

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE IN TÜRKİYE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: CHANGING POLITICAL DISCOURSE OF MUSIAD

Tarihsel Perspektiften Türkiye’de Sivil Toplum ve Devlet İlişkisi: MUSIAD’ın Değişen Siyasal Söylemi*

Talha KÖSEÖĞLU**

ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the political discourse of the MUSIAD under different political contexts since the establishment of the association. The analysis consists of three periods: (I) formation years of MUSIAD between 1990 and 1998; (II) aftermath of the 28 February 1997 military intervention that covers the period from 1998 to 2010; and (III) the third and fourth terms of Justice and Development Party in office as well as the first term of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the president that corresponds to the period after 2011. By a critical discourse analysis focusing on MUSIAD’s publications—namely, association’s periodical Çerçeve, annual reports on Turkish economy and special reports, booklets, and books concerning specific themes such as privatization, foreign trade, constitutional reform and the EU, this paper argues that MUSIAD’s claim of being independent of the state rooted in the clash between secular state policies and Islamic identity of the association rather than a bourgeois suspicion towards the state as seen in Western European countries. MUSIAD presented itself as a civil society agent independent of the state and emphasized its Islamic identity in the 1990’s during the escalating tension between Islamic social sectors and military-civil bureaucracy and political elite. The association reformulated its erstwhile critique after 28 February around democratic values in addition to references to its Islamic ori-

Öz

Bu makale, MUSIAD’ın kuruluşundan bu yana siyasi söylemini farklı siyasi bağlamlar altında incelemektedir. Analiz üç dönemi kapsamaktadır: (I) MUSIAD’ın 1990 ile 1998 yılları arasındaki kuruluş yılları; (II) 1998’den 2010’a kadar olan dönemi kapsayan 28 Şubat 1997 askeri müdahalesinin sonrası ve (III) 2011’den günümüze tekabül eden Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin hükümetteki üçüncü ve dördüncü dönemleri ile Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın cumhurbaşkanı olarak ilk dönemi. Derneğin resmi dergisi Çerçeve, Türkiye ekonomisine ilişkin yıllık raporlar ve özelleştirme, dış ticaret, anayasa reformu ve AB gibi belirli temalarla ilgili yayınladığı özel raporlar, kitapçıklar ve kitaplar gibi MUSIAD yayınlarını eleştirel söylem analizi tabii tutan makalenin temel savı, MUSIAD’ın devletten bağımsız olması iddiasının, Batı Avrupa ülkelerinde görülen burjuva sınıfının devlete karşı şüpheli tutumunun bir yansıması olmaktan ziyade laik devlet politikaları ile derneğin İslami kimliği arasındaki çatışmadan kaynaklandığıdır. MUSIAD, askeri-sivil bürokrasi ve siyasi elit ile İslami kesimler arasındaki gerginliğin tırmanmakta olduğu 1990’lar boyunca devletten bağımsız bir sivil toplum aktörü olduğunun altını çizerek ve İslami kimliğini vurgulamaktan çekinmez. Dernek, 28 Şubat’tan sonra eski devlet eleştirisini İslami kimliği ön plana almasının yanında demokratik değerler çerçevesinde yeniden formüle etmiştir. Nihayet,

* Çalışmanın taslağı 2022 yılında Erzurum’da düzenlenen Al Farabi 11. Uluslararası Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi’nde sunulmuştur

** Arş. Gör. Dr., Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi, İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü, tkoseoglu@ogu.edu.tr, ORCID:0000-0002-7292-0119.

entation. Finally, after 2010, MUSIAD's claims of being independence and the critical tone of its discourse seems to disappear since an Islamically-oriented political party started to dominate the political system in Türkiye and ended the ideological clash between the state and MUSIAD.

Keywords: *state, civil society, MUSIAD, JDP, 28 February, political Islam, political economy*

2010'dan sonra derneğin söyleminin bağımsızlık iddiaları ve eleştirel tonu, İslami yönelimli bir siyasi partinin Türkiye'deki siyasi sisteme hâkim olmaya başlaması ve MUSIAD ile devlet arasındaki ideolojik çatışmanın sona ermesiyle ortadan kalkmış görünmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: *devlet, sivil toplum, MUSIAD, AK Parti, 28 Şubat, siyasal İslam, politik ekonomi*

1. INTRODUCTION

Although significance of class as a political category seems diminished with the rise of identity politics after the 1980s, political movements still originate from an amalgamation of class position and social identity for the two are not mutually exclusive categories (Evans, 1999, p. 7; Fraser, 2009, p. 73). In this vein, studies focusing on the post-1980 context in Türkiye indicate that the rise of Islamic politics has a class dimension. For one thing, scholars accounts for the appeal of Islamic politics among popular masses through highlighting the detrimental effects of neoliberalization among the working class (Tuğal, 2009, p. 41-42; Ayata, 1997, p. 60). More interestingly, provincial, and newly urbanized petty bourgeoisie who enjoyed the opportunities created by the export-oriented free market economy was also mobilized around the Islamic political identity. These mostly small and medium-size enterprises acquired a sense of cohesion and adopted a particular defensive stance within a secular political environment based on their Islamic identity (Buğra, 1998, p. 523). As a result of their search for a place in business life, in 1990, they founded their own business association, the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association (MUSIAD).

This paper analyzes the political discourse of the MUSIAD under different political contexts since the establishment of the association. The analysis consists of three periods: (I) the formation years of MUSIAD between 1990 and 1998; (II) the aftermath of the 28 February 1997 military intervention that covers the period from 1998 to the end of the 2000s; and (III) the third and fourth terms of Islamically-oriented Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the office as well as the first term of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the president that corresponds to the period after 2011. By studying the publications of MUSIAD in these three periods, I explicate how the association' political concerns, the ways the association situates itself vis-à-vis the state, and the explanatory factors behind MUSIAD's political stance have changed over time under different political contexts.

2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN TÜRKİYE

State-society relationship and the autonomous power of civil society against the state have been a key concern for scholars of modernization and democratization (Acemoğlu and Robinson, 2012). Notably, modernization theorists since the 1950s have claimed, *inter alia*, that economic development and political liberalization go hand in hand (Lipset, 1959; Huntington, 1968). As civil societal actors expand their activities and sphere of influence, modernization narrative maintained, they would balance the power of the state—which was thought to be the main obstacle to political liberalization and democratization in non-Western countries (Göle, 1996). Scholarship on civil society in the Middle East highlighted the democratizing potential of Islamic movements within civil society against secular autocratic states. Analyses on the relationship between the state and civil society in Türkiye have largely adopted a similar approach—especially, under the influence of Şerif Mardin’s center-periphery framework. Religiosity, in Mardin’s framework is an integral analytical component of analyzing the relationship between the political elite (the state) in the center and popular sectors (civil society) in the periphery from the Ottoman Empire through republican era (Mardin, 1973). The recent consolidation of power in the JDP as a party of religiously conservative sectors have forced scholars to revisit center-periphery framework. While the JDP has been rooted in the state, Islamically-oriented civil societal actors have expanded their activities for two decades. MUSIAD, in this process, appeared to be among the most active and effective business associations both as a civil society initiative and as a partner of JDP governments. Hence, understanding MUSIAD’s changing political discourse over the three decades after its establishment is a key contribution to analyze changing dynamics of center-periphery duality and state-civil society relationship in Türkiye.

2.1. MUSIAD in the Existing Literature and the Framework of the Study

Although MUSIAD attracted scholarly attention, there is no substantial research on the evolution of MUSIAD’s political discourse in relation to the issues that are central for this paper. Scholars are often indifferent to the ways MUSIAD employs a particular language in its reflections on the political matters under different political contexts. For instance, Berrin Koyuncu’s study about MUSIAD’s discourse on democracy refer almost always to MUSIAD publications of 1990s and

early 2000s, although the article is dated to 2010 (105-128). One notable exception of the lack of historical perspective in studies on MUSIAD is Dilek Yankaya's article about MUSIAD's changing views on the European Union (EU). Nevertheless, Yankaya (2009) exclusively focuses on the aspect of EU and does not discuss MUSIAD's views on the EU in relation to the domestic political factors. On the other hand, other scholars usually analyze the economic discourse of MUSIAD and its position within the political economy of Türkiye. These studies focus on the behavior of economic actors with an overt Islamic identity in the free market, the ways they build cohesive business networks based on trust and how they reconcile their Islamic identity and capitalism (Buğra, 1998; Özdemir, 2006; Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005). Despite valuable insight into the nature of the relationship between business associations, including MUSIAD, and the state in the business environment, the study by Ayşe Buğra and Osman Savaşkan (2015) does not examine the political discourse of MUSIAD.

This study tries to fill those gaps in the existing literature on MUSIAD by scrutinizing MUSIAD publications since the 1990s in light of the major political factors of each historical context highlighted in the secondary literature. The association publishes a quarterly magazine, *Çerçeve*, which centers around a specific theme related to economy, politics or business life. The writings of MUSIAD members, advisors and guest writers appear in *Çerçeve* which has been the main media organ of MUSIAD since 1992. The other regular publication of MUSIAD is the annual reports on Turkish economy. MUSIAD started to publish these reports in 1994 to share its assessment of the economic indicators of the past year and its suggestions for economy policies. Although *Çerçeve* and Turkish economy reports are the most frequently used sources in this paper, I also refer to special reports, booklets, and books MUSIAD published concerning specific themes such as privatization, foreign trade, constitutional reform and the EU.

In my analysis, I elaborated on the place of Islam in MUSIAD's discourse, ideological implications of economic demands and the relations of these two with MUSIAD's stance vis-à-vis the state. Based on the findings, I argue that MUSIAD's claim of being independent of the state rooted in the clash between secular state policies and Islamic identity of the association. While MUSIAD reformulated its erstwhile critique after February 28 around democratic values, the claims of independence and critical tone of MUSIAD's discourse has waned after 2009 since an Islamically-oriented political party started to dominate the political system in Türkiye and ended the ideological clash between the state and MUSIAD.

3. MUSIAD IN THE MAKING: 1990 - 1998

As in most other Muslim-populated countries, the change in Türkiye's demographic structure resulted in mobilization of the rural and newly-urbanized peripheral segments of Turkish society around religion, unlike what modernization theories would predict (Mardin, 1991, p. 102). The formation of MUSIAD is also a result of this process. Started since the 1980s, mostly small and medium scale entrepreneurs and businesspeople both in major cities and in small towns of Anatolia established business links based on their Islamic identity (Buğra, 1998; Koyuncu, 2010). Among the most remarkable aspects of the religious mobilization in the post-1980 period is the search for alternative social, political, cultural, and economic programs or systems to the existing ones. The debates around projects for transcending Western modernity through Islam has become more vibrant than ever during the 1990s. It is in this period that Islamists in Türkiye started to question the legitimacy of the state and an Islamic way of establishing the relationship between the state and the civil society (Kentel, 2006, p. 723). The quest for an Islamic alternative for individual economic behavior, and a critique of the state establishment in Türkiye are the main components of the overall discourse in MUSIAD publications. Although existing studies on MUSIAD refer to the association's critical attitude towards the state, they do not explain the driving force behind this criticism adequately (Keyman and Koyuncu, 2005; Buğra, 1998; Koyuncu, 2010).

3.1. Championing Islamic Identity Against the "West"

In its formation years, MUSIAD advocates the necessity to replace the existing forms of social and economic relations allegedly based on Western values with an Islamic alternative. At the foundation of this Islamic alternative to the existing socio-economic system is a particular human conception based on Islamic values vis-à-vis the so-called *homo economicus* of liberal economic thought. *Homo Islamicus*, as opposed to its Western counterpart, is not a rational utility maximizer; s/he does not seek personal gain only. Instead, *homo Islamicus* is bounded with certain moral rules in his/her conduct determined by Qur'an and pursues the welfare of his/her community as well as his/her own benefits (Zaim, 1994, p. 102). MUSIAD proposes this alternative human conception not to modify the existing social and economic system which they think originated from the West. The founding president of MUSIAD, Erol Yarar (1990-1999), legitimizes the search for an Islamic alternative by arguing that modern capitalism is in a crisis. For Yarar, "it is impossible to overcome the crisis [of capitalism] by installing little Islamic themes [*küçük İslami motifler monte ederek*] into the Western economic model. Therefore, reconsider-

ation of the existing [economic] paradigms is unavoidable” (1994). Thus, in the early 1990s, MUSIAD does not consider capitalist economic system to be a viable option and foresees that in the future the economic activities of its constituencies will be outside of Western capitalism.

The anti-Western and anti-capitalist discourse of MUSIAD reveals itself clearly in the association’s negative views on international organizations such as the IMF and the EU. The same Islamic tone appears in MUSIAD’s foreign relations vision which urges for stronger cooperation among Muslim-populated countries.

Türkiye is not included in the enlargement plans of Europe until 2000-2010. It would be a mistake to adhere to the undertakings of [Customs Union] Agreement and be a part of the Customs Union which will not at all be under equal terms regarding the conditions of economic competition. ... Türkiye must be in pursuit of economic and political integration with Islamic countries. The religion of Türkiye and its cultural ties indicate that its mother’s bosom and area of leadership [ana kucağının ve liderlik sahalarının] is the Islamic World (MUSIAD, 1995, p. 65).

MUSIAD is highly critical of international organizations such as the EU and the IMF and recommends government to improve its relations with other Islamic countries instead of “vain” efforts to be a part of the West (Yankaya, 2009, p. 8). MUSIAD’s international vision in the 1990s is marked by a strong Islamic internationalism along with anti-Western and anti-capitalist tendencies (Başar, 1994).

3.2. MUSIAD’s Self-Attributed “Independence” from the State

MUSIAD’s profoundly suspicious attitude of toward capitalism does not suggest that the association favors central planning or government intervention in the economy. On the contrary, MUSIAD publications highlights the view that a properly Islamic economic system requires free market economy where monopolies and direct public involvement do not exist, and prices are set justly by free and fair competition. In fact, both the way the governments intervened in the economy in the pre-1980 period and the involvement of the state in the real and financial sectors are criticized by the association. For one thing, MUSIAD’s main discontent is with the public policies, notably during the import substitution industrialization (ISI) period (Buğra, 1998, p. 523). Türkiye followed the ISI regime from the early 1960s to the year 1980 by applying centrally planned growth policies and encouraging the development of its infant industries with import quotas (Buğra, 1994, p. 136). MUSIAD argues that these policies created a monopolistic industry based

in Istanbul. These publicly sponsored private entrepreneurs are claimed to be corrupted by cheap credits, tax amnesties, tax-free revenue, unfair competition, and subsidized investment (Altuğ, 1995, p. 12). On the other hand, MUSIAD emphasizes that economic policies create disadvantages for Anatolian SMEs against the Istanbul-based big industrialists. Hence, MUSIAD situates itself in opposition to the allegedly publicly sponsored monopolistic industrialists and claims to represent the spirit of the free Anatolian enterprise.

In addition to the discontent with the allegedly corrupt state-business relations, MUSIAD draws attention to the burdens created by the weight of the public sector in the overall economy. The very existence of the state in the economic sphere is problematic for the patrimonial power of the state in Türkiye. For Melikşah Utku (1997), a member of MUSIAD Board of Directors until 2008,

[b]eing the state in Türkiye has an unbearable lightness [Türkiye’de devlet olmanın dayanılmaz bir hafifliği vardır]. The [political] power brings along a complex mechanism for acquiring rent and power [rant ve güç]. All the public institutions and almost whole bureaucracy is at your disposal [when you are in power] (p. 95).

Although Utku’s remarks on the power of the bureaucratic machinery and its possible abuse to build clientelistic networks by rent-seeking bureaucrats and businessmen might apply universally, he, in fact, ascribes a negative view on Turkish state particularly. During the early to mid-1990s, this suspicious attitude towards the state establishment in Türkiye is diffused throughout the texts that are produced by MUSIAD. The state in Türkiye is blamed mostly for its authoritarian policies and interventions in people’s everyday lives. In so doing, as argued, the state curbed the private initiative and prevented the establishment of free entrepreneurship (Öztürk, 1995, p. 42).

Although MUSIAD’s attitude towards the state is framed and legitimized through an Islamic rhetoric, the criticisms for real policies and MUSIAD’s expectations from the state have, in fact, thoroughly neoliberal in nature. Neoliberal economic transformations entails that (I) the free market should determine prices; (II) economic activities should be freed from governmental control and protectionism bureaucratic barriers in front of private entrepreneurship should be abolished; (III) the state must shrink and state owned enterprises should be privatized (Sachs, 1991, pp. 237-38); and (IV) the state should only be responsible for provision of public goods and infrastructure such as the appropriate legal framework (Prybyla,

1991, p. 12). In short, neoliberalism stands on the principles of free market and minimum state.

MUSIAD's conception of the state in the mid-1990s displays great parallels to the neoliberal vision of the state. MUSIAD suggests levelling down the weight of state in the economy through bureaucratic regulations and privatization. Privatization of the SEEs and reduction of the number of employees in the public sector are the most frequent demands in the publications of the association. Privatization, for MUSIAD,

is a proper and recommended instrument for strengthening the free market economy, increasing the efficiency of business enterprises, updating the level of technology, allowing diffusion of wealth through popular masses (the base), securing the share of public in the obtained revenue, and realization of minimal state and stronger private entrepreneurship (Karaaslan, 1993, p. 78).

It is important note the link established in this statement between the liberal market economy and minimum state. Although it is seen necessary for the state to abandon its role in the economy as employment provider through SEEs and as the ultimate decision-maker in investments and subsidies, the state is needed for regulation of the economy and coordination of the economic decisions by private sector. State's regulatory role consists of providing environment for free competition, securing property rights, attracting foreign investment through legal regulations, and environmental concerns (Öztürk, 1995, p. 47). Thus, the role ascribed to the state by MUSIAD also reflects the conviction to the neoliberal understanding of night-watchman state.

Hence, MUSIAD relies on a particular discourse which blends an Islamic rhetoric with demands for neoliberal economic transformations. In this Islamic neoliberalism of MUSIAD, the association is situated against the state. Keyman and Koyuncu (2005) suggests that "as an effective economic actor and a powerful pressure group that links Islam with western economic rationality, MUSIAD constitutes a strong alternative to Turkish secular modernity, historically framed by the strong-state tradition" (p. 120). However, the way MUSIAD designates itself vis-à-vis the state, as discussed above, suggests that the association is particularly disturbed by the existing state practices in Türkiye. In other words, MUSIAD raises its criticism not towards an abstract category of state or state power, but the existing state establishment and bureaucratic machinery. Thus, MUSIAD's critical stance against the state does not offer an example of antagonistic bourgeois-state relations.

4. MUSIAD ON STANDBY: 1999 – 2010

“28 February process” after the meeting of the National Security Council on 28 February 1997 hit hard religiously conservative individuals as well as social and political movements through lawsuits against National Outlook (Milli Görüş) parties and their leaders, and measures against the headscarf, the Imam-Hatip schools and the Qur’an courses (Hale and Özbudun, 2010, p. 8). As an Islamically-oriented NGO, MUSIAD was also affected by the process. The association encountered the risk of being shut down as part of a campaign against the “green”, read Islamic, capital (Yankaya, 2009, p. 4). The response of MUSIAD to those threats of 28 February process overlaps with that of the Islamically-oriented social and political organizations, notably the National Outlook. 28 February resulted in a divergence in MUSIAD, parallel to the division of National Outlook movement. As MUSIAD leadership aligned itself with the reformist wing of National Outlook, those members of the association who were close to the conservative wing of National Outlook left MUSIAD and founded ASKON in 1998 (Tok, 2015, p. 88). Thus, the discourse in MUSIAD publications in the aftermath of 28 February resembles the trajectory of the reformist wing of National Outlook. This part is going to discuss how democracy, rule of law, transparent and accountable governance as well as free market economy and the Türkiye’s EU process have become central in MUSIAD’s political discourse in the aftermath of February 28. Moreover, the growing importance of these themes accompanies the erosion of MUSIAD’s erstwhile Islamic rhetoric. Since MUSIAD’s critique of the state mostly originated from the ideological cleavage between the state elite and the association, the diminishing Islamic tone also harbingers a rather moderate attitude towards the state in MUSIAD publications.

4.1. Liberalization in MUSIAD’s Discourse

In the face of the challenges of 28 February, MUSIAD adopted a pro-active strategy for political affairs in addition to economic issues. Not surprisingly, MUSIAD published a booklet containing the association’s proposals for a new constitution in 2000 which, they assumed, Türkiye urgently needed (MUSIAD, 2000). An important change in MUSIAD’s discourse after 28 February was the emphasis on individual rights and liberties, and commitment to democracy. In fact, it is possible to detect similar tendencies among other constituencies of Islamic movement in Türkiye since the 1990s. As democratic values and the rhetoric of human rights reign supreme following the end of the Cold War, Islamic demands such as freedom to the headscarf have been presented in the framework of freedom of faith

and religion, civil liberties and/or human rights (Mert, 2006). So much so that MUSIAD follows this trend by adding an extra item to its annual report on Turkish Economy in 1999 concerning the urgency for a legal reform to improve freedom for thought, for belief and faith, and for entrepreneurship (MUSIAD, 1999, p. 66). The following quote from MUSIAD's report on Turkish economy in 2008 demonstrates the supremacy of this rhetoric and significance of the EU in this regard:

There is direct connection between the EU process and democratization of Türkiye. For example, it is perhaps not fortuitous that the AK Party's closure case which is impossible to have in a normal democratic regime coincided with a period in which Türkiye-EU relations are deteriorating. Therefore, the process of democratization and expansion of liberties must accelerate. Türkiye's democratization is not needed for the EU process but for the virtuous life of Turkish people (Öztürk, 2008, p. 182).

In a similar way to other actors of Islamic movement, Türkiye's EU process becomes instrumental in legitimizing the political demands of MUSIAD which was highly suspicious of Türkiye's relations with the EU in the early 1990s.

Nevertheless, MUSIAD's changing view on the EU is not restricted to political concerns; the shift takes place also in economic dimension. A similar change in the association's attitude towards the IMF in the mid-2000s corroborates this observation. In 2003, for example, MUSIAD published two booklets about the history of Türkiye's relations with the EU and with the IMF (Bolat, 2003; Turhan and Gündüz, 2003). However, it should be noted that these shifts in attitudes, especially towards the IMF, does not correspond to the immediate aftermath of February 28. The moderation of MUSIAD's views on the IMF becomes salient during the implementation of recovery program of the IMF after 2001 economic crisis in collaboration with the JDP government. In a similar vein, MUSIAD's positive stance for the Customs Union, trade with the EU countries and EU's economic standards overlaps with the JDP's policies for Türkiye's harmonization with the EU. Although MUSIAD still argues that entering Customs Union without EU membership led to an asymmetrical power relation between the EU and Türkiye, it is also stressed that "Customs Union, looking from another perspective, steered Turkish industry to be internationally competitive and compatible with international competition rules, regulations and standards; disciplined it and increased its quality and efficiency" (Öztürk, 2004, p. 99). MUSIAD considers the EU as an anchor not only for political transformation of the country but also for the economic development.

Thus, the importance of integration with EU and with the world economy in general is much more strongly stressed in the aftermath of February 28. As it is pointed out in the literature, EU membership replaces the emphasis on the cooperation with Islamic countries in MUSIAD publications during this period (Öniş and Türem, 2001, p. 101). However, this shift does not refer to a wholesale change in the outlook and international vision of the association as the ideal of a stronger cooperation among Islamic countries does not disappear from MUSIAD discourse. MUSIAD still articulates its intentions with respect to Türkiye's cooperation with Muslim-populated countries, yet less frequently and with weaker reference to a desire to form an Islamic international unity.

4.2. Maintaining the Independent Stance vis-à-vis the State

In the immediate aftermath of 28 February, MUSIAD maintains its critical stance vis-à-vis the state establishment in Türkiye for its bureaucratic structure and authoritarian character. Evidently, MUSIAD articulates this critique with democratic, instead of Islamic, themes. Hence, the 28 February process brought along a need to reformulate MUSIAD's political discourse around the concepts of human rights, the rule of law, and EU norms. For MUSIAD's defensive strategic shift in its political discourse, the EU process assumes a particular significance for the EU has become an instrument through which MUSIAD puts pressure on the state to carry out democratic reforms which are hampered by bureaucratic and military tutelage, and rigid implementation of official ideology and secularism.

The shift in MUSIAD's discourse in the early 2000s is accompanied by a decline of the search for Islamic alternatives to the existing global economic institutions and behavior patterns. For one thing, this decline does not refer to a discursive shift through which Islam ceased to be the building block of social and political identities of the constituencies political Islam in Türkiye. Rather, as Jenny White argues, Islam ceased to be a thorough ideology which prescribes the proper form of behavior for Muslims. The new "Muslimhood model" in Türkiye replaces the calls for an authentic Islamic worldview pertinent in all domains of social life with attempts to accommodate Islam with (neo) liberal and democratic principles and privatization of religious identity (White, 2005, p. 88). The new synthesis of Islam and liberal democracy arrived in MUSIAD publications in the aftermath of February 28 emphasizes Islam's compatibility with capitalism, free market, democracy and pluralism.

In this vein, MUSIAD highlights that economic activities have a universal nature and should not be attributed ideological labels or "colors". For instance,

distinguishing business groups “on the basis of their color [read, ideology]” and discrimination towards certain groups is severely criticized (MUSIAD, 2000, p. 60). Although this emphasis is certainly a defense mechanism in the face of state persecutions against Islamic segments of the society, in so doing, MUSIAD undermines the *homo Islamicus* thesis which was enthusiastically propounded in the early 1990s. The decline in the tone of authentic Islamic alternative to the existing institutional and behavioral patterns erodes the association’s search to differentiate itself from state-sponsored big industrialists. MUSIAD still claims to represent small and medium scale entrepreneurs of Anatolia in the aftermath of February 28. The stress on Anatolian capital still continues; yet, unlike its discourse in the 1990s, MUSIAD does not antagonize the Anatolian capital with the state and state-backed capital.

More notably, MUSIAD’ attitude towards the state has become more complicated after the JDP came to power in 2002. MUSIAD’s discourse during the first term of JDP in power relies on a strict dichotomy between the bureaucracy and elected officials. The critical stance towards the state continues in the aftermath of 28 February mostly articulated through the distaste with bureaucracy. On the other hand, the parliament and governments are seen as the institutions which truly represent the popular will. Based on these assumptions, MUSIAD’s proposals for constitutional reform asserts that “the legislative function of the Parliament should be protected against pressures from extra-parliamentary organs [i.e. military and judicial bureaucracy] and it [the parliament] should not function on behalf of other persons or pressure groups” (MUSIAD, 2000, p. 11). MUSIAD is mainly concerned with the prestige and effectiveness of the parliament which is in an antagonistic relation with other state organs controlled by appointed officials in the overall discourse of MUSIAD publications. In so doing, MUSIAD maintains its suspicious attitude towards the state through a criticism of bureaucracy without targeting the JDP government.

5. MUSIAD ON THE RISE: 2011 – PRESENT

During its first and second terms in the office (2002-2007, 2007-2011) the JDP has followed a pro-liberal and pro-Western program that includes opening up opportunity spaces for civil and private initiatives through privatizations, initiatives to create a more pluralistic publish sphere through openly discussing the status of ethnic and religious minorities, reforms towards accession to the EU, and efforts to convince the public of its own adherence to the founding principles of the republic, most notably secularism (Dağı, 2013, p. 95). While this program has brought

along an increasing popularity and support for the party garnered 47 and 49 percent of the votes in 2007 and 2011 general elections respectively, the JDP governments also managed to change the dynamics of the civil-military relations as well as the composition of bureaucracy in its favor (Aydınlı, 2012, p. 104). Although the party's power was shaken towards the end of its third term (2011-2015, which resulted in the loss of parliamentary majority in June 2015 general elections, the party was able to take the control of the political landscape back with the support of Nationalist Action Party. The JDP-nationalist coalition brought presidential system in 2018 which further consolidated the power in the hands of the president Erdoğan.

One of the major outcomes of these challenges is the new dynamics of the relationship between MUSIAD and the JDP. As the JDP has become the dominant actor in the political landscape of Türkiye, the ideological clash between the state and MUSIAD has disappeared to a great extent. The most immediate result of this process is moderation of MUSIAD's suspicion and criticism towards the state. In this part I will argue that MUSIAD's political discourse displays great parallels to the discourse of the JDP in relation to democracy, popular representation, economic concerns and foreign policy vision. In the period after 2009, MUSIAD which would refrain to be associated with political parties before has made its close relations with the JDP explicit for the first time (Öniş and Türem, 2001, p. 105). Interestingly, however, the erstwhile quest for the formation of a Muslim entrepreneur type and for proper Islamic conduct in economy did not return although the JDP's discourse in the last few years has become increasingly Islamic (Özbudun, 2014, p. 1; Çınar, 2015, p. 14). Furthermore, instead of stronger cooperation among Muslim-populated countries, MUSIAD adopts a version of Neo-Ottomanism promoted by the JDP government for its international vision while reluctantly or less frequently maintaining the centrality of EU membership for Türkiye.

5.1. MUSIAD and the JDP

The relationship between MUSIAD and the JDP has always been close. MUSIAD made its preference clear in the division within Milli Görüş in favor of the reformists who later founded the JDP. Although traces of this close relationship can be observed in the first years of the JDP, the centrality of the party in MUSIAD publications increased tremendously in early 2010s. For example, in almost every volume of *Çerçeve*, one or more ministers of the JDP government appear as guest writers. MUSIAD also hosts the Prime Minister in its meetings and events frequently which are announced in the association's periodical. Despite the expect-

edness of these examples, they are also the harbingers of more significant developments in the position of MUSIAD within Türkiye's public sphere: MUSIAD is no more a minor figure in shaping the political economy; it is a central actor.¹ The self-confidence that the new position of MUSIAD has brought along is well reflected in the publications as well. Moreover, the JDP's consolidation of power within the political landscape of Türkiye alters the dynamics of the relationship between the party and MUSIAD where the JDP has the upper hand.

As a result of the dynamics of both the relationship between MUSIAD and the JDP as well as Türkiye's political landscape in the 2010s, MUSIAD expresses its support for the JDP much more explicitly. Responding to criticism of being submissive to the government, MUSIAD president Nail Olpak states that they are grateful for any good practice of the government and support Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for what they desire and persist in [*muradımız ve inadımız için Erdoğan'layız*] (MUSIAD, 2015, p. 14). Although Olpak also argues that MUSIAD warns the government when necessary, it is very difficult to find any overt criticism of the government even in the discussions about problems that are directly in governments' sphere of authority. For instance, MUSIAD never directly hold the government accountable for deterioration in economic indicators that MUSIAD frequently mentions in its publications such as high unemployment rate or chronic current account deficit. While these examples refer to the close relationship between MUSIAD and the JDP, MUSIAD's critical attitude towards the state and its claim to be independent of the state in its discourse gradually disappears, as the JDP consolidates its hegemony within the state establishment.

MUSIAD lends its support to the government in political and legal reforms as well. The most striking example in this regard is the highly controversial referendum for amending the constitution in 2010. MUSIAD views the reforms proposed by the JDP concerning the structure of higher judiciary bodies as a turning point in breaking the resistance of bureaucracy against demilitarization [*sivilleşme*] of the political sphere (MUSIAD, 2011, p. 14). Similar to the celebration of Ergenekon, Balyoz and other trials as the marks of an end to the tutelary regime, MUSIAD considers the liquidation of the Kemalist elite from higher echelons of civil and military bureaucracy through amendments as major steps toward democratization. In this sense, MUSIAD's Constitution Proposal [*Anayasa Önerisi*] reiterates most of the points that the association highlights in the period between 1998 and 2008 concerning political and legal issues.

¹ The number of MUSIAD members was slightly above 1000 when the association was founded in 1990 (Buğra, 1998). According to MUSIAD web page MUSIAD has more than 11.000 members now.

Apart from the debates on constitutional reform and democratization process, concerns about stability becomes the main factor which determines MUSIAD's political discourse on economic matters after 2010. Reflecting on the results of 2011 general elections, then-president Ömer Cihad Vardan puts forth that "the June 2011 elections resulted in the continuation of stability in the country. This [result] is highly important for the maintenance of an environment of trust markets needed. That being said, the new government must sustain macroeconomic policies" (Öztürk, 2011, p. xiv). Thus, stability, the major political expectation of MUSIAD, is closely connected to the continuance of the JDP government. Moreover, Vardan's statement shows that MUSIAD consents to the economic policies of the JDP and they expect the party to maintain these policies. At the discursive level, MUSIAD emphasize both democracy and stability at the same time. However, the connection between these two concepts is not clear, as stability is not among the values conventionally associated to democracy. For instance, stability was never mentioned in MUSIAD publications regarding the discussions about democracy after 28 February process where the association stressed individual rights and liberties, government accountability and transparency.

The ambivalence stems from the demand for stability through continuance of the JDP government and the emphasis on democracy is resolved by associating both concepts with the JDP itself. In a similar manner, religiously conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs are associated with free market and liberal economy. Then-president Vardan's statement is a case in point:

Whenever the Anatolian capital gained strength and was ready for a push there happened an economic collapse. Democratic rights and liberties were disregarded, the experiences of a mentality originated from this soil is ignored. For these reasons, 2002 elections resulted in people's desire, to run away from those who have ruled them and take refuge in a modern and civilized world" (Öztürk, 2010, p. 17).

This notion of democracy indicates a particular interpretation in a way that the concept refers, for MUSIAD's president, to an "authentic representation" of the people where conformity with people's values and political participation are the two building blocks (Mert, 2006, p. 418).

That democracy and liberal economy are closely linked to each other and simultaneously embraced indicates a shift in the ideological position of MUSIAD. Although MUSIAD developed a Western-oriented and pro-capitalist discourse in the aftermath of February 28 in response to the extraordinary conditions of the period, a similar discourse persists after 2009 with a significant change in the asso-

ciation's international relations vision. European Union membership still appears as an anchor for Türkiye's democratization and economic development despite deteriorating relations between Türkiye and EU. However, the emphasis on negotiating with EU as equals which was more dominant in the 1990s and reiterated less often in the aftermath of February 28 becomes central once again after 2009. The shift can be attributed both to the JDP's changing foreign policy vision and to the economic crisis which hit hard European countries. Hence, Nail Olpak, the current president of MUSIAD, asserts that "Türkiye appears as a stable island among the waves [that European countries fight against]" (Olpak, 2013, p. 2). Therefore, for Olpak, Türkiye's significance for EU must be understood in the new dynamics of the relationship. Nevertheless, it is evident that the continuance of pro-capitalist stance is accompanied by persistence in the EU membership. MUSIAD continues to refer to international economic and political organizations as well as agreements for reforms and transformations in Türkiye after 2009. Türkiye's integration to the global economy for which the association thanks to the JDP government's performance since 2002 has become central even under the conditions of a global economic crisis.

5.2. Shifting Emphasis from Independence to Co-operation

On the other hand, MUSIAD's calls for a resurgence of Muslim entrepreneur type and for greater economic cooperation among Islamic countries has waned since the early 2000s. As stated, the independent Anatolian entrepreneur who regulates not only his social life but also economic behaviors in accordance with Islamic principles was the most recurrent theme in publications in the early 1990s. This theme does not appear in MUSIAD publications after 2000s although 2008 economic crisis could have provided a fertile ground for promoting an alternative economic doctrine. That the emphasis on an authentic Islamic identity has waned in MUSIAD publications is parallel to the decline in the association's urge for economic and political cooperation among Islamic countries. The decline is, in fact, not a change observed in the period after 2009. It has started during the aftermath of February 28. For the previous period, the weakness of Islamic internationalist outlook can be attributed to the extraordinary context of the period where Islamic sectors of the society adopted a more defensive stance and promoted the ideals of liberal democracy and EU membership. However, as the factors that pushed Islamic sectors for such a stance disappeared and the JDP secured its dominant position in the political system, the discursive shift in MUSIAD publications do not reflect a turning back to the ideals of the 1990s.

Moreover, the independence from the state support is not a major issue in MUSIAD discourse after 2009. It is still possible to observe the distaste for ISI period and state protectionism. However, MUSIAD does not promote itself as a business group who is independent of the state. Negative reactions against an interview with Erol Yerar, MUSIAD's founding president, where Yerar claims that businessmen of MUSIAD is the "real bourgeois class" in Türkiye since their formation does not owe anything to the state unlike the state-sponsored industrialists is a telling example. MUSIAD repudiated Yerar's claim immediately, for the association do not wish to discriminate any business circle, along with an anti-capitalist discourse. According to Buğra and Savaşkan, MUSIAD administration was disturbed by the capitalistic connotations of the word bourgeoisie and criticized Yerar with an Islamic rhetoric. However, unlike the 1990s, it is very difficult to find support for this reactionary argument in the association's publications after 2009.

In addition to the waning emphasis on "independence" from the state, MUSIAD accommodates JDP's foreign policy vision in the 2010s. Unlike the aftermath of February 28, MUSIAD does not focus only on domestic matters, the association adopts a more pro-active approach towards foreign affairs recently.² However, MUSIAD publications in 2010s promotes a new image of Türkiye which has a prestigious position in the international order. The new discourse of MUSIAD contains phrases such as "great Türkiye", "Türkiye as a center-country", "Türkiye's historical mission in its region", and "the river of Türkiye flows in the right bed" (Olpak, 2014, p. 18; Vardan, 2010, p. 10). In short, in 2010s, MUSIAD's foreign affairs vision is in line with the JDP's Neo-Ottomanist vision. The main aspiration of MUSIAD has become, in this period, to rejuvenate a glorious past together with the pro-active foreign policy vision of the government. Thus, MUSIAD's Islamic internationalism in the 1990s is replaced by a combination of Islamism and Turkish nationalism under the guise of Neo-Ottomanism.

² MUSIAD started to publish annual reports on foreign policy in 2013. The name of the first report is very telling in terms of MUSIAD's new foreign affairs stance: "Batı Sonrası Dünyaya Doğru Türk Dış Politikası" [Turkish Foreign Policy Towards a Post-Western World]

6. CONCLUSION

It is not a coincidence that MUSIAD was founded in a period in which an Islamically-oriented counter-hegemonic movement started to challenge the process of Kemalist modernization. MUSIAD designated itself, as other constituencies of political Islam in Türkiye, against the existing state establishment when it was founded in 1990. The discourse in MUSIAD publications was critical of the state, with a unique combination of neoliberalism and Islamic political identity, with respect to the state's weight in the economy, bureaucratic structure, its discrimination against conservative business groups, and its Western-oriented foreign policy. Although the literature on MUSIAD point out this critical attitude towards the state, reasons of MUSIAD's critique of the state and its implications in the state-business relations in Türkiye are not adequately explained. MUSIAD' political discourse mainly targets the current practices and policies of the state for their secular characteristics. In this sense, MUSIAD's discourse is not critical of the state per se or the legitimacy of its role in the economic realm.

Thus, a close scrutiny of MUSIAD discourse reveals that the association is not suspicious towards the very existence of the state, as one can observe in especially Anglo-American contexts (Vogel, 1978). Although independence from the state is an important aspect of MUSIAD's discourse, the critique of the state is not ideologically substantive even in the 1990s. Therefore, MUSIAD easily reformulated the existing critical discourse towards the state in its publications by dropping the Islamic flavor in the discourse, promoting democratic values and embracing the ideal of EU membership. Better yet, this critical discourse has diminished after the JDP's consolidation of power through the end of 2000s and MUSIAD has become a state-friendly civil society initiative eventually.

Since the 1990s, MUSIAD's economic concerns which are marked by their neoliberal nature remain mostly intact. However, both the Islamic tone in MUSIAD's political self-identification and MUSIAD's critical stance towards the state in its political discourse have diminished simultaneously. The transformation of MUSIAD's political discourse undermines the position of MUSIAD which could otherwise constitute an alternative to the state tradition in Türkiye. This transformation suggests that the Islamic opposition to the existing state establishment in Türkiye is not necessarily a challenge to the formation of state-society relations in Türkiye. Hence, MUSIAD's critique of the state is not directly associated to the associations' neoliberal economic aspirations. Eventually, this argument suggests that neoliberal economic demands do not necessarily bring about a critical attitude toward the state. On the contrary, as this case indicates, consolidation of neoliberalism can go hand in hand with the consolidation of state's legitimacy.

GENİŞLETİLMİŞ ÖZET

Çalışmanın Amacı: Bu çalışma, Müstakil Sanayici ve İş Adamları Derneği'nin (MUSIAD) kuruluşundan bu yana benimsediği siyasi söylemi, farklı siyasi bağlamlar altında incelemektedir. 1990 yılında kurulduğu dönemden bu yana etkili bir sivil toplum örgütü olarak faaliyet gösteren MUSIAD'ın siyasi kaygılarındaki, kendisini devlet karşısında konumlandırışındaki ve derneğin genel siyasi duruşundaki süreklilikler ve kırılmalar/değişmeler üç farklı dönemin koşulları içinde analiz edilecektir: (I) MUSIAD'ın kuruluş dönemine denk gelen ve Türkiye'de askeri ve bürokratik elit ile İslami kesimler arasındaki gerginliğin yoğun şekilde hissedildiği 1990 ile 1998 yılları arasındaki dönem; (II) 28 Şubat 1997 askeri müdahalesinin etkisi ve İslami yönelimli Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin (AK Parti) ilk kez iktidara gelişi ile şekillenen 1998'den 2000'lerin sonuna kadar olan dönem; ve (III) AK Parti'nin iktidardaki üçüncü ve dördüncü dönemleri ile Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın cumhurbaşkanı olarak birinci dönemine tekabül eden 2011 sonrası dönem. Makalenin temel amacı MUSIAD örneği üzerinden Türkiye'de sivil toplum ve devlet ilişkisinin dinamiklerini ortaya koymaktır.

Araştırma Soruları: Genelde sivil toplumun özeldir burjuva sınıfından bir iş örgütü olan MUSIAD'ın devletle ilişkisinin mahiyeti nedir? Devletten ve devlet destekli olduğu iddia edilen iş dünyasından bağımsız (müstakil) bir konumda olma iddiasıyla kurulan MUSIAD'ın bu iddiasının altındaki ideolojik ve siyasi sebepler nelerdir? Çalışmanın temel çerçevesini oluşturan üç siyasi dönemde MUSIAD bu iddiasını tutarlı bir şekilde devam ettirmiş midir? Farklı siyasi dönemlerde devletin ekonomideki rolü, devlet-toplum ilişkisi ve dış politika gibi konularda ortaya koyduğu söylemlerde ne gibi süreklilikler ve kırılmalar gözlenmektedir? MUSIAD'ın devlet karşısındaki konumlanışında ve kuruluşundaki müstakil olma iddiasında, 1990'ların laik-mütedeyyin çekişmesinin ve 2010'lar itibarıyla Türkiye siyasetinin merkezinde bu çekişmenin çözümlenmiş görünmesinin etkisi nedir?

Literatür Taraması: MUSIAD hakkında yapılan çalışmalar dernek üyelerinin İslami kimlikleri ile kapitalist üretim tarzını nasıl bir araya getirdikleri üzerine yoğunlaşmaktadır. Derneğin siyasi pozisyonu üzerine yapılan az sayıda çalışma, derneğin ekonomi politikalarından nasıl etkilendiğine odaklanmakta (Buğra, 1998; Buğra ve Savaşkan, 2015) ya da konuyu tek bir tarihsel bağlam içinde değerlendirerek derneğin sabit/değişmeyen bir siyasi söylem tutturduğu izlenimini verecek şekilde ele almışlardır (Koyuncu, 2010). Literatürde, bu makalenin merkezinde yer alan devlet-sivil toplum ilişkisinin MUSIAD örneği üzerinden niteliği ile bağlantılı olarak MUSIAD'ın siyasi söyleminin farklı siyasi bağlamlardaki evrimi hakkında

önemli bir araştırma bulunmamaktadır. Bu makale, tarihsel bakış açısıyla literatürdeki bu eksikliği doldurma amacındadır.

Yöntem: Bu çalışma, ikincil literatürde vurgulanan her bir tarihsel bağlamın başlıca siyasi faktörleri ışığında 1990'lardan bu yana MUSIAD yayınlarını inceleyerek MUSIAD'ın siyasi söylemini analiz etmektedir. Çalışmada kullanılan temel kaynak, derneğin, ekonomi, siyaset veya iş hayatı ile ilgili belirli bir temayı merkeze alan ve periyodik olarak yayınlanan *Çerçeve* dergisidir. *Çerçeve*, MUSIAD üyelerinin, danışmanlarının ve konuk yazarların yazılarının yayınlandığı, 1992 yılından bu yana MUSIAD'ın resmi yayın organıdır. Çalışmada *Çerçeve* dergisi dışında MUSIAD'ın düzenli olarak yayınladığı Türkiye ekonomisine ilişkin yıllık rapor ile özelleştirme, dış ticaret, anayasa reformu ve AB gibi belirli konularda MUSIAD tarafından yayınlanan özel raporlar, kitapçıklar ve kitaplar da birincil kaynaklar olarak kullanılmaktadır. Birincil kaynaklardaki metinler, eleştirel söylem analizi yöntemiyle analiz edilmiş ve MUSIAD'ın siyasi söylemi hakkında sonuçlara ulaşılmıştır.

Sonuç: MUSIAD, 1990 yılında kurulduğunda, kendisini, toplumun İslami kesimlerinin diğer unsurları gibi, mevcut devlet düzenine ve politikalarına karşıt bir konuma oturtmuştur. Derneğin siyasi söyleminin temel noktası, devletin ekonomideki ağırlığının ve bürokratik yapının muhafazakâr iş gruplarına yönelik ayrımcılığa sebebiyet vermesi ve Batı odaklı dış politika izlenmesine yönelik eleştiriler olmuştur. MUSIAD'ın eleştirel siyasi söylemi, laik özellikleri nedeniyle ağırlıklı olarak devletin mevcut uygulama ve politikalarını hedef almaktadır. Bu anlamda MUSIAD'ın söylemi, devletin ve ekonomik alandaki devlet müdahalesinin meşruiyetini doğrudan eleştirmemektedir. Dolayısıyla, MUSIAD söyleminin yakından incelenmesi, özellikle Anglo-Amerikan bağlamlarında gözlemlenebilen devletin varlığına karşı sınıfsal çıkar temelli bir şüphe duymadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Devletten bağımsızlık, MUSIAD'ın söyleminin önemli bir yönü olmasına rağmen, 1990'larda bile devlet eleştirisi ideolojik olarak asli değildir. Bu nedenle MUSIAD, 28 Şubat sonrası süreçte, 2000'li yıllar boyunca söylemindeki İslami tonu azaltarak, demokratik değerleri öne çıkararak ve AB üyeliği idealini benimseyerek yayınlarında devlete yönelik mevcut eleştirel söylemini kolaylıkla yeniden formüle edebilmiştir. Nihayetinde, 2010'lu yıllarda AK Parti'nin iktidarını pekiştirmesi ve siyasi merkezde laik-mütedeyyin çekişmesine son vermiş görünmesiyle MUSIAD'ın daha önce benimsediği eleştirel siyasi söylem ortadan kalmış, MUSIAD devletle işbirliğini ön plana çıkaran bir sivil toplum girişimi olarak varlığını sürdürmeye başlamıştır.

Ethics Statement: The authors declare that the ethical rules are followed in all preparation processes of this study. In the event of a contrary situation, the Journal of Public Administration and Policy has no responsibility and all responsibility belongs to the author of the study.

Author Contributions: Talha KÖSEOĞLU has contributed to all parts and stages of the study.

Conflict of Interest: There is no conflict of interest among the authors and/or any institution.

Etik Beyanı: Bu çalışmanın tüm hazırlanma süreçlerinde etik kurallara uyulduğunu yazarlar beyan eder. Aksi bir durumun tespiti halinde Kamu Yönetimi ve Politikaları Dergisinin hiçbir sorumluluğu olmayıp, tüm sorumluluk çalışmanın yazarlarına aittir.

Yazar Katkıları: Talha KÖSEOĞLU, çalışmanın tamamında tek başına katkı sunmuştur.

Çıkar Beyanı: Yazarlar ya da herhangi bir kurum/ kuruluş arasında çıkar çatışması yoktur.

REFERENCES

- Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. A. (2012). *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty*. New York: Crown.
- Altuğ, O. (1995). Önce özel sektör özelleştirilmeli. *Çerçeve*, 13, 12-15.
- Ayata, A. (1997). The Emergence of Identity Politics in Türkiye. *New Perspectives on Türkiye*, 17, 59-73.
- Aydınlı, E. (2012). Civil-Military Relations Transformed. *Journal of Democracy*, 23(1), 100-108.
- Başar, H. (1994). *İslam Ülkeleri Arasında Ekonomik İşbirliği*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Bolat, Ö. (2003). *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye-AB İlişkilerinin Kronolojisi*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Buğra, A. (1994). *State and Business in Modern Türkiye*. Albany: The State University of New York Press.
- Buğra, A. (1998). Class, Culture, and State: An Analysis of Interest Representation by Two Turkish Business Associations. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30(4), 521-539.
- Buğra, A. and Savaşkan, O. (2015). *Türkiye'de Yeni Kapitalizm: Siyaset Din ve İş Dünyası*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Çınar, K. (2015). Local Determinants of an Emerging Electoral Hegemony: The Case of Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Türkiye. *Democratization*, 23(7), 1216-1235.
- Dağı, İ. (2013). Post-Islamism à la Turca. in A. Bayat (Ed.) *Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam*. (pp. 78-108) New York: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, G. (1999). *The End of Class Politics: Class Voting in Comparative Context*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
- Fraser, N. (2009). Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics. in G. Henderson and M. Waterstone (Eds.) *Geographic Thought: A Praxis Perspective*. (pp. 72-89) Abingdon: Routledge.
- Göle, N. (1996). Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics. In A. R. Norton (Ed.) *Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 2*. Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 17-43.
- Hale, W. and Özbudun, E. (2010). *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Türkiye: The case of the AKP*. New York: Routledge.
- Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

- Karaaslan, A. (1993). *Kit'lenme ve Özelleştirme*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Kentel, F. (2006). 1990'ların İslami Düşünce Dergileri ve Yeni Müslüman Entellektüeller. In Y. Aktay (Ed.) *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce Vol. 6: İslamcılık*. (pp. 721-798) İstanbul: İletişim.
- Keyman, F. and Koyuncu, B. (2005). Globalization, Alternative Modernities and the Political Economy of Türkiye. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(1), 105–128.
- Koyuncu-Lorasdağı, B. (2010). The Relationship between Islam and Globalization in Türkiye in the Post-1990 Period: The Case of MUSIAD. *Bilig*, 52, 105-128.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review*, 53(1), 69–105.
- Mardin, Ş. (1973). Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics? *Daedalus*, 102(1), 169–90.
- Mardin, Ş. (1991). *Türkiye'de Din ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim.
- Mert, N. (2006). Türkiye İslamcılığına Tarihsel Bir Bakış. In Y. Aktay (Ed.) *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce Vol. 6: İslamcılık*. (pp. 411-419) İstanbul: İletişim.
- MUSIAD. (1995). *Türkiye Ekonomisi 1995*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- MUSIAD. (1999). *Türkiye Ekonomisi 1999*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- MUSIAD. (2000). *Türkiye Ekonomisi 2000*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- MUSIAD. (2000). *Anayasa Reformu ve Yönetimin Demokratikleşmesi*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- MUSIAD. (2011). *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasa Önerisi*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- MUSIAD. (2015). MUSIAD 23. Olağan Genel Kurulunu Gerçekleştirdi. *Çerçeve*, 69, 12.
- Olpak, N. (2013). Avrupa'nın Krizi ve Türkiye Avrupa İlişkileri. *Çerçeve*, 61, 2.
- Olpak, N. (2014). Uluslararası Gelişmeler Işığında Türkiye-2014, speech delivered in MUSIAD annual meeting 2014, reported in "Davutoğlu: Avrupa Ekonomik Krizdeyken Türkiye Güç Biriktirdi", *Çerçeve*, 64, 18-19.
- Önis, Z., and Türem, U. (2001). Business, Globalization and Democracy: A Comparative Analysis of Turkish Business Associations. *Turkish Studies*, 2(2), 94-120.
- Özbudun, E. (2014). AKP at the Crossroads: Erdoğan's Majoritarian Drift. *South European Society and Politics*, 19(2), 155-167.
- Özdemir, Ş. (2006). MUSIAD ve Hak-İşçi Birlikte Anlamak. In Y. Aktay (Ed.) *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasal Düşünce Vol. 6: İslamcılık*. (pp. 837-886) İstanbul: İletişim.

- Öztürk, İ. (1995). Globalleşme sürecinde devlet ve dönüşümün yönü. *Çerçeve*, 14, 42-58
- Öztürk, İ. (2004). *2004 Türkiye Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Öztürk, İ. (2008). *2008 Türkiye Ekonomisi: Demokrasi ve İstikrar İçinde Kalkınma*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Öztürk, İ. (2010). *2010 Türkiye Ekonomisi Raporu: Demokraside ve Ekonomide Yükselme Zamanı*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Öztürk, İ. (2011). *2011 Türkiye Ekonomisi Raporu: Sürdürülebilir Büyüme İçin Stratejik Dönüşüm*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Prybyla, J. S. (1991). The Road from Socialism: Why, Where, What and How. *Problems of Communism*, 40, 1.
- Sachs, J. (1991). Poland and Eastern Europe: What Is to Be Done?. In A. Koves and P. Marer (Eds.) *Foreign Economic Liberalization: Transformations in Socialist and Market Economies* (pp. 235-246) Boulder: Westview Press.
- Tok, E. (2015). Islamic vs. Secular Business Interests: Towards Türkiye's New State Spaces. *Journal of Islamic Studies and Culture*, 3(1), 81-92.
- Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islamist Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Turhan, İ. and Gündüz, L. (2003). *Türkiye-IMF İlişkilerinin Kronolojisi*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Utku, M. (1997). Devlet kimi himaye etmeliydi?. *Çerçeve*, 23, 93-96.
- Vardan, Ö. C. (2010). Önsöz. In E. R. Usul (Ed.) *Yükselen Değer Türkiye*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Vogel, D. (1978). Why Businessmen Distrust Their State: The Political Consciousness of American Corporate Executives. *British Journal of Political Science*, 8(1), 45-78.
- White, J. (2005). The End of Islamism?: Türkiye's Muslimhood Model. In R. W. Hefner (Ed.) *Remaking Muslim Politics*. (pp. 462-481) Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Yankaya, D. (2009). The Europeanization of MUSIAD: Political opportunism, Economic Europeanization, Islamic Euroscepticism", *European Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9 [Online] <https://doi.org/10.4000/ejts.3696>.
- Yarar, E. (1994). Önsöz. In H. Şencan (Ed.) *İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı*. İstanbul: MUSIAD.
- Zaim, S. (1994). Ekonomik Hayatta Müslüman İnsanın Tutum ve Davranışları. In H. Şencan (Ed.) *İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı*. (pp. 101-112) İstanbul: MUSIAD.