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The New Authoritarianism Tendency and the Problem of Right to Revolution

Yeni Otoriteryanizm Eğilimi ve Devrim Hakkı Problemi

Abstract

This work is on the problem of new authoritarianism and the right to revolution. The main problem of the work is whether people will be given the right to revolution in the face of the new authoritarianism tendency. Should people be given the right to revolution in the face of this new authoritarian tendency? If people are given the right to revolution, when will this right emerge? We will try to analyze this study, which we have drawn on these questions, through Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Their description of the state of nature lies at the center of Hobbes' and Locke's reflections on the right to revolution. Hobbes and Locke's thoughts on the state of nature first shaped their ideas on the social contract, then on the state, and finally on the right to revolution. Hobbes described the state of nature as a state of war. In order to get rid of the state of war, people have transferred all their powers to the state. The state, which has all the powers, is exempt from the revolution. Even if the state crosses its borders, it is much better than the state of nature that will emerge with the revolution. Locke emphasizes that the state of nature is peaceful. People have transferred to the state only the power to protect the property and the power to punish. Therefore, the state has limited power. The state, which has limited power, is not exempt from revolution.

Keywords: Nev Authoritarianism, right to revolution, Hobbes, Locke.

Öz

Bu çalışma yeni otoriteryanizm ve devrim hakkı problemi üzerinedir. Çalışmanın temel problematiğini yeni otoriteryanizm eğilimi karşısında insanlara devrim hakkının tanınıp tanınmayacağı sorusu oluşturmaktadır. Bu yeni otoriteryanizm eğilimi karşısında insanlara devrim hakkı tanınmalı mıdır? Eğer insanlara devrim hakkı tanınırsa, bu hak ne zaman ortaya çıkacaktır? Bu sorular üzerinden çerçevesini çizdiğimiz bu çalışmayı Thomas Hobbes ve John Locke üzerinden incelemeye çalışacağız. Hobbes'un ve Locke'un devrim hakkı üzerine düşüncelerinin temelinde onların doğa durumu tasviri yatmaktadır. Hobbes ve Locke'un doğa durumunu tasvir etme şekli de önce toplum sözleşmesi üzerine fikirlerini, daha sonra devlete ve en nihayetinde devrim üzerine fikirlerini şekillendirmiştir. Hobbes doğa durumunu savaş durumu olarak tasvir etmiştir. Savaş durumundan kurtulmak için insanlar bütün yetkilerini devlete devretmişlerdir. Bütün yetkileri elinde toplayan devlet devrimden muafdir çünkü devlet sınırlarını aşsa bile devrimle birlikte ortaya çıkacak olan doğa durumundan çok daha iyidir. Locke ise doğa durumunun daha barışçıl bir niteliğine sahip olduğunu vurgular. İnsanlar devlete sadece mülkiyeti koruma iktidarı ve cezalandırma iktidarı devretmiştir. Bu yüzden, devlet uyrukları üzerinde sınırlı bir güce sahiptir. Sınırlı güce sahip olan devlet devrimden muaf değildir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni Otoriteryanizm, devrim hakkı, Hobbes, Locke.

Introduction

In the 21st century, a new tendency began to emerge: authoritarianism. This new tendency of authoritarianism re-emerged in reaction to democratic forces trying to build a more accountable and less corrupt system. Parallel to the global decline of democracy (Bieber, 2020, p. 1), the new tendency of authoritarianism is on the rise, eroding democratic guarantees and the rule of law. Writing in the *Journal of Democracy* in 2006, Carl Gershman and Michael Allen characterized this threat of authoritarianism as a “problem that involves a relatively limited number of countries— approximately 20 out of the more than 80” where democracy assistance was being provided at the time. The new authoritarianism tendency, which emerged as a problem involving a limited number of countries in the first decade of the 20th century, began to become a somewhat global form in the second decade of the 21st century. This new authoritarianism, which takes various forms depending on the regional context, is part of a global tendency (Greskovits, 2015; Plattner, 2015). From the Balkan states to states in Asia and Africa, new authoritarian tendencies began dominating (Cooley, 2016).

The main problem of the study is where the right to revolution stands in the face of the problem of re-emerging authoritarianism. Should people be given the right to revolution in the face of this new authoritarian tendency? If people are given the right to revolution, when will this right emerge? Will the right to revolution given to the people build a new order, or will it lead to more chaos? At this point, to limit our work, we center on the thoughts of Hobbes and Locke, who have opposing views on the revolution. The opposing ideas of Hobbes and Locke on the right to revolution will enable us to think scientifically on the problem of the new authoritarianism, which is on the rise again in the 21st century.

1. The Problem of New Authoritarianism

With the end of the cold war, a new world order began to be built. One-party and military dictatorships and authoritarian regimes collapsed in Africa, Eurasia, and much of Asia and Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Parallel to this collapse of one-party and military dictatorships, democratic tendencies began to spread (Levitsky and Way, 2010). This process has been called the “third wave of democratization” (Wiatr, 2019). However, this wave of optimism under the name of the third democratization was accompanied by a wave of pessimism that tried to be suppressed. In other words, the third wave of democratization was accompanied by “a third reverse wave”. Samuel Huntington (1991, pp. 292-293) tried to summarize the causes of the third reverse wave in six points:

- 1) systemic failures of democratic regimes, leading to the undermining of their legitimacy, (2) a general international economic collapse, (3) a shift to authoritarianism by a great power, (4) the lack of the usual preconditions for democracy in several newly democratic states, (5) the growth of power of a nondemocratic state beyond its borders, and (6) the emergence of “various forms of authoritarianism” appropriate to the needs of the times.

The authoritarianism tendency, which became more visible in the 21st century, began to spread in the Middle East and North Africa (King, 2009), especially in Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, in the Western Balkans (Bieber, 2020). There is no clear definition of what the new authoritarianism is that rises in the shadow of democracy because there is a democratic process at the beginning of new authoritarian tendencies, unlike the old authoritarianism. Old authoritarianism was often the product of violence. Authoritarian regimes were the products of military coups or civil wars. While they have the support of a segment of society, they have seldom tested public support in an open and fair election. On the contrary, new authoritarian regimes come to power through democratic elections and enjoy high public support (Wiatr, 2019, p. 175). Therefore, definitions of concepts such as “delegative democracy” and sometimes “illiberal democracy” have been suggested for this tendency, which stands within the boundaries of democracy-authoritarianism (Wiatr, 2019, p. 173). Some scholars also refer to it as the hybrid regime, which has a peculiar combination of authoritarian and democratic elements (Robertson, 2010; Treisman 2011). Another widely accepted definition in the literature is competitive authoritarianism. Competitive authoritarianism is best defined by Levitsky and Way (2010). According to Levitsky and Way (2010, p. 5),

Competitive authoritarian regimes are civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-à-vis their opponents. Such regimes are competitive in that opposition parties use democratic institutions to contest seriously for power, but they are not democratic because the playing field is heavily skewed in favor of incumbents. Competition is thus real but unfair.

When we consider authoritarianism in this way, we can see that authoritarianism is on the rise again in today's world, and even has become a global form (Cooley, 2016). From the Balkan states to the states in Asia and Africa, such authoritarian regimes are beginning to dominate. However, our aim in this study is not to explain this new authoritarianism's structures and features. The point I would like to mention here is that in the 21st century, authoritarianism has begun to take on a somewhat global form. The central problem of the study is where the right to revolution stands in the face of this authoritarianism problem

Hobbes and Locke have opposing views on the right to revolution. There are three points at the root of Hobbes and Locke's opposing views on the right to revolution: The state of nature, the social contract, and finally, the rights they transferred to the state they invented by contract. Therefore, to reveal what the two thinkers thought about the right to revolution, we will focus on their thoughts on the state of nature, secondly on their thoughts on the social contract, and finally on the rights that they transferred to the state.

Hobbes describes the state of nature as a state in which all humans are at war with each other. To avoid this state of war, people come together and make a social covenant. With the social covenant, people renounce their rights in the state of nature. They invent the state in which all the rights they renounced are gathered in a single body to implement the covenant. The state has absolute power over its subjects by collecting all the rights of the human being in the state of nature into its own hands.

On the other hand, Locke describes the state of nature as a state of partial peace (Abramson, 2009, p. 201) unlike Hobbes. Man in the state of nature only has the right to protect property and punish. However, this right of punishment, where everyone is the judge of their case, can be abused and drag people into chaos. Therefore, people in the state of nature renounce their right to punish with the social contract and then transfer it to the state for the contract to remain in force.

This difference in the way Hobbes and Locke describe the state of nature, hence the meaning they attribute to the social contract, and finally, the power they transferred to the sovereign power determines whether people will have the right to revolution. Since Hobbes attributes absolute power to the sovereign, he sees the sovereign as exempt from revolution; therefore, he does not give people the right to revolution. Since Locke attributes limited power to the sovereign, he does not see the sovereign as exempt from revolution; therefore, he gives people the right to revolution.

2. Thomas Hobbes: The State of War, the Sovereign's Absolute Power

Hobbes's description of the state of nature lies at the basis of the formation of his ideas on revolution. This depiction of Hobbes would later shape the content of the meaning he ascribed to the sovereign and, ultimately, his ideas on revolution. Living in a time of civil war in England, Hobbes himself witnessed how chaotic human nature was. The civil war in England showed Hobbes how the chaotic nature of humans manifests when there is no authority to restrain the human will (Hill, 1997, p. 249). Hobbes put forward the idea of the state of nature to describe this chaotic nature of people who emerged in the absence of sovereign authority. There is much debate about how the state of nature should be understood¹, but in the most general sense, the state of nature refers to a situation in which

¹ Jain says that Hobbes's concept of the state of nature may firstly be taken as an actual, pre-social, and primitive historical period. Secondly, it could be taken to refer to fully socialized individuals at those moments when the security of well enforced law is either absent or ineffective. Thirdly, it could refer to the relationship that holds between any two sovereigns, between sides in a civil war or between a sovereign and some individual in a state of nature. The concept of a state of nature might also be understood in a fourth sense, as simply an abstract fiction which serves as the criterion for justice and legitimacy (Kain, 1987, pp. 203-204).

there is no sovereign authority to restrain people's will. Hobbes builds his thoughts on politics and its extension, the revolution, on this state of nature.

In the state of nature, according to Hobbes, man pursues unlimited and absolute power. The first and most crucial point of human nature is the perpetual desire for power, which will only end with death. The cause why man is constantly chasing the desire for power is the fear that man cannot secure the rights one has to lead a better life. (Hobbes, 1997, p. 61).

Hobbes' rule of the state of nature is: everyone has an equal right to everything. Nature hath made men so equal that despite differences in body and mind, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest (Abramson, 2009, p. 183). In the state of nature, where there is such rough equality, Hobbes states that everyone has similar desires to achieve goals, which makes Hobbes' state of nature a state of war. As Abramson (2009, p. 184) stated that everyone's desire for the same things brings competition, competition brings hostility, and hostility brings the need to destroy the rival. In Hobbes' state of nature, man is also free. According to Hobbes (1997, p. 79), man has the freedom to do whatever he wants to achieve his goal. Hobbes's equality in the state of nature and freedom to do anything reveals the state of war. As Hobbes (1997, p. 77) stated, the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man". However, the fact that everyone is at war with everyone does not mean that people are at war all the time. What Hobbes means here is a situation where there is no sovereign power to keep people in fear and, therefore, control their behavior, and there is a tendency to skirmish at any moment (Tannenbaum, 2019). Tricaud also pointed to this. Tricaud (1988, p. 108) says it is clear what does not exist in the state of nature: the sovereign power. Hobbes (1997, pp. 77-78) expresses this situation as follows:

In a state of nature where everyone is at war with everyone, no one has any survival security, and everyone fears death. So, how will escaping from this state of nature occur? Hobbes' answer was the social covenant. He states that this happens in three stages. This unsecured environment, the fear of death, first reveals the first natural law that underlies the idea of the social covenant: "to seek peace and follow it" (Hobbes (1997, p. 80). As Hill (1997, p. 252) stated, to seek peace and follow it is the clue to all success of Hobbes. However, how can peace be achieved in a situation where everyone is at war with everyone? Hobbes' answer was the second law that fully introduced the idea of the social covenant: The mutual transferring of right (Hobbes, 1997, p. 80).

By transferring their rights, people acquire the right to protect their own life. The second law of nature, which fully reveals the idea of the social covenant, is followed by the third law, which will guarantee the social covenant: men perform their covenants made. According to Hobbes (1997, p. 88), as long as this law does not exist, everyone's freedom and equality to do anything continues.

Hobbes' description of the state of nature led him to the idea of the social covenant. In other words, people can get rid of the war situation with a social covenant. Hobbes' idea of the social covenant also shaped his ideas about sovereign power, the state. As Medina (1990, p. 14) stated, for the social covenant to remain in effect, there must be a sovereign power, the state, that will enable people to fulfill their covenants.

People guarantee the right to self-preservation, which they have acquired through the social covenant, through sovereign power. There is no guarantee that every man will abide by the covenant unless there is a sovereign power that has absolute power over all, thus having the power to control the conduct of all. The security aimed at by the social covenant cannot be achieved if there is no established power. Hobbes thus expresses the necessity of sovereign power. After Hobbes stated the necessity of sovereign power, he sought solutions on how to provide this power. This power cannot be exercised by merging a few individuals or families or by a majority that a single decision-maker does not lead. "The only way to erect such a common power", Hobbes (1997, pp. 105-106) says,

as may be able to defend them from the invasion of foreigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort as that by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth they may nourish themselves and live contentedly, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will...

Thus, a commonwealth, in Latin, Civitas, which the multitude so united in one person, is emerged. This commonwealth has almost divine power. Just as God has absolute power over his servants, commonwealth has absolute power over its subjects. This commonwealth is mortal god.

In the face of the state, which has divine power and absolute authority, no subject has the right to renounce the state. No one can oppose the state established by the covenant (Hobbes, 1997, p. 107). This power of Hobbes' state comes from the nature of the covenant. In Leviathan, each covenant with each not to form a people but to establish sovereign. Thus, there is no covenant between the sovereign and a people which could limit the sovereign's power: there is no independent people that might constitute an authority alternative to the sovereign (Kain, 1987, p. 210). Hobbes grants absolute power to the state and abolishes the right of his subjects to object to the state. The state is essential; Where there is no state, no sovereign power, everyone has a war with everyone. People are not safe. The state has to ensure the safety of the people.

3. John Locke: The State of Peace, The Sovereign's Limited Power

Just as we started from Hobbes's state of nature to reach Hobbes' thoughts on revolution, in the same way, to reach Locke's thoughts on revolution, we must first consider what state people were in Locke's state of nature. According to Locke, the state of nature is both a state of equality and a state of freedom, at least it is initially (Snyder, 1986, p. 730). However, Locke's equality and freedom in the state of nature is not Hobbes' equality and freedom in the state of nature. Equality in Hobbes' state of nature is the state of everyone having an equal right to everything. However, according to Locke (1989, p. 8), everyone has equal power and authority in the state of nature, and more importantly, this power and authority is mutual. Freedom in Hobbes' state of nature is the freedom of everyone to have the right to do anything. On the other hand, Locke's (1989, p. 8), freedom in the state of nature is the freedom to do what one wants, within limits drawn by the law of nature, without being dependent on others.

Hobbes' equality and freedom in the state of nature is a state of licence, but Locke's equality and freedom in the state of nature is not a state of licence. The state of licence causes people to be at war with each other. Freedom in Locke's state of nature does not allow humans to annihilate each other's existence. This is Locke's law of the state of nature. Thanks to reason, people learn that they should not harm each other (Thomas, 1995). Whenever this law is violated, people have the right to punish to prevent the violation from happening again (Locke, 1989, p. 10).

Man in Locke's state of nature has the power to punish. However, Locke's man in the state of nature also has another power: the power to protect the property. It is the power to protect the property that reveals the power to punish. Thus, Locke's thoughts on the state of nature were shaped by his thoughts on the property. Locke constantly refers to property. According to Locke, the motive of protecting property is the basis of all human actions (Abramson, 2009, p. 199). In Locke's formulation, people have two forms of property in the state of nature. The first of these is the property that man has on himself. Man's body is a property that belongs only to him and can only be used by him (Locke, 1989, p. 19). The relation of man to himself is basically a relation of property. Thus, Locke extends property to include "Lives and Liberties" (Abramson, 2009, p. 200). Another form of property is common property, bestowed by God on all human beings. According to Locke, everything that the earth produces naturally belongs to human beings in common. More importantly, as long as it remains in its natural state, nobody has originally a private dominion, exclusive of the rest of mankind (Locke, 1989, pp. 18-19). However, whenever man transforms the common property in its natural state by adding his labor, then he transforms the common property into his private property (Abramson, 2009, p. 202). In other words, the main factor that transforms the common property into private property is one's labor.

The power to protect man's property in the state of nature brings with it the power to punish. However, this power of punishment also causes some problems in itself. How will conflicts of interest be avoided during punishment? Conflicts of interest can take people to the extreme and lead them to act in their favor (Tully, 1993, p. 35). To deal with conflicts of interest, it is necessary a known and indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law (Abramson, 2009, p. 207). This reveals the necessity of civil government (Locke, 1989, p. 13). The

situation where there is no civil administration, no publicly recognized judge, who has the power to determine all differences, is a state of nature.

The two powers of man in the state of nature, the power to protect the property and the power to punish, have led people to enter the society and need the state. The essential purpose of people in the state of nature entering society is to protect their property (Snyder, 1986, p. 724) and to use it safely and peacefully (Abramson, 2009, p. 203). For this purpose, the person who entered civil society transfers the power of punishment to the state. It is this authorization that pulls people out of the state of nature and into the state of the state (Locke, 1989, p. 48).

In other words, the main task of civil government is to ensure that property is used safely and people live in peace. In order to achieve this, the state has the power to punish. Thus, when people in the state of nature enter civil society, they give up their two powers (the power to protect the property and the power to punish) to the state. This process, at the same time, shows us what the state's liability is. No one who rules the state can act with arbitrary decisions; on the contrary, everyone who rules the state acts with institutionalized laws. This situation is possible with impartial judges who will act by the law. Thus, anyone who rules the state uses his power to establish an order (Locke, 1989, p. 68).

Locke thus bestows power to the state. However, this power that Locke bestowed on the state is not the same as the power that Hobbes bestowed on the state. While Hobbes bestows absolute power to the state, Locke bestows superior power to the state. To say superior power actually means to say that power is limited (Tully, 1993). The power of Locke's state is limited. "Though it be the supreme power in every common-wealth; yet", Locke (1989, p. 70) states, "it is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the people." According to Locke (1989, p. 91), supreme power cannot take the property of subjects. Locke, thus, limits the state to which he bestows superior power.

4. Right to Revolution

So far, we have considered how Hobbes and Locke describe the state of nature, how the state of nature shapes the social contract, and ultimately how they authorize the state. Now, based on the above ideas of Hobbes and Locke, we will try to explain what kind of attitude they took towards the idea of revolution.

In Hobbes's thought, people transferred their rights to the state by making a covenant with each other to get rid of the state of war. The state thus attains absolute power. This power of the state cannot be questioned in any way by its subjects (Hobbes, 1997, p. 109). Therefore, the state cannot be punished in any way by its subjects². Hobbes thus abolishes the right to revolution. This situation can be better understood with Hobbes' representation theory. Hobbes' (1997) representation theory reveals that every act of the sovereign is the subject's action. In this case, resisting the sovereign means resisting oneself.

The sovereign's absolute power can only be abolished by his renunciation, not by the demands of the subjects. In Hobbes' thought, when the man has made a contract to obey the sovereign power absolutely, he has no right to renounce that contract. Whatever the sovereign power does, the subjects obeying it have no right to rebel against the sovereign power (Abramson, 2009, p. 192). Two factors play a significant role in Hobbes' abolition of the right to revolution. Firstly, according to Hobbes (1997, p. 109), sovereign power may have some shortcomings, but sovereign power is certainly not unjust in an absolute sense. Therefore, the subjects cannot oppose the state and cannot punish it. Second, and much more importantly, the possible harm that the state can inflict is no worse than the harm that would occur in the absence of sovereign power (Hobbes, 1997, p. 128). Therefore, Hobbes in no way accepts the abolition of the state by the subjects.

Hobbes hardly gives the subjects the right to revolution, but he does allow subjects to disobey the sovereign in a few cases (Sreedhar, 2013). While Hobbes transferred all rights in the covenant, he

² There are also studies claiming that the right of rebellion is reserved in Hobbes' thought. Susanne Sreedhar argues that there should be a Hobbesian right to rebel. According to Sreedhar (2010, pp. 132-168), Hobbes can, and indeed he must, allow subjects to organize against their political rulers under certain conditions of necessity.

did not transfer only one right: the right to defend one's own life. Whenever the sovereign attacks the subjects' right to self-defense, then the subjects have the liberty to disobey (Hobbes, 1997, p. 134). As Abramson (2009, p. 191) pointed out, an opposite idea would be a great contradiction, because people enter the state to secure their right to life. Moreover, Hobbes allows subjects to disobey the sovereign when the sovereign's power comes to an end. If the sovereign loses power due to external reasons such as conquest, the subjects have the right to disobey. The moment the sovereign loses his power, the sovereign loses his function of protecting people's lives, which is his primary duty, and man returns to the state of nature (Hobbes, 1997, p. 205).

Although Hobbes allows subjects to disobey in a few cases, he generally does not give them the right to revolution because what happens with the revolution will be the abolition of the state. The abolition of the state means a return to the state of nature. Since Hobbes' state of nature is a state of war, Hobbes does not accept the abolition of the state. Hobbes' aim is to prevent humans from returning to the state of nature and thus to the state of war. Hobbes, therefore, sought to abolish the right to revolution.

Locke's ideas on revolution are very different from Hobbes's. The right to revolution is very strongly present in Locke's works, unlike Hobbes (Abramson, 2009, p. 220). By limiting the legislature's power, Locke continued to give power to the people. The people have always continued to hold a superior power to protect themselves. According to Locke (1989, pp. 77-78), there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them.

In Locke's thought, the essential element that gives people the right to revolution is the change of legislation handed over to the state by the people. Whenever legislation changes, people naturally have the right to revolution. In this vein, Locke explains the circumstances in which legislation changes. According to Locke (1989, p. 109), firstly, whenever the sovereign power substitutes its arbitrary will for laws, legislation is changed. Moreover, whenever the sovereign power prevents the legislature from acting freely, the legislature is changed. Thirdly, whenever the sovereign power puts its interests instead of the common good of the people, the legislature is changed. Fourthly, whenever the people are handed over to a foreign power and the government is dissolved, then the legislature is changed again (Locke, 1989, p. 109).

In addition to these four points, Locke mentions a much more critical point that changes the legislature and ensures the dissolution of the administrations: legislative acts contrary to their trust: the legislative acts against the trust reposed in them. As Locke (1989, p. 111) states, "when the supreme power endeavors to invade the property of the subject, and to make themselves, or any part of the community, masters, or arbitrary disposers of the lives, liberties, or fortunes of the people, the supreme power acts against the trust reposed in them." This gives people the right to revolution. As we have shown above, the main reason people unite under civil society and enter the state is the protection of their property. Whenever the supreme power violates this basic rule, the power passes to the people, and the people have the right to revolution. Because Locke's state of nature provides people with a peaceful environment and the right to protect their property, governments that do not aim to protect property are so far from being better, that they are much worse (Locke, 1989, p. 113). Thus, Locke reached the idea of revolution based on the theory of property (Snyder, 1986, p. 726).

Locke in no way bestows absolute power to the sovereign but limits it; it does not pretend not to see to its arbitrary power (Tully, 1993). Whenever the supreme power exceeds its limits, the people have the right to revolution and change the administration. However, this does not mean that the people follow the path of revolution in every mistake made by the sovereigns. Revolution is not a part of general politics; it occurs in exceptional cases (Tully, 2008, p. 640). Revolution does not occur in the slightest mistake of the sovereigns, because people are not so easily got out of their old forms. Whenever the abuses and faults of the sovereign spread over a long time and are deeply felt by all sections of the people, then the people use the right to revolution to put them into hands that can secure the founding purposes of the state (Locke, 1989, p. 113).

Conclusion

In the current century, many states are moving towards authoritarianism. As we mentioned at the beginning of the study, the new authoritarianism has begun to become a somewhat global form. In the 21st century, we are witnessing the rise of illiberal politics in many parts of the world. This rise has been towards authoritarian regimes that took the form of radical Islamist movements in the Middle East, right-wing populist movements in some parts of the West, and radical conservatism in Africa and Asia (Lewis, 2020).

There is an authoritarian retreat from democracy. Of course, this is not a situation experienced by every state without exception. The new authoritarianism does not mean that it represents the future of humanity. As Wiatr (2019) points out, authoritarianism tendency is minimal in countries where democratic political culture is established. However, we can state that the new authoritarianism is not a temporary phenomenon.

The critical point is where the right to revolution stands in the face of the new authoritarianism tendency. Will the right to revolution put us in more chaos by transforming the authoritarian tendency into totalitarianism, or will it lead to the restoration of democratic values by destroying authoritarian tendencies? The Hobbesian point of view implies that the right to revolution to be given to the people, far from re-establishing an order, will drag people into much more chaos. However, the Lockean point of view implies that the right to revolution to be granted to the people does not lead to more chaos but is necessary to restore order.

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