

**Yazar Bilgileri
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Abstract

Civil-military relations in both Argentina and Turkey have always been problematic. Both militaries wanted to keep their decisive role in the political arena throughout the 20th century. This tendency often resulted in brutal coup d'états, and via direct military interventions, both armies kept their tutelary positions in politics. However, after 1983, the year both countries underwent the third wave of democratization, Argentina experienced rapid institutional changes in its military while the Turkish military kept its tutelary role in politics even if it had handed the power to the civilians. Until recently, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) was an important component of Turkish politics. This article traces the roots of both militaries and investigates the ideological and institutional transformations in their historical contexts. While doing so, it also reveals the political repercussions and changes in both countries. This study is based on a comparative historical sociological approach but it does not only compares two countries but also compares each country's historical and contemporary military setups. The idea behind choosing Argentina and Turkey, two totally different contexts, is that there is a lack of interest in cross-regional comparative analysis in the civil-military relations literature.

Öz

Hem Arjantin hem de Türkiye’de asker sivil ilişkileri daima sorunlu olagelmıştır. Her iki ordu da yirminci yüzyıl boyunca siyasi alanda kendi belirleyici rollerini sürdürmek istiyorlardı. Bu tavır sıklıkla sert askeri darbelerle sonuçlanıyordu ve doğrudan askeri müdahalelerle her iki ordu da siyasetteki vesayetçi pozisyonlarını devam ettiriyorlardı. Ancak her iki ülkenin de üçüncü dalga demokratikleşmeyi tecrübe etmeye başladığı 1983 yılından itibaren, Türk ordusu, erki sivilere devretmesine rağmen, siyasetteki vesayetçi rolünü saklı tutarken, Arjantin ordusu hızlı bir kurumsal dönüşüme tabi oldu. Yakın zamanlara kadar Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri (TSK) Türk siyasetinin önemli bir parçasıydı. Bu makale her iki ordunun da tarihi köklerini takip etmekte ve kendi tarihsel bağlamlarında ideolojik ve kurumsal dönüşümlerini incelemektedir. Bunu yaparken de her iki ülkedeki siyasi yansımaları ve değişimleri gözler önüne sermektedir. Bu çalışma karşılaştırmalı tarihsel sosyolojik yaklaşıma dayalıdır ancak sadece iki ülkeyi değil aynı zamanda her iki ülkenin tarihi ve çağdaş askeri anlayışlarını da karşılaştırmaktadır. Arjantin ve Türkiye gibi birbiriyle alakasız görünen iki ülkenin seçilmesinin arkasında yatan sebep, asker-sivil ilişkileri literatüründeki bölgeler-arası karşılaştırmalı analiz eksikliğidir.

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1. Introduction

German military style was quite influential in both Argentina and Turkey. This influence is, to some degree, still valid in the Turkish case. Militarism was one of the major components of the formation of German unification and modern Germany. Otto von Bismarck, a German statesman, chancellor, and builder of modern Germany, achieved his goal of unification on the battlefield as well as in the political arena (Belge 2011; Elias 1996). The success of the German military on the battlefield promoted the prestige of the German-style (a.k.a. Prussian model) military across the globe.

German military style had, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, several distinct features. First, it was based on the idea of the armed nation. Militarism in Germany was not an issue only in Nazi Germany (Third Reich) but also in the previous episode in German history. Norbert Elias observes that a kind of hierarchical structure within German society was encouraged by the governments even before Nazi rule in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Elias, 1996). Second, discipline and masculinity were prevalent not only in the military but also in society. Once again, Elias stresses that in all strata of German society, military-like discipline was prevalent, even in factories (Elias, 1996:36). Third, to realize an armed nation (Belge, 2011:579), universal compulsory male conscription was strictly implemented in preparation for total wars. Universal male conscription not only promotes masculinity in society but also is a useful tool to indoctrinate the people. Fourth, the military and the state were above everything, thus if necessary democracy could be sacrificed (Belge, 2011:272). Democracy was introduced in Germany later than in many Western European countries, and it was forced to transform from an empire to a republic (Weimar Republic) after the First World War by the Central Powers. Of course, German society knew what democracy is, and there were many city councils and parliaments but democracy can be dispensable as the modern history of Germany shows us. And fifth, the military was heavily dependent on the army. In other words, the main body of the military was comprised of the army which was considered vital in the defense of the mainland. Moreover, the Chiefs of Staff were chosen predominantly, if not always, among the army generals, and all other branches were responsible to the Chief of Staff.¹ In the Prussian military hierarchy traditionally ground forces (army) have more privileges than other military branches (Çatalbaş, 2022:197). However, armies have more tendency to be part of coups than other branches because of the logistical capabilities² (Belkin and Schofer, 2005; Powell, 2012).

As Rebecca L. Schiff (1995; 2009:13) posits military style is an important indicator of a military's position in politics. According to Schiff military style reflects the importance of military symbols, rituals, and traditions (2009:14). Schiff and her concordance model merely focus on civil-military relations and project on the possibilities of future military interventions in civilian politics. The concordance theory, as Schiff clearly states, does not involve democratic development (Schiff, 2009:46). As this study will show in the following pages, civilian control over the military does not necessarily mean a democratic order. Here, this study will investigate the German military influence in both Argentina and Turkey first. Then, the examination will extend to the post-modern transformation of both militaries according to Charles Moskos' (2000) analytical framework. The fact that both Argentina and Turkey underwent re-democratization processes in the same year 1983 after military interventions in politics makes both cases even more comparable. However, in the contemporary democratic era of two countries have followed different paths in terms of updating their military institutions. As elaborated in the following sections, Moskos' conceptualization of the post-modern military will help us to understand the institutional changes in the armed forces of both Argentina and Turkey. This study also implies the citizenry's role in military establishment and transformation to some degree, and has some tentative debates on the democratization problem. Hence, the question; 'what were (and still are, if any) the hindrances of democracy in Argentina and Turkey?' still needs an answer.

This article examines the post-modern transformation of the Argentine and Turkish armed forces in the third wave of democratization. But before doing so, it investigates the influence of the Prussian military model in Argentina and Turkey and its possible outcomes in the prevalence of militarism and military interventions, and to some extent democratization efforts in both countries' history. Hence the primary question in the first part of the work is 'How has the German military style impacted the political sphere in Argentina and Turkey?' German military influence in both Argentinean and Turkish contexts is an important component of this study because 1) it makes Argentinean and Turkish cases comparable to each other, 2) taking Prussian (German) military style as an example, Argentina and Turkey help us to understand the civil-military relations and militarization of the political sphere in both countries, and 3) it is an important indicator to understand the transformation of the military establishment in the case countries of this study.

The nature of this study (comparative historical sociological analysis) intrinsically acknowledges that historical background matters in civil-military relations and democracy, as many scholars posit (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan, 2013; Smith, 2012; Tilly, 2007). The institutional formation of militaries is an indispensable part of this historical background. Thus, along with the main research question, several sub-questions such as 'What are the historical bases of German military influence in both countries?' and 'How have Argentina and Turkey transformed their militaries according to contemporary needs?' By doing so, this work employs the comparative historical sociological method. This method has a multi-layered role in this work. It allows the researcher to compare not only Argentina and Turkey but

¹ The job description of the chief of staff was similar in the early 20th century in almost all modern militaries due to the general war doctrine of the time. However, Germany's chain of command structure was stricter than other militaries. As I shall describe later, Turkey still uses the same structural formation in its military while many contemporary militaries underwent structural reformations, including Argentina. Turkey's insistence is noteworthy since it is a member of NATO.

² This does not mean that navies and other military branches have no political aspirations and/or do not participate in military interventions. In some cases, navy forces can be more useful, in coups, for geographical reasons and transport elements of the navy and air force make it more important than the army (Luttwak, 1979:65).

also both countries' past and present. Therefore, it begs the question: Are the historical similarities in terms of military-style between Argentina and Turkey still valid today? If not, what has changed?

2. German Influence in Turkish and Argentinean Militaries

2.1. Turkey

Turkish modernization started with its military during the late Ottoman era. And German military style had a significant influence over the modernization of the Turkish military; especially the army. In the hope of balancing French and British influence in the empire, the Ottomans approached Germany to modernize the Turkish military, and Germany started sending military officers to Turkey to train the future officers as well as the conscripts (Avcı, 2016; Ortaylı, 2001; Özgüldür, 1993). The very first employment of German military officers in the Ottoman army dates back to the reign of Sultan Mahmud II in 1835 but the initial German employment did not last in the imperial army, and its effect was limited. The main transformation and modernization of the Turkish military according to German standards started nearly half a century later in 1880 during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. Thus, many German officers (becoming part of the Turkish military body appointed by the sultan as 'Pashas' – a title which was used for high-rank military officers at the time, an equivalent of general) started serving in military schools and actual field posts. Many German military officers not only trained the Turkish soldiers but also joined battles combating side by side with Turkish soldiers, especially during the First World War.³ Moreover, in order to improve the defensive abilities of the Ottoman Empire, Germany sent many engineers to build roads, railways, and factories, especially for the military. In this way, Germany played an important role in the modernization and industrialization of the Ottoman Empire. Turkish – German relations continued after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The German military style was still effective, and military relations and trade were still common between the two countries (Özcan, 2010).

The first German influence on the Turkish military started during the Tanzimat (Reorganization) period (Ortaylı, 2001). Two German military officials came to Istanbul to discuss and implement reforms in the Ottoman military at the invitation of the sultan in 1835 (Özgüldür, 1993:298). The results of the first attempts were modest but after severe defeats in the second half of the 19th century against internal and external threats, Sultan Abdülhamid II asked German King Wilhelm II to send a military envoy to Turkey, and a bilateral protocol was signed in 1880. Germany, as a neutral modern Western country, started transforming the Turkish military. The biggest German influence was on the Turkish army. Germany supplied massive amounts of ammunition and modern weapons, re-designed the military ranks and troops, introduced tactical and disciplinary formations, and many German generals served in the Turkish military as Pashas under the heel of the sultan (Avcı, 2016:204; Ortaylı, 2001). Although the Germans served diligently and passionately in the Turkish army, they could not stop the fall of the empire. Yet German influence in the Turkish military prevailed. They fought together in the First World War.

Germany's contribution to the Turkish military was not limited to training, engineering, and weaponry. Germans contributed to the military style and ideological indoctrination of the people and the military as well. The German nation became heavily militarized during and after the German unification. The desire of the country to join the colonialist competition with its long-term European rivals in every corner of the globe to exploit the sources to suppress the power hunger of the nation, and to propel the nation's industry was at its height. To fulfill this goal, the military was a useful tool, and soon after the unification, Germany started exporting its military to other nations to gain a foothold in foreign markets. Germany started modernizing the Ottoman military at the end of the 19th and in the early 20th centuries, gaining economic advantages in the vast Ottoman soil in return. Many military officers, including generals, started serving the Ottoman sultan. The Ottoman sultans were generous to the German military officers, and it was easy for those who served in the Ottoman army to climb the ranks easily in the German military too. Thus, many German military-men came to Turkey in the hope to make a good military career with outstanding financial benefits (Avcı, 2016; Belge, 2011).

Germany's influence continued after the reign of Abdülhamid II. German-Turkish relations were at their peak during the Union and Progress Party (UPP- İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası- İTF) rule after the 1908 coup d'état. Especially, Enver Pasha, the head of the military and War Minister, had close ties with the Germans. Germany supplied the Turkish military in Italo-Turkish War in Libya in 1911, the First Balkan War in 1912, and the Second Balkan War in 1913. They also send some military officers to train the Turkish soldiers, and even fight alongside with Turkish army. Finally, both countries formed an alliance during World War-I against the Allied Powers. The Ottomans sent some troops to Europe with the help of their German allies while many German officers led the Turkish army on several fronts. Liman von Sanders Pasha, for example, was the leading general in the Battles of Dardanelles (Gallipoli)⁴ (Özgüldür, 1993).

The inspirational relations between the two nations reversed after the war. Allied forces lost the war, and Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles but Turkey refused to acknowledge such a humiliating treaty (the Treaty of Sevres) and

³ In the First World War, Germany and Turkey were allies against Central Powers (France, Britain, and Russia). Hence, both sides sent soldiers with each other's help but some German generals were already a long time part of the Turkish military. On some fronts (such as Dardanelles) German generals led the Turkish army.

⁴ The founding father of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) was a colonel under the command of Liman von Sanders during the Battles of Gallipoli, and he showed his commanding abilities with his outstanding maneuvers, agility, and improvisation on the battlefield. Mustafa Kemal became famous nationwide after this battle.

continued fighting for four more years.⁵ To everyone's surprise, the Turks succeeded, beating the Greek invasion forces backed by the European powers (mainly the British Empire), and forcing the exhausted and economically devastated Allied Powers to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Although military relations between Germany and Turkey were at their lowest level in decades, when the Nazi party ascended to power in Germany, Adolf Hitler invested a special interest in Turkey. According to Stefan Ihrig (2014), in the Nazi imagination, Turkey had a special place because Turkey challenged the invaders after the Great War while Germany deserted the Turks, and accepted the humiliating unconditional surrender. During the early years of the republic in Turkey, many German engineers and academics were already serving in Turkey to build infrastructure in the country. Additionally, after the Nazi ascension to power in Germany, diplomatic ties started growing up once again. Although, Turkey did not take a part in the Second World War, received military assistance from Germany before and during the war while the Turkish Republic was a major supplier of valuable raw materials to Germany. An interesting fact is that Turkish diplomats in Germany helped the Jewish community to escape Nazi brutality, and Turkey opened its gates to the oppressed people. Many scholars came to Turkey, a neutral country during the war, from Germany, and they contributed to the modernization of the country as well, though many of them stayed for a short period of time.

After the war, Turkey declared a democratic transformation, and started receiving Western help for economic, militaristic, and political development, including Marshall Aids from the US. Moreover, as part of the Truman Doctrine to stop Soviet expansion in Europe, Turkey was accepted into NATO. Even after being a member of NATO, the Turkish military underwent little change in organization and structure, if any. Turkish military in the post-war era continued based on compulsory male conscription with a strong secularist ideological and hierarchical formation. German military style continued to exist within the Turkish Armed Forces until recently with little adjustments.

2.2. Argentina

Like the Ottoman Empire, Argentina started modernizing its military with the help of Germany in the early 20th century (Potash, 1969:3). Ongoing territorial disputes with its neighboring states (especially with Brazil and Chile) caused starting of an arms race between these countries. When the Argentinean military and government felt that they fell behind their competing neighbors in the arms race, they started seeking foreign help, especially from Europe. The traditional allies of Argentina, Spain, and Italy were on a decline in their military power, thus they sought an alternative. Argentina approached Germany because of its growing reputation in terms of military discipline, productivity, and effectiveness. Germany was eager to expand its influence overseas and accepted to assist in reforming and restructuring the Argentinean military, especially the army. German influence in the Argentinean military lasted for decades, although there were several interruptions due to international pressures and World War I but some Germanophile military personnel (such as General Jose Uriburu) in the Argentinean military also played an important role in pursuing relations with Germany.

German military mission in Argentina started with opening the new *Escuela Superior de Guerra* (High School of War, or Argentine War College) in 1900, and writing the military service law in the next year which introduced general obligatory male conscription, an important element of Prussian (German) military system (Atkins and Thompson, 1972:259) but it was extended to accepting the Argentinean military cadets to German military schools, sending military training officers to Argentina. Moreover, Germany started equipping the Argentinean military with the most advanced weaponry at the time developed and produced in Germany until the First World War. Other military-related schools (such as Ballistic School/*Escuela de Tiro*) and institutions (such as Military Academy/*Colegio Militar*) in Argentina were opened, and German instructors were appointed. Germany also appointed a military attaché to Buenos Aires to improve the relations and observe the German investments in the country.

German influence on the Argentine military structure was extensive, and it was growing with each passing year in the early 20th century. However, the decisive defeat of Germany in WW-I halted the German military mission in Argentina for several years. In the mid-1920s, Argentina re-started receiving military aid from German officers by employing seasoned warriors in military institutions. However, this move caused diplomatic tensions, especially with France. The French government was never convinced that Germany was complying with the Treaty of Versailles after the war, and was heavily critical of the employment of former German officers in the Argentine military. In need of military modernization, Argentina assured the international community by declaring dual citizenship of German officers serving in the military. However, during the 1930s, and especially with Nazi ascension to the power in Germany, neither side of the relationship stop feeling obliged to ease international concerns. The military relations between the two nations increased ceaselessly until the Second World War.

Nazi war machine in Europe was prolific in inventing and producing weaponry during the war. There was a huge accumulation of knowledge and experience in the German military industry and ranks. Hence, Argentina wanted to exploit this knowledge and experience in its favor after the war and hosted many former military engineers and military officers, including war criminals. German engineers started serving in factories to create new weapons for the Argentinean military (including some avionic experiments). Some German engineers (such as Kurt Tank and Ronald Richter) went to Argentina and started working Aero-technical Institution in Cordoba to create new weapon systems for the Argentinean military, especially for the air forces. Nazi fugitives and German engineers contributed to the

⁵ In fact, the Treaty of Sevres was signed by the Ottoman government but the Turkish resistance movement led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) refused it and started countering the invaders on the battlefield. Because of the limited space, I barely give an abridged historical background here.

Argentinean military after the war to some degree but the protection of Nazi criminals attracted severe international criticism and political pressure. After the fall of Juan Domingo Peron from power in 1955, the condoning attitude of the state apparatus towards Nazi criminals and fugitives in Argentina decreased but some German engineers continued to work for the military. In the meantime, the Prussian style of the military was still effective in the formation of the Argentine military. Especially, during the military dictatorships between 1966-1973 (Argentine Revolution), and between 1976-1983 (El Proceso), masculinity, discipline, and conservative nationalism were imposed on the society by the military. Until 1983, universal male conscription was implemented to supply manpower to the ranks within the military branches.

After the humiliating defeat against the UK in Falklands (Malvinas) War in 1982, the military junta was replaced by a democratically elected civilian government in 1983. The civilian government under the presidency of Raul Alfonsin started implementing some serious reforms in the formation of the military with its all branches, including military style and indoctrination. But before examining the reforms made to transform the military in Argentina, I would like to focus first on the theoretical base of contemporary changes in modern militaries. To achieve this, I will employ Charles Moskos' ideas on the post-modern military, and I will compare my case countries through the lens of Moskos' terminology and outline the post-modern transformation of the military.

3. Postmodern Military⁶

According to Charles Moskos (1977), one of the early scholars who investigated the post-industrial and post-modern transformation of armed forces first in the US context and then global comparative level, modern armies have been transforming and a new paradigm was needed to explain this kind of transformation. Although with the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the Soviet Union in 1991, the bipolar global system had an end, and many scholars (Moskos, 1998; Von Kippel, 2000; Barracca, 2007; Schiff, 2009) tend to mark this change in the global system as the turning point in the transformation of the military formation, the first signs of military transformation go back to 1970s. Modern armies were mainly based on masculinity (Basaran, 2014; Belkin, 2012), strong ideological attachment, obligatory mass conscription, and a strong focus on defending the country against external threats. In contrast, the post-modern transformation in the military implies changes in ideology, formation, and goals. Since it was a huge economic, social, and psychological burden for a society to feed bulky mass armies, and in return militaries were economically unproductive,⁷ the goals and formation of the military have been changed and redefined to be a more affordable and sustainable structure.

Moskos, to define the post-modern transformation of the military in the new era, gives five distinctive features of the new military concept: 1) new interpretation of civilian and military spheres, 2) equalizing emphasis on differences in all military-related specialties (combat, support, ranks, service, etc.), 3) changing definitions of the military missions (more humanitarian missions rather than war combating), 4) coalition and collaboration of national armies under the umbrella of international organizations such as United Nations, and 5) the internationalization of national armed forces themselves (Moskos et al., 2000). Moreover, traditional gender roles in the armies tend to change in the new era. Many national armies have started accepting LGBTQ individuals into military services.

According to Moskos, these changes are first observed in the changing nature of the institutional model of the military to the occupational model (Moskos, 1977). In his terminology, modern armies were based on an institutional approach. Service values and ideology (indoctrination) were important in modern militaries. Moreover, the line between military life and society was more salient. Members of the military were subject to military jurisdiction, they used to live in military houses, and their spouses used to be part of the military community. However, this tendency started changing in the contemporary (postmodern) era. Individuals started choosing military life not because of the institutional values but of the evaluation of the job's market value. In other words, military life has gradually become an occupation (or, another job). This new tendency also eroded the distance between the military and social life. Military members prefer living separate from the work environment (garrisons, barracks, etc.), their spouses are not an integral part of the military life anymore, and the purview of the military jurisdiction is narrower in the contemporary military establishment.

These changes and indicators are interchangeable and not compartmentalized. In other words, these changes incorporate and open space to each other. For the first indication Moskos supplies, the militaries started employing more civilian servants within the ranks to benefit from their expertise, and started using media relations to inform the public instead of manipulating it via embedded journalists.⁸ For the second indicator, all military specialties became of

⁶Although the concept of the post-modern military has been studied and expanded with the contributions of many other scholars (Snider, 2000; Williams, 2008; Hajjar, 2014; Çatalbaş, 2022) while tracing the institutional transformation of armies in both countries, I will utilize the conceptualization of Charles Moskos, a North American military sociologist. This choice does not come only because he is the first one to put the outline but also because he gives a more inclusive framework on the subject.

⁷One may argue that the entire industry of war can create its own economy, and military research triggers technological advance but still thousands of people (mainly men) are extracted from the social and economic life with the sole purpose of being deterrent to a (often created or fictitious/imaginary) enemy. Moreover, I think, the effectiveness of the military in the economic relations became more solid after the post-modern transformation. After all, it was the idea behind the post-modern transformation to enable the military system to be more economically productive.

⁸Media relations may seem a bit controversial. Power holders' ambition to manipulate the information channels in their own use is not a hidden secret but in the post-modern era, since the medium of informatics and communications is expanded, the military elites are tend to cooperate with the media more than ever.

more equal importance in the post-modern era. In other words, while modern militaries tend to prioritize some groups (such as combatants and special forces) or specialties (such as intelligence and/or pilots), in the post-modern era all units are acknowledged as of equal importance. Third, militaries are no longer combat-oriented but the spectrum of their mission definition is expanded. From internal and international humanitarian aid missions to environmental auxiliary assignments, militaries are employed by national governments and international organizations. Militaries are now the first group to show their colors in an environmental catastrophe (such as earthquakes, hurricanes), or a humanitarian crisis (such as famine, epidemic). Moreover, even the international umbrella organizations started promoting humanitarian interference, and changing the traditional ideological frameworks and aims. It is not a surprise, hence, to see NATO reducing its size (in terms of personnel, budget, bases, etc.), redefining its aims, expanding over former Warsaw Pact countries, and involving more humanitarian missions rather than being merely a defense pact. The fourth indicator in the conceptualization of Moskos refers to the transitional feature of the post-modern military. Today, none of the national armies venture overseas operations on their own, even for humanitarian ones. Instead, they prefer to collaborate in joint operations. Humanitarian aid programs in African countries operated by commissioned international military units are the best examples. Even the most powerful armies tend to seek international partners to legitimize their overseas operations, whether or not it has a sole humanitarian purpose. And finally, national armies want to expand their network on a global scale. This can be achieved via only joining an umbrella organization at the international level but there are several other ways to extend the military network; such as forming binational military units (such as; UN peacekeeping forces) within a pact. All these changes should be considered together rather than separately.

At this point, it is necessary to open a new paragraph for the case of diminishing masculinity of military expertise in the age of the postmodern military. As Aaron Belkin (2012), in his book dedicated to investigating the US context of military masculinity, aptly puts military masculinity was prevalent in modern armies. With some exceptions, all modern national militaries have been based on masculinity, and what's more, they would promote masculinity not only within the military ranks but also in society. Hence, the most dramatic transformation of the new military understanding can be seen in gender roles. Although some armies at the national and international levels adjusted their institutional behavior towards more egalitarian gender policies, many traditional armies resist conciliating their institutional stance. Women soldiers have always been accepted in modern armies to some degree but male conscription has been prevalent in almost all military ordination. Moreover, officer corps have been predominantly constituted of heterosexual male citizens, and women officers, if there are any, would experience a 'glass ceiling' in promotions in the ranks. With the strict endorsement of masculinity, LGBTQ individuals had no place in the military units.

The post-modern transformation of the military implies a break (or, as Zygmunt Bauman would say, fluidity [Bauman, 2008 and 2013]) in the gender roles within the military. As the military becomes more of a profession, being a member of the military body is seen as an occupation, and women's appearance is more common. With the need for civilian technocrats and experts within the ranks, the traditional emphasis on masculinity becomes meaningless each passing year. Some militaries started allowing LGBTQ communities represented in the military⁹ (Fleckenstein, 2000; Haltiner and Hirt, 2000).

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4. Transformation of Argentinean Military

One of the facts that makes Argentina and Turkey comparable is that both Argentina and Turkey started implementing re-democratization efforts in the same year (in 1983). However, the modes of democratization were different. Argentina, in the conceptualization of Samuel P. Huntington, experienced replacement while Turkey's power transition process was a transformation.¹⁰ The military government after the Falkland (Malvinas) War in 1983 was cornered in Argentina, and authoritarian elites agreed upon re-establishing the democratic order.¹¹ General elections were set in 1983 by lifting all electoral limitations from political parties allowing them to participate in free elections. However, generals and other military officers were in need to get exit guarantees after several notoriously violent years to be immune from being punished. Peronist Party, which was considered to be the front-runner in the elections, was eager to make a deal with

⁹ The change did not take place with a smooth transition, of course. Even in the most developed and free countries, military elites resisted the change in military masculinity (the degree of resistance differs among the contexts, needless to say). One of the best-known examples is the Netherlands but major national militaries also consider the change, at a slow and reluctant pace though. For example; during the presidency of Bill Clinton, the US army adopted the 'Don't ask, don't tell, don't seek, don't flaunt' (shortly; 'Don't ask, don't tell') policy with the advice of Charles Moskos, a military sociologist and advisor of Clinton government. Although it was intended to be a compromise regarding civil rights, the 'don't ask, don't tell' policy attracted many criticisms as well due to restricting LGBTQ individuals' freedom and rights.

¹⁰ According to Samuel P. Huntington, there are three modes of transferring power in the Third Wave of democracy across the globe since 1975 which are namely transformation (as in the case of Turkey), replacement (as in Argentina), and transplacement. Huntington posits that these categories define the means of civil-military relations during the democratization processes after a military rule. Transformations happen where the military has the upper hand in the negotiations. However, in the replacement cases, power is handed due to the failure of military rule, and democratizers have the upper hand. Finally, transplacement is a mode of power transition that is a combination of transformation and replacement where the military and civilians work together to re-establish the democratic order. Huntington observes the replacement as the best-case scenario for democratizers (see: Huntington, 1993).

¹¹ Of course, here, I do not intend to explain the failure of the military junta in Argentina just because of a defeat in Falkland War. The junta was already failing on all fronts (especially, in economic policies) in governing the country. In fact, the Falkland War was a desperate attempt of the junta to save their credibility in governing.

the military concerning the exit conditions (Aguero, 1998:390; Hunter, 1997:463). Some opposition groups, including URC (Radicals) one of the oldest political parties, stayed intransigent to the military's demands (Huser, 2002:49). Surprisingly URC candidate Raul Alfonsin, the underdog of the elections, won the majority of the votes and became the first elected president of the new democratic era.

Being aware of the public demand for the trials of the members of the military junta, Alfonsin initiated several reforms related to the role of the military in Argentina in order to make sure that the military remains subordinate to civilian decision-making processes. First and foremost, the mission definition of the military was re-outlined. The military was allowed to have professional autonomy in itself in the external defense but was put responsible to the civilian authorities. Before these reforms, the president had the authority over the military but with the new changes, it was the Minister of Defense in the democratic era (Huser, 2002:54). Second, the size of the military was reduced. Argentinean military, as a whole, was one of the biggest and strongest militaries in the region but during Alfonsin's presidency, the size of the military was reduced to almost half from around 100.000 officers. Many top-rank officers (almost two-thirds) were forced to retire (Huser, 2002:64-65). Military conscription was also limited by the civilian government. The number of conscripts was reduced to nearly one-third (from around 65.000 to 25.000) (Hunter, 1997:465). Third, the military budget was reduced. The country stopped the arms race with its neighboring countries (Huser, 2002:76), and the civilian government reduced imports of arms and weapons to one-tenth (from almost one billion dollars to a near hundred million dollars) (Huser, 2002:77). The military budget was also cut by nearly 40%, and military factories, industrial sites, and repair and service facilities were transferred to civilian supervision (Hunter, 1997:464-65). And fourth, the formation of the armed forces was restructured alongside the military doctrine. The Gendarmerie and Coastguards were assigned the responsibility of the Defense Minister (Akdağ, 2006:95).

Most of these reforms were realized within Alfonsin's presidential term from 1983 to 1989 but the reformation process within the military continued up-to-today. Following these reforms, many officers were disposed of their duties, and litigations were filed against military officers who committed atrocities against human rights during the military rule (Mallinger, 2009; Norden, 1996:86-88). Since there was a huge public grunt for the military dictatorship, the generals who were responsible for the atrocities toward civilians were put on trial. Within only two years many generals -- including former presidents General Videla who was also the head of the junta in 1976 and General Viola -- were sentenced to imprisonment (Hunter, 1998:305).

As indicated above, The Prussian military tradition was based on universal male conscription, and masculinity is an important component of this tradition. As part of institutional changes in the Third Wave democracy in Argentina, several radical changes in the gender policy of the Argentinean military have taken place. Argentina is one of the first countries to legitimize gay marriages, and concordantly homosexual individuals are now allowed to serve in the military (Çatalbaş, 2022:200).

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5. Stagnation of Turkish Military's Transformation

In contrast to the Argentinean replacement of military rule in the post-1983 era, Turkey experienced transformation. Unlike its Argentinean counterpart, the Turkish military never directly ruled the country for long periods but interluded democratic order to re-set the political game. On all occasions, the military handed the power willingly and peacefully to civilians. However, in this manner, the military kept its role as a tutelary force in politics (Demirel, 2005; Sakalhoğlu, 1997). The same happened during and after the last direct military intervention between 1980 and 1983. The military took control of all power in Turkey by toppling the elected government with the promise of ending the long-lasting violence on the streets and putting an end to economic instability.

By no means, the Turkish military actions were desirable during this period. Many people, including academics, were purged from their posts, many people were detained for long periods without tangible evidence, torture was common in prisons, and some military courts even sentenced many people to death (Cizre, 2008:310; Zürcher, 2004:407). Nevertheless, the success in eradicating violence from the streets made the public condone the military's harsh measures. Since the main political parties were banned and their leaders were detained, there was little opposition against the deeds of the military. Only international organizations, such as NATO, European Union,¹² and international pressure NGOs, such as Freedom House, Amnesty International, were advising the Turkish military not to use unequal force on civilians (Demirel, 2005:251).

What the Turkish military did concerning economics was to call experts and give full responsibility for transforming the country's economy from import subsidized industrialization to a neoliberal economy. Turgut Özal, a civilian technocrat who became elected PM and then the president of the country, firmly implemented and supervised the January 24, 1980¹³ decisions concerning the economy (Ahmad, 1995:258; Elçi, 2014:100).

¹² It was officially European Economic Community (EEC) at the time which became European Union in 1993. Turkey was negotiating with EEC to become a member, and these negotiations were used as leverage by international organizations to ease the military's ambitions.

¹³ These decisions were accepted by the civilian government just before the military intervention but since the civilian government was not able to supervise the decisions due to ongoing prevalent violence in the country and high fragmentation within the civilian politics, the military took the responsibility for the economic transformation. Because there was no opposition during the military takeover, the military did not encounter much criticism and was able to go to all length.

The Turkish military was already proved itself on the battleground before the 1980 coup. With the aim of joining NATO, the Turkish government sent troops to the Korean War with the call of the US, the leading force in the war, and Turkish soldiers found a means to demonstrate their abilities. Moreover, the Turkish military also exhibited its dedication to defending the motherland's interests in Cyprus. In 1974 Turkey militarily intervened ongoing ethnic clash on the island, and landed on the island in two rounds in the same year. These military maneuvers kept its prestigious position within the society, and during the 1980 coup process, the Turkish military had a vast credit in the public eyes (Demirel, 2005:252-53).

Before initiating the transition period and handing the power to the civilians, the military made some adjustments in the political game (Ahmad, 1995:255-95; Zürcher, 2004:410-11). First of all, they dismissed the senate which was previously constituted by the military after the 1960 coup d'état. The senate was not working as the military wanted and making things more complicated. Turkey is a unitary state and the senate was only adding more bureaucracy in legislative relations. Second, the military formed a Constitutional Commission (*Danışma Meclisi*) to re-write the constitution, and put it to referendum. In the referendum concerning the constitution, around 90% of the people voted in favor of the new constitution in 1982 (Zürcher, 2004:410). It should be noted that the referendum was highly controversial since the ballot boxes and ballot envelopes were nearly transparent, voting was compulsory, and criticizing the generals and campaigning against the new constitution were banned (Ahmad, 1995:263). However, the most surprising thing in terms of the constitutional change was that the previous one was also written under military supervision in 1961 which was, for many (Elçi, 2014:53; Sakalhoğlu, 1997:162), one of the most progressive constitutions in the history of the country. Apparently, the military elites had changed their minds thinking it was too liberal for the country. For many scholars, the 1982 constitution was a back-step (Ahmad, 1995; Zurcher, 2004). Third, before elections, the military made sure that previous political parties and their leaders were not joining the elections (Hale, 1994:266; Zürcher, 2004:410-15). In this way, the military aimed to have a new start in politics. Only three political parties were allowed to participate in the elections, and two of them were former military-men handpicked by the military council. The head of the military junta General Kenan Evren openly endorsed these two parties and their leaders. The only civilian party and leader was the trusted technocrat Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi – ANAP). Finally, General Kenan Evren secured his post as the president of the country, although traditionally the presidents had little power. Until recently, the elected Prime Ministers were responsible for the legislation. In the German-style parliamentary system, the president was the symbolic head of state playing the role of more like an ombudsman. However, in this case, the aim was to keep the military in its tutelary position supervising the civilian governments.

Under these circumstances, the general elections were held in November 1983, and the underdog Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) won the elections with a landslide victory over military-backed parties. With 52% of the total votes, Turgut Özal not only became the PM of the country but also his party won the majority in the parliament. The results were a strong signal to the military from the people. However, General Kenan Evren stayed in the presidency after resigning from his military post, and the military-imposed constitution came into effect.

All in all, since the military was forced to quit power in Argentina by the public and the political opposition after failure in politics, economics, and humiliating defeat on the battleground, it was a replacement, according to Huntington. However, in the Turkish case, the military demonstrated its abilities with a satisfying performance in power. Hence, the Turkish military kept its prestige in public opinion during the transition period. Since the Turkish military handed the power to the civilians via elections, it was a transformation in Turkey according to Huntington's terminology. Therefore, the institutional changes in the Turkish military during the Third Wave of democracy in Turkey stayed limited. Nevertheless, the mode of transitions in Argentina and Turkey defined the future of the democratic institutionalization processes.

6. Conclusion

In this study, instead of bringing new approaches to the postmodern military concept of Charles Moskos, institutional transformations in the Argentine and Turkish militaries were examined based on his work. Establishing concordance between the military, civilian politics, and citizenry was relatively easier in Argentina than it was in Turkey in the third wave of democratization. The military of Argentina, after consecutive failures on all fronts, realized that it was not the military's duty to govern the country. It became clear to everyone that the military was not capable of doing its primary job (defending the country), let alone finding remedies to the everlasting economic problems of the country. Moreover, being the single power outlet with no opposition means full responsibility, and after Falkland (Malvinas) War, the military started appreciating the importance of sharing responsibility. On the civilian side, both politicians and the citizens of Argentina seized the opportunity when the military was at its weakest moment in decades, and initiated the legal process to control the military. Yet, there was a fraction in civilian politics. Some moderates, mostly Peronists, were reluctant to take radical actions (Aguero, 1998:390; Hunter, 1997:463). However, it was the citizenry that paved the way to full control of the military and trials of atrocities of the military governments during Guerra Sucia (Dirty Wars) by choosing Radical Party (UCR) candidate Raul Alfonsin in the general elections in 1983. It was a clear message to both the military and the political elites.

In the third wave of democratic establishment in Turkey, on the other hand, concordance (in civil-military relations as Schiff suggests) has not been provided. The military had the upper hand, as indicated above, during the transition period, and it secured its tutelary position in Turkish politics. Thus, civilian governments, after the transformation of

the power in the country, could not implement reforms concerning the military's role in the country to put the military accountable for its actions.

Cross-regional studies help us understand the general trends in the global sense as well as show us the individual uniqueness of the cases. First-sight similarities might be deceptive because modernization processes had totally different grounds in Argentina and Turkey. In Turkey, modernization was a process that occurred with a top to down implementation while Argentinean modernization had a common ground among the populace. The citizenry has always been active in Argentina. The independence movement in the Spanish Colonial rule was, on its own, a sign of active citizenry. They refused to be a subject in a polity determined not by the people but by a close-knit group of people who were thousands of miles away. Regime changes in the country always had a common ground. It was possible to change the nature of the authoritarian regime in the early 20th century to an electoral competitive regime with the help of social mobility. The people challenged the governments with street rallies, general strikes, and even open rebellions.

In contrast, Turkish modernization did not take place to the demand of the people but was implemented by the elites who were trying to save the empire. Common people were mere subjects with limited rights, and the populace was mainly rural. Yet, no matter how modernization (including nation-building, industrialization, democratization, etc.) happened, both countries went through similar paths until 1983. In the post-1983 period, in the contemporary era, Argentinean and Turkish democratic orders stopped showing similarities and started differentiating. This differentiation is manifold. First, the nature of the civil-military relations is different between Argentina and Turkey primarily due to the nature of the transition processes. In Argentina, the military was forced out of power after its consecutive failures in economics, governing, and defending the country's interests. But in Turkey, the military willingly handed the power to the civilians by allowing electoral competitive regime change. Second, the military style and institutionalization of the militaries show differences. When civilians got power in Argentina, they immediately implemented dramatic reforms within the military. The size of the military was reduced, reliable civilian control over the military was established, and the military understanding was changed to more humanitarian missions. However, in Turkey, the military kept going with a sizable body and budget. Moreover, the Turkish military did not undergo a post-modern transformation. And third, the foundations of the democratic order in both countries are different.

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