

- Jhally, S. (1993). "Communications and the Materialist Conception of History: Marx, Innis and Technology". *Continuum: The Australian Journal of Media & Culture*. (7)1.
- Josipovici, G. (1982). *Writing and the Body*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lecerle, J. (1990). *The Violence of Language*. London: Routledge.
- Marx, K. (1973). *Capital Vol. I*. NY: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. and Engels, F. (1969). *German Ideology*. N.Y.: International Publishers.
- Mulgan, G. J. (1994). "The Dynamics of Electronic Networks." *The Polity Reader in Cultural Theory*. London: Polity Press.
- McLuhan, M. (1962). *Gutenberg Galaxy*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- McLuhan, M. (1964). *Understanding the Media*. NY: Signet.
- Morris, S. (1992). *Taking Ancient Mythology Economically*. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
- Morris, S. (1995). *Economic Structures of Antiquity*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.
- Ong, Walter (1986). "Writing is a Technology that Restructures Thought." *The Written Word: Literacy in Transition*. G. Bauman (der.) içinde. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ong, W. (1974). "The History and The Future of Verbal Media." In Silverstein, A. (ed.) *Human Communication: Theoretical Explorations*. NewYork: John Wiley & Sons, pp.165-184.
- Schiller, H. (1976). *Communication and Cultural Domination*. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Sciences Press.
- Siegelau, S. (1979). "A Communication on Communication." In Mattelart, A. and S. Siegelau (eds.) *Communication and Class Struggle, Vol. I*. N.Y.: International General, pp. 11-22.
- Williams, R. (1974). *Television: Technology and Cultural Form*. London: Fontana.
- Wolkstein, D. & Kramer, S. (1983). *Inanna: Queen of Heaven and Earth*. NY: Harper & Row.

Reproducing Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Diaspora

Abstract

This article seeks to come to an understanding of the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion among Turkish Muslims in Britain. The main objective of this article is to analyse how Turkish identity is constructed and what are the roles of family, culture, organisations and religious groups in the reproduction and transmission of traditional values to the young generation.

This article is based on an ethnographic research among Turkish residents in Britain. Research methods involved participant observation, in-depth interviews and a survey. Seventeen months of fieldwork in the north-east London and two months fieldwork in Berlin were carried out to collect ethnographic data. During the research, 77 people were interviewed in-depth, 93 young Turks participated in a survey and 29 people took part in group interviews.

Diasporada Etnik ve Kültürel Kimliğin Yeniden Üretimi

Özet

Bu makalede İngiltere'de yaşayan Müslüman Türklerin etnik, dinsel ve kültürel kimlik politikalarının anlaşılmasına çalışılmaktadır. Makalenin temel amacı, Türk kimliğinin nasıl kurulduğunu ve geleneksel değerlerin genç kuşaklara aktarılmasında aile, kültür, dinsel gruplar ve diğer örgütlerin rolünü incelemektir.

Çalışma İngiltere'de yaşayan Türkler arasında uygulanan etnografik bir araştırmaya dayalıdır. Araştırma yöntemleri, katımlı gözlem, derinlemesine mülakat ve anket taramasıdır (survey). Etnografik verilerin toplanmasına yönelik saha çalışmasının on yedi ayı Londra'nın kuzey-doğusunda ve iki ayı Berlin'de yürütülmüştür. Araştırma sırasında 77 derinlemesine mülakat yapıldı, 93 Türk gencine survey ve 29 kişiye grup mülakat uygulandı.

Talip Küçükcan
University of Warwick
Centre for Research in
Ethnic Relations

Reproducing Ethnicity and Cultural Identity in Diaspora

Multicultural Europe and New Identities

European countries are increasingly becoming multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious as a result of immigration and settlement of non-indigenous people. This means that European cities are accommodating an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous population. The settlement of immigrants in European countries gave rise to the establishment of permanent ethnic minorities with varying linguistic, cultural and religious differences. These communities have reproduced their distinct value systems in the midst of social and cultural structures of receiving countries. The institutionalisation of ethnic minority cultures exacerbated the heterogeneity of host societies to a certain extent by expressing their own languages, religions, food, music and dress. This means that new identities have emerged in Europe.

Among these new communities, Muslims constitute a significant group with an estimated number of 6.8 million who live in the European Union countries. Although the presence of Muslims in Europe is not a new phenomenon, it could be argued that the expression of Islamic identity has become more pronounced in recent years. The growth of Western-educated young generations and the rise of global/transnational Islamic movements are important sources of motivation for Muslims in Europe to express their identity in Western countries. For example, in recent years, Muslims in Europe have become more

concerned with the religious education of their children, they have shown strong reactions against the prohibition of headscarfs in schools and demanded legal recognition on local levels. Expression of Islamic identity has also taken place in the face of international events concerning Muslims such as in Bosnia, Palestine, and Kashmir. The marginalisation of Muslims on local levels and their victimisation on a global level, mobilised Muslims in Europe and strengthened their sense of belonging to the Muslim Umma. However, Muslims in Europe accommodate a great deal of diversity. Even a cursory look at the Muslim communities such as Pakistanis, Algerians, Moroccans and Bangladeshis in the West would reveal that all these communities have diversities of Islamic movements within themselves. The Turkish community in Europe is a part of emerging "European Islam" and has its own diversity in the expression of Turkish-Muslim identity.

Diverse Expressions of Islamic Identity

A proper understanding of Muslim communities in Europe depends upon the analysis of "Islams" rather than "Islam." Identity construction is a complex and a multidimensional phenomenon. National history, myths, language, shared values and a sense of solidarity all influence the formation of ethnic and religious identities. The construction of Islamic identities also goes through a similar process, underlined by the diversity

of variables which make Muslim groups heterogeneous. Therefore, Turkish-Muslim identity as expressed by the Turkish community in Britain and elsewhere in Europe should be seen as a micro-unit of an already diversified Muslim entity.

This article fills a vacuum in research on micro-Islamic communities in Britain. It is known that the overwhelming majority of research on Muslims in Britain has focused on Asian Muslims. It seems that Islam in Britain is usually equated with Asian Muslims in the public imagination. This clearly indicates that the Turks as a micro-community within the larger Islamic Umma are generally not included in studies of Muslims in Britain. This means that any generalisation about Islam and Muslims in Britain, drawing upon studies on micro-communities, would be misleading due to the diversity within Islamic communities. Therefore, I suggest that before making any generalisations about Muslims, "Islams" should be studied because there is no single expression of "Islam" even within the same ethnic or national group.

Re-constructing Turkish Family

Re-establishment of Turkish families facilitated the institutionalisation of culture, religion and language in Britain. The analysis of identity politics within the Turkish community revealed that family, marriage and social networks have played an important role in every stage of immigration. Family, kin and social networks were involved in three overlapping stages of Turkish experience of immigration. This article suggests that pre-migration, migration/settlement processes and post-settlement stages were marked by the involvement of various networks and by the reproduction of traditional sets of relationships rooted in shared values. Family, friends, neighbours and village men for example helped each other in finding jobs and accommodation during the course of migration and settlement. Kin and social networks were and are being reproduced after the family reunifications.

Research findings suggest that contextual factors led to the establishment of networks not necessarily confined to family, kin and village origin. This means that social networks were expanded by the influence of situational elements so as to include people previously not related on the basis of descent or village origin. Different areas can be mentioned which have generated new social relations. Adherence to a particular religious group for example has a potential for creating a "religious network". Economic activities can also be mentioned as a facilitating factor for widening the social networks. One can argue that the "trust" derived from belonging to the same ethnic/national/religious/ideological group can facilitate the establishment of partnership among Turkish people. Marriage and reconstruction of Turkish families also widen existing social networks through new alliances.

The establishment of family and marriage practices in the Turkish community inform us that traditional values are constantly reproduced as an expression of Turkish identity. First of all, marriage is still seen as an important institution for socialisation. Therefore considerable social pressure is brought on single individuals to get married. Parents who would like to arrange a marriage for their son, for example, are still seeking for intact "honour" and "reputation" of the girl candidate. Therefore, girls are encouraged to avoid situations which may damage their honour and family reputation. However, the meaning of honour and reputation is changing for the young generation. In contrast to parental attitudes they do not see, for example, social outings with unrelated male friends as damaging their honour and reputation. And increasingly they want to make their own choices for marriage. This article also suggests that "control" over the girls, in contrast to boys, has much to do with the cultural practices, not necessarily rooted in Islamic beliefs. Therefore, the justification for parental control can not be based totally on religious grounds. Had it been so, they should have developed the same attitudes spontaneously for their sons because religious principles apply to both sexes equally.

Young Turks, Generational Differences and Tensions

Generational differences are not confined to the issue of marriage. Migration and settlement in a culturally different society might cause a paradigm shift. This means that traditionally-loaded meanings of some concepts may lose their importance with the fusion of novel ideas through acculturation, social interaction and schooling in Britain. The analysis of in-depth interviews and survey results suggest that such a paradigm shift is taking place between generations. Turkish parents are deeply concerned with the transmission of traditional values to the young generation in order to protect their identity from "cultural contamination." Therefore, parents consistently put pressure on them to "absorb" and "internalise" the cultural values of the Turkish community.

Although there is not a whole-sale rejection of traditional values, it appears that the young generation are developing different attitudes towards parental values. Although most of the Turkish young people agree with the preservation of parental culture, they seem to attribute different meanings to some of the elements of traditional values. There is a tendency among young Turks to see marriage, social relations and sexuality in a somewhat different way than of their parents. The overwhelming majority of young people interviewed claim that they have disagreements with their parents over "meeting and socialising with the opposite sex," "type of clothing," "spending time outside the house," "restriction of freedom," "friendship with non-Turks and non-Muslims" and "the way marriages are arranged."

The development of different attitudes towards these issues may be attributed to the socialisation experience of the young generation in Britain. In contrast to their parents, young people have to deal with multiple identity choices. Parents as the first generation maintain their original culture rather than adopting the host society's social and cultural values. Therefore,

reactionary response curbs the fusionary effect of assimilation among the first generation members of the Turkish community. Young Turks, on the other hand, as a bridge generation, seem to have ambiguous tendencies towards some of the values and habits of their community. They have a desire, on the one hand, to preserve parental values at home, and on the other, to adopt some elements of the host culture outside. This means that there is an emergent identity construction taking place among the young generation. This emergent identity is not exclusively shaped by "Turkey/Cypriot inspired perceptions," but rather is increasingly based on "local/British inspired perceptions." This argument might be taken a step further to suggest that British-Turkish identities are emerging among young Turks in London. Due social-contextual factors on identity formation it is plausible to suggest that the emergent Turkish identity among young Turks in London is expected to be influenced and shaped to a certain degree by the "British social and cultural context."

Young Turks and Religion

Religion is one of the significant markers of Turkish identity. Therefore, the first generation of the Turkish community established Islamic institutions as soon they acquired sufficient resources. These institutions were meant to facilitate the transmission of religious values to young Turks. Research findings suggest that attitudes of young people towards religion are also changing. Although almost all young Turks still believe in the basic principles of Islam, it seems that religion is becoming a symbolic attachment for many of them. The survey analysis on the intellectual dimension of religious commitment among young Turks clearly indicates that young people know very little about Islam.

The lack of knowledge about the basic principles of Islam might be attributed to several factors. It can be argued, for example, that young Turks do not learn much about their

religion in the schools because there seem to be no special provisions for the teaching of Islam and Turkish culture. Another reason may be the failure of Islamic institutions to address a larger young audience because of their mostly outdated teaching methods. Findings on the ritualistic dimension of religiosity, on the other hand, show that only a small number of young people perform prescribed Islamic practices. Young Turks know little about their religion and they generally do not fulfil the required religious duties. Yet, most of them still believe in it. This means that a symbolic religiosity is developing among the Turkish youth who seem to be increasingly feeling the tension generated by continuity and change. It appears that young Turks will experience this tension at least for the foreseeable future. Parents and religious organisations will continue to teach the young generation the importance of religion and will try to inculcate an Islamic belief in their sense of belonging to the Turkish-Muslim community. However, social and cultural effects of the British context will also influence the young generation throughout their life which will inevitably induce changes in the emergent Turkish identity among the young generation to a certain extent, which would enable them to accommodate a sense of belonging to the multicultural community in Britain.

Institutionalisation of Identity Politics

The role of cultural, religious and religio-political organisations in the construction and maintenance of Turkish identity is also relevant in this context. Organisations and associations of various kinds were established and used by the Turkish community in Britain as a response to changing social and cultural conditions. These organisations have different membership and clientele profiles, different administrative structures, strategies and purposes. The foundational aspirations and priorities of Turkish organisations, reflected in their activities and functions, reveal that there are overlapping as well

as dissimilar, even conflicting concerns among the Turkish community. This means that the institutionalisation of identity politics of assumes diverse meanings according to the cultural, religious and political orientations of Turkish organisations. The process of community formation with its own "cultural boundaries" from that of fragmented individuals through family unions and marriages, was accompanied by the process of institutionalisation in various areas. The *raison d'être* of Turkish organisations lies in the fact that settlement and post-settlement processes generated numerous problems for the community and these challenging problems needed to be addressed. The issues around culture, language, religion, welfare and education of the young generation preoccupied parental and familial concerns. It can be argued that Turkish organisations emerged in response to these concerns which are related to the expression of ethnicity and identity.

The analysis of Turkish/Cypriot organisations suggests that there is a subtle differentiation between mainland Turks and Turkish-Cypriots which could be seen as the two poles of Turkish identity. Research findings confirm that minority organisations are established on ethnic and national lines. In addition to that, even within the same ethnic or national group there is a discernible degree of internal differentiation rooted in the geographical origins of an ethnic group. The membership structure and clientele profile of the Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London suggest that such a differentiation exists between mainland and Cypriot Turks. This differentiation can be explained by "self ascription" rather than an external attribution. Both groups define themselves as "Turks" and "Muslims" vis-à-vis "others." They also attribute more or less the same characteristics to Turkish identity. They would argue, for example, that Turks are "Muslims," and "culture," "tradition," "family," "kin" and "honour" are important elements of Turkish identity. The concern over the Cyprus issue is central to both groups. Transmission of traditional values to the young generation concerns equally mainland and Cypriot

Turks and has lead them to join forces to reproduce Turkish identity. However, internal differentiation emerges when Turkish-Cypriots define themselves vis-à-vis mainland Turks. Therefore, I would suggest that Turkish identity is diversified in London in contrast to Turkish communities in other West European countries and it seems to be plausible to suggest that the self-ascribed duality prepares a ground to discuss "Turkish identities" rather than a single "Turkish identity" in London. However, these self-ascribed boundaries between Turks from the mainland and Cyprus have become diluted during confrontations between "Us" versus "Them."

Almost all Turkish/Cypriot associations place a special emphasis on education because education is seen as a key to transmit traditional values to the young generation and to generate a sense of belonging to the ideals of Turkish community. It is a widely held view among the first generation that their children are exposed to the cultural influences of the larger society. Schooling, peer-group relations and media are constantly exerting cultural influences on young people and presenting new identity choices in conflict with the Turkish culture and Islamic values. Turkish/Cypriot organisations with few exceptions are devising policies and strategies to counterbalance the acculturation of young Turks in order to prevent their assimilation because assimilation would mean the loss of Turkish identity. However, although the meaning of Turkish identity is the same in principle, Turkish/Cypriot organisations seem to emphasise different components of their identity as the most basic and indispensable element. Some organisations, for example, place priority on teaching the Turkish language as it is perceived to be the most effective means of communication with the culture which defines Turkish/Cypriot identity. As I will discuss later some organisations, on the other hand, seem to place more emphasis on Islam because they believe that religion is the most significant source of strength against the forces of assimilation. Political issues are also important ingredients of identity politics within the community.

The Turkish Educational Attaché and some Turkish organisations in London claim that the number of young Turkish students at the supplementary weekend schools has reached 2,500 and it is estimated that their size will steadily grow. Increasing attendance in classes on Turkish "language," "culture," "music" and "folklore" indicates that parental concern about the future of their children is growing. They do not want to see young Turks lose their "Turkish identity," therefore the first generation is trying to mobilise Turkish community to prevent "cultural contamination" of children. It seems that institutionalisation of education is regarded as one of the most effective ways of reproducing Turkish culture and instilling an identity among the young generation by transmitting "reproduced values" within the British context. However, despite parental pressure and organisational efforts, the meaning of Turkish identity is changing for the young generation.

Turkish/Cypriot organisations sometimes resort to political mobilisation of the community to revive the "collective identity." The rationale behind such a strategy seems to be the expression of political identity which is considered to be a prerequisite to becoming a "politically conscious community" rather than that of a "silent ethnic community." Therefore, some organisations keep the issue of Cyprus alive because it is expected that such issues reawaken nationalist feelings and aspirations as sources of political identity. Political mobilisation inevitably requires involvement in the politics of the country of origin. Involvement in the politics of the country of origin in the diaspora reproduces attachments, alliances and hostilities which crystallise "identity boundaries."

Identity politics of Turkish/Cypriots organisations seem to generate at least twofold effects on their members and clientele. The first of these effects relates to the strengthening of "in-group" solidarity. The second one relates to the polarisation of identity boundaries to a further extent. Political concerns of

some Turkish/Cypriot organisations appeal to nationalist feelings and utilise political events both in Turkey/Cyprus. The organisations administered by Turkish-Cypriots, for example, regularly mobilise their members to publicise the Cyprus issue and encourage them to send letters to MPs and the Prime Minister asking for their support for the Turkish side. The invitation of speakers from Turkey and Cyprus clearly indicates that politics in the country of origin are used to generate a strong group identity in the community. It is expected that public meetings and addresses of Turkish/Cypriot organisations on political issues will also mobilise "others" to protest against these events. "Identity confrontation" and escalation of "identity conflict" were rooted in politics. Confrontation of political identities crystallise Turkish/Cypriot identity vis-à-vis "imagined enemies" in Britain because historical hostilities are renewed and national/political/ethnic allegiances are re-expressed. This means that polarisation between "Us" and "Them" adversely consolidates collective identity.

Findings also suggest that not only the politics of the home country but also politics on an international level cause concern for the Turkish community. Turks in Europe constitute a micro-community within the Muslim communities in Europe. Therefore, political events related to Muslims also enter into the politics of Turkish/Cypriot organisations in London. The reactions towards tragic events in Bosnia is a good illustration of the expression of "Islamic identity." Victimisation of Turks in other parts of the world and especially in Europe also produces an emphasised identity expression. The reactions towards these events showed that racism and xenophobia caused a "unified action" among Turks throughout Europe. In many parts of Germany where there are significant numbers of Turks, diverse sections of the Turkish community members, from secular to religious ones, were united around the same issue. The diversities and varieties of political and religious orientation were overcome by the common concern over the future of the Turkish community in Germany. The collective consciousness

and reactions strengthened the ethnic bond among the community members. These developments had transnational effects as Turkish/Cypriot organisations showed in London by arranging solidarity meetings, distributing leaflets explicitly claiming a belonging to Turkish communities in Europe.

Transnational Religion: Institutionalisation of Islam

Islam is one of the indispensable components of Turkish/Cypriot identity. Even those who defined themselves as "not religious" or "nominal" Muslims, feel that religion has had public and private influence on the formation of Turkish identity. Institutionalisation of Islam and the growth of Islamic movements among the Turkish community confirm that this perception is widely held. This means that Turkish ethnicity, identity and Islam are closely intertwined and can not be readily separated from one another. Therefore, it is almost impossible to analyse Turkish identity without reference to Islam. However, it should be born in mind that Turkish Islam is as diversified as Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Arab Islam. This means that national and religious identity influenced each other throughout history and it is this factor that lies at the heart of the non-monolithic nature of Islamic movements. Even within Turkish Islam there is a wide diversity of expression of Islamic identity in Europe. The Islamic organisations among the Turkish community in Britain also display such diversity. Almost all Turkish Islamic organisations are off-shoots of umbrella organisations/groups in Turkey or Cyprus and they implicitly, and more often explicitly, claim allegiance to the "national/model" organisations.

As far as the Islamic organisations in London are concerned, it appears that rivalry, competition and conflict rather than negotiation and co-operation are prevalent features of their politics. Such a state of affairs was inherited from the conflicts in Turkey and reproduced in Europe. The influence of "model"

organisations is very well documented on the institutionalisation of religious groups among Turks in Europe and in London. Therefore, I argue that without understanding the current developments in Turkey, it would not be possible to analyse the diversity of approaches to Islamic identity and politics among Turks in Britain. This argument is justified by the simple fact that the origins of Islamic groups among the Turkish community are rooted in the politics of religious movements in the country of origin. However, I suggest that for the young Turkish generation, the focus of Islamic politics seems to be changing. The young generation are increasingly becoming disillusioned by the priorities of these organisations.

The establishment of the Mosques has always been a priority for the Turks as they are considered traditional centres of Islamic learning, religious socialisation and education which contribute to the construction of Turkish-Islamic identity. Activities held in Mosques are designed to reawaken Islamic identity among the Jama'a and pass the traditional values onto the young generation. My findings suggest that the growth of the young generation especially seems to be causing some changes in the traditional politics of the Mosques. Some of the Islamic organisations, for example, seem to have recognised that classical teaching methods were not very fruitful within the British context. Therefore, they introduced new strategies for teaching, recruiting and appealing to a wider audience. One of the Mosques for example opened an independent primary school despite its ongoing insistence on traditional teaching methods. Another Mosque, on the other hand, had negotiated with the Local Council and was granted permission to register weddings in the Mosque. The novelty was even extended to allow the formation of small market places in one of the Mosques. It should be pointed out that these are significant changes in the politics of Mosques compared to Turkey or Cyprus where Mosques are only used for prayers under the strict control of the state apparatus. This also suggests that Islamic groups in Europe enjoy more freedom of expression since they do not challenge the state system.

The development of new strategies indicates that Islamic groups in Britain are aware of the social and cultural influences of the wider society. Nevertheless, new policies and strategies also carry the imprint of particular groups who have different approaches to Islamic issues. This means that Turkish Islamic organisations in Britain display a differentiation rather than convergence in terms of their methods of teaching, ideological standpoints and expression of Islamic identity.

One of the overlooked aspects of Islamic organisations among Turks in London and Europe in general is their contribution to the development of "Islamic networks." The development of Islamic networks seem to be taking place on two levels. The first level relates to Turks as a micro-Muslim community. Almost all Islamic organisations among Turks in Europe have their origins in Turkey. Islamic groups such as *Suleymancis*, and *Milli Gorus* (National Vision) are widening their networks in Europe. Observations of these groups in London and Berlin indicate that in-group relations are constantly renewed between Turkey and Europe. The second area of network development relates to Muslim communities in Europe. Some of the Turkish Islamic organisations are also contributing to the widening of transnational Islam. Political and mystical Islam especially do not confine their appeal to one ethnic/national group, but rather they try to recruit Muslims from all national origins. Sheikh Nazim Jama'a, for example, is comprised of Muslims who have different racial, ethnic and national origins. National Vision, on the other hand, is increasingly trying to involve themselves in the affairs of Muslims in a wider context. All of these groups have already opened branches in major European and American cities to widen their sphere of influence.

The analysis of family, kin and social networks, and various kinds of Turkish organisations has clearly shown that the politics of ethnicity, identity and religion have centred around the reproduction of traditional social and cultural values within the British context where the Turkish identity was perceived to be

threatened. Therefore, despite the diversity of attitudes towards Turkish culture and differences in the strategies of institutionalisation, the elements of Turkish identity was and still is reproduced in order to preserve and transmit these values to the young generation. However, young Turks were and still are exposed to contextual social and cultural forces which are different from and often conflicting with the parental values. This situation is producing tension between parents and young generations who appear to be adopting some attitudes and values of the British society. This means that the young generation is developing a somewhat different identity from that of their parents. Nevertheless, the emergent identity construction among young Turks still carries the imprint of Turkish tradition and culture but increasingly in the form of symbolic attachments. It appears that this trend among the young generation will continue as the Turkish ethnicity and national identity are not fixed categories, rather they are undoubtedly imagined, but equally felt, known and lived.

Geleneksel Yayıncılığa Alternatif Bir Medya Modeli Olarak İnternet Yayıncılığının Konumu ve Önemi

Özet

Son yıllarda kitle iletişim alanında geleneksel yayıncılık karşıtı arayışlar gözlenmektedir. Özellikle Yeni Sol'un düşünsel açımları bağlamında dile getirilen "kamusal hizmet yayıncılığı" modeli ve "İmmediast" ya da medya-karşıtı hareket, devlet ve sermaye gücüne bağımlı liberal yayıncılık anlayışının eksikliklerini eleştirmektedir. Bazı uzmanlarca yirmibirinci yüzyıla damgasını vuracağı ileri sürülen "İnternet yayıncılığı," bu çalışmada, sahip olduğu yapısal özellikler nedeniyle alternatif medya yayıncılığı kapsamında ele alınmaktadır. İnternet, ekonomik altyapısı nedeniyle Yeni Sağ'ın serbest pazar koşullarına uyum sağlaması boyutunda eleştirilmiştir. İnternet yayıncılığı bireylerin aktif katılımına dayalı olması ve "doğrudan demokrasi"ye dönük siyasal ve kültürel açımlar içermesi nedeniyle Yeni Sol ideolojisiye yakın görülmekte ve alternatif medya kapsamında değerlendirilmektedir. Sonuç olarak yazarlar, İnternet yayıncılığının, "ağ" ancak Yeni Sol'un ortaya koyduğu düşünsel temeller doğrultusunda yapılandırılırsa gerçek anlamda alternatif medya modeli oluşturabileceğini ileri sürmektedirler.

The Position and Significance of Internet Broadcasting As a Media Model Alternative to Traditional Broadcasting

Abstract

In recent years in the field of mass communication, it is possible to observe a pursuit of novelties repudiating traditional broadcasting. Particularly in the context of intellectual vision brought about by the New Left, "public service broadcasting" model and the "Immediast" or anti-media movement have been criticizing the shortcomings of liberal broadcasting perspective which is dependent on the state- and capital-power. In this study, "Internet broadcasting," which is claimed by some experts to dominate the twenty-first century, is considered as an alternative media thanks to its structural characteristics. The particular dimension on which Internet has adapted to the free market conditions promoted by the New Right is criticized. Internet is considered to be a medium closer to New Left ideology and as an alternative media because it consists political and cultural openings toward "direct democracy" involving individuals' active involvement. In conclusion, the authors claim that Internet broadcasting could only form a real alternative media model if the "net" is structured on the basis of the intellectual foundations put forth by the New Left.

Erdal Dağtaş
Gökhan Derelioğlu
Gazi Üniversitesi
İletişim Fakültesi