

Yayın Geliş Tarihi: 30.09.2022
Yayına Kabul Tarihi: 10.11.2022
Online Yayın Tarihi: 26.12.2022
<http://dx.doi.org/10.16953/deusosbil.1182181>

Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi
Cilt: 24, Sayı: 4, Yıl: 2022, Sayfa: 1656-1679
E-ISSN: 1308-0911

Araştırma Makalesi

**THE FOUNDATIONS OF MARX'S THEORY OF ALIENATION:
MARX'S CRITIQUE OF HIS PREDECESSORS AND
ALIENATED LABOUR ¹**

Görkem GİRAY*

Abstract

Marx's conceptualization of alienation is influenced by his predecessors Hegel and Feuerbach. However, Marx neither accepts these conceptualizations as they are nor makes a synthesis of them. Instead, he builds his original theory of alienation on the criticism of his predecessors' views on the subject. As a result, Marx's theory of alienation becomes materialistic, historical and social. The historical and social conditions Marx was in pointed to the capitalist mode of production and the alienation of the working class caused by it as the causes of unfreedom. In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, he focuses on the wage worker's alienation stemming from the labour process.

The purpose of this article is to present Marx's critique of his predecessors in grounding the concept of alienation and his original contribution. For this, first of all, Marx's criticisms of Hegel's and then Feuerbach's alienation theories will be explained. In this context, three points of criticism will be identified for each of them. Then, Marx's theory of alienated labour will be discussed and the four aspects of the alienation of the worker will be examined. Based on Marx's definition of alienated labour as forced labour, it will be argued that what causes alienation to productive activity, which Marx attributes a principal role compared to other aspects, is not division of labour or unpleasant work—or working conditions—but rather forced labour, which is a characteristic of the modes of production based on private property. The question of whether the alienation is specific to capitalism, which arises with this determination, may be a precursor for future studies.

Keywords: Alienated labour, Marx, Hegel, Feuerbach, Alienation, Forced labour

Bu makale için önerilen kaynak gösterimi (APA 6. Sürüm):

Giray, G. (2022). The foundations of Marx's theory of alienation: Marx's critique of his predecessors and alienated labour. *Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 24 (4), 1656-1679.

¹ This article has been derived from Görkem Giray's ongoing PhD dissertation at Istanbul Technical University, Department of Political Studies, Political and Social Thought PhD Program.

Ethics committee approval was not required for this article.

* Istanbul Technical University, Department of Political Studies, Political and Social Thought PhD Program, ORCID: 0000-0001-9465-6630, girayg@itu.edu.tr.

**MARX'IN YABANCILAŞMA KURAMININ TEMELLERİ:
MARX'IN ÖNCELLERİNE ELEŞTİRİSİ VE
YABANCILAŞMIŞ EMEK**

Öz

Marx'ın yabancılaşma kavramsallaştırması, kendinden önce gelen Hegel ve Feuerbach'tan etkilenir. Ancak Marx ne bu kavramsallaştırmaları olduğu gibi kabul eder ne de onların bir sentezini yapar. Bunun yerine, kendi özgün yabancılaşma kuramını öncellerinin görüşlerinin eleştirileri üzerine inşa eder. Böylece Marx'ta yabancılaşma kuramı materyalist, tarihsel ve toplumsal bir içerik kazanır. İçinde bulunduğu tarihsel ve toplumsal koşullar, özgür olmama halinin nedeni olarak Marx'ın karşısına kapitalist üretim tarzı ve onun sebep olduğu işçi sınıfının yabancılaşmasını çıkarır. 1844 El Yazmaları'nda ücretli işçinin emek sürecinden kaynaklanan yabancılaşmasına odaklanır.

Bu makalenin amacı, yabancılaşma kavramının temellendirilmesinde Marx'ın öncellerine eleştirisini ve kendi özgün katkısını ortaya koymaktır. Bunun için ilk önce Marx'ın Hegel'in, sonra da Feuerbach'ın yabancılaşma kuramlarına yönelik eleştirilerine odaklanılacaktır. Bu bağlamda öncellerin her birine yönelik üç eleştiri noktası tespit edilecektir. Ardından Marx'ın yabancılaşmış emek kuramı ele alınacak ve ücretli işçinin yabancılaşmasının dört veçhesi (dört ilişki) incelenecektir. Ayrıca Marx'ın yabancılaşmış emeği zorla çalışma olarak tanımlamasından hareketle, diğer veçhelere kıyasla temel bir önem atfettiği üretici etkinliğe yabancılaşmaya neden olan unsurun sıklıkla iddia edildiği gibi esasında iş bölümü ve hoş olmayan çalışma ya da çalışma koşulları değil, emeğin, özel mülkiyete dayalı üretim tarzlarında kazandığı zorla çalışma karakteri olduğu öne sürülecektir. Bu tespit ile birlikte ortaya çıkan, yabancılaşmanın kapitalizme özgü olup olmadığı sorusu gelecekteki çalışmalar için ön açıcı olabilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: Yabancılaşmış emek, Marx, Hegel, Feuerbach, Yabancılaşma, Zorla çalışma

INTRODUCTION

Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (hereafter *Manuscripts*) is considered to be the foremost and only work in which Marx put his theory of alienation systematically. Although Marx had used this concept in his previous writings, it was in its Hegelian or Feuerbachian sense. Therefore, Marx's authentic contribution was absent to a large extent until then. Also, although the concept was used by Marx in later works such as *Grundrisse* and *Capital*, it did not play a central role in these works as in the *Manuscripts*. For this reason, the *Manuscripts* has a distinctive place among Marx's works to understand Marx's theory of alienation.

In these writings, Marx seems to focus on alienation of the worker as the subject of the alienation process, and on their labour activity as the alienating activity. Alienation is defined briefly as the situation when the result of human's activity, that is the product, turns against its creator as an independent and hostile power (Marx, 1975b, p. 278). However, this definition alone is not sufficient to

grasp his original notion of alienation. My aim is to show how Marx differs from his predecessors Hegel and Feuerbach in terms of his conceptualization of alienation and how he discusses his own concept. For this reason, in the first part of the article, I will be separately discussing Marx's critiques of his predecessors, Hegel and Feuerbach's understanding of alienation. Then I will deal with the concept of alienation that Marx built on these criticisms. Marx regards the concept of alienation in the totality of four aspects each of which I will focus on separately.

AGAINST THE PREDECESSORS

Critique of Hegel

Even if it is usually asserted that Marx is a Hegelian philosopher, the foundations of his method is constructed on the critique of Hegelian philosophy just as his understanding of alienation is also a result of his critique of Hegel's. Hegel's understanding of alienation is described by Marx as "All estrangement of the human being is therefore nothing but estrangement of self-consciousness"² (Marx, 1975b, p. 334), that is, for Hegel, consciousness is alienated as long as it is unable to completely understand its ontological structure. Its ontological structure is composed of consciousness of the object and consciousness of itself, which means the concrete experiences of consciousness belong to its ontological structure and that makes consciousness and its object ontologically entwined (Rae, 2011, pp. 113-114). The failure to grasp its object in the right way, for consciousness, causes alienation.

Nevertheless, consciousness cannot overcome its alienation simply through an alteration of the understanding of its object. Provided that consciousness and its object compose its ontological structure and "consciousness's experience [of its object in a dialectical relation] continues to lead it to adopt new shapes of itself until it reaches" at a certain phase that is called "Absolute Knowing [or Absolute Knowledge]" (Rae, 2011, p. 143), the object that exists independently must be subject to change, too. Prior to Absolute Knowledge, contradiction between subject and object cannot be overcome, in other words, consciousness cannot overcome its self-alienation, or cannot realize itself as the differentiated unity of subjectivity and objectivity (Hegel, 1977, pp. 56-57). Absolute Knowledge that conditions the overcoming of consciousness' self-alienation means "having an adequate *conception* of knowledge and the Absolute, and understanding that there is no separation or 'epistemological gap' between them" (Solomon, 1985, p. 274). However, Absolute Knowledge is not independent from the Absolute Spirit because, as Merold Westphal says, "what has emerged in Absolute Knowledge is not just a new theory of knowledge, but a whole new view of reality, a new

² Although there are many different interpretations of Hegel's philosophy, the parts of the article where I mention Hegel are based on Marx's interpretation.

ontology” (1979, as cited in Burbidge, 2007, p. 70), that is the ontology of the Spirit.

According to Hegel, the process in which consciousness overcomes its self-alienation is social. Consciousness’ self-understanding fully develops through its interaction with society because social life is the medium that the Spirit expresses itself. Therefore, Absolute Knowledge is achieved only when the Spirit as the universal ontological substance fully realizes itself in and at a certain stage of social life, that is ethical life (*Sittlichkeit*). This process shows us that consciousness’ overcoming of its self-alienation is conditioned transcendentally by the Spirit.

Idealism

Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s philosophy draws its inspiration from the Left-Hegelians, who Marx was once a member of, on several counts. One of them is the criticism of idealism. Marx’s first and foremost objection to Hegel’s philosophy—and also Hegel’s conception of alienation—is about its foundations in the speculative philosophy which is based on *a priori* insights of the Spirit, the Absolute, the *Geist*, or the World Spirit that is the transcendent unity of all things. For Hegel, this aforementioned Spirit is so encompassing that existence, reality, and history are no more than “spirit giving itself the form of events or of immediate natural activity” (Hegel, 2008, §346).

Hegel’s definition of Spirit as including “all of us and everything in human experience,” as “the world, aware of itself as a self-conscious and comprehensible unity” (Solomon, 1985, p. 284) makes history equal to the movement and the self-realization of Spirit. Alienation is also not free from that all-encompassing substance. As Marx puts it “The whole *history of the alienation process* and the whole *process of the retraction* of the alienation is therefore nothing but the *history of the production* of abstract (i.e., absolute) thought—of logical, speculative thought” (Marx, 1975b, p. 331). Therefore, in Hegel’s philosophy, alienation is the essential manifestation of the Spirit. Nevertheless, Spirit is not an object acting in the world directly and manifesting alienation in its concrete practices, according to Hegel’s ontology. Instead, it acts through human agency. Marx and Engels explain this as

Hegel’s conception of history presupposes an *Abstract* or *Absolute Spirit* which develops in such a way that mankind is a mere *mass* that bears the Spirit with a varying degree of consciousness or unconsciousness. Within *empirical*, exoteric history, therefore, Hegel makes a speculative, esoteric history, develop. The history of mankind becomes the history of the *Abstract Spirit* of mankind, hence a *spirit far removed* from the real man. (Marx & Engels, 1975, p. 85)

This approach considering “the objective outer world beyond any subjective particular mind” as “*objectified spirit*” (Redding, 2020) constitutes the

idealism of Hegel's philosophy. Furthermore, this idealistic perspective is also seen as "offering a metaphysico-religious view of God *qua* Absolute Spirit" (Redding, 2020). Marx interprets Hegel in the same way and writes that the Hegelian dialectical movement is a process whose subject is "*God, absolute Spirit, the self-knowing and self-manifesting idea*" (Marx, 1975b, p. 342).

Marx interprets Hegel's philosophy as a reestablishment of religion in the philosophical form. However, religion, just like the Spirit, is not transcendent, but a human product. Such criticisms were heavily influenced by the Left Hegelians. Feuerbach, one of the prominent members of the Left-Hegelians, for example, describes Hegel's philosophy as "theological idealism" (Feuerbach, 2012, p. 208) because the transcendent is the essence of theology (Feuerbach, 2012, p. 156). "The personality of God is nothing else than the projected personality of man," he states in *The Essence of Christianity* (1989, p. 226) and this is what he sees as the essence of Hegel's philosophy: what is called transcendent thought is "the thought of man posited outside man" (Feuerbach, 2012, p. 156).

Such criticisms of Hegelian idealism lie at the centre of Marx's *Contribution to The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law: Introduction*, where he writes "Man makes religion, religion does not make man" (1975a, p. 175). He later repeats his criticism in the *Afterword to the Second German Edition of Capital I*, where he avows his project as "discover[ing] the rational kernel within the mystical shell" in Hegel's philosophy and turning it right side up (Marx, 1996, p. 19). So, the first point Marx criticizes in Hegel's conception of alienation is its idealistic roots. Marx explicitly challenges the idealistic understanding ruling over history and insisted on the point that both history and alienation should be understood in materialistic terms.

The identity of alienation and objectification

The second point that Marx criticizes is the identification of alienation with objectification. Although it is not so easy to argue that Hegel takes alienation in this way³, the identity argument was put forward by Lukács and attributed to Hegel in his work *The Young Hegel*. Arguments that Marx criticizes Hegel in this respect can be found in his writings, although not in very clear terms. Nevertheless, it is clear that Marx denies the identity of alienation and objectification in general. In my opinion, there are two causes that make the claim that Marx thinks Hegel takes objectification and alienation identical legitimate. The first cause is the terminological one, and the second is its compatibility with Hegel's ontology of Spirit.

Entfremdung and *Entäusserung* are the two German words commonly translated as "alienation." In English, sometimes the former is translated as

³ See Arthur, 1982 and Rae, 2011, p. 154.

“estrangement” and the latter as “alienation” or “externalization,” and sometimes the former as “alienation” and the latter as “externalization.” For Lukács, *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung* are simply the translations of “alienation” that was

used in works on economic theory to betoken the sale of a commodity, and in works on natural law to refer to the loss of an aboriginal freedom, the handing-over or alienation of freedom to the society which came into being as a result of a social contract. Philosophically, the term *Entäusserung* was first used, to the best of my knowledge, by Fichte for whom it meant both that the positing of an object implied an externalization or alienation of the subject and that the object was to be thought of as an ‘externalized’ act of reason. (Lukács, 1975, p. 538)

With this terminological interpretation, Lukács disregards the difference between *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung*. It seems legitimate if Marx’s terminology is taken as the reference point, because Marx uses *Entfremdung* and *Entäusserung* interchangeably to mean alienation. On the other hand, he uses *Vergegenständlichung* for “objectification.” This way, he conceptually distinguishes objectification from alienation without any ambiguity, contrary to Hegel’s terminology. Chris Arthur explains that “the difference [between *Entäusserung* and *Vergegenständlichung*], broadly, is that, while ‘*Entäusserung*’ carries the sense of ‘posited as objective’, it also connotes relinquishment, such that an alienated objectivity is created from which the subject is estranged” (Arthur, 1982, p. 15).

As for the second cause, it seems to be arising from Hegel’s ontology of Spirit. Spirit is the subject of history manifesting itself through externalization. At the same time, history is the history of the alienation of Spirit. According to Hegel, “*Geist* learns what it truly is and its relationship to the world of objectivity, at the same time, and in exact proportion, as it *becomes* what it truly is through manifesting itself in objective form . . . , and in so doing it eventually ends its estrangement from its world through identifying itself in it” (Arthur, 1982, p. 15). So, the movement of Spirit in history—that is its realization—appears to be both objectification and alienation. As Marx says “for Hegel this movement of *self-genesis* and *self-objectification* in the form of *self-alienation* and *self-estrangement* is the *absolute*, and hence final, *expression of human life*” (Marx, 1975b, p. 342) and therefore, Lukács argues, “there is the equation of alienation and objectification in general” (Lukács, 1975, p. 551).

Also, Spirit realizes itself through the actions of particular individuals and thus, its self-realization reflects on the social and economic activities, which makes the identity of alienation and objectification exist in the realm of production. Marx says that Hegel abstracts labour and conceives it both “as man’s act of self-genesis” and “as man’s relation to himself as an alien being” (Marx, 1975b, p. 342). This makes us think that human productive activity based on objectification is identified with alienation in general. On the contrary, Marx argues that

objectification is a necessity of labour activity, but alienation is not, because it means a distinct situation. He explains “The *alienation* of the worker in his product means not only that his labour becomes an object, an *external* existence, but that it exists *outside* him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own confronting him” (Marx, 1975b, p. 272).

It is impossible for any person to create anything without nature, “without *the sensuous external world*” and labour realizes itself on this material (Marx, 1975b, p. 273).⁴ He repeats this later in *Grundrisse* and declares that “Every production is an objectification of the individual” (Marx, 1986, p. 158). Any kind of work externalizes the object of labour, but this is not alienation because alienation occurs only when “the life which he [the worker] has conferred on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien” (Marx, 1975b, p. 272). In other words, objectification is something occurring “at the production of the worker” while estrangement is “the loss of the object, of his product” (Marx, 1975b, p. 273). On the other hand, alienation signifies a distorted relation in this process. Alongside Hegel, bourgeois economists cannot escape this criticism, either because they are “so wrapped up in the notions of a definite historical stage of social development that the necessity for the *objectification* of the social powers of labour appears to them to be inseparable from the necessity for their *alienation* over against living labour” (Marx, 1987, p. 210).

As a result, labour activity is recognized not as something essentially alienating, but as something alienating under certain conditions.

Inaccurate objective conditions

Hegel comes up with the idea that modern society represents the highest stage of historical development. He thinks in this way because the era that comes after the great wars in Europe and the French Revolution, that witnesses great political and social changes, and the foundation of the modern states ushered in the end of history, that is the overcoming of the contradiction between subject and its object. These conditions arising from the movement of Spirit represent the overcoming of the *objective alienation* for Hegel. Nevertheless, the *complete alienation* has not yet been overcome because even “if the social world *is* a home [a place having proper conditions for being unalienated], people are subjectively alienated if they *fail* to grasp this fact” (Hardimon, 1994, p. 121). The subjective alienation is explained by Hardimon as follows:

Hegel maintains that in the modern social world, reflective individuals experience ‘pure subjective alienation’. They are *subjectively* alienated because they feel estranged from its arrangements, which they regard as alien and hostile. But their

⁴ Any kind of productive activity is an externalization of labour. Farming, writing, carpentry, or playing an instrument are a few instances of human’s externalizing their essential powers in collaboration with nature.

subjective alienation is *pure* (unaccompanied by objective alienation) because, contrary to appearances, the world they inhabit is in fact a home. (Hardimon, 1994, p. 133)

So, according to Hegel, people are either completely or subjectively alienated. Complete alienation requires alienation both objectively and subjectively. Historically, according to Hegel, “people in ancient Rome and medieval Europe were completely alienated” (Hardimon, 1994, p. 122). On the other hand, they are subjectively alienated if the objective alienation has already been overcome but they think or feel they are alienated due to the fact that they are not reconciled, not content with the social world, with the society in which Spirit is fully realized. The latter case characterizes modernity.

According to Marx, “for Hegel the human being—man—equals self-consciousness. All estrangement of the human being is therefore *nothing* but *estrangement of self-consciousness*,” (Marx, 1975b, p. 334) and “Hegel’s standpoint is that of modern political economy. . . . he sees only the positive, not the negative side of labour. Labour is *man’s coming-to-be for himself* within *alienation*, or as *alienated man*” (Marx, 1975b, p. 333). With these considerations, Hegel concludes that objective alienation has been overcome in modern society. Marx thinks otherwise. He argues people are still *really alienated*. According to him, “the estrangement of self-consciousness is an expression of the real estrangement of the human being” (Marx, 1975b, p. 334). Thus, when Marx looks at material social relations, he sees the negative side of alienated labour and that objective alienation has not been overcome in modern society. In other words, the material conditions have not been suitable for overcoming alienation in modern society yet. There is a problem with the objective conditions and people are still objectively alienated. Despite Hegel’s glorification of the modern state and the modern society, Marx stated the problem as follows:

It [the state] rests on the contrast between public and private life, on the contrast between general and particular interests. . . . Indeed, in the face of the consequences that spring from the unsocial nature of this civil life, this private property, this commerce, this industry, this reciprocal plundering of different civil groups, in face of these consequences, impotence is the natural law of the administration. For this tearing apart, this baseness, this slavery of civil society is the natural basis on which the modern state rests, as the civil society of slavery was the natural basis on which the classical state rested. The existence of the state and the existence of slavery are inseparable. The classical state and classical slavery—frank and open class oppositions—were not more closely forged together than the modern state and modern world of haggling, hypocritical, Christian oppositions. (Marx, 2000, pp. 134-135)

So, it is not possible to argue for the overcoming of objective alienation in the modern state and the modern society. Even Marx labels capitalist mode of production that lies behind them as the “most extreme form of estrangement

[alienation]” (Marx, 1986, p. 439).⁵ Thus, he rejects Hegel’s historical reading of alienation and bases his own analysis on modes of production and class relations.

Critique of Feuerbach

G.A. Cohen gives us a brief explanation of the relation between the ontology of Spirit and the justification of the existence of God in Hegel’s philosophy starting with a reference to the book of *Genesis* which presents the creation of humankind as “God created man in his own image” (The Hebrew Bible, 2010, p. 13). Hegel’s answer to the question “If God is all-sufficient and lacks nothing, how does he come to release himself into something so utterly unequal to him?” (as cited in Cohen, 2001, p. 83) gives the theological revelation of his conception of Spirit. He says God comes to be by making himself manifested in the world. As a necessity of God’s existence and not being deficient, God creates; God creates the world and the human; “And what He creates is part of Himself” (Cohen, 2001, p. 84).

Feuerbach’s general critique was on this inverted image of God in Christianity and in Hegel’s theology. According to him, the idea of God is simply “our idea of our own human essence, our *Gattungswesen* [species-being], erroneously conceived as an entity distinct from and opposed to us” (Wood, 2004, p. 12). Religion and the image of God is an externalization, the externalization of the essential powers and characteristics of humankind. The attribution of these powers and characteristics to an imaginary being results in the estrangement of human from their own nature and in a state of powerlessness and shrinking. Feuerbach says “what is positive in the conception of the divine being can only be human, the conception of man, as an object of consciousness, can only be negative. To enrich God, man must become poor; that God may be all, man must be nothing.” (Feuerbach, 1989, p. 26)

The estrangement of human essential powers and their becoming hostile to the human being take a theological form in Feuerbach’s alienation critique. Human alienation becomes a form of wrong consciousness, an erroneous comprehension, an illusion in one’s relation to themselves, their human nature—their essential powers—, and reality in the most basic sense.

One-sided critique of alienation

It has been said that Feuerbach criticizes Hegel’s idealistic philosophy due to its implicit affirmation of religion. On the basis of his critique of religion,

⁵ In his works, Marx uses “modern society,” “bourgeois society” and “capitalist society” in the same sense: “Modern bourgeois society with its relations of production, of exchange and of property, a society that has conjured up such gigantic means of production and of exchange, is like the sorcerer, who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world which he has called up by his spells.” (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 489)

Feuerbach asserts his own theory of alienation from a materialistic perspective. Marx approves of Feuerbach's materialistic criticism of Hegelian idealism and expresses his enthusiasm in his 1844 letter to Feuerbach as follows:

[In your *Philosophie der Zukunft*, and your *Wesen des Glaubens*] you have provided—I don't know whether intentionally—a philosophical basis for socialism and the Communists have immediately understood them in this way. The unity of man with man, which is based on the real differences between men, the concept of the human species brought down from the heaven of abstraction to the real earth, what is this but the concept of *society*! (Marx, 1975c, p. 354)

Feuerbach's fundamental critique of religion is against human's converting the characteristics of their own nature into characteristics of God and so establishing them as external to themselves. According to him, God is only a product of thought (Feuerbach, 1989, p. 226). Thus, he comes to the conclusion that God did not create human, but human created God and God is nothing more than human alienated to themselves. Essential human powers are attributed to a human production, which is a *personified* God and thus, man's own nature becomes something external and not belonging to him:

Because faith represents man's own nature as that of another being, the believer does not contemplate his dignity immediately in himself, but in this supposed distinct person. The consciousness of his own pre-eminence presents itself as a consciousness of this person; he has the sense of his own dignity in this divine personality. (Feuerbach, 1989, p. 250)

Thus, alienation occurs “when something issues forth from men which they do not recognize as their own, and which consequently dominates them” (Cohen, 2001, pp. 94-95) and overcoming of it cannot be obtained in religion, by reconciliation with God (or Spirit) or by finding oneself in God; instead, this is exactly what alienation means. Only materialistic education can show people how they are alienated and religion is a result of alienation. With the fall of this mystical/theological mask, the Hegelian understanding of alienation as the alienation of the absolute idea (or God) in its religious theme is disregarded and “materialism [ascends] on the throne again” (Engels, 1990, p. 364).⁶

Nevertheless, this dense alienation critique propounded by Feuerbach remained limited within the framework of the criticism of religion. Marx agrees that “The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself” (Marx, 1975b, p. 272), but religion is not the only form emerging through humans' transferring their essential powers to a being they create: State and law, market and production are a few of the other social relations in which their essential powers confront people as

⁶ Marx and Engels are in line with Feuerbach on the fact that human being is not God's creation, but products of nature. Engels later puts this view in the following way: “Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious fantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence.” (Engels, 1990, p. 364)

alien forces. So, criticism of religion is *not enough* for the criticism of alienation. Marx concisely writes “Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of *consciousness*, of man’s inner life, but economic estrangement is that of *real life*; its transcendence therefore embraces both aspects” (Marx, 1975b, p. 297) and “For Germany the *criticism of religion* is in the main complete, and criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism” (Marx, 1975a, p. 175). These statements lead us to the next criticism of Feuerbach.

The need for praxis

God is not a creation of human’s free rational activity, instead, it originates from human’s feelings, desires and passions (Feuerbach, 1989, p. 186). This refers to a hierarchy between religion and philosophy, between practical and theoretical human tendencies for Feuerbach. Religion appeals to feelings, the desire of happiness, the passions of hope and fear while philosophical activity relies on reason. Human essence accords with the latter and to overcome alienation and take the essential human powers which are attributed to God back, the religious relations should be reinverted. The way to reinvert them is to destroy the illusion of religion and God, and of seeing human essential powers in them (Feuerbach, 1989, p. 275). Human thinks, but attributes thinking to God; loves, but attributes loving to God; at the same time human sees the institutions of marriage, property, and civil law sacred and respected because of their foundation in religion. However, these and such others are the human essential powers and the true social relations which are alienated into God (Feuerbach, 1989, p. 273).

The reinversion requires the awareness of people’s alienated situation which arises from the inverted image. This is possible by telling people how they are alienated in religion, what God really was, and what God is (Cohen, 2001, p. 95), God is created by human and in human image (Cohen, 2001, p. 93). Thus, the task is making people get rid of the illusions about themselves by uncovering the veil of religion and teaching them the true human relations and the true human essence. This way, Feuerbach considers the method for overcoming alienation as a theoretical upbringing program. Only this way people can take their essential human powers back. However, this view conceives alienation as an epistemological problem.

This is another point of which Marx is critical about Feuerbach’s theory regarding alienation. Before the *Manuscripts* and the *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx was emphasizing that religion did not originate from false consciousness but primarily from worldly suffering, that its source was social, not epistemological (Marx, 1975e, p. 151). Therefore, he stated that the solution would come only with the disappearance of social problems and they could not be solved as Feuerbach predicted. In the first of the *Theses on Feuerbach*, Marx writes that Feuerbach “regards the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude [and] . . . does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of practical-critical, activity”

(Marx, 1975d, p. 3). Later in the third thesis he writes that “The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men. . . . The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-change can be conceived and rationally understood only as *revolutionary practice*.” (Marx, 1975d, p. 4)

It is true that Feuerbach is “not satisfied with *abstract thinking*,” “appeals to *sensuous contemplation*” and discloses the secret of religious illusion, but “he does not conceive sensuousness as *practical*, human-sensuous activity” (Marx, 1975d, p. 4). He does not consider destroying the earthly conditions that lead to religious illusion, as indicated in the fourth and the fifth theses. In other words, Feuerbach’s materialism falls short and although there is a critical aspect, there is no sense for the practical activity to change the existing conditions that cause alienation; it lacks revolutionary practice, or *praxis*.

The absence of dialectical and historical aspects

Feuerbach’s philosophical comprehension of human activity and restricting himself to epistemology results in his abstractness. His approach—different from Hegel’s and Marx’s—does not establish a dialectical interaction between the epistemological problems and the problems of social and economic praxis (Lukács, 1975, p. 562), in other words, between the consciousness and the social practice. Therefore, his theory does not interact with human practice and results in a one-sided materialism. Feuerbach’s concept of human nature—or human essence—also suffers from this one-sidedness. The sixth thesis on Feuerbach is about the absence of this dialectical and historical side, and in fact, the original concept of alienation introduced by Marx in his *Manuscripts* is based on a conception of human nature in which Feuerbach’s deficiency is eliminated.

The human essence as it is understood by Feuerbach is just an “abstraction inherent in each single individual,” on the other hand, in reality, human essence has to be understood in conjunction with social relations (Marx, 1975d, p. 4) which vary and evolve in history and therefore gain a historical character. The human characteristics of a specific historical and social epoch shared by each single individual cannot be abstracted and applied as the universal human essence. On the contrary, human nature is social and historical according to Marx.

He defines human individual as “*the social being*” (Marx, 1975b, p. 299), their “*own existence [as] social activity*” (Marx, 1975b, p. 298) and therefore their existence is bound to others (Marx, 1975b, p. 305). In addition, Marx writes “*The forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present. The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense.*” (Marx, 1975b, p. 302) This is a pretty clear statement that human nature has been historically established. Nevertheless, human-beings are not passive objects of the social and historical conditions. Instead, they are active beings under these

conditions and their nature is not independent from their own activity. Marx emphasizes this view by defining “the *entire so-called history of the world*” as “nothing but the creation of man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, irrefutable proof of his *birth* through himself, of his *genesis*” (Marx, 1975b, p. 305).

A direct result of these relations, which makes human nature historical and social, is to make alienation historical and social. This attitude towards alienation can be seen in Marx’s treatment of religion in *On the Jewish Question*, where he writes “We do not turn secular questions into theological questions. We turn theological questions into secular ones. History has long enough been merged in superstition, we now merge superstition in history.” (Marx, 1975e, p. 151) He later deals with society and history in terms of modes of production and class struggles. The historical and social conditions Marx was in pointed to the capitalist mode of production and the alienation of the working class caused by it as the causes of unfreedom. For this reason, the *Manuscripts* mostly focuses on the wage worker’s alienation stemming from the labour process.⁷

ALIENATED LABOUR

Alienation, for Marx, is a social phenomenon. Human acts within nature and interacts with the external world—including their social world—through their labour. However, labour activity does not affirm their essential powers under some certain conditions. Rather than empowering human and actualizing their nature, worker’s labour now “produces wonderful things for the rich—but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces—but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty—but for the worker, deformity. . . . It produces intelligence—but for the worker, stupidity, cretinism.” (Marx, 1975b, p. 273) Thus, the productive nature of labour becomes barren for the worker and Marx calls this situation *alienation*, and the labour in question in this process *alienated labour*.⁸ The subject of the alienation as it is seen in the *Manuscripts* is the worker and worker’s alienated situation has four aspects. These are alienation to the product of labour, to the productive activity, to the species-essence, and to other people.

Alienation to the Product of Labour

While workers act within nature, they produce objects. Labour activity is the process of embodiment of labour into an object. Therefore, objectification is an ontological feature of labour and any labour activity results in this kind of embodiment. Transforming nature, producing means of life, even acting on our

⁷ In the *Manuscripts*, Marx also mentions the alienation of the non-worker (Marx, 1975b, pp. 279, 281-282) but the manuscript is cut off without Marx clarifying this issue.

⁸ In the *Manuscripts*, Marx refers to the process of alienated labour when he speaks of alienation.

own life are instances of production. In production, human-beings externalize their essential human powers into the objects of labour and these objects become a part of their being. The appropriation of these objects and thus the affirmation of the human essential powers is the form of production which is in accordance with human nature. Otherwise, the products of labour become independent objects to the worker and the products of human life activity slip through their producer's fingers.

At the end of the process, in the appropriate situation, the appropriation of the product represents the affirmation of human life through unification with the objectified part of life. Worker's production is, therefore, the richness of themselves. However, under the capitalist mode of production, worker's production does not produce wealth for them, instead the more they produce, the poorer they become (Marx, 1975b, pp. 271-272). This defect is a result of an improper relation between the producer and the product which is described by Marx as "the object which labour produces—labour's product—confronts it as *something alien*, as a *power independent* of the producer" (Marx, 1975b, p. 272).

So, alienation of labour is more than its objectification. It requires the product of labour to become an object having an external existence outside of its producer, but this does not make it alien by itself. It must also gain a hostile character, become a power over its producer. Thus, the product is not only independent from the worker, but it also has a hostile power over the worker under the conditions of alienated labour. Alienated labour results in the inability for producers to take the ownership and to benefit from the use-value of the products of their labour along with the loss of control over the objects of their labour—over the work, their means of labour, tools, raw materials, etc. Therefore, alienation to the product of labour becomes the first aspect of alienation, according to Marx, which makes human-beings the slaves of their products of labour.

Alienation to the Productive Activity

According to Marx, the first aspect of alienated labour—that is alienation to the product—finds its roots in the second aspect, that is alienation to the productive activity. The product of labour, actually, is nothing more than the summary of labour activity which is the essential human life activity. Therefore, the process itself should be alien if the outcome of it is alien (Marx, 1975b, p. 274).⁹ What is the cause of alienation in the productive activity then?

⁹ Marx states this argument with a rhetorical question: "How could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from himself?" This view regards the outcome as the summary of the activity in progress and attributes the qualities of the activity to the consequential product accordingly. Wood criticizes this causative argument by stating that Marx seems to be relying on the scholastic idea that the properties of a result should pre-exist in the cause in

Based on the context of the *Manuscripts*, it can be said that what causes alienation to the productive activity is the characteristics of capitalist work even though Marx does not go into the details of these alienating conditions. Nevertheless, it can be argued that there are two factors inherent to capitalist production that are supposed to render labour activity alienated: (i) Division of labour and (ii) unpleasant work—or working conditions.

For the first factor, Marx agrees with Adam Smith's analysis of the effects of industrial—or capitalist—work on the workers in *The Wealth of Nations*. Smith mentions the division of labour ruling in the factories and argues that

The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the effects are perhaps always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. (Smith, 1979, p. 782)

Similar to Smith, Marx uses the words “stupidity” and “cretinism” to explain worker's situation under the conditions of alienated labour (Marx, 1975b, p. 273). According to Marx too, capitalism advances the division of labour and accordingly “it replaces labour by machines, but it throws one section of the workers back to a barbarous type of labour, and it turns the other section into a machine” (Marx, 1975b, p. 273). Thus, routine caused by division of labour makes labour activity destructive and dulling rather than species' conscious life activity.

The second factor is unpleasant work—or working conditions. Marx regards the burdensome and sickening working conditions as another defect of capitalist work and explains the conditions of workers as follows:

Even the need for fresh air ceases to be a need for the worker. Man returns to a cave dwelling. . . . A dwelling in the *light*, which Prometheus in Aeschylus designated as one of the greatest boons, by means of which he made the savage into a human being, ceases to exist for the worker. Light, air, etc.—the simplest *animal* cleanliness—ceases to be a need for man. (Marx, 1975b, pp. 307-308)

These conditions obviously alienate people from their nature, but Marx does not consider them in detail in the *Manuscripts*. Instead, he takes up the exhaustion and the degradation in the labour activity under the capitalist mode of

advance, but even the supporters of this idea limit it only with “perfections” in an effect (Wood, 2004, p. 6). Even if Marx's shorthand result does not seem convincing, Marx seems to take the worker's current working conditions as given. It is obvious to Marx that the social structures and institutions governing labour, imposing their rules over the workers, and hence alienating their activities inevitably alienate the product.

production later in the first volume of *Capital*.¹⁰ It is obvious that under the conditions of capitalist work, labour is external to the worker and the worker “does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind” (Marx, 1975b, p. 274). Both of the aforementioned factors operating in the capitalist mode of production alienate workers to their human nature by degrading them physically and mentally.

However, this raises some important questions because it seems that division of labour and unpleasant work—or working conditions—belong to the very nature of work in general. The division of labour seems unavoidable to a degree¹¹ and there are always unpleasant things to do or conditions to work under out of necessity also outside capitalist production.¹² So, if these are also immanent to the very nature of labour activity and not peculiar to capitalist production, what lies in the essence of capitalist production that makes labour an alienated activity? What makes division of labour and unpleasant work—or working conditions—appearances of labour within alienation?

¹⁰ See “The Production of Absolute Surplus Value” and “The Production of Relative Surplus Value” in *Capital*, vol. I, part III and part IV.

¹¹ For example, Marx takes division of labour as posited alienated human activity when labour is only an expression of human activity within alienation (Marx, 1975b, p. 317), which means the division of labour he regards in relation to alienation is a result of alienated labour rather than its cause. So, it is better to call it capitalist division of labour to point out its peculiarity.

¹² In everyday life, there is division of labour and routine immanent to work itself in different ways: Giving a party, organizing a conference, or organizing a campaign to struggle against bad working conditions or injustice, etc. In such situations, every person takes on a task with different motivations like duty, interest, or altruism. A division of labour can be seen among siblings too while doing a daily activity such as house work or setting up an apparatus to play and enjoy. Besides, daily life has a lot of unpleasant work like cleaning the bathroom, sometimes dressing a wound, or cleaning and cooking offal, etc. Nevertheless, they are not regarded as external or alienated to the person in the activity. People in these activities usually do them as part of their daily life and they affirm themselves—they are engaged with these activities to render their living places healthier, to make their living conditions better and organized—in the process. These activities are not alienating because the agents in question have the full control both on their labour and the labour process. They can have a break and have a rest, they can develop new techniques to deal with these routine or unpleasant work, they can take initiatives and postpone the activity that has to be done only if they have the control over their labour and over the organization of work. Thus, they can use their essential powers to control and organize the degrading qualities of such work to render them manageable. The problem occurs when these activities are forced and external to the labourer—in favour of someone else in the opposite position.

Marx gives us enough material to solve these problems. When he says the worker feels at home only outside work and the work they are doing is not voluntary but coerced (Marx, 1975b, pp. 274, 278), he emphasizes the forced character of alienating work. Alienated labour is forced labour. This is why “its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague” (Marx, 1975b, p. 274). This means that the work has an external character and it is coerced by someone else other than the workers themselves. The worker does not have control over the production and his labour. They are not the owners of the means of production and they have no option other than selling their labour power in the market to survive. From the very beginning, workers are driven into capitalist production by indirect coercion.

After selling their labour power, they are forced to work both by the obligation of contract they agreed on and by the internal discipline of the workplace—meanwhile, they still have no choice but to constantly sell their labour power to survive. In this case, it seems the free contractual agreement does not provide enough protection to avoid the effects of forced labour. Marx states that “capital obtains this surplus labour [pumped out of the direct producers] without an equivalent, and in essence it always remains forced labour—no matter how much it may seem to result from free contractual agreement” (Marx, 1998, p. 806).

Workers’ inability to have their own labour—inability to have the means of production and the products of their labour, to manage the labour process, to use their labour according to their own will—is shown in the *Manuscripts* as the essential quality of the capitalist mode of production, not as the essential quality of work in general.¹³ Marx writes “It is characteristic that, in general, real forced

¹³ Today, different organization models in the workplace are observed, such as flexible or distant working or democratic participation of the workers to some of the managerial and decision-making processes. Managers organize the workplace not according to military discipline in many places, but they try to render them fun with facilities, playgrounds, colourful designs, etc. It can be argued that working is not boring and degenerating anymore, routine is removed and the workers have the control over their working time; it is promoted to be creative, the workers are urged to improvise and to be entrepreneurs. However, it is impossible for any worker to have the full control over their own labour in the capitalist mode of production. Workers are allowed to be free and have control in a limited manner because regardless of what form of work they do, the dispossessed workers have to sell their labour power and go under the domain of forced labour to survive. The worker’s labour is “not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another” (Marx, 1975b, p. 274), and it belongs to the capitalist in our case. “The bourgeois have very good grounds for ascribing *supernatural creative power* to labour; since precisely from the fact that labour is determined by nature, it follows that the man who possesses no other property than his labour power must, in all conditions of society and culture, be the slave of other men who have made themselves the owners of the material conditions of labour. He can

labour displays in the most brutal form, most clearly, the essential features of wage labour” (Marx, 1991, p. 321). In this context, the focus shifts from the division of labour and unpleasant work or working conditions to forced labour. In other words, the main problem is neither routine nor unpleasant work in essence, but rather the forced character of labour and its results, because forced labour makes division of labour the source of dull work and makes unpleasant work and working conditions inhuman.

Marx derived workers’ alienation to the products of their labour from the alienation in the labour activity itself (Marx, 1975b, p. 274). Then, he deduces the third and the fourth aspects from the two already considered (Marx, 1975b, p. 275). Therefore, it is clear from these statements that alienation to the productive activity that Marx refers to as “the act of alienation” has a principal role among the other aspects of alienated labour.

Alienation to the Species-Essence

The third aspect of alienated labour is alienation to the species-essence. Species-being, for Marx, simply refers to the species-specific features that distinguish human from other animals. Marx emphasizes conscious productive activity as the most important of these. Nevertheless, alienated labour estranges the species characteristics from human-being because it makes “*life activity, productive life* itself . . . appear . . . to man in the first place merely as a *means* of satisfying a need—the need to maintain physical existence” (Marx, 1975b, p. 276). Under the conditions of alienated labour, workers spend their energy only to get their means of subsistence and so, their productive activity that is “life-engendering life” becomes a means rather than an affirmation of species-essence and an end in itself.

Life activity as a means is a feature of animal life and an activity as mere means of subsistence does not belong to human species-essence. However, alienated worker “only feels himself freely active in his animal functions—eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.” (Marx, 1975b, pp. 274-275)

Alienated labour also causes a degradation in the conscious productive activity, as Marx states in the following way:

In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labour tears from him his *species-life*, his real objectivity as a member of the species, and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic

work only with their permission, hence live only with their permission.” (Marx, 1989, p. 81)

body, nature, is taken away from him. . . . The consciousness which man has of his species is thus transformed by estrangement in such a way that species[-life] becomes for him [merely] a means. (Marx, 1975b, p. 277)

Human-beings cannot affirm their species-essence during capitalist production because their activity is sold to someone else in return for the means for subsistence, their life activity becomes a means for someone else's profit. Thus, production process is ruled by the will of the capitalist rather than the workers of the free conscious productive activity. Marx, for that reason, thinks that alienated labour prevents humans from developing their rational capabilities and putting them to use, hence realizing their species-essence. He was consistent throughout his works to get rid of this problem in order to achieve a humane life and a society of producers of conscious life activity. In the *Critique of the Gotha Programme*, he states that the unalienated—communist—society would come with labour's becoming "not only a means of life but life's prime want" (Marx, 1989, p. 87). This means, in the unalienated situation, human life is not degraded to the detriment of the requirements of human nature; human activity becomes an end in itself and becomes the affirmation of the species-life.

Alienation to Other People

Humans are social by their nature, they live in societies, they produce with their fellow people, and for that reason their productive activity is also social. Nevertheless, another aspect of alienated labour is alienation to other people. According to Marx, alienation of "man from man" is an immediate consequence of the previous three aspects of alienation because, due to the necessity of the human social nature, my alienated relation to myself through my relation to my species-being, to my productive activity and to the product of my labour is not independent from my relations to others. Hence, the relation among the alienated people gives us an alienated relation among them.

Capitalism tends to generalize the alienating social relations within society. In this respect, there are two moments of alienation to other people inherent in the capitalist mode of production:

(i) The existence of antagonistic classes directly leads to the alienation of a person from another person. So-called "fellow men," who are the members of the same society, are actually people alienated from each other. They are the members of opposite classes whose relationship is determined on the basis of relations of exploitation and private property.

(ii) Capitalist production ensures that social relations between people take place not directly through their conscious and free activities, but through money, wages and commodities. As a result of this mediation, relations among people, not only between individuals from different classes but even from the same class, begin to be regulated on the basis of their interests over others'.

Under capitalism, the social relations among people are mediated through the alienated products such as money, wages and commodities that signify the alienated being of producers. Human-being becomes poorer in such social relations conditioned by the market rendering one person a means for another person's individual needs.¹⁴ "Every product [becomes] a bait with which to seduce away the other's very being, his money." (Marx, 1975b, p. 307) Therefore, the relation among people becomes "mutual swindling and mutual plundering" (Marx, 1975b, p. 306) and the main motivation of production becomes the accomplishment of personal desires. For that reason, this "general exploitation of communal human nature" (Marx, 1975b, p. 307) in capitalism presents itself as the fourth aspect of alienation.

On the other hand, Marx understands the essence of social life not as weakening the fellow citizens and dehumanization, but as development and progress, prosperity and freedom through common activity. The realization of human nature and overcoming self-alienation is a must to accomplish this project. However, it is not a personal project that can be pursued individually since, as Marx says, "man's relation to himself only becomes for him objective and actual through his relation to the other man" (Marx, 1975b, p. 278).¹⁵

CONCLUSION

Marx sets off from the conceptualizations of his predecessors Hegel and Feuerbach, and for him, alienation means a distorted relationship, a separation between the subject and the object, as in Hegel; and it expresses the fact that people's own essential powers become separated and powers opposite to them, as in Feuerbach. However, Marx neither contents himself with the conceptualizations of his predecessors nor makes a synthesis of them. He goes beyond Hegel's and Feuerbach's conceptualizations by criticizing them from different angles.¹⁶ As a result, Marx gives his concept a materialistic, social and historical content. Thus, in Marx's theory of alienation, alienation finds both its cause and its solution in real

¹⁴ This view is often used to argue for the Kantian motivations in Marx's theory: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means." (Kant, 1998, p. 38) The "other" is important for Marx because subjects can only become themselves through their relation to and through its recognition by others. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of the article.

¹⁵ See also Kandiyali, J. (2020, July 1). The Importance of Others: Marx on Unalienated Production. *Ethics*, 130(4), 555–587.

¹⁶ An interesting point here is that the concept of alienation that Marx explained in the *Manuscripts* was built on the theses that he would later make explicit in the *Theses on Feuerbach*. That is, Marx openly writes in the *Theses on Feuerbach* a criticism that he made implicitly in the *Manuscripts*.

human activities. Then, he, in the *Manuscripts*, deals with alienation within the framework of capitalist mode of production.

In the capitalist production process, the worker is alienated from the product of labour, labour activity, species-life and other people. Marx gives a principal role to the alienation to the productive activity among others. Contrary to popular belief, however, it is neither precisely division of labour nor precisely unpleasant work—or conditions—that makes productive activity alienating because in some cases these may also be the characteristics of work in general and they may not necessarily result in alienation. The division of labour may not always lead to the evils of dull work. Or unpleasant work does not always lead to degradation. Marx emphasizes a different point regarding alienated labour: It is forced labour. Workers who do not have the ownership of the means of production must both work and accept working conditions regulated by the capitalist. They are forced to produce more surplus in the labour process, just as their participation into the labour process is forced. Under these circumstances, the producers cannot avoid the alienating effects of the activity, cannot regulate them, cannot render them harmless, and cannot transform them into a self-affirming form¹⁷ because they do not have control over the production process. On the other hand, for Marx, work that is under one's own control can be really free, even if it is "the most damnably difficult, demanding the most intensive effort" (Marx, 1986, p. 530). So, it seems the difference between alienated labour and free labour emerges from this forced characteristic—either direct forced labour or mediated forced labour (Marx, 1986, p. 251). Forced labour is also *a characteristic of the modes of production based on private property* and thus, it seems that alienated labour is closely related to forced labour and its condition, property relations.

However, if alienated labour really stems from forced character of labour and its condition, private property, and if the alienated labour under capitalist mode of production is only one form of it, we encounter a question that goes beyond the scope of this article: Is alienated labour unique to capitalism? Answering this question can only be the subject of future research.

*The article has one author and the author's contribution is one hundred percent.
There is no conflict of interest.*

¹⁷ See Footnote 12.

REFERENCES

- Arthur, C. (1982, Spring). Objectification and alienation in Marx and Hegel. *Radical Philosophy*(30), 14-24.
- Burbidge, J. W. (2007). *Hegel's systematic contingency*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cohen, G. A. (2001). *If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Engels, F. (1990). Ludwig Feuerbach and the end of classical German philosophy. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 26, pp. 353-398). New York: International Publishers.
- Feuerbach, L. (1989). *The essence of Christianity*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Feuerbach, L. (2012). *The fiery brook: Selected writings*. London: Verso.
- Hardimon, M. O. (1994). *Hegel's social philosophy: The project of reconciliation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. (1977). *Phenomenology of Spirit*. (A. V. Miller, Trans.) Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hegel, G. W. (2008). *Outlines of the philosophy of right*. Oxford University Press.
- Kant, I. (1998). *Groundwork of the metaphysics of morals*. (M. Gregor, Trans.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lukács, G. (1975). *The young Hegel*. London: Merlin Press.
- Marx, K. (1975a). Contribution to the critique of Hegel's philosophy of law: Introduction. In K. Marx, Engels, & Frederick, *Collected Works* (Vol. 3, pp. 175-187). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1975b). Economic and philosophic manuscripts of 1844. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 3, pp. 229-346). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1975c). Karl Marx to Ludwig Feuerbach, August 11, 1844. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 3, pp. 354-357). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1975d). Theses on Feuerbach. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Complete Works* (Vol. 5, pp. 3-9). New York: International Publishers.

- Marx, K. (1975e). On the Jewish question. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 3, pp. 146-174). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1986). Economic manuscripts of 1857-1861 (First Version of Capital) [Grundrisse]. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 28). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1987). Economic manuscripts of 1857-1861 (First Version of Capital) [Grundrisse]. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 29). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1989). Critique of the Gotha Programme. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 24, pp. 75-99). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1991). Economic manuscript of 1861-63. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 33). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1996). Capital vol. I. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 35). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (1998). Capital vol. III. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 37). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K. (2000). Critical remarks on the article: 'The king of Prussia and social reform'. In K. Marx, & D. McLellan (Ed.), *Selected Writings* (pp. 134-137). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1975). The holy family. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 4, pp. 5-211). New York: International Publishers.
- Marx, K., & Engels, F. (1976). Manifesto of the Communist Party. In K. Marx, & F. Engels, *Collected Works* (Vol. 6, pp. 477-519). New York: International Publishers.
- Rae, G. (2011). *Realizing freedom: Hegel, Sartre and the alienation of human being*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Redding, P. (2020). Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. (E. N. Zalta, Ed.) *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2020 Edition). Retrieved from The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/hegel/>
- Smith, A. (1979). *An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations* (Vol. II). Indianapolis: LibertyClassics.

Solomon, R. C. (1985). *In the spirit of Hegel*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The Hebrew Bible. (2010). In M. D. Coogan (Ed.), *The New Oxford Annotated Bible* (5th ed., pp. 1-1376). New York: Oxford University Press.

Wood, A. W. (2004). *Karl Marx* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge.