

Role of an Agent in (un)Keeping the Multiethnic State Together: The Case of the Secession of Kosovo

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Abstract: *This paper proposes an explanation for the Kosovo secession from Serbia/Yugoslavia. This is achieved by disaggregating the 'reality' of the state through the process tracing method, which compares the cases of the Tito and Milošević triangles of accommodation practices. The focus is on the games of survival practiced at the middle levels of political life, around the local state policy implementer and the consequences of his removal. This paper examines not only why, but how the secession of Kosovo occurred when it did. It shows that the strength of authoritarianism or the regime-oppression capability is not what held the Serbia and Kosovo together; rather, it was the policies of accommodations which one leader did better than the other.*

Keywords: Multiethnic state, separation, Kosovo, Serbia, Yugoslavia, triangle of accommodation

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Introduction

As a consequence of the changing political landscape in a post-communist Europe, some countries have dissolved while new countries have emerged. The reasons for the dissolution of Yugoslavia are still being debated among international observers and academics, since its fallout had significant consequences for the entire global system.¹ Although most of the current discussions revolve around the role of the international structure and/or the country's institutional arrangements, insufficient attention is paid to the actions of individual agents, despite the fact that in this, as in most other cases, the individual agents played significant roles and were the decisive factors in the dissolution processes. To test this proposition, using Joel Migdal's work² on weak states and strong societies, this paper will examine the role of an agent in the case of the dissolution of Yugoslavia/Serbia and the emergence of Kosovo.³ This paper looks at Kosovo's emergence out of Yugoslavia/Serbia as an ideal and significant example of how political games around a single agent can explain why levels of groupness among ethnic Albanians could have increased and transformed local political conflict into a full-fledge inter-ethnic war and successful secession. Brubaker warns analysts about the need to distinguish groups from groupness,⁴ and to focus the analytical attention on the policy interventions which have caused the increased cohesion of a group that can help explain a more successful, or a less successful ethnic mobilization.

Despite the increasing number of cases where the actions of individual agents have had significant implications for the stability of the inter-state system, there has been no significant scholastic study on this level of action, nor has there been an investigation of how these activities affect the survival of any state holistically. As such, the significance of an individual agent in the secession of Kosovo presents itself as an opportune case study to compare Slobodan *Milošević* and Josip Broz Tito's approach to Kosovo at the middle level of political action, and draw conclusions about the causes for separations of the province at the time when it happened. A valid argument could be posited that the two sides of conflict in the case of Kosovo made irreconcilable historical demands that no agent could straddle. Yet, evidently, despite such long historical tendencies, Tito managed to straddle those different demands through balanced accommodations, while Milosevic did not. The argument here is that the key difference in the approach of those two leaders is the effective use of a skillful local implementer as a central state agent in keeping the multiethnic state together.

Approaches to the Case of Kosovo

As it is well known, the country of Yugoslavia dissolved into seven new states: the most recent being Kosovo, which formally declared independence from Serbia in 2008. In analyzing the reasons behind the dissolution of the country, some like Živojinović (1992)⁵ and more recently Pranger (2011),⁶ were arguing against the so called "Milošević factor" and were trying to suggest that Milošević had some 'bigger-than-life' messianic role not only to save Bosnian and Albanian Muslims from the ills of their religion, but that Milošević even tried to save Europe and the global world order from an incoming 'Islamic threat' in the Balkans. Alongside the fact that they talk about the 'centuries old' Islamic danger,⁷ this time coming from the local autochthonous Muslim populations,⁸ these authors also made a folly in attempting to present Milosevic as a popular Serbian nationalistic leader who was fighting hard for the Serbs and Croats not "to be minorities in their own houses."⁹ For these distortions we can exonerate Živojinović, a professor of history at the University of Belgrade, who wrote his piece in 1992 when Milošević was in the zenith of his power, and when it was dangerous for anyone to write against him and live *and to work* in Serbia. However, Pranger's 2011 writing is simply deceitful. A prime example of how Milošević was despised by most of the Serbs is his own burial, mentioned later in this paper.¹⁰

Among works that tried to circumvent the "Milošević factor," that of David Gibbs¹¹ is worth mentioning. Not knowing local languages and relying exclusively on secondary sources for his

analysis, Gibbs proposes that exogenous factors causing an economic failure, imperialism, and the policies of multinational corporations were the main reasons for the Yugoslav collapse and Kosovo separation. Although it will be hard to completely ignore the roles of those corporations, most of these proposals still fall short of explaining the ethnically charged civil war, which involved a case of genocide and the breakup of Yugoslavia into many units *celebrated* by all respective local populations. Furthermore, it should also be noted that the dissolution wars of former Yugoslavia occurred *exclusively* with Serbia's involvement.¹² This reality points to the crucial role which the Milosevic-led state played in the dissolution of Yugoslavia. It is tempting for the observers to oversimplify and use "Balkan ghosts" to explain these wars. However, as Laitin (2007) suggested,¹³ rather than focus on the long felt interethnic hatred and resentment which are latently always present, it is important to understand how the state failed to police its periphery, and what the tipping point was when these failures became the destiny. This suggests that most important factors should also be sought on an institutional *and* individual level *and within* those states.

Some researchers like Pavković (2010),¹⁴ note that institutional multiculturalism, as a foundation for later nationalisms of all different constitutive units, was the main prelude for the Yugoslav state fragmentation.¹⁵ Such nationalism is particularly potent in the case of counterbalancing states when ethnic majorities view the control of political institutions as an absolutely essential tool for their ethnic survival, as established by Horowitz (1995)¹⁶ and Shoup (2008).¹⁷ The same concerns were felt by Serbs of Yugoslavia, and – to a larger extent – by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Siding with that argument, this paper builds on the proposition of Brubaker that nationalism could be understood "as a form of remedial political action"¹⁸ that needs to be dissected as "category of practice."¹⁹ In the case of Serbia and the rise of Milošević into power, such dissection could be observed in the work of Vladisavljević (2004)²⁰ who well described how Milošević's nationalism was actually *not* his ideological preference. Rather, it was a remedial opportunistic political action that went wrong for him and caused Serbia to lose the territory that it previously controlled. Milošević's opportunism was also highlighted by Hall (1999) who intermittently suggested that Milošević was a post-communist dictator turned into nationalist.²¹ This paper, however, does not consider Milošević neither as a nationalist, nor as a leader with any principal ideological preference beyond opportunism, who misplayed policy options around local state implementor and lost Kosovo for Serbia.²²

The case of Kosovo represents a case of "triadic configuration" with national minorities, nationalizing states, and an external homeland, a combination of factors that Laitin noted to be particularly dangerous and complicated.²³ For that reason, the best approach to this case study is a micro level analysis of the roles of the key individual local agents in the process of Serbia-Kosovo's dissolution. This inquiry follows the advice of Migdal (1988) in that it takes steps to analyze the causes of the failure or success by disaggregating the 'reality' of the state, because that exposes the importance of the local agents in keeping or disaggregation of the multiethnic states.

In his seminal work, Max Weber long ago established the importance of a charismatic leader without elaborating much on the role of the individual local agents who are only seen as a part of the bureaucracy of a state. For him, a state has the exclusive right of coercion and hierarchy because "if the state is to exist, the dominated must obey authority claimed by the powers that be".²⁴ It will be hard to argue about this matter-of-fact-attribute of a state. However, is it only the coercion and hierarchy that keeps the states together? For Migdal, relations within the state are not so much organized in a strict hierarchy; rather, they are the *mélange* of social organizations often competing for influence by creating their own unit-special strategies of survival.²⁵ Such 'fragmentation of influence' forces all players within the state to play games of survival through the Triangle of Accommodation's structure. The particular attention for this observation will be the policies of survival practiced not only by the leaders, but also the middle levels of political life, as this is where many of the explanatory variables for the Yugoslavian dissolution query are to be found.

4 | That fragmentation of Yugoslavia occurred as a result of many internal conflicts which caused subsequent secessionist wars after “the disintegration of governmental authority and the breakdown of a political and civil order”, as Woodward (1995) correctly noted.²⁶ Since the process of dissolution began and ended in Kosovo, particular attention should be focused on the separation of Kosovo from Serbia using the Migdal’s (1988) established framework. The case of Kosovo best exemplifies the complexity of state building dynamics in the Triangle of Accommodation, which usually “results in an allocation of state resources that reinforce societal fragmentation.”²⁷ The Triangle of Accommodation, in the case of Kosovo, was organized between (i) the central state leadership of first Yugoslavia – and then Serbia, (ii) state policy implementor – later groomed to become *one of* the strongmen too; and (iii) local strongmen from various segments of ethnic Albanian society, which will be treated as a given and whose strategies of survival will not be elaborated upon. Rather than the usual concentration on agency, the focus here is on the role of the individual agent and the consequences of the breakdown of the previously established power Triangle, in the multiethnic Kosovo. The central point of the observations will be the implementor and the consequences of his removal.

When Serbian communist *and* national leader, Slobodan Milošević, dismissed the ethnic Albanian led Kosovo Communist Party leadership in 1988, he destroyed the previously established Triangle of Accommodation created by Tito. With that, Milošević left the Serbian state without local implementors in Kosovo, which in turn provided local separatists with unimpeded ethnic mobilization capabilities. Such ethnic mobilization increased the strength of the centrifugal forces and led to the full separation and independence of Kosovo. Once again, mobilization capabilities proved to be the decisive factor for the escalation of ethnic demands into full scale secessionist war, as Gurr and Harff (2003) observed in their study on ethnic conflict.²⁸

To add to the intricacy of the issue of Kosovo, it must be noted that Milošević in fact acted there in order to keep in check the growing power of the local implementors. At the same time, Milošević attempted to ride on the process of state driven ‘nation nationalizing’ to correct the perceived deficiencies of the ‘Serbian nation-state’.²⁹ However, he misread the whole game, and as a consequence of his mistakes the Serbian state lost Kosovo while his life ended in a prison cell of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Utilization of the historical, before-and-after process tracing method facilitates a comparison of two leader’s Triangle of Accommodation games, and offers an explanation for the separation of Kosovo from Serbia. This approach will also help us to dispel the popular misnomer that the former Yugoslavia was unified only under the “strong hand” of Tito and when that hand was removed everything fell apart. Yet, the argument should be made that it is *not* the strength of authoritarianism and the regime-oppression capability that held the country together; rather, it was political games of cooption, which Tito played much better than Milošević, and that kept Yugoslavia – as well as Serbia – and Kosovo together. This argument is a blunt refutation for those who claim that it is the strength of coercive mechanisms and the ability to oppress that keeps multiethnic states together. As we witnessed with the collapse of the states in Ukraine, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Somalia and maybe Bahrain, the same multiethnic compositions of those states present particular challenges for their leaders to maintain their respective states. It is still hard for observers to note how exactly the oppressive mechanisms failed to uphold state structures in those cases, but as an instance of failure, Yugoslavia provides such a possibility. The attention to individual agents in each case can perhaps best expose the telling points leading up to separation, and the factors why state oppression failed.

Tito's Triangle of Accommodation in Kosovo

To understand the complexity of state formation and relations in the Yugoslav and Serbian state, we have to briefly lay down the historical circumstances which set the country on the path where fragmented social control caused the problems of political mobilization. The country of Yugoslavia first appeared on the map as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1918.³⁰ The Serbian-led Kingdom was formed in phases. The first segment occurred as the result of war maneuvering by the young Serbian state and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Montenegro, Macedonia, Vojvodina and Kosovo as a part of Serbia). During the next stage, out of the collapsed Hapsburg Empire, emerged the short-lived Country of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs – composed of today's Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia. The new country lacked its own military to protect itself and hence joined the Kingdom of Serbia. Although Serbian armies acted in the newly conjoined territories as if they were the liberators of Serbian territories, the new state named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes inherited the strong multiethnic character of both Empires.

The three dominant ethnic groups mentioned in the name of the new country shared space with several other ethnic groups and nations, such as Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bosniaks and ethnic Albanians. These circumstances set the new South Slavic state on the path towards the ethnically fragmented country that had to carefully balance relations between all these groups which were already formed as strong societies. Even the name of the new country was an attempt to appease some of the stronger national liberation movements among them, who were also given portions of political leadership, but with the Serbian dynasty at its helm. While Serbs were the largest ethnic group in total count, there were large swaths of the new country with minimal or no Serbian presence. The political maneuvering did not work well and opposition to what was ultimately Serbian rule grew among the different ethnic groups. The first Constitution of the country adopted in June 1921 attempted to ease some elements of the fragmentations by declaring the new country to be the unitary kingdom and national state of one nation, and the three tribes of that same Yugoslav (Southern-Slav) nation. To further strengthen the argument of one nation, the country officially changed the name to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929.³¹ The new country grew increasingly authoritarian, and the King Aleksandar Karadjordjević's declared dictatorship in 1929 further strained the relations among different ethnic groups and increased the opposition to the Serbian-led rule. This strong disapproval left the Serbian-born King with no option but to rule with the iron fist of the army, and without enough local implementors on the ground capable of enforcing the central government's policies and of mobilizing the local population and resources for the central state's goals. Although Croatian opposition was the loudest, other groups resisted as well ultimately demonstrated with the assassination of the King by a Macedonian nationalist in 1934.³²

Old Yugoslavia eventually collapsed as a state after just eleven days of German onslaught in WWII and the new fascist vassal states mushroomed in the region during that period which further strained ethnic concord. However, the old notion of the united South Slavic state was held strongly by the Communist-led resistance and as they emerged victorious after the war, new Yugoslavia was constituted as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the helm of the state then came the ethnic Croat communist, Josip Broz Tito. After the very bloody years of interethnic slaughter encouraged by the Nazis in old Yugoslavia,³³ Tito's main platform was interethnic peace and accommodation as proclaimed by his policy of 'brotherhood and unity'. This program was well received by the majority of the population exhausted by the bloody war. The communist-led government tried hard to maintain itself utilizing what Migdal (1988) eventually called the Triangle of Accommodation, as a political constellation the communist government effectively adjusted to serve the multiethnic nature of the state. The longer the Triangle existed, the more accustomed people became to it and an expectation of accommodations continued and increased. Migdal also proposed such a situation when he stated that "once established, a fragmented distribution of social control has been difficult to transform [and] state leaders could not easily dismiss conflicting sets of rules in society."³⁴ This expectation of

accommodations played an important role in redefining what was – by then – the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) constitution in 1974, which was designed in light of these conflicting expectations to grant some of the various ethnic demands, while keeping the unified state. SFRY was by then comprised of six republics, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Serbia with the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. As proposed by Migdal's (1988) model, bureaucratic appointments in the federal state were not merit based, but based upon loyalties and/or the ethnic factor. Despite these accommodations, there remained some opposition to a South-Slav dominated state.

One of these groups that strongly rejected Serbian rule from the very creation of Yugoslavia was the non-Slavic Albanians which mainly inhabited the region of Kosovo and the surrounding areas. Albanians had their own strong national liberation movement which sought to create a national state for Albanians in the large territories of the South-west Balkans; they fought several wars against the Ottoman Empire in an attempt to achieve this goal.³⁵ However, as the Ottomans retreated from the Balkans, large parts of the territories with the ethnic Albanian majority fell under Serbian rule. Ethnic Albanians resented it, but their territories remained as a part of Serbia nevertheless. The Serbian state, on the other hand, never had a strong mobilizational capability in these territories and especially Kosovo.

This uneasy relationship between the ethnic Albanians and the Serbian state continued even after the communist victory in WWII. Denitch (1994) also notes that Albanians “never voluntarily became a part of either Yugoslavia or its predecessor state, Serbia.”³⁶ To appease some of the ethnic Albanian demands, and meanwhile keep in check Serbian nationalists, Kosovo was officially declared an Autonomous Province in the Socialist Republic of Serbia after 1964, and eventually, in 1974, given attribute of ‘Socialist’ as a sign of the full titular importance of the autonomous region.³⁷

The Albanian antagonism would also grow particularly strong during the reign of the notorious Yugoslav Secret Police Chief, Aleksandar Ranković, who often employed Stalinist methods to quash any real or perceived opposition. Tito eventually purged Ranković in the summer of 1966 and turned a new page in Yugoslav state relations with the ethnic Albanians.³⁸ It is hard to ascertain whether Tito understood that the Yugoslav state needed local ethnic Albanian implementors in order to be able to carry out central state policies and mobilize local ethnic Albanian population for the achievement of those goals. Nevertheless, certain indicators could point to such a conclusion. Above anything else, Tito's own political survival also depended on social control, interethnic peace, and careful balancing. This balance was most strongly challenged in Kosovo with a large ethnic group with strong centrifugal tendencies occupying territory adjacent to their national state.³⁹ Tito understood⁴⁰ that in such “circumstances of fragmented social control, the state have become an arena of accommodation”.⁴¹

Right after the ousting of Ranković in the Fall of 1966, Kosovo Albanians finally received the long sought right of instruction in the Albanian language at the state funded University of Priština, which at that time still functioned as an outpost of the Serbian-controlled Belgrade University. Two years later, the University in Priština became a fully independent state institution with its own staff and the parallel instruction in both the Albanian and Serbian languages. For ethnic Albanians, this was considered a major development since it finally provided not only a chance for higher education as a springboard for social mobility in communist-led countries, but also as the rallying point for their intellectuals and the elites. During the politically hot years of the 1980s, Priština University served as a hotbed for ethnic Albanian aspirations.⁴² Often led by their professors, ethnic Albanian students frequently clashed with federal police while demanding more autonomy and political rights for the Autonomous Region of Kosovo. The federal government, which at that time was still at the helm of a strong state, on the other hand feared that more autonomy and rights would lead Kosovo into irredentism to join the neighboring ethnic Albanian state,⁴³ which in turn did what it could to encourage such demands. The economically weak Albanian state with a paranoid Stalinist leader

pursued such a strategy not so much as a policy of choice, but rather as a policy of necessity to confront Yugoslav aggressive attempts to assert political domination over Albania. This foreign policy game, however, indicated what Migdal points to as “a second ‘sufficient’ condition for the emergence of strong states [of Yugoslavia] – the existence of a serious military threat from outside or from other communal groups in the country.”⁴⁴ While such a threat changes the risk calculus of state leaders, instead of further suppressing ethnic Albanians, Tito chose the risky game of balancing the Triangle of Accommodation.

To confront independently formed local strongmen, who could easily seek alliance with an outside power, Tito understood that he needed local implementors whose political survival would depend primarily on the Federal structures, while staying sufficiently close to the local population as an indicator of the willingness to compromise. For this role Tito chose an ethnic Albanian and young political star Azem Vllasi, who was at one point also popularly known as “Tito’s most beloved youth.”⁴⁵

This political maneuvering and the meteoric rise of Azem Vllasi, first on a federal Communist party platform, and then on Kosovo regional political stepladders, was the second strong indicator that Tito understood the need for the strong local implementor. As Kosovo slowly assumed the role as a de facto separate federal unit – especially after the amended Yugoslav constitution of 1974 – the Federal state needed local “bureaucrats of the state, [who] must identify their own ultimate interests with those of the state as an autonomous organization.”⁴⁶ Vllasi did carry out his role as predicted, however, eventually playing the double game of survival by correctly understanding where to place his loyalties and at what times. His position was further strengthened by the dreadful reign of Ranković who ‘effectively’ eliminated most of the other strongmen, and especially after the purge of the old guard of the ethnic Albanian Communist leader Mahmut Bakarli in 1981.⁴⁷ Bakarli could have been the peer-official competitor to balance Vllasi, but with his removal, Vllasi became “a key figure in distributing rewards intended as the backbone of the new [state fashioned] strategies of survival”⁴⁸ and effectively assumed both roles of state implementor and one of the Kosovo strongmen.⁴⁹

The best example of Vllasi’s usefulness as a local implementor capable of resisting local peer pressure and confronting other local strongmen was evidenced when he effectively confronted Albanian separatist rhetoric and reinforced the position of the Yugoslav state in Kosovo.⁵⁰ As various nationalistic separatist movements swept across Yugoslavia in the early 1980s, Priština ethnic Albanian students held demonstrations in which they demanded more autonomy for Kosovo. Some protestors were carrying signs which read “Kosovo-Republic.” In Federal Yugoslavia, only official republics had a constitutional right of secession. Confident in federal support, Vllasi was able to confront separatist forces by rejecting those demands and ‘explaining’ that such slogans were Enver Hoxha’s inventions, designed only to destabilize ethnic harmony in Yugoslavia, rather than out of concern for the rights of ethnic Albanians.

This instance of Vllasi’s opposition to his ethnic brethren’s demands also illustrates Migdal’s suggested regulating instrument of the “politics of survival” which effectively balances the Triangle of Accommodations. Vllasi played both sides in order to survive. Correctly understanding that his political life in the 1980s depended on the Yugoslav federal structure still led by Tito’s appointees, Vllasi sided with them and opposed ethnic Albanian separatism.

When Tito died in May of 1980, opportunistically riding on the resurgent Serbian nationalism, Slobodan Milošević eventually took over the reins in Serbia and in the late 1980s revoked Kosovo’s political autonomy, and turned down the ethnic Albanian expectations about their future within Serbia. This is because once political opportunities as accommodations are established, they become part of the population’s expectation for the present *as well as* for the future.⁵¹ The reduction of those opportunities increased the sense of relative deprivation and subsequently increased the likelihood of violence and separatist tendencies in Kosovo. The only thread still holding

the opposing communities together was the one managed by Vllasi. However, the change of the circumstances were too significant to be ignored by anyone. Migdal reminds us that just “like state leaders above them, implementors may be analyzed using a simple model of risk analysis.”⁵² Vllasi correctly understood that things had changed for his political (and even physical) survival, and he therefore strengthened his ties with his ethnic kinsfolk. However, his maneuvering among the “available resources, ideas and organizational means”⁵³ was not well received by the new Serbian leadership with Milošević at its helm.

Milošević’s Triangle of Accommodation in Kosovo

Only a few years after the death of President Tito, the Yugoslav communist party fell apart. Due to its numerical ethnic majority, Serbian political elites tried to take over Yugoslav federal control. As a result of careful maneuvering during the process of Serbian takeover-Yugoslavia attempt, Milošević assumed complete control in Serbia and later through carefully managed “dogadjanje naroda”⁵⁴ and “anti-bureaucratic revolution” managed to take the reins of the reduced Yugoslavia which tried unsuccessfully to become the continuer state of SFRY. By then, Kosovo was rocked by many ethnic Albanian protests and police crackdowns, while its institutions were stripped of all previous powers.⁵⁵ The carefully built Triangle of Accommodation was severely weakened. Priština University was closed and most of the Albanian bureaucrats were laid off,⁵⁶ so they started looking for new sources of survival. The ethnic Albanian political participation was reduced to just a few people. Although Vllasi was no longer just an ordinary local state implementor, he was still trying to uphold the severely weakened Triangle of Accommodation by playing the role of mediator between the ethnic separatists and state bureaucrats.⁵⁷ In such circumstances Milošević made a move to further orient his ostensibly populist policies “against the continuing social control of strongmen”⁵⁸ and employed ‘dirty tricks’ to uphold his agenda. After publicly denouncing Vllasi in 1988, Milošević famously promised his arrest at the ethnically charged Serbian public demonstrations.⁵⁹ As Vllasi was arrested a few days later, the Serbian state finally lost this last remnant of accommodation and the Triangle collapsed. This orientation of Milosevic was also well understood by Brubaker (1996) who correctly observed, that such moves “represented a fundamental and destabilizing challenge to the precarious national equilibrium constructed by Tito”⁶⁰ and ultimately undermined the whole constellation, which later collapsed under its own gravity.⁶¹

Milošević overlooked the fact that the state can only effectively express itself in the local *mélange* of organizations when existing local social settings are somehow severely disturbed,⁶² which was not the case at that time. Furthermore, “if discontented people have or get constructive means to attain their social and material goals, few will resort to violence”⁶³ and removal of Vllasi also removed the last possibility for a constructive means to resolve ethnic Albanian grievances.

The Serbian leader would try to replace Vllasi by appointing another ethnic Albanian politician, Rahman Morina as local Serbian state representative. But, Milošević forgot that even “local politics [is] vulnerable to damaging publicity.”⁶⁴ Morina’s local authority was already severely compromised because of his role as a police chief in the harsh crackdown on Albanian demonstrators. Such moves only enhanced the feeling that Albanian political dominance in the territory where they were an absolute majority was in severe danger. Such perception of threat caused outbidding and separatist tendencies to grow.⁶⁵ Thus, Vllasi’s removal served as an important impetus for increased ‘groupness’ among Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians, which increased the mobilization capabilities of those fractions among them that sought the full secession from Serbia.

Additionally, Milošević never had time to develop the “myriad of other agencies, each effective in delivering some components for strategies of survival [usually] offered by state”⁶⁶ in order to keep loyalties tied to the state and allow for effective interactions between the state and society at the middle level of state political life where resources are being allocated. Therefore the maneuver with a

new implementor “took on unexpected dimension and deprived state leaders of the concentrated social control and mobilization capabilities they had sought [and new] state figures could not overcome the [increased] fragmentation of social control.”⁶⁷ So when the Serbian state tried to “become a presence [among ethnic Albanian] society”⁶⁸ in Kosovo, the attempt utterly failed because there were no more meeting points between the two, and “no state can achieve predominance without local representatives pressing forward the state’s social control, rules of the game, and strategies of survival.”⁶⁹ The state “weakness in affecting goal-oriented social challenge”⁷⁰ became all too obvious especially after ethnic Albanians created parallel political structures throughout Kosovo – structures that were much more capable in mobilizing local population than the Serbian state.⁷¹ When Milosevic pragmatically turned the knob of violence even more with attempted genocide and expulsion of the entire ethnic Albanian population from Kosovo, he only further hampered his prospects of keeping Kosovo with Serbia because it made Albanian calculations simpler. For ethnic Albanians, at that point, independence was not just one of the political options anymore, but it was *the only* option. Therefore, it is not far-fetched to say that Milosevic’s pragmatism actually provided the possibility for the total mobilization of the Kosovo Albanian population towards that goal.

End of Serbia with Kosovo, End of Milošević

Without the moderation of Vllasi, ethnic Albanian separatist arguments became strengthened and were soon set on the path of complete separation. As it was observed in other cases,⁷² once such path is taken, it becomes almost impossible for players to stop the political game where the end is independence. The long-sought ethnic Albanian political aspirations in Kosovo⁷³ were relatively easily re-awakened as the right opportunity presented itself.⁷⁴ Milošević misplayed the game and lost not only the local implementor and the state territory, but his own political life.

This instance of state collapse showcased that “state leaders [are] able to deposit most individual strongmen with little difficulty. But one must be extremely cautious before equating a growing state apparatus and ability to get rid of a strongman with a state predominance.”⁷⁵ Furthermore, it shows that a regime’s repression ability is not enough to implement policies, and/or to keep diverse countries together. Milošević’s regime in Serbia was more oppressive than Tito’s regime, and it failed. Milošević obviously did not know that “leaders must know when to move and against whom [and that] changing conditions demand pragmatism in their approach.”⁷⁶ In order to preserve himself in power, he instead rigidly followed the nationalistic agendas, and was effectively duped by the ostensible overwhelming strength of the Serbian state military might over ethnic Albanians. Milošević’s policies did not work as intended, and Vllasi outlived his political hangman. Despite his ouster in 1988, Vllasi later became the ethnic Albanian special advisor during the negotiations over the final status of Kosovo. On the other end, Serbs could not forgive Milošević for the loss of Kosovo. He went from a national hero to a despised person who was refused a proper burial by the Serbian Orthodox Church and was rather conspicuously buried in the backyard of his family home in Požarevac instead of in a proper cemetery.⁷⁷

Additional support for the argument of the broken Triangle of Accommodation can be further obtained if a comparison is made with another Serbian Autonomous Region of Vojvodina which did not secede, despite the wishes of some local groups. However, the difference between Vojvodina and Kosovo with a *single* local implementor/strong man Azem Vllasi and non-Serb majority, was that Vojvodina had a multitude of local strong men and implementors and numerical and political domination of the Serbian ethnic group. With all these various players the Triangle in Vojvodina could not play the full role of balancing as described by Migdal since the state has overwhelmed all those different and fragmented groups.⁷⁸ Many of the local strong men in Vojvodina were supporting the state and behaving “as state leaders wanted,”⁷⁹ and implementors like Mihajlo Kertes⁸⁰ had only to worry about how to control and redistribute economic benefits to all of them, rather than oppose

their separatist tendencies. Therefore, any comparison of the two Serbia's Autonomous Regions has to be carefully structured, because with multiple minorities, Vojvodina itself is a much more heterogenous region than Kosovo. As such, Vojvodina is the region with a fragmented and weaker society and stronger presence of the state.

Furthermore, considering the near-genocidal outcome in the attempt to remove the ethnic Albanian population from Kosovo by the Serbian regime, this example of the disruption of the political maneuvering around the Triangle of Accommodation, can indicate that the regime might *possibly* adopt severe policies when it loses the critical local implementor in a country with just two dominant *ethnies*.⁸¹ The observed disruptions can serve as an early call for mobilization to prevent such outcomes. This analysis should remind us that the leaders in multiethnic states have to pay close attention to the Triangle of Accommodation in order to keep the state together. Therefore, we should carefully study the dynamic of this case, not because as H. Charles Woods would say "it is simply prudent to learn about it because its messes might become ours"⁸² describing the Balkans long ago, but because similar multiethnic constellations still exist in many other countries in the world.

Although Migdal used his framework to observe why and how leaders of newly independent nations failed in their ambitious goals to implement their programs and policies to develop their countries, we can also use his model to understand why and *how* some countries plunged into civil wars, and dissolutions and the role the individual agent played in that process. This is mainly due to Migdal's attention to the middle level of internal politics played in the Triangle of Accommodation in each country.

Therefore, by utilizing Migdal's framework, an examination of Kosovo's separation from Serbia shows that the main indicator of the successful ethnic mobilization and drive to full secession could simply be caused by the mistake of an important political actor at the middle level of political action. This is not to say that attention to the individual actors and activities around them are the sole factors providing a full explanation as to *why* the separation happened. Far from that. Even from the brief historical overview of the long-sought Albanian aspirations in Kosovo provided elsewhere,⁸³ it is clearly shown that it was only a matter of time as to when the separation would occur. Yet this fact suggests even more that it is indeed interesting to observe how that long-sought aspiration unfolded. This focus on individual agents involved in the process provide a better understanding on *how* the action played out on the mezzo level of politics in this case. To use Žižek's metaphor, this analysis helps us understand how the last letter-bomb which returned to Milošević exploded in his face.⁸⁴

Notes

¹ In a recent case, the first of its kind, the International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law. The Court issued its opinion in response to the request of the UN and many point that its ruling could have important consequences for the existing world order of states and other separatist movements.

² Joel S. Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States. State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988)

³ Although ethnic Albanian majority inhabitants call it Kosova, in this paper it will be referred to as Kosovo since that is how it is usually referred to by the international treaties and agreements. For example see United Nations Peacemaker. "Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo (Rambouillet Accords)" February 23, 1999. Accessed December 11, 2013, <http://peacemaker.un.org/kosovo-rambouilletagreement99>

⁴ Rogers Brubaker, *Ethnicity without Groups*. (Harvard, U.K.: Harvard University Press, 2006) 12.

⁵ Dragoljub R. Živojinović, "Islam in the Balkans: Origins and Contemporary Implications." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 3, no. 4 (1992): 51-65.

⁶ Robert J. Pranger, "The Milosevic and Islamization Factors: Writing Contemporary History in the Balkans." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 22 (2011), no. 1: 1-14.

⁷ To explain Milošević's Serbian nationalist mobilization against their Bosnian and Albanian neighbors, Pranger (2011, 5-6) concludes: "It should not have been surprising to outside observers that, with the breakup of Yugoslavia and the rise of a drive for independent statehood among Bosnia's Muslims, Serbs throughout the Balkans, most notably in Serbia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, should have yet again rushed to the barricades against another rising tide of Islam." The previous instance, for Pranger was probably the Ottoman conquest of the region several centuries earlier. In that sense Pranger is implicitly making a parallel of Bosniak and Albanian demands for national states same as the Ottoman conquest, even though both Bosniak and the majority of Albanians are autochthonous Muslims populations of the Balkans for last several centuries living in their own territories, with own independent cultural and political aspirations.

⁸ More recently Norwegian terrorist Breivik (2011) in his manifesto on almost 50 pages also wrote about the same 'Islamic danger' to Europe and often invoked forces created and led by Milošević as his forerunners. For more see Anders Behring Breivik, "2083: A European Declaration of Independence." *The Internet Archive*. (2011). Accessed June 11, 2012, https://archive.org/details/2083_A_European_Declaration_of_Independence

⁹ Živojinović, as quoted by Pranger, *Milosevic and Islamization*, 7.

¹⁰ Besides the episode of Milošević's burial, there are many other instances to show that Milošević was not popular in Serbia, particularly among Serbian nationalists, and that his support was obtained primarily through a strong authoritarian hand. Several attempts to assassinate Serbian über-nationalist Vuk Drašković, ordered by Milošević, could attest to that [for more see B92. "Ex- state security officials guilty in assassination case" June 19, 2012. Accessed Jun 19, 2012, http://www.b92.net/eng/news/crimes-article.php?yyyy=2012&mm=06&dd=19&nav_id=80845. Finally, Milošević even ordered the killing of his own ideological father, Serbian communist leader Ivan Stambolić, who was forced to dig his own grave on Fruška Gora before he was executed with a bullet in his head by the Serbian special police [for more see Gabriel Partos, "Analysis: Stambolić murder trial." February 23, 2004. Accessed August 25, 2012, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3511823.stm>. Stambolić is the former Yugoslav leader who was often credited with the resurgence of nationalism among Serbian communists, which Milošević joined as well, yet primarily for pragmatic reasons. For more see Nebojša Vladislavljević, "Institutional power and the rise of Milošević." *Nationalities Papers* 32, no. 1 (2004): 183-205.

¹¹ David N. Gibs, *First Do No Harm: Humanitarian Intervention and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*. (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2009)

¹² Despite Macedonia's secession which occurred at the same time and manner as in BiH, the Serbian-led Yugoslav People's Army did not fight the war with Macedonia because Serbia did not want to fight there. The same happened with Montenegro, which later seceded from Yugoslavia and Serbia. All other wars of former Yugoslavia, more or less, involved Serbia, from Slovenia, Croatia, BiH and finally Kosovo. Croatia was involved directly in the war in BiH and indirectly in Slovenia, but not in Kosovo. Montenegro was involved in Slovenia, Croatia and BiH, but not in Kosovo.

¹³ David D. Laitin, *Nations, State and Violence*. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007)

¹⁴ Aleksandar Pavković, "Multiculturalism as a Prelude to State Fragmentation: The Case of Yugoslavia." *Journal of Balkan and Near East Studies* 3/2 (2010): 131-143.

¹⁵ Although this is actually a common Serbian view, which alternatively implies that a more institutional centralism (presumably under Serbian control) will somehow preserve Yugoslavia. Yet the attempt to achieve such centralization was precisely what killed Yugoslavia. Sofos (1996) also notes a Serbian "popular concern such as the ever-widening Serbian perception that Yugoslavia was undermining 'Serbian rights'" which, I will add, often also permeates the literature on the Yugoslav crisis. For more on gendered violence in Kosovo see, Spyros A. Sofos, "Inter-Ethnic Violence and Gendered Constructions of Ethnicity in Former Yugoslavia," *Social Identities*, Vol. 2, Issue 1 (February, 1996), 73-92.

¹⁶ David Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. (Oakland, Ca: University of California Press, 1985).

¹⁷ Brian Shoup, *Conflict and Cooperation in Multi-Ethnic States: Institutional Incentives, Myths, and Counterbalancing*. (New York: Routledge, 2008).

¹⁸ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in New Europe*. (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 79.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 22.

²⁰ Vladislavljević, *Rise of Milošević*.

²¹ Gregory O. Hall, "The Politics of Autocracy: Serbia under Slobodan Milosevic." *East European Quarterly* 33, 2 (1999): 233-249, p. 238.

²² Hoare (2010, p.115) considers Milosevic's policies as a "fusion of socialism and nationalism," which places him ideologically very close to other European national-socialist situations. [Hoare, Marko Attila. "The War of Yugoslav Succession," in *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, edited by Ramet, Sabrina P. (Cambridge U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2010),111-135]. In his influential book on nationalism, especially in the mostly neglected chapter eight, Anderson establishes that nationalism and fascism (and national-socialism) are not the same phenomena, as the first has a basis in love and affection towards one's own nation, while the other concerns itself with the fear and hate of others. For more see Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. (New York: Verso, 1991) 141-154

²³ Laitin, *State and Violence*, 5.

²⁴ Weber, Max. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. Edited by Hans, H. Gerth and Mills C. Wright, Translated by H. H. Gerth and M. C. Wright, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd, 1952), 78.

²⁵ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 207.

²⁶ Woodward, Susan, L. *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1995) 4.

²⁷ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 256.

²⁸ Ted R. Gurr and Barbara Harff. *Ethnic conflict in world politics*, (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 2003),

²⁹ Brubaker (1996) notes that the process of "nation nationalizing" usually claims to remedy a "deficient or 'pathological' condition" (p. 79) of an imagined nation-state and, in the process, improves the position of a state 'owning' dominant group that was ostensibly "weakened and underdeveloped as a result of previous discrimination and repression" (Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 104).

³⁰ New York Times. "Wide anarchy in Austria." October 31, 1918. Accessed on 9/21/2013: http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9F01E1D61539E13ABC4953DFB7678383609EDE

³¹ This Yugoslavia was also often referred to as the 'Old Yugoslavia' by the local population.

³² Vlado Chernozemsky, the assassin of King Aleksandar I Karadjordjević, was a member of IMRO (the International Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). It is alleged that the Croatian Nazi group, "the Ustaše," was also involved in King Alexander's assassination. For more see Keith Brown, "The King is Dead, Long Live the Balkans! Watching the Marseilles Murders of 1934." (Conference Paper, Delivered at The Sixth Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Columbia University, New York, 2001). Accessed October 17, 2013, http://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/research/projects/terrorist_transformations/The_King_is_Dead.pdf.

³³ With over 1.5 million dead, over 10 percent of the total population, Yugoslavia was one of the countries with proportionally highest number of casualties during the WWII. Most of the victims were civilians killed in the interethnic strife.

³⁴ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 263.

³⁵ For more see Stavro Skendi, "Beginning of Albanian Nationalist Autonomous Trends: The Albanian League, 1878-1881. *American Slavic and East European Review* 12, no. 2 (1953): 219-232.

³⁶ Bogdan D. Dentich, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994) 100.

³⁷ With the titular importance of the region, the main ethnic group also gains "titular nationality" status. For more on the issue of titular nationality see Bremmer, as noted in Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transitions and Consolidation*, (John Hopkins Press, 1996) 389.

³⁸ Rankovic as a figure and as a metaphor resurfaced in Serbia in 1981, a few years before he died. Some allege that he was somewhat involved in the resurgence of Serbian nationalism of the 1980s, yet those claims are still inconclusive.

³⁹ Since the significant minority group is concentrated in one region of the country, adjacent to their own neighboring nation-state, if the group's demands for recognition, access and participation are ignored, they will likely and easily escalate to demand separation, autonomy and independence. For more, see Figure 2 and the first hypothetical situation in the relationship between the distribution of a minority group and its aspirations from Marvin W. Mikesell and Alexander B. Murphy, "A framework for Comparative Study of Minority Aspirations." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 81, no. 4 (Dec, 1991): 581-604, pp.585-586

⁴⁰ In an interview Vllasi claims that in one private conversation, Tito asked him what the main demands of ethnic Albanians were. After Vllasi told him, it is the status of the Republic for Kosovo, Tito said "You will

have everything, just don't insist on the term 'republic' now, since that is sensitive because of others. That will be resolved over time" (my translation). For more see Safet Šaćirović, "Azem Vlasi: Moja uloga u istoriji" [Azem Vllasi: My Role in History – my translation]. April 6, 2010. Accessed August 5, 2012, <http://www.autonomija.info/azem-vlasi-moja-uloga-u-istoriji.html>

⁴¹Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 264.

⁴² Because the mass demonstrations usually generate excitement with radical and utopian ideas, that further reduce the chances for compromise with the state, it is important for the popular mobilizations to be led by the organized elites who can articulate and/or escalate or de-escalate populous actions and demands. As it is noted by researchers [see Vladimir T. Ortakovski, "Interethnic Relations and Minorities in the Republic of Macedonia." *Southeast European Politics* 2, no. 1 (May, 2001): 24-45, 38], the vast number of Albanian elite intelligentsia throughout Macedonia, Kosovo and Montenegro attended the SFRY's only Albanian university in Priština" [Mirsad Krijestorac, "Democratic Transitions in new Multiethnic States: Case Comparison of Macedonia and Montenegro." *Istanbul Sebahattin Zaim University Journal of Social Science*, Spring 2013, 37-69] 44.

⁴³ "It is important to note that interstate relations between Albania and Yugoslavia were practically nonexistent during the Cold War. Albanian Stalinist leader Enver Hoxha, had sealed the borders in 1948 and maintained a generally hands-off policy towards the Albanian diaspora in Kosovo [and Yugoslavia]." International Crisis Group (10 July 1998) "The View from Tirana: The Albanian Dimension of the Kosovo Conflict." *ICG Balkans* 36:2 - as noted by Erin K. Jenne, *Ethnic Bargaining: The Paradox of Minority Empowerment*. (Cornell University Press, 2007) 164.

⁴⁴ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 273.

⁴⁵ Milorad Doderović, "Azem Vlasi ekskluzivno za 'Južne vesti'" [Azem Vllasi exclusively for 'South news'- my translation]. February 16, 2010. Accessed September 30, 2013, <http://www.juznevesti.com/Politika/Azem-Vlasi-ekskluzivno-za-Juzne-vesti.sr.html>.

⁴⁶ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 274.

⁴⁷ For more see Faton Raçi, "Demonstrations in Kosovo in 1981: The short history that preceded demonstrations, the reasons behind, media coverage and possible organizers." *KIJAC*, September, 14 (2009): 1-19.

⁴⁸ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 191.

⁴⁹ Although Migdal (1988, 256) notes that states often employ a local strongmen, or his cousin, as a local implementor to avoid tensions between those two levels of political influence, in the cases of Communism-ruled countries where many economic privileges customarily accompany political positions, we can easily see how a capable local implementor can maneuver himself into a position of one of the local strongmen as well. At that point it becomes even more important for a state to carefully manage and cultivate its relationship with such an implementor.

⁵⁰ In a televised speech Vllasi famously said "Albanians in Kosovo live freer in every aspect than Albanians in Albania" to answer Albanian president Enver Hoxha's assertions regarding ethnic Albanians in Kosovo issued at the Eight Congress of Albanian Party of Labor. Open Society Archives accessed on 7.21.2010 at: <http://files.osa.ceu.hu/holdings/300/8/3/text/85-3-38.shtm>

⁵¹ As it was correctly pointed, "men ordinarily expect to keep what they have; they also generally have a set of expectations and demands about what they should have in the future, which is usually as much or more than what they have at present." Ted R. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970) 27.

⁵² Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 239.

⁵³ *Ibid*, 27.

⁵⁴ "Dogadjanje naroda" could be translated as "people's self-actualization." The term was used by Milošević-controlled Serbian media to try to present the whole process of his take over as spontaneous and a result of people's will. LeBor (2002) notes how "a Serbian poet Milovan Vitezović proclaimed: The people have happened!" (p.109). However, the same author clarified that "although the rallies were presented as an expression of the 'spontaneous will of the people', they were nothing of that sort. They were highly planned and organized by Milosevic and the Serbian secret service, the SDB, designed to maintain a delicate balance between inciting fear and intimidation and actual violence." (p.106). For more see Adam LeBor, *Milošević: A Biography*. (London: Bloomsbury Publishing plc., 2002)

⁵⁵ Trix (2010, 361)) notes that after the Kosovo miners' strike in 1999, Milosevic sent in troops to rescind Kosovo's autonomy. He wanted the Kosovo Assembly to pass an amendment repealing its own veto power

previously established by the 1974 SFRY Constitution, to ensure Kosovo and Vojvodina's meaningful participation in decision-making in Serbia, under who's roof they were administratively placed as its two autonomous provinces. "On the day of the vote, the Assembly was surrounded by tanks and filled with Serb security police. No roll-call was taken. Most Albanian members chose to abstain, knowing that a two-thirds majority was required. The amendment was nevertheless declared passed." For more see Frances Trix, "Kosovo: Resisting Expulsion and Striving for Independence", in *Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989*, edited by Sabrina P. Ramet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 358-376.

⁵⁶ In his testimony Mahmut Bakarli, one of the prominent Kosovo Communist leaders, said at the Milosevic trial in Hague "People were thrown out of their jobs, they were thrown out of government offices, out of cultural affairs, out of education - in general out of social life." As reported by BBC. "First witness confronts Milosevic." February 18, 2002. Accessed on 8/20/2013, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1827565.stm>

⁵⁷ Vllasi for example visited protesting ethnic Albanian coal miners in Trepca (Stari Trg) in solidarity with them, while he still kept his political positions in regional political institutions all the way until 1988. For more on the dynamics of Albanian protests see Sabrina P. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: state building and legitimation, 1918 - 2005*. (Bloomington, In.: Indiana University Press, 2006). Also see Agneza Božić-Robertson, "Words Before the War: Milosevic's Use of Mass Media and Rhetoric to Provoke Ethnopolitical Conflict in Former Yugoslavia." *East European Quarterly*. 38, no. 4 (January, 2005): 395-408.

⁵⁸ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 265.

⁵⁹ Hall (1999) also suggests that "purges were another important tactic in Milošević's ascension to power" (237). For more also see Veljko Lalić, "Uhapsite Vlasija." [Arrest Vllasi – my translation]. July 06. 2009 http://www.pressonline.rs/sr/vesti/komentar_dana/story/67947/Uhapsite+Vlasija.html (accessed January 23, 2013).

⁶⁰ Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 70.

⁶¹ Hoare (2010) goes even further in classifying Milošević's Serbian tactic as a "rebellion against Titoism" (115).

⁶² Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 270-275.

⁶³ Gur, *Why Men Rebel*, 317.

⁶⁴ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 253.

⁶⁵ The same tendencies in multiethnic states are also observed by Shoup, *Conflict and Cooperation*.

⁶⁶ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 202.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 195.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 8.

⁶⁹ Ibid, 247.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 9.

⁷¹ Following the same pattern of the removal of the Tito-established institutions of balancing, on March 23, 1989, under the gaze of Milošević, Serbia amended its constitution so that it could take control over the Kosovo police force, courts, civil defense and education policy. This full loss of Kosovo's independent status was a wakeup call for the rest of the ethnic Albanian communist politicians who, after several political maneuvers, in September 1989, made a proclamation regarding their own Constitution with a new Assembly and a newly elected President, signaling the aspiration of their complete separation from Serbia. That provided fertile ground for the emergence of the Association of Philosophers and Sociologists of Kosovo and the Association of Writers of Kosovo, which later united into the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK), led by Ibrahim Rugova. The DLK then took the helm of the Kosovo Albanian struggle until the successful end and full separation from Serbia.

⁷² See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. (Hoboken, N.J.: Blackwell Publishers, 1988) 157

⁷³ For more see Skendi, *Albanian Nationalist Trends*.

⁷⁴ Also noted as a prelude for the growth of separatist tendencies in general by Smith, *Ethnic Origins*, 165.

⁷⁵ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 265.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 275.

⁷⁷ For more see Renate Flottau, "Milošević's Burial: Bidding Slobo Farewell." March 20, 2006. Accessed January 13, 2013, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,406927,00.html>

⁷⁸ Migdal (1988) points that, "the Triangle of Accommodation at the local level has meant that no single group – not implementors, local politicians, or strongmen – monopolizes power. Local politics has to reflect the bargaining strength of each of the actors" (252) and due to Kertes' exclusive ties with the state leader, the Migdal's Triangle of Accommodation cannot be successfully used as a framework for observation of Vojvodina's situation.

⁷⁹ Migdal, *Strong Societies*, 5.

⁸⁰ LeBor (2003, p.95) describes Kertes as an ethnic Hungarian and Milosevic's most important ally. He was connected to the SDB through the man who ran the organization, Jovica Stanišić, known as Milošević's intelligence chief. Both Kertes and Stanišić were from the same, very small town of Bačka Palanaka in Vojvodina. After the Yugoslav dissolution wars have ended, Kertes was tried for the embezzlement of 120 million German Marks from Serbia to Cyprus on behalf of Milosevic, while his colleague Stanišić, it turns out, was a double agent and was actually working for both the Serbian intelligence and the American CIA. For more see Greg Miller, "Serbian Spy's Trail Lifts Cloak on His CIA Alliance" March 01, 2009. Accessed 28 February 2014, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/01/world/fg-serbia-spy-cia>

⁸¹ It is interesting that single agent removal in Rwanda was the trigger for the carnage there, which could again point to the importance of the Triangle of Accommodation established among the individual political actors in a multiethnic state.

⁸² As mentioned by Katherine Elizabeth Fleming, "Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography." *The American Historical Review* 105, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 1218-1233, p.1226.

⁸³ Krijestorac, *Transitions in Multiethnic States*, 42-44.

⁸⁴ "For years, Milošević was sending letter- bombs to his neighbors, from the Albanians to Croatia and Bosnia, keeping himself out of the conflict while igniting fire all around Serbia – finally, his last letter returned to him" [Slavoj Žižek, "Against the Double Blackmail." *New Left Review* I, no. 234 (March-April, 1999): 76-82] 76.