

## THE CRISIS OF TURKISH DEMOCRACY(\*)

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### Introduction

Democracy means government by the people, or, more specifically, by representatives elected by popular majorities in free and competitive elections<sup>(1)</sup>. The difficulties that Turkish democracy still faces are well illustrated by the periodic interventions of the armed forces at roughly ten-year intervals in 1960-1961, in 1971-1973, and recently in 1980-1983.

The question why democracy broke down again in September 12, 1980 may be assumed at different levels. But before attempting to understand this event, it should be noted that whenever Turkish democracy has broken down, it has not been superseded by an authoritarian and totalitarian rejime<sup>(2)</sup>. Yet there is a fundamental contrast between these temporary interventions in Turkey and the long-term interventions by the military in other Third World or Mediterranean countries such as Korea, the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil in the 1960s, Chile in the 1970s, Egypt in Nasser period, Spain in Franco period or the Clonels' Junta in Greece<sup>(3)</sup>.

Many years ago, the father of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, enunciated an important verity. He observed about the new national state he was bringing into being: "We resemble ourselves"<sup>(4)</sup>. By that, "he did not intend to imply that Turks are inherently different from other peoples, or that the rules of political behavior in the world at large did not operate in Turkey. But he was calling attention to the fact that Turkish political experience was no carbon copy of that of other sates"<sup>(5)</sup>. Following Mustafa Kemal's lead, one should be especially cautious identifying Turkish political practice with models drawn from other societies and other times.

The product of Turkish history, the changing constellation of international pressures, the impact of personality, and sheer chance combine to impart a uniqueness that cannot be completely comprehended in the shorthand of analogy to other countri-

(\*) The first version of this article was presented at the Turkish Studies Colloquium series in University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, U.S.A., February 21, 1991.

es. There is some discussion on the Turkish Constitution that it bears a resemblance to some European countries-such as the Weimar Republic(German Republic) or the French example (6). No matter how much the framers of the current constitutional system may have borrowed from European examples, Turkey today is far from resembling any of the various examples or any other external sources of inspiration.

Is Turkey a democracy? Is there a return to real democracy in Turkey or what are the factors which make Turkish democracy into what it is? It is not easy to answer these questions. However, we would like to explain the causes of the crisis in the Turkish democracy, the role of the military in political life and the creation of a new Constitution. We hope that answers to these questions are inherent in the explanations.

### **The Emergence of Polarization and Fragmentation**

In fact, the dilemmas that Turkish politics went through since 1945 are typical of the paradoxes of the democratic form of government. According to Ergüder, they arise from the fact that a viable democracy should involve a successful blend of maximum amount of **consent** on the hand and the need for **coercion** to perform the basic tasks of government on the other (7). He stated that "this critical balance between consent and coercion is more paradoxical in the case of developing countries which desperately need effective governmental leadership and effectiveness to transform their societies and economics while at the same time trying to build a democracy based on consent as broadly based as possible"(8).

In each breakdown of democracy in Turkey during the past 45 years these contradictions or paradoxes of democracy were much in evidence. In 1960 the democratic system collapsed because conflict between political parties had been very polarized and the mode of dealing with this polarization was majoritarian authoritarianism in the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA). Between 1961 and 1980, the constitutional framework and the electoral system acted a broad-based representative parliament. What was lacking was the consensus needed to make coalitions work in a very fragmented TGNA (9). As Ergüder stated that:

*The attempt by the military to restructure the Turkish Political System after the Intervention of 1980 aimed at minimizing political conflict through constitutional arrangements and by excluding elements in the party system that were associated with conflictual style of politics. This meant the exclusion of political parties with ideological or anti-systemic appeal as well as leaders of major parties which were thought to be responsible for the failure of the party system to produce effective governmental leadership in a fragmented parliament. Depolarization was and is a favorite term of day-to-day Turkish politics of the 80s to describe the political philosophy of September 12 th (10).*

The recent Turkish experience shows how a liberal and democratic system can breakdown, and how perhaps it may be revived. With the greater protection for freedoms contained in the 1961 Constitution, the Turkish political system was more liberal and democratic in form. In the Turkish case, custom, prejudice and long established economic and social connections influenced voting, and other expressions of political interest, more than in most of the liberal democracies of the Western World. Every liberal -democratic political system requires responsible but positive political leadership in the general interest. The danger from the political elites in this regard is that they have a tendency either to be corrupted by an excessive pre-occupation with interests, or to be carried away with ideological rhetoric (11).

The Turkish system does not produce an elite able to maintain itself in office for very long periods. The influence of party members is paramount and the device of primaries for the election of candidates to run in the general elections help enhance the influence of party officials lower down in the hierarchy. What a responsible democratic leadership must do is to produce realistic but creative policies and put them firmly into effect when in office (12). In the Turkish case, temptation of short-term party gains is more important than long-term responsible and responsive to demands of policies.

In liberal democracy, the military, the educational system and even the administrative of the law assumes important roles. It is vital to have a bureaucracy whose members actually believe in liberal and democratic norms, though the obstacles in the way of achieving such a desirable condition are enormous. The perfect civil servant for a liberal and democratic political system is only going to be found in utopia, but the great danger of a politicized bureaucracy needs to be guarded against at the price of other disadvantages. That the bureaucracy should provide a measure of leadership in a liberal democracy even with regard (13).

For Turkey, the polarization of the bureaucracy was a real danger in recent political life. It has, still, a polarized character and a tightly organized centrally directed institution (14).

### **The Military and Politics**

The institution which has advanced itself most as the champion of the public interest in Turkey, in very broad terms has to be the military, often dubbed the "guardian of Turkish democracy" (15).

Paradoxical though it may seem, there is no doubt that this authoritarian institution has fulfilled this function both in 1960 and in 1971 and again in 1980.

However, on all three occasions the military have intervened to set up a dicta-

torship intended only for a limited period until some modified form of liberal and democratic system might be made to work once more. According to Dodd "the language of 'collapse' or 'breakdown' rather suggest a marked contrast between democratic rule on the one hand and military rule on the other a black and white contrast that is too sharp for the Turkish state (16).

He added that " at least since 1961 Turkish politics has always been under the scrutiny of the military ; it has not been particularly the case since 1971. The role of the National Security Council (NSC) with its substantial military membership has of late years been enhanced. The military has taken upon itself the duty of offering advice and has delivered stiff warning as soon as the political situation has shown signs of getting out of hand." (17)

### **Role of the Military in Turkish History**

The military have played a significant role in Turkish culture and politics historically. In the most general sense, the Turks have inherited Muslim culture which recognizes and accepts the legitimacy of the military as an arm of the Islamic Community. Heper and Tachau noted that " the military played a key role in the establishment of the Ottoman Empire. The military continued to figure prominently throughout Ottoman history. Not only was the Sultan expected to manifest military prowess and physical courage among other royal attributes, but also the elite Janissary Corps occupied an important position in the imperial structure." (18)

That is , the empire relied upon the army which played a fundamental role not only in the economic organization based largely on conquest. However, for the purpose of understanding the current position of the Turkish military establishment, little is to be gained by looking at the Ottoman experience before the latter nineteenth century.

The guardian role of the officer corps as an honored calling ran as a basic thread through all Ottoman and modern Turkish history. This attitude of respect for a confidence in the military commanders was in recent times to underline their inclination to intervene when they saw threats to the state and to condition popular acceptance of a military move.

By the end of the 19 th century, liberal reformist ideas had permeated the military officer crops (19). The military played an important if somewhat indirect role in the upheavals of the early 20 th century beginning with the so-called Young Turk revolution of 1908 and continuing through World War I (20). They provided the example of military action against constituted authority on behalf of the Young Turk period were mixed. They set no clear limits on military engagement in politics (21).

In terms of the connection of officers with political parties, the Young Turk experience provided a compelling example for Atatürk to follow. Officers were the core of the Committee of Union and Progress even though civilians played a continuing major part in this seminal political involvement with civilian leaders was vital in nourishing the concept that the officers were responsible for the destiny of the state.

The new Republican army became in fact the first institution of the nascent Turkish state even though it was formally relegated by Mustafa Kemal to secondary place with respect to the parliament and especially the party. As Heper and Tachau pointed out that:

*One of the important aspects of the so-called Kemalist regime was the attempt on the part of Mustafa Kemal to separate the military from the ordinary conduct of political affairs. In addition to his public statements on this point, he took official action by persuading the Parliament to forbid military officers to stand for election unless they resigned their commissions. (22)*

According to Heper, the aim of this policy was not only to prevent the military from exercising direct political influence, but also to insulate the military establishment from the pulling and hauling of the political arena <sup>(23)</sup>. This is, in fact, characteristic of stable political regimes <sup>(24)</sup>. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that channels of influence over the military were carefully preserved throughout the first three decades of Kemalist Republican rule (roughly 1920 - through 1950).

A major factor in preserving stable relations between the military and civilian leadership was the military background of the top figures involved: Mustafa Kemal himself as President of the Republic until his death late in 1938 and İsmet İnönü, successor to Mustafa Kemal was assured of military support for his far-reaching reform program. By the same token, the military was assured of freedom from partisan political interference in their affairs as well as having access to the highest authorities of the state.

A major change in the Turkish political system occurred in 1950, when the 27-year reign of the Republican People's Party (RPP) was brought to an end by a stunning electoral victory won by the break-away Democrat Party (DP) under leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes <sup>(25)</sup>.

Heper and Tachau noted that " the victory of the Democrats did not occur in a vacuum. It was the expression and the result of deep-seated social and economic developments. Primary among these was the rise of a class of middle-class entrepreneurs and businessmen in place of the non-muslim minorities who had fulfilled these functi-

ons in the Ottoman Empire <sup>(26)</sup>. They added that " the years of Republican rule had produced an unprecedented era of peace for the Turkish people, bringing rising standards of living and the beginnings of industrialization and commercialization of the economy."<sup>(27)</sup>

Consequently, a military career was no longer the only channel for upward mobility. The proportion of ex-military officers among the political elite (i.e., in parliament and cabinet) declined <sup>(28)</sup>. Indeed, the twin pillars of the Kemalist regime ( the military and civil bureaucracy) receded in power and significance during the decade of the 1950s, overshadowed by the commercial enterpreneurs and businessmen as well as segments of provincial and regional elites. These groups became the core of support for the DP <sup>(29)</sup>.

In addition, the expended educational facilities of the Republican era opened up alternative career avenues for upward mobility, particularly in the professions. What is more, in the inflation which developed under the Democrats ambitious policies of rapid economic development, the civil and military bureaucrats suffered material and psychic losses because their salaries failed to keep up with rapidly rising costs. Thus, not only did the military feel they had lost access to the pinnacle of power, but social status and prestige in the bargain <sup>(30)</sup>.

The change in ruling elites, <sup>(31)</sup> which derived from important social transformations and reflected a shift in political structures, was perceived by the army as the degradation of its own institutional prestige and a challenge to its image within society. This was further aggravated in 1954 by the electoral success of the incumbents, who played the military bureaucracy under their control. Thus, for the first time in Turkey, military power was subject to civilian authority.

### **The Background of the First Military Intervention**

By the begining of 1958 the DP government had become isolated from virtually all the institutions of the state. Firstly, it had been the press and the judiciary followed by the civil bureaucracy and finally the army and the universities <sup>(32)</sup>. The performance of the DP government was highly criticised not only on its economic policies but mainly on its enactment of unconstitutional laws <sup>(33)</sup>.

Politically, there is an intimate relationship between the deteriorating economic situation and its impacts on the social life and politics. DP government responded to this by taking measures to isolate the public from politics. After the repressive mea-

asures, political activity outside the framework of the Assembly became virtually impossible. As the government could not deal with the rising demands within the society, DP government found refuge in enacting unconstitutional laws and amendments which gave the government broad powers of intervention in controlling prices and economy on the one hand and the mass media on the other (34).

The military take-over of 1960 was a turning point in the relationship between civilian and military elites that had governed the country since 1923. Karpat noted that "justified as a stop necessary for the preservation of democracy, the action appeared to be chiefly designed to answer a threat to the RPP, which had governed Turkey from 1923 to 1950." (35)

Strains within the civilian-military coalition had begun to develop as early as 1946, with the establishment of the opposition DP. The Democrats interjection of economic issues into party politics was accompanied by an open display of animosity toward the military's informal linkage with the RPP. The absolute majority election system ensured the DP a far greater number of seats in the parliament than the percentage of the votes it obtained (36). Meanwhile, Menderes did not try to amend the Constitution of 1924 when the DP came to power in 1950, for he did not really disapprove of its provisions. As Karpat pointed out "in fact he made use of the Constitution had vested too much authority and had been misused by the DP for partizan purposes." (37)

The 1924 Constitution stressed democracy over liberalism, even if it produced neither. The basic freedoms were not spelt out in detail, and could be, and were quite easily curtailed. Nor was there much emphasis on the separation of powers, the legislature remaining the dominant institution of government. It was a strong parliamentary system, but power also resided in the office of the president.

The extent of this power is closely related to political circumstances, including the personality of the incumbents and the strengths and weaknesses of Prime Ministers, cabinets and the parliament. The 1924 Constitution made the presidency a party office, the chief of state being elected by each Assembly for a concurrent term. The leader of the party in power was elected in practice (Mustafa Kemal and İsmet İnönü from RPP and Celal Bayar from DP). The President held the authority to choose the Prime Minister and to approve his choice of ministers (38).

In the decade after 1950 this Constitution therefore quite easily opened up the way to the emergence of a dominant party government. Following in the tradition of the RPP, the DP government showed a marked tendency to authoritarianism (39).

For the Army, the coup of 1960 marked the beginning of the process of its af-

firmation in the political arena, and thus the definition of its identity. Although the military did not implement identical policies during its three interventions (directly in 1960 and 1980, indirectly in 1971), having had to take societal changes into account, its aim remained the same: the establishment of a political system which, on numerous counts, comprises the normative values of the army and conforms to a privileged position.

As Heper and Tachau stated that "the Junta which carried out the 1960 military coup may have intended to establish a regime which would have fallen somewhere between Nordlinger's "guardian" and "ruler" types."<sup>(40)</sup> In actuality, however, after severe internal tensions and confrontations, the more moderate senior officers won out over their younger colleagues, and the regime assumed the character of a "guardian" regime, i.e., one which took control of the government for the purpose of preserving (or re-establishing) the status-quo<sup>(41)</sup>.

Two types of problems concerned the National Unity Council. In the political sphere, the 1924 Constitution was suited to the emergence of an authoritarian-leaning regime like that of the Democrats of 1950-1960. For democracy to survive in Turkey, the members of the NUC felt it necessary to change the Constitution. The ailing economy was the second concern. The officers emphasized that the wasteful policies of the Democrats had brought the economy to the verge of collapse with a rising inflation rate and trade deficits. To find solutions to these problems, the officers established a Constituent Assembly and government largely composed of civilians.

Following the intervention except for the relatively short period until the ousting of the "radical fourteen", there was no real military junta installed in power. In fact, by the RPP, once more, although there were military personnel in a number of important positions. Karpat stated that "it should be emphasized that the military rule of 1960, unlike the intervention of 1980 was wide-open from the beginning to cooperation and intercourse with civilians and these civilians belonged overwhelmingly to the RPP."<sup>(42)</sup>

The RPP assumed the responsibility or guardianship of the state and Kemalist principles. And the military saw itself as 'the most concentrated embodiment of the Kemalist elite for service to the state and nation.' It is true that the military officers in general felt greater sympathy for the RPP than for the DP. This sympathy had sociological as well as political roots. They included the deteriorating socio-economic position of the officers corps, along with the civil bureaucracy, as well as the historical link with the party through identification with Mustafa Kemal and his successor, Ismet Pasha.

The new Constitution adopted on July 9, 1961. It was explicit in emphasizing democratic principles and the Kemalist concept of the Republic as a democratic, se-



cular state based on human rights. This document included articles that dealt with the safeguarding of individual rights and freedoms, the protection of citizens against abuses of power by the local and national administrations, the autonomy of courts, and the granting of unionization and strike rights to the workers (43).

Unlike the Constitution of 1924, the Constitution of 1961 did openly recognize the existence of some social groups such as labor, and acknowledged the workers right to organize themselves politically on the basis of occupation and interests. The authors of the 1961 Constitution including members of the Junta, who participated actively in the debates of the Constituent Assembly, sought to prevent the re-emergence of a authoritarian partisan regime based on massive parliamentary majorities. Thus, they produced a regime which placed restrictions on the government's freedom of action (i.e., by establishing a second parliamentary chamber, by adopting an electoral system based on a strictly proportional system of representation, by providing such salient institutions as the universities with broad autonomy and by establishing such new institutions as the Constitutional Court with powers to invalidate governmental decrees and legislation.)

Significantly, the new regime also provided more institutionalized channels for access to the topmost political authority by the military (through the NSC), including the Ministry of Defense and the senior military commanders.

These changes were also designed to decentralize the state. The powers of the President became only symbolic (unlike to 1924 and 1982). The President was to represent to country as Head of State; executive powers were largely removed from him. Decision-making was mainly in the hands of the Council of Ministers, the Grand National Assembly, Prime Minister, Constitutional Court, and the local administrations (44).

Structurally, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet constitute the chief power center of the Turkish government. The members of the Cabinet have both collective and individual responsibility. The framers of the 1961 Constitution had to go to great lengths to limit the possibility of dominance by any one party. The overall aim of the new Constitution was to strengthen democracy.

Taken together, the results of economic and political policy decisions were the emergence of a liberal democratic order, similar to those in West European states, and the reacceptance of planning for economic development. The national elections of 1961, when political power was returned to civilians, marked the beginning of experimentation with these concepts in the new Republic. However, the leader of the Junta, general Cemal Gürsel was elected President of the Republic. Furthermore, the

next two Presidents of the Republic were also retired military officers (in the last analysis, all presidents of the Turkish Republic, except Celal Bayar and the current President Turgut Özal, have been military figures).

The framers of the Constitution established a constitutional court and strengthened the Council of State, both of which bodies were made quite independent of governmental influence in the matter of their membership. In this and in other ways, the role of the judiciary was greatly increased and made independent.

The universities and the Radio and Television Administration were accorded a large degree of autonomy. Also, there was a large measure of freedom for the press. The formation of business and other associations was also encouraged. For the first time, trade unions were given the right to strike. The other important point was the change to a election system of proportional representation. The new system did not prevent the RPP and Justice Party (JP) from emerging as the two major parties. But generally speaking, as we have seen, coalition cabinets dominated the period 1960-1980 (45).

#### **Crisis in Turkish Democracy (1961-1980)**

The Constitution of 1961 also gave voice to aspirations for social justice as well as civil and social rights. Then, for the first time under the Republic, a socialist party, the Turkish Labor Party (TLP), was established. Organized labor made significant gains among industrial workers, partly as a result of a new law authorizing the right to strike (1963). University students became politically active, and the first signs of political polarization appeared. On the other hand, the era after the 1961 elections became dominated with an inflation in the number of political parties and their increasing polarization (46). As mini-crises developed from time to time, the military issued threats of greater or lesser subtlety against the parties, increasingly adopting an anti-left position. Finally, on March 12, 1971, in the face of rising violence on the part of leftist militant groups, the military forced the resignation of the government. It was the second military intervention in slightly more than a decade and the same aim: safe guarding of the state and Kemalist principles (47).

The "coup by ultimatum" of 1971 (48) was the culmination of a deteriorating political situation marked by a rising tide of violence, fragmentation of political parties and weak and ineffective government. Through its intervention in politics, the military exercised (or threatened to exercise) a veto over civilian authorities with the goal of preserving the social and economic status-quo. As Heper and Tachau pointed out:

*The 1971 intervention in Turkish politics resembles what Nordlinger calls "moderate" military rule. The difference between the 1960 and the 1971 interventi-*

ons was that the military commanders now apparently wished to keep the regime intact with only moderate changes designed to shore up its authority against challenges, particularly from the political left<sup>(49)</sup>.

The essential reluctance of the military to seize power overtly, it was not long before the civilian politicians openly flexed their muscles and forced the officers to yield on a highly salient issue. This confrontation took the form of a refusal on the part of the major parties to ratify the military's favored candidate for the presidency of the Republic early in 1973. It was a rare occasion on which the RPP and the JP formed a common front<sup>(50)</sup>.

In the meantime, political polarization continued to develop, although violence was at least temporarily brought under control. The RPP came under new leadership in 1972 with the resignation of İsmet Paşa and the elevation of the relatively youthful Bülent Ecevit<sup>(51)</sup>.

The takeover of March 1971 drew its impetus from the old tradition of the armed forces association with the statist-elitists and the RPP, although it was a rather premature, only half-thought out action. After the natural death of İnönü in 1973, the RPP gradually discarded Kemalism as an ideology.

As Karpat stated that :

*It tended to reject the concept of nation (millet) and the idea that Turkey was a national state. It sought for a solid social foundation on the basis of which it could call itself a true socialist mass party... It is clear that the deviation of the RPP to the left, its rejection of the Kemalist principles, and its espousal of a hodgepodge of minority and potentially explosive causes (for example, Kurdish nationalists found favor with the party) alienated the military from the RPP in general and from Ecevit in particular<sup>(52)</sup>.*

Indeed, the political history of Turkey after 1971 is the history of final collapse of the old coalition with the military emerging as the supreme arbiter above political parties and social groups with the 1973 national elections, a new chapter began in Turkish politics.

From 1973 until the 1980 coup, the country was run by weaker and weaker coalition cabinets coupled with deteriorating economic conditions and increasing political violence<sup>(53)</sup>. The process of coalition formation, maintenance and dissolution be-

gan to assume central importance in party politics. Extremist parties had the opportunity of participating in coalition governments. So, they won an important role in the political arena (54).

Especially NSP and NAP were able to gain important ministerial posts in the coalition governments due to parliamentary arithmetics and thus assumed a political power and an important voice in the decision-making infact unproportionate to its electorate success.

The most important problem with Turkish politics of the 1970s was the failure of the political parties to make coalitions work effectively. In fact this is one of the dilemmas of the democratic form of government not only in Turkey but also most developing countries. As Ergüder pointed out that:

*On the one hand government must be based on a broad base of consent and be representative of major social forces while on the other hand governmental effectiveness must not be compromised to solve the momentous social and economic problems that arises in the process of transformation. Failure to balance these two paradoxical objectives often leads to a decline of legitimacy of political institutions (55).*

The stability of the Turkish political system and its capacity to tackle the important social and economic issues is closely related to the capacity of the political parties to strike a consensus on constitutional reforms as well as on broad principles of policies. The issues Turkey faced in the 1970s ranged from the consolidation of secularism to population growth and educational reform from consolidation of a market-oriented economic system to constitutional reforms on liberal political values.

At this point, the capacity of the leaders of political parties to make agreement or pacts on the solution of social and economic problems and the consolidation of democracy was not sufficient. The polarization between the two major political parties to the point where no compromise or bargaining could be achieved.

Turkish politics in the 1970s was thus characterized by excessive fragmentation and polarization, and by a lack of decisive authority on the part of the government. Polarization came to characterise not only the parties, but important social sectors as well, including organized labor, the teaching profession, the civil bureaucracy, and even the police.

At the same time, extremist militants engaged in escalating violence. Political assassinations came to include members of parliament, and ex-prime minister, prominent journalists and university professors. Some of the victims were extremists of the

left or the right, but others (particularly among the journalists and professors) were moderates. As Heper and Tachau stated that:

*The latter type of assassination was clearly designed to undermine the political center and accelerate the process of polarization. Nor were assassinations the only form of violence. There were also massive outbreaks of communal conflict in several provincial cities marked by an ominous emergence of inter-ethnic (i.e., Kurdish-Turkish) and inter-sectarian (Sunni-Shii) cleavages. There can be little question that these traditional cleavages were fanned and exploited by political extremists, and they threatened to broaden the base of political violence in an exceptionally dangerous way (56).*

The crisis was further exacerbated by rampant inflation accompanied by serious industrial slowdowns and short-ages of consumer and important goods. By the summer of 1980, the rate of political killings had reached an average of over 20 per day (57).

The activities of the NSP during the 1970s was against the secularist aspects of Kemalism. As Toprak noted that "the NSP was a neo-Islamic party whose major concern was the partial retraditionalization of Turkish culture along Islamic precepts." (58) The NSP's concept of political development also remained vague until 1980 when the party organized the "Konya March" in a call for the replacement of the secular system with a shariat order. This event is said to have inflamed the military and prompted them to intervene (59).

Finally, between 1973 and 1980 Turkey's economic growth declined with growth indicators showing serious economic problems; GNP's growth rate declined from 8.0 in 1975 to - 1.0 in 1980 the trade deficit reached the S 4.7 billion mark in 1980, the inflation rate jumped over 100 percent, and trade as percent of Gross National Products (GNP) fell sharply, as shown in Table 1.

These poor economic indicators were coupled with decline of policy performance in social equity. Investment in education continued to decline adding more fuel to student unrest on university campuses. The wages of bureaucrats the largest wage-earning group in the country, fell below the 1963 level. Military expenditures soared up with dramatic jump in 1976 following the US arms embargo on Turkey. The wages of workers, on the other hand, remained relatively high but unemployment moved to over 20 percent in 1978 (60).

Under these worsening conditions (as shown in Table 1), Turkish society be-

came throughly politically polarized. While the number of labor strikes per year and their intensity increased, political violence between labor unions, student groups, police organizations, teachers' organizations and most important the political parties, became an every day activity.

Given these critical circumstances, it is perhaps to be wondered why the military did not intervene much earlier than September 12, 1980. Economic breakdown, civil violence, and open challenges to such highly symbolic values as secularist nationalism, all of these were important reasons for military intervention. In the eyes of the military, all these facets fused into one major failure of the system: the complete erosion of governmental authority.

Three major factors account for the deteriorating political situation in Turkey from 1973 - 1980. First was the polarization between the two major political parties to the point where no compromise or bargaining could be achieved. The second was the Justice Party's protection of the anti-state, militant, right-wing parties, the NAP and NSP, for the sake of keeping the JP in office. Third, once in office, all of the political parties attempted to fill the bureaucracy with their loyalists. The outcome was the severe polarization of the Turkish bureaucracy.

The fragmentation among the political cadres reflected to a large extent the fragmentation and polarization taking place in society at large. Law and order had to be restored, but in the eyes of the military that could not be accomplished without resolving the conflict among the political actors in the first place. On the other hand, fragmentation and polarization within and among governmental or civilian institutions could have adversely affected the military organization itself.

Turkish political culture has traditionally placed great value on governmental authority. No group could be expected to take this matter more seriously than the military. It could be argued that the military should not have intervened if it really had the cause of democracy at heart. On this argument the military should have allowed the political system to put itself to rights. Behind this view lies the belief that the political system must learn to solve its own problems if it is to gain the experience and collective wisdom necessary for survival.

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The problem lies with the political elites. The greater complexity of society which follows from economic and social development may well make military intervention

Table 1 : Indicators of Growth, Equity, Order and Liberty

Year	Indicators of Economic Growth					Indicators of Social Equity					Indicators of Order & Liberty		
	GNP Growth Rate (%)	Workers Remit (\$M)	Annual Inflation Rate (%)	Trade Deficit (\$M)	Trade as % GNP/ Year	Average Daily Wages (TL)			Invest. In Educ. (%)	Military Expend. Index	Strikes Year (N)	Strikes Post- poned (%)	Number of Political Prisoners/ Year
						Public Sector	Private Sector	Civil Servant					
1963	9.7	-	5.7	319.5	15.7	16.7	12.4	29.4	10.6	65	8	0	2344
1964	4.1	9	2.3	126.4	13.3	18.8	13	34.4	12.1	66	83	6	2720
1965	3.1	70	4.3	108.3	13.3	20.3	12.9	33.7	11	70	46	8.7	1946
1966	12	115	6.4	227.8	13.2	21.9	13.5	32.6	11.3	77	42	16.7	910
1967	4.2	93	6.5	162.4	12	21.8	13	30.6	11.8	88	100	2	644
1968	6.7	107	3.9	267.3	11.3	23	13.2	31.2	12.4	93	54	0	949
1969	5.4	141	5.3	264	10.3	24	14	31.8	10.7	93	86	5.8	819
1970	5.8	273	11.9	297.3	12	26.5	15.1	41.1	10.1	100	72	6.9	1024
1971	10.2	471	18.3	411.6	14.7	24.7	16.3	38.3	9.4	114	78	6.4	1097
1972	7.4	740	16.4	678	15.5	27.2	14.9	33.9	7	124	48	4.2	1223
1973	5.4	1183.3	22.1	719.6	16.8	27.8	15	33	8.8	131	55	5.5	1040
1974	7.4	1426.3	23.4	2207.6	18.9	30.3	14.7	34	9	147	110	5.5	604
1975	8	1321.3	16.2	3337.5	18.3	32.9	15.3	40	8.4	132	116	6.9	595

Continue Table 1

Year	Indicators of Economic Growth					Indicators of Social Equity					Indicators of Order & Liberty		
	GNP Growth Rate (%)	Workers Remit (\$M)	Annual Inflation Rate (%)	Trade Deficit (\$M)	Trade as % GNP/ Year	Average Daily Wages (TL)			Invest. In Educ. (%)	Military Expend. Index	Strikes Year (N)	Strikes Post- poned (%)	Number of Political Prisoners/ Year
						Public Sector	Private Sector	Civil Servant					
1976	7.9	982.7	16.1	3168.4	18.8	43.8	16.8	41	8	177	78	27.6	749
1977	3.9	981.8	24.9	4043.4	17	47.3	17.9	41	7.5	222	116	15	590
1978	2.9	983.1	43.8	2310.8	14	50.7	16.3	34.9	5.8	182	184	5.4	796
1979	-0.4	1694.4	67	2808.2	12.4	43.7	15.3	31.9	6	178	176	10.2	2601
1980	-1	2071.1	107	4757.2	20.8	37.7	13.3	24.2	5.9	202	222	18.5	4305
1981	4.5	2490	36.8	4230.5	22.5	40	13.9	20	5	220	0	100	18606
1982	5.3	2500	25.5	3096.6	23.1	38	13	18.1	4.3	230	0	100	9305
1983	3.5	2600	40	2500	21.5	36.8	12.3	17.2	4	230	0	100	7313

Sources : State Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbooks (1965-81); State Planning Organization, Annual Programs (1965-83); SPO, Sectoral Report: Education (1983); SPO, Trends and Prospects in Turkish Labor Force (1982); Ministry of Labor, Labor Force Statistics (1965, 1973, and 1982); Ministry of Justice, Adalet İstatistikleri (Justice Statistics) (1968-81); Index on the military expenditures is calculated by deflating total defense expenditures by consumer price index of each year; Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı, Halkla İlişkiler Bürosu, (Chief of Staff Public Relations Office), "Tutuklu İstatistikleri", (Statistics on Prisoners) (1983); The statistics on wages is transformed from current wages to real values by deflating the current wages using the consumer price index of each year with the starting value of 1963=100. Current wages are obtained from the SPO and SIS. (61)



more difficult but it is never impossible because of unsuccessful civil leaders. More developed states than Turkey have been governed by the military often with disastrous results. The success of democracy depends on the success of political elites. If political elites are successful, the military will not intervene to system easily. The justification, or if you will, the legitimization for each military intervention was based on the failures of political parties to rule effectively and democratically.

The tragedy of the Turkish system was that moderates of the major parties could not join together, but were forced apart in order to cope with their extremist wings. The leaders of the two major parties ( RPP and JP ) were frequently criticized by the moderate opinion in Turkey for not forming a coalition of moderates to deal with violence and the economic situation, but we can appreciate that the logic of the system of competitive politics as much as personal animosities blinded them to the effects of their actions.

On the other hand, in Turkish political elite, there is no value consensus or will for preserving democracy and interaction among factions. Undoubtedly, this is related to political and historical cultures and to the historical framework. However, Turkish political elites must change this understanding or their behaviors. The growth of democratic consensus is the most important factor for the survival of democracy. If political elites cannot attain success in providing democratic consensus and preserving democracy, other institutions (such as the military) seize the opportunity of taking over political power. Shortly, the lack of cooperation, collaboration and compromise among the leaders of political parties lead to the destruction of the political balance which had previously guaranteed the survival of democracy.

It has been observed that social agitation prevails in most crisis situations and in all takeovers the government in power had restored to declaration of martial law. In such critical instance is the military is in the position of obeying the civil governments orders that he might evaluate as not being neutral and always in relation to electoral expectations. The military's commitment to be apolitical and neutral is paradoxical in such cases, and the military chose to intervene directly to the political life to be able to stay neutral and establish order when the civilian governments failed to do so. The legitimacy of the civil institutions was not questioned as a concept but their performance had been at stake.

In short, ideally, the role of the Turkish armed forces is to remain above and outside politics, and to act as defenders of the Turkish state against external enemies. Politization and factionalization of the armed forces is to be avoided at all cost. This does not mean, however, that the military are not interested in the internal affairs of the

state.

### **Aftermath of the 1980 Intervention**

On September 12, 1980 the military moved again. This time they ruled directly for three years and produced a new system that maintained for themselves a direct but limited role in majority party rule. All political parties were banned and their leaders were barred by law from politics for periods from 5 to 10 years<sup>(62)</sup>.

According to Heper and Tachau:

*"The attitudes of the post - 1980 military junta clearly indicate that it did not regard itself as moderator regime nor that it intended its coup merely to exercise a political veto. The Junta's perception of itself concurs more closely to Nordlinger's second category of a "guardian" regime, for clearly the intention has been to remove corrupt and squabbling politicians, revamp the machinery of government, and re-distribute some political power and economic rewards."*<sup>(63)</sup>

However, Nordlinger's third category of a "ruler" type was more suitable than the "guardian" type at this point. The military junta had as its goal not control but often basic changes in significant aspects of the political, economic and even social system.

Ever since the coup in 1980, Turkey's relations with the European Community caused pressure on the junta to return to civilian rule. The only two allies that supported the actions of the generals were Great Britain and the United States. Yet, both also expressed their wish for a return to democracy in Turkey when the time was right<sup>(64)</sup>.

Possibly crucial factor in determining the Turkish army's political attitudes may be the fact that, alone among the Near Eastern countries, Turkey is a member of NATO and the Council of Europe, besides having an Associate status with the European Community which is supposed to lead eventually to full membership. This involves Turkey in formal obligations to respect democratic principles which do not affect the leadership of most developing countries<sup>(65)</sup>.

The armed forces have on several occasions been aware of the serious external problems which would be created if they would fail to convince the outside world that interventions would be succeeded fairly quickly by the reinstatement of a democratically elected government<sup>(66)</sup>.

It is hard to prove the importance of this factor in the General's decisions befo-

re and after 12 September 1980, but impossible to dismiss it entirely. It was important to them to keep their relations with the Western allies on as even a keel as possible (for example, Turkey was suspended from membership of the Parliamentary Assembly after the 12 September Coup).

The 1980 military junta insisted on more far-reaching reforms than its predecessors. It was certain to retain a significant role in the new regime. The generals decided that before the transition to civilian rule could take place certain essential measures had to be taken. Those who carried out the 1980 coup found the 1961 Constitution largely responsible for the political crisis. The military regime quickly moved to replace this with a new constitution, adopted in 1982. It brought drastic changes to Turkey's political order.

The military rulers of 1980 - 1983 tried to provide laws and a constitutional machinery for preventing an eventual return to anarchy. However, the army's greatest problem, it appears, was not in dealing with the terrorists, but with the politicians. They broke the democratic rules in the 1961 Constitution. As Harris stated that :

*"The military leaders sought to carry out these aims by reworking the constitution and amending the political parties act and the election law. It would be a mistake, however, to regard the 1982 Constitution, as much more authoritarian than the one enacted in 1961, for the 1961 document was the basic model for the new order."* (67)

The adjustments embodied in the 1982 version were designed to provide ways to prevent parliamentary deadlock or to end it through such expedients as elections. The focus was on creating a system that would provide the voters with an effective government, not to restrict the options and the ability of the electorate to express its will and wishes. Harris added that "it was clear that the framers of the constitution saw anarchy as a denial of democracy and hoped to inject greater discipline into society through such mechanisms as a more hierarchical educational structure under a centralized board of directors." (68)

The Constitution replaces the bicameral Assembly with a single National Assembly composed of 400 members elected every five years. It also calls for a presidential system by concentrating powers in the executive branch and restricting individual rights and liberties. Attempts to limit and control political participation while at the same time decreasing the representativeness of the TGNA and increasing governmental effectiveness poses a new problem for the consolidation of Turkish Democracy in the 1990s.

According to the 1982 Constitution, the president is elected by the National Assembly for a single seven-year term. Compared to the pre-1980 presidential powers, the new executive branch has extra powers. Not only his executive powers but also legislative and judicial powers were expanded.

The new Constitution provides a long list of such powers and classifies them in Article 104<sup>(69)</sup>. Among the President's powers relating to legislative functions are: delivering, if he deems it necessary, the inaugural address at the beginning of each legislative year; summoning the TGNA into session when he deems it necessary; promulgating laws; returning laws to the Assembly for reconsideration, submitting proposed constitutional amendments to popular referenda, appealing to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of laws as well as dissolving the Assembly and calling for new elections<sup>(70)</sup>.

The President's powers pertaining to the executive function are as follows; appointing the Prime Minister and accepting his resignation; approving or rejecting other ministers proposed by the Prime Minister; presiding over the meeting of the Council of Ministers whenever he deems it necessary; accrediting Turkish diplomatic representatives to foreign states; promulgating international treaties; representing the office of the Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the TGNA; mobilizing armed forces; appointing the Chief of the General Staff, calling meetings of the National Security Council and presiding over it; proclaiming martial law or a state of emergency in collaboration with the Council of Ministers; signing governmental decrees; appointing the chairman and members of the State Supervisory Council and instructing it to carry out investigations and inspections; appointing the members of the Board of Higher Education; and appointing university rectors<sup>(71)</sup>.

Finally, the President's powers pertaining to the judicial functions are: appointing the members of the Constitutional Court, one-fourth of the members of the Council of State (the highest administrative court), the Chief prosecutor of the Court of Cassation and his deputy, the members of the High Military Administrative Court, and the members of the Supreme Council of Judges and Prosecutors<sup>(72)</sup>.

The President is elected by a two-thirds majority of the full membership of the Assembly. If a political party maintains the majority in the Assembly, it can obtain this additional power through a simple majority vote. On the other hand, the most important point that the President is not politically responsible for his actions connected with his office. Since it is one of the fundamental rules of public law that authority and responsibility must go hand in hand, the absence of political responsibility for the President and the constitutional requirement that all presidential decrees must be signed

by the Prime Minister and the Ministers concerned means that the executive function is, in reality, exercised by the politically responsible component of the executive branch (73).

With regard to individual rights and freedoms, the restrictions introduced by the amendments of 1971 were culminated in the 1982 Constitution. Article 13 of the Constitution includes a rather extensive list of conditions under which the government can restrict individual rights and liberties by law.

In comparison, the 1961 Constitution did not include any such article. It is important to note that key concepts in Article 13, like "national security" and "general tranquillity", are left undefined. The vagueness of these terms allows each administration to define them as best fits its own interests. For example, with regard to the freedom of the press, the Constitution states that freedom is guaranteed, except that anyone:

*... who writes or prints any news or articles which threaten the internal or external security of the state or the invisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, which tend to incite offense, riot, or insurrection, or ... who prints or transmits such news or articles to others ... shall be held responsible under the law relevant to these offenses (74).*

As the Helsinki Watch Committee reports, this press provision seems to establish not a guarantee of freedom of speech, but "penumbras of unprotected speech". (75)

On these occasions, the broad civil, political and social rights it details may be suspended in the name of national interest. As shown above, there are some restrictions on publications (which threaten the external security and the integrity of the state) and strikes (which are not banned unless they have political ends) (76) and on political participation. The Constitution prohibits the trade unions from associating themselves with political parties and restricts their political activities (77). The right of association is guaranteed, except that associations may not:

*... Contravene the general restrictions in Article 13, nor shall they pursue political aims, conduct political activity, receive support from or give support to political parties, or take concrete action with labor unions, with professional associations having public functions or with foundations (78).*

The main purpose of these restrictions seem to prevent participation of unions and associations in politics. A further restriction on political participation states that:

*... Associations, foundations, trade unions, and professional associations with public functions, shall not organize assemblies or demonstration marches beyond the scope of their legitimate fields of activity and legitimate aims*<sup>(79)</sup>.

The restrictions are quite vague with the phrases "legitimate fields of activity" and "legitimate aims" left undefined.

Trade union activities were to be further regulated by the new Law No. 2822 on "Trade Unions, Collective Bargaining, Strikes and Lockouts". This law limits the formation of new unions and places restrictions on right to strike.

The 1982 Constitution continues its predecessor's provisions for a National Security Council (NSC).<sup>(80)</sup> This body was originally created in the 1961 Constitution to assist in "taking decisions and ensuring necessary coordination" in the domain of national security policy in its broadest definition. The NSC was often used during the previous period of civilian rule for the public expression of military wishes; the commanders of the armed forces issued their declaration in March 1971 as members of the NSC. The military takeover of 1980 was also accomplished in the name of this body.

As for the Higher Education Council, mandated by the new Constitution,<sup>(81)</sup> this body is designed to provide central supervision of the various institutions of higher education to ensure that they operate in conformity with the objectives and principles set forth by law. This council, established in 1982, was accorded extensive authority to appoint university governing boards.

In essence, through these decisions universities lost their autonomy and became state-controlled training centers for the Turkish university activities (curriculum, research, teaching staff) throughout Turkey.

To further increase state controls over academic research, such autonomous institutions as the Turkish Historical Society (**Türk Tarih Kurumu**) and the Turkish Language Society (**Türk Dil Kurumu**) were placed under the newly created Atatürk High Institution of Culture, Language and History<sup>(82)</sup>. These two institutions were established in the 1930s and had remained as autonomous centers of research in Turkish Language and History, gaining an international reputation for their work. It was also expressed in the will of Atatürk that these institutions should remain autonomous bodies receiving financial support from his estate<sup>(83)</sup>. By transforming these institutions into state-controlled establishments the coup makers in fact violated Atatürk's will. In any case, this move by the military regime imposed further state controls over the intellectuals of the country.

All the developments discussed above indicate that bureaucratic controls over political participation in Turkey have been strengthened, giving the Third Republic an authoritarian atmosphere. Similar to the restrictions on political participation by associations, NSC and its allies took measures to control the formation of political parties (84) that would enter the national elections in November 1983. Furthermore, the electoral law was rewritten to make it more likely to return that one-party majority governments to the TGNA instead of unstable coalition governments.

1982 Constitution was broadly modeled on the 1958 French Constitution (85). Although retaining a classic division of powers, it was intended to strengthen the executive power of the President, limit the role of political parties, and circumscribe the exercise of individual and associational rights that might threaten national unity and security.

The Constitution was accepted by more than 87 percent of the electorate - 92 percent of the 95 percent who voted - on November 7, 1982 (86).

It is important to note that the 1982 Constitution was significantly different from the 1961 Constitution. While the 1960 Coup leaders aimed at preventing the rise of authoritarian regimes by establishing a liberal order, 1980 Coup coalition's main concern was the restriction of liberties included in the 1961.

The fact that Kemalism has been modified and reinterpreted after the 1980 military intervention may in fact be related to the syndrome of being lonely at the top. The military coup of 1980 accomplished what the conservatives in Turkey long desired: the establishment of a rightist restrictive political order with liberalism in economics. Perhaps, the ruling elite's desire to create a Turkish-style liberalism closely resembles nineteenth century European Liberalism with the exception that citizens have voting rights in Turkey. The system, on the one hand favors liberalism and free competition in economics. On the other hand, it limits political participation to those who dominate the economic sects. In any case, this type of "liberalism" is highly dangerous because such liberalizing efforts in the economy will create more political concerns for all citizens alike. Unless the individuals are provided with political channels to effectively voice their opinions in these matters, further social unrest is likely to emerge.

## **Conclusion**

The military institution has advanced itself as the champion of the public interest in Turkey it has been the military often dubbed the "guardian of Turkish Democracy".

With the breakdown of Turkish democracy in the late 1970s, the military remained the only united element capable of restoring order. In contrast to the preceding coups, the September 12, 1980 intervention demonstrated both careful planning and military unity. As Ergüder pointed out that "this military interlude, in comparison with the previous ones, was longer-three years- and more radical in terms of solutions the military leaders tried to implement". (87)

The military policy of centralization and reform was intended to prevent the recurrence of terrorism and disorder. But it was also meant to reduce the ability of political actors and pressure groups activity for providing liberal democracy.

The 1982 Constitution is declared to be unfit for Turkey by all of the parliamentary political parties, each of which seems to have a different opinion about what the content of the Turkish Constitution should be. Various articles of the 1982 Constitution (as shown before) are inoperative for all practical purposes. Various articles codifying the activities of associations are considered to be in contradiction with freedom of expression and other liberties.

Social equity in Turkey was negatively related to military regimes and political order. Basically, despite their poor performances in this field, the civilian regimes have paid more attention to the improvement of social equity than the officers. It is found that liberty is weakened under military regimes and times of economic growth. In fact, the military regimes did not change the development policies of the pre-coup civilian administrations. For social equity, however, the presence of military regimes meant further decline in these indicators. In short, the civilian regimes placed more emphasis on liberty and social equity than the military regimes.

The 1961 Constitution was quickly amended in 1971, restricting its liberal elements. Ironically, the amendments to the Constitution, designed to increase law and order in Turkey, were quickly ignored by 1976 with increasing anarchy and political violence. Finally, after nine years, these amendments along with 1961's liberal democracy were cast aside by the 1980 coup makers.

Despite the transfer of power to civilians, the political structure of the state closely resembles bureaucratic-authoritarianism. The framework of the 1982 Constitution, increases in state control of associations through new laws, various restrictions on individual liberties, and the way the regime transfer to civilians was carefully controlled, all indicate that order weighs more heavily than liberty in the new period.

In sum, the Third Republic of Turkey has made her a member of the authoritarian regimes in the Western World. The process through which democracy broke



down during the Second Republic involved a complex interaction of political and economic variables, both in domestic and external fields. Also, these relationships were highly crucial in the establishment of elite coalitions which in turn helped aggravate power competition between the elites.

The comparison between Turkey and Western European countries, from democratic point of view, the overwhelming majority of the Turks not only defend the principles of democracy but demand that it be protected and fully implemented. However, it would seem that the spirit of democracy may be preserved in Turkey if its implementation and administration are made compatible with the country's traditions of government and political culture. This implies that democracy in Turkey may have to be implemented by means other than those known in the West.

In other words, the Turkish situation contradicts the common view, accepted by Western students of politics, that democracy is the product of compromise and agreement among civilian groups. Democracy in Turkey began to be undermined when the traditional understanding of government and authority. Their implicit supremacy began to be replaced by an individualistic and interest-oriented understanding of government and authority. In spite of some important reasons (as explained above), all three crises resulted from the failure of the civilian to compromise or learn to live each other, whether in power or in opposition.

In addition to, institutionalized is the most important factor for survival of democracy (88). How democracy has been maintained in a country with weak political institutions and low level of consensus (governing without consensus, republic without government, crisis of the state parliament, crisis of democracy).

Finally, when Turkey, in 1946 passed to multi-party system, we thought that the liberal democracy was set but it was wrong reflective; it was only a first step to the liberal democracy. After from this years, system in the transition period, brought some crisis such as 1960 - 1971 - 1980 crisis.

## NOTES

1. It is not our intention here to examine the different definition of the democracy. Nevertheless, the best definition was summarized by Linz as follows: "...Legal freedom to formulate and advocate political alternatives with the concomitant rights to free association, free speech, and other basic freedoms of person, free and nonviolent competition among leaders with periodic validation of their claim to rule, inclusion of all effective political offices in the democratic process, and provision for the participation of all members of the political

- preferences. Practically, this means the freedom to create political parties and to conduct free and honest elections at regular intervals without existing any effective political office from direct or indirect electoral accountability." Juan J. Linz and A. Stephan, eds., **The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes** (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p.5 For a detailed discussion see Robert A. Dahl, **A Preface to Democratic Theory** (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), Alan Lijphart, **Democracies, Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-one Countries** (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984), Philippe Schmitter, L. Whitehead and G. O'Donnell, **Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy** (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press, 1986).
2. For a survey of the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes see Juan J. Linz, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes," in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, eds., **Handbook of Political Science** (Massachusetts, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975), vol. 3, pp. 175-411.
  3. For the critical interpretation of military intervention in these countries see Ulrike Liebert and Maurizio Cottz, eds., **Parliament and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey** (London, Pinter Publishers, 1990), Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., **Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia** (Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 1989), vol.3, and **Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America**, vol.4.
  4. Atatürk's speech analyzing the draft Fundamental Law bill being debated in Turkey's war-time parliament, December 1, 1921, **T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi** (Ankara, T.B.M.M. Matbaası, 1958), Devre 1, İçtima 2, vol.14, p.428. Mustafa Kemal was making clear that Turkey "does not resemble a democracy, does not resemble socialism, and does not resemble anything! Sirs, we must be proud not to resemble them! Because we resemble ourselves."
  5. George S. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s: Guardians or Decision-Makers?", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military, Turkey in the 1980s** (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp.177-200.
  6. See Christian Rumpf, "The Military, the Presidency, and the Constitution: A Comparative Approach to the Weimar Republic, France 1958, and Turkey 1982", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp.215-238.
  7. See Üstün Ergüder, "Redemocratization and Elections in Turkey", prepared for delivery at the 24th Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, San Antonio Convention Center, November 10-13, 1990.
  8. *Ibid.*, pp.4-5.
  9. For a detailed analysis of the major consequence of increased fragmentation in the

Turkish party system see Sabri Sayarı, **Parlamentar Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri** (İstanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayını, 1980), pp.190-200 and Ergun Özbudun, **Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey** (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1979).

10. September 12 th, 1980 is the date of the last military intervention. Ergüder, "Redemocratization and Elections in Turkey", p.5.
  11. For more detailed analysis of competitive elitism in liberal democracies see David Held, **Models of Democracy** (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1987),ch.5, pp.143-185.
  12. Ibid., pp.170-175.
  13. Ibid.
  14. A detailed study of the polarization of the Turkish bureaucracy can be found in Metin Heper, "Negative Bureaucratic Politics in a Modernizing Context : The Turkish Case. " **Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies**, 1 (September 1977). Also see Metin Heper, "Bureaucrats, Politicians and Officers in Turkey Dilemmas of a New Political Paradigm." Prepared for Submission at the "Colloquium on Continuity and Change in Turkey," The University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, April 16-17, 1982.
  15. Nordlinger has classified three models of military. In the first of these, the military act as "moderators". Typically, in this model, the military do not overtly seize the reins of government, but rather exercise " veto power" from behind the scenes. The goals of military groups which fit this model are correspondingly limited in scope as preserving the status-quo, maintaining the balance of power among contending groups. ...ensuring political order and governmental stability. A second model of military regime is referred to as a "guardian" regime. Military guardians are essentially similar to moderators except that they feel it necessary to displace the civilian governors, that is, to overtly assume control of government. Their goals, however, are as conservative as those of the moderators. Finally, the third type of military regime is the ruler type. This type of regime has as its goal not only control but often basic changes in significant aspects of the political, economic, and even social system. The ruler types are likely to stay in place for a more extended period of time, perhaps indefinitely. Eric A. Nordlinger, **Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments** (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 22-27.
- Dodd has also noted that "the Turkish military is frequently regarded as the guardian of democracy." See Clement H. Dodd, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy** (Walkington, Eothen Press, 1983), p.1.
16. Dodd, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy**, p.23.
  17. Ibid.
  18. Metin Heper and F. Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", **Comparative Politics**, 16 (October 1983), p.11.

19. See more detailed Walter F. Weiker, **The Modernization of Turkey** (New York, Holmes-Mener Publishers Incs, 1981), pp.37 - 39 and Dodd, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy**, pp.2-4.
20. Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Army and the Founding of the Turkish republic" **World Politics**, 4 (July 1959), p.516. For a detailed, see, also, Dankwart A. Rustow, "The Military : Turkey", in Dankwart A. Rustow and R.E.Ward, eds., **Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey** (Princeton, Princeton University Press., 1964, pp.361-363).
21. For the interpretation of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 as to be the first intervention in politics see Dood, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy**, p.2.
22. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey," p.11.
23. Ibid.
24. For an elaboration, see Nordlinger, **Soldiers in Politics : Military Coups and Governments**, ch.3.
25. A detailed study of the political evolution of the DP can be found in Metin Toker, **Tek Partiden Çok Partiye** (Istanbul, Akis Matbaası, 1970), Kemal Karpat, **Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi-Party System** (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959) and Cem Eroğul, **Demokrat Parti** (Ankara, Sevinç Matbaası, 1970).
26. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", p.20.
27. Ibid.
28. "The new man in Turkish politics, is the lawyer and the merchant, replacing the soldier and the bureaucrat at the pinnacle of formal power." See Frederic W. Frey, **The Turkish Political Elite** (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1965), pp. 195-196. On the other hand, useful information on the proportion of ex-military officers among the political elite can be found in Frank Tachau, "The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments, and Elections", **Comparative Politics**, 5 (July 1973), pp. 551-573.
29. For an elaboration, see Karpat, **Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi-Party System**, and Cem Eroğul, **Demokrat Parti**.
30. For a detailed discussion, see Ergun Özbudun, **The Role of the Military in Recent Turkish Politics**, Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No.14 (November 1966), p.21, and Weiker, **The Modernization of Turkey**, pp.38-39.
31. After the victory of the opposition party in 1950 and during its administrations, the percentage of deputies of military origin fell sharply. Moreover, five of the six ministers of internal defense during this period were civilians as compared to their eleven predecessors, all of whom came from a military background. Ibid.
32. For a detailed analysis of the isolation of DP, see Karpat, **Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi-Party System**, ch.10, and Eroğul, **Demokrat Parti**, pp.170-175, See, also, Feroz Ahmad, **The Turkish Experiment in Democ-**

- racy, 1950 - 1975 (London, C. Hurst and Company, 1977), pp.175 - 200.
33. Unconstitutional laws such as Martial Law (Committee to investigate the activities of the RPP and the section of the press) and Fatherland Front (Vatan Cephesi - investigatory commission set up to inquire the changes against RPP) can not be properly discussed here. For a detailed analysis, see *Ibid.*
  34. See Eroğul, **Demokrat Parti**, p.172.
  35. Kemal Karpat, "Military interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, p.137.
  36. For a detailed analysis of the election results, see Karpat, **Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi Party System**, ch.10.
  37. Karpat, "Military Interventions : Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", p.138.
  38. For detailed analysis of the 1924 Constitution, see Suna Kili, **Osmanlı ve Türk Anayasaları** (İstanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1980), pp.31-55.
  39. It is interesting that the 1982 Constitution has sought to strengthen the President in just these ways, paving the way for the President's personal power and influence.
  40. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", p.21.
  41. The Turkish military is frequently regarded as the guardian of the state and Kemalist principles. However, the military takeover of 1960 was a major deviation from the Kemalist principle that officers should remain outside politics as long as they were part of the armed forces. It was for this reason that officers including Mustafa Kemal first resigned from the military before taking on active roles in politics. The coup of 1960 signalled a change in this tradition.
  42. Karpat, "Military Interventions : Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", pp.141-142.
  43. Republic of Turkey, **The Constitution** (1961), arts. 14-24, 46-48, 63-66, 120-121, 132, 145-152.
  44. *Ibid.*, arts. 96-97, 105, 108-109, 113-114, 116-132, 145, 147.
  45. For the detailed information about proportional representation system and coalition cabinets between 1960 and 1980, see Sayarı, **Parlamentar Demokrasi-lerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri**, pp.167-210.
  46. For more details, see C.H. Dodd, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy**, pp.7-41.
  47. For a detailed discussion on second intervention, see Feroz Ahmad, **The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975**, ch.VII.
  48. For more details on the ultimatum, see *Ibid.*, pp.288-289.
  49. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", p.23.
  50. *Ibid.*, pp.23-24.
  51. A more detailed explanation on the new leadership of the RPP and the new character of the RPP, see Ahmad, **The Turkish Experiment in Democracy**,

- pp.327-361 and Suna Kili, **1960-1975 Döneminde Cumhuriyet Halk Partisinde Gelişmeler** (Istanbul, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayını, 1976).
52. Karpat, "Military interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and After 1980", p.148.
53. For a detailed study of the coalition governments between 1973-1980, see sayarı, **Parlamentar Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri**, pp.167-210.
54. The 1973 election showed that seven parties gained seats in the Assembly but only five (RPP, JP, National Salvation Party-NSP, Republican Reliance Party-RRP, National Action Party - NAP) had the potential to participate in coalition governments. Besides, governments were formed the bipolar alignments of the two major parties on the Centre-Left (RPP) and the Centre-Right (JP) providing the bases for two alternative coalition formations (RPP+NSP, JP+NSP+RRP+NAP). After the 1977 election the JP, also, formed a new coalition government with the NSP and the NAP. For a detailed analysis of the major consequence of increased fragmentation in the Turkish party system, see Sayarı, **Parlamentar Demokrasilerde Koalisyon Hükümetleri**, pp.190-200, and *Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Hürriyet* August 3, 4, 5, 1977 - January 7, 8, 9, 1978.
55. Ergüder, "Redemocratization and Elections in Turkey", p.31.
56. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", p.25.
57. Ibid.
58. Binnaz Toprak, "The State, Politics, and Religion in Turkey", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, p.125.
59. See Dodd, **The Crisis of Turkish Democracy**, p.21.
60. For detailed analysis of economic conditions between 1970-1980, see Yakup Kepenek, **Türkiye Ekonomisi** (Ankara, ODTÜ yayını, 1983), Mustafa Sönmez, **Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım** (Istanbul, Belge Yayınları, 1982), Sectoral Statistics from the State Planning Organization (SPO), **Annual Program (1965-1983)** and **Trends and Prospects in Turkish Labor Force (1982)**.
61. Compiled from Birol Ali Yeşilada, "Breakdown of Democracy in Turkey", Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1984, pp.196-197.
62. In 1983 the military rule ended nad yet another transition to democracy started with a completely new set of leaders and political parties. On the other hand, all bans on the former political parties leaders were ended after the referendum in 1985. For a detailed discussion on this subject see İler Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post-1983 Turkey" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp. 66-84, and, Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 Parties and Politics in Turkey" in Ergun Özbudun, ed. **Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey**. (Ankara, Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), pp.129-132.
63. Heper and Tachau, "The State, Politics, and the Military in Turkey", p.28.

64. Helsinki Watch Committee, **Human Rights in Turkey's Transitions to Democracy**, New York: Helsinki Watch, 1982, pp.79-90; **The New York Times**, July 10, 1982, C.H. Dodd, **The Crisis of Democracy in Turkey**, pp.54-59.
65. William Hale, "Transition to Civilian Governments in Turkey" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp.160-162.
66. In the case of the crisis which led to the intervention of 12 March 1971, we know that such considerations were important to the high command. As General Muhsin Batur, then the Air Force Commander, tells us, a group of officers had earlier approached him with a plan for the imposition of an outright military regime, which they wished him to lead. General Batur turned the idea down: "The Western World cannot accept this sort of system and procedure. It's just not good enough to say 'if they don't accept it, then so be it'. If we give way (i.e., adopt the proposed plan) we'll get support from the Eastern Block and Red China, but that would be a disaster for Turkey".
- Muhsin Batur, "Son 30 Yıllık Olayı: Muhsin Batur'un Anıları", Part 10, **Milliyet**, 12 May 1985.
67. Harris, "The Role of the Military in Turkey in the 1980s", p.194.
68. Ibid.
69. Republic of Turkey, **Constitution of the Republic (1982)**, arts.104.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. For the detailed on the scope of the presidential powers and classification of list of such powers as pertaining to legislative, executive, and judicial function, see Ergun Özbudun, "The State of the President of the Republic under the Turkish Constitution of 1982" in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp.39-40.
73. Republic of Turkey, **Constitution of the Republic (1982)**, art. 105.
74. Ibid., art. 28.
75. Helsinki Watch Committee, **Human Rights**, p.71.
76. The right to strike is also controlled by the state. The law lists a number of occupational areas where strikes are prohibited. These areas are: the rescue services, including life and property funeral services; water, electricity, gas, coal, natural gas, oil exploration, extraction, refining and distribution services, public sector fire-fighting, street cleaning, garbage removal and transport (land, sea, and air) services, vaccine and serum producers, hospitals, clinics, sanatoriums, dispensaries, chemists shops and other places related to health services; institutions of education and child care, home for the elderly, cemeteries; workplaces operated by the Ministry of Defense, the High Command of the Gendarmerie and the Coast Guard. **Merip Reports**, no 121 (February, 1984), p.20. Accordingly, a trade union must announce a strike plan at least six days in advance. If the strike is permitted by the state, the union is held responsible

- for any damage to machinery or the workplace sustained during the strike.
77. Republic of Turkey, **Constitution of the Republic (1982)**, art. 52, par.1.
78. *Ibid.*, art. 33, par.3.
79. *Ibid.*, art. 34, par.4.
80. *Ibid.*, art. 118.
81. *Ibid.*, art. 130-132.
82. *Ibid.*, art. 124.
83. Hıfzı V. Velidedeoğlu, "Atatürk'ün Vasiyeti Bozulmaz", **Cumhuriyet** (İstanbul), 16 January 1983.
84. There is no need here to go into detail. As noted before, all political parties were outlawed, following the coup of September 1980. Moreover, the leaders of these parties for a period of five to ten years. Thus, when the generals decided to reinstate parliamentary politics beginning with the November 6, 1983 national elections they called for the formation of new political parties. However, the formation of the new political parties was to be heavily controlled process under close watch by the NSC. This process of party formation was to follow specific guidelines.
- First, the new parties were required not to have ties to the pre-1980 political parties and had to be formed by at least thirty founding members. Second, the NSC would evaluate each party's by laws, the list of founding members and veto those individuals found unfit for political roles. Third, the parties that received vetoes would then appoint new founding members and submit their lists back to the NSC. Finally, this process would continue until the ratification of the party's list by the NSC. Following the NSC decision to allow political competition to re-open in May 1983, several parties emerged hoping to run for office in November.
- For a detailed analysis of the new political parties, see İlter Turan, "Political Parties and the Party System in Post - 1983 Turkey", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp.63-77; Üstün Ergüder, "Post-1980 parties and Politics in Turkey", **Perspective On Democracy in Turkey** (Ankara, Turkish Political Science Association, 1988), ch.3, pp.115-145, and Frank Tachau, "Political leadership in Turkey: Continuity and Change", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp.103-114.
85. See Lucille W. Pevsner, **Turkey's Political Crisis** (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 95-96 and Christian Rumpf, "The Military, The Presidency, and the Constitution: A Comparative Approach to the Weimer Republic, France 1958, and Turkey 1982", in Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin, eds., **State, Democracy and the Military**, pp.216-238.
86. The NSC selected 160 Consultative Assembly members from a list of 10 thousand names, drawn up with the aid of provincial governors and excluding all politi-



cal cadres. A set of provisional articles appended to the Constitution was not open to public debate. Furthermore, remarks by General Evren and Prime Minister Bülent Ulusu had also made it clear that rejection of the Constitution would result in continuation of military rule. **New York Times**, November 8, 1982; **Financial Times** (London), July 27, 1982; **Turkish Daily News**, November 1-7, 1982.

87. Ergüder, "Redemocratization and Elections in Turkey", p.3

88. Some set of hypotheses relates military intervention to weaknesses in civilian political institutions. For more detail, see Samuel Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies** (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968) and Samuel E. Finer, **The Man on Horseback** (New York, Praeger, 1962).

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