


International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS)

ISSN: 2667-8268

<https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijps>



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Source : International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS) / Vol. 5 / No. 1 / May 2023, pp. 19-72

DOI: 10.53451/ijps.1174300

Date of Arrival : 12.09.2022

Date of Acceptance : 11.02.2023

To cite this article:

Ariba, Mariam. "Mutual-Grand Strategy Modeling of the Russia-Ukraine War 2022: Balancing the Unbalanced". *International Journal of Politics and Security (IJPS)*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2023, pp. 19-72, DOI: 10.53451/ijps.1174300

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Mutual-Grand Strategy Modeling of the Russia-Ukraine War 2022: Balancing the Unbalanced¹

Mariam Ariba²

Abstract

This paper strategizes the Russian-Ukrainian War 2022 based on a game theory and hyper-game theory perspective. Setting the most optimal strategies described and prescribed for each conflicting party is the main objective of this Mutual-Grand Strategy Modeling.

At the core, theorizing the actual war situation through four waves predicting this war's multiple possibilities, and explaining the grand strategy made by each side reflects the manner under which the rationality argument and utility assumptions of a (hyper) game theory situation exist.

It is claimed that by applying a developed balance of deterrence rules and the related equilibria, the war can be terminated by each wave's end in either a theoretic-strategic diplomatic way, military victory, or both.

Keywords: *Deterrence; (Grand) Strategy; Equilibrium; War; Russia; Ukraine; Alliance; Balance.*

1. Introduction

Since the Russian-Ukrainian War possibility became a fact by February 24, 2022, when Russia initiated its invasion of Ukraine, this theoretic analysis deals with war strategies under a grand strategy built mutually for both parties; (Russia) as a (Wave Player “WP”), and (Ukraine and NATO under the US leadership) as a (Counter-Wave Player “CWP”). Strategizing the war theoretically aims to introduce a prediction of every side's game or hypergame but by explaining all sides' (possible) strategies made in interaction with the other(s), considering that they are all rational players seeking to maximize their utility in the war at one another's expense. Therefore, what might be an uncertainty becomes almost a certainty through this modeling of a mutual-grand strategy. Here, no equilibria are referred to in general, however, particularly by shedding light on what we call a (Deterrence Entanglement

¹ This modeling has been built by early April 2022, when the latest updates of the Russia-Ukraine War 2022 were represented in “Ukrainian forces have regained control of large areas around the capital Kyiv as Russian forces withdraw and refocus their efforts on operations in the east of the country,” where the latest developments on day 40 of the invasion that began by February 24, 2022, were: “Russian forces abandon efforts to take the capital Kyiv; Russia is now believed to be refocusing on the Donbas region; Ukraine accuses Russian troops of massacring civilians in the town of Bucha; Fighting continues in the (mostly occupied) port city of Mariupol” (David Brown, Bella Hurrell, Dominic Bailey, Mike Hills, Lucy Rodgers, Paul Sargeant, Mark Bryson, Zoe Bartholomew, Sean Willmott, Sana Dionysiou, Joy Roxas, Gerry Fletcher, Jana Tauschinsk, Debie Loizou and Prina Shah, “Ukraine War in Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion,” BBC News, April 4, 2022. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60506682>).

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Law “DEL”) that we developed and published elsewhere, and on this (DEL)’s relevant equilibria cases that focus on achieving a *balance of deterrence* for impeding the conflict or war between nations. While concentrating on revealing how each wave of the concerned war can be the possible path to end this war, relying simultaneously on applying (DEL)’s Relative Balance Rule, Outright Balance Rule, or Incomplete Balance Rule, we address the (Attack) and (Defense) strategies for both players first in an attempt to contain the scale and level of war at each wave’s end.

Based on that, by strategizing four waves of the Russo-Ukrainian War 2022, this modeling anticipates what might occur in this war in assumingly its first, second, third, and fourth stages, answering:

- a. What strategies should every player use as a rational actor at every War Wave?
- b. What are the counter-strategies that the other should use in response?
- c. At every wave’s end, how a diplomatic exit can be traced for ending the war?
- d. If the war escalates to be a major one, how will this occur, and simultaneously how will such a possibility be eliminated or contained in scale and level?

Depending on a game and hyper-game-theoretical analysis, we developed this modeling, focusing on revealing the weak points in the second actor’s interactions by providing a (Counter-Wave) in each War Wave besides the (Wave) of the first actor. If this modeling is not ideal enough, it is applicable and prescribing matters as how they ought to be, after describing how they are, for containing the war while deterring the opponent (i.e., the Wave-Player) sufficiently as possible as we could deduce. When concluding this work, which we call the “Mutual-Grand Strategy Modeling of the Russia-Ukraine War,” we prove that our developed (Deterrence Entanglement Law/DEL) can be restored and maintained to precluding this war re-initiation possibility in the future under an (Outright Balance Rule).

2. Theoretical Assumptions and Configurations

For a (Future Advance Towards Victory, “FA-V”)’s Distance, we consider that $\{(-6 \text{ DU})_v > (-5 \text{ DU})_v > (-4 \text{ DU})_v > (-3 \text{ DU})_v > (-2 \text{ DU})_v > (-1 \text{ DU})_v > (0 \text{ DU})_v > (1 \text{ DU})_v > (2 \text{ DU})_v > (3 \text{ DU})_v > (4 \text{ DU})_v > (5 \text{ DU})_v > (6 \text{ DU})_v\}$, where (DU) is the (Distance Unit), and (v) is the (Value) of (DU). Where the (Distance Unit “DU”) is a mathematical tool that we set to use in referring to the distance that exists for a player (x) or (y) from/to their (Future Advance Towards Victory)/(FA-V).



Also, we assume that there is an Infinite Distance Unit (∞ DU) resembling the less value (v) ever of any {DU (FA-V)}, and ($-\infty$ DU) that is the highest value ever of {DU (FA-V)}. Thence, the less the Distance Unit number is, the higher value it reflects for the (Wave Player, “WP”) or (Counter-Wave Player, “CWP”).

Most importantly, according to this modeling’s configurations, we assume that: The “War Length (WL)” factor for the (WP) or (CWP), if added to the “Stabilization of War Objectives (SWO)” factor for the same player, both result in indicating the “Distance Unit (DU)” of the player from its “Future Advance Towards Victory (FA-V)” factor. We denote this relationship in symbols within this equation:

$$\{ (WL) + (SWO)_{(WP/CWP)} \simeq DU (FA-V)_{(WP/CWP)} \}$$

Based on this relationship, we could calculate the level of moving toward (Victory) or (Defeat) at the end of every wave for a player. Adding to that that we consider other variables and assumptions in the such calculation, as to follow.

Defining who is the (Attacker) and who is the (Attacked or Defender) in the given War Wave, where the (Attack-Defense) Key Wave Strategy means that a player is the (Attacker) using the (Attack) strategy primarily, and (Defense) is merely a counter-strategy. Likewise, the (Defense-Attack) Key Wave Strategy refers to that a player is the (Attacked/Defender) using the (Defense) strategy principally, and (Attack) is merely a counter-strategy.

What level of strategies is relied on by the (Attacker) in a War Wave, where there is either (Attacker and Defender) or (Defender and Attacker) mainly in each wave? Given that any become in play under (Attack-Defense) Key Wave Strategy, (Level I Strategies “LIs”) mean that a player is using *less intensified* strategic tactics in both (scale, level, and effect). Comparingly, (Level II Strategies “LIIs”) refer to the dependence of an (Attacker) in a wave on *more intensified* strategic tactics in the (scale, level, and effect) than those of (Level I Strategies). So, (Level III Strategies “LIIs”) are the *highest and most intensified* strategic tactics ever in the (scale, level, and effect) used in our (Mutual-Grand Strategy Modeling of the Russia-Ukraine War).

There is an *inverse relationship* that we defined and re-used in our calculation of the (Victory-Defeat) relationship by each wave’s end, between a (Distance Unit) for a Player x “(Px)” from its (Future Advance Towards Victory) and the (Distance Unit) for the other, Player



y “(Py),” from its (Future Advance Towards Victory). Namely, the closer the {DU (FA-V)} for (Px) is, where the less (DU)’s number indicates a higher value it yields, the farther the {DU (FA-V)} for (Py) is in the same level and scale. For example, if the {DU (FA-V)_{Px}} is (-3), it means not only that (Px) is closer to its (FA-V) but also that (Py) is farther from its (FA-V) in exactly (3 DU). Specifically, we assumed that in a *war-zero-sum game*, a *victory* for one conflicting party reverses the *defeat* for the other (i.e., the enemy), and vice versa, as follows:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \{- \text{DU (FA-V)}_{Px}\} & \longleftrightarrow & \{+ \text{DU (FA-V)}_{Py}\} \\ \text{(Victory for One/Per Wave)} & & \text{(Defeat for the Other/Per Wave)} \end{array}$$

We assume that the (Distance Unit “DU”) between the (Wave “W”) and (Counter-Wave “CW”) in any War Wave is equal to the {DU (FA-V)} of the (Attacked), either (WP) or (CWP), achieved by a previous wave’s end. In other words, the more defeated the (Attacked) is regarding its {DU (FA-V)} by a wave’s end, the farther the distance must be between the (W) and (CW) in a new War Wave in real-world circumstances. Alternatively, the (DU) between the (W) and (CW) in a War Wave is equal to the {DU (FA-V)} of both players if this {DU (FA-V)} for the (WP) and (CWP) are equal (i.e., this case is to occur in the First War-Wave only when the two players begin the war from a status quo’s (DU)-estimates, the “5 DU”).

The (Level I Strategies) causes a less deviation in (DU) for a player than (Level II Strategies) than (Level III Strategies); namely, {(DU) LI_S > (DU) LII_S > (DU) LIII_{S}}} for the (Attacker) player, where the more intensified strategies used by this (Attacker), the closer it becomes to its (FA-V) and the less its relevant (DU) is. That is the less (DU) number, the higher value it gives, and vice versa. So, we can argue that the (+ ∞ DU) of (FA-V) reflects the least value ever with the (Distance) is infinite, and likewise, the (- ∞ DU) represents the highest value ever for a (Distance Unit) to (Future Advance Towards Victory) for a (Wave Player) or (Counter-Wave Player) where the (Distance) to (FA-V) ceases to exist.

Contextually, in this modeling, a. the (WP) in (W₁), who is the (Attacker), using the (LI_S) could transform its (FA-V) position in this wave of war from {(5DU) to (-3 DU)}, in decline in (Distance) estimated by totally (8 DU); b. the (CWP) in (W₂), who is the (Attacker), using the (LII_S) could transform its (FA-V) position in the wave from {(3 DU) to (-6 DU)}, in decline in (Distance) estimated by (9 DU) in total; c. the (WP) in (W₃), the (Attacker), using the (LII_S) could transform its (FA-V) position from {(6 DU) to (-3 DU)}, in decline in



(Distance) estimated by (9 DU) in total; d. the (CWP) in (W_4), who is the (Attacker), using the (LIIs) could shift its (FA-V) position from $\{(3 \text{ DU}) \text{ to } (-\infty \text{ DU})\}$, in decline in (Distance) estimated by an (Infinite DU).

The (Stabilization of War Objectives “SWO”) indicators over time are in a *direct relationship* with these of the $\{\text{DU (FA-V)}\}$, given that the less (DU) number means its higher value and that a player is closer to its (FA-V), and vice versa. Likewise, on the ordinal numbers line, the higher number of the (SWO) indicator, in relation to the “War Length (WL)” index, refers to the less value for a player, and the lower (SWO)-indicator number reflects the higher value for the same player. Here, we prepared a short classification of six categories of the (WL) indexes, as follows: a. with the first four months of the war passing, when the war takes place in this period, we refer to that by (-1); b. with the second four months of the war passing, we refer to that by (-2); c. with the third four months of the war passing, we refer to that by (-3); now, it is the first year of the war. Sequentially, in the second year of the war: a. with the first four months passing, it is (-4); b. with the second four months passing, it is (-5); c. with the third four months passing, it is (-6). We provide below two examples of that:

The first example, what are the (SWO)-indicator values over two years of the war, if the $\{\text{DU (FA-V)}\}$ value for the player (x) “(Px)” is (-3), and the $\{\text{DU (FA-V)}\}$ value for the player (y) “(Py)” is (3), given that both (DU) are calculated through knowing the (Strategies Level) used by the (Attacker “(Px)”) against the (Attacked “(Py)”)?

Based on having both players’ $\{\text{DU (FA-V)}\}$ as a *static given* along with two war-years, not an (actually) variable one, and considering that $\{ (\text{WL}) + (\text{SWO})_{(\text{WP/CWP})} \approx \text{DU (FA-V)}_{(\text{WP/CWP})} \}$, we can introduce these six results of the (SWO)-indicator values for the (Px) where its $\{\text{DU (FA-V)}\}$ value is (-3): a. If the (WL)-index value is (-1) where the war is passing its first four months of the first year, then the (SWO)-indicator value is (-2); b. if the (WL)-index values consecutively are $\{(-2); (-3); (-4); (-5); (-6)\}$ for the remaining (WL)-index’s categories, then the (SWO)-indicator values respectively are $\{(-1); (0); (1); (2); (3)\}$.

Where $\{(12v) < (11v) < (10v) < (9v) < (8v) < (7v) < (6v) < (5v) < (4v) < (3v) < (2v) < (1v) < (0v) < (-1v) < (-2v) < (-3v) < (-4v) < (-5v) < (-6v) < (-7v) < (-8v) < (-9v) < (-10v) < (-11v) < (-12v)\}$ for the (SWO) indicator, since the $\{\text{DU (FA-V)}\}$ is estimated by considering the least number as the highest value (v) in a given context.



Similarly, these are the six (SWO)-indicator's values for the (Py) where its $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ value is (3): a. If the (WL)-index value is (-1) where the war is passing its first four months of the first year, then the (SWO)-indicator value is (4); b. if the (WL)-index values consecutively are $\{(-2); (-3); (-4); (-5); (-6)\}$ for the other (WL)-index's categories, then the (SWO)-indicator values respectively are $\{(5); (6); (7); (8); (9)\}$.

The second example, what are the (SWO)-indicator values over two years of the war, if the $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ value for the player (x) " (Px) " is (-6), and the $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ value for the player (y) " (Py) " is (6), given that the (DU) is calculated through knowing the (Strategies Level) used by the (Attacker " (Px) ") against the (Attacked " (Py) ")?

Based on having the $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ as a static given during two years of the war, not an (actually) variable one, and considering that $\{(WL) + (SWO)_{(WP/CWP)} \approx DU (FA-V)_{(WP/CWP)}\}$, these are the six resulting values of the (SWO)-indicator for the (Px) where its $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ value is (-6): a. If the (WL)-index value is (-1) where the war is passing its first four months of the first year, then the (SWO)-indicator value is (-5); b. if the (WL)-index values consecutively are $\{(-2); (-3); (-4); (-5); (-6)\}$ for the rest of the (WL)-index's categories, then the (SWO)-indicator values respectively are $\{(-4); (-3); (-2); (-1); (0)\}$.

Likewise, these are the six (SWO)-indicator's values for the (Py) where its $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ value is (6): a. If the (WL)-index value is (-1) where the war is passing its first four months of the first year, then the (SWO)-indicator value is (7); b. if the (WL)-index values consecutively are $\{(-2); (-3); (-4); (-5); (-6)\}$ for the remaining (WL)-index's categories, then the (SWO)-indicator values respectively are $\{(8); (9); (10); (11); (12)\}$.

Lastly: Strategic Explanation, first: Based on the configurations mentioned above, we conclude that:

a. The same $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ is associated with an (SWO)-indicator value decreasing gradually over time, coinciding with the (WL)-index extension with the war range increasing to be more extended or protracted. More obviously, whenever the (WL) stretches to be longer, whenever the (SWO)-indicator value becomes reduced over time, at the same $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ for a player, where the less (DU) number means the higher value of a player's (FA-V).

b. The higher the value of the $\{DU (FA-V)\}$ for a player is, the higher the (SWO)-indicator value is, correspondently, over a specific period. This relationship is denoted in this



formula: $\{(6 DU)_v < (3 DU)_v < (-3 DU)_v < (-6 DU)_v\}$ where, symmetrically, $\{(7v) < (4v) < (-2v) < (-5v)\}$ of the (SWO)-indicator} for $\{(Py); (Py); (Px); (Px)\}$ respectively, given that the (WL)-index lies in the first category of (-1) value with the war taking place in the first four months of the first year in these cases.

Second: On the strategic modeling of a mutual-grand strategy of the war.

The (W_1) of the Russia-Ukraine War is the most direct one, where the (Attacker) or (Wave Player “WP”) formerly concluded all possible taken moves by the (Counter-Wave Player “CWP”) and therefore what the last (i.e., the Attacked) might consider as its (Attack) strategy is originally a (Defense) one. By explaining famous repeated strategies made by (CWP) in (W_1) , we build on that to move into (W_2) when we correct the counter-strategies as they must be, not as they are, facilitating this player’s way towards victory by either method mentioned at any War Wave to follow. So, it is modeling prescribing the most optimal decision-making process to be made during the war by both sides, helping the (CWP) counter the invasion in the perfect way ever where the scale and level of the war are maintained contained along with the war’s diverse trajectories. That is to say; the (WP) can move forward and defeat the (CWP) fiercely in the present and future if, and only if, the last did *not* make those most rational actions (i.e., decisions) that are introduced in our modeling, leaving the war shift from a stage to another based upon the way the (WP) shapes. Here, we depend, in this game-and-hypergame theoretic strategic modeling and analysis, on explaining each wave of the war by focusing on three interrelated elements:

- a. War Objectives and the War Wave’s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively.
- b. The (WP)’s Major Strategies in Interaction with the (CWP)’s or vice versa.
- c. The Wave’s Outputs and the Diplomatic Exit Possibility.

3. The First War-Wave “ (W_1) ”

3.1. War Objectives and the War Wave’s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively

The (WP)’s Key Strategic Objective in (W_1) is the (Territory Invasion) of Ukraine, where it uses the (Attack-Defense “A-D”) Key Wave-Strategy, deriving from this one other five major strategies. The (A-D) means that the (WP) uses the (Attack) strategy mainly by initiating the invasion primarily, while the (Defense) is a counter-strategy versus the (CWP)’s



(Counter-Attacks). Contradictorily, the (CWP)'s Key Strategic Objective in (W_1) is the (Territorial Sovereignty) of Ukraine, where it uses the (Defense-Attack "D-A") Key Wave-Strategy, deriving from this one other five major strategies. The (D-A) means that the (CWP) uses the (Defense) strategy principally in response to the (WP)'s initiated invasion (i.e., the "Attack" strategy), while the (CWP)'s (Attack) is merely a counter-strategy.

The (W_1)'s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively are: "Economic Sanctions; Alliance Building; Media and Propaganda; Collective Security; Military Preeminence," with the (Diplomacy and Negotiation) possible exit; see Figure 1.

3.2. The (WP)'s Major Strategies in Interaction with the (CWP)'s:

As mentioned above, this wave's strategies are so repeated in relation to the (WP) and (CWP)'s used strategies in our real-world circumstances; still, it is necessary to define better counter-strategies for the (CWP).




Figure 1: The Russia-Ukraine War's First War-Wave (W_1)



First, while (CWP) pushes for the expected (Imposing Economic Sanctions) on (WP) major strategy, the last could use (Maneuvering) over that where the (Invasion Continuity) takes place.

Second, with (CWP) moving to the (Empowering Alliance Building) major strategy, the (Attacker) or invader (WP) moves, even earlier, to the (Counter-Alliance and Balancing Power) one, utilizing the leverage it enjoys over many former Soviet Republics and Eastern bloc states.

Third, the (WP) depends on the media as a (Pro-Invasion) *war* machine, whereas the (CWP) attempts to rely on it as an (Anti-Invasion) *peace* machine.

Fourth, the (CWP) prefers the (Collective Security) strategy choice, perceiving that it is (Besieging the Opponent) mainly by i. its imposed sanctions that are *not* de facto binding to all states where none is forced to be subjugated to their implementation mechanisms, particularly, those of the former Eastern bloc and Russia's client states, and also, by ii. causing casualties on the enemy's side, the (WP), depends on:

i. outnumbering its enemy, the Ukrainian army, in battle zones and using more advanced war weaponry while being strategically strong and highly organized,

ii. using mercenaries, thus decreasing its casualties to a minimum level to the extent that the (WP)'s people can hardly notice that there is a war and invasion relevant-human cost,

iii. the fear it did/does create inside the European peoples' minds and hearts from a major war, thus pushing them out of the battle perpetually, easily "hunting" the Ukrainians, and gradually causing severe casualties on their side. That is credible by targeting not mercenaries but ordinary soldiers in actual human losses deeply inside the Ukrainian society, killing civilians on the road and harshly defeating this lonely army more (i.e., Ukraine's).

Therefore, it is direct to conclude that the (WP) uses the (Collective Security) Dominant Strategy for a (Counter-Besieging) strategic purpose versus the (CWP), relying on:

a. causing terrible human losses on the Ukrainian side;

b. creating an unprecedented immigration crisis in Europe by pushing millions outside Ukraine to other European states, hindering their economic expansion and achievements by causing economic crises and recession over time;



c. controlling the oil and food supplies from Ukraine to Europe and other places in the world. Here, it seems that in the future, the (WP) is going to counter-deterrence even more heavily, coinciding with each inch it achieves regarding the territorial advance in Ukraine, as explained later.

d. If we add to that that the (WP) capability to manage the Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea, and therefore, the oil tunnels and ships' navigation over this strategic area on behalf of "Liberated" (Russian-backed-Ukrainian separatists), it is a matter of time, with NATO leaving the Ukraine army facing this enemy alone, till the (WP) gains the momentum, advancing strongly in the Black Sea region, and the invasion is to be a multi-invasion. However, through the next waves, we prevent the (WP)'s possible territorial advance by prescribing more balanced-strategic interactions, relying on the rationality argument of both.

Fifth, on the (Military Preeminence) Dominant Strategy of (W_1), it appears that the (WP) depends on (Deception-Oriented-Extended War) tactics and stratagems, while the "tolerant" (CWP) uses (Perception-Based War Tactics).

3.3. The Wave's Outputs and the Diplomatic Exit Possibility

a. The First War-Wave's Outputs

For the (WP) using "only," the "Level I Strategies," which are the less intensified ones on level, scale, and effect, in attacking Ukraine as a protégé to NATO, Europe, and the US, the (Output)₁, for the (WP) or the (Attacker), is (Further Expansion), while the (Output)₂, for the (CWP) or the (Attacked), is (Counter-Expansion). Whereas both actors began the war where we assume that each one is far from its Key Strategic Objective of the war or (Future Advance Towards Victory "FA-V") in about (5 DU), the military preeminence with other major strategies played by the (WP), helped this actor get closer to its (FA-V) where the relevant (DU) became (-3). This (temporal) victory of (WP), the {-3 DU (FA-V)}, marks in an opposite relationship a (temporal) defeat on the other side of the (CWP), which is reversely equal in level and scale to the (WP)'s victory, where the (CWP)'s (DU) from its (FA-V) becomes (3), by the (W_1) end.

Although the (CWP)'s { DU (FA-V)} decreased from (5 DU) of the status quo to (3 DU) according to the (WP)'s opposite indicator, this refers to that: the major strategies played out by (CWP) had a role in getting it a little closer, however, still far, from its (FA-V). Since



If (CWP) accepts, the war ends by this stage; however, the (WP) could gain an unexpected future opportunity to advance deeply inside Ukraine on any occasion since it did not achieve its complete Key Strategic Objective of the (Territory Invasion) of Ukraine and not merely territorial parts. Adding to that, establishing a Soviet/Russian Ukraine in Eastern Ukraine grants the (WP) the leverage it exactly needs to conquer former Soviet/Communist Republics once the Russian-backed separatists in these states realize and witness that “Mother Russia” is a credible “Mom”! The probability (p) of the diplomatic exit possibility by the (W_1)’s end is ($0.5 \leq p \leq 1$) under uncertainty, deception, and (intentional) misperception conditions, while it is ($0 \leq p < 1$) under certainty and correct perception circumstances.

4. The Second War-Wave (W_2)

4.1. War Objectives and the War Wave’s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively

The (WP)’s Key Strategic Objective in (W_2) is still the (Territory Invasion) of Ukraine; however, it uses the (Defense-Attack “D-A”) Key Wave-Strategy instead, while relying on this key one in playing five major strategies. The (D-A) refers to the that (WP) uses the (Defense) strategy principally in confronting the (CWP)’s (Attacks) in a second wave, where the (WP)’s (Attack) strategy is only a counter-one versus (CWP). On the other hand, the (CWP)’s Key Strategic Objective in (W_2) shifted to be (International Security), activating the (Attack-Defense “A-D”) Key Wave-Strategy, deriving from the other five major strategies. The (A-D) means that (CWP) uses the (Attack) strategy mainly against (WP), while the (Defense) is merely a counter-strategy versus (WP)’s (Counter-Attacks).

The (W_2)’s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively are: “Preventive Threats; Creating Enemies; Media & War Manipulation; Collective Security; Military Preeminence,” whereas “Diplomacy and Negotiation” is a possible diplomatic exit by the wave’s end; see Figure 2.




Figure 2: The Russia-Ukraine War's Second War Wave (W₂)



4.2. The (CWP)'s Major Strategies in Interaction with the (WP)'s:

In (W₁), (NATO and the US) have left (Ukraine) alone in the battle zones to face an enemy that overwhelms it strategically, in numbers, and weaponry. However, in (W₂), the (CWP) in its dual part (i.e., NATO under the US leadership and Ukraine) collide against (WP) in a “*Chain of Deterrence-via-War*” active (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy, that might end the war by this wave, or in a Fourth War-Wave to follow.

First, under (Preventive Threats) (W₂)'s Dominant Strategy, the (CWP) becomes better off by preparing a *strategic surprise* by (Destabilizing the Enemy's “Victory” Status Quo in CASO). (CASO) is an abbreviation referring to that (CWP) should open four fronts of fighting against (WP), still indirectly, though, to avoid the major war possibility (at least, if it is to be a major war in the Third War Wave at the (WP)'s hands, then through this made action, it will be limited in scale and level as explained in the Fourth War-Wave if a diplomatic exit does not succeed by the (W₂) and (W₃)'s end).

We can explain the (CASO) four military fronts that the (CWP) opens to weaken the (WP) from the heart as follows:

Firstly, what are the (CASO) fronts, and how will they “De-stabilize (WP)'s “Victory” Status Quo”?

a. (C) is (Crimea), which (WP) occupied in 2014, which is part of Ukraine. Apparently, from (Crimea), the (CWP) forces can get the “capability and credibility tools” to advance toward Eastern Ukraine's invaded territories, breaking the Russian Military fortresses, distracting and inflicting their occupying forces deeply inside, causing harsh military losses, and thwarting their high-level military organization regardless of the (WP)'s attempts to re-organize its forces thereafter. That is while considering that the (CWP)'s (Attacks) there and all the (CASO) fronts must take a “*Repetitive Nature*” along with the “Russia-Ukraine War” at whatever cost. Strikingly, each front is a “*victory key*” either in (W₂) or (W₄) and permanently in the future. The question is, how the war on this front is to be fought effectively to achieve military advance for (CWP) on the whole systemic battle, even if a victory in Crimea is not gained (it is not the aim here), in terms of building this front's combat as a decisive sub-strategy of this player (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy to end the war by this stage, or to pave the way to a huge victory for the (CWP) in (W₄)? We answer that below.



b. (A) is (Abkhazia) and (S) is (South Ossetia) in Georgia; both are territories that Russia invaded in 2008, depending on i. creating fear inside Europe from a major war and thus hunting the Georgians and occupying their sovereign territories and recognizing them as de facto Russian lands, ii. weaponize more than 70 thousand soldiers from Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, to fight against 10 thousand Georgian soldiers, forcing the Georgian Army's retreat and surrender over its central lands, iii. managing the Black Sea from occupied Abkhazia, and encircling any Georgian ship attempts to re-seize Abkhazia through the sea, or penetrating Russian occupying forces lines or the Russian-backed-separatists, using Georgian Navy Forces.

Russia or (WP) are repeating almost the same tactics in Ukraine, and if (CWP) does not (Attack) on (Abkhazia) and (South Ossetia) fronts, not to achieve victory at all but to de-stabilizing the opponent's victory, Russia will have a determined victory in the future, inside Ukraine. Again, we explain below how a significant victory for (CWP) is to be gained against (WP) in (W₂) or finally in (W₄) through the (CASO) enemy-weakening fronts' combat.

c. (O) of (CASO) is (Odesa), which is the fourth of weakening-the-enemy fronts. Odesa is a strategic city in South-Eastern Ukraine; until now, it is not yet been occupied, but there is a distinct possibility that it will if Russian troops continue their territorial advance on the same (February 24 to April 3, 2022) level, from the (captured-Kherson to Mykolaiv, and from the last to Odesa). This possibility of victory status quo is to be precluded by the (CWP)'s (Attack-Defense) in (W₂).

Odesa is not only strategic because it hinders Russia from repeating the madness journey that it did by using Abkhazia's advantage on the Black Sea to encircle and attack any Georgian ship that tries to advance to Russian and separatists' lines in Abkhazia through the sea to end the invasion, as mentioned above. Further, besides allowing a free navigation passage to Ukrainian and NATO ships on any present or future occasion for penetrating invading Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine, the same Ukrainian and NATO forces have the privilege to use Odesa as a capable and credible "*Strategic Fortress*" to achieve two strategic advantages towards victory; these are:



The first, to Crimea and from Odesa, the supplies of soldiers, food, and weapons are facilitated through a possible “*water bridge*” or safer to say “*water-land bridge*,” which is highly advantageous for the troops-deployment purpose coinciding with air forces interference; that is, from Odesa to Crimea through the Black Sea and from Crimea to all surrounding occupied Ukrainian lands. Thence, from Crimea, a continuous counter-combat deeply within it and other occupied lands in Eastern Ukraine can take place, “beating and biting” the enemy invasion lines from the heart, impeding further expansion, and halting its battles in future steps, as to come.

The Second, from Odesa, military forces, meeting military reinforcements from Northern, Western, and Southern Ukraine, must be the case for achieving advance towards the country’s center whenever Russian forces on the Eastern front attempt to move again to the capital Kyiv, as they tried to utilize their distinguished position in East to conquer the center and declare from the capital that the invasion is complete and accomplished based on a *de facto* occupation’s imposed-status quo. In other words, if Russian troops tried to capture the Eastern Ukraine region constituting a half-circle to completely encircle any advancing Ukrainian troops moving towards them from any side (not all sides coherently) in future occupation of the capital, the other parts remained unoccupied of Ukraine compose the other bigger half-circle of the country to defeat these forces from all sides collectively and counter-encircling them, if more organized and intelligent strategic tactics are set and followed.

Shorty, if Russia succeeds in invading Odesa, it a. blocks any NATO attempt in the future to help the Ukrainian army through the Black Sea, b. any attempt to fail the Russian victory status quo in Crimea would be contained by sending reinforcements from the surrounding cities of Crimea themselves, empowering the last more, noticing that the majority of all Russian supplies to invade Eastern Ukraine are delivered and directed from Crimea. It means c. no reaching a *foot position* (all what (CWP)-forces need to “De-stabilize the Victory Status Quo of the Enemy”) for (CWP)-groups for fighting in Crimea. The last reflects, a. no ability to hinder or intercept Russian supplies that help continue the military advance or break the enemy’s Eastern fronts, b. no possible water-land bridge to assist (CWP)’s present or future navy forces in encircling Russian troops at the Black Sea-Ukrainian occupied cities, and thus c. preventing the possibility of surrounding the enemy from the “*North, central lands, South-*



East, and the Black Sea” altogether to restore these territories through *credible coercion* with diplomacy in (W_2), or by a *de facto* victory in (W_4).

Secondly, how are the “De-stabilizing the Enemy’s Victory Status Quo” four combat fronts to be fought successfully to achieve their productive results and avoid a major war at the same time? Realizing the weakness points at the (CWP) side means that we substitute them with strength- points, as follows:

a. “*Using the Knife That the Enemy Uses Against You Against Him!*” Since the Russian troops depended on minimizing their casualties by using “mercenaries” through some private military companies, and therefore, making the whole European continent forced to kneel on their feet, asking for their mercy to not “butcher” the Ukrainians in “Bucha” town, for example, it is ironic to see NATO alliance sacrifice the Ukrainian army and people while it is capable of recruiting mercenaries likewise to eliminate the “butcher” Russian troops. This is not only a mechanism of war tactics but also the first complementary “victory key” to those of the (CASO)’s (De-stabilizing the Enemy’s Victory Status Quo) four combat fronts. This first supplementary key concerns tackling the enemy’s outnumbering and its minimum casualties versus maximum Ukrainian casualties dilemma.

b. To succeed in the (CASO)’s weakening-the-enemy four fronts, only “*Guerrilla Warfare and Insurgencies*” can help accomplish this purpose, since the war escalated in level and scale, however, at the weak expense (i.e., the Ukrainians). Most noticeably, nearly all Russian troops’ advances in Ukraine relied on Russian-backed-separatists combat, penetrating the Ukrainian army fronts massively in Eastern Ukraine, at least from (February 24 to April 4, 2022). It is theoretically and practically proved, then, that “Guerrilla Warfare and Insurgencies” combating forces can achieve through their clandestine tactics the defeat of the strongest armies ever in the world, as was witnessed in former Yugoslavia and Italy when defeating the Germans’ giant war machine during World War II.

c. It is ironic that after the Russian advance fiercely inside Ukraine by early April 2022, NATO still did not move towards recruiting mercenaries to help achieve a quick and decisive military advance for Ukraine’s army. It is also still not going to organize “Guerrilla Warfare and Insurgencies” depending on opening the (CASO) four fronts of the (Preventive Threats) to vigorously cause the opponent’s permanent military losses, territorial de-stabilization in its occupying lands, and deep penetration inside Russian troops lines from all sides in Ukraine



(North, West, South, South-East, center, and the Black Sea's besieging to occur gradually). It is further unbelievable and surprising that NATO left the Ukrainian Army to fight alone in a "suicide mission," as if NATO was asking Russia for, and facilitating to it, having a *prompt* victory in the battle zones of Ukraine. Accordingly, the third method is the provision of "*Para-Military Forces*" to fight side by side with the Ukrainian army. If Russian forces now are, say, 30 thousand, the Ukrainian forces must be 60 thousand to disperse and shatter the advancing Russian troops, not step by step (!) as we witness currently, no, but *thoroughly* from all fronts as if they are all "only one coherent war front." It would and will mean that it is, by this moment, the Ukrainian army with its para-military and mercenaries wings that becomes the "Butcher Army," however, against the enemy's military and mercenaries, not the Russian "Butcher Army" against "Civilians (!)."

Second, after the (CWP), according to its (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy, uses the (De-stabilizing the Enemy's Victory Status Quo in (CASO)) major strategy, the (WP) resorts to the (Defense in Confronting Internal Chaos and Fronts Weakness) major strategy where it depends on (Counter-Attacks) in support of its defensives. Under the second Dominant Strategy of (W_2), (Creating Enemies), the (CWP) or the wave's (Attacker) moves to (Imposing Isolation) on the (WP). A (Conciliation with, Appeasement, and Attraction of (WP)'s Allies) action made by (CWP) lies in the realm of that major strategy.

On the other hand, the (WP) becomes better off by using the (Resistance and Threatening Allies of both the (WP) and (CWP)) major strategy to coerce all to *not* stand or re-ally with the (CWP). One example of that is when Russia attempts to break a ceasefire treaty signed with Turkey by attacking civilians in Turkey-neighboring Syrian Idleb, compelling Turkey to not *effectively* support NATO's efforts toward Ukraine by threatening to create a renewed wave of massive immigration crisis to both Turkey and Europe _ if the Syrian regime more fiercely carries out the Russian-backed-missile strikes on this area. While seeing itself in an actual stalemate by the (W_2)'s end, the (WP) will *vigorously* move to this choice in (W_3) as an (Attack) not (Defense) strategy if a diplomatic exit fails at this moment of (W_2).

Third, under the (W_2)'s third Dominant Strategy, (Media and War Manipulation), the (Attacker/CWP) develops its media strategy by (Pushing For and Adopting) the (Manipulation of War via Media) as a major strategy. Here, the (CWP) utilizes the (WP)'s war atrocities and aggression to activate an (Anti-Opponent Public Discontent Creation in the Opponent's Lands)



stratagem. Such a productive tactic must be well-organized through non-conventional media outlets where it is of medium-and long-term effects. It also paves the way towards a final victory for (CWP) in (W_4), coinciding with other media and diplomatic tactics followed if a diplomatic exit does not succeed in (W_2 and W_3). The (Anti-Opponent Public Discontent Creation) stratagem does not refer to merely some *random* broadcast publicized, from time to another, on Russian war atrocities and violations. Rather, it does mean resorting to a high-level organization of “*black propaganda*” campaigns against the Russian administration inside Russia by Russians themselves so that the media is no longer a peace machine for ending the war *naively*, showing the Russian atrocities in begging for peoples’ mercy, but a war-machine used to “*enforce and coerce*” ending the war by provoking actively public revolting against the war by influential people, at either (W_2 , W_3 , or W_4).

Confronting that, the (WP) becomes in the best position by (Countering and Re-Directing) its media outlets to work as counter-war manipulation of (CWP) if it reveals that the last is behind that, which must not occur, or by suppressing its people if not revealing that. In either case, as long as the black propaganda campaigns continue, the (CWP) will still have the leverage to end the war easily the way it wants in this modeling when manipulating the Clausewitz trinity’s “public” element to be used in this player’s favor at present or, if needed, in future. Moreover, with the war scale and level increase in possible (W_3), the (CWP) is going to alter its media strategy by its way drawn toward victory. Given that, in (W_4), the (CWP) will be immensely the (Attacker), this player will need global public support more than Russian national one, while the last is still effective for obligating the government to make concessions for *irreversibly* ending a bloodshed war coinciding with (CWP)’s active “chain of deterrence via war,” as explained later.

The question now is: how the (CWP) can alter the Clausewitz trinity’s “public” element of the enemy to work for its interest?

We can answer that by formulating these six connected “*media, war, and public*” strategies as a sub-grand strategy of “*black propaganda campaign versus the opponent*.”

The First Element: The “War Persuasive Message” strategy, an effective “What.” Given that the Russian administration works on propagating a “liberation war” of ethnic Russians, it does mean that any sufficiently influential counter-campaign must move from



counter-persuasion tactics that are equivalently equal to the official narrative. We argue that such a strategy can succeed by shaping the “*War of Tyrant against His Slavic Ethnicity*” as a label and slogan, putting current Russian President Vladimir Putin in comparison with Adolf Hitler in his deadly action by killing and displacing the Polish in World War II for being Slavic. The same that Putin does by displacing and killing the Slavic ethnic civilians with his cold hands. It is also a “Labeling and Shaming of War Leader” tactic. We must notice that every element serves the other, and none can ever work separately for a sound impact in the medium and long term.

The Second Element: The “Live Interaction with Peoples from Both Sides for Activating a two-steps flow of communication.” It is the “How” strategy.

Here, the best method for a successful black propaganda campaign in the opponent’s land is the dependence on digital media tools. The social media pages, sponsored advertisements, programs, and paid short videos on the war are highly effective for getting broad classes of Russian audiences to serve the (*allegiance to Ukraine*) purpose, considering the (*efficiency, efficacy, and reliability*) principles of these media contents; it is the first target.

The second target concerns the modality of bridging influential peoples from both sides to share first the atrocities of war and it's relevant military, political, economic, and mutual human damage. And then, each influential public opinion leader in his/her small societal group in Russia can convince the others who constantly listen to him, particularly during crises when the dependence on (reliable) news resources increases significantly by the mass public. Many utilized the war in Russia to beg for money, stealing others from the whole world, but still, we did not see those who could open the bridge between Ukrainians and Russians to build peace and end the war through “bottom-top mechanisms.” The more the public leaders from both sides succeed in convincing each other about the inevitability of ending the war, the more that all will witness ordinary Russians walking in the streets pressurizing Putin to end this war. Through this element in support of the other ones, we create “anti-war pressure groups” to face fanatic ones that countenance continuous Russian aggression over time.

The Third Element: The “Comparison by Example in the Same Sample” strategy, the “Which” tactic. This element is so direct, however, influential in integration with other elements. If we consider that tyranny can only be overthrown by another tyranny similar in



power and leverage, then when a black propaganda campaign tries to highlight Putin's aggression, it needs more of an example of the same sample to convince audiences that "Liberation is Invasion," especially, for the sleepy and inactive masses of the twenty-first century. A "Liberation is Invasion" slogan can find its way easily into Russian society through social media ads, pages, active groups, live programs, etc.; also, relying on a mission of thousands of public opinion leaders who do not absorb information about the war from media, and then, delivering media messages to their public followers and social groups, as theory suggests. Rather, these public opinion leaders are to move to obtain breaking and live information about deadly airstrikes on civilians in Ukraine, for instance, from these civilians themselves and conveying and convincing the others around by it. Contextually, the Third Element, activated politico-social comparisons between "*Peaceful Gorbachev*," the last president of the former Soviet Union, and "*Bloody Putin*," is one of the best ways to *restore pacific memories of the nations*, paving the way to accept "No Invasion is Liberation" slogan. From here, it is the need to answer "Who."

The Fourth Element is the "The More Influential the Sender, the More Influenced the Receiver" strategy. It is the effective "Who" tactic. In this element, we suggest societal parties in Russia for an influential counter-campaign to terminate the war; these are; a. public opinion leaders, as we mentioned above; b. opposition leaders; c. international figures who have the necessary influence in Russian society; d. peace and war universities' departments and scientific institutions; e. civil society organizations; f. oil company managers to speak out the discourse as economic elites, "*complaining a grief*" of damage occurring due to the decline of Russian oil exports, the fall of currency because of war and relevant economic crises, future recession possibility, and the sufferance of ordinary citizens in a sequence to political enmity-manufactured-economic setbacks made up by the political authority.

The Fifth Element, the "Direct Manipulating of the Enemy's Public" strategy, is an effective "Why." It is now the timing to publicly answer the reason for ending the war; however, manipulating the audiences themselves to achieve this purpose. A successful black propaganda campaign to counter Russian propaganda for invading Eastern Europe must highlight "*Mass Initiatives of Human Relief and Assistance of Ukrainian Brother-People*." Such an effort must be a. repetitive, b. sympathetic, c. showing by example thousands of



Russians who oppose the war to others, and d. crystalizing the Russian war atrocities against Ukrainians to Russia's people under a brotherhood frame of sharing the same ethnicity, religion, history, and language. These initiatives, if strategically (and well-planned) activated through all social media instruments and internet websites that the ordinary citizens daily use, along with the war trajectory, will help with the other elements in bringing Russians into the streets to protest against Putin's aggressive war first, and to pressurize him to end it second, at (W_2 , W_3 , or/and W_4). That depends mainly on the masses of rallies that such relief campaigns, in interaction with the other set strategies activation, can gather for this sake.

The Sixth Element, the "Idea Continuity" strategy; is an effective "When." We suggest a chronology of the black propaganda campaign for ending the war, through this element, as follows: a. The first stage is the "seeded and fledgling idea" phase for gathering Russia's public against the war; it is associated with governmental suppression. b. The second stage is identical to the "mature idea and continuance" goal; in both stages, the desired impact is still not yet achieved. c. After the continuation, despite possibly employing harsh and suppressive-state apparatuses against this campaign, the third stage resembles the "public sympathy with the campaign and continuousness" objective accomplishment. d. Following the cultivated *cognitive* and *emotional* components of formulated public attitudes and reshaping of the masses' values towards *otherness* of Ukrainians as a *brotherhood* with them, with the campaign significantly taking place, the fourth stage represents the "public protests and continuity," under completely shaped-behavioral attitudes, against the Russian government decision of war, coinciding with the planned campaign persistence.

These strategies are summarized in this typology:

"The War of Tyrant against His Slavic Ethnicity Versus a Liberation War of Ethnic Russians," → "Digital Media, Live Interaction with Convincing Sympathy, Two-Steps Flow of Communication, and Anti-War Pressure Groups Creation," → "Comparison by Example in the Same Sample, Peaceful Gorbachev Versus Bloody Putin, and (No Invasion is Liberation) Slogan," → "Influential Sender Generates Influenced Receiver," → "Direct Manipulating of the Enemy's Public: Mass Initiatives of Brotherhood," → "Seeded and Fledgling Idea, Mature Idea and Continuance, Public Sympathy with the Campaign, Formulated Attitudes and Public Protests and Continuity."



Fourth, under the (W₂)'s fourth Dominant Strategy, (Collective Security), the (Attacker), (CWP), plays out the (Effective Opponent Besieging) major strategy, when it works on managing: a. harsh sanctions imposition and economic deterioration of (WP)'s lands, b. de-stabilizing (WP)'s victory in (CASO), c. (WP)'s weakening, enforced isolation, d. chaotic internal public-discontent creation versus (WP). Through (CWP)'s alliance coordination and collaboration, each ally's action must be in harmony with the other allies' actions under the same course of actions by NATO while serving each major strategy drawn in (W₂) as a comprehensive grand strategy for all actors as one coherent ally. Namely, it is a harmony of interests among all allies together that can defeat a conflict of interests with the enemy. Of course, Russia's success in attracting Germany, France, or Turkey, for example, to its side by even *active/inactive neutrality* will affect (WP) positively in a. initiating its (Attack-Defense) Key Wave Strategy of (W₃), b. not accepting an imposed diplomatic exit that we assume to be fair to all sides, among them Ukraine, by the (W₂)'s end, and surely, c. de-stabilizing the (CWP)'s victory output in (W₄) if needed. Under this modeling perspective, the penetration of one member in an alliance is considered a penetration of all. Put simply; all alliance members are like soldiers of shields protecting one king, given that this king is the alliance itself, and one soldier's absence means that from its empty place, the arrow will be launched by an enemy to assassinate the king (i.e., the alliance) where there is no shield there to cover that gap, particularly, at times of war more than those of peace (when actions can be compensated in terms of the time manifestation as a strength-point, not a weakness one if not managed promptly as in the war's case).

Interestingly, the (CWP) harvests the crops, and the utility of its (W₁) and (W₂) strategies collectively, however, by making sure of its future continuity. Now, either the war ends by (W₂), or it will be other waves while confirming such a future continuity of gains for (CWP) based on a. how it acts and b. what it achieves in all waves connectedly. Facing (CWP), the (WP) relies on moving to a (Defense-Alliance Reinforcement) strategy, whereas (CWP) works strongly on de-stabilizing the (WP)'s utility of such strategic choice by imposing isolation even if through applying tactics of *dollar diplomacy* and *credible promises* to get (WP)'s allies into a desired disciplinary line.



Fifth, within a (Military Preeminence) Dominant Strategy, the (CWP)'s major strategy is (Superiority) in a. army confrontations, b. opened fronts to weaken the enemy in (CASO), c. used mercenaries, guerrilla wars and insurgency tactics, and para-military, and d. the effective besieging of (WP). Finally, the (WP) can not be in a better position than being under an (Actual Stalemate). It is the perfect timing for diplomacy to end the war before the (W_3)'s initiation.

4.3. The Second War Wave's Outputs and the Diplomatic Exit Possibility:

The Wave's Outputs: The (Second War Wave) ends with the (Ongoing Status Quo) as the ($Output_1$) of (WP) and (Counter-Expansion) as the ($Output_2$) of (CWP). Given that the last is the (Attacker) who relied on Level II Strategies, which are more intense than (LIs) in scale, level, and effect, this player was able to shift the situation to its interest by transforming the {3 DU (FA-V)} outcome, that it started the (W_2) with, to {- 6 DU (FA-V)} one by the same wave's end. Thus, if another wave is to begin, it will be initiated relying on these values. Comparingly, a victory achieved on the (CWP)'s part is translated into defeat at the same level and scale on the (WP)'s (i.e., the Attacked) side, where the latter's (DU)_v from its (FA-V) becomes (6), which is so far reduced in an estimated (9 DU) from that one it started the wave with, (-3 DU), thanks to the (CWP)'s (LIIs) while being the (Attacker). If a (W_3) takes place, the (DU) between the (W) and (CW) within will be (6) according to the defeated or the (Attacked)'s {DU (FA-V)} estimate that defines the gap existing between such a (W) and (CW).

We can denote the "*(W_2)'s Victory-Defeat Relationship*" in this formula:

If { (WL) + (SWO)_(WP/CWP) \approx DU (FA-V)_(WP/CWP) }, and that,
 { (WL) + (SWO)_(CWP/A-D) \approx - 6 DU (FA-V)_(CWP/A-D) }, where

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \{- \text{DU (FA-V)}_{Px}\} & \longleftrightarrow & \{+ \text{DU (FA-V)}_{Py}\} \\ \text{(Victory for One)} & & \text{(Defeat for the Other)} \end{array}$$

Then, { (WL) + (SWO)_(WP/D-A) \approx 6 DU (FA-V)_(WP/D-A) }



The Diplomatic Exit Possibility: The (WP) under a gloomy situation and uncertainty, is better off by keeping all its military advances and territorial acquisition intact. The most rational choice for the (WP) now is to a. stabilize the situation by accepting a moderate, *not humiliating*, diplomacy outcome and trading over the stability of (Crimea) plus getting a foot position in Eastern Ukraine, or b. to send the red alarm for retaliation, seeking glory by winning a decisive war of restoring the old Soviet reign.

Based on third-parties intervention, each side, the (WP) and (CWP), is better off by making these demands: a. for the (WP), offering the “military expansion’s halt” in exchange for “stabilizing Crimea” and agreeing on “maintaining the possession of territorial lands bordering Russia” that the (WP) *de facto* declared its occupation in advance. b. For the (CWP): offering a “complete withdrawal from all invaded Ukrainian territories back to the status quo before February 24, 2022,” in exchange for i. halting the military confrontations, ii. promising that Ukraine will not be a NATO or EU member-state on any possible occasion at present or future, and iii. a *regranting* of Crimea (instead of trading on Eastern Ukraine-occupied lands) by promising the stabilization of Crimea and halting the counter-combats of “Ukrainians’ (who are predominantly paramilitary by agency and mercenaries) insurgency” in this concerned territory.

The (CWP)’s offer is the best choice for ending the war at this wave, with this probability ($0.5 \leq p < 1$). Nevertheless, the probability that (WP) is going to accept this diplomatic outcome for buying some time, re-organizing its military lines, eliminating the penetration gaps for not being re-targeted by the opponent, and empowering the weakness in fronts or its occupation lands of (Crimea, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia) to retaliate in the future is ($0 < p < 1$). In the latter case, the (WP) becomes better off by re-allying and re-attacking fiercely where almost all strategic flaws that this player’s enemy, the (CWP), can utilize to worsen its position in any possible war cease to exist unless it shifts to a *large-scale*, major war that the (WP) is quite sure that the (CWP) is going to avoid at whatever cost.

5. The Third War Wave (W₃)

In (W₃), the (WP) resorts to brutality war tactics as possible as it can in an attempt to alter the (W₂) end’s (DU) estimates _ if a diplomatic exit did not succeed _ since the (CWP)



caused the (WP)'s temporal defeat when being the victor yielding the closer distance (i.e., “-6 DU”) that any could achieve ever, till now, along with the War Waves, regarding the (FA-V).




Figure 3: The Russia-Ukraine War's Third War Wave (W₃)

Seeing that (CWP) used (Level II Strategies) to gain its wave's victory, the (WP) now has the incentive to apply its already prepared deadly tactics of the war, *incorrectly* perceiving that they are (Level III Strategies) that will end the war in its favor promptly and immensely (as it might occur in other wars it fights against weaker parties).



Differently, (W₄) must follow here as a *remedy* because any diplomatic exit sought by the (W₃)'s end should admit the (WP)'s victory, as explained later, with a future deterrence and conflict stability achieved permanently under the (Opponent Victory Equilibrium) or temporarily under the (Disguised Opponent-Victory Equilibrium), of this study's developed (Deterrence Entanglement Law "DEL")'s (Relative Balance Rule). The matter that differs from those diplomatic outputs of (W₂)'s end, which paves the way towards the stability of deterrence and conflict in the future, precluding the war, reflecting a (Status Quo Equilibrium) under the (Incomplete Balance Rule) of the (DEL). The last is the first preferred balance outcome for ending the war in the future, still not permanently, to avoid the escalation of (W₃) and (W₄). At the same time, the second preferred balance case is that of (W₄)'s end, which is to be the (Compromise Equilibrium) under the (DEL)'s (Absolute Balance Rule), that we fear to come at the expense of previously more casualties paid by both sides, but its relevant balance in future is the most stable one ever where no such a war is to re-occur once the (Absolute Balance) takes place.

One may ask, should the (CWP) not use the (LIIs) initiating the (W₂), would that mean that no brutal (Attack) strategy was to be used by the (WP) in (W₃)? The answer is, this would mean that the (WP) would win the war by (W₁)'s end gaining a decisive victory, as long as the continuity of its (W₁)'s (Attacks) gets this player theoretically and practically closer to its (FA-V), particularly, in the first months of the war. Also, it would mean that the (CWP) is willing to grant the (WP) the honor of the victory in Eastern Europe in the present and future. A second issue is that what if a diplomatic victory outcome was to be achieved for the (CWP) by the (W₂)'s end through a future (Incomplete Balance Rule) of (DEL) under a (Status Quo Equilibrium)?

Yet, it can never be the case after the (W₁)'s severe state of war if it were not for the (CWP) halting the (WP)'s (Further Expansion) output of the (W₁)'s end, confronting the (WP) by the (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy as a strategic surprise in (W₂) to enforce a "discipline of war" that creates a "discipline of peace" on the other hand.



5.1. War Objectives, Key Wave Strategies, and the Third War Wave's Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively

The (WP)'s Key Strategic Objective in (W_3) is still the (Territory Invasion) of Ukraine. In the (W_3), it re-uses the (Attack-Defense "A-D") as a Key Wave-Strategy, relying on it in playing the other five major strategies. The (A-D) means that (WP) uses the (Attack) the strategy mainly against (CWP) in a third wave, whereas the (WP)'s (Defense) strategy is only a counter-one versus (CWP)'s (Counter-Attacks). In comparison, the (CWP)'s Key Strategic Objective in (W_3) is maintained to be (International Security); however, playing the (Defense-Attack "D-A") as a Key Wave-Strategy, depending on it when using its five major strategies of (W_3). The (D-A) specifies that (CWP) uses the (Defense) strategy primarily facing the (WP)'s (Attacks), while the first's (Attack) is merely a counter-strategy.

The (W_3)'s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively are: "Counter-Threats (Banned Weapons); Counter-Deterrence; Revivalism; Collective Security; Military Preeminence (Equality)." Again, "Diplomacy and Negotiation" is a possible diplomatic exit by the wave's end; see Figure 3.

5.2. The (WP)'s Major Strategies in Interaction with the (CWP)'s

First, as we showed above that, the (WP) in (W_3) considers military and political brutality as a method for restoring its military advance and eliminating the state of temporal victory achieved to the (CWP) by the (W_2)'s end and the beginning of (W_3). Under (Counter-Threats (Banned Weapons)) Dominant Strategy of the wave, the (WP) re-activating its (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy uses the (Pushing For and Employing) strategic choice as its first major strategy interacting with the (CWP)'s one. In this context, (WP) is better off playing over the (Counter-Threats) Dominant Strategy by using (Banned Chemical Weapons) against civilians in Ukrainian cities after seeing that (CWP) succeeded in halting its expansion and advances further in these territories. Now, and only now, along with the war's trajectory, the (WP) perceives that it has the justification to use such a type of weapon to:

- a. Impose a tremendous human displacement and forced immigration from Ukraine, emptying the Eastern, North-Eastern, and South-Eastern Ukraine for a stable invasion's sake, and facilitating the advance toward the center when the capital will easily be seized, where the invasion-completeness declaration is being made.



b. Where the (WP) understands that it will achieve an *unmatched victory* by fiercely dropping chemical weapons in *battle* and *civilian* zones in Ukraine, not the ballistic missiles _ given that this player is well-aware that in a nuclear missiles' launch case, a possible retaliatory strike would follow from other places of the world through intercontinental submarines-carried-ballistic missiles against its homeland territories according to the (Mutually Assured Destruction) strategy. The last is not the same as the case of deploying chemical weapons by air jets, then naively "*denying*" that they have been used (!).

It is going to be an unexpected victory because the (WP) will rely on the usage of such weapons to halt the military advance of the (CWP)'s army, guerilla, and insurgency groups from the bottom by targeting these fronts, divisions, and corps themselves inside the civilian cities where they settle. Put simply, from the (WP)'s viewpoint, emptying the cities to conquer will achieve merely fear by killing civilians only, granting the fighting armies and groups the motive and incentive to vigorously commit fierce killings of the (WP)'s soldiers in the positions and fronts that they penetrated in (W_2). Simultaneously, dropping these chemical weapons in battle zones against the enemy's (i.e., the CWP) military and paramilitary troops are seen to achieve a permanent victory, and an unmatched fear in the hearts of the remained fighting armies and groups as to escape the battleground leaving the sphere purified to concluding the invasion promptly and immensely by the (WP). Such a brutal war tactic, when used here, leads us more to explain how the (WP) will depend highly effectively on adopting a (Counter-Deterrence) strategy in the next step.

We must admit that the (CWP) is better off now by playing a (Watch and Assess) strategy; why? So simply, if the (CWP) arrogantly moves in a rush to retaliate in (W_3), then it is what the (WP) was waiting for, "I drop chemical weapons in Ukraine, and you do likewise against my troops in "Ukraine;" thence, thank you (CWP), you helped me advance further to conquer Ukraine rapidly and utilize the momentum to ally with my "baby" client-state "Belarus" to re-seize:" a. weak Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia Baltic Sea states first, b. Moldova and Slovakia, second, and c. over time, it is Poland, Hungary, and Romania Ukraine's neighboring states that are to be encircled and penetrated, restoring the (Iron Curtain) Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe under a newly re-established Soviet Union. At the same time, the majority of Asia's former Soviet states still already grant the (WP) allegiance as puppet states of Russia in a decentralized way, and after all, the (WP) becomes on its way to



restoring Black Sea ports previously claimed by the Soviet Union following World War II, which the US protected for Turkey to be Turkish possessions over history. Not surprisingly, one wrong action or strategy choice made by the (CWP) would mean the loss of the geopolitical map of the world; it will not be only the old reign of the Soviet Union that rises, but the empowered Soviet Union that this world never witnessed its revival before.

Accordingly, we assumed that the (Watch and Assess) is the best strategy of (CWP) to not deprive itself of the (W₄)'s endless victory by "*finding the justification*" for re-allying with global, regional hegemons in the international system and re-gathering global rallies and masses at the same moment for ending the (WP)'s aggression once and forever, as explained later. In other words, the (CWP) is highly better off (Pushing Against) a used (Banned Chemical Weapons) strategy through the (Watch and Assess) one relying on a tactic of "*verbal deterrence only*," for now, and continuing to fiercely impose the (Destabilization of the Opponent Victory Status Quo and Continuity) strategy using the harsh methods ever that it can apply for accomplishing this strategic objective because this is a huge "victory key" for the (CWP)'s final and infinite victory in (W₄). Nevertheless, it is extremely important to confirm that the (Watch and Assess) strategy must never be the case in confronting the (WP)'s (Adoption of Counter-Deterrence) and (Destabilizing Eastern Europe Region) strategies, but "preventive and preemptive" strategies must be taken significantly by the (CWP) before even the (WP) picks these moves. Otherwise, the (CWP) would lose tremendously in (W₃), and its assumed-decisive victory that we draw through (W₄) is going to be compromised (!) by the (WP). The thing that is not acceptable where no mistakes should be made; if it is a war, then it must be the war to end all wars, not the war of gaps that stretch the length of conflict in the future separately for decades to come. One strategic flaw of the (CWP) may set the whole European continent's life at stake, the Eurasia region and North-Western Asia continent's life second, and third, it is going to be the "*global final prize*," our homeland, the broader Middle East region in North Africa and Western and South-Western Asia.

Second, under the (Counter-Deterrence) Dominant strategy of (W₃), and after the (WP) utilizes its first major strategy to a. target essential agrarian lands and international oil-supplies positions in Ukraine and b. manage and control these positions under its own (provisional)



military administration; the time comes now for this player to move to the (Adoption and Activation of a Counter-Deterrence) strategy.

The first element, it will not be the EU and US that impose sanctions on Russian oil exports; it is Russia now that will own the capability and credibility to leave the whole world in critical need of oil by imposing an “*Oil Embargo*” on the European countries concerning any oil exports of Ukraine plus Russia, not the last only. Such a strategy choice is aimed to cause an unexpected, sudden increase in oil prices worldwide, generating industrial production setbacks and gradually accumulating (with the deprivation of Ukrainian and Russian international grain exports second element) in creating *intentionally* a “global economic recession” that the world may suffer from for years along with the war’s course and beyond. At this moment, the (WP) perceives that it succeeds in compelling the European states to beg for the war’s end, relying further on the (WP)’s conditional approval from the last’s perspective.

The second element, the famous “Russian and Ukrainian grain and Ukraine’s exporting agricultural products,” are the next weapon of the (WP)’s second major strategy of (W₃). Rationally, the (WP) is better off by adopting and activating a “*Food Embargo and Starvation*” strategy. For oil, which is a permanent (but unrenewed) natural resource, imposing its embargo does not mean a remarkable deal regarding any future economic loss for Russia but huge political, territorial, and military benefits if a (CWP)’s (Avoiding and Re-Structuralizing) strategy is not used in advance. Symmetrically, preserving the Russian and Ukrainian grain for a few months relying on high technological techniques of food conservation, reflects geopolitico-military gains for Russia, bringing major parts of the world to their knees before the Russian military in Ukraine. Suppose the (WP) resorts only to raising the Ukrainian and Russian grain prices to double. In that case, this actor creates economic crises elsewhere in the world, noticing that Russia used a similar tactic during President Richard Nixon’s era (1969-1974) in the late 1960s and early 1970s when utilizing the Secretary of State and National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger’s détente policy for buying the grain product from the US markets causing a severe American grain crisis by that time. Thence, what about Russia’s war utility from leaving the world under a food (i.e., grain) deprivation crisis for just one or two months? The (WP) does not lose here; it wins at the expense of the others.



If the (CWP) is to succeed in achieving a final victory in (W_4), it must prove the “*incredibility and non-capability*” of the (WP)’s (Adoption and Activation of Counter-Deterrence) strategy by resorting to the (Avoiding and Re-Structuralizing) major strategy, before the (WP) attempts to act the way we explained. It is the (CWP)’s “First Preventive and Preemptive Strategy” in the (W_3). Strikingly, should the (CWP) see that it is willing to stretch the war length to (W_4) not (W_2)’s end only, thence, it must avoid the (WP)’s embargos strategy of (W_3), during the First War-Wave (W_1) itself, if, and only if, the (CWP) seeks the victory of (W_4). Now, “*finding the alternatives*” is the *first preferred strategy choice* for (CWP) in (W_1):

a. cultivating reserve lands of grain in other areas of the world, Africa is the best choice because of the adequate climate there,

b. establishing or reinforcing friendly relationships with some oil-producing Latin America states and Arab ones to help during any possible oil crisis along with the war by showing some tolerance in prices, plus,

c. securing some oil positions in the Middle East, in Libya, Iraq, and Syria, at low prices preemptively for the highly needy industrial countries that are in direct exposure to the war in Ukraine and its repercussions before a probable damaging oil crisis and embargoes erupt in (W_3) at the (WP)’s hands.

d. Also, following an “*Austerity policy*” seems helpful for the (CWP) if it decides the war’s continuity till (W_4), not only (W_3), since once (W_3) is initiated by the (WP)’s (Attacks), the (W_4) must sequentially be in play to bring the war to an end permanently with the (CWP)’s decisive victory not the (WP)’s one, as we explain later.

Third, over (Revivalism)’s Dominant Strategy, the (WP) becomes in the best position by moving to the (Sovietism-Reviving Propaganda), shifting all ideological imaginary and suppressive state-apparatuses to work on its (W_3)’s Key Strategic Objective, the (Territory Invasion of Ukraine), not as a (liberation operation of ethnic Russians (i.e., separatists)) now as it did in (W_1) and (W_2). Rather, it better happens to be a (restoration war of Soviet glory) in (W_3) given the actual stalemate that the (CWP) left the (WP) in by the (W_2)’s end with no successful diplomatic exit to terminate the war. Namely, the (WP) perceives that the (W_3) is its “last resort,” where it must buy the victory at whatever cost.



So, Sovietizing the Russian society sufficiently and with a red-alarm efficiency appears to be the best “societal preparation” for the (WP)’s nation to accept and tolerate any expected escalation of war level, consequences, and losses, if the war’s goal is framed to serve the glory of old empire than to seek liberation of some separatists. It is a direct war relationship; that is, whenever the public’s economic, human, political, and military war losses get higher and more costly, whenever the “war’s cause and justification” should be re-manufactured to jump outside the curve by the rationality of government’s reasons to further motivate an army of griefs, in a modified trinity of war. Under such a war stage, the black propaganda campaign designed in (W₂) to end the war must be posited in its third phase with Russia’s masses already starting to the (Sympathy with the Campaign and Continuousness). It means that, at this point of (W₃), the (WP) is going to apply all suppressive state apparatuses to repress the campaign.

Based on that, the (CWP) moves to its (Countering Soviet Revivalism and Re-Constructing) major strategy. International human rights organizations deployed to watch, or harshly and soundly report globally about, the probable-human rights violations in Russia’s society seem to be an exit for the campaign continuity purpose, the *foreign surveillance eye*. Adding to that that the almost “virtual nature” of our set anti-war black propaganda campaign is effectively creative in transforming the Russian human abuses, atrocities, and territorial violations in Ukraine committed during (W₃) only to rally more masses in Russia against a “Brotherhood’s Bloody Aggression.” The latter is a slogan of this developed stage of gathering vast amounts of ordinary citizens versus the government decision of war, coinciding with reaching the third phase of the campaign chronology first.

As extended Russian aggression is to serve the (CWP) to achieve victory in (W₄), it must be utilized nationwide in a “Re-Construction of Public Enmity Against Political Leaders” strategy in (W₃), *not* in favor of creating the other’s (i.e., “CWP”) hatred for the (WP)’s interests. The reason lies in providing evidence of extraordinary aggression primarily, and that developments in “political hostility-manufactured-economic setbacks” made by the political authority during the war initiation prove to be more than concrete in Russian society simultaneously. The best persuasive messages ever can be re-produced now by feeding on Putin’s “Brotherhood’s Bloody Aggression” actions to reinforce and empower “anti-war pressure groups” in a “re-framed social struggle” against the ruling class that suppresses the



the bourgeoisie and the proletariat alike. That constructs solid roots of making global audiences embrace and interact with their partners in Russia within (W_3), paving the way toward activating a universal public opposition to the Russian aggression in (W_4).

Fourth, agreeing that it is the (WP)'s fierce wave ever in the war, this player, organizing its all war tactics and strategies to work harmoniously supporting one another, and under the (Collective Security) Dominant Strategy, moves to (Destabilize Eastern Europe Region) major strategy. Since it is its last resort's War Wave, through this strategy, and incentivized by the (CWP)'s (CASO) open fronts to weaken its side, the (WP) becomes better off by "financing and weaponizing" separatists or/and ethnic Russians in Eastern Europe states who back up Russian and Soviet revivalism objectives, or by using mercenaries there to support separatist movements or basically, for achieving Ukraine's rapid invasion and desired victory results.

In (W_3), it is the (WP)'s turn to open fronts to weaken the (CWP) and destabilize its victory status quo that it could achieve by the (W_2)'s end. As we said before, it works better for the (WP) if it re-controls first the weak Baltic Sea states of "Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia" on any possible further expansion chance in Europe, noticing that Russia already installed its fleets in both the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea even before days of the outbreak of war on February 24, 2022 (then, Moldova and Slovakia come second; and Poland, Hungary, and Rumania Ukraine's neighboring states, third). Applying a (Destabilizing Eastern Europe Region) successful strategy as might be perceived by the (WP) means that the latter is better off by starting to (create and support insurgencies or guerilla warfare) within the largest countries in size and population first to leave an immense echo in the whole European continent thereafter. So, (Poland, Hungary, and Romania) seem to be the best targets for the most beneficial results of the (WP)'s goal of destabilization that bring about a prompt Russian victory by compellence, not deterrence, in this stage.

One aim of this modeling is to activate some preemptive policies to be taken by the (CWP) instead of dismissing the right action at the right time in the right course. Here, the (CWP)'s best strategy choice in confronting the (WP)'s (Destabilizing Eastern Europe) major strategy is the (Reinforcement of Collective Security Measures and Eastern Europe States-Stabilization and Security Policizing by Force). The last is the (CWP)'s "Second Preventive and Preemptive Strategy" of the (W_3), which hinders the (successful) occurrence of (WP)'s



(Destabilizing) strategy. Again, if (CWP) is determined to move ahead to (W_4) and not to terminate the war by (W_2)'s end, it must seek the mentioned preventive strategy in advance, specifically by the beginning of the Second War Wave (W_2) and in a prior time to opening the (CASO) fronts of weakening the opponent (WP).

In the same context, following the (CWP)'s playing of the (De-Stabilizing the Enemy's Victory Status Quo in "CASO") strategy in (W_2), the (WP) can always obtain the best utilities by preparing for a. "Defense and Counter-Attacks," as mentioned, and also, b. initiating a "Cyber War for Recruiting New Citizen-Soldiers in Europe" strategy, repeating similar tactics it used to build a shield of militarized, ordinary Ukrainian citizens for achieving its war's breakthroughs. In short, the (Reinforcement and State-Stabilization and Security Policizing by Force in Eastern Europe) strategy must be conducted before the (W_2)'s beginning, as follows: a. through using the suppressive state-apparatuses like police and army, and the employment of high-tech, continuous, overt and covert surveillance systems, and b. in the *cyber-space* by recruiting thousands of official guardians who watch and analyze probably-targeted citizens' activities online to deter and repel all *incoming cyber-attacks* on Eastern Europe states' security by disguised Russia.

Fifth, what about the (Military Preeminence) fifth Dominant Strategy? The (WP) re-activating the (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy is up to broaden the level and scale of war, using the (Continuous-Dispersed Attacks) major strategy for:

a. Targeting other states' borders, which are neighboring Ukraine, and once more create the fear of a major war in Europe, but now, using the well-known *brinkmanship* strategy of taking the enemy to the edge of risk and leaving it to perceive that the other is going to commit harsh harm or dangerous escalation while it is *not* going to do so (or at least by this stage of war where no final victory of the (WP) is obtained in Ukraine yet). That reflects a (WP)'s *deterrence policy via war*, not a compelling one.

b. Besides the (WP)'s (Attacks) in Ukraine and dropping the (Chemical Weapons), this player becomes highly better off by fiercely (Attacking) Syria to force the emergence of a massive refugee crisis in Europe with that one it works on maximizing by bombarding Ukraine vigorously during (W_3). From one side, the (WP) destabilizes the European economies by escalating the Ukrainian immigrants' dilemma in Europe, and from the other, it creates its



climax by simultaneously multiplying the Syrian immigration crisis in the same continental area. It is a (WP)'s compellence policy via war to enforce ending the battles as it desires, not a deterrence policy.

c. By seeing what it considers “national interests” at stake, the (WP) enjoy now the leverage of conducting naval attacks in the Black Sea region supported by air attacks on Ukrainian ships and positions there. The last's aim is to show military primacy and superior maneuvering capabilities with the ability to achieve victory at whatever consequence as to “deter and compel via war” the (CWP) to admit the (WP)'s territorial victory through a diplomatic exit or a *de facto* victory status quo in all of Ukraine.

By the end of this stage, it is not unbelievable that the (WP) might declare the completeness of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine from the capital Kyiv itself. In this regard, the (CWP) is better off by only choosing the (Counter-Attacks and Offensives) major strategy in front of the (WP)'s (Continuous-Dispersed Attacks). The reason is that in the (W₄), the (CWP)'s surprising (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy must be built upon “*immense aggressions, violations, and human rights abuses*” made by the (WP), to bring out a universal victory of the peace party (i.e., CWP) versus the war initiator, as to come later. By maintaining its (Counter-Attacks and Offensives) in both Ukraine's all combat fronts and the (CASO) ones as stable in causing diverse and tremendous losses at the (WP)'s side as possible as it must be, the (CWP) preserves (Equality) criteria of the (Military Preeminence) for the two parties that assist it in acquiring a final military victory by the (W₄)'s end.

5.3. The Third War Wave's Outputs and the Diplomatic Exit Possibility ***The Wave's Outputs***

This wave ends with the (WP)'s (Output₁) of (Further Expansion) and the (CWP)'s (Output₂) of (Defense), where the (WP) could shift the outcomes to be in its war interests using (Level II Strategies). This player minimized the (DU) to its (FA-V) from (6) at the beginning of the wave to (-3) by the same wave's end, in an estimated decline of about (9 DU), getting closer to its (FA-V). Since the victory for one reflects the defeat for the other, the (CWP)'s (DU) from its (FA-V) is reduced from (-6 DU)_v to (3 DU)_v, reversely in an increase of distance estimated by (9 DU). It means that if a diplomatic exit fails in (W₃), the next War-Wave's (W) and (CW)'s (DU) is to be (3) according to the {DU (FA-V)} indicator of the (Attacked) or the



defeated by this previous wave's end, which specifies the distance likewise between the (W) and (CW) in a new War Wave.

We can denote the “(W₃)’s Victory-Defeat Relationship” in this formula:

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{If } \{ (WL) + (SWO)_{(WP/CWP)} \simeq DU (FA-V)_{(WP/CWP)} \}, \text{ and that,} \\ &\{ (WL) + (SWO)_{(WP/A-D)} \simeq - 3 DU (FA-V)_{(WP/A-D)} \}, \text{ where} \\ &\quad \{ - DU (FA-V)_{Px} \} \quad \begin{array}{c} \longrightarrow \\ \longleftarrow \end{array} \quad \{ + DU (FA-V)_{Py} \} \\ &\quad \text{(Victory for One)} \quad \quad \quad \text{(Defeat for the Other)} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Then, } \{ (WL) + (SWO)_{(CWP/D-A)} \simeq 3 DU (FA-V)_{(CWP/D-A)} \}$$

The Diplomatic Exit Possibility:

At the end of (W₃), a dual “exotic” diplomatic exit is waiting for the (CWP). Firstly, based on all configurations mentioned in this War Wave, any diplomacy and negotiation strategy might bring both sides to admit the “Russian War Victory with Ukraine as a De Factor Russian State” total outcome. That is derived from the actual situation of Russian (Further Expansion) output. If accepted by both sides, this outcome is preliminary for future Russian expansion in Eastern Europe and the Black Sea region. However, the probability of this possibility is (0 ≤ p < 0.5), with the (CWP) officially not recognizing that since this case does not apply to the international law legislation.

Secondly, it would be more than ironic in politics if mediators of the day attempted to compromise over a “*Partitioned Ukraine (!)*” agreement. Clearly, it is not Palestine that was the original homeland of Jewish people and ethnicity one day; it is a Ukrainian sovereign state of a mere Soviet Union that ceased to exist, and it is the whole universe that is going to be destroyed after a probable chain of Russian invasions in Eastern Europe, Black Sea Region, and North-Western Asia proves to be successful over time. At last, the probability of this second possibility is (0 ≤ p < 1), and if the stability of deterrence and conflict is achieved in the future, agreeing on a (Partitioned Ukraine) diplomacy outcome, it is going to be maintained under the (Opponent Victory Equilibrium), which is permanently stable under a perception and



certainty state of the (Relative Balance Rule) within the (Deterrence Entanglement Law), conditioning that the (WP) becomes *legally* obligated to not re-invade any other territorial parts of Ukraine or Eastern Europe in the future “credibly and reliably.” Rather, it is the (Relative Balance Rule)’s (Disguised Opponent-Victory Equilibrium), which is temporarily stable only, coinciding with being reached under deception, intentional misperception, and uncertainty conditions.

6. The Fourth War Wave (W₄)

6.1. War Objectives, Key Wave Strategies, and the War Wave’s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively

Given that (WP) achieved a temporal victory by the (W₃)’s end, possible declaration of Ukraine’s invasion completeness, and that no diplomatic exit has been reached by the (W₃)’s end to eliminate the state of severe war, the (WP)’s Key Strategic Objective in (W₄) developed to be a (Territory Invasion and Advance), stabilizing its positions that it conquered in Ukraine and seeking to capture more territorial possessions deeply and further with attempting to acquire international recognition in this regard. Nevertheless, in the (W₄), the (WP) finds itself forced to play the (Defense-Attack “D-A”) as a Key Wave-Strategy, relying on it in using its five major strategies of the wave. Through the (D-A), the only thing that (WP) can do in (W₄) is to play the (Defense) strategy principally in facing the (CWP)’s (Attacks), whereas its (Attack) strategy is a counter-one that reflects means of (Counter-Attacks) versus (CWP). Comparingly, the (CWP)’s Key Strategic Objective in (W₄) changed to (International Security and Prompt-Enemy Defeating), depending on playing the (Attack-Defense “A-D”) as a Key Wave-Strategy and, most importantly, *strategic surprise*, deriving from it the activation of its five major strategies of (W₄). The (A-D) refers to that (CWP) uses the (Attack) chiefly against (WP) while the (Defense) is a counter-strategy to confront the (WP)’s (Counter-Attacks).

The (W₄)’s Dominant Strategies Played Over Interactively are: “Credible Retaliatory Threats; Territorial Advance; Counter-Revivalism; Collective Security; Military Preeminence,” while the (Diplomacy and Negotiation) strategy represents a possible diplomatic exit to eliminate the war by this wave’s end, or that the war will cease to exist forcibly anyway; see Figure 4.



6.2. The (CWP)'s Major Strategies in Interaction with the (WP)'s

Playing interactively over the Dominant Strategies of (W_4), the (Attacker/CWP) has its best choice ever in exploiting the (WP)'s *tremendous aggressions and violations* along with (W_3) to rally against the latter more fiercely to bring a prompt and permanent end to such a war.




Figure 4: The Russia-Ukraine War's Fourth War Wave (W_4)



It is safe to say that the (WP)'s granted a *golden chance* to the (CWP) to *globalize* the war in “effect” while *de-escalating* it in “level and scale.” Yes! A legitimized justification is what (CWP) must have been searching for to deter the (WP) via collective-security efforts of war, with gathering other areas in the world to support globalized, not regionalized, *deterrence-via-war* efforts. If NATO forces were to intervene in any former wave, its interference would be in vain because it would work on escalating the war, and that is what the (WP) was waiting for, among other choices, to stand in a position of a forcibly continuous state of war in front of its publics, claiming that it is the other who escalated first (!).

For that reason, in no previous wave that we set a strategy of military intervention of NATO, but we paved a fertile ground for introducing this strategy in a final wave to fight a war that ends all wars in Eastern Europe thereafter. Through previous waves, we set stratagems that force the (WP) to use its strategies, which it would, maybe randomly, be made at any time in any way, according to a *course of rationality* we intended to draw depending on (WP)'s perceptions and being as a rational actor. The aim was and is to leave *no rational choice* for (WP) to pick at a *determined wave* in a *specific way* except those and their modalities we posited in response to (i.e., Defense) or confronting (i.e., Attack) the strategies that the (CWP) use every wave. It is a work of strategically maneuvering to force the enemy to do what it would already do, but the way that serves the (CWP) to achieve a diplomatic victory by the (W₂)'s end or a decisive military victory by that end of (W₄). We can call that “*strategic navigation*.” In this wave, the time has come to harvest a success we cultivated in former waves, relying on how the (CWP) acted every wave and what it achieved by each one's end, namely, its {DU (FV-A)} per wave.

First, under the (Credible Retaliatory Threats) Dominant Strategy, the (CWP) is better off attacking the (WP), playing the (Second Use Policy of Dropping *Symmetrically Banned-Chemical Weapons* in Occupied Lands in Ukraine Against the Enemy's Military, and the (BMDs) Activation Declaration) strategy. Now, the (CWP) deals with uncertainty as follows:

a. If the (WP) was to use (Banned Chemical Weapons) tactic, perceiving that a free world is not going to act likewise, and therefore this player's victory in Ukraine is guaranteed, then the (CWP) is to surprise the (WP) by a brutality method followed from the same level and scale targeting the (WP)'s military in this stage, not civilians.



b. Counting on the (WP)'s perceptions of easily (Denying) the use of chemical weapons after employing them in battle and civilian zones in Ukraine, it is now the (CWP)'s turn to (Drop Banned Chemical Weapons and Deny), provided that the (CWP) uses these weapons tracing the same type of the same level and effect of those used by the (WP) in the (W₃). If the (CWP) exceeds the level that the (WP) used first in dropping chemical weapons, it will provoke the (WP) to retaliate, escalating the battles to be even “nuclear” in Ukraine. Cautiousness is a victory key targeted here.

The aim of the (CWP)'s first major strategy is to: a. deter the (WP) and compel it not to use such banned weapons in the battleground again once these weapons prove over time their *uselessness* in bringing victory to the (WP) but massive human and military losses on this player's side due to sequential credible retaliation, and thus, b. hindering the (WP)'s *incorrectly*-perceived prompt victory in Ukraine when the (WP) realizes that its aggressive and brutal war tactics will be met by others symmetrical in “level, scale, and effect” that are also credible and capable.

c. The third uncertainty that the (CWP) must deal with is the nuclear miscalculations and risk-takers in Kremlin. Given that the (WP) is to see that it is going to be deterred and compelled to follow discipline in its war in Ukraine by the (CWP), the arrogance of war leaders can lead them to commit madness sometimes, as was the case of Adolf Hitler during World War II, particularly that all our set strategies of (W₄) to the (CWP) will unprecedentedly trap the (WP) militarily, diplomatically, and politically. So, the ((BMDs) Activation Declaration) is a joint strategy that must be used beside the (Second Use Policy of *Symmetrically* Banned-Chemical Weapons in Occupied Lands in Ukraine Against the Enemy's Military). The (BMDs) means the (Ballistic Missile Defense Systems), that the (CWP), referring to NATO in this case as an alliance of coherent allies (not the US lonely or separately), must declare their activation versus any *possible* nuclear attack in Ukraine “*for protecting the regional common good of Europe.*” Now, the (CWP) precludes even the thought of using nuclear missiles in Ukrainian lands by the Russian administration. Accordingly, we decisively agree with those theorists who first argued for the (US)'s adoption of the (BMDs), sacrificing the stability of the mutually assured destruction (MAD) strategy but ensuring, on the other hand, that *on no single occasion* would the enemy think that it might succeed in striking other nuclear lands by a nuclear strike.



As Russia is going to be informed through an official declaration of NATO that any possible nuclear strike in Ukraine will be intercepted through (BMDs) and unofficially that a “probable” retaliatory strike might follow against its army there, such a “certainty of nuclear strike failure” with a possible retaliatory threat in a response-in-kind against Russian forces in Ukraine (only), would prevent all possible nuclear miscalculations and risky escalation from the occurrence in battle zones by Russia. In a sequence, the (WP)’s (Counter-Attacks) major strategy would *at most* concern a re-dropping of (Banned Chemical Weapons) and denying _ in a limited time fearing remarkable human and military losses on its side caused by symmetrical retaliation _ motivated by proving an “invincibility” myth of Russian army publicized worldwide. Here, the other four major strategies of (CWP) must be entangled with its first one to enforce, not deter for or compel only, Russian military retreat back to the (WP)’s borders at the (W₄)’s end.

At last, it is fair to refer to three main strategic points:

a. Firstly: The (CWP)’s side is to apply the (Second Use Policy of *Symmetrically Dropping Banned Chemical Weapons Against the Enemy’s Military*) under the (Credible Retaliatory Threats)’s Dominant Strategy the fighting armies and paramilitaries in Ukraine who are supervised, supplied, and supported by NATO under the US leadership. In other words, *neither* NATO *nor* the US militarily intervenes in employing the (CWP)’s first major strategy; only, in the second major strategy, NATO-allied forces do interfere and thereafter along with (W₄). However, we set the stratagem of (Drop and Denying) to avoid global public discontent if these publics in a *distorted way*, see that the (CWP) acted similarly as brutal as the (WP), while the first is to do so necessarily to respond in kind deterring the other, and sufficiently by not harming the (WP)’s civilians ever, only military.

If they are not NATO forces that activate the (Dropping) strategy, then the path is clear for the (CWP) toward getting global support for the NATO operation in the next step. Thence, the first major strategy is aimed to prove the (CWP)’s _ represented in the Ukrainian fighting corps and divisions assisted by NATO and the US in this stage without direct interference _ credibility, and capability of retaliatory threats to eliminate what the (WP) perceives as a key of prompt victory by using banned weapons in (W₃). Otherwise, it is going to be the (WP) who declares its long-lasting *de facto* victory as long as its killing machine proves superior over the (CWP)’s.



b. Secondly: The (“BMDs” Activation Declaration) strategy is meant to manage any possible irrationality that the Russian administration might consider necessary, coinciding with being defeated at the hands of its “weak subjects” (i.e., the Ukrainians) who must successfully prove to the (WP) that *no use* of (Banned Chemical Weapons) strategy will set Putin the king of Ukraine as it placed him a king of Russian domain of influence in Syria at the Syrian regime-controlled-territories after 2013 revolution and civil war there. At the same time, the case of Ukraine is even worse by developing to be an actual, legitimized invasion and integration of occupied Ukraine into the Russian sovereign territories, serving Russian expansionism’s sake in former Soviet or communist lands.

c. Thirdly: If Putin attempts to shame and label (CWP) for using (symmetrically) banned weapons, given the assumed preemptive action (explained below) of propagating for a (NATO Peace-Enforcement Operation) before the last is initiated and before the (CWP)’s first major strategy occurs at the Ukrainians hands in battle zones, this aggressive political leader becomes better off by not exposing credibly such a planned fierce defeat of its forces in Ukraine, and particularly, in a precedented phase of NATO intervention, or that his subjects of millions of masses might “revolt” against him and his administration. The reason is that it will be if occurred, the first time that the brutality Russian war machine shows that the knife targets its bloody owner and that the mirror reflects the same image of Putin’s inhumanity on this leader’s guided-military troops themselves. Here, a skillful reader might notice that the (CWP) is to be highly better off now if Putin tries to overturn the global public against the Ukrainian side while he mistakenly becomes a *loyal servant* to bring about a “revolt” against himself from the heart if these facts are to be employed to topple Putin’s “irrational” decisions of war in Eastern Europe under the black propaganda campaign that already reaches its (matureness level and Russian public sympathy with it) even before the (W₄) begins (!). Yes, the war is merely a “dirty trick,” it is *not* about “what happens,” it is about how the “what happens” is being used and exploited to create “another what happens” at the proper multi-dimensional timing of this “another what happens.” That is, in a prior time to any uncertain move to shame the (CWP) by the (WP) in (W₄), the (CWP) will be prepared by the public masses in Russian society to stand for its purposeful end to enforce terminating the war whereas carrying, on the other hand, millions of audiences internationally to countenance its first major strategy of (Second Use



The policy of Credible Retaliatory Threats) against the Russian military (only, not civilians) before even this strategy becomes into play. We can call the Fourth War Wave's (CWP)-strategies and stratagems coherently, based on this player's formerly played ones, the *"overwhelming bottom-up and top-down victory of the war."*

Second, over the (Territorial Advance) Dominant Strategy of (W_4), the (Attacker/CWP) becomes better off by moving to its "last resort," implementing a (NATO Peace-Enforcement Operation) in Ukraine under a (NATO Forces Intervention, (CASO)-Destabilization, and Restoration) major strategy. Playing this strategy at this wave of the war, and after leaving the sphere vacated to the (WP) in (W_3) to show the world "who the (WP) is," all calculations of the war's military and territorial superiority are to be thoroughly altered now for the (CWP)'s favor. Such an intervention of NATO forces to combat in battle zones with legitimized peace-enforcement measures and tools is meant to operate side by side with local forces of Ukraine's army and previously NATO-financed and supported guerilla and insurgency in the (CASO) fronts of weakening the (WP).

The NATO intervention mirrors a. overcoming the Russian military not only in numbers but in strategy, organization level, and active security alliance, b. using more advanced or symmetrically high technological weaponry, and c. focusing on carrying out air attacks and strikes against (WP)'s troops, more than using the artillery efforts that might become a direct, hunted target by the (WP)'s air jets dropping banned weapons. Therefore, all military reinforcements that were to overturn the war outcome in favor of the (CWP)'s interest must be provided by this moment with the NATO operation is welcomed through a global justification and legitimacy to repel a would-be undeterrable aggressor of a globalized violation against the whole international society. The military chance of (WP) that we granted in (W_3) is going to be withdrawn, in this wave, through these efforts:

a. land encirclement of Russian forces on Ukraine's all sides by the foreign troops, cooperating and collaborating with domestic ones,

b. organized NATO air attacks to be in line with land artillery ones, and c. penetration from the Black Sea on the South-Eastern side of Ukraine, from Odesa's side, for example, relying on naval forces operations to deliver supplies, surrounding the enemy's fleets before it



does first, and conduct attacks from the sea against this enemy in occupied lands of the Eastern front jointly with established insurgency and guerilla's clandestine attack arrangements.

With all (WP)'s efforts to (Repelling) now, a decisive territorial advance must be the outcome for the (CWP) based on the (De-stabilization of (CASO) Continuity) first, which could be maintained along with the previous waves, and (W₃)'s preventive and preemptive strategies followed, second. As long as the (CWP) troops, and before NATO intervention in (W₄), have been capable of standing in their positions in (CASO) and elsewhere, despite the (WP)'s attempts to finalize the invasion and declare it, the NATO mission in (W₄) is to be facilitated. The opposite is right, though. What if the (CWP)'s achievement in (W₃), for example, was not (Defense) as an output but a humiliating severe defeat and the displacement of troops and captivating them? It would mean that the (CWP) has committed strategic mistakes that trapped it in a stretched war and that its planned, crucial victory of (W₄) had been overpassed by an ongoing-war status quo.

The rule of (W₃) is clear; if the (WP) is to advance, it must come with (CWP)'s ((CASO)-Destabilizing Continuity; Preventive and Preemptive Policies; and Counter-Attacks and Offensives) strategies are taking place. Otherwise, it would be a decisive and final victory for the (WP) occurring in (W₃) due to political leaders' miscalculations; and by the end, why would there be a fourth wave of the war, or even a second one, if such a victory of this player was to be gained easily in (W₁) of the war? It is vital to notice that the (CWP)'s {DU (FA-V)} by the beginning of (W₁) was longer than that reached by the (W₃)'s end. So, the (5 DU) of (W₁)'s start that is less in value than the (3 DU) of (W₃)'s end means that the (CWP) would still have been closer to its (FA-V) more than that case of the war initiation's status quo.

Third, under a (Counter-Revivalism) Dominant Strategy of the (W₄), the (CWP) is better off intending to escalate its war propaganda to adopt a ("Global Defense of World Security" Peace-Enforcement Operation) media propagating strategy. As we mentioned before, with the NATO intervening in Ukraine militarily, global public support is needed to conduct the strategic objective of (W₄) effectively. Again, the Russian public countenance is as much needed as the global one, with more focus on the last given the next (NATO Re-allying) strategy. Another imagination of Clausewitz's trinity of war may reflect that:



- a. the government is “*supranational* of NATO and its newly gained allies in the war,”
- b. the public element must address *three branches*; the NATO states’ publics, the masses of their new war allies, and the enemy’s mass audiences influenced by the designed black propaganda campaign to strike the Russian administration from the heart by provoking active protests and opposition against the government decision of war, coinciding with witnessing high-level casualties due to political authority’s ambitions and expansionist goals,
- c. the army is *globalized* oriented by international governance’s rationality and reasons for war and supported by the global public opposing Russian unmatched aggression in Eastern Europe.

The (WP), perceiving the (CWP)’s media strategy as “a momentum’s exploitive” to constrain its expansionist objectives, which is fair to understand, moves to a (Counter-Manipulation) media strategy. Suppression of the implicit (CWP)-directed anti-war propaganda in Russia to end the war by relying further on bottom-up tactics is the (WP)’s first aim here. Simultaneously, the (WP) becomes better off by turning to the international society to speak out the discourse on a “liberation of ethnic Russians and Russian national security,” which is not going to be effective under these conditions:

- a. If the (CWP) succeeded effectively in (Imposing Isolation) on (WP) during (W₂) and after that.
- b. If a remarkable success of the designed black propaganda campaign in the enemy’s lands took place earlier, addressing its four stages sufficiently, to convince the global masses by providing the example of partner publics in Russia.
- c. If the (CWP) proves superior in its media strategy of (Countering and Re-Constructing) against (Revivalism) in (W₃), both inside the enemy’s territory and in the global arena.
- d. Most importantly, if the (CWP) moves first in a preemptive action to propagate for a (“Global Defense of World Security” Peace-Enforcement Operation) *precedentially* to two necessary circumstances: before the NATO operation even takes place through the (CWP)’s second major strategy of (W₄); before the (WP) possibly begins to shame and label (CWP) after the last applies the (Second Use Policy and (BMDs) Activation Declaration) strategy. In other words, if Russia moves first to insult the (CWP) when acting likewise dropping banned



weapons against its military, it means that the (CWP) loses, in a huge part, not only global public support and re-allying objectives but also Russian public backing and gradually it wrongly “*isolates itself*” and “*encircles it in a prolonged war,*” serving the (WP)’s war tactics over time, if a correction course is not made. That is the reason why we set the (*Watch and Assess*) strategy using only the (*Verbal Deterrence*) tactic in (W₃) versus (WP)’s (*Employing of Banned Chemical Weapons*) strategy. To reply in a rush, responding-in-kind, the (CWP) loses a decisive victory of (W₄); however, to wait and prepare the trap, this player wins, as illustrated in the three strategic points above. Still, no strategic mistakes must be made concerning the media propaganda of (W₄) since it is one basic ground of a “*globalized war in effect and de-escalated one in level and scale*” wave-stratagem of (CWP).

Fourth, moving after its war propaganda of international, regional, and national media succeeded in rallying masses worldwide in support of its cause to fight in Ukraine through NATO military operation, the (CWP) sequentially finds the way paved for adopting a strategy of (*NATO Re-Allying with Global Regional Hegemons Against Russian Aggression in Ukraine*) as a developed method of enlarging the (*Collective Security*) domain to pressurize a prompt end of the war. It is a “*diplomatic and political globalization of war*” step. Like media propaganda strategy, this step must also take place in a *prior stage* to the (*Second Use Policy*) the first major strategy of (CWP) and its (*NATO operation initiation*) second major one. Through some bilateral conferences, congresses, and seminars, a representative delegation of NATO can conduct such a strategy with influential leaders in Asia, Central and Latin America, Africa, and Australia. Such an effort does *not* reflect an official obligation by any met-with leader; however, it helps obtain three benefits: a. enforcing international isolation on Russia in diplomatic and foreign policy realms, b. granting the war its globalized nature in effect to assist in minimizing it in level and scale, and c. provoking millions of rallies around the world in active opposition to Russian aggression in Ukraine, following their titled leaders.

The (WP), seeing the (CWP)’s efforts to enforce its battle retreat, becomes better off by continuing its deterrence and compellence policies in Eastern Europe using the (*Regional Destabilization Continuity*) strategy. Again, a. financial support and weaponizing of fighting groups, b. initiating a *cyberwar* for recruiting local allies in neighboring states of Ukraine and c. attacking surrounding borders are the best tactics rationally perceived by the (WP) to de-



stabilize the Eastern Europe region, imposing what was the temporal victory in (W_3) to be an *unquestionable status quo*. It does mean that the (State-Stabilization and Security Policizing by Force) strategy must be applied by (CWP) along with the war's trajectories to preclude any possible (WP)'s penetration of national security in Eastern Europe.

Fifth, regarding the (Military Superiority) Dominant Strategy of (W_4), by the end of this wave, the (CWP) succeeds in imposing a (Globalized Superiority) strategy through fiercely fighting NATO forces on land, air, and sea, backed by previously and harmoniously organized (Ukrainian army, mercenaries, guerilla warfare, and insurgencies) to multiply the war efforts for enforcing the enemy's military retreat completely by war or diplomacy. In a sequence to

a. formerly initiated media propaganda of ("Global Defense of World Security" NATO Peace-Enforcement Operation);

b. (NATO's Re-allying with Global Regional Hegemons) against the Russian war in Ukraine and for gaining their (verbal/non-verbal) support of a planned NATO-defensive military operation;

c. (CWP)'s employing of (Credible Retaliatory Threats) at the hands of Ukraine's army only under the (Second Use Policy) strategy;

d. (Territorial Advance) by NATO interference and (Restoration) gradually of occupied lands, the (CWP) leaves to the (WP) no military strategic choice except the (Trapping Stalemate) one, with being globalized-superior on it. Now, it is either the military means that end the war in favor of (CWP)'s permanent prompt victory or the diplomatic exit.

6.3. The Wave's Outputs and the Diplomatic Exit Possibility

The Wave's Outputs:

At the (W_4)'s end, the ($Output_1$) of (WP) is (Enforced Military Retreat), while the ($Output_2$) of (CWP) is (Military Advance). Using (Level III Strategies) in (W_4), which are the most intensified ever in scale, level, and effect in our modeling, the (CWP) alters the war's equations to prove its military victory in battle zones and to impose a fair and absolute balance in a reached diplomatic exit. The (CWP)'s (DU) from its (FA-V) now is $(-\infty)$, where the distance ceased to exist, coinciding with this player's achieving of *de facto final victory*. That reversely means that the (WP)'s (DU) from its (FA-V) is (∞) , where this player is the (loser) of war at present and in the future with existing such an infinite distance to its (FA-V).



We can denote the “(W₄)’s Victory-Defeat Relationship” in this formula:

If { (WL) + (SWO)_(WP/CWP) ≈ DU (FA-V)_(WP/CWP) }, and that,

{ (WL) + (SWO)_(CWP/Victor) ≈ - ∞ DU (FA-V)_(CWP/Victor) }, where

$$\begin{matrix} \{- \text{DU (FA-V)}_{Px}\} & \longleftrightarrow & \{+ \text{DU (FA-V)}_{Py}\} \\ \text{(Victory for One)} & & \text{(Defeat for the Other)} \end{matrix}$$

Then, { (WL) + (SWO)_(WP/Defeated) ≈ + ∞ DU (FA-V)_(WP/Defeated) }

The Diplomatic Exit Possibility:

Firstly, the war might end militarily directly when stretching its length until completely enforcing the military retreat of invading Russian forces back to their borders, without reaching any diplomatic convention to put an end to the war by diplomacy. This case, if reached, reflects future stability of deterrence and conflict under the (Opponent Victory Equilibrium) of the (Deterrence Entanglement Law)’s (Relative Balance Rule), which is permanently stable, provided that there are certainty and correct perception conditions to be achieved within, where the (CWP) is the victor side at present and future. This possibility is not suggested because stretching the length of war might carry with it many strategic surprises or uncertainty and misperceptions like a military coalition occurring between Belarus and Russia to repel what they may perceive as a (manipulated war of anti-sovietism) that might be conducted under Putin’s leadership on behalf of all ethnic Russians, for example, in Eastern Europe.




Figure 5: Illustration of a (Singularity Point of the Infinite Distance and Created Outright Balance)



In that case, it would be the (Disguised Opponent-Victory Equilibrium), if achieved in favor of (CWP), which is stable only temporarily due to deception or intentional misperception made by the enemy against this victor side. So, the more the Fourth War Wave becomes extended, the more the risk of major war manifests in Europe and surrounding regions. In the (W_4), the (CWP)'s key strategic objective must *constantly* remain a (*Prompt* Enemy-Defeating) plus (International Security).

Secondly, the (CWP) may go arrogant! Yet, after witnessing unmatched victories in battle zones in Ukraine against Russia, relying on the (W_4)'s strategic surprises of the (CWP)'s advanced (Attack-Defense) Key Wave-Strategy with the ability to harvest many cultivated utilities of strategies intentionally made over the previous waves for obtaining its decisive victory in (W_4), the (CWP) might mistakenly refer to "impose reparations" on Russia due to the war's damage caused by its ambition adventure in Europe, and/or to gain a "victory via humiliating the enemy," by any method followed. The "invincibility" myth of the Russian army is assumed to be translated here into madness and complete irrationality, with Russian leaders seeing themselves as better off by "destroying Europe" than to accept "historical humiliation" that disgraces their military and nation for decades or maybe centuries, particularly, under Putin's reign. The probability of this strategic choice of (WP) sequentially to the (CWP)'s possible strategic flaw is ($0 \leq p < 0.5$). On states' leaders-level analysis of politics and strategic preferences, it is empirically proved how far right-wing military leaders can lead their nations and neighboring regional ones to thorough devastation for only satisfying their ego and fulfilling personal ambitions (e.g., Germany's Hitler and Italy's Mussolini).

Thirdly, the (Absolute Balance Rule). After the (CWP) becomes able to enforce a Russian military retreat and prove military superiority and advance with a restoration of invaded Ukrainian territories in at least 90% coinciding with the (W_4)'s termination, the path is clear now for bringing an end to the war via diplomacy where Russia correctly perceives that any future military escalation will be followed by credible and capable deterrence-via-war by the (CWP). Under this case, the (CWP) is better off by formulating terms of a. complete Russian withdrawal from all Ukrainian territories according to the status quo that existed before February 24, 2022, b. Russian public assurances of not re-invading Ukraine, c. issuing that Ukraine pledges not to be a member state of NATO or the European Union on any present or



the future occasion, d. Ukrainian guerrilla, insurgencies, and military confrontations are to be utterly halted everywhere they occur, and stability is to be restored in Crimea or any Russian zone of influence that was a war object (i.e., Abkhazia and Ossetia) as in sovereign Ukraine's territories.

Finally, the military victory of (CWP) is to be binding through another unmatched diplomatic victory with the avoidance of humiliating the enemy, the (WP), by reassuring it regarding its future security in the region. The probability of this diplomatic exit possibility is $(0.5 < p \leq 1)$. This case reflects the future stability of deterrence and conflict under the (Compromise Equilibrium) of the (Absolute Balance Rule) within the developed (Deterrence Entanglement Law). While the (Defeated/WP)'s (DU) to its (FA-V) is (∞) , the distance between the (W) and (CW) of the war becomes (∞) likewise, where both the {(W) and (CW)} fade away till a (Singularity Point of the Infinite Distance and Created Outright Balance (SPID-COB)) exists (see Figure 5) to usher the rise of a "universal peace-beginning creation," by a globalized stabilization of secured EU-lands, and following suit in other parts of the world, setting (seldom by a deterrence-via-war) the peace as the king of the day.

7. Conclusion

By strategizing four waves of the Russo-Ukrainian War 2022, we developed modeling anticipating what might occur in this war in assumingly its first, second, third, and fourth stages. Depending on a game and hyper game-theoretic analysis, such theoretic-strategic modeling focuses on revealing the weakness-points in the second actor's interactions by providing a (Counter-Wave) in each War Wave besides the (Wave) of the first actor, where (Russia) is a (Wave Player "WP"), and (Ukraine and NATO under the US leadership) are a (Counter-Wave Player "CWP"). In conclusion, we proved that our developed Deterrence Entanglement Law (DEL) could be restored to impede this actual state of war and, further, maintained to precluding this war re-initiation possibility in the future under an (Outright Balance Rule). There are two crucial relationships are defined and used to reach the balance points out of this war by each wave.

First, the {(WL), (SWO), and {DU (FA-V)} Relationship}, that is denoted in symbols within this applicable equation:

$$\{ (WL) + (SWO)_{(WP/CWP)} \simeq DU (FA-V)_{(WP/CWP)} \}$$



Based on that relationship, we could calculate the level of moving toward (Victory) or (Defeat) at the end of every wave for a player, where the less the Distance Unit number is, the higher value it reflects for the (WP) or (CWP) since any becomes closer to its (FA-V).

In comparison, the second is the {War-Zero-Sum Game's Victory-Defeat Relationship}, theoretically assuming that in a *war-zero-sum game*, a **victory** for one conflicting party reverses the **defeat** for the other (i.e., the enemy), and vice versa, where (P_x) is Player x and (P_y) is Player y . Thence, the {DU (FA-V)} concerning victory-defeat outcomes in a war-zero-sum-game is denoted as the following:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \{- \text{DU (FA-V)}_{P_x}\} & \begin{array}{c} \longleftarrow \\ \longrightarrow \end{array} & \{+ \text{DU (FA-V)}_{P_y}\} \\ \text{(Victory for One/Per Wave)} & & \text{(Defeat for the Other/Per Wave)} \end{array}$$

And therefore:

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \{- \infty \text{DU (FA-V)}_{P_x}\} & \begin{array}{c} \longleftarrow \\ \longrightarrow \end{array} & \{+ \infty \text{DU (FA-V)}_{P_y}\} \\ \text{(Final War-Victory for One)} & & \text{(Final War-Defeat for the Other)} \end{array}$$

Given that the ($+ \infty$ DU) of (FA-V) reflects the least value ever with the (Distance) is infinite; comparingly, the ($- \infty$ DU) represents the highest value ever for a (Distance Unit) to (Future Advance Towards Victory) for a (Wave Player) or (Counter-Wave Player) where the (Distance) to (FA-V) ceases to exist with being translated into a decisive and ultimate victory of the war.



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