

DIFFERENT MANIFESTATIONS OF NEUTRALITY: THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF SPAIN AND TURKEY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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Abstract

A critical point that is not sufficiently addressed in studies of Second World War is the significant differences between the policies followed by states that did not participate in the war. This study undertakes a comparative analysis of the policies pursued by Spain and Turkey during the war, on the basis that comparative studies on neutral states have the potential to enrich research on the Second World War. Although both countries are generally assessed under the term "neutrality", there were important differences between the policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War. The variable positions between "neutrality" and "non-belligerency" of these two states constitute the focus of the analysis. The ideological reasons and conditions that enabled Spain to take a close line to the Axis powers and Turkey to the Allies during the war are also among the points emphasized in the study.

Keywords: *Neutrality, Non-belligerency, The second world war, The Franco regime, Turkey.*

Öz

Tarafsızlığın Farklı Görünümleri:

İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında İspanya ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikaları

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na ilişkin çalışmalarda üzerinde yeterince durulmayan kritik bir nokta, savaşa katılmayan devletlerin izledikleri politikalar arasındaki farklılıklardır. Bu çalışmada, tarafsız devletler üzerine yapılan karşılaştırmalı çalışmaların İkinci Dünya Savaşı ile ilgili araştırmaları zenginleştirme potansiyeline sahip olduğu düşüncesinden hareketle, savaş sırasında İspanya ve Türkiye'nin izlediği politikaların karşılaştırmalı bir analizi yapılmaktadır. Genel olarak "tarafsızlık" kavramı çerçevesinde değerlendirilse de, İspanya ve Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında izlediği politikalar arasında kayda değer farklılıklar mevcuttur. Bu iki devletin "tarafsızlık" ve "savaş-dışılık" arasındaki değişken konumları, analizin odak noktasını teşkil etmektedir. Savaş sırasında İspanya'nın Mihver devletlerine, Türkiye'nin ise Müttefiklere yakın bir çizgide olmasını sağlayan ideolojik nedenler ve koşullar da çalışmada vurgulanan noktalar arasında yer almaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Tarafsızlık, Savaş-dışılık, İkinci Dünya Savaşı, Franco Rejimi.*

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Introduction

The history of the idea of "neutrality" in international politics can be traced back to the ancient Greek city-states. In this context, neutrality consists of "not participating in war" during an ongoing war. However, agreements made by a neutral state with one of the warring parties do not mean that neutrality is violated. These agreements often include provisions such as not using neutral state lands for military attacks, not trading with warring parties or providing arms support to them.¹ Nevertheless, it is also known that some practices carried out by neutral states during the wars keep these states away from "neutrality", which makes it necessary to evaluate the concept of "neutrality" together with one or more other terms. At this point, we encounter the concept of "non-belligerency", which was first used in 1939 in order to describe the position of Italy before that country turned into a belligerent.² Unlike neutrality, which refers mainly to legal principles, "non-belligerency" refers mainly to positions taken in the dynamic conditions of war. It is known that the non-belligerent states are usually able to establish their own position without the limitations of strict neutrality throughout the conflicts; which, in some cases, causes non-belligerents to receive significantly better treatment than their neutral equivalents.³ Occupying a status between neutral and belligerent, the non-belligerent has the opportunity to avoid, to a certain extent, the highly restrictive rules of neutrality. Although it is a controversial issue whether non-belligerency status constitutes a violation of the law of neutrality, it is clear that this status provides states with great advantages during war. The only situation that can put an end to the "non-belligerent" position of a state, which can even provide war material to the belligerents, is direct intervention in the war on the side of the belligerents. In such a situation, the state becomes a party to the war.⁴ With these characteristics, "non-belligerency" is a critical concept in assessing the policies of Turkey and Spain during the Second World War, which is examined in this study.

Another important point regarding the issue of neutrality in the Second World War is the content of the neutral policy adopted by the countries in the midst of a conflict. While some of the neutrals took a close stance to the Allies during the war due to their historical or economic relations, another part of them maintained close relations with the Axis powers for similar reasons. For example, Portugal, which has a centuries-old commercial alliance with Britain, continued its commercial relations with this state during the war. Likewise, it was seen that the main trading partners of Austria, one of the neutral states of the Second World War, were Germany and Italy during the war.⁵ Apart from this, it is known that some neutral states included their troops in the war to some extent during the war. Hence, it can be said that there are differences between the "degrees of neutrality" of the countries. At this point, it is argued that there are critical differences between the positions of Turkey and Spain during the war, although both of them are

¹ Cottey 2018, pp. 27-28.

² Wilson 1941, p. 121.

³ Wylie 2002, p. 4.

⁴ Ronzitti, 2005, pp. 198-199.

⁵ Devine 2008, p. 84.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

considered under the title of "neutral" in the studies on World War II. This statement is analysed in three sections. The first is the ideological difference between the two states at the time of the war. This difference was also decisive in the relationship each state established with the parties to the war. As a consequence of the first difference, the positions taken by the two states at critical stages of the war were also different from each other. Events that prompted Spain to move from neutrality to a non-belligerent position or vice versa did not have the same effect on Turkey; similarly, Spain either did not react at all or reacted belatedly to events that prompted Turkey to take up new positions. However, it should be noted that both states experienced a constant ebb and flow between neutrality and non-belligerency during the war. This constitutes the second main point analysed in this study. Another striking difference between the foreign policies of Spain and Turkey in the Second World War is that while the former at times gave the impression of being prepared to participate in the war, even placing their troops under the command of the German army, the latter avoided it as far as possible. Thus, the difference in the degree of sensitivity of the two states to non-participation in the war is the third central point of the study.

It is important to note that, the policies pursued by Turkey and Spain during the World War II years have previously been analysed together in some studies, albeit under separate headings. As these studies tended to cover all or part of the neutrals of war together, the "neutral" and "non-belligerent" positions of the two countries were not directly analysed in a bilateral comparison. Russell and Tokatlian's study, which comparatively analyses the internal and external factors that prompted the governments of Argentina, Chile, Spain, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey to take a neutral stance in World War II, is one of such studies.⁶ Also in the study by Herbert R. Reginbogin comparing Swiss policy with that of neutral European states and the United States, which took a neutral stance in the first two years of the war, Turkey and Spain are among the countries analysed.⁷ It should be noted that, in some studies where the policies of neutral parties in the war are analysed in a comparative manner, Turkey's policies in World War II have not been examined. Jerrold M. Packard's *Neither Friend Nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War II* is among such studies.⁸ Likewise, in the study titled *European Neutrals and Non-Belligerents During the Second World War* edited by Neville Wylie, Turkey was not included.⁹ Considering the scope of the aforementioned studies and the subjects of their analyses, it is hoped that this article will contribute to the field in the absence of a study that directly examines the neutrality of Spain and Turkey during World War II in a reciprocal manner.¹⁰

6 Russell&Tokatlian 2001.

7 Reginbogin 2009.

8 Packard 1992.

9 Wylie 2002.

¹⁰ Although it is not a study focusing on the issue of "neutrality", Murat Yüksel's master's thesis should also be mentioned at this point in terms of the relations between Turkey and Spain. In this study, Yüksel did not refrain from discussing the foreign policies of the two states during the

1. Ideological Preferences

The main difference between Turkey and Spain in the first period of the war and its continuation was the blocs to which they were close to. While Spain was in a position close to the Axis powers during the war, Turkey seemed to cooperate with the Allies in general, except for a limited period when it moved closer to Germany and followed a more neutral policy. The positions of the two countries were largely shaped before the war. Spain, on the road to war, left the League of Nations and joined the Comintern Pact, and showed that it was close to the Axis powers with these critical decisions. Turkey, for its part, drew closer to the anti-revisionist West, especially to Britain. However, ideological orientations were also decisive in these rapprochements. In the case of Spain, this was much more pronounced. The newly established regime in the country had a Catholic-nationalist character. During the Civil War years, the fight was fought against a broad left front. Germany and Italy, which had provided great support to Franco's forces during the war years, were ideological allies of the new rulers of Spain. In this context, for Spain, the USSR represented the opposite pole. In Turkey, the main objective since the founding of the Republic was to be included in Western civilization. For this reason, the first republican period was marked by progress towards the goal of modernization. It was inevitable that foreign policy was shaped in this direction.

At the beginning of the Second World War, Spain was a corporatist state where the social structure prior to the "Second Republic" declared in 1931 was reestablished, the reforms were completely eliminated and the traditional oligarchy reestablished its dominance.¹¹ Under these conditions, the decisions of the Franco regime up to 1 September 1939, when the Second World War began, showed from the outset that Spain would act from a position close to the Axis. Two of these decisions stand out more than the others. The first of these was Spain's participation in the Anti-Comintern Pact on 7 April 1939, previously established by Germany and Japan with the aim of "fighting international communism" and which included also Italy. The second was the decision to leave the League of Nations on May 8, 1939. Spain had made it clear that it would stand in a line close to the Axis powers by leaving the League of Nations, which Germany left in 1933 and Italy in 1937.¹² Needless to say, this was not surprising. The intense support received from Germany and Italy during the Civil War, as well as their ideological orientation, brought the new rulers of Spain into close contact with the Axis bloc during the Second World War. It should also be noted that before the end of the Civil War some secret agreements were made between Spain and the Axis powers. The Francoist powers signed a secret cooperation agreement with Italy in November 1936, just at the beginning of the war in Spain; and towards the end of the Civil War, they made a similar agreement with Germany.¹³ Hence, at the start of the Second World War, Spain was in very close relations with anti-democratic and anti-communist forces.

war; however, he did not attempt a comparative analysis of the foreign policies of the two states as it was beyond the scope of his study. Yuksel 2019.

¹¹ Preston 1994, pp. 281-282.

¹² Bowen 2006, pp. 21-22.

¹³ Bowen 2006, p. 21.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

In contrast to Spain's close relations with Germany and Italy, as the war approached, Turkey pursued a policy of improving its relations with France and Britain in line with the Republic's goal of linking the country to the West. A critical reason why Turkey adopted a position close to Britain and France in these years was also the expansionist policy of Italy and Germany. The fact that Italian leader Mussolini often referred to the Mediterranean as *Mare Nostrum* (Our Sea) in his speeches in the 1930s caused great concern in Turkey. Mussolini's proposal of an alliance with Greece in 1935 to Turkey was also seen as an attempt by Italy to render the Balkan Pact inoperative by pitting the Balkan countries against each other. Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in October of the same year caused Turkey to cut off its economic relations with this country in line with the decision taken by the League of Nations, of which it had been a member since 1932. This attitude prompted Italy to deliver a note of protest to Turkey.¹⁴ Similarly, Turkey always had to be cautious in its relations with Germany, which pursued an expansionist policy after the National Socialist Party came to power in 1933. Although Turkey sympathized with the German stance against Versailles, it was not in favor of the Germans changing the status quo by force. In this respect, Turkey was both ideologically and strategically close to Britain and France, the status quo powers of the time.

Given its ideological position and the circumstances described above, it may seem strange at first glance that Spain was among the countries that declared neutrality in the first days of the war, on September 4, 1939. The decisive factor in the decision of the Franco regime was the serious economic conditions in his country. Spain, whose economy depended on trade with Britain and France, was also trying to get closer to these states during the summer of 1939. These efforts paid off and Spain resumed trade and diplomatic relations with these two states within a few months. In the same period, Spain also improved its relations with Portugal, which was close to Britain.¹⁵ In this way, Spain, in addition to exhibiting a position favorable to the Axis, also demonstrated that it would respect to a certain extent the balances between the parties. This situation was also manifested in the contacts of the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Ramón Serrano Súñer, with Italy. Súñer, at the meeting in Rome on June 13, 1939, transmitted in detail the difficult conditions of his country to the Italian leader Mussolini and the Italian Foreign Minister Ciano. At the same meeting, Súñer also stated that, although Spain intended to join the war, it needed at least two years for his country to recover militarily.¹⁶ Therefore, in the first phase of the war, Spain was in a neutral position despite the close relations it established with the Axis powers and the commitments it acquired with these states. However, it was not long before Spain abandoned its position at the beginning of the war.

While Spain took this position in the first phase of the war, Turkey was in a "non-belligerent" position at the beginning of the war. As previously mentioned in the study, Spain, another state considered among the neutral states of the Second World War, declared its "neutrality" in the first days of the war. For Turkey, such a situation was not in question at that time. This was also clearly stated by the statesmen. For example, the

¹⁴ Uzgel 2009, pp. 295-296.

¹⁵ Bowen 2006, p. 23.

¹⁶ Pike 2008, p. 16.

then Foreign Minister Şükrü Saracoğlu, in a statement he made in January 1940, argued emphatically that Turkey was not "neutral" but was "non-belligerent."¹⁷ At the beginning of the war, Turkey was still striving to form an alliance with the British and the French, and was continuing negotiations with the Soviets.¹⁸ Not long after, with the alliance agreement signed with Britain and France on October 19, 1939, it became clear that Turkey would continue to position itself close to the Western states. With this treaty, Great Britain and France promised to support Turkey in case of attack by European states. In the event of an attack that could take place in the Mediterranean, Turkey offered the same commitment to Britain and France.

Although not as sharp and strong as in Spain, there was an effective anti-communist attitude in Turkey during the war years. This attitude was, in reality, the result of a continuing trend derived from the dominant ideology in the country. The objective of westernization of the regime naturally included incorporation into western capitalism. In this regard, Turkey's skepticism towards the USSR as it approached Western democracies would be understandable considering the line it followed. In fact, at the beginning of the war, the first break with the USSR took place despite the close relations established with the Allies. The 2nd Protocol, which was added to the alliance agreement between Britain, Turkey and France with the concern not to provoke any conflict between the USSR and Turkey, prevented the USSR from reacting harshly to the agreement. However, the USSR did not like Turkey's rapprochement with Britain and France. For this reason, the Soviets assessed the treaty as a violation of the principle of neutrality by Turkey and soon stopped oil shipments to Turkey.¹⁹ Under these conditions, Turkey followed a distant policy towards the Soviets throughout the war.

2. Positions Taken in the War

A common feature of Spain's and Turkey's policies during the Second World War is that they alternated between neutrality and non-belligerency. However, these shifts were not in the same direction. Critical developments during the war led each of these two states to revise their positions in accordance with their relations with the warring parties.

2.1. The Early War and the German Occupations

A critical event that boosted Spain in June 1940 was Italy's participation in the war on the side of Germany. Immediately after Italy's participation in the war, Franco put an end to his country's "neutrality" status and declared "non-belligerency."²⁰ Before long, Spain's policies began to take shape in line with its new status in the war. Especially in the autumn months, there was a visible increase in Spain's rapprochement with Germany and Italy. During the same period, Spain entered into intense negotiations to go to war with the Axis powers. One of the important dates on which these negotiations took place

¹⁷ Çelik 2018, p. 324.

¹⁸ Aydın 2009, p. 418.

¹⁹ Koçak 1986, pp. 92-95.

²⁰ León 2005, pp. 105-106.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

was October 23, 1940. Although there was no decision to join the war at the meeting between Franco and Hitler in Hendaye, on the French border, the protocol signed between the parties after the meeting clashed profoundly with the "non-belligerent" status that Spain had recently declared. According to the protocol, Spain, which was included in the "Treaty of Friendship and Alliance" signed between Germany and Italy in 1939, undertook to act jointly with these two states on many issues, from cooperation between secret services and police organizations to economic partnerships.²¹ The reason Spain did not get directly involved in the war was that it could not get the commitments promised by Germany. Franco had no intention of plunging his country into the war unless he was certain of acquiring Gibraltar, controlled by the British, and part of France's territory in North Africa. As a result of this, it would be seen that Hitler, who renounced a comprehensive operation against Gibraltar, began to concentrate on an invasion plan against the Soviets from this time onwards.²²

Turkey maintained its "non-belligerent" position after Italy's entry into the war. As stated above, with this development, Spain ended its "neutrality" status and declared itself as a non-belligerent country. This development did not have an equally large impact on Turkey. In the declaration dated 26 June 1940, it was stated that the situation "which occurred with Italy's entry into the war" was examined and the current position would be maintained "to ensure the safety and security of the country."²³ That same year, after the Italian attack on Greece on October 28, the Triple Alliance Treaty was again put on the table. Turkey raised Protocol No. 2, noting the possibility of engaging the Soviets as a result of an intervention in Italy. This attitude of Turkey provoked the discontent of the Allies. However, these states could not afford to drive Turkey away from them. For Britain to lose Turkey would jeopardize its position in the Middle East. For this reason, Britain followed a policy that avoided putting pressure on Turkey. Britain's only expectation of Turkey in this period was that it would maintain its neutrality in a way that would benefit the Allies. The policy followed by Turkey was not far from meeting this expectation. Turkish officials described their country's policy as "non-belligerency" rather than "neutrality" and stated that this position would be maintained unless an attack occurred or a situation arose that required the implementation of the commitments.²⁴

Turkey's stance in this direction continued until the spring of 1941, when German forces reached the country's borders. From the first months of 1941, Germany had its eyes set on the Balkans. In March 1941, Bulgaria joined the Axis. Then in April, Yugoslavia and Greece were occupied by Germany. The Nazis were now on the western borders of Turkey. Considering that Syria was under the control of Vichy France and Iraq was under the control of pro-German officials, German rule was also in question on other borders of Turkey. Great Britain, with which Turkey had a close relationship from the beginning of the war until this period, was in a defensive position on all fronts.²⁵ These developments

²¹ Marquina 1998, pp. 171-172.

²² Bowen 2006, pp. 37-38.

²³ Deringil 1994, p. 119.

²⁴ Aydın 2009, pp. 430-431.

²⁵ Deringil 1994, p. 139.

led to intense German pressure on Turkey. The German demands increased day by day. One was to allow troops and supplies to pass through Turkey's borders. In return, Turkey was offered territory in Western Thrace and the Aegean islands. Despite insistent offers, Turkey did not agree to cooperate on this issue. Another German objective at the time was to act against the Soviets in the near future. The German-Turkish Treaty of Friendship signed on June 18, 1941, served to secure Germany's right wing before the Soviet invasion on June 22.²⁶ In these circumstances, it was inevitable that Turkey would introduce some changes in the policy it had been pursuing since the beginning of the war. Turkey declared its neutrality right after the invasion of the USSR.²⁷ Neutrality was officially declared once again in December, when Japan was also involved in the war.²⁸ At this stage there was no longer any mention of a "non-belligerent" position from the Turkish officials.

At this point, it should be noted that the effect of the Nazi invasion of Soviet territory on Turkey's position in the war was limited in comparison with the effect the same event had on Spain. In this, the position adopted by each Turkey and Spain from the beginning of the war was decisive. After Nazi troops invaded the USSR, Spain sent the Blue Division to the new front of the war to support the German forces and dominated pro-axis propaganda throughout the country. In Turkey, by contrast, although pro-German support gained strength, there was no willingness to join the war. The content of the treaty with Germany also clearly revealed its intention to stay out of the war. The treaty was prepared to protect Turkey against various pressures from both the Allies and the Axis. In the first place, with a note placed at the entrance, Turkey ensured that its territory could not be used against Britain, thus preventing Germany from having a passage through Turkish territory. On the other hand, Turkey promised not to act against Germany and prevented British planes from using Turkish air bases or British warships from passing through the Straits.²⁹

It would also be convenient to compare the attitudes of the Spanish and Turkish press in the new phase of the war. As already mentioned, there was strong Nazi propaganda in Spain until mid-1943. Intense propaganda was carried out in the country, both through bulletins prepared by the German embassy and through the press, which evaluated the events of the war from a pro-Axis perspective. The fact that Germany became a serious threat to Turkey from the beginning of 1941 forced also the Turkish press to adopt a new attitude. The Turkish press, which was close to the Allies from the first days of the war until March 1941, began to adopt an attitude close to Germany after the Nazi armies reached the Turkish border. At the beginning of the war, the probability of being sanctioned was quite high if the media outlets made German propaganda. For example, *Cumhuriyet* was closed for three months because of pro-German articles by Nadir Nadi. This situation changed, especially after the entry of German forces into the USSR. It was seen that positive articles about Nazi Germany increased in the Turkish

²⁶ Armaoğlu 2010, p. 410.

²⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, 23 June 1941.

²⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 10 December 1941.

²⁹ Aydın 2009, pp. 443-445.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

press and this was not interfered with.³⁰ In this process, it is also known that the government was also very sensitive to news that might go against Germany. For example, the publication of a photograph of the Charlie Chaplin film "The Great Dictator" and an anecdote that made fun of Hitler in *Vatan* in December 1942 led to the closure of this newspaper for three months.³¹ *Tan* was the only newspaper openly opposing Nazi Germany in the Turkish press. In this newspaper, controlled by Zekeriya Sertel and Sabiha Sertel, pro-USSR news was prominent. It is known that Sabiha Sertel's articles, which drew attention to what was happening in the German-occupied countries, especially to the Jews, were met with a reaction by the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper at this period.³² Thus, during the period of increased German influence in the war, pro-German Nazi publications were prominent in Turkey, similar to Spain. However, in accordance with government policy, the press in Spain openly supported Nazi Germany from the beginning of the war. In Turkey, on the other hand, a similar situation occurred only in a certain period of time, when the country moved from a "non-belligerent" to a "neutral" position. The "anti-communist" sensibility shared by the regime was the determining factor in the press's approach to Germany in Turkey. For this reason, from the moment it became clear that Germany was not a power that could neutralize the USSR, the number of pro-German publications gradually decreased and the pro-Allied attitude of the beginning of the war came to the fore again.

2.2. Late 1941 and the Changing Course of the War

Both Turkey and Spain continued to revise their positions as conditions changed in the later stages of the war. At the end of 1941 two critical events occurred that would determine the outcome of the war. The first of these was the counterattack by Soviet forces, which were on the defensive against the German invasion, since the beginning of December. At the very least, this proved that Blitzkrieg, which was Germany's war doctrine in WWII and can be summed up as "destroying the enemy with sudden attacks without allowing him to establish a defense," would not work. The second critical event was the United States' participation in the war in the same month. Thus, in the year 1942, a new period was entered in which the USA, USSR and Britain acted together in the war. Under these conditions, it was clear that the balance in terms of military and economic power would be broken against the Axis powers.³³

Contrary to expectations, these developments did not initially lead to a change in Spanish policy. Hitler's moves continued to be received with enthusiasm in the Falangist newspapers. At that time, the Spanish media, in which Nazi propaganda was still very present, focused on legitimizing Germany's struggle.³⁴ Meanwhile, Spanish leaders did not hesitate to openly affirm their pro-Axis stance. An important indication of this was that Foreign Minister S  ner sent a congratulatory message to the Japanese embassy the

³⁰  elik 2018, pp. 324-325.

³¹ Ko ak 1986, p. 188.

³² Vural 2008, p. 386.

³³ Kennedy 1988, p. 343.

³⁴ Bowen 2006, p. 47.

day after the attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7. When Franco initiated the sale of wolfram to Germany in January 1942, he was also indicating that the status quo would continue. However, it cannot be said that the will in the indicated direction lasted for a long time. The introduction of some demands by the US against Spain and the increasing economic sanctions in the spring of 1942 forced Franco to reconsider his relations with the Axis powers after a while. Demands and growing US pressure for neutrality weakened Spain's belief in Axis victory.³⁵ In this new situation, it was not possible for Franco to maintain his "non-belligerent" status for a long time, which allowed for close relations with Germany and Italy. Soon, Spain began to move towards "neutrality" again.

At that time, the decisive factor for Franco's regime to return to its position at the beginning of the war was the progressive expansion of the Allies' sphere of influence. "Operation Torch" carried out by British and US forces on 8 November 1942 was one of the critical developments in this direction. As a result of the operation, Algeria and Morocco, which were in the hands of Vichy France, were captured by the Allies. Also, with this development, considering the territory of Gibraltar, the Iberian Peninsula became one of the regions where Allied troops settled.³⁶ It became necessary to watch out for a possible Allied victory and Spain slowly adapted itself to the new conditions. However, at the rhetorical level, support for the Axis was not abandoned. In a speech delivered in December 1942, Franco harshly criticized both liberalism and Bolshevism and glorified fascism. This speech, delivered while the Blue Division was still fighting on the Eastern Front, also emphasized the belief that the victors of the war would be the Axis powers.³⁷ Although Franco continued to maintain an anti-allied discourse, in 1943 the events that accelerated the opening of the distance between the Axis powers and Spain were more frequent. The Axis forces surrendered to the USSR troops in Stalingrad in February 1943. In the spring of that same year, North Africa was completely cleared of military units belonging to the Axis powers. Although Spain continued to sign secret protocols with Germany during this period, this significantly limited its political relations with Germany. The invasion of Italy by the Allies in July and the fall of Mussolini was another event that further weakened the Axis alliance.³⁸ These events made even the Falangists in Spain seriously concerned about the future of the war. It was the rapid collapse of the Fascist Party after Mussolini's overthrow in Italy that bothered the Falange the most. Meanwhile, the Spanish press, which was under the control of the regime, put aside Nazi propaganda and began to report on the war in a more balanced tone.³⁹ Franco, for his part, revised his foreign policy in the new emerging conditions and moved closer to neutrality. As a result, the regime was able to implement some practices that it would have avoided when the Axis powers were strong. For example, hundreds of French refugees, including many officers, were allowed to pass through Spanish territory to Allied territories in North Africa. It was also during this period that the secret services of

³⁵ Bowen 2006, pp. 47-48.

³⁶ Pike 2008, p. 84.

³⁷ Pike 2008, pp. 87-88.

³⁸ Leitz 2002, p.143.

³⁹ Bowen 2006, p. 52.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

the allied powers received approval to operate in Spain. Finally, Franco announced in his speech of October 1, 1943 that Spain was once again following the policy of neutrality.⁴⁰

When the course of the war turned in favour of the Allies in 1942, Turkey also reconsidered its policy. It was clear that Turkey had significantly improved its relations with Germany from the beginning of 1941 to the end of 1942 within the framework of the balance policy it had pursued since the beginning of the war. For example, Turkish-German economic relations had revitalised from 1941 onwards.⁴¹ However, by the end of 1942, the Axis powers were retreating on all fronts. In the following months, British victories in North Africa against German forces and Russian victories at Stalingrad led to increased pressure on Turkey.⁴² On the Allied agenda was the opening of a second front in Europe and the inclusion of Turkey in the war. In the spring of 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that Turkey's position in the war had to be changed. As to how to persuade Turkey to join the war, Churchill suggested putting military aid at the forefront, while Stalin did not oppose this proposal, but argued that resorting to the hard line should also be on the agenda.⁴³

Under the new conditions, Turkey again limited its relations with Germany and engaged in rapprochement with the Allies as at the beginning of the war. It was at the three conferences in early and late 1943 that efforts to draw Turkey into the war became most visible. However, the Turkish authorities, after the Adana Conference and the Cairo conferences, managed to gain time in this critical period of the war by making difficult demands on the Allied states. During the Adana Conference, which took place between 30 January and 1 February, Churchill asked İnönü to include his country in the war on the Allied side before the end of 1943. According to the British Prime Minister, with Turkey's support, Germany could have been neutralised before a new offensive was launched. İnönü, for his part, asked primarily for Churchill's military support in this matter. It was imperative to strengthen Turkey's armed forces in order to achieve what was expected of the country. İnönü also expressed his concern for the Soviet Union during the talks. Consequently, a defeat of Germany would have revealed a serious Soviet threat to Turkey this time. The Adana Conference did not strengthen relations between Turkey and Britain, and Allied pressure on Turkey increased in the following months. At the first of the Cairo conferences, which took place as the end of the year approached, British Foreign Secretary Eden and Turkish Foreign Minister Menemencioglu met. During the negotiations held on 5-6 November 1943, Eden tried to convince Menemencioglu that the Soviet Union had no expansion plans. Eden also requested a base from Turkey during the meeting. Turkey's response to Britain's demands and efforts regarding the Soviets was negative. In a note to the British Embassy, it was reported that the request for a base was rejected on the grounds that it would inevitably lead Turkey into war with Germany. At the second Cairo Conference, held on 4-8 December 1943, İnönü met this time with Roosevelt and Churchill. Although İnönü agreed to participate in the war "in principle"

⁴⁰ Marquina 1998, p. 181.

⁴¹ VanderLippe 2001, p. 66.

⁴² Deringil 1994, p. 188.

⁴³ Koçak 1986, pp. 259-260.

in the face of increasing pressure from the leaders of the Allied states, no date was set in this regard.⁴⁴ When he returned to Turkey after the summit, it was decided that no clear steps would be taken in the war until the military talks in Ankara in February 1944. A few days later, Britain was notified of a very comprehensive list, which was said to be necessary for Turkey's defence.⁴⁵ The Turkish authorities successfully used delaying tactics during this critical period of the war by making demands that were difficult to meet.

As mentioned earlier in the study, Spain had held talks with Hitler in Hendaye, similar to those in Adana and Cairo,⁴⁶ where the insistence on incorporating Turkey into the war became much more visible. Negotiations of Turkey and Spain with two different wartime blocs had serious similarities, especially given the lists of demands that could not be easily met. However, given the policy that Spain followed throughout the war, it is possible to argue that Franco's demands were part of a plan to enter the war on the most advantageous terms and with the highest yield. In the case of Turkey, the detailed lists of requirements, which came to annoy the Allied powers, especially the United Kingdom, served mainly as excuses to stay out of the war. The Turkish authorities demanded more from the Allies at every meeting, and also kept the threat of the USSR on the agenda despite suggestions to the contrary. Thus, a serious difference emerges between Turkey, which managed to stay out of the war until the end of the war, and Spain, which arguably participated directly in the war by supporting Nazi forces during Germany's attack on the USSR, in terms of the nature of negotiations with nearby forces.

2.3. The Final Stages of the War

As the outcome of the war became clearer in 1944, both Turkey and Spain began to take sharper steps to adapt their policies to the changed circumstances. However, the positions taken before and at the beginning of the war determined the limits of new actions for both states in the final stages of the war.

In 1944, taking into account the transforming course of the war, Turkey tried to establish much closer relations with the Allied powers than before. In this period, in which alliance ties replaced the emphasis on neutrality in official statements, the press also adopted a position appropriate to the new foreign policy.⁴⁷ At the same period, the Allied powers' pressure on Turkey became even more severe. The Allies were particularly uncomfortable with Turkey's sales of raw materials to Germany. On April 14, 1944, the United Kingdom and the United States formally requested the Turkish government to stop shipping chrome to Germany. If this demand was not met, an economic embargo would be imposed on Turkey. Despite the negative effects it would have on its economy, Turkey agreed to stop the shipment of chromium as of April 21.⁴⁸ This decision showed that an even more distant stance would be taken against Germany, which was clearly losing the

⁴⁴ Aydın 2009, pp. 451-462.

⁴⁵ Deringil 1994, pp. 233-235.

⁴⁶ This similarity was also pointed out by Kaya. Kaya 2019, p. 64.

⁴⁷ Koçak 1986, pp. 308-310.

⁴⁸ Koçak 1986, pp. 306-308.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

war. Considering that even Spain, which followed a policy close to Germany throughout the war, began to follow a policy of neutrality from the autumn of 1943, it was quite understandable that Turkey would strive to return to a position close to the Allies, as it was at the beginning of the war.

At that time, the similarity of the political transformation between Turkey and Spain was quite evident in the sale of raw materials to Germany. The Franco regime had to sign a detailed agreement, which included the cessation of mineral exports to the Axis powers, on May 2, 1944, shortly after Turkey stopped selling chrome to Germany. Thus, both states were under intense Allied pressure from the later stages of the war. However, there is also the fact that, although Turkey stopped its chrome shipments shortly after negotiations with the Allies, Spain continued to sell tungsten to Germany for a long time. Moreover, this was with the knowledge of the Allied states. Although the Allied powers exerted intense pressure on both Spain and Turkey as the end of the war approached, the positions taken by both states at the beginning and in the later stages of the war were also decisive in the limits of the decisions they took in the final phase of the war. Consequently, since Turkey was in a position close to the Allies at the beginning of the war, the expectations of the states of this bloc towards Turkey were also quite high during the war. The Allies attempted to draw Turkey into the war for much of the period. Spain, for its part, remained close to the Axis powers until the last stages of the war.

By the fall of 1944, the conditions that had allowed the Franco regime to be flexible for most of the war had largely disappeared. Following the success of the Normandy landings, Franco accepted that Germany's defeat was inevitable.⁴⁹ It was also seen that the leader of Spain, after a while, began to deny the relations his country had established during the war. In a statement to the international press in November, Franco claimed that Spain was not a fascist or a Nazi at any time during the war, nor did it make any secret or other agreements with the Axis powers.⁵⁰ However, these efforts would not prevent the isolation that Spain would face after the Second World War. Also influential on the isolation was Spain's failure to respond to the Allies' call to declare war on the neutral countries in the final days of the war. While many states, mostly from outside the European continent, including those that sided with the Axis powers in the war, declared war on Germany and Japan in February 1945 to be among the founding members of the United Nations (UN), Spain stood aside. The rhetoric of neutrality in the last months of the war was not enough to restore Spain's image. As a result, when the Allies met in Potsdam in July, Spain was the only state among the neutrals in Europe that was not invited to the creation of the UN.⁵¹

The Turkish authorities managed to take a more successful stance in line with the new situation. First, on January 3, 1945, relations with Japan were terminated in accordance with the demands of the United States, Britain and the USSR. In doing so, it was emphasized that this decision was a continuation of the decision to sever relations with Germany and did not signify a declaration of war. However, the expectations of the

⁴⁹ Payne 2008, p. 253.

⁵⁰ Pike 2008, p. 109.

⁵¹ Bowen 2006, p. 59.

Allies from both Turkey and neutral states were more. At the Yalta Conference in February, Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill decided that states which did not declare war on Germany and Japan until March should not be among the founding members of the UN. This development was followed by the note given by the U.S. and the U.K. on the issue.⁵² Finally, Turkey declared war on Germany and Japan very shortly before the end of the war. This step, which Turkey took to ensure its security in the postwar order, constituted another notable difference between it and Spain. While Turkey took its place among the founding members of the UN at the San Francisco Conference held on April 26, 1945 with the decision to declare war, German intelligence agents could still continue their activities in Spain.⁵³ Although Franco's regime distanced itself from Germany at the end of the war, especially due to the economic threats from the Allies, it saw its future in a world in which Hitler's Germany continued to exist. For this reason, it was deemed necessary to remain Germany's last friend among the neutral states for years to come.⁵⁴ Turkey, for its part, made its choice in favor of the Western world, especially in view of the threat of the USSR, and also in line with the goal of Westernization of the Republic. Thus, at the end of the war, both Spain and Turkey were more or less in the same position as at the beginning of the war.

3. The "Degrees" of Non-Belligerency

As stated earlier in the study, a non-belligerent state, although not involved in the war, has the opportunity to maintain commercial relations with the belligerents and to supply them with several items, including war materials. For a significant part of the war, both Turkey and Spain continued to sell critical raw materials to the warring parties. The difference between the two countries in terms of raw material sales was mainly reflected in the fact that Spain continued to sell raw materials to Germany at the end of the war. However, the most important difference that will be emphasized in this part of the study is that Spain was in a position where one could even argue that it was in a "belligerent" position at certain stages when the Axis was strengthened in the war, while Turkey, despite intense Allied pressure, was constantly trying to stay out of the war with various maneuvers. Turkey took the same stance in the face of German pressure, despite the territorial offers.

It can be argued that, the Franco regime demonstrated its intention to gain territory by exploiting the opportunities created by the war in the early stages of the war. One of the most important events of the first year of the war was the German invasion of France. After the invasion in May 1940, Spain's position became even more critical. Already in June, Franco began to plan the seizure of a part of France's lands in North Africa with some negotiations to be made with Germany.⁵⁵ The clearest indication that Spain could become involved in the war under favourable conditions came around a year later. In the summer of 1941, a new phase began in the Second World War. When Hitler lost interest

⁵² Koçak 1986, pp. 322-323.

⁵³ Payne 2008, p. 260.

⁵⁴ Payne 2008, p. 236.

⁵⁵ Bowen 2006, p. 27.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

in the Mediterranean and turned his attention to the newly opened Eastern Front, Franco's critical move made Spain's support for the Axis even more evident. This move was the preparation of a "Blue Division" to support Germany on the Eastern Front.⁵⁶ Spanish volunteers were offered to fight on the Eastern Front under German command in the framework of the Blue Division plan. The plan was prepared by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and adopted by Franco, and presented to Germany immediately after the Nazi invasion of the USSR on June 22. This offer was immediately accepted by the Nazi leadership. Subsequently, a volunteer group of eighteen thousand people, including Falangists, university students, soldiers and many people from different professions, was quickly assembled and sent to Russia. The Blue Division was a union that would allow a reckoning with the USSR from the Spanish Civil War, especially in the eyes of the Falangists.⁵⁷ The dispatch of the Blue Division to Soviet lands made a declaration of war by Spain unnecessary since Spain and the USSR were at war since the beginning of the Civil War on July 18, 1936.⁵⁸ This movement of the Franco regime in this phase of the war was due to the decrease in the strategic importance of Spain with the opening of the Eastern Front. Germany's attack on the Soviet Union was enthusiastically welcomed by the Spanish ruling classes. Falangists, monarchists, Carlists and Catholics, who had major conflicts of interest, united under the umbrella of anti-communism. Although this situation put pressure on the regime to participate in the war, economic dependence on Britain once again prevented a decision on the issue.⁵⁹ In the new conditions, Spain did not hesitate to position itself openly alongside Germany on the new front of the war in order not to lose the opportunity to obtain a share of the possible gains of the Axis powers.

At this time, Turkey also moved from non-belligerency to neutrality and improved its relations with Germany. At a time when it seemed likely that the Axis would win the war, the German threat reaching the borders strengthened the pro-German discourse in domestic public opinion. However, it was observed that Turkish authorities maintained a cautious attitude on these dates. Especially after the German armies crossed the Soviet border on 22 June, Nazi Germany continuously tried to draw Turkey into the war on its side. The invasion of Iran by Britain and the USSR on August 25 was seen as an opportunity for the Germans to distance Turkey from the Allies, and it was proposed to Turkey to unilaterally cancel the Montreux Treaty and prohibit the passage of all ships, including merchants, through the Strait. Germany's objective in this case was to prevent Britain, which could carry merchant ships from the Strait to the Black Sea, according to the treaty. However, Turkey did not take into account the recommendations of Germany and the Turkish Government was in favor of a peace of reconciliation.⁶⁰

With the withdrawal of German forces from November 1942 onwards, efforts to bring Turkey into the war again began to come from the Allied forces, rather than from Germany. On the other hand, it can be said that Turkey did not compromise its policy of

⁵⁶ León 2005, p. 116.

⁵⁷ Bowen 2006, pp. 41-42.

⁵⁸ Pike 2008, p. 59.

⁵⁹ Bowen 2006, p. 40.

⁶⁰ Koçak 1986, pp. 175-177.

neutrality at the end of 1942, as it had done from the beginning of the war until the beginning of 1941, when German superiority began to make itself felt. The basic understanding in relations with Germany was to avoid German pressure by using ongoing relations with the Allies as a balancing factor and to buy time to stay out of the war. Although 1941-43 was a period when German influence over Turkey was greater than that of Britain and the USSR, it was seen that Turkey was making a serious effort not to disturb the balance.⁶¹ As mentioned before, the Adana Conference was one of the most concrete examples of this attitude. At the conference, Turkish military representatives drew up a list of military requirements, later to be known as the "Adana List", and it was decided that Turkey's land, air and naval war material needs would be met by the Allied powers. However, despite all this, Turkey did not accept Britain's request for bases. According to Turkish officials, giving bases to Britain would have meant getting involved in the war.⁶² In 1943, Turkey, with the support of the United States, also succeeded in obtaining military aid of about 80 million dollars from the United Kingdom.⁶³ Turkey's continued non-participation in the war, despite increased arms aid, was a clear indication that the Turkish authorities had a strong will to stay out of the war.

While this was the case for Turkey, although the relations were weaker compared to the previous period, there were no signs that Franco had completely severed his ties with the Axis powers. The Blue Division in the service of Germany had still not been completely withdrawn. The continuing relations with the Axis powers made Allied pressure on Spain even greater in 1944. Threats that oil and food shipments would be stopped if exports of tungsten to Germany were not cut off accompanied the economic pressure on the country during this period. Franco could no longer withstand this pressure and had to sign an agreement on May 2, 1944, in which he accepted all the conditions demanded by the Allied states. According to the agreement, the existing agreements for the export of minerals would be cancelled, the Italian ships still in Spanish ports would be allowed to leave, the service personnel of the Axis powers in Spain would be expelled from the country and the German consulate in Tangier would be closed. With the agreement, Franco accepted the dissolution of the last remaining units of the Blue Division.⁶⁴ However, in line with his "sinuous policy" throughout the war, Franco avoided fully implementing the agreement. Spain violated the principles of the agreement, especially with regard to the export of minerals. In this way, Germany's tungsten needs continued to be met by the Franco regime. This was also the last major support given by the regime to the Nazis in the war.⁶⁵

Conclusion

During the Second World War there were many states that did not participate in the war. In studies of war, these states have usually been treated as "neutral". Very few

⁶¹ Koçak 1986, pp. 180-181.

⁶² Öztoprak 1999, p. 611.

⁶³ Öztoprak 1999, p. 618.

⁶⁴ León 2005, p. 122.

⁶⁵ Payne 2008, p. 249.

Different Manifestations of Neutrality: The Foreign Policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War

of these studies have focused on the differences between neutral states. In some of these limited examples, Turkey was not included. Moreover, Turkey has not been the subject of detailed bilateral comparison on neutrality and non-belligerency issues. This study has taken into account the aforementioned deficiency in the studies on the subject and examined the differences between the policies of Spain and Turkey during the Second World War. As a result of the examination of the motivations of both countries for not participating in the war, it seems possible to highlight three main differences.

First, the ideological position of the two countries was decisive in the relations they established before and during the war. With the aim of establishing a corporatist order and emphasizing the Catholic-nationalist emphasis during the Civil War, Franco's forces received strong support from Germany and Italy between the years 1936-1939, when the war in Spain was in progress. When the Francoists brought Spain back under the rule of the traditional oligarchy at the end of the Civil War, they adopted a position close to the two main fascist states of Europe. As for Turkey, a position close to the Western democracies was followed in the process leading up to the Second World War, in accordance with the objective of Westernization pursued since the early years of the Republic. This position, which became increasingly visible before the war, became completely clear with the alliance agreement signed with Britain and France on October 19, 1939. At the same time, the opposition to communism constituted the common points of Spain and Turkey at the ideological level that stood out during the war

The second major difference in the policy pursued by Spain and Turkey during the Second World War is seen in their reactions to critical events of the war. These events caused both states to experience ebbs and flows between "neutrality" and "non-belligerency" in the war. As a result of this situation, shaped by ideological positions and established relations with the blocs as noted in the previous paragraph, Spain entered the war years declaring its neutrality, although without hiding its closeness to the Axis powers. Franco's regime changed its position from neutral to non-belligerent when Italy entered the war in June 1940. After the defeat of German forces in the USSR, which its own troops also supported on the ground, Spain moved closer to its position early in the war and finally declared its neutrality again on October 1, 1943. At the end of the war, Spain avoided declaring war on Germany and Japan, and in a sense paved the way for the isolation it would face after 1945. Turkey, on the other hand, acted in a non-belligerent position in the first period of the war. Although Italy's entry into the war had a serious impact on Turkey, that position was maintained in this period. Turkey's transition to neutrality took place after Germany's invasion of the USSR. While, subsequently, the end of Germany's superiority in the war and the transfer of control to the Allies brought Spain to neutrality, Turkey resumed its non-belligerent position of the first period of the war. At the end of the war, while the call of the Allied forces to declare war over the founding membership of the UN found no response in Spain, Turkey, which aspired to Westernization, did not hesitate to declare war on Germany and Japan.

The third fundamental difference in the policies followed by Spain and Turkey in the Second World War is the degree of their sensitivity towards non-participation in the war. As stated in the study, Spain, at a critical stage of the war, formed a unit under the name of the Blue Division and placed this military force under the command of the

German army, explaining this move to the Allied states as "the continuation of their war with the USSR". Thus, Spain actively participated in the war for some time. In addition, in June 1940, when Spain abandoned the policy of neutrality it had declared at the beginning of the war, the regime entered into negotiations with Germany to acquire France's land in North Africa. The Franco regime repeated these negotiations from time to time until the dates when it would necessarily return to neutrality. It seems very likely that Spain would leave its position and join the Axis bloc if it had a power that could offer strong military support to the states of Germany and Italy. On the other hand, the Turkish authorities managed to continue their efforts to stay out of the war in the face of mounting Allied pressure, especially in the later stages of the war, with various political maneuvers. The war declared against Germany and Japan at the end of the war had no meaning other than symbolic.

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