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Turkey: Modern or Postmodern? The Genealogy and Ecology of Kemalist Modernization and a Democracy to Come

Abstract

Turkey, in its modernist incarnation as the Republic of Turkey in 1923, is a country whose identity has been reformed in the image of the European Enlightenment ideals of progress and modernity. The modernist imaginary of a teleological History has been hegemonic in defining the horizon of the imagination of even its detractors. However, the genealogy of this supposedly universal history exposes it as one story among others. Social and ecological evaluation of the record of development and modernization uncovers a monumental mess of failure and unfulfilled promises. Together with a series of social movements and developments, these have engendered a postmodern consciousness that deconstructs the alleged universals, and the indivisible unity and integrity, of modernist certainties and identities. The supposedly uncontaminated unity of the modern in the present is shown to be always-already inhabited by difference and otherness. Democracy enables us to think and live with this relation of a difference-within in political terms. However, democracy is not something that those in the modern West have and those in oriental Turkey lack, in the taken-for-granted familiarity of that binary opposition. It is, rather, "a democracy to come," one that responds to the undemocratic and colonizing nature of this very divide, "a democracy to come" that exceeds rather than completes the unity of the modern, and opens it up to new possibilities and new configurations across the colonial divide.

Türkiye: Modern mi, postmodern mi? Kemalist modernleşmenin soykütüğü, ekolojisi ve "Gelmekte Olan Demokrasi"

Özet

1923'te Cumhuriyetle birlikte yeniden doğuşunda Türkiye'nin imgelemi, Avrupa aydınlanma düşüncesinin gelişme ve modernlik idealleri içinde biçimlendi. Teleolojik Tarih anlayışının modernist kurgusu tabi konumda olanların da ufkunu tanımlamakta hegemonik olmuştur. Evrensellik iddiası taşıyan bu Tarihin soykütüğü incelendiğinde, onun pek çok farklı anlatıda sadece biri olduğu görülür. Gelişmenin ve modernleşmenin beraberinde getirdiklerini toplumsal ve ekolojik açıdan değerlendirdiğimizde başarısızlıkların ve gerçekleşmemiş vaatlerin oluşturduğu çöp abidesi ile karşılaşırız. Bir dizi toplumsal hareket ve gelişme ile birlikte bunlar, varsayılan "evrenselleri" ve modernist kesinliklerin ve kimliklerin ayrılmaz birliği ve bütünlüğünü yapıbozumuna uğratan postmodern bilincin gelişmesine yol açmıştır. Bugün modernliğin bozulmaya uğramış varsayılan bütünlüğünün, çoktandır farklılık ve ötekilik tarafından işgal edilmiş olduğu görülür. Demokrasi, bizim politik olarak farklılıklarla ilişki içinde yaşayıp düşünmemize olanak sağlar. Aslında, ikili karşıtlıklarla sorgulama alışkanlığının getirdiği biçimi ile demokrasi, modern Batıda yaşayanların sahip oldukları ve oriental Türkiye'nin sahip olmadığı bir şey değildir. Karşıtlıklarla düşünenin oluşturduğu bölünmenin demokrasi karşıtı ve kolonileştirici doğasına yanıt verecek olan bir "gelecek olan demokrasi" kavramıdır. Bu kavram, modernliğin bütünlüğünü tamalamaktan çok onu aşarak ve onu yeni olasılıklara ve birleşimlere açar.

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Turkey: Modern or Postmodern? The Genealogy and Ecology of Kemalist Modernization and a Democracy to Come

Introduction

Turkey, in its modernist incarnation as the Republic of Turkey in 1923, is a country whose identity has been re-formed in the image of the European Enlightenment ideals of progress and modernity. In this paper I present a post-modern review of Turkey's modernization as a historically and culturally specific, limited project. This is in contrast to the modernist representation of this project as a universal, all-encompassing, unlimited, and necessary unfolding of History and Reason. However, my review is situated within the difference and alterity of the modern and I do not claim a detached and uncontaminated Archimedean position that is unambiguously outside or beyond what I represent. Rather than signaling an erasure or destruction of the modern, my reference to the post-modern is deconstructive of the modern. Hence, the contrast between modern and postmodern that I just alluded to is internally differential.

In the first section, I introduce the main themes of Kemalism inspired by the European Enlightenment, summarizing Turkey's trajectory of modernization guided by the Kemalist worldview, and looking at how Turkey's identity was rearticulated in its terms as a clean break from its Ottoman past.

In the following section titled "Modernism as a Colonizing Project," I discuss the Kemalist goal of "reaching the level of

contemporary civilisation" in terms of a modernist tall-tale that plots the progressive course of a universalized man, his reason, and his story.

In the next section titled "Development as the Means of Modernization," I look at how development has fared as the means of modernization in Turkey and around the world, its claim of "catching up," and its social and environmental costs.

In the last section titled "Democracy in Turkey: A Democracy to Come," I look at the place of democracy in the Kemalist modernization project, its evolution in Turkey, and think of a "democracy to come" as a supplement that will supplement but not complement the modernist project. And finally I note the connection between this "democracy to come" and our representational practices in the academia.

The Trajectory of the Kemalist Quest for Modernization

Kemalism or Atatürkism, named after the "founding father" of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,¹ has been developed as the official ideology of the Turkish state throughout its Republican years (1923-Present). Relying on a modernist grand narrative, it provides us with an understanding of the universal course and teleology of history, as well as a sense of who we are in relation to the evolution of that history, and, consequently, a sense of our own necessary course of development.

¹ Following the passage of the law which made it mandatory to assume Western style surnames on June 21, 1934, Mustafa Kemal assumed the surname Atatürk- which literally means "Father (of the) Turk"- by a parliamentary decree on November 24 of the same year.

2

Many of the radical social reforms following the founding of the Turkish Republic were accomplished under the "Law Concerning the Reinforcement of Peace and Order" passed in March 4, 1925 that instituted special "Courts of Independence" and which granted the reformers incontestable powers. As Mustafa Kemal Atatürk saw it, this was a necessary condition: "It should be granted that the implementation of this Law was of utmost necessity from the standpoint of showing that our society actually was not a superstitious and primitive nation" (1982: 53). The later course of Kemalist modernization, following the transition to a multi-party democracy, was kept steady by military interventions at almost regular intervals in 1960, 1971, and 1980 as well as a "virtual" one in 1997. As we shall see later on, the legacy of these interventions has been the institution of a kind of military trusteeship over Turkish democracy.

3

On the meaning of the "post" of postmodern see İlter, 1994: 51-81

Its hegemony over our imagination has been secured by an uneasy mixture of dictatorial repression,² persuasion, and social reforms like the alphabet reform that adopted the Latin script in place of the Arabic one, making it practically impossible for coming generations to simply read what was previously written, and which, thus, facilitated the claim of an uncontaminated break from the past.

The notion of a clean break from the past, as expressed in the concept of *revolution*, is a cornerstone of the modernist outlook. In the Enlightenment narrative, the French Revolution of 1789 which inaugurated the new French Republic is the outstanding symbol of such a clean break from the *ancien regime* of the past. The republicanism of Kemalists is informed by this Enlightenment narrative. My references to "postmodern" and "postcolonial" in what follows should not, therefore, be taken to refer to a clean break from the modern but rather to the modern's difference-within in a deconstructive sense.³

Despite its claim of a clean break from the Ottoman past, the genealogy of the modernizing mission of Kemalism can be traced to the administrative, military, and social reforms of Ottoman sultans like Selim III (1789-1807) and Mahmut II (1808-1839), and, even more closely, to the Tanzimat Reforms of the Young Ottomans (1865-1876) and the Committee of Union and Progress initiatives of the Young Turks (1895-1918) (Berkes, 1978; Timur, 1987). After Mustafa Kemal's death, and with the end of the monoparty rule, a decade or so later, a succession of parliamentarily democratic and military rulers have continued the modernizing mission in Turkey under the banner of Kemalism.

The hegemony of Kemalism's modernist outlook in Turkey has been so powerful that even its detractors tend to situate themselves within the "progressive versus backward" polarity set up by Kemalism's modernist horizon. Furthermore, the modernist imaginary of a unilinear and teleological progress is not confined to those who uphold a strictly "Kemalist" identity

for themselves. For instance, the critics of "Kemalists" (of the present, First Republic) such as the ideologues of the so-called "Second Republic" are also informed by this imaginary. Nevertheless, this hegemony has recently come under question by an Islamic "revival" that questions the claim of an uncontaminated break from the past and the polarized historicist sensibility of the archaic and the modern; a Kurdish insurgency that questions the indivisible, indifferent unity of being Turkish; and, perhaps more significantly, by what could be described as a nascent postmodern and postcolonial call for democracy and ecologically responsible development⁴ that problematizes both the progressive teleology of the Kemalist conception of history and civilisation, and the essential, indivisible unity of Turkish identity posited by Kemalism. It seems that the diverse and pluri-vocal people(s) of Turkey will no longer be contained in the modernist imaginary of the teleology and unisonance of progress.

Turkey's modernist quest has experienced a more recent setback with the European Union's decision in October 1997 to exclude Turkey from its list of candidates for admission to the Union. This, despite Turkey's application that dates back to the 1960s, and its still-standing membership in the European Customs Union, its ongoing inclusion in various councils of the EU, and its long standing Western credentials as a NATO member and as an active player of the Western alliance dating from the Korean War.

The significance of this rejection by the European Union lies in the fact that, in the modernist teleology of history adopted by Kemalism, Europe signifies the telos, the aim or goal, of historical progress and civilisation. European objections rested on lack of progress in democracy and human rights in Turkey, as well as the Cyprus stalemate, and the consequences of a free flow of population, whence it was feared the problem of unemployment in the European Union would be exacerbated with the flooding of Europe by the high number of unemployed

4

Hocamköy Ecological Village (<http://hocamkoy.metu.edu.tr/>) is an example of such initiatives and stands in a David versus Goliath kind of contrast to mega development projects like GAP, the Southeastern Anatolia Project (<http://www.turkey.org/gro-upc/gap.htm>). Also noteworthy are a series of initiatives ranging from the (now defunct) "New Democracy Movement" to the mushrooming growth of "civil society organizations" and to local democratic and environmental struggles such as the heroic, and successful, stand of the citizens of Bergama against Eurogold Corporation's state supported cyanide-leach gold mining operation there.

and underemployed in Turkey. This was especially feared by Germany which has a significant minority of Turkish "guest workers," and has to deal with unemployment problems of its own, a problem that brought about highly visible and openly racist, xenophobic outbursts following German reunification.

Cognizant of these objections, and accepting the need to make further progress in democratization and human rights, Turkey had not asked for a date of admission, but only to be included in the list of candidates and to be given time to develop the required conditions. To allay Germany's fears about the size of Turkey's population, Turkey had suggested that the free flow of Turks could be regulated even after Turkey's admission to EU.

Having taken such a conciliatory stance, and considering that the concurrently recognized candidates Rumania and Poland have comparably sized populations and will pose an even greater threat to Germany's employment equation, this rejection has led many in Turkey to think that there are, perhaps, other, unspoken reasons for Turkey's exclusion. When, for example, earlier in the debate leading to Turkey's rejection, a Dutch Christian Democrat representative declared that as a Moslem nation Turkey was unfit for European membership, many people in Turkey wondered whether he was expressing a tactfully unspoken but widely shared sentiment in Europe, that, in the minds of those judging Turkey's candidacy, the new Europe was to be a "Christian Club." The fact that the Eastern European countries included in the list of candidates are far behind Turkey in their past experience of Western style parliamentary democracy-especially when compared with democratic and human rights objections directed at Turkey-have further reinforced this suspicion.

What is also noteworthy is that this coincides in Turkey with the removal of the Islamist Welfare Party from the coalition government under pressure from the staunchly Kemalist military in February 1998, and its subsequent closure by the Constitutional Court on the grounds of endangering

Turkey's Kemalist, secular constitution.⁵ In the modernist representation of the unilinearity of progress adopted by Kemalists, the Welfare Party is made to stand in for the backward past, the Other of (modern) civilisation. The problem has been that, those who upheld this modernism were now themselves rejected by Europe, the Europe that is represented as the telos of history, the very history they use to condemn the Welfare Party and various different-others within Turkey.

This outright rejection was later alleviated somewhat by Turkey's belated inclusion in the list of candidates to European Union in the Helsinki Accord in 1999. However, this last minute inclusion was made *de facto* conditional upon Turkey's meeting the criteria for European membership by the time its membership comes up for review. These conditions did not necessarily discriminate against Turkey in particular. As far back as 1993, the European Union had indicated that all candidates for membership would have to meet certain basic requirements. EU's 1993 "Copenhagen Criteria," for example, required, among other things, that candidate countries establish stable institutions that guarantee "democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities." And yet, in November of 1999, before Turkey's candidacy was taken up in Helsinki, a spokesperson for the Turkish Foreign Ministry would state that "Turkey will not accept any preconditions for European Union membership." When we consider that the Turkish Republic's reason for being had been from the start-modernization, this mismatch becomes remarkable. Once again we come face to face with the strange problem that our "modernist" judges were still found lacking, after all these decades of modernization, when judged by "modernist" standards.

All of these give us ample reason to review and rethink the Kemalist modernization project.

I should point out at the outset that in my review, I will not be confined to the structural polarity of the terms of Kemalism

⁵ The Welfare Party was later replaced by a surrogate Virtue Party.

6 Consider also Atatürk's rhetorical question: "Is there a single country that has not turned to the West after deciding to enter the realm of civilisation?" (The Turkish National Commission for Unesco, 1981: 145).

and its modernism. My criticism of modernism will not consist of reversing that polarity and in asking for, say, a revival of Islam from the past of modernity or a "new" future uncontaminated with the past. Rather, I am interested in modernism's deconstruction, that is to say, in looking at the structuration and textual fabrication of the opposing identities of Occident and Orient, modern and backward, so that we can find ways to reinscribe them, to re-structure them differently.

In other words, I am not interested in erasing the modern in favor of its designated opposite but, rather, in a rearticulation of modernism, a postmodernism if you will.

Modernism as a Colonizing Project

In its typical formulations, modernism refers us to a Western tall-tale which tells us about the past journey and future course of both "us" and our others. Briefly known as "History," this arrogant tall-tale informs the Enlightenment discourse that is most commonly referred to as "reaching the level of contemporary civilisation" in Turkey. To understand our standing relative to the contemporary level of civilisation, as well as to the standing of others, the tall-tale refers us to a unilinear, teleological, and monocultural scale of History.

Accordingly, modernity is singular, there is only one measure of modernity and civilisation, and that measure is universal. As the tall-tale that gives us this universal History is a Western tale, it is taken for granted that the telos of history is the West, and, consequently, modernization turns out to be Westernization. History is thus his(s)tory, that is to say, the Western (or Westernized) Man's story. As Mustafa Kemal himself argued, although there are many nations, there is only one civilised world, the Western world (Atatürk, 1982).⁶

It then followed that its opposite, the oriental concept of civilisation, is an impediment on the way to "real" civilisation, as it confines "man" to otherworldly, archaic concerns, whereas modern, civilised man is guided by reason, logic, and

intelligence, a distinguishing characteristic of modernity.⁷ Hence, Mustafa Kemal argued as early as 1907 that "we must cast off and divert our identity from that of the Eastern civilisation to the Western" (Atatürk, 1982: 4-5).

In line with this reasoning, pre-Republican, Ottoman past was repudiated and denied after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. As Atatürk put it: "The new Turkey has no relationship to the old. The Ottoman government has passed into history. A new Turkey is now born" (1959: 104).

Significantly, officials of the Turkish State routinely make reference to this notion of a clean break today to absolve themselves of any responsibility regarding the accusations of an Armenian genocide that "properly" belongs to, and addresses, the repudiated Ottoman past. Recently, however, there has been some interest in reclaiming the Ottoman past especially after the Kurdish demands for cultural autonomy has put the traditional claim of an indivisible Turkish identity in question. What is claimed here is an idealized image of the Ottoman Empire as a multi-cultural society organized in terms of a plurality of "millets." In contemporary usage *millet* means nation but in the Ottoman context this refers to a rather more religious-communal identification. During the quincentennial of Columbus' voyage to America in 1992, the Turkish government eagerly propagated the fact that the Jews who were expelled from Spain in 1492 found welcome in the Ottoman Empire. This is, of course, significant in countering the accustomed European view of "the Turk" as the categorically uniform despotic oriental, the other of civilised Europe. However, the denial of an Armenian genocide through a denial of the Ottoman past on the one hand, and the claiming of a multicultural Ottoman past on the other hand, is clearly a contradiction, and gives the impression of a shortsighted *realpolitik* maneuvering rather than a thought-through reflection on the past.

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a series of far reaching reforms aiming to reshape Republican Turkey in the

7 Part of the language reform involved the purification of Turkish from the contaminating influences of other languages, particularly Arabic and Persian which had been very influential in the language spoken in the Ottoman court. As part of its purification program, The Turkish Language Institute, founded by Atatürk in 1932, began constructing Turkish counterparts to annulled foreign words. It is remarkable that the Turkish counterpart thus devised for the word "intellectual" is "aydın", meaning "enlightened," as it clearly illustrates the influence of the European Enlightenment ideology that upholds this monocultural conception of Reason.

8

Abolition of the Sultanate (1922); declaration of the Turkish Republic (1923); abolition of the caliphate, abandonment of the Islamic sharia law, unification of courts and education (1924); closure of *tekke*, *zaviye*, and *türbe* (dervish lodges, cloisters, and tombs) (1925); "hat" reform and the introduction of western forms of clothing (1925); adoption of the "universal" Christian calendar and the 24-hour day (1925); adoption of the Swiss civil code and the Italian penal code (1926); deletion of the mention of Islam as state religion in the constitution (1928); adoption of the Latin alphabet (1928); women given the right to vote and to get elected in municipal elections (1930); adoption of the metric system (1931); adoption of surnames (1934); women given the right to vote and to get elected in general elections (1934); official declaration of a secular state based on the Republican Party's six principles put in the constitution (1937).

Western image of civilisation followed.⁸ We should, however, note the necessarily local nature of this, or for that matter any other, Westernization. It would be a mistake to counterpose Westernization to an indigenous nativism as the difference between the two is deconstructively internal. Indeed, Westernization in Turkey was supported by an indigenism.

The denial and forgetting of the Ottoman past, and modern Turkey's substitution in its place, has led early Republican intellectuals to search for a more suitable past, and even to project a Turkish ethnic and cultural identity on earlier inhabitants of Anatolia like the Hittites and the Sumerians. The Ottoman past was then portrayed as an obstacle obstructing a civilised Turkish identity already headed to the highest level of modern civilisation. This was in line with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's contention that "the movement of Turks for centuries has kept a steady course. We have always been marching from the East to the West" (Atatürk, 1982: 39). The reference here is to the migration of Turkic peoples from their historical-mythical homeland in Central Asia.

This active forgetting is, of course, typical of the construction of a new national identity and underlies Benedict Anderson's description of nations as "imagined communities" (1983). As Homi Bhabha reminds us, being obliged to forget becomes the basis for re-membering the nation, that is, peopling it anew by an active remembering, and imagining the possibility of other contending and liberating forms of cultural identification (1990: 311). We should, therefore, note that the subject of Turkish nationalism was constituted through a process of substitution, displacement and projection. As the supposed "indivisible unity" of that identity was constituted through the location of the Other, it is always, necessarily, "excessive to" or "less than" its pure or holistic representations. The threat of cultural difference against which we are warned so sternly today, is thus not a problem of "other" people, but is rather a question of the otherness within the indivisible-people-

as-one. That is to say, "differences do not only exist between outsider and insider-two entities-they are also at work within the outsider and the insider-a single entity" (Minh-ha, 1991: 76).

The "new woman" of the Kemalist-era that became an explicit symbol of the break with the Ottoman past, was inscribed with just such a genealogy (Kandiyoti, 1991; Baykan, 1994). Indeed, it was Mustafa Kemal's adoptive daughter Afet İnan who was entrusted with the task of setting the historical record straight regarding the Anatolian civilisations and the role of the Turks within those civilisations. The resulting "Turkish History Thesis" argued that the Turks were contributors to "civilisation" long before their incorporation into the Ottoman state and their conversion to Islam. The ethnocentric exclusion of the Eastern other from the ranks of civilisation was countered by repeating the essentialism of its racism-this time by displacing and including the Turks in the position of the sovereign subject. In her book *The Emancipation of the Turkish Woman*, Afet İnan argued that Islamization brought about a decline in the status of Turkish women, and devoted a section to the status of women before their identity was refashioned by Islam (1962).⁹ The symbolic universe of the East-West opposition as designating unchanging, ontologically fixed identities was left intact and not questioned.

This mapping of the world in terms of a West versus East binary opposition, where, typically but not necessarily, the Western pole of the opposition is privileged over the Eastern pole that is represented as its external Other, and hence as unsuitable for contemporary civilisation, is an orientalist worlding of the world.

In his pathbreaking study *Orientalism* that has become such an important reference point for postcolonial theory, Edward Said traces the genealogy of Western representations of the Orient (1979). He looks at the constitution of what we came to know as "the Orient" in the representations of orientalist scholars, travelers, historians, artists, writers, and the like. Said

9

Deniz Kandiyoti addresses the question of "the extent to which the paternalistic benevolence of the Kemalist era actually fostered or hindered women's political initiatives" and points out that whereas "the republican regime opened up an arena for state-sponsored 'feminism,'" and, in the 1937 election, following their enfranchisement in 1934, women achieved the highest level of representation in the parliament (4.5%, unequalled ever since), "at one and the same time [the regime] circumscribed and defined its parameters," and actively discouraged women's autonomous political initiatives (41-42). A striking example in this regard is the Kemalists' refusal to authorize the Women's People's Party that was founded in 1923 before the founding of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's Republican People's Party; its subsequent re-creation as the Turkish Women's Federation in 1924, and its dissolution in 1935 soon after hosting the 12th Congress of the International Federation of Women (Kandiyoti, 1991: 41). In focusing on the work of Nezihe Muhittin, who founded the Women's People's Party, Ayşegül Baykan highlights women's own struggles in the early years of the republic that clearly influenced the Republican elite's policies regarding women, but also points out that "women not only were subjects of social change who constructed new identities for themselves and sought emancipation, but they were objectified by nationalist discourses" (1994).

and other postcolonial theorists like Gayatri Spivak (1987; 1990; 1993), Trinh Minh-ha (1989), Rey Chow (1993), Homi Bhabha (1994), Robert Young (1990), and Meyda Yeğenoğlu (1998) have pointed out how these representations referenced and reinforced each other, and how they constituted the reality of the Orient as the subaltern other of the West, while hiding, and otherwise ignoring, the inexcisable role of the Western imperialist project in worlding the world of the allegedly "outside" observer or researcher.

The West desires to portray itself as independently separate and apart from what it represents as the East, and what it projects as negative Eastern attributes, and yet, not only are the representational signs of "the Orient" a western fabrication-the very textual fabric that enables us to see and understand the world in terms of an ontologically distinguishable West-East opposition-but the actual terrain of the Occident-Orient divide is also fabricated by Western colonization. The identities described as Occidental and Oriental belong to the same textual fabric of modernity. They are not independent of each other but are relational, and that relation is a colonizing one.

The Kemalists are very much aware of the colonizing nature of this relationship and their understanding of the unavoidably forceful imperative of modernization is also informed by the awareness of its imperialism. What makes Western civilisation a compelling choice is not so much its *civil* features-for we are substituting an imperialist domination in place of an oriental despotism in the following narrative-but rather its predestined sovereignty. This sense of inevitability is built into the Enlightenment notion of progress, and is itself a secular repetition of the religious notion of *fate*. As Mustafa Kemal Atatürk puts it,

It is futile to resist the thunderous advance of civilisation, for it has no pity on those who are ignorant or rebellious. The sublime force of civilisation pierces mountains, crosses the skies, enlightens and explores everything from the smallest particle of dust to the stars...When faced with this, those nations who try to

follow the superstitions of the Middle Ages are condemned to be destroyed or at least to become enslaved and debased (1959: 212).

Those who are uncivilised are condemned to be trampled under the feet of civilised ones (1982: 15).

For many centuries our nation had gravely suffered under the weight of two tyrannical and destructive forces: The first of these were the despots who had a direct claim to the rule of the country and the nation, and the second consisted of the world of imperialist capitalism (1982: 11).

This you-can't-lick-them-join-them subservience to the allegedly predestined sovereignty of the world of civilisation, a sovereignty that is preordained by the modernist teleology of progress, nonetheless has a Janus-faced ambivalence about it. In order to join the ranks of the imperialists, an oriental subaltern had to become first an anti-imperialist-however provisionally. Indeed, especially while organizing the national liberation struggle early on, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk employed an anti-imperialist discourse that claims to take up the cause of the entire Orient:¹⁰

The current Turkish struggle does not concern Turkey only....Because what it defends is the cause of all oppressed nations, the cause of the entire Orient (1982: 35).

As this map before us shows very clearly, Anatolia is like an outpost of all Asia and of all the oppressed peoples towards the world of oppression. Owing to this situation, Anatolia takes the brunt of all oppression, attacks and aggression. They want to ruin, trample and tear Anatolia apart. But these aggressions are not limited to Anatolia. The overall object behind all these is the entire Orient (1982: 32-33).

This anti-imperialist bent of Kemalism has endeared it to much of the Marxist left in Turkey whose Marxism, in its mode of production narrative, also relied on the modernist teleology and hierarchy of progress. For both sides, their anti-imperialism did not involve a questioning of the preordained, victorious

10

We should also keep in mind that such a stance is responsive to the anti-imperialist liberation sentiments of developments and organizations following the October Revolution in Russia. The Bolsheviks supported Turkey in its "anti-imperialist" War of Independence.

11

Classical Marxism did highlight the expropriation, displacement, and enslavement of peoples around the world as a result of colonization and imperialism and called on us to respond to their suffering. But when seen through the lens of the mode of production narrative, all this was understood as "primitive capital accumulation," that is, as a sad but necessary and early step in the teleologically serial development of capitalism, whose further development would eventually result in socialism. The disagreement with capitalism was not over the teleology of modernization, which they shared, but over who represented the predestined telos of modernization. The intense arguments over the nature of the revolution taking place in Russia before 1905 and 1917, whether it was bourgeois-democratic or socialist, only makes sense by reference to this modernist teleology (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The same arguments were repeated among the Marxist left in Turkey. This is just another example of the hegemonic reach of Kemalism's modernist outlook.

12

For a detailed argument which demonstrates that the events of the Holocaust need to be understood as deeply rooted in the very nature of modern society and in the central categories of modern social thought, see Bauman, 1996.

13

Rather than an ontological given, this is a modern articulation with a history of its own. For an account of this history from a position that defends the idea of

march of progress that naturally "trampled" or "enslaved" different-others who stood in its path, but was seen as a necessary step to make its further progression possible.¹¹

Those who constitute their identity by reference to modernism, are, therefore, only able to understand cultural difference-their alterity and difference from themselves, as well as their difference from others-by plotting difference in a relationship of exteriority on the hierarchical ranking of their universal measure of progress.

The most devastatingly far reaching and effective barbarism known to humankind, fascism/nazism and its holocaust, is a most modern, European accomplishment that relied on modern science and industry,¹² and yet, it is typically projected as a revival of a pre-modern barbarism.

The word barbarian was the name given by the Greeks of classical times to those people living in their East, and whose language they could not understand (Sardar et al., 1993: 26). So they called these strangers barbarians, meaning babblers, and referred to their land as Anatolia, meaning the land from which the sun rises or, more simply, the Orient.

For the modern West, which incidentally, has assumed a Greek genealogy for itself as part of its colonizing efforts,¹³ the "savagery" and "barbarism" of the savage and the barbarian Other are not seen as qualities that signify difference among the different, unknown qualities that would necessarily alter our knowledge of the nature of the unknown. Rather, their identity is always already known and specified as the opposite other of modern civilisation.

As the claimed *universality* of modernity erases its own difference from our view, differences *within* modernity are projected to its outside, for example, to the past of the present signified by the modern. By identifying itself exclusively with the present of a unilinear time scale,¹⁴ the modernists relocate their difference to the past. Our contemporaries in the world

who are represented as "backward" or "underdeveloped" by reference to this measure of history have not arrived in our time by journeying in a time-machine, rather the modernist tall-tale *projects* them from the present to the past.

Furthermore, as modernity's evolution is "our" evolution, the projection of different contemporaries to modernity's past means that they are projected to our past. It is on this basis that those who constitute their identity as modern by referencing this tall-tale are able to address the others they project as barbarians with the patronizing statement "you are at my past, I am at your future," and, consequently, to provide them with prescriptions of civilisation and development that aim for *their* present.

Development as the Means of Modernization

Especially after Turkey's transition to a multi-party democracy, the Kemalist Westernization project was rearticulated in terms of the development prescriptions received from the West. Numerous military interventions did not disrupt but continued the Western oriented development project. They removed various democratic objections by outlawing labor and trade unions, and other civil organizations that could, and did, voice such objections.

The social engineering of the monoparty era was taken over by technocrats and, particularly, a number of engineers with remarkably long political lives. Süleyman Demirel, presently the President of Turkey and whose long political career has survived two military interventions, and who is a civil engineer, first became famous as "the King of Hydroelectric Dams." The generals who accomplished the coup d'etat of 1971 had their own "brain cabinet" that included the World Bank technocrat Atilla Karaosmanoğlu. Turgut Özal, another engineer who has left a lasting impression on Turkey's economy, was the generals' "architect of the economy" after the coup d'etat of 1980, as well as in two successive civilian

Western Civilisation against its contemporary critics, see Gress, 1998. Taner Timur points out how "a young Bavarian prince was appointed to head the Greek state, founded after a revolution that had stirred the entire European public, and reigned for years with his retinue of Austrian counselors who openly despised the Greeks" and that "the newly founded political parties were curiously named the French, British, and Russian parties" (15).

14

For instance, Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary defines modern as: "of, relating to, or characteristic of the present or the immediate past: CONTEMPORARY..." Incidentally, this is why the conception of the "postmodern" as a period succeeding the modern is a modernist one (Lyotard, 1992).

governments. Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the now banned Welfare Party and the principal spokesperson for Islam in Turkey, who also has had a remarkably long political career, is an engineer as well. He rivals Demirel in attending groundbreaking ceremonies of development projects. Their engineering ideology has been influential in defining the limits of modern "reason," and its "science of society," especially as it pertains to democracy.

Strictly speaking, the idea of development targeting "underdeveloped areas of the world," and the statistical operations that defined a worldwide poverty as the target of development, is a product of the 1940s. However, it fits properly within the framework of the Kemalist project of reaching the level of modern civilisation with the help of science and technology in general, and with the goal of "reducing the economic gap" and "catching up with," the West that was expressed as early as the İzmir Economic Congress of 1923 (Ökçün, 1968).

The idea of development is itself informed by the modernist tall-tale. In the recent modernist cartography of the world, the capitalist First World, the socialist Second World, and the nominally postcolonial Third World, all shared the developmentalist outlook. The Capitalist West and the Socialist East argued over which one of them was at the apex of the developmentalist track while the Third World, which was conceived and defined as "underdeveloped" in the U.S. President Harry Truman's baptizing inauguration speech (January 20, 1949), saw itself as a latecomer on the same developmentalist track. It seemed impossible to conceptualize the reality of the world otherwise because these very identities from which people surveyed the world were the result of a developmentalist outlook and, therefore, their world was "worlded" in terms of those identities. The dissolution of the communist block has taken care of the "family quarrel" between the First and Second Worlds (Bauman, 1992: 221), and has clarified the Western telos of progress even further.

To put it bluntly, as a socio-economic project, that is to say, as a project that promised prosperity to those parts of the world that were designated as underdeveloped, development has failed miserably. The ruins we call the Third World in both the Orient and the Occident stand as a grand sad monument of development's failure.

Despite the theme of "catching up," while in 1960 the Western countries were 20 times richer than their Oriental others, in 1980 they became 46 times richer (Sachs, 1992). And the gap has been widening since then. Between 1960 and 1991 the ratio of the shares of the richest 20% and the poorest 20% increased from 30:1 to 60:1 (United Nations Development Programme, 1996: 13).

Turkey's position reflects this trend.

In 1996, after many decades of development, Turkey's per capita GDP was 13% of the OECD average. The richest 20%'s share of the disposable income in 1994 was almost 55% while the poorest 20% made do with less than 5% (State Institute of Statistics Prime Ministry Republic of Turkey, 1998: 693, 695, 665). Inflation has hit 99.1% in 1997, reducing the buying power of 100TL by almost half (reported in *Sabah*, 4 January 1998). According to a study conducted by the State Planning Office in 1997, 32 million people whose income falls under 64 million TL, that is 47% of the population, are living below the poverty level (reported in *Milliyet*, 15 April 1997).

Clearly, the development project has been impoverishing those it was supposed to prosper.

On the other hand, development has been very successful in worlding the world of our imagination in both the First and the Third World. In fact, it can be said to have successfully colonized postcolonial thinking to the extent that it is confined to the limits of the identity, "the Third World," and to Third Worldism.

15

For this reason, Vandana Shiva argues that "it is useful to separate a cultural conception of subsistence living as poverty from the material experience of poverty resulting from dispossession and deprivation" (1993). Similarly, Anuradha Vittachi argues that "to live simply and frugally according to the values one has chosen is not to be 'poor,'" and that "if the profoundest ways I know of living are forcibly taken away from me, I am poor to the point of death" (1992).

16

"The word itself is a contraction not only of permanent agriculture but also of permanent culture" (Mollison, 1995).

The conventional understanding of development aid extended to the oriental Other by the West is that it is a modern version of the white man's burden, that it places an undue burden on the West, that the West is benevolently extending a helping hand to overcome poverty and hunger in the Orient. And yet, as Susan George points out, "in the five years between 1982-87 Third World countries as a group, including the most impoverished and crisis-ridden in Africa, sent us \$220 billion more than we sent them. Never before in history have the poor financed the rich on such a lavish scale" (George, 1988: 18-19). Such estimates do not include unrecorded capital outflow known as "capital flight." By the 1990s this drain is estimated to be more than 50 per cent of the developing countries' total net external debt (Miller, 1991: 14).

Clearly, the burden of carrying the Occident -even in financial terms- seems to have been on the shoulders of its Oriental Others.

Furthermore, the global poverty which required the intervention of western development initiatives was a cultural, ethnocentric fabrication and projection in the same way that underdevelopment was. It was "the result of a comparative statistical operation, the first of which was carried out only in 1940" (Sachs, 1990: 9). One important consequence of this projection, which today typically relies on the universal measure of annual per capita income, is that different and heterogeneous ways of securing a living around the world are homogenized and "impoverished," and that subsistence living which, to a large extent, does not register in the cash economy, as well as more frugal and earth-friendly ways of living, show up as poverty.¹⁵

These ways of living then become the targets of intervention by the forces of development wherein imperialist and colonialist reconfigurations substitute cash crops and monoculture for diverse forms of mostly sustainable agriculture or permaculture.¹⁶ It is through such interventions that people

are evicted from their social fabrics of subsistence and transformed into "expendable 'resources' for exploitation" (Ecologist, 1993: 21).

A colonial editorial in New Guinea from the mid- 1930s illustrates this relationship in the mind of the colonizer:

One of the greatest contributing factors to the unsatisfactory services rendered by native laborers in this country is their economic independence. For it must not be forgotten that every native is a landed proprietor, and nature has endowed New Guinea with a prolific soil, which provides adequate sustenance for a minimum of labor. Dismissal from employment, if he fails to carry out his duties, holds no terrors for the New Guinean native...Unless and until our natives reach such a stage of development that they must work to obtain sustenance or a livelihood, they will never make suitable indentured labor for the average white resident (quoted in Ecologist, 1993: 32).

"The Ecologist" who quoted this editorial also notes how Boer settlers in South Africa regularly drove local farmers off their tribal lands by reasoning that the "natives were merely subsistence farmers and deserved to be treated as squatters since they were not engaged in any systematic forms of agriculture" (31).

The desired transformation to reach the requisite stages of development, expressed by the colonizers above, is expanding today with the modernist development projects. Their interventions have created a world-wide and growing Diaspora of displaced peoples on the move. In Turkey, this displacement is reflected in increased migration to its cities and to Europe, and the incredible rise of its urban population which has increased from 24.22% in 1927 to 59.01% in 1990 (Timur, 1997: 50). The latest (1977) census results show that Turkey's urban population has increased to %65.03 (<http://www.die.gov.tr/TURKISH/SONIST/NUFUS/nufus97.htm>). Much of this new urban population lives in squatter and other poor neighborhoods that have been refiguring Turkish cities in a

17
Squatter houses. Literally translated, it means, "landed at night."

18
The extent of this impoverishment cannot be dismissed as easily as some authors are prone to do. However, we cannot, at the same time, overlook that these monocultural plans have unintended consequences, meet with resistance, are rearticulated locally, and, as a result, lead as well to unexpected configurations, to the formation of new identities, and to new foci of resistance. It is not like modernism springs forth from a God-like center and whatever God wills, happens. We are dealing with a worldly, human, cultural project limited in time and space. By focusing on the difference within the modern, various postmodern (poststructuralist, postmarxist, postcolonial, postfeminist etc.) perspectives are very well suited to examine this complexity.

counter-hegemonic contrast to the designs of the modernizers for quite some time now.

The migrants' disfiguring intrusion into the planned spaces of the modern city was unexpected and unwelcome by its planners. Long before this displacement and the resultant migration gained such momentum, Herman Jansen, the planner of Ankara, the capital of the newly founded republic, had this to say:

In new town planning practices, the new section of the town should be clearly separated from the old. Theoretically, the old town should be covered by a bell jar (quoted in Nalbantoğlu, 1997: 195).

The return of the migrant, her/his homecoming, alienates the holism and functional integration of the modernist design that Jansen wanted to protect from contamination. The *gecekondus*¹⁷ are now supplementing the metropolitan center, and stand in an adjunct relation that, rather than aggrandizing the presence of the planned-modern, make its shortsightedness all too visible.

Development impoverishes our world in other ways as well. Monoculturalization of the world based on universalizing or, more recently globalizing, the West has immensely accelerated the extinction of different peoples, languages, cultures, knowledges, as well as different species of animals and plants (Shiva, 1989; Sachs, 1992; Seabrook, 1993).¹⁸

The growing inequalities, hardly disguisable behind constantly postponed promises of catching up, and the dispossession and displacement that accompanies development projects, have given rise to a proliferation of conflict and war, contributing further to the ranks of the displaced populations. Reports indicate that the Turkish army, in its war against the Kurdish insurgents, has forcefully evacuated more than two thousand villages and hamlets between 1993 and 1994, and

burned forests to flush out the insurgents and to cut off their local support (1996: 8-9). A report by a parliamentary commission studying migration, clearly links migration with poverty, conflict, forced evacuations, breach of human rights, and loss of the means of securing a livelihood. Significantly, one of the measures proposed is reforestation (quoted in *Sabah*, 16 January 1998).

The cost versus benefit calculation of development projects, which is also used to measure our relative standing on the scale of development, is such that the social and environmental costs of these projects typically do not show up as costs. They are referred to as "externalities" in modern economic reasoning and are simply dismissed. Measures of our developmental standing, like the Gross Domestic Product, can not tell misery from well-being, only more from less, and hide gross inequalities. Women's work is omitted but activities that pollute and make life otherwise miserable for us, show up as positive economic activities that increases our developmental standing. Coronary bypass surgeries add significantly to the GDP, compared to the simple diets and healthful living that help prevent them but which do not count. Clear-cutting of old-growth and rain forests increases our standing on the scale of development and does not register as the irretrievable loss that it is.

But while natural resources can be transformed into cash, the opposite is not true. Indeed, much of Western development is based on laying to waste of millions of years of natural accumulation.

These externalized costs are included back in, as costs to be reckoned with, only to the extent that there is enough extra-economic *democratic* pressure to do so, and I will return to the question of democracy in the last section. A heartening example in this regard has been the mobilization and resistance of the locals of Bergama in Turkey, who steadfastly and, so far successfully, opposed the start of Eurogold corporation's

cyanide-leach gold mining operation there (TMMOB Çevre Mühendisleri Odası, 1998).

The consumption rates in the West are so disproportionately high that the municipalities are already running out of landfills to dump their waste. As we march towards development, increasing amounts of toxic waste unwanted in the West are exported to the Third World. About 125,000 tons of toxic waste are sent each year to the Third World from Europe alone (Ransom, 1992: 19). Unfortunately much of this trade takes place behind closed doors. For example, in February of 1997, it was disclosed in Turkey that during 1988-89, 1150 tons of highly toxic German nuclear waste that Germany did not know what to do with was brought to Turkey and was buried in a factory in Isparta, and an additional 800 tons of toxic waste were burned in another factory in Konya (*Yeni Yüzyıl*, 20 February 1997). The fact that the factory in Isparta belongs to then President Süleyman Demirel's brother, is significant in that it reflects our modernizers' unconcerned outlook on the matter.

So far, I emphasized how development has been a dismal failure in its own terms, and that it was constitutionally unable to bring about prosperity to those who followed development prescriptions. My purpose in exposing development's failure is not to suggest that we should find what went wrong and make it work once again. Given the colonizing nature of the modernist, orientalist worlding of the world, where the West is constituted as sovereign and its oriental others are constituted as subalterns of that sovereignty, development is constitutionally unable to bridge and equalize that relationship and overcome its binary opposition.

Modernization theories assume that all countries are destined to develop, and that they are Robinson Crusoe-like self-referential individuals that exist on the proverbial island by themselves, getting ready to take-off after following the prescription of development. Development's relational and differential constitution is completely ignored.

The other point I want to make is that, we should worry less about development's failure than the prospect of its success. Had the development project been successful, that is, had all countries successfully followed the industrialized Western example, five or six planets would be needed just to serve as mines and waste dumps (Sachs, 1992: 2). Various studies show that the West consumes as much as five-sixths of the global resources and that its orientalized others make do with the remaining one-sixth. When we factor in their respective populations, this means that per person consumption in the Occident is around 20 times as much as that in the Orient. "Catching up" with the West, as development prescriptions and Kemalism suggest, would clearly be disastrous for life on earth.

The industrialized countries of the West are overwhelmingly responsible for damage to the ozone layer and acidification, as well as for roughly two-thirds of global warming with just the U.S. contributing 23 percent of the carbon emissions. Western factories generate most of the world's hazardous chemical wastes, their military facilities have built more than 99 percent of the world's nuclear warheads, their atomic power plants have generated more than 96 percent of the world's radioactive waste, and their air conditioners, aerosol sprays and factories release almost 90 percent of the chlorofluorocarbons that destroy the earth's protective ozone layer (Durning, 1992: 51).

Clearly, upholding the West as the telos of History without paying attention to the alterity and difference both of history and of the West itself, is a nightmarish prospect. The Western lifestyle, as it is promoted in modernization theories, is not viable and sustainable, and it cannot be generalized without dire consequences for all. There is no reason or justification for pursuing development other than the logic and teleology of modernism, and that logic is ruining both Turkey and the world at large.

Whenever the changing relations between those who claim universality and the unity of the present for themselves on the one

hand, and those whose identity is understood by a projection to the past on the other, is questioned and displaced as a relation within the present, as I have done here, this relation is re-presented as the relation of a difference-within. In our modernity the question of democracy is what provides the framework for thinking this relation of a difference-within in political terms. I also emphasized, earlier, democracy's significance in internalizing the social and environmental costs of modernization projects. So it is to the question of democracy that I now turn.

Democracy in Turkey: A Democracy to Come

Contemporary Turkey is a pluralist parliamentary democracy in contrast to the mono-party dictatorship when the principal pillars of Kemalism was laid out and the Western oriented reforms were introduced. In tune with the victory of Western democracies after the Second World War, a multi-party system was adopted in 1946. In the normalcy of events, governments change hands depending upon freely-held election results. In general terms, democratic rights and freedoms are granted in the constitution.

And yet, this normalcy is complemented by another.

From the founding of the Republic onward, Turkey has seen few years without the imposition of martial law, or its recent substitute called the Emergency Situation Law, in one or more regions of the country. Needless to say, these laws take away or extremely limit the said rights and freedoms.

The present multi-party period has been marked by military interventions in 1960, 1971, and 1980 as well as a "virtual" one in 1997. The military's justification for intervention, "to save" democracy by removing the "demos" from "democracy," has become a familiar refrain. Significantly, none of the generals responsible for those military coups has ever been brought to trial. On the contrary, they enjoy a respectable standing, the highest ranking ones as presidents, in the Kemalist historiography of the Republic.

Each military intervention has revised and left its stamp on the Constitution and other laws. The present Constitution, for example, was drafted by the generals of the 1980 military coup and includes provisions to enable their continued influence under civilian rule. The institutionalization of military intervention in politics has, in effect, established what Taner Timur refers to as a "military trusteeship" over Turkish democracy (19). In February of 1998, the National Security Council was thus able to impose the conditions of the military to the civilian coalition government, again under the banner of Kemalism, and to induce its downfall with threat of another military intervention, in what could be referred to as a virtual coup. Significantly, their target, the Islamist Welfare party, was represented as an archaic threat for the modern, secular Republic. Since then, the Constitutional Court has outlawed the Welfare Party for breaching the secularism principle of the Republic.

The Kemalist principles of the Turkish Republic were represented in the six arrows of the Republican People's Party founded by Mustafa Kemal. They were listed (in May 1931) as: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, revolutionism, and were also put in the constitution in 1937. For the Kemalists, republicanism did not mean, and does not mean, rule by the people as the name might also imply (*res publica*). Instead it meant rule over the people, and in their name, by an enlightened, modernizing elite. Hence the attraction of a disciplinarian, teacher-like, stern, and benevolent dictatorship. On the other hand, democracy is conspicuous in its absence from the list.

The closure of the Welfare Party may have been the first time that a political party, which had won the highest percentage (19%) of the popular vote, had been outlawed, but the closing down of political parties that voice contrary views seems to be the norm rather than the exception. Since the transition to a multi-party system, 23 political parties, ranging from green to socialist to "Kurdish," have been closed down by 1998.

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For example, in a briefing of Turkish journalists in 1995, then armed forces deputy chief General Ahmet Çörekçi is reported as saying "we'll finish terrorism soon but we're being held back by democracy and human rights" while condemning ongoing democratization efforts (Reuters, 1 July 1995). This was before the issue of Turkey's entry into the European Union was taken up and when the need for further democratization to ease its entry into the EU was put on the agenda. Especially since Turkey's acceptance of the European Court of Human Rights' jurisdiction on 22 January 1990, many cases of alleged human rights abuses not addressed at home have been taken there and the condemnations of the Turkish government by the court have been mounting. These abuses range from the closure of the United Communist Party of Turkey in 1990 to the destruction of Kurdish homes by army soldiers during anti-guerrilla operations in southeastern Turkey in 1993 (<http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/eng/Judgments.htm>). According to newspaper reports, the monetary reparations that Turkey has had to pay as a result of such decisions has reached 2 billion TL by mid October 1997 and was expected to reach 15 quadrillion TL as the case of the Elekçi village that was burned by the Turkish military in the Southeast was also just decided in their favor (*Liberal Bakış* 15 September 1997; *Sabah* 20 September 1997). Many in the ruling circles see democratic and human rights reforms not as a gain in itself for Turkey, but rather as a cost to be borne in order to enter the European Union.

Given the scope of Turkey's problem with the Kurdish insurgency that has claimed more than twenty one thousand lives since 1984, it is highly significant, I think, that every political party that sought political representation of the Kurdish demands for cultural expression has been closed down or is under threat of closure, and that even elected Kurdish representatives of such parties have been convicted and imprisoned for having ties with the Kurdish insurgents. In the official discourse of the government, there is no Kurdish problem but a problem of "terrorism" and a problem of "underdevelopment." Typical official response, therefore, is to see democratic and human rights concerns as an irrelevant or extraneous irritant that needs to be superficially addressed in order to appease outside, mostly European, objections, or simply as a ploy hiding the plan to divide up Turkey.¹⁹

Hence the government has responded to the Kurdish demands on the one hand with military might and repression, and on the other with a huge development project, the Southeastern Anatolia Project. The whole region is enclosed and overseen by the Emergency Situation Law allowing what would otherwise be extraordinary breaches of human rights and freedoms, to become ordinary and normal. Within this framework, the constitutional rights and freedoms that could lead to the articulation and assumption of different identities and trajectories are annulled or severely limited by other provisions and other laws.

As a result, Turkey, today, has a very embarrassing record of human rights violations including banning of books and imprisonment of authors and journalists, use of torture in detention, and assassinations and disappearances of civilians in the hands of death squads.²⁰

There is no doubt that Turkey needs further democratization.

However, this should not be taken to imply simply the inadequate, barbarian nature of an oriental Turkey. Democracy is needed for that very terrain that establishes and maintains this West-East, modern-backward, civilised-barbarian binary opposition. Let us not forget that the Turkish modernizers aim to protect the integrity of the Turkish nation, and or the Turkish people, precisely in order to raise it to "the level of contemporary, that is Western, civilisation." If the Turkish modernizers are so concerned with unity and integrity, it is because the unity of Man/Reason/History and the uni-versality and uni-linearity of modernization that they have learned from the West itself does not allow for difference and alterity except through assimilation and domestication. Similarly, the science of society that the Kemalists have learned from August Comte (positivism) and Emile Durkheim (solidarism) onwards is also based on the indivisible unity and reality of Truth. Their social engineering ideology is based on the uni-versal claims of that science. Rather than being the expression of an essential Oriental despotic identity, their authoritarianism derives from their (modernist) Westernization. The subject position that they assume and occupy-vis-à-vis the ascribed "backward" and "archaic" others in Turkey-is that of the Western sovereign subject.²¹ Their authoritarianism is an *enlightened* one that is *authorized* by the European Enlightenment.²²

Therefore, concern with lack of democracy in Turkey cannot be seen simply as an addition to the lack of an incomplete Other from the whole of the fully self-referential identity of the West. The supplementing others of modernization point to the anterior default of a presence in the modern, to a minus in the origin of modernization. They highlight the West's colonizing past and present, and point out the inexcisable role of its global imperialism in the constitution of its domestic subjectivity.

What is needed, therefore, is a democratization that does not add up to make modernization whole and finish the

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For recent reports by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch see (<http://www.amnesty.org/ailib/countries/indx444.htm>) and (<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/worldreport99/europe/turkey3.html>). A women's human rights group known as "Saturday's Women" (Günçikan, 1996), comprised mostly of wives and mothers of victims of human rights abuses in Turkey, and which held weekly vigils in İstanbul to campaign against torture, extrajudicial killings and "disappearances" of political dissidents in Turkey, made the headlines abroad after winning the International League for Human Rights medal in Berlin on December 8, 1996 (Reuters, 8 December 1996).

21

Following the deconstructive critique of the humanist notion of subjectivity and its metaphysics of self-presence, Western subject should not be thought of as an ontologically pre-given essence but as a process of differential becoming. As Meyda Yeğenoğlu has argued, "one is not a Western subject because there exists a pre-given structure called the Western culture which imposes itself upon its members. The transformation of individuals into Western subjects is not accomplished by issuing Western identity cards. One 'becomes' and is made Western by being subjected to a process called Westernizing and by imagining oneself in the fantasy frame of belonging to a specific culture called the 'West'" (4).

22

Şerif Mardin similarly traces the Kemalists'

authoritarianism to "a Rousseauist-Jacobin conception of the 'general will'" (Mardin, 1997).

23

I borrow the term "democracy to come" from Jacques Derrida (1992).

"unfinished project of modernity" in the manner of a Jürgen Habermas-the very thing under question- but an addition that does not add up, one that enables its rethinking and rearticulation in what Jacques Derrida has called the logic of the supplement (1976: 141-164; 1981: 61-171).

The democracy that I am referring to, therefore, is not something that "we" in the West have and "they" in oriental Turkey lack, in the taken-for-granted familiarity of that binary opposition. It is, rather, "a democracy to come," one that responds to the undemocratic and colonizing nature of this very divide, "a democracy to come" that exceeds rather than completes the unity of the modern, and opens it up to new possibilities and new configurations across the colonial divide.²³

Occident and Orient are not two externally distinct and independent entities, but are relational and differential. Therein lies the importance of focusing on the colonization that is inherent in this relation. In a sense, this is analogous to the way that Athenian "democracy" was founded on slavery and to the way that it also excluded women from its ranks. The relations that made democracy at its "proper" site possible were not democratic and its demos was limited to a privileged few.

One contemporary reminder of this relationality is the migration of displaced peoples across cultural, geographic, and national borders. The "less-than-modern" others who show up in modern metropolises in both the First and Third Worlds, are not coming from the outside of modernity. As one of their slogan states: "We are here because you were there!" Or, as Whisky Sisodia, in Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses*, explains: "The trouble with the English is that their history happened overseas, so they don't know what it means" (Rushdie, 1989: 337). Indeed, the paradox of development creating poverty and underdevelopment that was discussed earlier will become less of a paradox and seem more logical when we get to see the identities West and East, modern and backward as relational-that relation

being a colonizing one-and where the oriental other is not outside but is internal to the constitution of "the modern West."

Similarly, the women students who show up in Turkish universities with headscarves, actively constituting a counterhegemonic Muslim identity for themselves,²⁴ and the Kurds who demand education and publication in their own language -to foster a Kurdish culture and identity, not reducible to the confines of an indivisible Turkish identity- do not come from the outside of modernity, but they represent modernity's difference and alterity. They repeat modernity in a repetition where this return is another turn and another becoming for modernity. Simply put, they represent modernity's difference-or otherness-within.

Because difference is always-already inside and does not only and simply denote an external outsider, any teleologically modernist attempt-like Kemalism-that strives to establish harmony and reconciliation in an indivisible unity, is bound to fail. Such a consensus view of modernization is unable to accommodate diversity and conflict, and is in constant need of projecting "outside enemies" from the inside. In discussing the unilinear teleology of the modernist narrative of progress, I explained how some of our contemporary moderns were projected to the past and made other. Republican Turkey's history can also be read in terms of such othering where a succession of peoples were dislocated by reference to the modernist teleological time-line, and their identities were redefined as backward and lacking, and, thus, in need of the intervention of "enlightened" modernizers.

If we follow up on the radical implications of liberal democracy, perhaps its most significant distinguishing characteristic as a new form of social organization is its legitimation of diversity and conflict, and its refusal to eliminate conflict through the imposition of an authoritarian order (Mouffe, 1996: 8). That there is a diversity of conceptions of the good is not seen as a threat to the supposedly indivisible unity

24

Nilüfer Göle captures this modern articulation in both the original Turkish title (1992), as well as the translated title, of her book *The Forbidden Modern: Civilization and Veiling* (1996). The Turkish title could be translated as *Modern Veiling*.

25

Nietzsche's announcement that "God is dead" is significant in this regard as well, and cuts across the religious-secular divide.

of truth and social order but rather as something to be valued and celebrated for their very constitution.

As we have seen, the modernist grand narrative assumes an otherworldly God's-eye-view whose point of perspective is not situated in a particular time and place in the world, and projects the trajectory of the Western sovereign self and his truth as History and Reason. As Kemalists were quick to note, that is how the world was divided into an ontologically distinct modern West and a backward East in familiar orientalist terms, and civilisation, modernization, and progress were equated with Westernization.

Without the self-serving reference to the modernist grand narrative, one cannot but recognize that one's truth and way of life is temporally, spatially, culturally limited and partial, and that difference and alterity inhabit both the West and the East. The recognition that one's truth and history is merely one among others, in both the West and the East, informs such a radically *pluralist* democracy. In a sense this is the recognition that there is no God-like omnipresent, omniscient, omnipotent authority to adjudicate conflicting notions of the good.²⁵ The Enlightenment substitute for heavenly wisdom, Reason, has been shown to be similarly limited in a worldly disposition. Deconstructively postmodern and postcolonial critiques of this logocentrism have dethroned Reason from its lofty, omnipresent and omniscient location in our imaginations, by unmasking its always-already worldly involvement in the here-and-now affairs of us mortals. Thus, there is no neutral reason uncontaminated by interest, institution, and power struggle to appeal to in dealing with social conflicts.

This does not mean that any decision taken is as good as any other but rather that the absence of a final arbitrator (outside of a historically and culturally limited and transient, institutional one) calls on us to be ethically and politically responsible in our choices. Indeed, as Jacques Derrida has

argued, such a radical experience of undecidability is the necessary condition of ethical-political responsibility and hence...of decidability:

A decision can only come into being in a space that exceeds the calculable program that would destroy all responsibility by transforming it into a programmable effect of determinate causes. There can be no moral or political responsibility without this trial and this passage by way of the undecidable. Even if a decision seems to take only a second and not to be preceded by any deliberation, it is structured by this experience and experiment of the undecidable (1988: 116).

It does mean, however, that whatever the decision we make, it will be with the recognition that it is made at the expense of another, that it is always provisional and contingent, and that (democratic) politics can never overcome conflict and division. The aim of democratic politics is thus the establishing of unity in a context of conflict and diversity. The recognition of the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion means that to think that the institutions of any (Western or Eastern) society instantiates Justice is an illusion.²⁶ Indeed, this is the very insight that forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive. As Chantal Mouffe points out, "the specificity of modern pluralist democracy resides not in the absence of oppression and violence but in the presence of institutions that permit these aspects to be limited and contested" (Mouffe, 1996: 11). For this reason too democracy cannot be finalized complacently in any one institutional configuration but is *always* to come. Its closure in any configuration with the final word on democracy, therefore, needs to be resisted.

Unfortunately, democracy is too often defined in the very limiting terms of the mere presence of certain reified institutions like a parliament and a voting mechanism which may or may not denote democratic contestation. I argued earlier that Turkey is in need of democratization but also pointed out that, in terms

26

It would, therefore, be misleading to oppose a neutral "civil society," understood as free from and uncontaminated by politics and its conflicts, to the realm of "the state" that supposedly circumscribes the proper site of political power play. Yael Navaro-Yashin traces how an appeal to "the civil society" as distinguished from the state and hence privileged as "the beyond" of power play and politics, was played out, nonetheless, as instrumental components of the competing discourses of state power of both the Kemalists and the Islamists in Turkey in the first half of the 1990s (1998).

27

So proclaims Jacques Attali, the first chairman of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. He also describes Africa as a "lost continent" and Latin America as sliding into "terminal poverty" (quoted in Bello, 1994: 107-108).

of the presence of such reified institutions, it can be classified as a democracy and the case closed.

Equating democracy exclusively with the West similarly limits and hinders our understanding. This is not only because the West has also given us the highest form of barbarism known to humankind, fascism and nazism in the modern age, as I pointed out earlier, but also because from the age of the colonies to the present day "globalization" initiatives, the reason that governs the modern world has not been open to democratic contestation. The taken-for-granted and unquestioned assumptions of the universality of the modernist teleology with its hierarchy of peoples that put the West at its destination; of the manifest destiny of the chosen few; and of civilizing and/or modernizing the backward others as the white man's burden; have also and more principally informed and governed the Western perspective on the world.

Likewise, our ongoing "globalization" by the West is governed not by democratic concerns but by a limited and limiting capitalist, economic reason. Indeed, as regards the other side of the international division of labor, the main concern seems to be focused mainly on economic infrastructural modernization and not so much with the "externalized" democratic voices and concerns of those who bear the brunt, and suffer the consequences, of such modernization. Under "globalization," we are witnessing a narrowing rather than a multiplication and enhancement of democratic contestation. Indeed, people other than the modernized and globalized triumphant Western subject are increasingly left out and seen as "millennial losers" without a future.²⁷ That is also why I argued earlier that democracy is needed at the very site where the division between the supposedly modern, advanced Occident and the backward Orient as its opposite is established.

The radical formulation of a pluralist democracy, based on these insights, stands in contrast to the imperialist arrogance of the modernization imperative and to the consensus view of

democracy which assumes that a final resolution of conflict is eventually possible in a progressive process of rationalization.

Democracy is often invoked to give voice to a plurality of identities as opposed to a univocity. And, clearly, I am doing that here too. However, appealing to other voices requires that we pay close attention to our representations of others' voices and to the otherness in our voice. For instance, speaking of Turkish identity as a mosaic of different identities seems to be gaining currency in Turkey. While the introduction of difference is to be welcomed, the trope of a mosaic suggests that the pieces that make up the mosaic fit together, that they all add up to make a whole.²⁸ It suggests a transparent dialogue among equals in an economy of the same. Such a totalization reestablishes univocity at a higher level and silences precisely those voices that do not fit, the voices that are other to the integral vision of the totality.

This is not what I have in mind.

I argued earlier how, in the orientalist worlding of the world, the oriental Other was constituted as subaltern in order to constitute the Occidental self as sovereign. Because of its subaltern constitution, the search for "the real Orient" (as opposed to Western "distortions" of it, for example), and naive appeals for "letting the other(s) speak for him/herself" are, therefore, not an alternative but a further reinforcement of orientalism. Orientalism and nativism are "the obverse and reverse of the same coin" (Chow, 1993: 6). That is why I highlighted the indigenist aspect of Turkish Westernization earlier. Such an appeal for the authentic native self, therefore, establishes the sovereignty of the ethnocentric Subject by assuming transparency and invisibility (and hence centrality and universality) for that Subject, and by recognizing the Other through domestication or assimilation.

In Gayatri Spivak's apt description, such "pure Orientals" and "speaking Others" rely on the invisibility of the "first-world intellectual masquerading as the absent nonrepresenter" (1988:

28

For an example of the mosaic perspective see Bozkurt Güvenç (1993).

292). Arguing that "the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably heterogeneous," Spivak points our attention to the subservient, token status of "native informants for first-world intellectuals interested in the voice of the Other." Rather than appealing to the "authenticity" of the Other, Spivak calls on us to pay attention to the "mechanics of the constitution of the Other," and to "the epistemic violence" at the heart of the imperialist project which can only authenticate the Other as a domesticated "object of study" or as a "native informant" in order to draw some domestic benefit. The other thus recognized is, therefore, a "self-consolidating other" consolidating the Western subject as the Subject of knowledge.

Putting the "demos" back in democracy, therefore, does not consist of simply letting the others speak, for such a "letting speak" is never innocent and involves representational practices that are hidden from our view in order, precisely, to give the impression of a "letting speak." As there is always-already representation, even when we claim an "objective" view, it is an invitation for us to engage in the *politics* of representation, so that we can represent differently and not do violence by donning the mask of the non-representer.

It is also a call to assume responsibility for our representational practices in the academia and not to hide behind transparent claims of "objectivity"-especially in the disciplines of social *science* that habitually claim such objectivity. Designated arenas of political representation such as parliaments are not the only sites where a politics of representation takes place.

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