


Post-international Intervention Libya: The Challenges Against State-Building

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ABSTRACT

The most critical and dangerous prospect for the revolution is that Libyans not only overthrow the Gaddafi regime but also destroy any representation of contemporary power and its center that lacks firm roots in Libyan soil and culture. The revolution and war caused widespread devastation, necessitating a start from scratch. However, due to the Libyan context and situation, this attempt is hampered by numerous impediments related to historical, natural, and geographical contexts to the extent of tribalism and external interference. This has resulted in the emergence of tribal, local, and regional tendencies that are sometimes contradictory but persistent. This makes the process of disarming and integrating militants into state institutions a dangerous endeavor that threatens and impedes the establishment of state institutions necessary for the democratic transition process to succeed and significantly impedes the establishment of the new political system. This article aimed to analyze Libya's future in the post-international intervention context by looking at the democratic transition and state-building challenges, the impact of the crisis on economic activity and oil production, and weak institutional structures and modernization requirements.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received: 20.05.2022

Revised: 27.06.2022

Accepted: 03.07.2022

KEYWORDS

Libya,
international
intervention,
democratic transition,
economic recovery,
state building

Introduction

Like many Arab countries, Libya was swept by a tsunami of change, resulting in a sea change in the country's political history. For nearly 42 years, Libya was ruled by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and his family, and tribal control over the state's joints precluded most social groups from participating in decision-making. A series of accumulations and social and economic motives within Libyan society pushed the populace to declare their uprising. His rejection of the status quo of political repression, regional differentiation, and economic deprivation, which exacerbated the conflict between Libya's eastern and western regions, perhaps explains the origins of the country's eastern outbreak.

By analyzing the events in Libya since Colonel Gaddafi took power, we can infer the regime's strength and see that the people could not lead the change process on their own. This is primarily because of the Gaddafi regime's strict policies that established their intellectual foundations and developed the tools and mechanisms necessary to ensure their continuity. Chiefly among these were the formation of Revolutionary Committees and reliance on tribalism. Thus, we conclude that the protest movement in Libya persisted and developed into an armed conflict between the opposition and the regime and that this conflict grew out of control. This situation prompted the international community to intervene via NATO forces, which had an agenda. However, their agenda has begun

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to develop to deal with the consequences and how to direct them toward their interests (Al-Faqih, 2012, p. 21).

The revolution against the Gaddafi regime reflected the nature of this regime and its policies for more than four decades, as well as the nature of Libyan society and its economic and social development. However, it must be noted that the active forces in the revolution and their participation in working against the regime until its overthrow continue to be influential at various levels following the regime's fall, while some of the active forces have assumed new roles and acquired additional capabilities as a result of the revolution and its operations, as well as the interference of internal forces with the external. Additionally, this appears clear in what is known about the transitional phase, which continuously reflects the active and intense presence of the dynamics that were present in the work of the revolution against Gaddafi, as well as reflects, in a way that foreshadows future developments, the direct and indirect effects of Gaddafi's policies on the one hand, and the effects of the intervention on the other. Also, the foreigners enabled the people's victory over the regime and introduced elements into the national context that demonstrated its influence during the transitional period.

There is a dialectical relationship between the growth of internal conflicts and the worsening of the state's impotence, which creates a real dilemma for intervening parties. It is clear that the more the state's deficit worsens, the faster the pace of internal violence accelerates. On the other hand, Libya faces a degree of complexity due to challenges following the collapse of the former Libyan political system. Numerous obstacles continue to obstruct political, social, and military stability. Libya paid a high human and material price during the crisis, with thousands of dead and wounded and an almost complete collapse of institutions that were never the same as those of civilized countries, all within a few months. A stricter sense now accompanies this sense of the enormity of the price; the results were not on the scale of hope or sacrifice. Perhaps these attacks by the rebel militia on the centers of power inside are sure evidence of the extent of frustration and dissatisfaction rather than discontent and protest (Al-Faqih, 2012, p. 21).

Moreover, the size, strength, and duration of NATO's military operations in Libya resulted in enormous human losses among military and civilians in many of the NATO-targeted locations. This also destroyed entire Libyan cities such as Sirte and Misurata (International Legal Aid Group (ELAC), 2012, p. 42).

Additionally, to the consecration of a vast social segment dubbed the "environment of the revolution," the absence of party institutions with clearly defined programs that are supposed to contribute to the purposeful and conscious political movement of the Libyan people's political, social, and economic realities, and the fact that resolutions 1970 and 1973, despite their reliance on the responsibility to protect, do not entail the responsibility to protect.

As a result, Libya faces significant challenges, including democratic transition; state-building; economic recovery; oil re-production; weak institutional structures; and modernization requirements. This topic will be discussed in this article.

Democratic Transition and State-Building Challenges

Libya distinguished itself from the rest of the Arab system during the Gaddafi era by failing to adhere to the procedural definition of the state embodied in the political contract, namely the constitution and the institutional bureaucratic structure of the army, parliament, security, and police, as well as the absence of a political and social network distinct from the system of parties, unions, and other institutions. This is a significant challenge for the National Council during the transitional period in terms of maturing sovereign institutions such as the national army, security, and various ministries, as well as creating a political climate conducive to the crystallization of diverse political ideas. In a way that contributes to the establishment of organized formations with various names in the post-Gaddafi era, the future of the state and the coming regime in Libya are represented in light of an

unavoidable political fact: "NATO" was a fundamental partner of the "National Transitional Council." Libya's former political system (Belkiziz, 2011, p. 121).

France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have contributed to NATO's campaign against the former Libyan political regime. Each of them is seeking a fair share of reconstruction projects with estimated revenues in the billions of dollars, which will have an effect and repercussions on the Libyan economy.

NATO's Secretary-General stated, "the alliance does not intend to deploy ground forces in Libya, but it has other modes of existence consistent with its soft security strategy." This is demonstrated in the Libyan case of "institutionalizing security," as stated in the academic vision. On the alliance's performance and content during the Libyan crisis: The demise of the Gaddafi regime does not necessarily imply the state's stability, as it still requires international assistance to build, as it lacks the governance structures and institutions necessary for security and stability (Kishk, 2011, p. 25).

Fears of the state dissolving into independent entities increased in the new Libya after Libyan leaders declared the Cyrenaica region in eastern Libya a federated part with self-rule. This sometimes came on the pretext of expressing identities with the right to self-expression and at other times in protest against the new ruling regime's bias. For groups without others, and even though the signatories of the Burqa Declaration affirmed their commitment to the state's unity, they adopted the 1951 Constitution of Independence, which established Libya as a federal kingdom comprised of three states: Tripoli, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan, each of which enjoys self-rule and which some believe presents opportunities for the partition scenario to be realized. In Libya, following Gaddafi's overthrow, this is precisely what human rights defender Azza al-Maqhour warned against, stating that "resistance to democracy is fueling regionalism at the expense of national cohesion, with the potential for a confrontation between elected authorities and an unelected authority" (Al-Maqhour, 2012).

There is an escalating relationship between international humanitarian intervention in various forms and the increasing tendency of societies to secede from the central state, as evidenced by the experiences of international interventions in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Kurdistan, and Iraq, and that relationship begins in two fronts. There is no reason to remain in a central state that has been weakened by international intervention and has lost its legitimacy. On the other hand, there may be a point of convergence of interests with an international intervention that views dismantling as a means of achieving its objectives (Eid, 2012).

Constructing the state according to the intervening parties' vision requires international assistance to the ruling elites to consolidate the foundations of good governance by focusing on the form of government rather than on who governs.

While there are conflicting indicators for determining the outcome of the transitional stages, there is no doubt that Libya must make significant progress to address the consequences and implications of Gaddafi's rule. This is because his legacy encompassed human rights violations, war crimes, and the squandering of the country's natural and financial resources. Establishing a new value system is rarely complete, as retreat and reversion remain possible. The switch does not occur ultimately, as it does not occur in a straight line but rather along a path filled with contradictions, ruptures, and pain. It appears that changing Libya's value system entails high costs, possibly blood and devastation, which the Libyans have already begun to pay.

Lags in Political Awareness

The most devastating blow to political education has been the failure to establish knowledge as the primary determinant of individual and group consciousness. This is because scientifically based consciousness is more capable of expanding perceptions than consciousness founded on superstition and quackery, and awareness that is ambiguous and receptive to other cultures is more capable of expanding horizons than self-assured and self-absorbed consciousness. As a result, no true

democratic transformation is possible without including scientific knowledge and open cultural performance as factors influencing the mentality that governs social behavior. Because educational institutions, critical conduits for scientific and cognitive empowerment in our country, suffer from structural imbalances, we tend to condone Libyans' lack of political awareness.

The previous regime's closed-minded attitude toward all cultural expatriates, coupled with its stigma of invasion, alienation, and cultural alienation, fostered a fear of openness to other cultures, resulting in a marked narrowing of the intellectual horizon in general and the political horizon in particular. Meanwhile, a utopian ideology that promises earthly paradises and final solutions to all the problems humanity has faced throughout its long history has dominated. This ideology has been associated with a person who ascended to power and assumed the reins of a security system that adopted an exclusionary stance toward all political and cultural elites except those within its orbit. As a result, we have a flawed political consciousness par excellence (Al-Mughairbi & Al-Hasadi, 2019, p. 4).

Following the February Revolution, the brevity of the elapsed period, the benefits of transformation, and the modernity of the democratic experiment all conspired to prevent this awareness from taking necessary reform steps. Suddenly, all doors and windows were opened, and political visions and ideologies rushed in, unincubated by a culture of dialogue or values of tolerance and acceptance of the opposing viewpoint. Religion, politics, and ideology are thrown in the face of every contradictory position. Of course, political awareness cannot be shaped in such circumstances and environments in a way that promotes democratic values.

To illustrate the flawed value system upon which local political awareness is founded, we calculated the Libyans' position on the value of obedience and some political trends, as monitored by the "comprehensive survey of Libyans' views on values," and compared it to the position of the Arab Spring's peoples and some peoples with well-established democracy. Obedience is a static value in a wide variety of activities, including scientific research, technological innovation, artistic creativity, and political participation, because it perpetuates the ancestral tradition and encourages submission to authority and domination in an environment where imitation and obedience are a breakdown of responsibility and a barrier to the initiative.

According to value survey data, Libyans place a high premium on obedience, with six out of ten wishing to instill it in their children's souls, compared to only 6.4 percent in Azerbaijan. In addition, 24 percent of Libyans, 23.2 percent of Tunisians, 25.7 percent of Egyptians, and 45.8 percent of Yemenis believe that obedience to the ruler is a necessary characteristic of democracy. These percentages are significantly lower than those in well-established democratic countries, such as the United States, where they are 8.2 percent; Germany is 2.8 percent; Sweden is 3.2 percent; and the Netherlands is 1.1 percent. It is a well-known fact that democracy values obedience to the ruler. This results from a distorted political upbringing that fostered a culture that venerates obedience to those who assume power, regardless of their management abilities (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Values, 2019).

Regarding actual political participation, 92.9 percent of Swedes and 90.8 percent of Americans have signed or are considering signing the petition, compared to 21.5 percent of Libyans, 25 percent of Tunisians, 20.2 percent of Yemenis, and 4.3 percent of Egyptians. Participation in peaceful demonstrations was 73.2 percent in Sweden and 68.5 percent in the United States but fell to 49.9 percent in Libya, 32.5 percent in Yemen, 31.2 percent in Tunisia, and 10.6 percent in Egypt, despite the Arab Spring countries' dramatic political transformations. In Yemen, 22.1 percent participated in strikes, as did 21.8 percent in Tunisia, 20.9 percent in Libya, and 3.3 percent in Egypt. In comparison, 49.1 percent did so in the United States and 72.5 percent in Sweden (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Values, 2019).

What explains this discrepancy is that in countries with established democracies, a culture of participation instills in citizens a sense of their ability to influence the political process. In Arab Spring

countries, citizens remain under the sway of a parish cultural pattern that feeds their sense of inability to control the process and the futility of their participation.

The Predominance of Exclusionary Tendencies

The impact and danger of exclusionary tendencies on the path and outcome of the democratic transition process cannot be overstated. This tendency manifested itself in behaviors openly hostile to the democratic process, as evidenced by the fact that more than half of Libyans agreed, according to a June 2014 poll, to dismiss all those who held sovereign positions in the former regime (Chivvis & Martini, 2014, p. 22).

Additionally, the type of groups indicates that Libyans dislike their neighborhood, a behavior directly related to the tendency toward exclusion. Those who oppose a group's neighborhood are less likely to tolerate it, and thus more likely to exclude it. The importance of believing in the trustworthiness of others is that suspicion of the other does not contribute to strengthening civic participation, commercial partnership, or international or even local communication, and it does not contribute to dialogue, the primary entitlement in any national reconciliation. This means it may obstruct the democratic transition process in more than one way.

The predominance of exclusionary tendencies in the hierarchy of the Libyan value system, in comparison to the hierarchies of other peoples, is demonstrated by the fact that only a small minority of Libyans recognize others' trustworthiness (10 percent). Sixty-six percent of the Dutch population believes that most people are trustworthy. In Spain, 4.8 percent of people say they do not want their neighbors to be of another race. Libya's rate is 55.1 percent, second only to Azerbaijan's (58.1 percent). In New Zealand, the percentage of residents who do not want their neighbors to incur additional debt is 1.4 percent; in Libya, it reaches 54.1 percent, a figure surpassed by Armenia (56.6 percent). In Uruguay, 1.7 percent of residents oppose their neighbor being a foreign worker. Libya has a rate of 59 percent, which is only exceeded by Malaysia (59.7 percent). Finally, 3.5 percent of Swedes oppose their neighbors' speaking another language. It is 39.3 percent in Libya. It is a ratio in which Libyans outnumber all other human beings on the planet (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Values, 2019).

What has been accomplished in Libya since the fall of the Gaddafi regime is, by all accounts, positive, despite the daily reports of violence or an assault on temporary legitimacy. What has been accomplished is favorable compared to what the country knew over a long accumulation period. The emancipation of people from all complications and restrictions is at the forefront of what has been accomplished, and fear is at the forefront of this. As a result, despite Gaddafi's repeated assertions that people come first, this assertion was not realized until after his regime collapsed. As a result, we see frequent instances of authority mockery and an assault on its symbols and representatives' persons, just as we see the importance and presence of various street levels, even at the expense of the national public interest. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the country faces a long and perilous road before achieving the historic goal of establishing a democratic state, as numerous challenges and obstacles stand in its way (Vandewalle, 2018, p. 36).

While Libya shares many similarities with other countries regarding the post-conflict or civil war phase and how this casts a dense shadow over any democratic transition, Libya also has unique components and challenges. Some of these difficulties stem from the political culture and the nature of the national economy. In contrast, others result from Gaddafi's rule and the circumstances and conditions that followed his ouster. The external threat, or foreign intervention, emerges as the most severe threat to national sovereignty, undermining any possible balances or agreements between the parties. It also magnifies the severity of other challenges, particularly those related to rebuilding and rehabilitating the state and its prestige.

Libyans have no choice but to uphold long-forgotten values to avoid the country's dire consequences of militarization and foreign intervention, rather than calling for more of it, as the dangers of intervention increase, and the error of prioritizing overthrowing authoritarian rule is

repeated. The overthrow of a dictatorship through an armed revolution in the face of the dictator's killing machine would establish violence and its institutions, as well as the possibility of resorting to them at various levels of practice, as an existing or possible issue at a later stage. This appears to be a foregone conclusion, particularly when we consider how dictatorship eliminates or weakens and marginalizes all forces of democracy and change. The methods of struggle employed are inextricably linked to the distribution of influential forces necessary to accomplish the revolution's goals of eradicating tyranny and establishing a democratic system, just as they are inextricably linked to preventing the emergence of a new dictatorship. Jane Sharp observes that in dictatorial regimes, people and civil society institutions are weak while the government is powerful. If this balance of power remains unchanged, the new rulers may wish to be dictators like their predecessors (Sharp, 2013, p. 72).

While indicators are inconclusive in determining the direction of what is occurring or will occur during the decisive transitional phase and what will ultimately prevail in terms of trends and situations following its conclusion, what Lisa Anderson wrote more than two decades ago appears more relevant today. As a result, "Gaddafi's policies defined his regime's legacy in Libya, and any new regime will be required to deal with the economic and social upheaval brought about by his revolution" (Anderson, 1986, p. 24). Libya has a long way to go before addressing the consequences and implications of Gaddafi's governance shortcomings, which extended to everything else. Its adverse effects included human rights violations, war crimes, and squandering national natural and financial resources. On the other hand, Gaddafi's crimes went beyond material devastation, destroying moral values and disrupting society's political culture, a necessary component of cultural development. Gaddafi's legacy has created enormous obstacles, making social reconciliation more difficult, even though it is considered essential for democratization and eventual reconstruction (Secretary-General, 2011).

The Impact of the Crisis on Economic Activity and Oil Production

Civil wars frequently occur in countries that lack the resources necessary to maintain primary governance institutions and provide public services. Libya is a wealthy country compared to many other war-torn countries, with the expectation of a high per capita national income following the end of the conflict. The conflict, as well as a subsequent return to large-scale economic activity, were anticipated. Economic improvement, in turn, was expected to facilitate the peaceful transfer of power and alleviate financial burdens on international donors. Libya should theoretically be in an excellent position to pay for its own reconstruction. The population's high level of wealth and education provides an ideal opportunity to create job opportunities that would facilitate the rebels' disarmament and reintegration.

Libya's energy resources are both a boon and a bane. On the one hand, it relieved Libya of some of the economic constraints that other countries faced in the aftermath of the war, which should encourage Europe, and to a lesser extent, the United States, to care about Libya's future, thus reducing the likelihood of Western policymakers overlooking Libya.

On the other hand, Libya's oil wealth exacerbated both anticipated and unanticipated problems. While oil wealth reduced the need for foreign assistance, it also complicated international actors' influence over Libyan politics. In post-conflict situations, the international community provides foreign aid and peacekeepers, but aid is not a significant factor in the case of Libya. Additionally, Libya's oil wealth has been a hindrance to development and the establishment of Libyan economic institutions and public administration. In the long run, Libya's reliance on oil and gas may jeopardize the stability of democratic transition efforts, particularly if conditions for diversifying the economy and encouraging the private sector do not improve.

Economic battles will be uphill in the current security environment. Because the Libyan government's hold on power is tenuous, most of its economic policies are designed to gather power, buy time, and gain loyalty. This is understandable, but it is not a strategy for reform and growth.

Contraction and Recovery in Oil Production in Libya

Economic activity contracted significantly during the war, with the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011 falling by 60% from 2010, owing to the decline in oil production from 1.77 million barrels per day to just 22,000 barrels per day. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the February 2011 revolution, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1971 imposed international economic sanctions on Libya. Libya's economy has made strides toward peace by releasing some frozen funds, but the Libyan authorities have not been able to access all of them. These were frozen, foreign exchange access was restricted, and foreign workers who fled the country left numerous job openings (Cevik et al., 2012).

Fortunately, the conflict has caused only minor economic damage. Eastern Libya fell under revolutionaries' control early in the conflict, resulting in limited damage. At the same time, Misrata and other cities were heavily bombarded during the fighting, resulting in minor losses to Libya's primary infrastructure and manufacturing industries, while cities supporting Gaddafi, such as Sirte and Ben Waleed, suffered more. NATO also sought to ensure that the Libyan oil and gas industries were not significantly harmed or disrupted during the war's final weeks.

While NATO refrained from attacking Libya's infrastructure, oil production plummeted due to the fighting on the ground. Libya has proven reserves of 47.1 billion barrels, the most in Africa. Libya is one of the top ten oil-producing countries in the world, and it also has significant natural gas reserves (US Energy Information Administration, 2012).

While NATO refrained from attacking Libya's infrastructure, oil production plummeted due to the fighting on the ground. Libya has proven reserves of 47.1 billion barrels, the most in Africa. Libya is one of the top ten oil-producing countries in the world, and it also has significant natural gas reserves (Khan & Mezran, 2013).

Given this reliance on a single resource, oil, the rapid return to oil production was a critical, welcome, and successful step, albeit relatively easy.

While Libya's oil wealth benefits post-conflict reconstruction, it also poses long-term risks, particularly in establishing durable democratic political institutions. When a country's oil wealth is substantial and state-controlled, there are significant incentives for corruption and the appropriation of the wealth by armed militias and tribal groups. This often leads to the rise of tyranny or the fall of a state, as well as to what is sometimes called "the curse of oil" or "the curse of resources." Oil control is now a source of regional and other tensions (Humphreys et al., 2007, p. 146).

The control of oil installations by armed militias in 2013 resulted in a drop in oil production to a post-war low of 160,000 barrels per day in September, costing the Libyan government \$130 million per day in revenue loss. This unrest resulted in the dismissal of foreign companies that were about to increase their investments in Libya's energy sector or even buy oil from the country in the future (Krauss, 2013).

Libya requires prudent energy management as transparency regarding oil wealth expenditures and revenues is critical; the issue of how to distribute energy resources in Libya is also a thorny one, with implications for all political parties; and the method of commodity support needs to be reconsidered, as it encourages Libyans to waste valuable resources that could be better spent on education, health care, and infrastructure development. Subsidies on commodities encourage the smuggling of subsidized goods such as flour and gasoline into neighboring countries. Subsidies in Libya are substantial and reducing them without inciting the populace's wrath will be a significant challenge for future Libyan governments (Chivvis & Martini, 2014, p. 59).

Libya's Economic Future

Economic development along the transitional path provides a decisive impetus for the competing elites' movements toward the formulation of democratic settlements. At the same time, these approaches are compatible with the possibility that economic crises will undermine the entire democratic process. Economic development, it appears in the Libyan case, cannot account for the movements of political elites toward the formulation of democratic settlements. Armed conflicts, whether they are fought for economic gain or to impose a certain ideology, can bring a country to the edge of economic collapse and make it harder to make the transition to democracy that is wanted.

Rentier Economy and Financial Abundance: The increase in Libyan state income during the 1970s due to the rise in oil prices resulted in the state gaining control of economic wealth. The state's intervention in the local economy was pervasive, as it dominated the industrial and agricultural sectors, as well as wholesale and retail trade, and owned banks, insurance companies, and other major service providers, employing approximately 75% of the workforce. The state's monopoly on the rent collection process and its restrictions on activities that promote the emergence of competitive companies and privately owned enterprises have prompted citizens to engage in unproductive rental activities. When the state began implementing economic reforms in the late 1980s, the effect of these circumstances on the economic liberalism strategy became clear (Khan & Mezran, 2013, p. 28).

Due to the availability of oil revenues, the Libyan state has enjoyed a high degree of independence, which has influenced the state formation and expansion process in Libya. In contrast to traditional patterns of spending in social welfare countries with productive economies, which are based on expanding and diversifying the tax base, spending in Libya has resulted in the establishment of large bureaucratic structures characterized by distributive performance. At the same time, regulatory and extractive capabilities remain limited. Due to the local economy's reliance on oil revenue, these capabilities were irrelevant to the Libyan state. The fact is that most of the the Libyan state's ambitions and policies were attainable without the development, empowerment, or strengthening of the horizontal bureaucratic institutions characteristic of the modern state.

Because the Libyan economy is rentier par excellence due to its near-complete reliance on oil revenues to finance expenditures and create jobs. The rentier characteristics are evident in Libyans' attitudes and tendencies toward the questions included in the comprehensive survey of their values views. Additionally, this survey demonstrates the spread of long-standing dependency culture, as evidenced by the view of public office as the embrace of safety, in contrast to the values of creativity, innovation, and risk that characterize workers in the field of individual initiative, where values such as independence, saving, and perseverance are only of interest to a minority of Libyans (38.4 percent, 29.8 percent, and 25.2 percent, respectively) (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Views of Values, 2019).

Financial and Administrative Corruption and Mismanagement of Economic Resources: Since the early 1990s, Libya has been restructuring its economic system and gradually transforming it from one in which the state exerts near-complete control over economic activity to one in which the private sector gradually gains a more significant role. These changes began slowly and cautiously but gained momentum in the early years of the third millennium, particularly following the resolution of the Lockerbie crisis, the lifting of Libya's economic blockade, and the normalization of relations with Western countries.

As a result of shifting economic policy orientations, issues have arisen regarding the state's ability to manage and direct the macroeconomic transformation process as well as to control financial and administrative corruption associated with the transformation process. This means that the success of Libya's economic reform processes required the development of the state's institutional capabilities and the strengthening of the state's role in controlling and organizing these processes. It also required establishing a high level of transparency and accountability to combat financial and administrative corruption.

However, the state was unable to control this for a variety of reasons, the most significant of which are as follows (Nasef, 2019, pp. 60-68):

- (1) Competencies and responsibilities that overlap and conflict at various political and administrative levels, as well as within each level.
- (2) Inadequate balance between the responsibilities assigned to the political and administrative levels and the authority granted to ensure that they are carried out, and decisions are imposed, as some responsibilities are not accompanied by powers equal to them and others by specific responsibilities.
- (3) Ineffectiveness and lack of transparency in accounting processes as a result of the multiplicity of command and enforcement authorities.
- (4) The institutional and spatial instability of structures, political and administrative apparatus, and the resulting waste of public funds.
- (5) The inefficiency of the state's administrative apparatus results from some administrative leaders' low levels of competence and their inefficiency as a result of weak selection mechanisms, controls, and standards.

Of course, there has been no positive change in the economic mechanisms following the February revolution. Instead, because of the unfavorable security situation and the state's inability to impose any control, it has become more random and disoriented while remaining completely unemployed in some areas.

Libya requires economic reforms to improve the working environment to achieve long-term economic growth. Although some reforms began before the war, economic reforms during the Gaddafi era were primarily concerned with preserving power, not economic efficiency. Most of the post-Qaddafi policies are not conducive to achieving long-term sustainable growth (Vandewalle, 2012, p. 181).

Labor laws and financial and commercial regulations were largely irrational during the Gaddafi era. Non-oil infrastructure was neglected, and the educational system became clogged with students pursuing degrees unrelated to the labor market, as is the case in many oil-producing countries. Commodity support distorted the market. It is highly economical, particularly when it comes to gasoline, which is estimated to cost an average of 12 cents per liter, making it the cheapest in the world. As a result of these policies, the Libyan economy was distorted, the non-oil sector remained marginal, and official unemployment rates were high due to the scarcity of Libyans willing to work for low wages outside the government sector. In 2010, the official unemployment rate was 13.5 percent, and the percentage of unemployed youth is estimated to be higher than twice that (Khan & Mezran, 2013).

Libya must continue organizational and financial reforms and establish a fair judiciary, legislation, and property protection measures, among other things. Wholesale and retail sales, as well as current oil services, all represent promising economic diversification opportunities.

If the civil war continues, Libyans will enjoy a relatively high standard of living following the conflict's conclusion, owing to their available energy resources. The state's greatest challenge will be met by reforming the national economy to lay the groundwork for a stable political system in which citizens work productively. Additionally, economic reforms will be difficult to implement unless the security situation is stabilized, and the political process is legitimate.

Weak Institutional Structures and Modernization Requirements

Libya's state and society inherited an inclusive heritage as well as a traditional and submissive political culture. Libya has never had democracy because the Gaddafi regime was a dictatorship.

The crisis can be overcome by forging a national unity that takes tribal diversity into account as a critical factor in forming social and political reality. Libya's transition should be gradual and facilitated by social and cultural engineering (Belkiziz, 2011, p. 120).

The recognition of the tribe as a fundamental unit in Libyan society should not lead to an exaggerated reliance on it as a foundational reference for the national state, as this would constitute a call to self-retreat. The tribe should not be politicized, resulting in the state's fragmentation and collapse.

We will examine the nature of some Libyan state institutions' performance in this section, ascertain their capacity to bear the burdens of this process, and determine whether they have made any progress toward dismantling the dominant state that dominated during the previous regime.

Poor Performance of the Transitional Legislative and Executive Institutions

The democratic process's success is contingent upon the presence of capable political leaders who embrace democracy as a strategic choice, a pledge, and a national commitment. However, when one considers the role of Libyan political leaders following the February Revolution, one quickly realizes that they have fallen short in this regard. Human Rights Watch expressed concern about the lack of transparency surrounding the transitional council in particular. The general public was unaware of what occurred in the council chambers, but they were concerned about controlling and implementing those with a specific orientation. At the legislative level, there was a distinct lack of responsibility delineation, resulting in overlap in terms of reference and an ongoing debate with the Executive Office (Al-Mughairbi, Zahi and Al-Hasadi, 2019, p. 27).

Despite massive budget allocations, successive legislatures and governments have been unable to devise practical solutions for moving the national economy forward, addressing centralization issues, confronting the proliferation of arms and armed formations, and building the national army. This has led to citizens' confidence in the transitional phase's institutions and political leaders.

Trust in legislative and executive institutions directly affect their acceptance and sense of legitimacy and thus is a critical indicator of their performance quality. The "comprehensive value survey" revealed that Libyans lack confidence in the military (armed forces), the security establishment (the police), the courts (the judicial authority), the parliament (the legislative power), and the central government in the capital, in comparison to their counterparts in other countries (the executive power).

In that survey, 59.9 percent of Tunisians, 49.4 percent of Libyans, and 38.1 percent of Yemenis expressed a high or substantial level of confidence in the armed forces. Most of the Tunisians' confidence in their military establishment can be attributed to their armed forces' constructive role during the revolution and their absence from political life. Yemen's low level of confidence can be attributed to the military establishment's support for the former regime and its direct interference in the political process (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Values, 2019).

In this regard, the divisions among Libyans may reflect the nature of the Libyan experience. On the one hand, the lack of trust in the military establishment reflects a negative view of the 1969 coup and the nature of the military rule that dominated the country and contributed to its political, economic, and social backwardness. This is also because the security brigades that were part of the Libyan army remained loyal to the old government until the very end.

On the other hand, those who have confidence in the military establishment can trace their position back to the early defection of many armed forces officers and soldiers, as well as the Libyan citizens' desire for a strong military establishment amid the prevailing arms chaos. Of course, the Libyans do not have to trust, and the state of insecurity, as previously stated, in the military institution's actual ability to impose its control and restore the state's prestige is a factor (Ihmida, 2012, p. 13).

Regarding the security establishment (the police), 59.1 percent of Tunisians, 55.2 percent of Libyans, and 50.3 percent of Egyptians expressed strong or very strong confidence in the security establishment. This may reflect less confidence in the security establishment's past or current performance than it does in need of a security institution that provides security and stability.

Concerning trust in courts, it stands at 54.4 percent in Egypt, 53.1 percent in Libya, 47.4 percent in Tunisia, and 20.3 percent in Yemen, indicating a desire to activate the judicial institution to realize rights and administer justice, while also reflecting Sweden's rise (75.5 percent). The judiciary's strength in it, and its decline in the United States of America (53.8 percent), reflects minorities' negative perceptions of the courts' role and their bias against them.

The survey's findings on citizens' confidence in legislative councils reveal a high degree of similarity across Arab Spring countries, as all of them expressed a low level of confidence, which did not exceed 5.9 percent in Tunisia, 9.9 percent in Yemen, 13.6 percent in Libya, and 25.3 percent in Syria. This reflects the citizens' experience with these councils in Egypt, whether in terms of their complete compliance with previous regulations or their poor performance and inability to conduct state affairs. On the other hand, it reaches 59.3 percent in Sweden, but drops to 20.2 percent in the USA, possibly due to the general climate of hostility and suspicion toward central federal authorities.

The situation is similar regarding confidence in the capital's central government, with 17.8 percent of Tunisians, 22.5 percent of Libyans, 27.5 percent of Yemenis, and 54.4 percent of Egyptians expressing high or very high confidence in it. Tunisian, Libyan, and Yemeni citizens' lack of confidence in their governments can be explained by the marginalization and injustice meted out to residents of regions remote from the capital. The Swedes' (59.9 percent) and Americans' (32.6 percent) confidence in the central government in the capital are due to the same factors that determined their confidence in the central authority (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Values, 2019).

In summary, the performance of Libya's transitional legislative and executive institutions falls short of the stage's merits, as citizens' confidence in these institutions is low, reflecting their dissatisfaction with their performance. As will be demonstrated in the following sections, these institutions' poor performance is one of the reasons for questioning their legitimacy.

Questioning the Legitimacy of the Transitional Period Institutions

No democratic society can last indefinitely without some semblance of legitimacy. Legitimacy is a difficult concept to define and quantify, particularly in authoritarian societies, but it can be simplified by dividing it into three components (Mahdi, 2011, p. 83):

Geographical legitimacy: this means that those who live within the state's borders accept or do not oppose the state's territorial boundaries except through constitutional means. If individuals and groups lack confidence in the legitimacy of the state's geographical framework, democratic political processes will be jeopardized, and in extreme cases, the threat may manifest as separatist movements. Without democratic means of secession, groups are unlikely to follow democratic processes, and violence becomes almost inevitable.

In Libya, extremist terrorist claims have emerged that rejects not only the state's concept but also the democratic transition process. Due to the former regime's marginalization policies and their continuation following the February Revolution, separatist claims emerged, even if they used the call for a federal system to justify their actions. In both instances, there is an explicit or implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the state's geographic framework and shared national identity.

"Legitimacy of the constitution" refers to widespread acceptance of the rules governing the organization and distribution of political power, as well as competition for it. Establishing constitutional norms is one of the most challenging aspects of the democratic transition process because it exposes a diverse and conflicting range of interests. Each group seeks to understand how the new constitutional arrangements affect their interests and ensure they are protected. Because various groups seek to influence the shape and content of the constitution, negotiations and bargaining are frequently arduous and challenging.

There is clear polarization in Libya regarding the form and system of government. According to the most recent survey conducted by The Research and Consulting Center at the University of Benghazi, the presidential system is preferred by 44.1 percent of respondents, followed by the mixed

system (34.5 percent). The parliamentary system (18.9 percent) is the least preferred. On the other hand, 59.2 percent believe that administrative decentralization is the best system for Libya; 28.8 percent prefer centralization, and 10.8 percent prefer federalism. Due to the country's security chaos and the control of militias and groups operating outside the law, it is not ruled out that any loser of his case, as determined by the results of the upcoming referendum, will doubt the legitimacy of the body tasked with formulating its project or the referendum's integrity. Therefore, it could make up any other reason to avoid constitutional arrangements against its interests (Ali & Robbins, 2014, p. 8).

Political legitimacy is a term that refers to the degree to which citizens believe that the current authorities have the legal authority to assume power. Political legitimacy can be established when competitive election results accurately reflect voter preferences in accordance with constitutional and institutional rules and arrangements.

However, we do not lack anyone who questions the existing regime's eligibility to assume power during the transition period simply because his party, clan, or militia did not accept his assumption. In times of security turmoil, voter preferences alone do not determine who runs the state. When certain political currents lose at the ballot box, they may resort to ammunition boxes to defend their interests. This type of legitimacy questioning reached a zenith when the General National Congress refused to cede power to the elected House of Representatives. This led to the establishment of two powers on the ground and the outbreak of violent armed clashes.

Thus, it becomes clear that the issue of legitimacy, in all its manifestations, may threaten to derail the democratization process and even allow the country to fall into the failed state category.

The Weakness of the Military and the State's Inability to Control Security

National security in Libya during the previous regime was based on regime security, as it was based on preserving the political system and means of strengthening it. Numerous factors confirmed this concept's supremacy, including the neutralization and dissolution of the military establishment, the formation of alternative forces to protect the regime, and the military's and other security institutions' reliance on traditional sources of recruitment, such as kinship and ideological loyalty. In general, the revolution overthrew a security system that failed to comprehend the concept of human security as it is (Ihmida, 2012, p. 25).

- (1) It is based on silencing voices against injustice, confiscating freedoms and rights of expression, and the proliferation of devices and their continued incubation.
- (2) It increases tension and division and contributes to creating shipments of social and political anger that no one can predict the size and methods of its explosion.

In fact, matters did not improve in any way following the revolution but deteriorated in numerous ways, and Libyans expressed their concern about the security situation in various ways. Over two-thirds of Libyans support prohibiting organized groups from joining the armed forces, prohibiting military formations outside the armed forces, and prohibiting the armed forces from interfering in political life.

Four in ten Libyans believe the country requires a strong leader, and nine believe the army and police should be activated to achieve security (Comprehensive Survey of Libyans' Values, 2019).

In short, the country's security situation is insufficiently stable to allow for the democratic process to proceed. The case is such that it is not durable enough for life to function correctly. When security is compromised, the citizens' faith in everything is eroded. The capital does not terrify it nearly as much as the absence of security. Without protection, neither the state of institutions nor the provisions of the constitution establishing it can be found. On the other hand, values are difficult to memorize in the absence of security. Compassion, tolerance, solidarity, altruism, and justice have no place in their conscience when they are obsessed with preserving their life.

In the absence of a regular army in Libya and with the ousted Libyan president's security battalions serving as the primary pillars of the authority's informal security structure during the

former Libyan regime, militias that were instrumental in overthrowing the Gaddafi regime have developed into a major issue following the regime's demise. These militias and their numbers are ambiguous, with some estimating there are a hundred groups and others estimating there are triple that number. It is reported that over 125,000 Libyans carry weapons; these groups have clashed repeatedly, and rebuilding Libya requires addressing the fate of these militias (Zunmino, 2011, p. 19).

NATO appears poised to repeat the lessons of Afghanistan and Iraq, which gave the alliance tremendous influence in those countries. The decision to dispatch security experts from alliance members may have been the first step in implementing this strategy, which NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen explicitly referred to when he stated, "President Barack Obama of the United States of America has announced a long-term strategy to support democratic reform and economic development in North Africa and the Middle East, and NATO can make a significant contribution in this area." For Libya and many other countries in the region, modern defense and security institutions that are fully accountable to democratically elected authorities will be a critical priority. "We welcome a democratic Libya as a partner in the Mediterranean dialogue," Rasmussen added (Rasmussen, Middle East, 2011).

Even though the security factor continues to influence the new Libyan government's ability to establish itself in light of the new reality, security is still a big challenge. The problem is the chaos caused by armed groups, some of which continue to operate independently of the central military leadership subject to the Libyan government.

The breakdown of security institutions, the proliferation of weapons in Libyan society, and the looting of weapons stores facilitated the emergence of organized crime and the spread of revenge and revenge operations against groups opposed to the revolution, most notably the presence of tens of thousands of victims of Colonel Gaddafi's regime, and some Transitional Council members admitted that the security situation is dire. This is one of the most dangerous files that should be addressed due to its impact on the situation's stability.

Among the fundamental requirements for the process of establishing the new Libyan state are the following: the availability of a minimum level of security stability in a state consumed by chaos; the establishment of general stability; the disarmament of militias; support for the establishment of the Libyan National Security Forces; and encouragement of the initiative with a serious political start to lay the groundwork for good governance and the abolition of the prevailing governance traditions. All Libyans have the right to participate in the new system without political isolation or political or social discrimination based on their full citizenship rights. This is highly important for the security situation's stability (Haseeb, 2011, p. 10).

NATO played a significant role in international humanitarian intervention in Libya due to the United Nations' inability to resolve the Libyan conflict peacefully, prompting the UN body to adopt new international policies based on delegating the use of force to regional organizations via UN Security Council resolutions. NATO was not explicitly mentioned in the 1970 or 1973 resolutions as conducting military operations in Libya.

NATO has flouted international resolutions on everything from imposing an air embargo on Libyan military air traffic, protecting civilians, and providing humanitarian assistance to the Libyan people to a mission that went above and beyond those objectives by bombing civilian targets and government headquarters. In exchange, the UN Security Council has remained silent on NATO's operations.

Conclusion

Libya's regime change as a result of international humanitarian intervention has opened up previously unknown doors on humanitarian, political, security, and social levels. The assassination of the American ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, during the attack on the consulate in Benghazi, eviscerates the myth that Libya is stable, free, and steadfast in its pursuit of modern democracy.

The more international intervention is linked to state-building efforts, the better the chances of dealing with societal structures that generate chaos efficiently and effectively, which means approaching their dismantling and replacement with new structures that create security and peace values. The effective intervention aims to establish a permanent solution, which must include the establishment of a state capable of preserving social stability within its borders.

While this type of intervention may benefit Libya on a local level, some believe it has a detrimental effect on international relations and is a threat to all countries. The threat is to deprive them of sovereignty over their territory, ostensibly for humanitarian reasons. The critical factor in this was an intervention, which resulted in the end of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's rule and compelled the UN body to intervene with the most significant degree of intervention in its history. This intervention, I believe, represents a paradigm shift in international relations, or at the very least a re-examination of one of its most fundamental concepts, that of national sovereignty, and Libya today may seem more in need than ever of a clear and comprehensive road map that will reintroduce this country to the Arab and international political landscapes.

The Libyan state's primary challenge is to cross Libya to safety and escape its predicament by working to rebuild a new Libya that brings all parties together through the following:

- (1) Disarming armed militias in all their manifestations and strengthening the security institution: The Libyan state's conditions cannot be improved until these groups are disarmed, which is inextricably linked to enhancing the security establishment's ability to impose the law on everyone.
- (2) Using Libyan oil as a weapon against extremism by redistributing oil revenues to ensure social equality and justice, as well as the satisfaction of all geographical and tribal groups.
- (3) Establishing a strong army: it monopolizes the acquisition of weapons and protects the country and its people from conflicts and disputes over power and wealth, which is critical for the nascent Libyan state's survival.
- (4) Inclusion of militias and armed groups in the political process: The existing government must work to include these groups in Libya's future consultations, relying on the logic of inclusion rather than exclusion.
- (5) Consensus among political forces regarding the state's form: There is disagreement among ideological currents, particularly Islamic ones, regarding the Libyan state's vision. As a result, there must be some agreement on the system's and state's shape.
- (6) Coordination with neighboring countries to tighten the screws on extremist groups: Due to Libya's state's inability to control borders, extremist groups can spread their ideas and have the possibility of contact with others who share their views in neighboring countries.
- (7) Coordination with major countries in the fight against terrorism and extremist groups, particularly with NATO countries, in order to assist Libya in establishing security institutions and undergoing a democratic transformation process.
- (8) Initiating a comprehensive national reconciliation process involving all segments of Libyan society, including regions, cities, and tribes, energizes the judiciary's role in prosecuting those responsible for criminal acts.

Finally, Libya's democratic process faces numerous impediments and difficulties, and each impediment, in its own unique way and proportion, contributes to impeding the desired transformation process. Perhaps by framing the obstacles as challenges, we convey an optimistic message that nothing stands in the way of the Libyans overcoming these obstacles by confronting the challenges they pose. The fact that some groups have taken positions in favor of strengthening the civil state and that the electoral experiment has been successful four times in a row demonstrates that a sizable segment of Libyans are betting on peaceful solutions, despite the proliferation of weapons, and prefer democratic options, despite their recent experience. However, the impact of the current value system, with all its associated negative behaviors, and the fact that the previous regime's legacy

of devastation, with all its unfortunate consequences, is too great to be displaced within a few years. Possibilities for democratization are supposed to multiply in countries with a political culture that supports democratic trends. However, the previous regime's disorganized political upbringing severely impedes Libya's democratic transformation. This resulted in, among other things, backward political awareness and traitorous exclusionary tendencies.

Regrettably, the economic recovery in Libya following the international humanitarian intervention did not proceed according to plan, owing to a stalled political process and insecurity. While oil production quickly recovered to pre-international humanitarian intervention levels, rapidly escalating insecurity posed a significant impediment to economic progress. For a time, the violence diverted the government's attention. It resulted in the intimidation of foreign workers and investors, both of whom Libya needed to achieve economic stability. For a time, Libya was able to subsist on oil revenues. Unfortunately, less than eighteen months after Gaddafi's assassination and the outbreak of political unrest coincided with the Libyan state's weakness, which allowed gangs and armed militias to seize control of the country's multiple production ports, and oil production fell to dangerously low levels. This revealed that the country's economy was weak.

One of the most severe issues confronting Libya is the fragility of political structures in comparison to traditional social structures as a result of power inflation, the absence of a state, and the absence of political life in Libya for more than forty years, with the resulting phenomena of disagreement between the nascent state power and traditional civil authority, and the difficulty of establishing mechanisms for distributing national symbols. Tribal diversity needs to be incorporated into the structures of the new Libyan government through the principle of equal political representation and consensual democracy.

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Disclosure Statement

The author has declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. The author has received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.