

## THE POTENTIAL OF IBAZIYYA TO BE A ROLE MODEL FOR CONTEMPORARY FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS

Doç. Dr. Orhan ATEŞ<sup>1</sup>

### ABSTRACT

As the spiral of violence surrounding the Middle East gained an international dimension, articles related to radical/fundamentalist movements became more visible. Describing the fundamentalist groups that adopt violence as a method as Neo-Kharijis and considering Ibazis as a Khariji sect unites fundamentalist movements and Ibazism at the common point of Kharijism. From this point of view, in this article, the potential of Ibaziyya to be a role model for radical movements that adopt violence as a method will be discussed. In the article, first of all, the development of fundamentalism is briefly evaluated, and then, in the last chapter, the fundamentalist potential of Ibaziyya is discussed by emphasizing the methodological problems in dealing with the group called Khawarij in the historical sources of sects. The confines of the article are limited to the critique of deep-seated opinions rather than a historical period. As a result, it has been determined that Ibaziyya is different from the Khariji groups that adopted violence as a method in the past and that it has no similarity to the contemporary fundamentalist movements regarding the thought and action plan.

**Keywords:** Fundamentalism, Radicalism, Khawarij, Ibaziyya

الإباضية وإمكانية أن تكون نموذجاً يحتذى به عند الحركات الأصولية المعاصرة

ملخص

أصبح الاهتمام بالحركات الأصولية الراديكالية من حيث البحث والدراسة امر لا مفر منه في ظل استمرار الاضطرابات في الشرق الأوسط واتساع دوامة العنف واكتسابها بعداً دولياً. تُعرف الحركات الأصولية والجماعات المتشددة التي تتبنى العنف كوسيلة لتحقيق أهدافها بالخوارج الجدد، كما أن أقحام الإباضية ضمن فرق الخوارج دون وجه حق، تعتبر النقطة المشتركة بينها وبين الحركات الراديكالية الأصولية. من هذا المنظور نتناول في مقالتنا دور الإباضية وإمكانية أن تكون نموذجاً يحتذى به لدى بعض الحركات الأصولية. كما سنحاول تسليط الضوء على مفهوم الأصولية وتطورها من جانب، وإلى فرقة الخوارج ومبادئها من جانب آخر، معتمدين على مصادر تاريخ المذاهب الإسلامية، أما في الخاتمة سنناقش إمكانية مفهوم الأصولية في الفرقة الإباضية، المقالة لا تقتصر على أحداث تاريخية معينة بل تتجاوز حدودها التاريخية منتقدةً القناعات الحالية الراسخة. الإباضية لم تعتمد أسلوب العنف في الماضي واختلفت عن فرق الخوارج الذين اتخذوا من العنف مبدأ لهم وعدم إمكانية التقارب الفكري والعملية بينها وبين الحركات الأصولية.

الكلمات الدالة / الكلمات المفتاحية

الأصولية الراديكالية الخوارج الإباضية

<sup>1</sup> ORCID: 0000-0001-2345-6789, [tutumsead@gmail.com](mailto:tutumsead@gmail.com)

Arařtırma Makalesi/Research Article, Geliř Tarihi/Received: 26/07/2022–Kabul Tarihi/Accepted: 27/09/2022

## INTRODUCTION

The concept of fundamentalism, which is originally English, is used in different contexts depending on users' fields of specialization. This concept is expressed in our language with different concepts such as religious fundamentalism, extremism, fundamentalism, radical religiosity, and foundationalism. In terms of the constructivist approach, it is not proper to compare the two particular concepts due to some similarities between them. For a healthy comparison, the universal integrities on which particulars depend should also contain similarity. In this respect, identifying this movement, which emerged as a "return to the original texts of the Bible" in the Protestant environment as a reaction to modernity in Christian Europe, with the return to the essence movements in other cultures will not give correct results.

With the help of western researchers and translations from western languages, the meaning of the concept of fundamentalist has been expanded and has been used for some Islamic movements that emerged in the Islamic geography. There are some underlying reasons for this; the West's desire to confront Muslims among themselves, showing Muslims and Islam as the source of the crises in the world, and concealing the intellectual accumulation of Muslims.

In the West, fundamentalism emerged as a reactionary movement against Darwinism, which was the basis for secular modernism, liberal Protestantism and progressive understandings and the moral degenerations that were caused by them. It corresponds to the framework that aims to rebuild social life according to the fundamental principles of religion and establishes a strict adherence among its followers. Fundamentalism is not an understanding that takes its energy only from religion. It is a counter-reactive perspective of secularism and its derivatives that try to push belief out of social life in a globalizing world.<sup>2</sup> However, considering its view that sanctifies violence today, it can be said that there is a danger for authentic religions.<sup>3</sup>

We have stated that fundamentalism emerged as a religious, political and epistemological movement in America at the beginning of the previous century as a concept expressing a return to the basic beliefs of Christianity<sup>4</sup> among Evangelical Protestants, and then it was made part of groups and understandings of other religions emphasizing the return to roots.

When it comes to American Protestant fundamentalism<sup>5</sup>, the first thing that comes to mind is Jerry Falwell. Equating Muslims with 'fundamentalism', 'radicalism' and 'terrorism', Falwell endeavored to make Christianity effective not only in the USA but also in the world politics of the USA.

<sup>2</sup> Kutlu, Sönmez, Çağdaş İslami Akımlar ve Sorunları, Ankara 2008, p. 69-76.

<sup>3</sup> Ercins, Gülay, "Küreselleştirici Modernliğin Bir Antitezi: Fundamentalizm, Uluslararası İnsan Bilimleri Dergisi, Volume: VI (1), 2009, p. 654; Wessels, Antonie, "The Role of Religion in Present –Day, Secular Society? Studies In Interreligious Dialogue, Volume: 8 (2), p. 172-190.

<sup>4</sup> Eralp Tunç, (1995), "Hristiyan Fundamentalizmi", İlim ve Sanat (Haz: M. Es'ad Coşan), Volume: 38, (Mayıs), p. 24, 22-30

<sup>5</sup> Hoffman, John; Graham, Paul, "Fundamentalism and Modernity" <http://etd.gsu.edu/the-07282006-145046/07/07/2008>; Karen Armstrong is the author of The Battle for God; A History of Fundamentalism; [http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/publicEvents/pdf/20050126-Intolerance Armstrong.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/website-archive/publicEvents/pdf/20050126-Intolerance%20Armstrong.pdf)

As the leader of the Moral Majority movement<sup>6</sup> in the 1980s, Falwell struggled to bring the United States to the Biblical line and in this struggle; he argued that the country was ruled by an immoral secular minority. Falwell and his movement, which encouraged American fundamentalists to engage in politics against this minority, promoted political behaviors such as voting, writing letters to Congress, and lobbying.<sup>7</sup> While talking about the attacks on the World Trade Center, Falwell attributed the root cause of these events to the efforts to remove God from public life as a result of secular politics. He held abortion supporters morally responsible. He said that because when we killed forty million innocent babies, we angered God, and God punished us because of our feloniousness.<sup>8</sup>

No social event occurs spontaneously, out of the blue.<sup>9</sup> The exacerbation of fundamentalist movements is also the result of some of the causes that occurred this century. In very general terms, it is possible to summarize these reasons under three headings as secularism, imperialism and globalization. That is, in societies where secularism was dominant as a lifestyle in the previous century, the weakening of spiritual life and the decrease in the influence of religion on social life led to some moral degradation. The moral corruption of society led to a rise in reactions involving a return to the foundations of religion. Another point is that the colonial activities of the industrialized countries had results such as culturally suppressing the colonized countries and humiliating them.

Religion began to draw attention as a savior recipe against the humiliating and shaping policies of the imperialist states. Another issue is that nationalist ideologies lost power all over the world with the effect of globalization. The place vacated by nationalism was filled by fundamentalist religious understandings.

One of the main features of the fundamentalist movement is that it rejects the distinction between public and private, as well as the distinction between religion and politics. This understanding is an opposition to liberal approaches that try to drive religion from under vault of heaven. The framework of fundamentalism models a particular sanctification of thought and lifestyle.

The flawlessness of this model and its competence in making humanity happy is indisputable. It is also important that model texts are interpreted in an activist manner by those who have a fundamentalist understanding. These comments constitute the motivation for action.

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<sup>6</sup> Liebman, Robert and Robert Wuthnow (1983), *The New Christian Right*, p. 58. New York: Aldine Publishing Company. ISBN 0-202-30307-1

<sup>7</sup> Rozell, Mark J. and Clyde Wilcox (2003). "Virginia: Birthplace of the Christian Right," *The Christian Right in American Politics*, ed. John C. Green, et al., p. 43. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. ISBN 0-87840-393-0

<sup>8</sup> Falwell; *An Autobiography, The Inside Story*, Liberty House Publishers, Lynchburg, 1997, p. 395.

<sup>9</sup> Cayır, Celal, "Din ve Şiddet Üzerine Psikolojik Bir Yaklaşım", *DÜİF. Dergisi*, Volume XIII (1), 2011.

## ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM<sup>10</sup>

The Muslim fighters trained by the US military to fight against Russia in Afghanistan lost their functionality with the collapse of the Soviet Union. These people, who turned war into an art, moved to problematic areas such as Iraq and Syria to continue the art of jihad, which they consider sacred. They took on the responsibility of defending Islamic lands against imperialism by using their combativeness. These groups crossed the Muslim geographies where they were located and engaged in jihad activities on a global scale. This has led to the acceleration of discussions such as Islam and Fundamentalism, Islam and radicalism. Especially, after the September 11 attack, we see that studies on this issue have gained intensity.

Studies on the historical roots of Islamic fundamentalism generally begin with Khariji, continue with Ahmet b. Hanbal, reach a contemporary form with Muhammad b. Abdulvahhab and end with a framework that encompasses many Islamist organizations that fray from there. In the history of Islam, especially Kharijis are shown as the first core and source of inspiration for religious-origin violence movements. It is said that there are common ties between contemporary Salafi movements and Kharijism.

Salafism or Salafiyya means "those who are tied to ones who come first, or those who are based on them".<sup>11</sup> The terminology of the Salafi sect refers to basing on the Prophet and the companions who followed him, then the generation that followed them, and then the views of those who followed them.<sup>12</sup> This understanding is based on a hadith. "The best of people are the people of the age I am in. Then they are the people of the second century, next the third century."<sup>13</sup> "The best of people are the people of my age. Then, they are those who follow them, and then are those who follow them. Then come some communities. The testimony of some of them precludes their oath, and the oath of some precedes their testimony."<sup>14</sup> The idea of being subject to these three generations is based on a verse.

"The vanguard (of Islam)- the first of those who forsook (their homes) and of those who gave them aid, and (also) those who follow them in (all) good deeds,- well- pleased is Allah with them, as are they with Him: for them hath He prepared gardens under which rivers flow, to dwell therein for ever: that is the supreme felicity."<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> There are many religious, political, internal and external reasons why fundamentalist movements are rampant in the Middle East. If we summarize these reasons briefly; first, the states that emerged after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire were sectarian-centered formations with the effects of the imperial powers and the transformation of anti-sectarianism into de facto interventions. Second, Wahhabism's opening up to the world with political Islamism and its politicization. Three, Iran's attempts to take Shia to the international dimension. Four, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan and the birth of a jihadist spirit there and five, with the invasion of Iraq by the US, the movement of people involved in the Afghan jihad to this region.

<sup>11</sup> Ammâra, Muhammed, Daru'l-Meârif Tunus yy, p. 9- 18; Uludağ, Süleyman, 1979, p. 33; Özervarlı, 2009, c. 36, s. 399.

<sup>12</sup> Uludağ, Süleyman, "Selefiyye ve Tasavvuf, Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefilik, İstanbul 2014, p. 343...357.

<sup>13</sup> Müslim, Fedailü's Sahabe, 2p.16.

<sup>14</sup> Buhâri, Fedâilü'l-ashâb 1; Şehâdât 9

<sup>15</sup> Quran, (at-Tavba / 100).

This verse is interpreted by Salafiya as follows: The first generation, which is the generation of the Companions, the second generation, which is the generation of the Tāb'īn, and the third generation, which is the generation of the Tābi'ū al-Tāb'īn, are holy generations. The Islam represented by them is the most correct form of Islam, and their interpretation is definitive. The framework set by them can never be exceeded.<sup>16</sup> However, these scholars attributed to the predecessor are not the scholars of the companions or the Tāb'īn, but the scholars of the Tābi'ū al-Tāb'īn (like Imam Malik and Hasan Basri. Salafist thought opposes the interpretation of the Quran and sunnah with reason. In order to make this approach clear, sources generally state that Salafist understanding is against the school of Ahl ar-ra'y, which interprets the verse with reason represented by Abu Hanifa. However, there was someone in Basra who interpreted the verse wisely decades before Abu Hanifa. In Medina, Abdullah b. Omar heard of his rational approach. This person is Jabir b. Zayd, who is the architect of the thought of Ibaziyya. Thus, when Abdullah b. Omar saw Jabir during the pilgrimage, he said:

*"Jabir, you are one of Basra's scholars. And you are the one who gives fatwa to the people of Basra. If you are going to issue a fatwa, give a fatwa with a speaking Quran or a sunnah that you have received. If you do anything other than this, you will both destroy yourself and destroy the people."*<sup>17</sup>

Again, Abu Sufyan narrates: One day, Jabir sees one of the guards or pilgrims praying on the Kaaba. Jabir shouts at him and says: "The person praying on the Kaaba! You do not have a qibla." Ibn Abbas (may God be pleased) was also in a corner of the mosque and said: "If Jabir is in Mecca, this word is his."<sup>18</sup> Thanks to this, Jabir had the opportunity to talk to many Companions. Due to the fact that these first three generations were the perpetrators of the first bloody wars in Islamic history, some thinkers try to interpret this hadith differently. They state that an approach that keeps three generations from sin and mistake will lead to Arab nationalism and sacred ancestry. Therefore, they claim that it would be more correct to understand this hadith as the best will come from these three generations. Those who base salafist<sup>19</sup> understandings on hadith claim three distinctive features: 1. "We cannot understand the Quran."<sup>20</sup> 2. "Hadith is the same as the Quran."<sup>21</sup> 3. Hadith can cancel the verse.<sup>22</sup> With the collapse of the Umayyad State, the Salafi sect lost its state support.

The Abbasids carried the Mutezila sect to the palace in their first centuries (750-849 / h.133-234). When the Umayyads, who kept the Salafist thinking, were in power, they tortured the Mu'tazilites and Hanafis mostly after Kharijis and Shiites.

<sup>16</sup> Bkz. Uludağ, Süleyman, "Selefiyye ve Tasavvuf, Tarihte ve Günümüzde Selefilik.

<sup>17</sup> İsfahanî, Hilyetü-l Evliya ve Tabakatü-l Esfiya Bekkûş, Fıkhu'l- İmâm Câbir b. Zeyds.79İbn Kesîr el Bidâye, ve n-Nihaye, p. 157.

<sup>18</sup> Savafî el İmam Câbirve Âsaruhu fi'd-Da've s.43; Harisi,el-Ukûdü'l-Fiddiyye fi Usuli'l-ibâziyyes.102; Muammerel-ibâdiyye fi Mevkibi't-Tarihs. p. 116.

<sup>19</sup> Ammâra, Muhammed, Daru'l-Meârif Tunus yy, s. 9- 18.

<sup>20</sup> İbn Kuteybe, 1989, p.77, 86, 94.

<sup>21</sup> Koçyiğit, T. Hadiscilerle Kelâmcılar Arasındaki Münakaşalar, Ankara 1989, ss. 139, 235-250.

<sup>22</sup> el-İhkâm fi usuli'l-ahkam, Volume 1 (470-476); t.y., el-Muhallâ bi'l asr, Volume 11 p. 416. 17

When the Abbasid State and Mu'tazila came to power, this time Mu'tazila started to put pressure on Salafis and Hanafis.<sup>23</sup> Salafi and Hanafi scholars cast in their lot with each other in the dungeons. While this situation brought the Salafi scholars and Hanafi scholars closer to each other, it also led to a common name for these two groups. The common name found for these two groups was "Ahl-i Sunnah Wahl-Jamaah." According to the Mutazila point of view, Hanafis should have been some kind of Salaf as they accept sound hadith. However, there are important differences between Hanafi and Salafi. It was not their ideas that united them, but the persecution and oppression they experienced.<sup>24</sup> However, in the following centuries, we can see that the Abbasid State gradually moved towards the Salafist line due to the tension created by the Crusades (1095), the chaos created by the Mongol invasions (1205) and the pressure of the Arab culture, and by the 13th century, it settled on the Salafi line thoroughly. Later, this understanding will be updated with Mohammad Abdulvahhab's thought and Muhammad b. Suud's action plan.

## **1. THE POTENTIAL OF IBAZIYA TO BE A ROLE MODEL FOR FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENT**

It is said that the mentality levels of terrorist groups associated with Islam, such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, extend to Khawarij. However, we have to say that the structure called Kharijism is not a homogeneous structure. In fact, this group, which initially came into the political scene as Muhakkima, was divided into different groups in the following process. While Sunni and Shiite sources call all of these groups as Kharijî as a whole, regardless of the processional developments, Ibazis call the groups such as Azariqa and Sufriyya, which adopt violence as a method in the spread of Islam, as Khariji. According to this point of view, Ibaziyya, which does not adopt violence as a method of declaration in the spread of Islam, should not be considered within the Khariji movement.

The potential of Ibaziyya, which is accepted as the moderate branch of Khawarij in Sunni sources, to be a prototype in terms of thought and action for violence organizations is not a subject that has been studied sufficiently.

As of today, we do not want to have a discussion by naming the whole of this movement Kharijism, which has been on the stage of history with Muhakkima and has been divided into intellectually opposite branches since sixty-four years of the Islamic calendar. When it is called Kharijism, we understand Azariqa, Sufriyya and Najadat, and we do not see Ibaziyya, which won the enmity of the Khariji sects because of its opposition to violence as a Khariji sect. At this point, we have to state that the studies conducted on the Kharijism sect contain very serious methodological deficiencies, normative evaluations and inaccuracies.

<sup>23</sup> Emin, Ahmet, Duha'l-İslam, Volume III, p. 178, İbn Esir, Volume VII, p. 8.

<sup>24</sup> Ay, Mahmut, "Mutezilizm'den Arta Kalan Mu'tezile" Kelam Araştırmaları Volume IX, p. 66. 57-76

Discussing that Ibaziyya is a fundamentalist movement via the judgments built by the aforementioned sources will not yield healthy results. Therefore, we would like to focus on the problematic areas seen in the studies of Kharijism by bracketing the section on Ibaziyya's potential to be a role model for fundamentalist movements.

### **1.1. Problematic Areas of Kharijism Studies**

Over the past few centuries, Islamic society has experienced internal and external crises. As the victims of the European imperialism, the gradual decline of the Ottoman and Persian powers led to the question of fundamental Islamic principles again. As a matter of fact, the answers given in times of crisis in Islamic history were updated.<sup>25</sup>

The fact that the founders of global violence organizations like Al-Qaeda and Daish are Muslims and carried out violent acts on a global scale brought the relationship between Islam and violence to the agenda. First of all, Islam's approach to violence and its historical depth have been a matter of curiosity. In this context, Kharijism, as the origin of Islamist violence, comes up frequently as a dominant element. When looked at what is written and said; Kharijism is accepted as the core of (so-called) Islamic terror.

Although it is a great claim that Kharijism was the first terrorist movement that emerged in the history of Islam and inspired religious violence that took place in the following centuries, the intellectual basis of this claim is not as strong as it seems. Namely;

#### **1.1.1. Kharijism has not been the subject of the in-depth sociological research it deserves:**

Although the paradigms created about Kharijism, which is one of the most important events in Islamic history, still affect our opinions on many issues, unfortunately, they have not been the subject of the in-depth sociological research it deserves. The paradigm of Kharijism, which is included in Sunni and Shiite sect books, is not only normative judgments composed of the interpretations of opposing views, but has taken the place of truth because it is not examined adequately.

Kharijism is discussed in a context that is independent of and out of sociology's theories of violence. The Khawarij approach of Sunni and Shiite sect books is obvious. In these sources, there is a judgmental approach, not an understanding. Although Imam Ash'ari generally complained about this approach, he could not completely get rid of the stigmatizing approach; he drew a picture of Kharijism based on the references to unknown people and groups. Baghdadi, on the other hand, sends some interpretations to hell and some comments to heaven as an authority that assumes the duty of separating the right from falsehood.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Özvarlı, Sait, İbn Teymiyye'nin Düşünce Metodolojisi ve Kelamcılara Eleştirisi, İstanbul 2008, p. 98. 97-125

<sup>26</sup> Bağdadi, Abdulkahir b. Tahir b. Muhammed, el-Fark beyne'l-Fırak, (Muhammed Muhiddin Abdullhmid), Beyrut 1995, p. 5-11.

### 1.1.2. Identification in the Shadow of Singular Causes

Generally, the social, cultural and political context of the event has not been adequately clarified on the basis of individual reasons such as nomadic life and ignorance, or even exaggeration. Lack of resources can be seen as an important problem in this regard. However, using this inadequacy against it is not an acceptable situation in terms of scientific mercy and objectivity. It is possible that this mass, which is called Khariji, like other religious groups, has very different characteristics. However, the encompassing reduction of the other causes of events to a singular cause has created a dominant status on the phenomenon of Kharijism. For example, violence and nomadic life, literal reading of the verses have been highlighted in such an encompassing way that Kharijism is imprisoned in these concepts. When violence and nomadic life are mentioned in the history of Islam, Kharijis come to mind. The dominant status associated with violence and ignorance causes their other attributes to be ignored. In addition, the prominence of violence and similar negative features as a dominant status causes new identity constructions and new interpretations regarding the past. For example, the explanation of some gaps in the history of Islam is filled with the dominant status attributed to the Kharijis. For example, why did the development of Islam lose its initial development? The emphasis on violence and ignorance as the dominant status attributed to Kharijis fills this gap as a key concept. Khariji violence and ignorance has put social life into chaos and prevented the development of Islam.

However, this is the sign of objective science, when we look at the Ibazi sources. Ibadiyya is initially based on an intellectual basis. The builder of this foundation is primarily Jabir b. Zayd.<sup>27</sup> There is historical information about him. Abu'l-Habbab says When Jabir b. Zayd was buried, Katada said: "Today the knowledge of the earth is buried in the ground."<sup>28</sup>

Jabir b. Zayd was one of the most famous scholars of the Hijri first century and was an imam (kudwa) that was followed in tafsir, hadith and fiqh. He was famous for giving fatwa. During the hajj season, he runs into Abdullah b. Omar b. Hattab. Abdullah says to him: "*Jabir, you are one of Basra's scholars. And you are the one who gives fatwa to the people of Basra. If you are going to issue a fatwa, give a fatwa with a speaking Quran or a sunnah that you have received. If you do anything other than that, you will both destroy yourself and destroy the people.*"<sup>29</sup>

There has been a narration from Abu Sufyan Mahbub b. Rahil; one day, Jabir went to Hazrat Aisha. He asked questions that had not been asked until then. He even asked the Prophet's jima, and sweat flowed from his forehead because he was ashamed. Hazrat Aisha: "Ask my son." said to him.

<sup>27</sup> Sülün, Cevat, Cabir b. Zeyd'in Hayatı ve İlmi Kişiliği, DÜİF, Basılmamış Yüksek lisans Tezi, Diyarbakır 2016.

<sup>28</sup> İsfahanî, Hilyetü-l Evliya ve Tabakatü-l Esfiya Volume 3 p.85; İbn Kesîr, el Bidâye, ve n-Nihaye, p. 157

<sup>29</sup> Bekkûş, Fıkhü'l- İmâm Câbir b. Zeyd, p.79; İsfahanî, Hilyetü-l Evliya ve Tabakatü-l Esfiya; İbn Kesîr el Bidâye, ve n-Nihaye, p. 157.



When looked at Jabir's books, it is possible to see the effect of the information he received from Hazrat Aisha on the fatwas he gave.<sup>30</sup> Then Hazrat Aisha said to him: "Who are you?" Jabir told her, "In the east, I am a citizen of a town called Oman."<sup>31</sup>

Iyas b. Muaviya, who was a Basra kadi during the Omar b. Abdulaziz period, would say: "*I grew up to the master of Basra and the fatwa giver, and he was Jabir b. Zayd.*" Hasan-i Basrî praises Jabir in the same way and says: "*He is a juristic scholar*".<sup>32</sup> The following statement of Amr b. Dinar, one of the hadith narrators of the Tābi'in, indicates the position of Jabir in ijtehad and fatwa: "*I have not seen anyone more knowledgeable about fatwa than Jabir.*"<sup>33</sup>

Muhammad b. Mahbub, one of the scholars living in the Hijri third century, says: "*Jabir was more knowledgeable than Hasan-i Basri, but Jabir was the imam of a tribe but Hasan-i Basri was the imam of the general. In other words, Hasan would give preaching to the general but to give a fatwa was special to Jabir.*"<sup>34</sup> Rabi 'b. Habib says: "*I came to Jabir about matters that people were addicted to. I have never seen a scholar, a jurist, or a khan wiser than him.*"<sup>35</sup>

### 1.1.3. Ahl-i Sunnah Wahl-Jamaah Setup

The handling of Kharijism outside the context of the prevailing Ahl-i Sunnah Wahl-Jamaah belief has a separate pain point. Because opposing voices were pushed out of the fiction of Ahl-i Sunnah, they were marginalized and disapproved, and in this way, legitimacy was given to the violence inflicted on them by the state. It should not be forgotten that the phenomenon of Ahl-i Sunnah Wahl-Jamaah initially represented a political framework and later moved to the field of creed.<sup>36</sup> Kharijism and similar interpretations were subjected to normative negative judgments from the very beginning because they were excluded from Ahl-i Sunnah. This approach prevents us from understanding the relevant religious structures correctly.

If we take the political considerations out of parentheses, it is not understandable that Imam Jabir and his community are excluded from Ahl-i Sunnah in the light of the information below. He took hadith lessons from the Companions such as Abdullah b. Abbas, Abdullah b. Zubayr, Abdullah b. Omar and Muaviya b. Abu Sufyan.<sup>37</sup> Jabir b. Zayd explains the importance of taking lessons from the Companions with the following words: "*A person who does not have a teacher from the Companions does not have anything about religion. Surely, Allah graced us with people like Abdullah b. Abbas, Abdullah b. Masud and Abdullah b. Salam, who are rooted in knowledge.*

<sup>30</sup> Geniş bilgi için bkz. Cabir b. Zeyd, Resâil İmam Cabir b. Zeyd, Muscat 2013.

<sup>31</sup> Salimi, Nureddin, Ebû Muhammed Abdullah b. Hamîd, Tuhfetü'l-A'yân bi Sîreti Ehli Umân, (ta'lik: Ebû İshâk), Kâhire, 1380/1961, p. 10.

<sup>32</sup> İbn Kesîr el Bidâye, ve n-Nihayes 157; Dercîni, Tabakât. Volume II, p. 205.

<sup>33</sup> Bekkûş, Fıkhü'l- İmâm Câbir b. Zeyd, s. 75; İbn Kesîr el Bidâye, ve'n-Nihaye, p. 159;

<sup>34</sup> Harisî, el-Ukûdû'l-Fiddiyye fi Usulî'l-ibâziyyes. p. 40

<sup>35</sup> el-Halilî Sikolociyetü-l İmâm Câbir b. Zeyd p. 24

<sup>36</sup> Kutlu, Sönmez, Mezhepler Tarihine Giriş, İstanbul 2008, p. 14.

<sup>37</sup> İbn-i Cevzî, Sifat-s-Safve, p. 814; Bekkûş, Fıkhü'l- İmâm Câbir b. Zeyd, p. 44

*We took their works, followed their words, took their lives as an example and acted according to their methods. A sect that does not have sound texts reaching the Messenger of Allah (pbuh) has no value, and likewise, a madrasah without a solid foundation in knowledge has no value.”*<sup>38</sup>

#### **1.1.4. Epistemic Pressure**

By epistemic pressure, we mean the effect that the works written within the line of Ahl-i Sunnah have on the addressees. When we look at the general opinions about these sources;

##### **1.1.4.1. Considering These Sources as the Only Right and Right Ever**

Considering the sources and the imams that think Kharijism is grim as the only truth and right ever puts an epistemic pressure on dissenting views.<sup>39</sup> As a result of epistemic pressure, different opinion holders are discouraged and their views do not receive the attention they deserve. Despite the unbearable pressure of opposition political administrations against Ibazis, these pressures were ignored. Epistemic repression sometimes paved the way for political and actual oppression, and sometimes tried to hide them from the witness of history. Hajjaj was torturing in ways that Satan could not think of. He confined three leaders of Kharijis in a room made of reed and lined with animal droppings, and they stayed in this filthy place for three days and died.<sup>40</sup> However, Hajjaj was upset that they died so quickly because he was a person who enjoyed torturing. Because of these deaths, he called for a Zoroastrian doctor and told him "death entered among those in prison, but I do not want them to die, I want them to suffer." What the doctor did was more compassionate than what Hajjaj had planned for them. The Zoroastrian wanted their food to be changed to oil and garlic, and at his request, the prisoners got some relief.<sup>41</sup> And the divine judgment enabled some prisoners in prison, including Abu Ubayda and Dammam, to be saved, and the person who tortured people brutally to die by going mad. "*They did not get anyone out of prison until that sinister died,*" said Abu Ubayda.<sup>42</sup>

##### **1.1.4.2. Conscious Silence:**

It does not go unnoticed that these sources fall silent when the opposition movements are justified, otherwise they take exaggerated evaluations. For example, while the groups accepted as Khariji were declared almost non-religious because of their opposition to Hazrat Ali following the Arbitration<sup>43</sup>, Ahl-i Camel and the People of Damascus, who were in the same position, were excluded from these evaluations by some forced comments.

<sup>38</sup> Ca'birî, Ebû Hamza eş-Şarî, p. 71

<sup>39</sup> A'birî, İsmail b. Sâlih, el-İbâziyyetü beyne Hiraseti'd-Dîn ve Siyâeti'd-Dünyâ, Muscat 2013, p. 264-272.

<sup>40</sup> ed-Dercîni, Tabâkât, Volume II. p. 248

<sup>41</sup> ed -Dercîni, age, Volume II. p. 248

<sup>42</sup> ed-Dercîni, age. volume II. p. 247; Geniş bilgi için bkz. Yahya Ertürk, İbâzî Bilgin Ebu Ubeyde Müslim b. Ebî Kerime, DÜİF Basılmamış Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2015.

<sup>43</sup> Muammer, Ali Yahya, Men hum el- Havâric, www. İbadiya.com, p. 2

### 1.1.5. Disregard of Processes

Again, in these sources, the ensuing developments of this movement, which took the stage of history for the first time with the names such as Muhakkima, Ahl-i Nahravan, Haruriyya, and which was stigmatized with Kharijism, were not taken into account because when we look at the history of thought, no movement can survive as it started. Although Islam is under the protection of Allah Almighty, hundreds of different understandings have developed within the Islamic thought. These institutionalized over time and formed different religious structures. What is the reason we do not know that will protect the Muhakkima movement from this social reality?

It is an epistemic misdirection to call all of this movement, which appeared on the stage of history under the name of Muhakkima, as Khariji in unity, without taking into account the breaks it experienced in the following period. What advantages this manipulation provides to policy makers should not be ignored. Usually, sources that describe those who left Hazrat Ali following the Arbitration decision as Kharijis in the Hijri thirty-seven year make evaluations on Azariqa, which emerged in the Hijri sixty-four year when it comes to the evaluation of idea. This is a very serious method mistake.

## 2. FUNDAMENTALIST DISCOURSE AND IBAZIYYA

### 2.1. Building an Oppositional Ideology:

When we look at the fundamentalist religious movements which have been accelerated by secularization, colonialism and globalization in the Islamic geography and are said to be Islamist, we know that they are people who are not satisfied with the current political models and want to build a new world according to the originals of religion.

An obvious conflict of political models manifests itself in fundamentalist or radical discourse. However, when we consider Ibaziyya or its predecessor Muhakkima from this point of view, we cannot say that they are in a political model conflict with the existing powers. Although they constitute one side of the religious political problems that arise, they do not have any problems with the ideology followed by the state. They want the current model to be operated more equitably. Therefore, the discourse of Ibaziyya does not include an alternative ideology that points to a return to roots. In every period of their history, they completely performed the Quran, the sunnah and the practices of the first two caliphs, Hazrat Uthman's first six years, and Hazrat Ali's actions until the Arbitration. Like other Sunni sects and groups, they criticized the unfair practices carried out by the Umayyad administration. However, especially Ibaziyya avoided approaches that might divide the Muslim society, and displayed a conservative attitude. While the unfair practices of the administrators were brutally criticized, they remained away from approaches that would drag the Islamic society into an administrative chaos and solve the bonds of unity in the society. In Islamic society, praying behind the state, having good relations with them and receiving gifts has a political meaning.

It is mentioned in the sources that Jabir b. Zayd, as the leader of the Ibazi movement, met with the Umayyad rulers, prayed behind them and got and gave gifts. Although Imam Jabir b. Zayd and his followers wanted a more righteous state order, they wanted to achieve this in a gradual process by preserving the gains of Islam without atomizing the society. We have the work that is called Rasailu Imam Jabir b. Zayd and ascribed to Imam Jabir b. Zayd. When we look at the letters in this work, it is possible to see ideas and fatwas that suggest designing our individual religious life according to Islam. However, there is not a single line that suggests a politically opposing ideology.<sup>44</sup>

## 2.2. Building a New Society

When we evaluate the Ibazi movement with its predecessors, Muhakkima, in integrity, it cannot be said that this movement is a movement that is fed by violence, based on the construction of a new society and built against the lifestyle of the society because both Muhakkima and Ibazis, who accepted themselves as its continuation, criticized the actions of the rulers, but they did not develop a discussion on the lifestyle of the society. The fact that they supported Hazrat Ali during the Siffin War but objected to Hazrat Ali after the Arbitration is completely related to the practices of the rulers. There is not a single piece of evidence to refute this thesis in opposing sources.

Because Ibaziyya has an understanding that does not sanctify people even if they are Companions, it is out of question to consecrate a period collectively. Reflections of this understanding are more dominant in the understanding of Ahl-i Sunnah rather than Ibaziyya. For Ibaziyye, which does not hesitate to criticize Hazrat Ali, Ahl-i Camel and the people of Damascus due to their actions, predicating on an imaginary and faultless period and claiming to rebuild the society accordingly is not a consistent claim.

What is said in the context of Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice does not constitute a reference to this subject. Because the command of goodness and the prohibition of evil is a religious duty all the components of Islamic society shoulder. Ibazis' remarks that mean commanding goodness should be evaluated not as the construction of a new society, but as a desire to reach a more decent social structure. Likewise, the fact that deeds related to the definition of faith constitute a part of belief is not just an opinion defended by Ibaziyya. There are other sects within and outside the Ahl-i Sunnah which share the same view. Therefore, it is not a healthy approach to mark Ibaziyya as a violent act based on the view of faith.

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<sup>44</sup> Câbir b. Zeyd, Resâilu'l-Îmam Câbir b. Zeyd el-Ezdî, (thk. Ferhât b. Ali el-Ca'birî) Muscat 2013.

### 2.3. Sanctifying Violence

Violence has never been an aim for Muhakkima. Even the claim that they use violence as a tool is not accepted by Ibazis. By the Hijri sixty-four year, the injustices based on the arbitrariness of the Umayyad state must have reached such serious levels that we know that many uprisings such as Hazrat Husayn's rebellion, Abdullah b. Zubayr's declaring his caliphate in Mecca<sup>45</sup>, the Tawwabun Movement<sup>46</sup>, the Mukhtar al-Saqafi Movement took place during these dates.<sup>47</sup> When we look at the sources, there is a perception that there is no problem in the flow of social and political life, but the groups called Khariji are uprising and only they disturb the peace of the society living in peace. However, when we look at this period holistically, we see that there are not only groups called Khariji but also many individuals and groups that rebelled apart from them.

In this process, Ibaziyya did not accept the suggestions of violence offered to it and accepted the method of persuasion as the basic principle. Because of this attitude, it was named al-Kaada by the Khariji sects who adopted violence.<sup>48</sup> The name Kaada is a pejorative name that means those who sit down while there is jihad against cruelty and is given to humiliate them. Ibazi scholars said that the struggle against an administration in whose minarets adhan is recited and in whose mosques prayers are performed should be through persuasion methods rather than violence.

While Khawarij is handled as a whole in studies, it is overlooked that they are psychological subjects woven with emotions like other people. Human and the communities it formed have another emotional side besides the visible flesh and bone. It is this aspect that also gives people the form of being human. If we start from the view of the schools that acknowledge that crime is not an individual act, we need to consider human behaviors together with the emotional loadings that activate them. For example, when Hazrat Omar was killed, his son was defeated by his feelings and not only killed the murderer, but also killed his relatives who did not have any guilt or sin. Therefore, he was criticized. If we examine the uprisings called Khariji revolts as free from the Battle of Nahravan and the pressure exerted on them by the political power, we will have wrong conclusions. This is because the actions of small groups other than those of the Khariji groups such as Azariqa and Sufriyya, which use violence as a method, should be evaluated as a reaction to the pressure exerted by the state on opposing psychological subjects, in other words, an explosion of anger.

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<sup>45</sup> Aycan, İrfan, "Emevîler Döneminde Bir İktidar Mücadelesi Örneği" Abdullah b. Zübeyr, p. 105-108, [dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/37/2049/21282](http://dergiler.ankara.edu.tr/dergiler/37/2049/21282).

<sup>46</sup> Yiğit, İsmail, İSAM, volume 41, p. 50

<sup>47</sup> Belâzuri, Ensâbu'l-Eşrâf, Volume VI, p. 367-380.

<sup>48</sup> Bağdadî, el-Fark, p. 103

## 2.4. Obedience Without Question

Ibazis are not people of imitation but people of limitation.<sup>49</sup> That is, they take into account documents and evidence, not imitation. In today's Islamic geography and in the regions that overflow this geography, in the functioning of violence groups and these organizations established by Muslims, the emphasis on absolute obedience is a dominant color. However, when the Muhakkima Movement is considered from this point of view, acting with absolute justice is a more dominant character than absolute obedience among its followers.

Actually, the Prophet (pbuh) left behind an ummah that questioned, investigated, and even did not avoid criticism whenever necessary. Before the Battle of Jamel, Hasan b. Ali criticized his father for his decisions. *“Father, after Uthman was killed, when people came to you and asked you to accept this job, I told you not to accept this offer until the obedience of all people from other provinces reached you. When the news that Zubayr and Talha were moving to Basra with Aisha came to you, I told you to return to Medina and sit at your house. I advised you to leave Medina when Uthman was besieged. If Uthman was killed, you wouldn't be there. You did not accept my view in any of these.”*<sup>50</sup> Hasan b. Ali grew up in the discipline of the Prophet. As you can see, he criticizes his father very easily.

In terms of his charismatic leadership, Hazrat Ali is an inaccessible model according to most Ahl-i Sunnah and Shiite understandings. Even today, this charismatic personality is kept alive in Ahl-i Sunnah. Both Hazrat Ali and some other personalities cannot be criticized. Despite his many charismatic features, Muhakkima abandoned him, claiming that he did not act fairly and did not act in accordance with the general principles of Islam. In other words, Ibazis are not people who sentence principles to charisma. If these people who fought alongside Ali one day ago were based on charisma, a day later, they would not leave Hazrat Ali for the sake of their principles. For example, thousands of people changed positions in the face of the persuasiveness of a speech Hazrat Ali gave. Therefore, Muhakkima is not a dull, solid mass that loses nothing from its volume; on the contrary, it is like a sieve where entries and exits are constantly experienced. In the later process, there is no continuity in the leaders of Muhakkima due to their charisma.

## 3. THE POTENTIAL OF IBAZIYA TO BE A ROLE MODEL FOR THE CONTEMPORARY ROOTED SPIRIT STRUCTURE

Certain spiritual characteristics are attributed to individuals and groups inclined to fundamentalist movements. When we look at western sources, these people are often morbid personalities who grew up in unhealthy social environments and had psychological problems. Although these approaches are fairly justified, it is also necessary to see the destruction of imperialism on the mental structure of fundamentalists and their social structures.

<sup>49</sup> el-Hârisî, Min Mûmeyyizâtî'l-İbâziyye, “Mukaddime”, p. 4-5.

<sup>50</sup> Dineverî, age, p. 145,146

Crime is not an individual activity. The reasons motivating the crime should be investigated thoroughly as well as the internal and external opportunities that constitute the crime.

In this section, we want to evaluate Ibazis based on the summary determinations made by R. Hrair Dokmeciyan<sup>51</sup> regarding the spirit map of the fundamentalists. We think that it will be more beneficial to do this through facts rather than perceptions. As stated in the previous section, the epistemic pressure of opposition sources on Ibazism should not be forgotten. The sentence "We judge according to the apparent"<sup>52</sup>, has the meaning of "appearance" as well as "fact". Therefore, it is not possible to reach correct results with subjective judgments.

### 3.1. Estrangement<sup>53</sup>

"A fundamentalist is above all an alienated personality." This alienation is twofold; both the alienation from the society in which he lives and the alienation from the authentic structure of religion itself. When we look at the sects that emerged from Muhakkima from this point of view, we see that factions such as Azariqa and Sufriyya shifted to violence with the effect of the Nahravan disaster and the oppressive treatment of the existing political power. The overwhelming and stigmatizing treatment of the political power prompted not only them but also other groups that are not described as Khariji to revolt. Abdullah b. Zubayr's Makkah uprising and Hz. Hussain's revolt in Karbala can be an example for this. Azariqa was completely alienated from the oppressive political power and the people who ignored its oppressions. As a result, it accused everyone who did not act together with it of polytheism and declared war. However, it would not be a fair approach to stick this attitude of Azariqa to Ibazis and describe them as violent because Abdullah b. Ibaz and other Ibaazi leaders did not respond positively to Azariqa's calls for jihad. For this reason, they are named Kaada meaning cowards by them. Ibazis were against the political structure at least as much as Azariqa. However, they did not marginalize those who did not think like themselves and did not see armed struggle as a necessity in the change of political power.<sup>54</sup>

### 3.2. Early Perfection<sup>55</sup>

*"A novice's discovery of the new belief is often followed by a full commitment to that belief. For young converts, this enthusiastic attachment creates an extreme rigidity in beliefs."* There is no serious information about the age and scientific level of the people who took part in the separations that occurred in the early period of Islamic history. Of course, the accusations made by the parties about each other due to sectarian fanaticism cannot be objective evidence in this regard.

<sup>51</sup> Dökmeciyan, R. Hrair, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, İstanbul 1992.

<sup>52</sup> Hz. Peygamber'in "Ben ancak bir beşerim, siz bana dava getiriyorsunuz. Bazılarınız delillerini sunmakta diğerlerinden daha başarılı olabilir. Ben de dinlediğim şekliyle onun lehine hükmederim. Bu şekilde kime bir müslim hakkı verirsem, o ateşten bir parçadır, onu alsın ya da bıraksın" sözünden mülhemdir. Buhari, "Hiyel", 10; "Mezalin", 16; "Ahkâm", 20, 29, 31.

<sup>53</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 45.

<sup>54</sup> Geniş bilgi için bakınız, Ateş, Orhan, "Hariciliği Doğuran Sosyal-Psikolojik Bir Çerçeve Olarak Anomali", p. 355-365.

<sup>55</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 46.

The group known as Ibazi retreated to Basra after the Battle of Nahravan and started its scholarly activities. It is highly probable that this movement is the continuation of a scholarly tradition, Korra. Because in their most difficult moments, it is expected that people do what they know best while other things are possible. Therefore, it will be very difficult to talk about an early perfection for Ibazis, who stay away from violence. The moderate nature of Salim b. Zakwan' Sirah and Abdullah b. Ibâz's letters written to the administrators confirm this claim.

### 3.3. Inferiority - Superiority<sup>56</sup>

*"The inferiority feelings of a person or a group are the result of their alienation and lack of place in society. These feelings of inferiority then manifest as aggression."* When we look at the early events of Islamic history, we see that there are very serious accusations between the parties. When we evaluate the Ibazi movement from this perspective, we see that Sunni and Shiite sources accuse them of being false and humiliate them. However, the humiliation, marginalization and stigmatization in the sources were made by the authors in the eras after the important historical events took place. As of before, we do not have any information regarding the humiliation of these people and it is not a tolerable mode of behavior in terms of Islamic morality. When we look at the events known as Khariji uprisings, we see that Ibaziyya and Muhakkima do not have a problem with the people.

### 3.4. Activism-Aggression<sup>57</sup>

Fundamentalist movements behave aggressively towards believers other than themselves, cutting off their alleged compromise. It is possible to see a great activism in Ibazis. However, they did not use these energies in negative ways like other violent groups. They sought to improve themselves scholarly and to warn the public. They did not respond positively to calls for violence by Khariji groups.

When Talibu-l Hakk saw the explicit persecution, serious bullying and ill-treatment of people in Yemen, he told his friends:

*"It is not halal for us to stand here and be patient against what we see."*

While Talibu'l-Hakk expressed his views to his friends in this direction, he did not hesitate to consult by sending letters with his friends living in Basra and other regions. In the letters that were received, Ibazis warned them not to stay there even for one day, to leave the persecution zone based on their strength. This uprising carried out by Talibu'l-Hakk is regarded as the first and last action in which Ibazis resorted to violence against their opponents by going beyond the limit of self-defense.<sup>58</sup>

<sup>56</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 46.

<sup>57</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 46.

<sup>58</sup> İbn Ebi-l Hadid Nehcu-l Belaga, Volume V, p. 106.



### 3.5. Authoritarianism<sup>59</sup>

*“Fundamentalists have most character traits of authoritarian personality. The search for political and social domination is a big factor.”*<sup>60</sup> No authority has endless and unquestioning powers, since it is not welcome to bless people in the Ibazi tradition. The authority of principles, not the authority of individuals, is always in the foreground. Ibaziyya continued to seek to establish a political ground based on the Quran and sunnah. However, the dominant color in this search was perseverance, tolerance and knowledge. For this reason, a radical community did not come into being.

### 3.6. Intolerance<sup>61</sup>

*The intolerance of Islamist radicals stems from the natural content of their beliefs and their identification with rigid principles.* After the Battle of Nahravan, Ibazis who retreated to Basra began to engage in knowledge and deeds. Khariji riots in Basra and Kufa were like bursts of anger from the severe trauma experienced in the Battle of Nahravan because these rebellions were not made by the joint decision of Muhakkima left over from Nahravan and Muhakkima lost its homogeneous structure after Nahravan. This difference became apparent when Naf put forward takfiri views.

In this process, Ibazis did not hesitate to stay away from violence and to invite the rulers to be fair. Letters written by Ibazi leaders to the Umayyad rulers are important in this regard. When we consider the letter that Abdullah b. Ibaz wrote to Abdulmalik b. Marwan, it will be seen that they used the method of persuasion. Salim b. Zekwân mentions the following verses in his Sirah<sup>62</sup>. It is seen that they do not have the belief that it is necessary to fight with anyone who does not think like them until their swords are broken.

*“Fight in the way of Allah with those who fight you, and do not exceed the limit (before they start the war). Surely Allah does not like those who go too far and violate the limits.”*<sup>63</sup>  
*Except those who reach a people between whom and you there is an alliance, or who come to you, their hearts shrinking from fighting you or fighting their own people; and if Allah had pleased, He would have given them power over you, so that they should have certainly fought you; therefore if they withdraw from you and do not fight you and offer you peace, then Allah has not given you a way against them.*<sup>64</sup>

*“Allah does not forbid you from dealing kindly and fairly with those who have neither fought nor driven you out of your homes. Surely Allah loves those who are fair.”*<sup>65</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 46.

<sup>60</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 46.

<sup>61</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 47.

<sup>62</sup> Geniş bilgi için bkz. Ateş, orhan, “Salim b. Zekvân’ın Sire’inde Hz. Osman’la ilgili Kısmın İbazi Fikirler Açısından Değerlendirilmesi.” Çukurova İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, Volume 9/2, Adana 2009; Sâlim b. Zekvân, es- Sire (çev. Harun Yıldız) Ankara 2016

<sup>63</sup> Bakara, 190

<sup>64</sup> Nisa, 90.

<sup>65</sup> Mümtetine, 8.

### 3.7. Paranoia<sup>66</sup>

The fundamentalist soul structure obsessively believes in the domination of imaginary demonic forces. The result is a strong sense of mistrust towards the political administration and its institutions. Until the separation of the Hijri sixty-four, Muhakkima was not a homogeneous structure as it was supposed from the outside, and it did not exist in a political union. This reality emerged when Ibn Azrak put forward his understanding of faith and jihad. Ibazis believe that change in the state is possible through politics. Those who run the state may be bad, but they do not have an extraordinary power to exceed the will of society. For this reason, they want change to be possible with the will of the people. Another thing is that Ibazis were not opposed to absolute authority because they approach the administration of Hazrat Ali, whom they finally objected to, positively until the Arbitration. Also, they don't say anything negative about Hazrat Uthman's first six years. Apart from these, when Omar b. Abdulaziz came to power, they obeyed him. This shows that there is no paranoia in them in the sense of absolute opposition to the political power.

Despite being subjected to unimaginable pressures, Ibazis did not produce any paranoia about the Umayyads and the Abbasids. Oman Chief Mufti Halili states that the negative opinion about the Umayyads is not due to the Umayyad hostility. "...The inviters of the right worried the warriors who walked under the yoke of the oppressors to attain the blessings of life, and who were always in the tribes of the oppressors. Undoubtedly, people are individuals who are subject to the world. Unfortunately, knowledge was also under the command of the oppressors due to the same interests. All this happened after the Umayyad State seized power in Islamic lands. This state deviated from the principles of Islam that were sound in its rulings (the way it governed). After them came the Abbasid State. It also went its own way. There were many conflicts between Ibazis and these two states. Although Ibaziya stayed within the limits set by Allah, acted based on the sunnah of the Prophet, and never and ever left the things that came with the orders of Allah, it was subject to many accusations. The reader may think that I am prejudiced against the Umayyad State and proportioning things that have nothing to do with them. I want to prove the facts for those who think I am prejudiced. Neither I nor those who say what I have said talk subjective about the Umayyads just because they are the Umayyads. But in my soul there is an aversion to falsehood because it is falsehood, to cruelty because it is cruelty, and to heresy because it is heresy. We submitted to the rule of a man who came at the end of the Umayyads, who were cruel and oppressive, for Allah and who was a caliph from Umayya. Although he was one of the sons of Umayya, he substituted God. This is the righteous caliph, the true imam Omar b. Abdulaziz. We submitted to his rule for God. We found his administration close to God. Omar b. Abdulaziz destroyed the darkness of oppression, cruelty and despotism that had accumulated in the period of the sons of Umayya with the light of justice. He carried the right that was standing in the time of the Prophet and his later Rashid Caliphs to the people.

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<sup>66</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 47.

We describe the words and actions of this caliph as evidence that the Umayyads persecuted. Those who want to understand this issue should look at what is written about it. The Umayyad, which deviated from the right path followed by the Prophet in its tracts, was not tolerant of its forerunner. It took all the goods unjustly taken from the treasury of Muslims. By doing so, they attained cruelty and injustice. Although Omar b. Abdulaziz was from Umayya, he was on the side of truth, maturity and righteousness. This just caliph was far from persecution and oppression in his practices. Ibazis were in alliance with this just caliph. When they heard of his justice, direction and virtue, they went to him and agreed with him on many issues. However, very few and simple matters were disputed with him. During this period, Abu Ubayda Muslim b. Abi Karîma et-Tamimi, the imam of Ibaziyya, said, "I wish his tribe would have accepted him." In other words, he said, "I wish he had been allied with on simple matters causing conflict." There is no one among Ibazis who is famous for raising a sword to him. On the contrary, they submitted to him in obedience and accepted him as a just caliph. When you look at Ibazi books, he is described as a praised caliph. You can see this effect in Ibazis' poems and prose. This situation is evidence that the Ibazis' opposition to Umayya is not just due to their hostility to Umayya.

Until the separation of the Hijri sixty-four, Muhakkima was not a homogeneous structure as it was supposed from the outside, and it did not exist in a political union. This reality emerged when Ibn Azrak put forward his understanding of faith and jihad. Ibazis believe that change in the state is possible through politics. Those who run the state may be bad, but they do not have an extraordinary power to exceed the will of society. For this reason, they want change to be possible with the will of the people. Another thing is that Ibazis were not opposed to absolute authority because they approach the administration of Hazrat Ali, whom they finally objected to, positively until the Arbitration.<sup>67</sup>

### 3.8. Privacy View <sup>68</sup>

Just like the "absent imam" understanding of Shia, some wise schools also base their views on some secret figures. There are also some psycho-social reasons for this approach. Especially, the fact that the administration was taken over first by the Umayyads and then by Abbasids, and the tribal politics did not give the right to life for other views and these communities were exposed to severe traumas led to the emergence of western tendencies. However, when the Ibazi movement is evaluated from this aspect, it will be seen that they do not have any secret views other than the views conveyed to people by the Prophet. In fact, since Ibaziyya was based on individual piety based on narration and asceticism, wisdom schools could not find popularity in Ibaziyya.

Ibazis started a secret struggle against the political pressure of the Umayyads. Ibazis call this period Kitman Imamati. However, this secrecy does not correspond to hiding a perverted view or to the understanding of dishonesty of Shia.

<sup>67</sup> Halilî, Mezhep Taassubu, p. 35, 36.

<sup>68</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 47.

The most important reason for this is the wise personality of Jabir b. Zayd, who was in the leader position of the Ibazi community, in the fields of fiqh, hadith, tafsir and religious beliefs. Ibazis conducted this period without breaking away from knowledge. The fact that they were based on the Quran in one hand and the authentic sunnah in the other prevented the formation of a fundamentalist structure that alienated the people during the secrecy period and turned hostility to the state into paranoia.

### **3.9. Idealism**<sup>69</sup>

In fundamentalist structures, it is a powerful ideal to destroy the demonic state and society structure. It is of great importance to realize this idealism with absolute accuracy and absolute devotion. Although Ibazis are people who are devoted to their beliefs, they do not exclude other schools of belief insofar as they adhere to the Quranic verse. For Ibazis, the formation of a just state is a powerful ideal. But for this ideal, they did not allow the formation of a fundamentalist identity that violates the social order and disregards the security of property and life because the Ibazi understanding of politics is extremely realistic in practice. As the phrase goes, when the idea of overthrowing a cruel administration appears, Ibazis act with reality, not ideals. They do the math of the rebellion; they will never rebel if the revolt will take society further back. This approach is a defining feature that distinguishes them from Murji'ah and Khawarij. According to Ibazis, Khawarij is in constant rebellion without considering the consequences of the rebellion. Murji'ah, on the other hand, is insensitive to political corruption.

### **3.10. Difficulty- Courage**<sup>70</sup>

A fundamentalist produces a very strict interpretation of religion and believes that living with it is more meaningful to God. Ibazis struggled in a social structure where strict interpretation and liberal interpretations that excluded responsibility matched. There was no obstacle for them to choose one of these. However, Ibazis did not choose these two ways expressing extremism and understatement. They accepted the suitability of walking in the middle. Although Ibazis attach importance to individual asceticism, they do not include the excesses seen in wise schools.

### **3.11. Obedience Reconciliation**<sup>71</sup>

A fundamentalist promises absolute loyalty to the leader of the movement with obedience to Allah and His Messenger. In other words, a fundamentalist identifies the Prophet and his leader to some extent. He makes obedience to the leader a very high-level belief like obeying the Prophet. Of course, an identity associated with the Prophet requires unlimited obedience. So a fundamentalist approves of the leader's every command by converting it into creed, without questioning.

<sup>69</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 47.

<sup>70</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 47.

<sup>71</sup> Dökmeciyan, Arap Dünyasında Köktencilik, p. 48.

When we look at the history of both Ibaziyya and Khawarij, it will be seen that they did not bless the leaders.<sup>72</sup> In fact, Kharijis were divided into many groups because they rebelled against their leaders. It is possible that we can see this behavior in contemporary movements and in Shiite geography. In the contemporary period, this approach is based on ignorance and in the Shiite motif, it is based on faith. However, when we look at the Muslim personality of the Companions and the Tābi'in, it is not possible to see a scene that approves this approach. People did not hesitate to come face to face with the elders of the Companions. Idolizing a leader is a modern disease. Ibazis describe themselves as not people of imitation but people of limitation. That is, they take into account documents and evidence, not individuals.

We can say that the friends of the Prophet (pbuh) had a critical mindset. Because when they needed, they asked for an explanation from the Prophet and were questioning him. Muhakkima criticized the last two caliphs for their actions. The first critical understanding of history in the history of Islam started with them. But this laudable approach was denigrated due to sect fanaticism. While today's education systems are trying to develop a critical mindset, we have waged war against critical thinking. This is not acceptable.

Based on the critical mentality, Muhakkima criticized statesmen, but did not sanctify people. Problems disappear when people are sanctified. The worst disease seen in the Islamic world today is the sanctification of people and the evaporation of problems for this reason. In fact, this disease has affected our perception of history. While explaining the history of Islam, it has been dealt with only before and after the Prophet based on mentality centered. Before and after Islam. Subsequent processes were associated with people, not mentalities. Ali period, Uthman period, the Umayyad period, the Abbasid period etc.

## CONCLUSION

Fundamentalism was born among Evangelist Protestants in America towards the end of the nineteenth century. It proposes to return to the Biblical texts as a reaction to the spiritual depression brought on by modernization. Later, the concept became widespread and used for other religions and groups.

Islamic fundamentalism has started to be discussed as a result of the globally violent acts of aggressive groups that are said to have been founded by Muslims. The effort to seek a root for Islamic fundamentalism brought researchers together with Kharijism. It has been established almost as a general belief that Kharijism is the ancestor of contemporary fundamentalist movements.

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<sup>72</sup> A'birî, el-İbaziyyetü, p.. 54, 264- 272.

It can be said that both studies on Kharijism and studies that try to establish a connection between contemporary fundamentalist movements and Khawarij are impaired by normative judgments as well as methodological mistakes. It is not overlooked that the connections these studies try to establish are also compelling.

Muhakkima is not a group that emerged with a new social project proposal and alienates the people's Islam. They did not propose an alternative political project to the current administration. The dominant color in their discourse is that administrators should be fair and act in accordance with the law. Contemporary fundamentalist movements claim to offer alternative political projects to political systems and to shape society according to an imaginary model that was presumed perfect in the past. Muhakkima and Ibazis, which say they are the continuation of Muhakkima, claim to be a social movement using persuasion methods against the political activities of the day. Since Ibazis do not see it permissible to use domestic violence, they do not consider a militant approach to violence against the state suitable.

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