

Marc Lanteigne, *Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction 4th Edition*, Routledge, 2020, 256 p.

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In the field of Chinese foreign policy, different theoretical approaches and methodological perspectives are applied to the analysis of foreign policy issues and developments. Even though it is quite difficult or even impossible to make a clear-cut separation among different approaches while doing foreign policy analysis, it provides some advantages to concentrate on some issues more than others or limit the scope of the scholarly work which is intended to be explored. The existing literature on Chinese foreign policy analysis can generally be categorized into five main perspectives which are based on their underlying assumptions and motivations. These are the security-oriented approach (Nathan and Scobell, 2012), policymaking (decision-making) perspective (Lampton, 2008), interaction-based analysis (Shambaugh, 2013), cultural identity focus (Carlson, 2005), and regional diplomacy approach. In this regard, the expanded and updated version of Marc Lanteigne's book on *Chinese Foreign Policy* involves a wide range of topics of foreign policy decision-making by adopting an integrated approach, particularly on cross-regional relations in recent years.

The most significant aspect of his work is to examine both the expansion and reconstruction of Chinese foreign policy by analyzing the changes in different agents and structures. As he puts it, from the era of Hu Jintao to the present Xi Jinping government, Chinese foreign policy has been remarkably transformed into a cross-regional focus of international interests. This expansion of Chinese foreign policy has been closely associated with China's growing economic influence and the intensification of its interactions with other states both in bilateral and multilateral levels. The second aspect of the focus of Lanteigne's analysis refers to the diversification of actors and structures in Chinese foreign policy, which includes not only governmental actors but also non-governmental agencies and their engagements with global norms and institutions. The increased number of agents in the Chinese foreign policy-making process, their globalized interests and their intensified interactions with global structures are the crucial underlying main factors that create complexity to identify a clear separation between China's domestic politics and foreign policy (p.1). China's rapid economic growth and its growing international interests has led

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Chinese foreign policy makers to reconsider China's strategic, economic and diplomatic relations and calculate new priorities according to the new demands arising from both domestic and international environments.

The remarkable emphasis made by Lanteigne for the year 2018 needs to be underlined in order to understand the future direction and orientation of Chinese foreign policy in the future. It is regarded as an important turning point that indicates China's growing interests in other regions of the world, particularly the oceans and polar regions. With its increasingly globalized interests, China's growing concerns about environmental issues have also become more apparent. The recent institutional reforms which have taken place such as the establishment of the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and the Ministry of Natural Resources reveal China's efforts to promote "green" economic policies with respect to its changing interests under ongoing geopolitical shifts (p. 5). This significant policy modification with its institutional support implies a great deal of potential implications for the technology-energy nexus by promoting green development under the framework of BRI.

Lanteigne's book most notably contributes to scholarly work by analyzing China's growing interest in the Arctic region. As it represents a Nordic view and interpretation of China's Polar Silk Road, three important dimensions are particularly emphasized such as new economic opportunities based on trade and energy connectivity, the utilization of Arctic Sea routes, and Beijing's diplomatic efforts for participating in the Arctic governance (pp. 222-223). In terms of new economic opportunities, the Arctic region presents a high potential for future development of joint collaborations among different actors. Lanteigne pays particular attention to the improvement of China-Russia strategic cooperation, but he refers less to the commercial benefits for the Nordic countries. The development of the Northern Sea Route for cross-regional shipping from East Asia to Europe creates favorable advantages for all relevant countries in the Arctic region. And what is interesting is that East Asian countries, particularly Japan and South Korea, demonstrate their willingness to improve 'broader maritime cooperation in order to utilize these expected economic benefits.

Second, Lanteigne joins one of the central debates on Chinese foreign policy-making process by addressing the tendency to return to centralization in the era of Xi Jinping. One of the main questions has become to evaluate the role of non-governmental actors and their impacts on the central place of the Chinese Communist Party. Even though the "fifth generation" under the leadership of Xi Jinping represents a strong emphasis on the idea of defending the central power of the CPP, there are also ongoing efforts toward decentralization in China regarding economic and bureaucratic reforms. In this regard, Lanteigne makes remarks on the role sharing between the CCP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chinese foreign policymaking. And he stresses that the sources of foreign policy information that are accessed by the MoFA are often used by non-governmental actors (p. 39). Besides, in his consideration of the impact of nationalism on Chinese foreign policy, the ideological orientation towards "techno-nationalism" is pointed out as a new tendency (p. 50), however, it is not clear whether or not techno-nationalism mainly

drives China's overall foreign policy actions. China's power projection toward global tech-leadership is more likely to be driven by rational motives and less by ideological orientation. From a policymaking perspective, the ideational dimension of Chinese national power is based on infrastructure-driven innovation that is supported by political and diplomatic leadership (Lampton, 2008). Even though it is important to recognize the strong emphasis made by Chinese leaders to achieve self-reliance in the high-technology field, it can be regarded as only one aspect that is influential in the formation of a new type of nationalism emerging in China today.

Third, with regard to the strategic value of BRI in Chinese foreign policy, Lanteigne's historical reference to the significance of the Maritime Silk Road which linked the Imperial Tang Empire with the Byzantine Empire through the Indian Ocean sea routes is quite noteworthy (p. 15). Additionally, the inner development of BRI with the two new maritime roads, via the Pacific Ocean to Latin America and the emerging Polar Silk Road demonstrated how China's growing role in the world could reach to the frontiers. In thinking about the concentration of Chinese foreign policy through the efforts to establish new multilateral institutions, such as the New Development Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, it is suggested that China's influence has increased in developing a new type of "norm shaper" attitude at regional and global levels (p. 15, 44, 226). To a certain extent, this approach reflects some evidence, but China's intentions and capabilities to change the existing rules and norms are still questionable. It is difficult to suggest that China behaves in a revisionist manner to change existing regimes, but instead, as a reform-oriented great power it aims to increase its bargaining leverage in institutional reform by creating new multilateral institutions (Tüter, 2019).

Fourth, Lanteigne mentions the term "commercial diplomacy" as one of the most important aspects of China's economic rise. As he defines, "Commercial diplomacy signifies the use of negotiations designed to influence government policy in the areas of trade and investment". And "commercial diplomacy uses economic power to influence non-commercial decisions in the political or even strategic realm" (p. 74). To support his argument, he shows evidence from China's attempts to seek free trade agreements with some smaller non-EU member European countries like Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland, and adds his anticipation for similar negotiations between China and Britain after Brexit. Although he explicates that both sides get better off as a result of positive-sum rather than zero-sum negotiations, his identification of commercial diplomacy is likely to be contradicted by his views on the features of Chinese "networking power" (p. 86) or at least needs much clarification in terms of the main drivers and orientations of China's connectivity power. This dimension of China's foreign policy is crucially important to examine China's BRI-related policy efforts in cross-regional relations, particularly in the Arctic region.

Fifth, his discussion of China's new multilateral approach also reflects a similar binary or ambivalent approach. He argues that China's increasing confidence is supported by the idea of being a "networking power" and developing a new approach to multilateralism. And with an expansion of its multilateral efforts from the economic realm to the security realm, he correctly points out that China has begun to pursue both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in an attempt to attain security

cooperation. The two typical examples are based on China-Russia strategic partnership mostly at a bilateral level on the one hand, and China's intensified efforts for multilateral security cooperation with ASEAN on the other. So, he concluded that China's selective engagement with security regimes relies on its acceptance of mutual security and cooperation rather than alignment and hierarchical power structures, which means that China remains to follow a more pragmatic attitude rather than ideologically oriented great power aspirations. Lanteigne clearly identifies China's new approach to regional security cooperation based on the idea of building "security communities" within a global network of organizations instead of "alliance structures" (134). What is missing in this analysis is to think more broadly about China's new understanding of the development-security nexus in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy (Tüter, 2021). While this new understanding is especially important for explaining regional interactions in East Asia, it largely shapes China's economic and diplomatic efforts through all BRI-related projects.

With that note, the future pattern of security interactions between China and the US has become dependent upon China's new approach to security cooperation. In Lanteigne's analysis of power transition theory, the historical example of WWI is evaluated for making some analogy with the current strategic situation between the US and China. As he concludes that the analogy between Europe's past and today's Asia is rather weak (p. 157), which I completely agree with. However, in the transformation of WWI from an isolated Balkan conflict to a pan-European conflict in 1914, there were certain structural conditions such as the existence of a rigid alliance system, the specific isolation of some European powers, and "offensive" strategies that European states developed. Even though neither of them exists in the East Asian region today, the other possibility of an isolated or limited conflict could be regarded as the 'Balkanization of the region. For instance, the North Korean regime remains to be one of the destabilizing factors and the tensions over the SCS present some potential security risks for the region.

Moreover, the extended scope of China's military and security approach is associated with increasing domestic and international challenges for moving beyond traditional concerns. And it has evolved into a more multidimensional and more issue-oriented character than before. While the non-traditional issues such as terrorism, economic security, health, access to resources and energy, and transnational crime have gained importance regarding the urgent needs of current foreign policy, policymakers have become more attentive to the conflicts in other regions, such as Africa and the Middle East, especially after the BRI launched (p. 132). At this point, Lanteigne's emphasis on China's new approach to regional "economic terrorism" (p. 131) is worth to be mentioned due to the increasing significance of regional trade and energy connectivity in East Asia. Although China agrees on sharing information on terrorism with other states and regards terrorism as an international threat rather than a regional one, its new approach to terrorism defines "economic terrorism" differently than separatism. If it is considered as a new threat against Asia-Pacific trade and one of the main non-traditional security concerns mutually shared by regional states, including Japan, then the main motivations behind China's changing approach are subject to investigation especially concerning its implications to regional diplomacy. The question is why China needs to develop a new approach to regional terrorism in its relations

with neighbors. And what would be the political implications of this effort for regional security cooperation in the medium-to-long term period?

And last but not the least, Lanteigne argues that the focus of Chinese foreign policy has shifted from great power and peripheral diplomacy to “cross-regional diplomacy” (p. 200). And afterward, he focuses on China’s “cross-regional diplomacy” in different regions of the world such as Europe, Latin America, and the Indo-Pacific. In the China-Europe context, China has demonstrated its ability to improve relations with European counterparts at the bilateral diplomacy level as well as the EU level. While China offers to create some “sub-regional” agreements with the European countries such as the 16+1 initiative, China’s free trade negotiations with the European Free Trade Association provide itself some opportunities to gain leverage on non-European countries without making a commitment to direct negotiations with the EU. Here, Lanteigne underlines the difficulties that the EU faces to produce a unified policy towards China and suggests that there have been different tendencies to develop trade links in benefitting from the BRI such as the “Nordic” approach which the five Nordic countries lean to align their overall foreign policy interests (p. 206). In Latin America, China does not refrain from improving its economic and diplomatic relations with Latin American countries even if the region is considered as the US sphere of influence. Lanteigne correctly addresses the significant role of BRICS and the New Development Bank in developing regional trade in Latin America and across regions. And he also refers to the consequence of Trump’s trade war policy as China’s search for alternative suppliers, especially in Latin American countries. In the Indo-Pacific, however, Lanteigne’s focus is mainly given to China’s regional diplomacy in its relations with India and Pakistan. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, to maintain stability in the greater region the need for constructing an “Afghanistan-Pakistan” regional policy has become significantly critical. As Lanteigne puts it, the Xi government is especially concerned with this regional policy for creating a stable environment for the future development of BRI (p. 221).

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