Istanbul Anthropological Review
İstanbul Antropoloji Dergisi

İSTANBUL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Istanbul Anthropological Review - İstanbul Antropoloji Dergisi, Issue/Sayı 2, 2022
DOI: 10.26650/IAR2022-1178113 Theoretical Article / *Kuramsal Makale*

Formal Exclusion/Informal Inclusion: Towards a Critical Political Economy of Long-Term Refugee Camps

Nadia Latif[1]

[1]Dr., Lecturer in Anthropology, Columbia University. New York, USA

ORCID: N.L. 0000-0001-5124-3502

Corresponding author/Sorumlu yazar:
Nadia Latif,
Lecturer in Anthropology, Columbia University.
New York, USA
E-mail: nl2021@caa.columbia.edu

Submitted/Başvuru: 21.09.2022
Accepted/Kabul: 09.12.2022
Published Online/Online Yayın: 15.12.2022

Citation/Atıf: Latif, N. (2022). Formal exclusion/ informal inclusion: towards a critical political economy of long-term refugee camps. *Istanbul Anthropological Review - İstanbul Antropoloji Dergisi, 2*, 119–138. https://doi.org/10.26650/IAR2022-1178113

ABSTRACT

This essay traces conceptual shifts in ethnographic analyses of long-term refugee camps. Earlier studies analyzing long-term refugee camps formally established as "temporary" responses to conflict drew on Foucault's theorization of the exercise of power in modern states. This literature focused on the attempts of host-states and humanitarian aid organizations to discipline refugees within spaces of containment and surveillance, as well as refugees' articulation of diasporic nationalism in response to these unequal relationships of power. With the securitization of (im)migration policy in the Global North as well as Global South, researchers have deployed the concepts of "encampment" and "humanitarian government," drawing on Giorgio Agamben's critique of liberal democracies, to highlight the difficult conditions within refugee camps, and question the legitimacy of the authority with which they are administered. A shortcoming of these paradigms is a focus on the "political" to the exclusion of the "economic." Drawing on long-term fieldwork conducted in the Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, a different conceptual framework is proposed which examines social relationships within particular refugee camps in light of their historically shifting location within local and global political economies.

Keywords: Refugee camps, Informality, Statelessness

This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

Over the past two decades, scholarship analyzing long-term refugee camps in the Global South in terms of the social production of space has proliferated, as has statelessness around the world. A comprehensive review of this large body of scholarship is beyond the scope of this present work. Rather this article aims to highlight and evaluate some of the main theoretical paradigms that have emerged within this body of work. Early efforts to analyze the continued existence of spaces formally established as "temporary" responses to conflict were initiated by anthropologists conducting fieldwork in Southeast Asia and East Africa. This body of scholarship was preoccupied with the attempts of host-states and humanitarian aid organizations to discipline and modernize refugees within spaces of containment and surveillance, as well as refugees' articulation of diasporic nationalism in response to these unequal power relationships (Hitchcox, 1990; Hyndman, 2000; Malkki, 1995; Mortland, 1987).

With the securitization of (im)migration policy in the Global North as well as the Global South, researchers have deployed the concepts of "encampment" and "humanitarian government" to highlight the difficult conditions within refugee camps and question the legitimacy of the authority with which they are administered. A shortcoming of these paradigms is a focus on the "political" to the exclusion of the "economic." Drawing on analyses of long-term fieldwork conducted in Burj al-Barajneh refugee camp located in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the interplay of (formal) norms and their (informal) implementation, negotiation, and circumvention is proposed as a framework with which to analyze the histories of particular refugee camps in relation to changing local and global political economies.

A concerted effort to analyze refugee camps as social spaces began in the late 1980s. Led by anthropologists conducting fieldwork in Southeast Asia and East Africa, this body of scholarship sought to understand social organization and the exercise of power within spaces formally deemed temporary and transitional responses to conflict and the "collateral damage" of development in recently independent nation-states (Hitchcox, 1990; Hyndman, 2000; Malkki, 1995; Mortland 1987). The 1970s had seen the beginnings of a shift from the preeminence of industrial manufacture to that of service production in the political economies of the Global North, which until the end of the Second World War had governed territories and peoples in the Global South through imperial and mandate rule. "De-industrialization" in the Global North was accompanied by the global implementation of neoliberal policies with the stated aim of creating and "freeing" markets around the world in response to the inefficiencies attributed to state regulation (Harvey, 2005). Subsequent changes in international labor migration flows, as well as a decided shift in international refugee policy from resettlement to repatriation, facilitated the perception among scholars and policy-makers that the continued existence of refugee camps in the Global South—spaces that had been explicitly established by host nation-states and international organizations as temporary measures—necessitated further analysis.

These early studies were based on fieldwork conducted in transit and processing camps which were established, through coordination between host states and the United Nations

High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to provide humanitarian aid to refugees of Cold-War conflicts and process asylum claims for resettlement in the Global North. Reflecting the prevailing conceptualizations of globalization as an increased porosity—and for some, the weakening—of nation-state borders, the problematics of this body of scholarship were articulated primarily in terms of the power of modern institutions and the (im)possibility of "local" resistance. These early attempts to theorize the space of long-term refugee camps in the Global South played a pioneering role and established the terrain of subsequent inquiries that took place in the early twenty-first century context of global economic crisis and the global securitization of (im)migration policy. This body of scholarship highlighted the exercise of power by host state institutions and humanitarian aid organizations in refugee camps, and also drew attention to the transformations in the practices, social relationships, and identities articulated by the inhabitants of these permanently temporary spaces.

However, these studies tended to focus on "the political" in isolation from the "economic." This focus mirrored the distinction between "political/forced" refugees and "economic/voluntary" migrants institutionalized in international law during the 1950s (Karatani, 2005; Long, 2013). It also reflected the prevailing view of globalization as a recent phenomenon that brought modernization and capitalism to the peoples of the Global South. In her work on a refugee processing center in the Philippines, Carol Mortland argued that the processing center operated as a liminal space where humanitarian workers attempted to transform refugees from "traditional small-scale societies" into future citizens capable of being resettled in "large and complex industrialized societies" (Mortland, 1987, p. 375). In a similar vein, Liisa Malkki analyzed Hutu refugees' production of "mythico-histories" within the confines of the Mishamo Refugee Settlement in Tanzania as a response to their unequal power relations with the Tanzanian state and the humanitarian aid organizations administering the settlement (Malkki, 1995). According to Malkki, this heightened diasporic nationalism could hinder the refugees' integration within host societies.

With the U.S. led "War on Terror" initiated in 2001, a succession of global economic crises, and a marked shift in international refugee and migration policy towards "securitization," the organization and administration of refugee camps came to be analyzed in terms of "encampment" (Diken and Laustsen, 2003, 2005; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Pandolfi, 2003; Perera, 2002) and "humanitarian government" (Fassin, 2012, 2013; Feldman, 2014, 2018). In addition to Michel Foucault's theorization of power in modern states (Foucault, 1991, 1995 [1975]), this body of scholarship drew on philosopher Giorgio Agamben's critique of liberal democracy (Agamben, 1995, 1998, 2005). These studies have focused primarily on the exercise of power by the multiple institutions —host nation-states, UN agencies, and international humanitarian aid organizations—that are posited as governing the space of refugee camps and their inhabitants. Terming this exercise of power "sovereignty"— divinely mandated absolute authority claimed by European monarchies in the fifteenth-nineteenth centuries—these analyses of refugee camps have questioned its legitimacy given the lack of representation by those over whom this power is exercised. A corollary to this postulation of

refugee camps as exceptional spaces of "governmentality" and "bare life," isolated from their environs, has been the representation of their inhabitants as a homogenous and unstratified "population" that is uniformly dispossessed in their subjugation to the illegitimate exercise of power.

Conceptualizing the disparate efforts of host nation-states', UN agencies', and humanitarian aid organizations' disparate efforts to contain, manage, assist, and render refugees productive in terms of "sovereignty" invites a critique of reification in the misrepresentation of these efforts as the uniform exercise of power by monolithic entities. Moreover, analyses in terms of "sovereignty" preclude consideration of the ways in which these disparate efforts shape social relationships within refugee camps as well as the local political economy that they give rise to—a political economy that is integrated into regional political economies as well as with global capitalism through production, consumption, labor migration, and migrant remittances.

Spaces of Exception

Giorgio Agamben's critique of liberal democracy conceptualizes the modern state's exercise of power in terms of "sovereignty" (Agamben, 1995, 1998, 2005). Agamben has argued that, given the dual nature of exceptions, the very assertion of the sacredness of life in opposition to the exercise of sovereignty places that life squarely within the realm of the modern state's power. In other words, the citizen can only come into existence by exchanging their right to participate in political life with an unconditional subjection to the state/sovereign's power of death over their life. According to Agamben, the statelessness of refugees reveals this hidden relationship between the modern state (whether totalitarian or liberal-democratic) and "bare life" (Agamben, 1995).

The "camp," then, is the space that is opened when the state exercises sovereignty, since the "state of exception" becomes the norm, and the only possible life is "bare life." Claiming Auschwitz as the exemplar of both refugee and concentration camps, Agamben argues that it is the "paradigm" of the modern nation-state, in particular, the modern developmentalist state (Agamben, 1998). In Agamben's words: "…in a different yet analogous way, today's democratico-capitalist project of eliminating the poor classes through development not only reproduces within itself the people that is excluded but also transforms the entire population of the Third World into bare life" (Agamaben, 1998, p. 193).

A large number of scholars have drawn on Agamben's work to criticize the securitization of migration policy in the Global North, it's out-sourcing to nation-states in the Global South, and the establishment of detention centers for the containment and processing of asylum seekers. In order to highlight the abuse experienced by asylum seekers and the difficult material conditions of their lives in detention camps, these scholars have argued that host states' denial of their civil rights reduces refugees to "bare life". They have also claimed that humanitarian organizations assist nation-states in this process by facilitating the containment

of refugees within camps where anything is possible and the "state of exception"—abrogation of citizens' rights—is the norm (Diken and Laustsen, 2003, 2005; Pandolfi 2003; Perera 2002). According to these scholars, the modern state seeks to resolve the ambiguity of the asylum seeker's status by including them in its own sphere of authority. It does so by denying them the rights that it grants its own citizens. In other words, since an asylum seeker is considered to be stateless until their claim is processed, their containment by host nation-states in detention centers where civil liberties are abrogated opens up a "space of exception" where violence is the norm.

The violence wreaked upon the objects of "development" cannot be disputed or dismissed (Cooper and Randall, 1997). The imprisonment of asylum seekers is a grave injustice. The overt and covert violence exercised in these camps regardless of who is formally in charge —nation-states in the Global North or their Southern sub-contractors—has been well documented (Boochani, 2018; Conlon and Hiemstra, 2014; Gueguen-Teil and Katz, 2018; Pandolfi, 2003). Nonetheless, Agamben's work raises serious questions about the implications of universalizing the Nazi concentration and death camps as the paradigm of power relations within the modern system of nation-states. The analogy banalizes by universalizing (Latif, 2008(b)). Moreover, it appropriates an other's experiences of violence, and rhetorically uses their suffering and death as a form of political capital in a manner similar to the use of slavery as a trope in Enlightenment critiques of absolutist monarchy (Latif, 2018). It narrates a total and totalizing order in which power is exercised as a constant, ever-increasing attempt to reduce the human beings within its sphere to inhumanity. The only history that can be told is the history of the omnipotent Sovereign's development of more effective technologies of subjection and the concomitant reduction of human beings to "bare life."

Over the last decade, widespread Palestinian criticisms of the Palestinian Authority have facilitated recognition of camp refugees' fraught relationship, not only with the Lebanese state and the UN agency responsible for the protection of Palestinian refugees (UNRWA), but also with the leadership of the PLO. Drawing on the literature on encampment, this newer body of scholarship has analyzed these fraught relationships in terms of governance that lacks legitimacy (Feldman, 2014, 2018; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Hajj, 2017; Issa, 2021).

Referring to Agamben, Hanafi and Long have argued that the Palestinian camps in Lebanon constitute "spaces of exception," since they are subject to the "multiple partial sovereignties" of the Palestinian political parties, the Lebanese state, as well as UNRWA and other humanitarian aid organizations. According to Hanafi and Long, this co-existence of multiple authorities results in "the suspension of all sovereign authority over the camp" (Hanafi and Long, 2010, p. 147). Moreover, they claim, that the Lebanese state and the international community have co-opted and undermined the legitimacy of Palestinian governance structures in the camps, replacing them with the bureaucracies of NGOs and humanitarian aid organizations.

Ilana Feldman has counter-argued that the aid agencies and host states that administer refugee populations do not usually claim "sovereign" authority, as they do not view themselves as the refugees' political representatives (Feldman, 2014, p. 244). Neither do they view refugees as political actors. Rather, in humanitarian circumstances, aid agencies and host states secure authority by holding the question of legitimacy in a temporary/permanent state of abeyance.

While the two positions differ in their conceptualization of the authority of UNRWA and the Lebanese state over Palestinian camp refugees, they appear to concur in viewing it as an unrepresentative and, therefore, illegitimate authority, echoing Enlightenment critiques of the absolutist state. Furthermore, neither considers the particularities of the local political economies that have emerged in different refugee camps in Lebanon as a consequence of the formation of social, political, and economic ties between the camps and their neighboring communities. Neither do these two positions systematically consider the ways in which these political economies have shaped and are shaped by changes in the international political economy.

Humanitarian Government

Didier Fassin has pointed to links between the US led War on Terror and the global shift towards the securitization of migration by examining ways in which both have been legitimated with reference to humanitarianism (Fassin, 2012, 2013). Fassin has proposed "humanitarian government" as a concept with which to examine nation-states, international institutions, and NGOs' deployment of "moral sentiments" as justification for their management and regulation of populations, whether stateless or holding the rights of citizenship. Highlighting the manner in which collective emotions are mobilized across political divides by appeals to a common humanity and shared suffering, in order to legitimate military intervention and the use of violent political action, Fassin has situated the origin of this "politics of compassion" in the emergence of "moral sentiments" in Enlightenment thought (Fassin, 2012). According to Fassin, since the 1990s, the production of a "scientific literature of compassion" in sociology, psychology, literary theory, and anthropology has accompanied the establishment of ministries of humanitarian assistance as well as humanitarian aid organizations that claim the right/duty/authority to intervene in situations deemed "humanitarian crises."

Hence, Fassin claims that, a lexicon of moral sentiments has come to take the place of what he views as an older vocabulary of social critique. "Inequality is replaced by exclusion, domination is transformed into misfortune, injustice is articulated as suffering, violence is expressed in terms of trauma" (Fassin, 2012, p. 6). This "politics of compassion" is simultaneously a politics of solidarity in its recognition of others as fellows, as well as a politics of inequality in that it focuses on the most vulnerable. Moreover, Fassin has argued, that the very conditions of the social relation between benefactor and recipient—good intentions not withstanding—preclude the possibility of reciprocity, as it is grateful

compliance that is expected as a counter-gift. Thus, humanitarian government is a politics of precarious lives, lives that are “not guaranteed but bestowed in answer to prayer” (Fassin, 2012, p.4).

Fassin’s work has highlighted some of the consequences of the privatization and outsourcing of the provision of social welfare, development, and humanitarian aid that have accompanied the global implementation of neoliberal policies. These consequences, as Fassin’s scholarship demonstrates, continue to be legitimated through the discourse of “moral sentiments.” However, my own work on the inequality of social relationships between refugees and humanitarian aid workers—many of whom are fellow refugee inhabitants of camps, —as well as the ways in which these relationships may shift over time, raises questions about their conceptualization in terms of sovereignty and its claim to absolute power (Latif, 2008(a), 2008(b)). Such a conceptualization overlooks the inequalities generated by the access of some camp refugees to salaried employment which facilitates the accumulation of social and economic capital through a predictable income and higher status work as employees of humanitarian aid organizations or the local NGOs with whom they partner.

Failed Urbanization

Scholarly concern with the unequal power relationships which organize refugee camps has been concomitant with the recognition that, over time, refugees come to form new social relationships that imbue camps with a symbolics of space (Agier, 2002, 2011; Allan, 2013; Davis, 2011; Khalili, 2007; Peteet, 2005). In his work on Daadab camp in Kenya, Michel Agier highlighted the ways in which the grouping together of refugees in residential blocks on the basis of country of origin, ethnicity, and clan facilitated the process by which local identities were transformed into national identities, which in the context of the camp took on the character of ethnic identities (Agier, 2002, p.333). Agier claimed that these identities acquired an operational reality in being deployed in various configurations of alliance and competition over access to the material and political resources made available through humanitarian aid. The process of identity coalescence was also reflected in the ways in which the various residential blocks grew and developed particular spatial characteristics. The manner in which “urbanization” took place suggested an attempt to reproduce life as it had been led at “home” within the constraints of the camp. However, Agier argued, that despite the emergence of new social relationships, identities, and solidarities, the transience and liminality characterizing life in the camps prevents individual and collective projects of self-realization from ever coming to fruition. In Agier’s words, “The camp, then, is comparable to the city, and yet it cannot ‘reach it’” (Agier, 2002, p. 336).

In his work on Kakuma camp in Kenya, Bram Jansen has demonstrated the continuities between this conceptualization of long-term refugee camps as spaces of “perpetually deferred urbanization,” and the developmentalist view, based on modernization theory, that deems all paths to urbanization seen as differing from an idealized Euro-American trajectory as

inherently problematic (Jansen, 2018). Emphasizing the ambiguity of refugee camps as spaces of control *and* care, Jensen has proposed the concept of "humanitarian urbanism" as a way of examining the ways in which the space of a refugee camp is produced by the refugees who inhabit it, through practices "that are both constitutive of and produced by humanitarian governance" (Jansen, 2018, p. 27). According to Jansen, since refugees have become accustomed to consultants, journalists, and researchers advocating for them, they may position themselves with the understanding that in certain contexts their refugee status can function as a form of capital. At the same time, refugee status is one of many from among the social repertoire of camp dwellers. While pertinent in dealings with camp administrators, humanitarian aid officials, and representatives of the host nation-state, refugee status may be irrelevant in daily interactions between fellow camp dwellers. In his analysis, Jansen has highlighted the ways in which Kakuma camp's political economy is based on links between the provision of humanitarian aid, as well as salaried and informal employment within the camp and its environs.

The resettlement of relatives in other countries has facilitated a flow of remittances to those remaining in Kakuma camp. These remittances have enabled some refugees to initiate economic activities ranging from schools to poolhalls to the provision of computing and internet services. These activities are non-agricultural, frequently precarious, and are based on transnational ties that connect Kakuma to the global economy. The diversification of refugee incomes, tastes, and patterns of consumption is similar to processes associated with informal urbanization. In Jansen's words, in the long run, humanitarian aid can become "a resource that refugees render into livelihoods…on the basis of which other forms of income generation and sociocultural phenomena" emerge in the camp, producing "a form of social organization comprising status, networks and power, and forms of social stratification" (Jansen, 2018, p. 108). My work on humanitarian aid and the urbanization of Bourj al-Barajneh refugee camp supports these conclusions (Latif, 2008(a), 2008(b)).

Marginality and Tradition

Scholarly interest in the inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon emerged in tandem with the Palestinian Liberation Organization's (PLO) establishment of its base of operations in Lebanon in the late 1960s. This body of scholarship was not primarily concerned with refugee camps as spaces. Rather, in keeping with analyses of marginalization developed in response to rural-urban migration in Latin America, the preoccupation of this work was to establish the "revolutionary consciousness" of the camp refugees in light of their dispossession (Franjieh, 1972; Peteet, 1991; Sayigh, 1978, 1979; Sirhan, 1975; Turki, 1972). Agreeing on the poverty of life in the camps, accompanied by the perception that pre-1948 kinship based social relationships and rural forms of political organization had been preserved in ghurbā (exile), scholars disagreed about the extent to which the camp refugees had acquired a proletarian consciousness and whether national liberation required such a consciousness.

For many scholars, the preservation of traditional fellah (peasant) culture they perceived in the refugee camps attested to the authenticity and strength of Palestinian nationalism, which they viewed as cutting across class, sectarian, and regional divides (Sayigh, 1978, 1979; Sirhan, 1975; Turki, 1972). For others this was the "legacy of a semi-tribal past" that had survived because the refugees had not been "integrated into any economic productive process and so know nothing of the economic exploitation to which a normal proletariat is subjected, and against which it ultimately rebels with the aim of establishing a new system of social relationships" (Franjieh, 1972, p. 53). It is significant that, regardless of whether they viewed social relationships and political organization in the camps in a positive or negative light, both positions concurred in viewing them as premodern survivals.

Moreover, both positions failed to systematically examine the political economies that had come into existence in the camps that were shaped by, and part of, the local political economy of their environs, whether urban or rural. While refugee social mobility and out migration from the camps were acknowledged, a shared experience of political dispossession was viewed by scholars and nationalist activists as being of greater social and analytic significance than the changes in class distinctions brought about by the humanitarian provision of formal education and opportunities for labor migration to the Gulf and other Arab nation-states.

This view of the camps as spaces whose isolation and containment facilitated the conservation of tradition—and by implication precluded the possibility of change from within—appears to have been shared by scholars as well as camp refugees themselves. In the words of anthropologist Rosemary Sayigh,

…the camps where the poorest Palestinians lived became, like Jewish ghettos, the conservation areas of "traditional culture." This was possible precisely because the host regimes were not interested in training the Palestinians for liberation struggle, merely in preventing them from independent action" (Sayigh, 1978, p. 102).

However, as I have demonstrated elsewhere, such ascriptions of autochthony can be simultaneously empowering and disempowering. They empower the identity articulated with the weight of tradition, while at the same time disempowering the bearers of that identity as premodern and in need of intervention (Latif, 2011).

Building on earlier scholarship's positing of camp refugees as nationalist symbols of muqāwimā (resistance) and sumūd (steadfastness in the face of opposition), more recent scholarship on Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon has examined the relationship between camp refugees' collective memories of the thaūrā (literally, revolution, the term is used metonymically by camp refugees to refer to the PLO when it was based in Lebanon) and the articulation of a national history in the absence of a nation-state (Allan, 2013; Davis, 2011; Khalili, 2007; Peteet, 2005).

A major contribution of this body of scholarship has been to highlight the camp refugees' marginalization within considerations of "the Palestinian question" since the PLO's withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982, as well as the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and the West Bank after the Oslo Accords of 1993. Camp refugees' continued identification with their villages of origin in the Galilee as evinced in the names of camp neighborhoods, the establishment of village leagues, and the compilation and publication of village histories has been analyzed in terms of the refugees' unwavering assertion of their right to return. However, these attempts to create a space from which the accounts of camp refugees—now recast as "subaltern" in relation to the Palestinian nationalist leadership, humanitarian aid organizations and the Lebanese state—may "speak for themselves," are hampered by their treatment of the refugee camps as homogenous, unstratified, contained spaces without any ties to their environs in Lebanon, or to the global economy.

The practices, social relationships, and forms of political organization in Palestinian refugee camps, which in earlier scholarship were analyzed as unchanging remnants of traditional fellah culture authenticating the history of Palestinian nationalism, have been recast in more recent scholarship in terms of the "idiom" of kinship (Allan, 2013; Hajj, 2017; Hanafi and Long, 2010; Issa, 2021). Perla Issa has argued that the perceived "paradox" of Palestinian political parties maintaining authority without legitimacy in the refugee camps in Lebanon can be understood through an examination of the ways in which camp refugees' political participation and relationship with Palestinian political parties is based on familial and personal ties of intimacy and trust (Issa, 2021). Similarly, Diana Allan has claimed that camp refugees' increased impoverishment since the PLO's withdrawal has necessitated the formation of new and wider "networks of dependency" with neighbors and friends that are articulated in the "idiom of kinship" (Allan, 2013, p. 76).

Anthropological scholarship on "primitive"/"pre-modern" peoples conceptualized kinship—whether "biological" or "fictitious"—as the idiom structuring their social, political, and economic organization (Evans-Pritchard, 1969 [1940]; Geertz, 1975; Geertz, Geertz and Rosen, 1979). In an essay on conflict in newly independent nation-states, Clifford Geertz argued that collective identity in "modernizing" societies remains bound up with "the gross actualities of blood" (Geertz, 1963, p. 106). According to Geertz, in such societies, the "givens of social existence" such as congruity of blood, language, custom, and religion appear to have "an overpowering coerciveness in and of themselves" (Geertz, 1963, p.107). In modern societies, by contrast, Geertz argued, unity is not maintained by calls to blood and land, but through "routine allegiance to a civil state, supplemented to a greater or lesser extent by governmental use of police powers and ideological exhortation" (Geertz, 1963, p. 107). In other words, modern societies have bureaucracy, a police force, ideology, and a conception of civil society, whereas modernizing societies rely on the idiom of kinship. Since, the modernizing society's inevitable transformation is structured by its traditional culture of "kinship as idiom," its failure or success in achieving modernization is determined by the local particularities of this culture. Moreover, Geertz argued, conflicts in such societies

have to be understood in light of the newly independent states' mobilization of resources for the provision of social welfare. He claimed that in the absence of a strong sense of civil society, the size of these resources, alongside the institution of universal suffrage made it very tempting to continue to lay claim to identity through primordial attachments.

Geertz's essentialized distinctions between societies categorized as modern or modernizing rests on a conceptualization of modernization as a totalizing process in the course of which personal ties of "kinship as idiom" are superseded by the "impersonality" of the market and of bureaucracy, legitimated by "ideology" as opposed to "tradition." Scholarship examining informality in "modern" bureaucracies have discredited these claims revealing them to partake in the "fair/democratic" "corrupt/authoritarian" dichotomy used to contrast the alleged impartiality of "older" nation-states in the Global North with the patronage claimed to be rife in their aberrant counterparts in the Global South (Hart, 2009; Jaffe and Koster, 2019; Ledeneva, 2018; Lomnitz, 1988). Modernization theory's claims regarding the impersonality and impartiality of bureaucratic and market forms are problematized by the insight that "formality can only be enacted in practice in conjunction with informality, both played as appropriate in a given context, seeming opposite but interconnected and interdependent" (Ledeneva, 2018, p.5).

Bram Jansen's work on Kakuma camp has demonstrated that the designation—whether bureaucratic or scholarly—of long-term refugee camps in the Global South as spaces of containment obscures the ways in which the social relationships that emerge within them are imbricated in global as well as local political economies. Jansen's analysis parallels the critique made of marginalization theory's postulation of Brazilian favelas' political, economic, and social isolation from the cities in which they were located (Perlman, 1975) The imbrication of local, regional, and global political economies is brought about by camps refugees and favela dwellers' production and consumption of commodities and services. Informality, in this context, is understood not as the absence of state regulation or as a state of exception (Roy, 2005), but as the ways in which the norms constituting "the formal" are performed and circumvented. If the formal is enacted on the basis of a situational "know-how" of how to follow, implement, enforce or bend rules, then the formal and the informal do not constitute separate spheres (Ledeneva, 2018). Rather, each contextualizes the other. Moreover, the persistence of the informal over a period of time can give rise to new norms that operate as such (Sassen, 1993). Such an understanding of the relationship between the formal and the informal may open up different ways of thinking about societal transformation that do not reproduce the teleology of modernization theory.

The Interplay of Formal Exclusion and Informal Inclusion in the Emergence of Refugee Camp Political Economies

My work on Burj al-Barajneh camp has shown that, despite statelessness and, hence, formal exclusion, decades of inhabitation in Lebanon have resulted in the "informal"

inclusion of Palestinian camp refugees in Lebanon's sectarian political economy (Latif 2008(a), 2008(b), 2012). Hence, the predicament of Palestinian camp refugees in Lebanon has to be understood not only in light of their formal exclusion as stateless persons, but also in terms of the precarity of an informal inclusion that does not confer any legally recognized or enforceable rights.

The Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon emerged during the late 1940s and early 1950s as a consequence of the mass expulsion of Palestinians during the founding of the nation-state of Israel in 1948. Prior to the establishment of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in 1950, humanitarian aid to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was provided by the League of Red Cross Societies (LRCS), of which the Lebanese Red Cross, founded a year prior to national independence from French Mandate rule in 1946, was a member.

Burj al-Barajneh camp came into existence in 1949, near the village of Burj al-Barajneh on the southern outskirts of Beirut. According to interviews conducted with first and second-generation camp refugees in the course of fieldwork, members of a notable family from the village of Tarshiha in the Upper Galilee had taken refuge in the village of Burj al-Barajneh as they had pre-existing economic and social ties with a notable family from Burj al-Barajneh. Over time, the refugees from Tarshiha were joined by fellow villagers and kinsmen from neighboring villages in the Galilee. As the number of refugee families grew, the LRCS began to provide assistance in the form of tents, food rations, and basic health care. The increasing migration of Palestinian refugees to Burj al-Barajneh, the LRCS' provision of humanitarian aid, as well as the *wāsṭa*—mediation—of the notable family from Burj al-Barajneh with Lebanese state officials, facilitated the formal recognition of the settlement as an official refugee camp.

Along with fieldwork I conducted in Burj al-Barajneh camp (2003-ongoing), research in the archives of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent movement in Geneva (2007), revealed that the establishment of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, involved both organized transfers of refugees under the supervision of the League, as well as movement on the part of refugees themselves. The location and settlement of the camps, similarly, entailed both refugees' own initiatives as well as interventions on the part of the League (Latif 2008(a), 2008(b)). According to League reports, the Lebanese state viewed those refugees who were in need of humanitarian assistance as a threat to its sectarian balance of power between Muslims and Christians and relegated the provision of relief to the League[1]. This abbreviated account of the emergence of Burj al-Barajneh camp highlights the importance of researching the particular histories of long-term refugee camps in order to gain a better understanding of

1 Report to the United Nations Relief to Palestine Refugees on the part of the League of Red Cross Societies in the Palestine Refugees Relief Programme (January 1950). IFRC archives. LRCS Box 19742.
(LRCS 1949)
Report to the United Nations Relief to Palestine Refugees on the part of the League of Red Cross Societies in the Palestine Refugees Relief Programme (April 1950). IFRC archives. LRCS Box 19742.
(LRCS 1949)

the social relationships that emerge within them, as well as the ways in which these social relationships shape and are shaped by changes in the location of the particular camp within local and global political economies.

Interviews with first generation camp refugees, LRCS reports of its work, as well as subsequent UNRWA reports from the 1950s make clear that the humanitarian aid provided was never sufficient to meet the refugees' needs. These circumstances, alongside the Lebanese state's legal prohibitions on their employment, necessitated informal work on the part of both adults and children. In a first-generation refugee's words: "Everyone worked, man, woman, boy, girl, to be able to live." At the same time, fieldwork revealed that the refugees' possession and dispossession of economic and social capital was not uniform or constant. Given the constraints on camp refugee employment in those early years, UNRWA was one of the few avenues of salaried employment and potential upward mobility open to some camp refugees. Hence, the camp was never an unstratified space.

The emerging political economy of Burj al-Barajneh camp was also shaped by the newly independent Lebanese state's domestic and foreign policy considerations, as well as by the political economy of Beirut and its environs. Scholarship on the regions that were administratively brought together under the French Mandate for Lebanon (1920-1945) indicates that the integration of these regions into the world economy during the Ottoman period led to the emergence of a sectarian political economy (Makdisi, 1996; Owen, 1981; Traboulsi, 2007). During the Mandate period, sectarian membership was institutionalized as the official basis for political participation (Amel, 2020; Traboulsi, 2007). The independent Lebanese republic was run on the basis of laissez-faire, understood as minimal state regulation of the economy. "Public" services such as education and healthcare continued to be provided primarily by each sect's charitable institutions to its own members. In other words, sectarian belonging in Lebanon came to be institutionalized not only as the basis of political participation, but also as the means by which to access social services in a capitalist political economy that had long been incorporated into the world economy.

The influx of Palestinian refugees in 1948 was deemed a threat to the new nation-state's sectarian balance of power and a burden on its economy (Sayigh, 1997; Vernant, 1953). This was in contrast to the settlement and naturalization of Armenian refugees during the French Mandate, a decision supported by many Christian political leaders and opposed by many of their Muslim counterparts (Traboulsi, 2007). At the same time, the regional boycott of the newly established state of Israel greatly benefited Lebanon's service sector. Beirut took over Haifa's role as a major port for the Arab hinterland and as an important hub of intercontinental communications. Beirut also received a huge inflow of Palestinian capital, along with large numbers of wealthy and middle-class Palestinian refugees, many of whom acquired citizenship (Nasr, 1978; Smith, 1986; Traboulsi, 2007). However, it is the impoverished refugees and their descendants who have come to be the representation of Palestinians in Lebanon.

In the milieu of Lebanon's sectarian political economy, living in the refugee camps as a marker of class and autochthony also came to be associated with sect. In 2003, when I first began fieldwork in Burj al-Barajneh camp, many second and third generation refugees responded to my questions about Dbayeh camp, located in the eastern suburbs of Beirut, with surprise that any Palestinian Christians still lived in a camp and had not been naturalized.

Over the course of the 1950s-1960s, a ring of informal construction formed on the outskirts of Beirut. Concentrated around industrial sites and punctuated by official Palestinian refugee camps, as well as informal refugee settlements, it was termed the "misery belt" in official and political discourse. Many Lebanese from the south and the Biqāʿ, as well as Palestinian refugees from more rural camps such as Nahr al-Bared in the north and Rashidieh in the south migrated to the rapidly suburbanizing villages on the outskirts of Beirut in search of work. The founding of the state of Israel in 1948 had had a deleterious impact on the economy of south Lebanon, as Palestine had been an important market for its exports (Traboulsi, 2007). At the same time, the increasing capitalization of agriculture, monopolized by a small number of notable families, exacerbated landlessness and indebtedness in the rural regions of Lebanon, contributing to mass rural-urban migration (Gilsenan, 1977; Nasr, 1978; Nasr and James, 1985). This migration, in turn, facilitated the formation of social, political, and economic ties between impoverished Palestinian refugees and their Lebanese class counterparts.

The state's ideology of laissez-faire notwithstanding, thirty families—occupying key governmental offices—held monopolistic control over the main axes of the economy (Traboulsi, 2007). *Wāsṭa*—literally mediation or intercession—facilitated access not only to "public" services such as education and healthcare, but also to day and salaried employment in public and private ventures alike. New migrants to the city found it difficult to join existing social networks, which coalesced at the level of the neighborhood around strong-men associated with the neighborhood—*qabadayat*. In addition to "protecting" the neighborhood, *qabadayat* mediated access to urban notables—*zuʿamaʾ*—whose intercession facilitated matters ranging from registering children in the school, to securing employment, to acquiring permission to build, and even\ obtaining electricity connection (Denoeux, 1993; Johnson, 1986). In the absence of pre-existing claims based on shared inhabitation, claims based on sectarian membership, facilitated new migrants' access to social networks. This contributed to the increasing sectarianization of these relationships (Khuri, 1972).

Sectarianism was viewed by a number of scholars as serving a socially stabilizing function in facilitating redistribution across class lines (Denoeux, 1993; Johnson, 1986; Khuri, 1972). According to this view, the Lebanese civil war was brought about by the collapse of the sectarian order, in part due to the exclusion of Palestinians from the sectarian organization of patrons and clients, as they did not have a vote to offer in exchange for services accessible only through the patron's *wāsṭa*. This claim is problematic on a number of counts. By the 1960s, a number of elite and middle-class Palestinians had acquired citizenship and therefore were eligible to vote. Moreover, fieldwork in Burj al-Barajneh camp revealed that

intermarriage between Palestinian camp refugees and their Lebanese class counterparts also inhabiting the "misery belts" surrounding Beirut, was not uncommon (Latif 2008(a), 2012). If the male partner of the marriage was Lebanese, the children of the union would be eligible for citizenship.

A narrow view of patron-client relationships as loyalty/votes in exchange for access to employment and social services may result in a reductive understanding, not only of how those ties come to be formed and change over time, but also of the contradictory ways in which they may be experienced by those involved in them. Drawing on Marcel Mauss' work on non-monetary forms of exchange, some anthropologists conceptualized patron-client ties as unequal relationships of reciprocal exchange articulated through a discourse of kinship and amity (Hart, 1975; Gilsenan, 1977; Khuri, 1969, 1972; Lomnitz, 1988; Peters, 1972). In this view, unwritten rules of sociability prevent the requirement of reciprocity from being made explicit, recasting it as a "debt of honour." As exchanges take place on a shifting continuum of power relations, relationships that are relatively egalitarian may become less so if one party's capacity to give is increased beyond the other party's capacity to reciprocate. These power relations are hegemonic in that both parties must be able to make a claim on each other.

The balance between these reciprocal claims is delicate. A patron who does not have a surplus to redistribute will find themselves without clients. Moreover, when detached from its social context, reciprocal exchange can transform into impersonal market exchange, such as exchanges between individuals who, due to class differences, cannot have a personal relationship, or when what is exchanged falls outside the claims of kinship or amity. In other words, the form of the exchange depends on the relationship and, hence, the difference in power between the parties involved. This does not remain constant over time, as the relationship itself may be transformed by the exchange.

Long-term fieldwork in Burj al-Barajneh camp indicates that *wāsṭa*—mediation—could be regarded by either party as honorable, marking the patron as a community-minded person of influence. It could also be regarded as an egalitarian or philanthropic redistribution of surplus. In this case, accusations of corruption and oppression were reserved for those on whom a claim to reciprocity could not be made (sectarian differences) or those who refused to recognize such claims (class differences). Discourses of kinship and practices associated with them may facilitate a disavowal of entanglement in relationships of unequal exchange. It does not, however, follow that kinship is the idiom that structures the social, political, and economic organization of communities deemed premodern.

In his work on social change in rural South Lebanon during the first two decades after Lebanese national independence, anthropologist Emrys Peters cautioned against taking at face value, the use of kin terms to press a claim upon the person so addressed (Peters, 1972). Whether or not the claim was honored may have little to do with kin ties, whether "real"

or “fictitious.” By facilitating the impression of a community structured by unchanging “tradition,” the discourse of kinship could forestall a consideration of the ways in which the appearance of continuity masked significant changes in the political economy of the community (Gilsenan, 1977). In other words, assuming an unchanging structure of patronage legitimated by the idiom of kinship can obscure shifts in who occupies the position of patron and who is relegated to the position of a client. Moreover, such an assumption hinders an examination of changes in the political economy within which these relationships of unequal exchange come into existence and are transformed.

Conclusion

Pioneering scholarship examining long-term refugee camps in the Global South as disciplinary spaces played an important role in delineating the terrain debated by subsequent work in the wake of the securitization of international (im)migration policy. However, the potential of this literature for critique was limited by its focus on what was deemed “political”—nation-states, international organizations—to the exclusion of what considered “economic”—local forms of production and consumption, global commodity and financial flows, and migration in search of work. This exclusive focus on the “political” mirrored the distinction between “forced” and “voluntary” migrants institutionalized in international law after the Second World War. Subsequent scholarship deploying the concepts of “encampment” and “humanitarian government” has sought to problematize this distinction. However, analyses led by these concepts may result in a reductive account of the micro and macro political economic processes that Henri Lefebvre theorized as “the social production of space” (Lefebvre, 1991 [1974]). Erasing historical specificity, analyses based on the universalization of encampment fail to consider the ways in which the social production of refugee camp spaces is shaped not only by changes in the local political economies that emerge within particular camps, but also by changes in their location within the global political economy as well as the regional political economies of their environs. An examination of the interplay between formal exclusion and informal inclusion may also facilitate a better understanding of the interplay of coercion and hegemony in the changing social relationships that give shape to these political economies. By providing an alternative to reductive analyses led by conceptualizations of “bare life”, an examination of shifts in the interplay of formal exclusion and informal inclusion can make a valuable contribution to broader debates regarding migration, statelessness, and precarity in the contemporary capitalist global economy.

Peer Review: Externally peer-reviewed.
Conflict of Interest: Author declared no conflict of interest.
Grant Support: The author declared that this study has received no financial support.
Acknowledgement: The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this essay for their feedback.

References

Agamben, G. (1995). We Refugees. *Symposium*, 49(2), 114-119.

Agamben, G. (1998). *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press.

Agamben, G. (2005). *State of Exception*. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press.

Agier, M. (2002). Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee Camps. *Ethnography,* 3(3), 317-341.

Agier, M. (2011). *Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Allan, D. (2013). *Refugees of the Revolution: Experiences of Palestinian Exile* Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press.

Amel, M. (2020). *Arab Marxism and National Liberation: Selected Writings of Mahdi Amel*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

Boochani, B. (2018). *No Friend but the Mountains: Writings from Manus Prison.* London, UK: Pan Macmillan.

Conlon, D., and Hiemstra, N. (2014). Examining the Everyday Micro-Economies of Migrant Detention in the United States. *Geographica Helvetica,* 69(5), 335-344.

Cooper, F. and Packard, R. 1997. Introduction. In F. Cooper and R. Packard (Eds.), *International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge* (pp. 1-44) Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.

Davis, R. 2010. *Palestinian Village Histories: Geographies of the Displaced*. Stanford, USA: Stanford University Press.

Denoeux, G. (1993). *Urban Unrest in the Middle East: A Comparative Study of Informal Networks in Egypt, Iran, and Lebanon*. Albany, USA: State University of New York Press.

Diken, B, and Laustsen, C. (2003). “Camping” as a Contemporary Strategy—From Refugee Camps to Gated Communities. *AMID Working Paper Series* 3. Aalborg University, Denmark: AMID.

Diken, B, and Laustsen, C. (2005). *The Culture of Exception: Sociology Facing the Camp*. London, UK: Routledge.

Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (1969 [1940]). *The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People.* Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Fassin, D. (2012). *Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present*. Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.

Fassin, D. (2013). The Predicament of Humanitarianism. *Qui Parle*, 22(1), 33-48.

Feldman, I. (2014). What is a Camp? Legitimate Refugee Lives in Spaces of Long-Term Displacement. *Geoforum*, 66, 244-252.

Feldman, I. (2018). *Life Lived in Relief: Humanitarian Predicaments and Palestinian Refugee Politics*. Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.

Foucault, M. (1991). *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1995 [1975]). *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*. New York, USA: Vintage Books.

Franjieh, S. (1972). How Revolutionary is the Palestinian Resistance? A Marxist Interpretation. *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 1(2), 52-60.

Geertz, C. (1963). The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States. In C. Geertz (Ed.), *Old Societies and New States; the Quest for Modernity in Asia and Africa* (pp. 105-157). New York, USA: Free Press.

Geertz, C., Geertz, H., and Rosen, M. (1979). *Meaning and Order in Moroccan Society: Three Essays in Cultural Analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Gilsenan, M. (1977). Against Patron-Client Relations. In E. Gellner and J. Waterbury (Eds.), *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (pp. 167-183). London, UK: Duckworth.

Gueguen-Teil, C. and Katz, I. (2018). On the Meaning of Shelter: Living in Calais's Camps de la Lande. In I. Katz, D. Martin, and C. Minca (Eds.), *Camps Revisited: Multifaceted Spatialities of a Modern Political Technology* (pp. 83-98). London, UK: Rowman and Littlefield.

Hajj, N. (2017). *Protection Amid Chaos: The Creation of Property Rights in Palestinian Refugee Camps*. New York, USA: Columbia University Press.

Hanafi, S. and Long, T. (2010). Governance, Governmentalities, and the State of Exception in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 23(2), 134-159.

Hart, K. (1975). Swindler or Public Benefactor? The Entrepreneur in His Community. In J. Goody (Ed.), *Changing Social Structure in Ghana* (pp. 1-36), London, UK: International African Institute.

Hart, K. (2009). On the Informal Economy: The Political History of an Ethnographic Concept. *CEB Working Paper* No. 09/042. Brussels, Belgium: Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hitchcox, L. (1990). *Vietnamese Refugees in Southeast Asian Camps*. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hyndman, J. (2000). *Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism*. Minneapolis, USA: University of Minnesota Press.

Issa, P. (2021). *The Endurance of Palestinian Political Factions: An Everyday Perspective from Nahr el-Bared Camp*. Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.

Jaffe, R. and Koster, M. (2019). The Myth of Formality in the Global North: Informality-As-Innovation in Dutch Governance. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 43(3), 563-568.

Jansen, B. (2018). *Kakuma Refugee Camp: Urbanism in Kenya's Accidental City*. London, UK: Zed Books.

Johnson, M. (1986). *Class and Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840-1985*. London, UK: Ithaca Press.

Karatani, R. (2005). How History Separated Refugee and Migrant Regimes: In Search of Their Institutional Origins. *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 17(3), 517-541.

Khalili, L. (2007). *Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of National Commemoration*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Khuri, F. (1969). The Changing Class Structure in Lebanon. *Middle East Journal*, 23(1), 29-44.

Khuri, F. (1972). Sectarian Loyalty Among Rural Migrants in Two Lebanese Suburbs: A Stage Between Family and National Allegiance. In R. Antoun and I. Harik (Eds.), *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East* (pp. 198-213). Bloomington, USA: Indiana University Press.

Latif, N. (2008(a)). Space, Power and Identity in a Palestinian Refugee Camp. *Asylon(s)* 5. Retrieved from http://www.reseau-terra.eu/article800.html

Latif, N. (2008(b)). Making Refugees. *The New Centennial Review*, 8(2), 253-272.

Latif, N. (2011). Fellahin, Fidaʾyīn, Lājaʾyīn: Palestinian Camp Refugees in Lebanon as Autochthons. *Arab Studies Journal*, 19(1), 46-77.

Latif, N. (2012). “It Was Better During the War”: Narratives of Everyday Violence in a Palestinian Refugee Camp. *Feminist Review*, 101, 24-40.

Ledeneva, A. (2018). Introduction. In A Ledeneva et al (Eds.), *Global Encyclopedia of Informality, Volume 1* (pp. 1-27). Berkeley, USA: University of California Press.

Lefebvre, H. (1991 [1974]). *The Production of Space*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Lomnitz, L. (1988). Informal Exchange Networks in Formal Systems: A Theoretical Model. *American Anthropologist*, 90(1), 42-55.

Long, K. (2013). When Refugees Stopped Being Migrants: Movement, Labour and Humanitarian Protection. *Migration Studies*, 1(1), 4-26.

Makdisi, U. (1996). Reconstructing the Nation-State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon. *MERIP Report*, 200, 23–26, 30.

Malkki, L. (1995). *Purity and Exile: Violence, Memory, and National Cosmology Among Hutu Refugees in Tanzania*. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press.

Mortland, C. (1987). Transforming Refugees in Refugee Camps. *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development,* 16(3/4), 375-404.

Nasr, S. (1978). Backdrop to Civil War: The Crisis of Lebanese Capitalism. *MERIP Report*, 73, 3–13.

Nasr, S. and James, D. (1985). Roots of the Shi’i Movement. *MERIP Report*, 133, 10–16.

Owen, R. (1981). *The Middle East in the World Economy 1800-1914*. London, UK: Methuen.

Pandolfi, M. (2003). Contract of Mutual (In) difference: Governance and the Humanitarian Apparatus in Contemporary Albania and Kosovo. *Global Legal Studies*, 10(1), 369-381.

Perera, S. (2002). What is a Camp? Borderphobias–the Politics of Insecurity Post-9/11. *Borderlands*, 1(1). Retrieved from http://www.borderlands.net.au/vol1no1_2002/perera_camp.html

Perlman, J. (1975). Rio’s Favelas and the Myth of Marginality. *Politics and Society*, 5(2), 131-160.

Peteet, J. (2005). *Landscape of Hope and Despair: Palestinian Refugee Camps*. Philadelphia, USA: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Peteet, J. (1991). *Gender in Crisis: Women and the Palestinian Resistance Movement*. New York, USA: Columbia university Press.

Peters, L. (1972). Shifts in Power in a Lebanese Village. In R. Antoun and I. Harik (Eds.), *Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East* (pp. 165-197). Bloomington, USA: Indiana University Press.

Roy, A. (2005). *Urban Informality: Toward an Epistemology of Planning*. Journal of the American Planning Association, 71(2), 147-158.

Sassen, S. (1993). The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old Regulations. *The Yale Law Journal*, 103, 2289-2304.

Sayigh, R. (1978). The Struggle for Survival: The Economic Conditions of Palestinian Camp Residents in Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 7(2), 101-119.

Sayigh, R. (1979). *Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries*. London, UK: Zed Books.

Sayigh, Y. (1997). *Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement 1949-1993*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Sirhan, B. (1975). Palestinian Refugee Camp Life in Lebanon. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 4(2), 91-107.

Smith, P. (1986). The Palestinian Diaspora, 1948-1985. *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 15(3), 90-108.

Traboulsi, F. (2007). *A Modern History of Lebanon*. London, UK: Pluto Press.

Turki, F. (1974). To Be a Palestinian. *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 3(3), 3-17.

Vernant, J. (1953). *The Refugee in the Post-War World*. New Haven, USA: Yale University Press.