A NEW FORM OF SECURITY COOPERATION AND COLLECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN THE POST COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

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—Abstract—

International security environment changed completely after the Cold War. During the Cold War years security challenges were shaped by competitive power relations between Soviet Union and the United States. On the other hand after the end of the Cold War, global security was redefined and wide range of security challenges and threats occurred. After fragmentation of security threats, new threats emerged such as terrorist attacks, massacres which are made by humans own governments, chronic politic instabilities, environmental degradations etc. Under these circumstances new forms of security cooperation became more vital in order to cope with these complex challenges. In this respect third parties became an actor to manage conflicts, security challenges and crises. Unlike traditional nation-state intervention, regional organizations, international agencies and non-governmental organizations became more active in conflict management process. In this framework this study will evaluate performance and the effectiveness of the main actors in the collective conflict management (CCM) process.

Key Words: conflict management, international organizations, NATO, UN, EU, comprehensive approach, security.

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1. INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold War third parties (regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations) became an actor to manage conflicts. As historical pattern, United Nations became more active in managing crises in the post-Cold War period. After the Gulf War, UN was a major actor in collective conflict management. However the troublesome UN operations in Bosnia, Crotia, Somalia and Rwanda showed the ineffectiveness of UN in
collective management. On the other hand NATO and EU became important partners of UN in order to cope with international crises. Especially operations like Kosovo and Macedonia indicated increasing roles of third parties in other people conflicts. European Union also became an important partner of UN and NATO in civil and military operations. EU managed nearly 22 military and civil operations since 1999 with NATO and UN such as operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Chad, Indonesia etc.

However, like UN operations these operations were strongly criticised by NGO’s because of their ineffectiveness. Generally there was an upturn in armed conflicts. Because financing, sending military personnel and planning operations are not easy tasks for institutions when they are trying to act together. Multiactor operations requires more cooperation, coordination, consultation and integration. Meanwhile in the War of Iraq and Afghanistan, UN and other institutions were pushed aside and there was a great rift in the EU. This kind of power politics prevented a comprehensive solution. Rehabilitation and restructuring activities also became problematic after operations. In this framework to overcome military crises and achieve a success in military operations, a global approach and an empowered partnership is necessary.

In conclusion this paper provides an evaluation for the evolution of military crises management and military operations after the Cold War. Roles of international organizations will be analysed and effectiveness of operations will be interrogated. On the other hand future directions and forms of collective crises management will be discussed.

2. THE TERM OF COLLECTIVE CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

In order to analyse difficulties, necessities and benefits of collective conflict management first of all we should understand how it works, what are the obstacles and benefits of conducting these operations.

Collective crises management (CCM) is a new term. CCM was broadened and developed in the late 1990s by the late Joseph Lepgold, Thomas G. Weiss and Paul F. Diehl to describe an emerging type of interstate and intergovernmental collaboration between NATO and the United Nations on peacekeeping operations. Weiss and Lepgold described “CCM as a pattern of group action, usually but not necessarily sanctioned by a global or regional body, in anticipation of or in response to the outbreak of intra or interstate armed conflict. CCM includes any systemic effort to prevent suppress or reverse a breaches of the peace where states are acting beyond the scope of specific alliance commitments, the traditional
means of international security cooperation.” (Lepgold, Weiss, 1998:5-6) Weiss and Legapold also described differences of CCM from collective security. According to their description CCM is more flexible form of collective security. Instead of pursuing individual interests states coordinate policies when international order breaks down or peace in danger. In CCM military forces are part of collective action and operations based on common norms, obligations and understandings.

3. DIFFICULTIES OF MANAGING CONFLICTS COLLECTIVELY

Today’s security threats changed and non-traditional threats occurred such as organized crime, terrorism, arms trading, human rights abuses etc. In order to cope with these new challenges actors of CCM broadened. Regional organizations, international organizations, NGO’s, professional bodies and task-specific international agencies became part of crises management process. (Crocker, Hampson, Aall, 2011:40) On the other hand increasing number of participants required more coordination, coherence, and integration because there are acute difficulties in managing crises together.

The lack of empowerment is the first problem. There is no legal personality such as sovereign state to control and coordinate operations. Moreover sometimes managing operations serves national interests rather than common will. The other thing is inequality of reactions. For example it is not possible to compare international response to ISAF Afghanistan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. USA with the other countries deployed nearly 100,000 troops in Afghanistan on the other hand only 20,000 troops were deployed in Congo. (Tanner, 2010:211)

The other problem is in some cases using military power is evaluated as antithetical. On the other hand some scholars claim that the use of force is a necessary tool for establishing normative goals. For example, in order to stabilise Western Balkans USA used military forces. The Kosovo intervention was supported by NATO members and especially UK and France tried to persuade USA for ground operation. The use of force was accepted as a tool of normative power in this kind of operations. However in some cases military power is accepted as the antithesis of normative power so it is the matter that how legacy of military operations attained. Simon Duke asked in his article “What happens when there is a norm that clearly favours intervention on humanitarian grounds when it is set against a competing norm that rejects the use of force without UN Security Council authorisation?” (Duke, 2010:319)
In addition to these difficulties the other basic problem is capability. Crisis management requires capabilities. The funding of military operations is the big problem for international organizations. For example two decades after the end of the Cold War, European armed forces still own 10,000 main battle tanks and 2,500 combat aircraft. So European Union still have capacity problem especially chronic shortage of airlift and shortage of trainers as we see bad examples in military operations in Chad and Afghanistan. In order to increase their military capabilities EU and NATO make new regulations. The new Treaty of Lisbon that was signed by the member states in 2007 introduced important institutional reforms for the EU. At the same time it created essential principles, new mechanisms and institutions such as solidarity, permanent structured cooperation and European Defence Agency. On the other hand NATO also adopted the Lisbon Capability Package for fixing the funding for a number of multinational projects. (Biscop, 2011:4)

One of the most important difficulties of the CCM is the dysfunctional structure of international organizations. Although after the Cold War international organizations became the basic actors of the CCM process, we witnessed failure of their operations so reform and innovations are necessary to manage conflicts successfully. It is not easy to reform and change whole structures so one option for more effective management is the increasing collaboration between organizations by this way they can act more systematic. For example division of labour between organizations can be option. New forms of specialisation for managing crises would necessitate coordination and coherence among actors.

4. COORDINATION AND COHERENCE AMONG INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

4.1. NATO and EU

First we concentrate on the future cooperation possibilities between NATO and EU. The NATO and the EU are two major players in the post-Cold War crises management system. However the effective EU-NATO cooperation is obstructed by different factors such as imbalances between capabilities, differences of politic strategies and quarrels between members.

The first debate is about roles of the EU and NATO. The basic discussion is about will they complement or compete in the future. Because with the Lisbon Treaty Regulations, EU decided not only be a soft power any more. After the Cold War both NATO and EU have changed and they moved beyond their traditional roles. NATO became to play more global role. By its enlargement process NATO
started to dialogue and engaged in closer cooperation and security dialogue with a large number of countries. Instead of collective defence and deterrence NATO must deal with new challenges so it tried to transform its capabilities and structures. (Koenig, 2010:6) Washington Summit was a turning point for transformation of NATO. Common Joint Task Force was created and in Prague Summit NATO Response Force was shaped. (NRF) will be a coherent, high readiness, joint, multinational force package, technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable.) On the other hand with Lisbon regulations EU tried to increase its military capabilities.

Thus roles of NATO and EU have changed. So there will be dispute about the possibility of division of labour between two organizations. Although these reform efforts we continued to witness failure of these organizations in managing international crises.

_The Case of Afghanistan:_ One of the basic problem of the NATO is the lack of civilian capacity in the alliance therefore NATO strategic concept that was accepted in Lisbon notes that comprehensive approach. The comprehensive approach of strategic concept integrates political, civilian and military components. Comprehensive approach emphasizes the need for actors involved in a stabilization mission to work together, from planning to implementation (Williams, 2011:65-66). A shared understanding and collaboration is necessary to cope with complex stabilisation process. This concept is also compatible with the logic of the new collective conflict management system.

Although this new comprehensive approach became important there are still practical problems occurred in the conflict management. Formulation of the strategy is the basic problem because there is a mismatch between ends, ways and means.

First of all comprehensive approach was criticised by non-governmental organizations. According to the ideas of NGO’s humanitarian activities which planned as a part of comprehensive approach was militarizes assistance and they emphasized that they don’t want to be part of military operation. The other basic problem is working with the civilian organizations is difficult task for NATO because members of NATO are not capable enough about the funding, civilian capacity and ext. On the other hand all member countries accepted comprehensive approach at the Bucharest Summit but North European and North American allies gave much more importance to the implementation of this concept. (Williams, 2011:70)
Moreover, the operation had difficulties about the dissonance between resources and aims. ISAF, in partnership with the Afghan Government, tried to support improved governance and development in order to protect the Afghan people and provide a secure environment for sustainable stability. The main aim of this operation is to take the support of government of Afghanistan and this give operation more legacy. Britain and USA believed that Operation Moshtarak will be successful with the government support but the performance of security forces and government was disappointment for them. The operation and COMISAF strategy was evaluated as a failure. (Johnson, 2011:384). For example, there was a conflict between USA counter insurgency strategy (COIN) and ISAF. According to the USA COIN strategy the combined ISAF and Afghan security forces would need to number between 568,000 and 710,000. On the other hand the total number of coalition security forces in Afghanistan to 396,000. (Johnson, 2011:390). This number does not overlap with expectations so we can conclude that there is a mismatch between resources and aims of the operation.

NATO has its own difficulties about the implementation of comprehensive approach and it was fiercely criticised by NGO’s but the other fundamental problem is relations with the other organizations such as EU. NATO’s 2010 Security Concept established “cooperative security.” Under this broad definition, cooperation and partnership activities are re-introduced as Alliance tasks. The importance of collaboration in the crises management process also increased. As the performance of the NATO, EU civilian mission was criticised in Afghanistan. The EU has launched a three-year civilian ESDP mission in mid-June 2007. The mission of EU is the training police force and stabilising the country. On the other hand it is important for the EU in order to prove itself about its capability to conduct civilian aspect of the military operation. In this context Afghanistan is a test for the future of transatlantic relations and for the EU’s credibility as a global security actor.

However the EU reluctance about the sending troops and inability to remove national restrictions on their deployment caused another problem. For example, “EU Member states, at NATO’s 60th Anniversary Summit on 3–4 April 2009, committed 5000 new troops to the 26 000 already in place, but 3000 of them would be deployed only temporarily to provide security for the August 2009 elections”. (Blockmans, Wessel, 2009:16)

EU has more expertise and experience in the civilian aspect of conflict management. In the areas such as the police and judicial training, reform, strengthening Afghanistan’s governance and struggling narcotics EU could play
more effective role. EUPOL is one of the important contribution area. Although 19 EU members plus Canada, Norway, Crotia and New Zealand contribute to the mission the capability of police force was very poor to leave Kabul and help provinces. On the other hand sending experts for training is other problem for EU countries. 400 experts were sent for training 16.000 Afghan personnel. These ineffectiveness harm EU credibility and capacity.

In this framework it is possible to conclude that although comprehensive approach, cooperative security efforts and collaboration experiments between NATO and EU there are still important disputes, complexities of concepts and dysfunctional collaboration in the crises management process. Some scholars argued that division of labour is necessary between two organizations “meaning that NATO would focus on the military aspects of crisis management operations whereas the EU would be in charge of the civilian aspects of operations”. But this kind of division would disturb some members of EU like France. Because they believe that the EU would lose its autonomy of decision in comprehensive interventions and that NATO's leadership would degrade the CSDP's role to the one of a "junior partner". (Koening, 2011:17)

In this context in order to achieve more effective cooperation roles of NATO and EU must be defined clearly. Although EU is more capable about the civilian aspects of the crises management it tries to be more active in military aspects so in the future cooperation there will be more disputes about this subject.

4.2. EU AND UN

The EU-UN in conflict management has not been the focus of much attention such as NATO-EU cooperation. However the role of the UN was determined by the European Security Strategy as a “key partner”. But two organizations are very different in terms of objectives, means and institutional procedures so their cooperation was found unsatisfying. CCM requires increased cooperation and coordination between different organizations but different organization means different tasks and aims so providing the consonance is not easy. For example regional Africa is important for UN in order to attain stabilisation and peace. On the other hand EU is reluctant about the commitment in regional Africa. Especially deep disputes occur between members such as the reluctance of Germany about the Chad operation.

Like EU-NATO civilian& military aspects cooperation, EU-UN cooperation established on the basis of legitimacy& military capability-financial funding principles. While EU is providing military personnel and funding for the UN, the
legitimacy of UN is crucial for some EU members in order to join military deployments.

In this framework two organizations institutionalize their cooperation and in 2001 they established platform for intensified cooperation. In January 2003 the institutionalization process was formalized. As a result of enhanced cooperation, two organizations worked together in Bosnia-Herzegovina and DR Congo. This cooperation relieved the UN. After Artemis operation the UN and EU signed joint declaration on EU-UN cooperation in crises management. In 2004 and in 2007 Joint Declaration and Joint Statement reaffirmed determination of both sides about cooperation on the other hand in reality these declarations could not establish an effective mechanism. (Major, 2008:10) The aim of being more autonomous power and deciding engaging military force independently shows that EU will not engage in UN operations automatically so differences between aims and needs between two sides limits the possibility of cooperation.

The Case Of Congo: UN requested EU help for MONUC operation because since the beginning of the operation the UN had to face serious challenges. Both external and internal problems created difficulties for operation such as lack of financial and human resources and weak commitment of the various groups involved in the Cease fire Agreement. The basic problem is inability of MONUC soldiers to stop the violence and protect the civilians in Bunia. In this context UN requested EU help and EU established operation Artemis. Although EU acted rapidly to decide to establish mission and there was a general consensus about the Artemis, still the operation was criticised because it was limited a very small area of the DRC. On the other hand the lack of information between the UN and the EU, the forceful behaviour of EU soldiers and the doubts of UN officials about EU capabilities caused confidence problem between population and soldiers. “In the Artemis operation EU and UN worked as complementary way, EU focus the implementation of the integrated police unit (IPU) in the capital city, MONUC worked for a country wide but there was a lack of communication”. (Morsust, 2009:268) Division of labour could not be provided because of this gap. Like Afghanistan case, in the Congo operation, cooperation was more pragmatic rather than institutionalized approach.

5. CONCLUSION
The current strategy about the collective conflict management is comprehensive approach. This comprehensive approach can be achieved through coherence, coordination and collaboration between international organizations. Joint strategy,
joint responsibility and joint determination are necessary to manage conflicts more effectively. International organizations emphasized the importance of these factors in the joint declarations or strategy paper like European Security Strategy but in reality there are disputes about coordination, division of labour, lack of coordination, capability and communication. Instead of real reforms or building more strengthened structure international organizations find short-term solutions but more institutionalized approach is necessary for future operations. On the other hand NGO s are the other important part of CCM process but in some case NGO s have been reluctant to engage with international organizations especially with military units.

In conclusion in order to attain more effective CCM system all main actors have to enhance common approach. Increasing capability, providing coordination and restructuring communication channels between actors are the basic instruments for a solid cooperation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


