sal etkiye yol açamaz. Etkinin kalıcılığı ne bu ticari yapımın yapımcıları tarafından (hedeflenmekte) ne de 2014 yılının seyircileri tarafından beklenmektedir. Çünkü bu yapımın salt temel dayanağı olan bugünün CGI tekniklerinin, bu yüzden de filmin kendisinin bir süre sonra modası geçecektir. Bu savın sağlaması için on yıl önce çekilen benzer filmlere bakmak yeterlidir. Yani gelecekte yeni San Pietro'lara talep doğacak ve bu talep hiç kuşkusuz karşılanacaktır.

Bugüne dek birçok kuramcı Kantgil yüce kuramındaki "doğal" olanın geleneksel alanını genişletmenin ve klasik modeli çağdaş kültürel fenomenlere uygulamanın yollarını aramışlardır. Her şeye rağmen Kantgil yüce kavramının vasat bir eğlence filmine uygulanmasını reddedenlere yapabileceğimiz tek şey Ockham'ın usturasını önermek olacaktır.

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Media's Dirty Dancing in the Aegean

The Coverage of Kardak/Imia Crisis on the Turkish Daily Newspapers

Abstract:

This study examines the media coverage of the Kardak (in Turkish)/Imia (in Greek) crisis between Turkey and Greece that brought the two countries to the brink of war between December 25, 1995-February 1, 1996. A content analysis of five mainstream daily newspapers of the time, *Hürriyet, Milliyet, Yeni Yüzyıl, Zaman, Cumhuriyet* and *Sabah* have been conducted. The hypothesis of the daily press of the both countries' being a part of the notion referred as "rambo-journalism" is tested by looking at the two countries newspaper coverage. In the study, "rambo-journalism" is defined as a kind of journalism where extensive discourse of patriotism, jingoism and stereotypes are used. Besides the descriptive analysis and cross-tabulation analysis, the sequence analysis has also been applied in order to highlight the changes of the coverage during the crisis. This study is a part of a larger comparative research of how five Greek newspapers, *Vima-Nea, Eleftherotypia, Eleftheros Typos, Kathimerini, Rizospastis* covered the same crisis which will be published in a Greek scholarly journal shortly.

Keywords: Turkey, Turkish media, Imia, content analysis.

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Medyanın Ege'deki Kirli Dansı:
Kardak Krizi'nin Türk Basınında Sunumu

Özet:

Bu çalışma, 25 Aralık 1995-1 Şubat 1996 tarihleri arasında Türkiye ve Yunanistan'ı savaşın eşiğine getiren Kardak krizinin medyadaki sunumu üzerinedir. Bu içerik çözümlemesi o dönemin etkili ve merkezdeki gazeteleri, *Hürriyet, Milliyet, Yeni Yüzyıl, Zaman, Cumhuriyet* ve *Sabah* gazetelerini ele almaktadır. Araştırmanın başında yola çıkılan varsayımı destekleyici anlamda ve "rambo-gazeteciliği" kavramına uygun düşecek şekilde aşırı milliyetçi ve saldırgan söylemin bulgularla desteklenmesi bu araştırmanın sunduğu yönlerden biridir. Betimleyici çözümleme ve çapraz tablolama yöntemlerinin yanısıra kriz süresinceki medyadaki yansımayı kronolojik olarak göstermek amacıyla sekans analizi kullanılmıştır. Bu çalışma, *Vima-Nea, Eleftherotypia, Eleftheros Typos, Kathimerini, Rizospastis* adlı beş Yunan gazetesinin de aynı olayı nasıl yansıttığını da içine alan daha kapsamlı kıyaslamalı araştırmanın yazar tarafından yapılan Türkiye ayağını oluşturmaktadır. Yunan gazetelerini kapsayan veriler de Yunanca olarak akademik kaynaklarda yer alacaktır.

Anahtar sözcükler: Türkiye, Türk basını, Kardak, içerik analizi.

Media's Dirty Dancing in the Aegean:
The Coverage of Kardak/Imia Crisis on the Turkish Daily Newspapers[1]

This research focuses on the role of Turkish daily newspapers during the Kardak (in Turkish)/Imia (in Greek) dispute between December 25, 1995-February 1, 1996. It aims to uncover the coverage of the media where sometimes referred to as "Rambo-journalism" while bringing the two countries to the brink of war. Rambo-journalism" is as a type of journalism where extensive discourse of patriotism, jingoism and stereotypes are used. This form of "war-mongering journalism" demonizes the enemy and patronizes the victim and it conceals or ignores peace initiatives. Many journalists from both countries frequently confirm and legitimize this perception like seen in the prominent journalist Ricardos Someritis' letter to the Athens Journalists' Union (ESIEA)[2] or in the editor in-chief of Hürriyet, Ertuğrul Özkök's words. Someritis wrote:

> *Many Greek journalists, mainly on radio and television, behave like soldiers in the front: they have chosen their camps, their uniform, their flag. If they are columnists, it is their right to do so...*

Özkök while supporting the active participation of Turkish journalists by erecting the flag on the island and abandoning their identities as journalists, similarly indicated:

> *I am asking my Greek colleague: if one night three Turks cross the other side of the Evros River and erect a flag on your land, what would you do? Some people ask what the all fuss is about for a few rocks? Does it worth it? I would say yes it does. If you consider those pieces of rocks as your land, you have to protect your sovereignty rights no matter what.[3]*

In fact, as Billig points out, nationalism is routinely "flagged" in the media through symbols like flags and language involving phrases like "national interest" in less visible forms which he defines as "banal nationalism." However, reminding of nationhood is at its peak during crises like Kardak/Imia. There are various studies on how national media participate in the processes of national identity building (Demertzis et.al., 1999; Entman, 1991; Rivenburgh, 1997, 2000; Sofos, 1999; Yumul and Özkırımlı, 2000). National mainstream newspapers, as tellers of national myths and engravers of national smybols upon the nation's memory, construct the news for the readers with which they share national membership (Entman, 1991; Rivenburgh, 2000). Especially in times of crises or external threat the media produce and reinforce the relational oppositions of "us vs. them."

At this point, it is necessary to understand that Greece and Turkey are two countries fought against each other as a part of the Turkish War of Independence between 1919-1922. With the borders secured with treaties and agreements at east and south, the Greeks evacuate east Thrace, Imbros and Tenedos as well as Asia Minor, and the Evros (*Meriç*) River to be set as the border at Thrace at its pre-1914 position. Greeks call this the "Asia Minor Disaster" or more commonly the "Meghali Katastrophi" which means "Great Catastrophe." Consequently, however, the collective memory in both Greece and Turkey is continuously nourished by the reminders of past enmity in history textbooks and the stereotypes

portrayed in the print and visual media. In other words, the historical reservoir of negative images, prejudices and stereotypes about the "other" is very critical in the emergence and the escalation of crisis. Therefore, both peoples tend to build their nationalism on the adversary toward each other (Hadjidimos, 2000). This study aims to find statistical support for this widely accepted argument in the time of a major crisis and trace down the presentation of "rambo-journalism" by conducting content analysis. This effort becomes particularly important since we have recently witnessed similar but more insignificant crises over the same issue on April 13 and April 23, 2005. In fact this can be considered how fragile all the political balances between the two nations still are after a decade and how media's coverage of those disputes can depict the changing atmosphere in Greek-Turkish relations.

A Brief Overview of the Kardak/Imia Crisis

The Kardak/Imia crisis of 1996 was a very significant incident that left a deep impact on the Greek-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era. Some have argued that particular crisis strengthened negative perceptions and hostile feelings in both Greece and Turkey, thus bringing an increase in the security dilemma. On January 28-31, 1996, Imia, the small 10-acre rocky islet situated 5.5 miles from Kalymnos in the Dodecanese and 3.5 miles from Turkey, played host to a dangerous game of nationalism. After an exchange of flags on the islet first by the Mayor of Kalymnos, then by Turkish journalists, and finally by a Greek naval unit, what had once been a quiet and peaceful outcropping, visited by fishermen and birds, became a symbol of everything wrong between Greece and Turkey (Khalilzad, 2000: 23). The islet belongs to Greece under the Paris 1947 convention in which the Dodecanese island chain was ceded to Greece from Italy after World War II in reward for Greece's fighting against the Nazis. Italy had taken them from Turkey in 1932; the islands were under the Ottoman rule that broke up in 1918. The 1932 protocol between Turkey and Italy transferred sovereignty of the Dodecanese from Turkey to Italy, stating that the sea border between Turkey and Italy is at the middle of the distance between Kato (Turkish), and Imia (Italian). The former Turkish-Italian border became the Turkish-Greek border after 1947 (Kramer, 2000: 169). Turkey alleged that the 1932 Protocol is invalid because it has not been submitted for registration with the Society of Nations. This argument does not stand, as the Charter of the Society of Nations states clearly that only main Accords must be officially registered and that added Protocols, maps, technical documents etc. are not registered (Meinardus, 1991).

Maps of Turkey published by the Turkish Foreign Ministry as late as 1954 (January) do not include the islet Imia, showing the borderline near the island of Kalymnos at exactly the point where Greece says it is. Emerging from a late night conference with former foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, and senior military and intelligence officials, the Turkish Prime Minister of the time Tansu Çiller said that "it is out of question for Turkey to allow others to have designs on its territory." Further, Mr. Baykal said that Turkey is "prepared for every eventuality." The Turkish foreign Ministry said that Turkey asked Greece to withdraw Greek troops dispatched to the islet, and remove any sign that tries to prove Greek sovereignty. In Greece, former foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos said to the Greek media that Greece would not go to the negotiating table for this matter. On the same day, reports by the Greek Ministry of Defense stated that Turkish and Greek fighter jets chased each other in the sky over the islet. Greek forces warned a Turkish frigate to leave Greek territorial waters. Defense Minister Gerasimos Arsenis said that (Greek) armed forces "are responsible on, and are in position to defend national sovereignty." He also described the Greek armed forces as being "in high state of preparedness" (Nachmani, 2003: 169).

Meanwhile, Greek and Turkish warships had taken up positions around Imia. "The Greek side does not want escalation of

the crisis, and called upon Turkey to remove its military presence from the area," said G. Arsenis on a news conference. On the same day, Turkey called on Greece to withdraw its warships from around Imia. The Turkish foreign Minister announced that the Greek ambassador was called to the Ministry where Turkey asked "the immediate withdrawal of Greek ships." "The Greek flag will come down, and no foreign flag should fly on Turkish soil," said Tansu Çiller after a meeting with Turkey's former president Süleyman Demirel. It was also reported on that day, that Turkish commandos were landed on the islet of Akroyialia, near Imia. Baykal said that Turkish troops would not leave unless the Greek troops leave the area. Further, a Greek helicopter that confirmed the presence of Turkish commandos, went down. No further details were given on the incident. Three people went missing. In the Greek House of Representatives, there was a unanimous stand on the matter: No negotiation with Turkey, and the Greek flag will remain on the islet of Imia (Aksu, 2000).

In this diplomatic scramble, Washington and some of the European partners of the two countries have urged Greece and Turkey to negotiate over the dispute, and/or to resort to the International Court of Justice. The crisis settled after Greek and Turkish troops left the area, and the Greek flag was removed. Greek Prime Minister Constantine Simitis said that the disengagement was achieved without any negotiation whatsoever (on Greece's sovereign rights) with the Turkish side. Mr. Simitis thanked the United States for their help and contribution to the disengagement. Greek foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos said that the agreement was made possible through U.S. foreign envoy Richard Holbrooke. In the Greek Parliament, opposition parties heavily criticized the government, and called the disengagement "a defeat for Greece." On January 31, Turkey claimed victory for forcing Greek soldiers off Kardak. "We said those soldiers would go and that flag would come down. As from today, those soldiers have gone, and that flag has come down," said Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller (Keridis, 2001: 6).

The Structure of the Turkish Press in the 1990s

During the times of the Kardak/Imia crisis in the second half of the 1990s, the Turkish press was facing radical changes in terms of financial infrastructure. Prior to focusing on the sample newspapers in this research, we need to have a clear picture of the Turkish press of this period. In the first half of the decade, despite the media sector's not being very profitable, several businessmen entered into this sector.[4] This triggered a new trend in terms of concentration in the ownership (Tunç, 2004). The irreversible conglomeration trend of the Turkish press in the 1990s was the result of this newspaper owners' dependency on the State. Paper prices had been subsidized by the State until January 24, 1980 (Kologlu, 1998), when the government took new steps towards liberal economic policies. Starting in 1983, neo-liberalist discourse gradually penetrated every aspect of society including the journalism world. Under these circumstances, the daily press became an important player in Turkish political life. While the mainstream press armed with the Atatürkist/Kemalist (rooted from the founder of the republic, Atatürk) principles of republicanism, nationalism, secularism, populism, and reformism was enthusiastically supporting the values of the military, the "alternative" press with a different shade of right and left-wing ideologies was severely punished (Tunç, 2004).

Another turning point in the Turkish media industry was Aydın Doğan's purchasing Milliyet in 1980. He was definitely not the first media magnate who was not coming from the journalism background[5], however, this move radically changed the media climate in Turkey. Following Doğan, bank and construction firm owners (Kozanoğlu-Çavuşoğlu Group) purchased Güneş in 1982. Afterwards, Asil Nadir, a well-known businessman bought Günaydın and Güneş and virtually owned about one third of the Turkish print media until 1991, the year he declared bankruptcy in a severe financial crisis. The Bilgin family from İzmir region who has been the owner of an important regional newspaper, Yeni Asır

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According to Sönmez (79), the profit rate in other sectors was much higher than in the media sector in the 1990s: for instance, in the food sector the rate was 6.1%, in cement 9.9%, and in chemicals 3.8%. In the same period the profit rates of Hürriyet, Sabah and Milliyet were minus 14.8%, minus 2.2% and minus 0.4% respectively.

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According to Topuz (329), a handful of businessmen tried to enter the media sector before 1980. For example, a businessmen, Cemalettin Saraçoğlu bought Yeni Sabah in 1948; Tercüman was purchased by four businessmen in 1950, and finally another businessman, Malik Yolaç, bought Akşam in 1957 until he sold the daily to Türk-İş (The Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions) in 1971.

moved to İstanbul in the mid-1980s and began to publish *Sabah* and *Yeni Yüzyıl*. *Yeni Yüzyıl* has folded in the 2001 financial crisis. Then he added the dailies *Takvim*, *Bugün* dailies, and a private television channel, *ATV* to his holding. In 1997, Bilgin Group made a big mistake and entered the banking sector by owning a 50 % share in Etibank with Cavit Çağlar and then owning the whole shares of the bank. However, in 2001 he has been imprisoned of the financial fraud in the bank's accounts. During the Kardak/Imia crisis, *Yeni Yüzyıl* (*New Century*) was one of the most influential newspapers in Turkey with its liberal, elitist stance, aiming urban and college-educated reader profile. Within the Sabah Group, *Yeni Yüzyıl* began to be published in the end of 1994 and it was one of the mainstream dailies during the peak day of the crisis. *Hürriyet* (*Freedom*) and *Milliyet* (*Nationality*) are still belong to the Doğan Media Group which approximately holds 47 % of the whole media scene in Turkey and their reporters played a big role in covering the Kardak/Imia story. *Sabah* belonged to Bilgin Group at the time of the crisis and it was significant to include this newspaper in the sample. The other two newspapers were *Cumhuriyet* and *Zaman*, leftist-statist and Islamist respectively. *Cumhuriyet* (*Republic*), as a symbol of the defender of secularism has still been considered credible among certain circles, such as the military, justice and academia despite its relatively low circulation (approximately 45,000 in the 1990s). *Zaman* (*Time*) has been published by a religious cult leader Fethullah Gülen since 1985 with a religious conservative view. In the 1990s, weekly news magazines such as *Nokta*, *Tempo*, *Aktüel*, and *Aksiyon* were more influential than the dailies, had the power to set the political agenda and created a platform to discuss the delicate issues such as sexuality, educational system, youth problems in Turkey, etc. The total number of magazines which was 20 in 1990 reached 110 in 1999 on various subjects. Also the total circulation of two news magazines (*Nokta* and *Tempo*) was 2 million during this decade.

Research Methodology

The content analysis consisted of six mainstream newspapers, *Hürriyet*, *Milliyet*, *Yeni Yüzyıl*, *Zaman*, *Sabah* and *Cumhuriyet* briefly mentioned above. Those newspapers have been selected as representative because of their different political stances and also belonging to different media groups of the time. All newspapers except *Yeni Yüzyıl*, are still in print in 2006. The news items and headlines of the newspapers (issued between the dates December 25, 1995-February 1, 1996) were coded as the unit of analysis (see Appendix for the coding sheet). Photographs, cartoons, columns were excluded for this particular research to be considered for the future projects. The coding process lasted for three months (October 2004-January 2005). Five coders were trained for between 10 and 15 hours before they began working on this project. During the training process, researchers coded sets of stories, and their work was compared to that of previous coders until a minimum reliability level of 80 % is reached for all variables. In other words, categories and criteria were rigorously defined and applied consistently to all material. In order to create the coder reliability and minimize coders' subjective predispositions, additional coders were used until all the coders reached the same conclusions with the same criteria.

In the first part (Part A) descriptive analyses of the total distributions of each question have been stated to make a clear comparison between six newspapers. In the second part (Part B) the cross-tabulation analyses have been conducted to various pairs of questions. In the third and final part (Part C), the sequence analysis has been applied in order to see the change of events chronologically.

In this research, "time series analysis" could not be conducted in analysing the data collected due to some assumptions not satisfied by the data itself. In order to apply time series regression analysis; it was necessary to aggregate the event sequence data into fixed temporal intervals (Van De Ven and Poole, 1995). Since the

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For further and more
detailed findings, please
contact the author.

data collected on the Kardak issue is not on a daily but on a random basis it does not suffice to apply the time series data.

Time series analysis basically is used to examine historical trends and patterns. For a researcher deciding whether or not to use time-series data, first question s/he should ask is whether the issue s/he is examining is essentially a dynamic process. The data collected for the Kardak issue meets this criterion, however, since time series observations are usually collected on a single entity such as a country, a corporation or so on (Gerald, 1998); it is not healthy to apply the time series analysis to our data which contains six different entities (newspapers).

Markus (1979) suggests that for data which is composed of multiple entities followed over time, it is appropriate to conduct longitudinal data analysis. However, since longitudinal data is collected on multiple entities, it is only feasible to collect data at relatively long intervals of time (every two, three, four, or more years). Thus, longitudinal data are not appropriate for analyses requiring more frequent data collection. In this respect longitudinal data analyses is not suitable for the data collected on the Kardak issue since it involves a single time period in which the data was collected. In consideration of the issues stated above, the data collected has been analysed by simple sequence analysis and by line graphs which indicated how each variable has changed in number in accordance with the dates associated with the data. The sequence charts derived from the sequence analysis corresponds to the sequence of values of a variable in ordinary data analysis. Each case (row) in the data represents an observation at a different time (Norusis, 2004).

The Findings[6]

The findings in this section are mainly descriptive to give an idea of the reader about the general distribution of news items in six newspapers. As seen in Fig.1, 318 news items related to the Kardak/Imia crisis have been detected. Hürriyet and Sabah have given more coverage to the issue with 79 (24.8 %) and 73 (23 %) news items respectively.

Part A

Figure 1. Total Quantity of Kardak/Imia-Related News Items

Name of Newspaper	Number of News Items	Percentage (%)
Cumhuriyet	54	17,0
Milliyet	29	9,1
Sabah	73	23,0
YeniYüzyıl	53	16,7
Zaman	30	9,4
Hürriyet	79	24,8
Total	318	100,0

During the times of crises, clear statement of the news becomes more crucial. The reader has the right to know who reported the news and from which agency the news has been obtained in order to avoid the possibility of fabrication. As shown in Fig. 2, 44 % of the total news items' source has not been stated clearly. Especially in Cumhuriyet, Sabah and Zaman the unknown sources outnumber the news with indicated sources. In Sabah this ratio is approximately 60 % (44 in a total of 73) and in Hürriyet, it is 52 % (41 in a total of 79). On the other hand, in Yeni Yüzyıl and Milliyet the ratios of the unknown sources drop to 6 % and 20 % respectively.

Figure 2. The Clear Statement of the News Source

	Name						Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Clear Yes	24	38	24	29	50	13	178
Source No	30	41	5	44	3	17	140
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

If we look at the positions of the news items on different newspapers, Fig. 3 shows us the total distribution where 62.5 % of the whole news items have been placed on inner pages and 35.5 % have been placed on the front pages. This distribution also varies according to the different newspapers (Fig. 3)

Figure 3. Position of the News Item

Position of Unit of Analysis	Name						Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Front Page	25	32	5	16	25	10	113
Inside	29	42	24	56	28	20	199
Back Page	0	5	0	1	0	0	6
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

Using visual support to highlight the news is another important element while analyzing the coverage of crises. Despite relatively low total number of news items accompanied with photographs (139 in a total of 318, 43.7 %), the individual distribution of the items is mostly above the average the percentage. For instance, in *Hürriyet* which has a colorful layout and played an active role in the Kardak/Imia crisis, 43 pictured items in 79 have been used (54.4 %) *Cumhuriyet* which has a black and white layout with a traditional rare usage of photograps has given place to 28 pictured items in a total of 54 (51.8 %) and also *Sabah* gave half of its Kardak coverage (50.6 %) accompanied by visual elements. *YeniYüzyıl*, however, despite its use of sensational headlines gave only 16.9 % of its coverage supported with photographs (Fig. 4).

Figure 4. Is the News Item Accompanied by a Photograph?

| Photo	Name						Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Yes	28	43	13	37	9	9 •	139
No	26	36	16	36	44	21	179
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

Figure 5. Total Distribution of Photographs/Illustrations (operation, SAT commandos, etc.) on the Front Page?

In Fig.5, we only looked at the distribution of the front-page photographs. In a total news item of 318, 137 of them did not have any photograph and/or illustration about the Kardak/Imia crisis whereas 53 of them have only 1 and 34 of them have 6 photographs on the front page. This indicates that there are 181 photographs / illustrations on the front-page about the crisis in total (57 %). The distribution however shows us that almost 1/5 (18.7 %) of them is devoted to 6 photograps a page which is a rather high percentage. This shows the level of sensational news coverage and use of excessive imagery resonate with the Turkish public.

Figure 6. Total Distribution of Obvious Threat and/or Accusation towards the Greek Side on the Headline

Threat Or Accusation	Name						Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Definitely Yes	10	5	1	16	5	2	39
Definitely No	35	69	28	45	33	25	235
Not Clear	9	5	0	12	15	3	44
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

7
An example which
includes threat and/or
accusation can be shown
as the headline reads
"Pull Your Soldier Back.
Otherwise..." ("Askerini
Çek. Yoksa...") January 30,
1996, Milliyet.

Fig. 6 indicates whether the headline includes some kind of threat and/or accusation towards the Greek side. Undoubtedly this analysis goes beyond the quantitative and focuses on the qualitative. The quantity of obvious threats[7] have been indicated as 39 out of a total of 318. Despite this total percentage (12.2 %) seems negligible, it can not be ignored as insignificant. Besides if a headline is considered unclear, we assume that there is also a tendency towards a hostile attitude to a certain extent. Especially in *Sabah* approximately 22 % of the total headlines have been evaluated as hostile towards the other side. Only 62 % of the total headlines have been coded as definitely neutral. This ratio is 87 % in *Hürriyet* and 65 % in *Cumhuriyet*.

Figure 7. Total Distribution of Exclamation Mark (!) on the Headline

Exclamation Mark	Name						Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Yes	0	2	1	6	0	0	9
No	54	77	28	67	53	30	309
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

The use of exclamation mark (Fig. 7) can be considered an indicator for sensationalism, emotional language and a sign of taking sides while covering a crisis. Exclamation marks which are commonly used in tabloid press have the effect of over-emphasis. As shown in Fig. 7, 2.8 % of the whole headlines and descriptions make exaggerated statements with excessive exclamation. At this point the highest percentage belongs to *Sabah* where there are 6 exclamation marks have been coded in a total of 73 (8 %). Although this percentage might seem to be negligible, this result should not be interpreted as the headlines' devoid of sensationalism.

News items accompanied with an expert opinion can be considered as relatively more reliable. Thus the percentages of giving space to expert opinion such as scholars specialized on international relations, international law, or marine law can give us

Figure 8. Total Distribution of Expert Opinion (IR, law, etc.) Opinion Accompanied the News Item

Exclamation Mark	Name						Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Yes	0	2	1	6	0	0	9
No	54	77	28	67	53	30	309
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

an idea about the general tendency towards covering a crisis. In this case (Fig. 8), 17 % of the *Milliyet* news items have been devoted to experts whereas 6.3 % of *Hürriyet* has carried the expert opinions.

Figure 9. Total Distribution of Word Usage of "bayrak/bayrağımız" (flag/our flag) on the Front Page?

No. of the Word Flag	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman
0	49	25	56	46	16	57
1	2	2	5	4	3	3
2	1	1	7	2	3	7
3	0	1	1	0	5	7
4	1	0	1	1	1	1
5	0	0	2	0	0	2
6	0	0	0	0	2	2
8	1	0	1	0	0	0

The front page coverage and the usage of certain words and phrases are always significant to present a general nationalistic tone. As the flag's being the most obvious symbol of nationalism, the frequency of usage this particular word can give us an idea of the newspapers' position. *Zaman*, as the conservative-religious daily, has used the word, "flag" frequently as indicated in Fig. 9. For instance in *Zaman*, the word has been used 3 times on 7 news items on the front page. *Yeni Yüzyıl* also gave a relatively even distribution of the word usage. In *Yeni Yüzyıl*'s case, this outcome is

rather interesting since it was considered more liberal daily than the others. *Milliyet*, as expected, has given a relatively strong emphasis on the use of word, "flag" or "our flag" (Fig. 9).

Figure10. News Item Written in an "us vs. them" Format

Us/Them Format							Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Yes	22	20	11	41	51	10	155
No	31	45	15	27	2	14	134
N/A	1	14	3	5	0	6	29
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

In terms of creating stereotypes, the general discourse used is extremely important. In Fig. 10, the results of the question where dehumanizing the "other" side have been calculated are presented. The ideological loading of certain linguistic forms and the relations of power which underlie them may seem unclear. This particular question focused on how meaning is structured in news text since a wide range of oppositions (brave Turks-coward Greeks, right-wrong cause, natural-unnatural environment, friendly-hostile act, logical-illogical solution, etc.) in the Turkish press is presented while covering the Kardak/Imia dispute. Consequently, we indicate that positive self-representation and negative other-representation largely controls all of the six newspapers' coverage. For instance, "us vs. them" dichotomy is most obvious in *Zaman* (1/3). In *Hürriyet*, this rate slightly goes down as to 1/4. In *Cumhuriyet*, the percentage is 40 %. However the most striking of all is *Yeni Yüzyıl*, almost 96 % of the total news items are written as "us vs. them" polarization. The percentage in total is 48.7.

Fig. 11 indicates whether those six Turkish newspapers looked at the Kardak/Imia crisis as a part of a bigger problem that has been going on the Aegean Sea for years or they referred to the Aegean Issue as a specific problem. According to the findings, the position of every newspaper varies while covering the

Figure 11. News Item's Direct Reference to the General Aegean Issue

Aegean Issue			Name				Total
	Cumhuriyet	Hürriyet	Milliyet	Sabah	Yeni Yüzyıl	Zaman	
Yes	54	13	21	42	19	6	155
No	0	66	8	31	34	24	163
Total	54	79	29	73	53	30	318

Kardak/Imia crisis. For instance, *Cumhuriyet* has definitely seen the crisis as a part of a bigger problem; on the other hand *Milliyet*, *Yeni Yüzyıl* and *Hürriyet* covered the crisis as an independent issue. This might tell us that *Cumhuriyet* had a more in-depth analysis and coverage of the issue whereas the others mostly have taken a more sensationalist position and taking the whole issue from its historical and political backgrounds which was an indication of issue-based rather than event-based reporting.

Part B

In this part, two pairs of questions have been analyzed together to get a meaningful correlation and highlighted a few among many possible pairs. In Fig. 12 below, the results of the cross-tabulation of analysis of the coverage in "us vs. them" format and the coverage consisting of "threat/accusation towards the Greek side" has been presented. On the basis of individual newspapers, the hypothesis was finding a direct proportion with the coverage that includes some kind of threat and also "us vs. them" discourse. But this proves wrong in *Yeni Yüzyıl* whereas nearly all the "us vs. them" items do not have any kind of accusation towards the Greek side. *Sabah* also turned out to be an interesting case whereas the news items which have strong us/them dichotomy might both have threatening (12/16) and non-threatening (19/32) coverage (Fig. 12).

Figure 12. Reviewing "us/them" Format of Analysis" and "Threat/Accusation Towards the Greek Side"

NEWSPAPER			Definitely Yes	Definitely No	Not Clear	Total
			Threat/ Accusation towards the Greek Side			
Cumhuriyet	Us/Them	Yes	7 *	11	4	22
		No	3	23	5	31
		N/A	0	1	0	1
	Total		10	35	9	54
Milliyet	Us/Them	Yes	1	10	0	11
		No	0	15	0	15
		N/A	0	3	0	3
	Total		1	28	0	29
Sabah	Us/Them	Yes	12 *	19 *	10	41
		No	4	21	2	27
		N/A	0	5	0	5
	Total		16	45	12	73
Yeni Yüzyıl	Us/Them	Yes	5	32 *	14	51
		No	0	1	1	2
	Total		5	33	15	53
Zaman	Us/Them	Yes	1	7	2	10
		No	0	14	0	14
		N/A	1	4	1	6
	Total		2	25	3	30
Hürriyet	Us/Them	Yes	4 *	13	3	20
		No	1	43	1	45
		N/A	0	13	1	14
	Total		5	69	5	79

In Fig. 13, the correlation between the expert opinion and giving reference to the Aegean problem proves to be strong in *Milliyet* (6/8), *Sabah* (20/31), *Zaman* (23/24) and especially in *Hürriyet* (61/66). *Milliyet* does not follow a pattern since there are also 76 % of the news items have no expert-opinion and Aegean issue reference at the same time. *Cumhuriyet* fully reversed the

pattern that nearly 99 % of the news items with no expert opinion had reference to the Aegean problem. This might be another indication of *Cumhuriyet*'s in-depth coverage.

Figure 13. Reviewing Expert Opinion and Giving Information about the Aegean Issue in General

NAME of NEWSPAPER			AEGEAN PROBLEM		TOTAL
			YES	NO	
Cumhuriyet	EXPERT OPINION	YES	1	0	1
		NO	53	0	53
	Total		54	0	54
Milliyet	EXPERT OPINION	YES	5	0	5
		NO	16 *	6 *	22
		N/A	0	2	2
	Total		21	8	29
Sabah	EXPERT OPINION	YES	4	0	4
		NO	32	20 *	52
		N/A	6	11	17
	Total		42	31	73
Yeni Yüzyıl	EXPERT OPINION	NO	6	12	18
		N/A	13	22	35
	Total		19	34	53
Zaman	EXPERT OPINION	YES	3	1	4
		NO	3	23 *	26
	Total		6	24	30
Hürriyet	EXPERT OPINION	YES	0	5	5
		NO	12	61 *	73
		N/A	1	0	1
	Total		13	66	79

Among 25 news items presented on the front page in *Cumhuriyet* 8 of them use "us vs. them" dichotomy which can be interpreted as an obvious partisan discourse in Fig.14. In addition to the front page, a 50 % use of this dichotomy is also striking since *Cumhuriyet* is not considered a sensational daily. However, its coverage seems to be

jingoistic when it comes to national issues like Kardak/Imia dispute. On the other hand, *Hürriyet*'s use of "us vs. them" discourse is rather expected and the figures support this hypothesis. In total number of news items in *Hürriyet*, approximately 1/4 of the whole items is devoted to the possible partisan coverage and 80 % of the front page news is portrayed in the similar fashion. *Yeni Yüzyıl*, another actor of the sensational journalism covers nearly all (24/25 on the front page and 27/28 on the inner pages) of the Kardak news in "us vs. them" coverage which is an obvious indication of the newspapers' war mongering attitude. Finally, *Sabah* prefers to cover the issue with the similar tone on the front page (13/16).

Figure 14. Position of the News Item and us/them Assertion

NAME OF NEWSPAPER			US vs. THEM			TOTAL
			YES	NO	N/A	
Cumhuriyet	POSITION	FRONT PAGE	8 *	17	0	25
		INSIDE	14	14	1	29
	Total			31	1	54
Hürriyet	POSITION	FRONT PAGE	8 *	21	3	32
		INSIDE	10 *	23	9	42
		BACK PAGE	2	1	2	5
	Total			45	14	79
Milliyet	POSITION	FRONT PAGE	3	1	1	5
		INSIDE	8 *	14	2	24
	Total			15	3	29
Sabah	POSITION	FRONT PAGE	13 *	1	2	16
		INSIDE	27	26	3	56
		BACK PAGE	1	0	0	1
	Total			27	5	73
Yeni Yüzyıl	POSITION	FRONT PAGE	24 *	1		25
		INSIDE	27	1		28
	Total			2		53
Zaman	POSITION	FRONT PAGE	5	3	2	10
		INSIDE	5	11	4	20
	Total			14	6	30

Part C

The following four graphs show the data relating to the time distribution (January 22-February 16, 1996). In Fig. 15, we can see on which dates the coverage of the Kardak/Imia crisis makes a peak on various newspapers. There is an obvious escalation in the coverage starting January 29 especially in *Hürriyet*. On January 26, the mayor of Kalymnos and a priest hoisted up a Greek flag on the islet and following this event, some Turkish journalists and TV anchors flew to the islet with a helicopter and raised a Turkish flag, bringing down the Greek one, the whole events being broadcast live on Turkish television stations between January 28-29. By 30 January, the Greek navy changed the flag, which resulted in exchange of fierce statements lead by the Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Çiller and the Greek Prime Minister Simitis.

As indicated in the graph, a day after this tension (January 31), *Hürriyet*'s number of news items devoted to the Kardak/Imia dispute makes a peak. Following January 31, a steep decline in number of news items is detected. In the first days of February, the


Figure 15. Total Distribution of News Items During the Crisis

immediate military threat was defused with the US envoy Richard Holbrooke and NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana intermediating so there is a decreasing trend can be detected in the coverage of the story.

Fig. 16 below depicts the mean values of how many photographs and how many columns were devoted to the Kardak/Imia issue. As the columnists play a significant role in Turkish press, average opinion pieces published is an indication of the significance of the event. Similar to the peak trend in the news coverage, columns are also strikingly plenty in number during January 29-February 3. Photographs, however, follow a consistent path throughout the crisis with a minor increasing trend during the same period.

Fig. 17 below demonstrates the number of adjectives and concepts used in referring to the Kardak issue on a time dimension. The total use of the words, "crisis," "difficulty," "problem," and two slightly similar Turkish variations of the term, "tension" (gerginlik and gerilim) are shown throughout the dispute. The Kardak/Imia issue is evidently defined as "crisis" by nearly all


Figure 17. Distribution of Concepts with Negative Connotations Over Time

newspapers. The second frequently-used terms are tension and problem that make climax during the 5-day period (January 29-February 2).

Figure 16. Average Photographs and Columns Devoted to the Kardak/Imia Issue

Figure 18. Distribution of Specific Concepts Over Time

Finally, Fig. 18 demonstrates the range of definitions used relating to Kardak issue on the time scale. Comparing the use of the terms such as "peace," "tolerance," or "self-criticism" with the term, "threat" on the same graph presents the compelling difference in word selection in coverage. As indicated in Fig. 18, the term, "threat" is used throughout the dispute despite its periodic ups and downs. The term, "peace" makes a peak on February 3 when the US diplomatic efforts officially began and then it makes a steep decline.

Conclusion

In this research, we focused on the coverage of the Kardak/Imia crisis on six different newspapers by using content analysis. As a result of this research, it was indicated that nationalist tone remained deeply embedded in the concepts, images, and very language of the news coverage used to describe this crisis. This research was not about Turkish newspapers' presenting "banal nationalism" (Billig, 1995), the routine way in which nationalism is "flagged" daily, but rather dailies' presenting nationalist discourse in such critical times. The findings of the research supported the hypothesis of *Hürriyet*'s dominant role in the coverage of the Kardak/Imia crisis. However, to author's surprise, *Sabah*, *Cumhuriyet* and even *Zaman* gave more coverage than *Milliyet*. There was a significant quantity of unstated news sources which actually signified the problem of reality in reporting. Most of the news has been placed on the front and inner pages with considerable provoking pictures which showed the importance that the editors gave to the topic. Interestingly, in terms of using war terminology, sensational and aggressive headlines *Sabah* outnumbered *Hürriyet*. Additionally, *Yeni Yüzyıl* which has been considered an elitist and highbrow newspaper used "us vs. them" dichotomy in almost 98 % in its coverage. *Sabah* came second by a large margin and *Cumhuriyet* came third. *Cumhuriyet* gave the most in-depth coverage by putting the dispute in the context of a larger Aegean issue.

Despite *Hürriyet*'s immense patriotic coverage, *Sabah* seemed more jingoistic in tone than *Hürriyet*. *Hürriyet*'s and *Sabah*'s editorial policies in their coverage of the Kardak/Imia dispute were found very similar. On the other hand, *Zaman* and *Cumhuriyet*, Islamist-concervative and leftist respectively, were alike in their word selection unlike their political positions. Overall, *Hürriyet* was not the only aggressive and patriotic newspaper unlike a widespread belief. All of the six newspapers were founded as extremely partisan and far from a balanced, calm and cautious coverage.

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En Son Babalar Duyar Dizisinde Geleneksel Baba Otoritesinin Temsil Edilişi ve Sorgulanışı

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Özet:

En Son Babalar Duyar adlı TV dizisinde karşımıza çıkan ve Mehmet Usta'nın kişiliğinde cisimleşen "otorite" kavramının içerdiği anlamlar, özellikle bu otoriteyi üreten geleneksel ilişkiler ve yaşama biçimi ile modern yaşama biçimi ve ilişkileri arasında sıkışıp kalmış bir otoriteyi açığa vurmaktadır. Bu nedenledir ki, bir yandan, temelinde saygı, vefa borcu, minnet duygusu ve belli ölçüde de kutsallık kavramlarını barındıran ataerkil geleneksel aile yaşamı ile günümüz modern aile yaşamının çıkara dayalı "sevgisiz" bir birlikteliği öngören karmaşık yapısı, babanın temsil ettiği simgesel otoriteyi ve bu otoriteye duyulan ihtiyacı haklı kılmak gibi bir paradoksu da içinde taşımaktadır. Söz konusu olan şey, artık sadece babanın kimliğine ve otoritesine duyulan saygının azalması değil, aynı zamanda babanın otoritesinin hükmetme alanlarının gitgide daralmasına bağlı olarak, özellikle anne-baba ve baba-çocuklar arası ilişkilerde meydana gelen ahlaki gedik ve yarılmaların geleceğin çekirdek aile yapısında ne tür değişimlere yol açacağıdır.

Anahtar sözcükler: geleneksel baba, baba otoritesi, otoriteyi paylaşmak, aile içi iletişim.

Representation and Interrogating Traditional Father's Authority Concept in the En Son Babalar Duyar TV Series

Abstract:

The meanings which are contained by the concept of authority appearing at TV series *En Son Babalar Duyar* and concreting at Mehmet Usta's personality reveal that authority is squeezed into modern life styles with traditional relations. For this reason, complex structure of modern family life leaning on benefit, and patriarchal traditional family life including idea of respect, fidelity, sacredness comprise a paradox as a symbolic authority which is represented by father and the necessity of father's authority. The matter is not only reducing the respect to father's authority and personality but also the possible changes on nucleus family since moral corruption appears on relations between mother-father and father-children on reducing father's authority.

Keywords: traditional father, father authority, sharing out authority, domestic communication.