması / <i>Literature Review</i>	Çalışma için gerekli literatürü taramak / <i>Review the literature required for the study</i>	Tuğçe YILDIZ