

What Determines Labour Movement from Turkey to Europe? Extent of the Situation and Implications

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Türkiye'den Avrupa'ya İşçi Göçünü Neler Etkilemektedir? Olayın Kapsamı ve Sonuçları

Abstract

There are several different issues affecting migration on the global scale, which are commonly interconnected. These include work migration, lifestyle migration, ecological migration, workers' wages abroad, transit migration, irregular global migration, forced and forced humanitarian migration, human trafficking, refugees, and the safety of displaced populations. This study analyzes causation and consequences of Turkish workforce migration. Social and cultural discourse analysis have used in the study. It is preferable to investigate the macroeconomic factors of each country, in order to assess the economic implications of immigration. The present study looks at immigration from an economic, as well as a cultural and social point of view. Apparently, immigration policies are unable to achieve their prespecified demographic targets, at least under most circumstances, because controlling the synthesis and volume of net migration poses a remarkable challenge. Apart from the economic crisis, certain factors that are unique to Turkey lately, such as social-legislative problems and unemployment, push large segments of the population to migrate to other countries, raising the fraction of immigration therefore. Demographic circumstances and effects of relevant policies work in tandem, and their combined influence alters the volume and makeup of the workforce in complex ways. Moreover, any undertaking to pinpoint the needs of the future work market in a decisive way, regarding immigration, and to optimize immigration strategies, appears to have modest results as well.

Keywords : Labour Migration, Informal Labour Markets, Labour Mobility, Labour Force Standards.

JEL Classification Codes : F22, F66, J46, J61, J80.

Öz

Birbirine bağlı olan küresel ölçekte göçü etkileyen birkaç farklı konu bulunmaktadır. Bunlar arasında iş göçü, yaşam tarzı göçü, ekolojik göç, yurtdışında çalışanların ücretleri, transit göç, kuraldışı küresel göç, zorla çalıştırılan ve zorla insani yardım göçü, insan kaçakçılığı, mülteciler ve yerinden edilmiş nüfusların güvenliği sayılabilir. Bu çalışma, Türk göçmen işçilerinin nedenselliğini ve sonuçlarını analiz etmektedir. Bu araştırma özellikle iş pazarında bulunan ve geçimlerini sağlamak üzere Avrupa'ya gittikçe artan oranlarda gelen düzensiz göçmenlerin durumu üzerine yoğunlaşacaktır. Çalışmada sosyal ve kültürel söylem analizi kullanılmıştır. Göçün ekonomik etkilerini değerlendirmek için, her ülkenin makroekonomik faktörlerini araştırmak tercih edilir. Bu çalışma, göç olgusuna ekonomik, kültürel ve sosyal açıdan yaklaşmaktadır. Görünüşe göre, göç politikaları, en azından çoğu

durumda, önceden belirlenmiş demografik hedeflerine ulaşamıyor. Bunun nedeni net göç sentezinin ve hacminin kontrol edilmesi dikkate değer bir zorluk oluşturmasıdır. Ekonomik krizin yanı sıra, sosyal yasama sorunları ve işsizlik gibi son zamanlarda Türkiye'ye özgü bazı faktörler, nüfusun büyük kesimlerini diğer ülkelere göç etmeye iterek göçün bir sonucunu doğurarak itiyor. Demografik gelişimler yaklaşma tepkisiyle işbirliği içerisinde iş gücünün boyut ve yapısını karmaşık olarak etkilemektedir. Bunun da ötesinde, iş pazarının gelecekteki ihtiyaçlarını göç akımlarına göre kesin bir şekilde ayırt etmek ve göç politikalarını iyileştirmek için yapılan girişimler de oldukça kısıtlı kalmaktadır.

Anahtar Sözcükler : İşçi Göçü, Kayıt Dışı Emek Piyasası, Emeğin Hareketliliği, İşgücü Standartları.

... What we call globalization is best understood as representative of sets of complex and often contradictory globalizing social practices.
- Louise Amoore¹

1. Introduction

As Hannah Arendt (2007)² wrote in "We Refugees," for refugees to evolve into citizens, as they wander from place to place, they must uphold their identity. Although there is nothing new to the occurrence of international migration between countries, things have changed over the years in terms of restrictions, gains, form, migration composition and the migrants' profile. A literature search regarding international norms reveals four main characteristics that set the pace: binding force, specificity in definition, compliance with domestic and international legislation, and mutual understanding among implicated parties. To set the context in relation to Turkey, the composition can be studied in three different groups. First are the European norms, which are lawful and gather the preference of Turkish migrants when compared with alternative destinations. Then, the Islamic norms gained popularity in the past three years, which shaped the migration form to follow the rules of Islam. Finally, there are the Nomadic norms, which have been studied extensively. Their popularity is greater in the context of illegal inter-country migration. When considering all these issues, one discovers that immigration is seen as a natural phenomenon among individuals who oppose the notion of national borders. Turkey has the reputation of a country of emigrants. Beginning in the early 1960s and lasting for most of the 1970s, an increasing number of Turkish nationals followed the migration stream to Western Europe, with Western Germany receiving the bulk of the migrating population. In recent times, the migration stream re-emerged via family reunion programs and the refugee crisis. In this study, we aim to investigate how countries are affected by immigration in terms of their social and economic life, and how immigrants cope with these effects. Nationals from Turkey who

¹ Amoore, L. (2002), *Globalization Contested: An International Political Economy of Work*, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press.

² Arendt, H. (2007), *The Jewish Writings*, Schockenbooks, New York.

immigrate abroad have the tendency to perceive themselves, and be seen, as guests, which leads them to avoid adapting their values, beliefs and traditions to those of the destination, but to try to take over the country's culture instead. As a result, in this study, we also explore the strengths and weaknesses of the national and international co-operation, with the purpose of better organizing the network's working structures and further development in a more efficient manner.

2. Methodology

First, this study examines late patterns and examples regarding migration to the European Union; then, it conducts an analysis of migration's economic effect, with a focus on the general upsets and the work market changes that immigration causes to the countries of destination. Finally, it deals with a number of genuine arrangement approaches. The developments of migration to Europe from a social, cultural and economic point of view, is discussed. More and more studies are looking at the immigrants' qualitative data, their financial reconciliation and how migration streams affect nations at both ends. The literature examining the factors that determine migration streams also shows that the primary motivators of migration are strategic, as well as demographic and economic factors.


3. A Short Review of Immigration in Turkey and Normative Referents

Turkish people utilize a number of different standardizing references when they make normative demands regarding migration hidden in various cultural, historical, social, and civilization-related world experiences. This stance becomes more highlighted after comparing it with the diversity of the various standardized positions towards immigration that are legitimized and justified within the issue. Through this approach, it becomes apparent that Turkish people participate in a type of "comparative political theory" of migration, in which they assess the pros and cons associated with the various perspectives towards immigration exhibited by each of these references. Although these referents do not always accurately reflect reality, we can gain satisfactory insight on the Turkish normative perceptions towards immigration by analyzing them. "European norms" are one of these perceptions, and the European precedence may adequately explain them, specifically in the form of European influence in the culture and politics of Turkey in the past two hundred years. As Etienne Copeaux explained when he analyzed Turkish nationalism in texts and textbooks, there is a polymorphous nature in the tension towards the West; these essays deal with the secular, democratic and modern West at the same time, as well as the Greco-Latin culture, which the West ultimately adopted. Further on "Islamic norms" are less standardized terms commonly used as a method of approaching the will and/or reliability of the political aspect of Islam. The tendency of popular religious characters to join common society support endeavors toward refugees is also proof of the private association of Islam with immigration. For the most part, the Islamic norms toward migration are considered a positive implication; however, they are not completely devoid of problems, specifically in the Islam-dictated distinction of immigrants. Last, "Nomadic norms" is the only term which is truly Turkish in nature. From the Turkish Nationals' point of view, the very notion of population movement and migration within the context of Turkish history must acknowledge the close relationship

of the Turkish nation with versatility, due to its long nomadic past. Ease of movement prompted for a peaceful means of accomplishment, while the versatility suggested by triumph and migration because of environmental change is interlaced with pictures of steeds, trains, and foldable tents. The continued state of movement affects both the state and the populace. This renders nomadism a crucial component of the Turkish culture at the time, and it poses a landmark feature of the way of life of these specific Turkish tribes, which can be eloquently described as the "Culture of the Steppes".

Turkey's endeavors to blend into the European structures goes back to 1963 when the nation increased partner enrollment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and presented its application for the EU participation four years after the fact (Glazar & Strielkowski, 2010). The Turkish population across Europe grew from a little over half a million people in 1972 to nearly 3 million in the mid-1990s. Most of these people migrated to countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Only Norway and the United Kingdom are new places for refuge for Turkish migrants, as the other countries have been accepting them for over 50 years. Turkey experienced incomplete achievement when it entered into the European traditions union in 1995. After four years, it gained the EU enrollment and the transaction rounds started in 2005. Up to today, Turkey shuts just one of the 35 parts of the "Acquis communautaire" (the collection of European Union Law) and arrangements are yet continuous (Korfali & Üstübcü & De Clerck, 2014). Extensively scaled Turkish work resettlement to Europe began with an understanding marked by the Turkish and West German governments in 1961 (Akkoyunlu & Silverstovs, 2009). The settlement harmonized with a West German financial blast and the relocation of developing quantities of Turkish in transients from rustic ranges to major urban focuses. The agreement was meant to give the German economy makeshift untalented work, "guest specialists," while diminishing the positions of Turkey's unemployed (Boeri & Brücker, 2000). It was normal that these specialists would come back to Turkey with new attitudes and reorient the Turkish economy from rustic agribusiness to industry. According to Stalker (2002), Turkey consented to comparative arrangements with other European nations, including Austria, Belgium, Holland, France, and Sweden. A large number of these guest laborers frustrated desires, nevertheless, by settling down and in spite of conveying their families to go along with them. Besides, often-gifted workers emigrated.

Figure: 1
Turkish Citizens in Europe



Source: Austrian Academy of Sciences, EuroGeographics for the Administrative Boundaries, EUROSTAT - GISCO, M.L.Engel, 2012.

The financial downturn in Western Europe that conferred with the oil emergency of 1973 finished the enrollment of work from Turkey. As an after effect of this migration, settlements sent by Turkish immigrants and laborers abroad have been a noteworthy remote cache of data for the economy since the mid-1960s. According to Wanner (2002), settlements relentlessly expanded as a rate of Turkey's yearly exchange shortfall, coming to a rest in 1994 of 62.3 percent, and dropped to their most reduced level in 2000 with 20.4 percent. After the end of work enrollment from Turkey, Turkish displacement to Europe proceeded through family reunification in the 1980s and the majority of the 1990s (Gitmez, 1983).

From time to time, a need for migrant labor arises, driving governments to put entry systems in place with the purpose of attracting highly skilled workers to seek work while deterring others who do not hold the necessary qualification from entering illegally (Metcalf-Hough, 2015). However, as Castles suggested (2013: 129): "Rather than a need for migrant labor, we should, therefore, be analyzing a demand promoted by powerful economic and political interests".

There are many factors for migration as there have been migrants since centuries. The factors that motivate people to migrate while others do not have different classifications.

It is interesting to know how it is classified and what the categories are. The result is 4x2 matrix summarizing why people migrate, the factors that maintain migration flows between and within countries.

Table: 1
Determinants of Migration

Type of migrant	Demand-Pull	Supply-Push
Economic migrants	Higher wages Better working conditions Better employment Available resources Income opportunities	Low productivity Unemployment Poor economic conditions Low wages Lack of opportunities for advancement Cost of living Exhaustion of natural resources Natural calamities
Cultural migrants	Lure of freedom Education Place of residence Career opportunities Civil rights and voting A voice in decision making Religious persecution	Forced migration Changes in borders Refugees from conflict Political instability Unfair court system Unable to vote Religious persecution
Environmental migrants	Preferred climate Vegetation	Natural disasters Adverse physical conditions Pollution
Miscellaneous factors	Cultural diversity Vitality Family unification transportation Land	Flee-war Persecution Loss of wealth Primitive conditions Poverty Revolution Demographic pressure

3.1. Current Scenario

The outburst of emigration from Turkey to Europe was extraordinary due to several reasons. For example, it evolved from a small number of Turkish migrants in 1961 to more than five hundred thousand migrants residing in countries across Europe in the 1970s. The migrant population almost reached 2 million in the '80s, and 3 million before the end of the 20th century. There are now more than 3.5 million Turkish migrants leading their lives across Europe (İçduygu & Kirişçi, 2009). After looking into the causes of the migration wave, one notices that the flow of refuge seekers from Turkey to Western Europe began in the mid-1980s, as a result of the Turkish military intervening with the political life in 1980 and the increase in violence accompanying the efforts of the large Kurdish minority (almost 20 percent of the population) to separate from Turkey, which led many individuals to look for safer alternatives. The Kurdish minority and the state have fought over several issues. Government statistics indicate that, especially during the first half of the 1990s, the turmoil surrounding the Kurdish issue resulted in the dislocation of approximately 330 thousand people from their homes (Kirişçi, 2003). However, the Turkish Human Rights Association reported that over 2.5 million people were internally displaced during the same period. Most

people displaced from their homes were Kurds (İçduygu, 2010). According to UNHCR (2001) statistics, during the 1990s, approximately 340 thousand Turkish citizens sought refuge in different European nations. Outcast acknowledgment rates varied among nations and, as the UNHCR has indicated; in recent years, they have decreased for a variety of reasons, including the improper utilization of the refuge channel.

The most exceedingly of the contention between the military and separatist rebels slowed down in the beginning of 1990s, taking after the steady presentation of political changes. Shelter applications have fallen. On the other hand, an unidentified number of Turkish nationals keep endeavoring to enter EU nations unlawfully looking for jobs. Kaiser (2003) states that a portion of the boats conveying vast quantities of sporadic transients that have as of late landed on Italian and French shorelines have included Turkish nationals. In the last part of resettlement, within the last couple of years there has been a great increase in the number of qualified experts and college graduates moving to Europe or the CIS nations. Today, it is evaluated there are roughly 3.6 million Turkish nationals living abroad, of whom around 3.2 million are in European nations with a generous increment from 600,000 in 1972 (Kirişçi, 2003). Roughly, 2.5 percent of Turkish immigrants worked as laborers in 1960s, and that number has increased to nearly 5.5 percent in the mid-2000s. This means roughly 6 percent of the Turkish labor force has been employed abroad for the last fifty years.

Table: 2
Turkish Workers and Total Turkish Nationals Abroad, 1973-2014

Year	Turkish Population (1)	Turkish Nationals Abroad (2)	(2)/(1)	Turkish Civilian Labour Force (3)	Turkish Workers Abroad (4)	(4)/(3)
1973	38,072,000	948,531	2.49%	14,670,000	735,363	5.01%
1980	44,736,957	2,018,602	4.50%	17,842,451	888,290	4.98%
1990	56,473,035	2,539,677	4.49%	20,163,000	1,149,466	5.70%
1991	57,326,000	2,857,696	4.98%	20,145,000	1,250,964	6.20%
1992	58,584,000	2,869,060	4.89%	20,073,000	1,313,014	6.54%
2000	66,187,000	3,603,000	5.44%	23,078,000	1,180,420	5.11%
2001	67,296,000	3,619,000	5.37%	23,491,000	1,178,412	5.01%
2002	68,393,000	3,574,164	5.22%	23,818,000	1,194,092	5.01%
2003	69,479,000	3,576,804	5.14%	23,641,000	1,197,968	5.07%
2004	70,556,000	3,520,040	4.98%	24,290,000	1,108,550	4.56%
2005	72,100,000	3,304,300	4.58%	24,566,000	1,343,594	5.47%
2006	72,974,000	3,336,900	4.57%	24,776,000	1,365,111	5.50%
2007	70,586,000	3,350,500	4.74%	23,500,000	1,380,500	5.87%
2008	71,517,100	3,380,100	4.72%	24,407,000	1,369,900	5.60%
2009	72,561,312	3,765,100	5.18%	24,748,000	1,381,023	5.58%
2010	73,722,988	3,765,175	5.18%	25,641,000	1,400,414	5.65%
2011	74,724,269	3,785,740	5.07%	26,725,000	1,420,518	5.31%
2012	75,627,384	3,812,300	5.05%	27,339,000	1,429,600	5.23%
2013	76,667,284	3,920,592	5.11%	27,430,210	1,462,912	5.34%
2014	77,695,904	4,010,120	5.16%	28,786,100	1,503,210	5.23%

Source: Various Annual Reports of the Turkish Statistical Institute (TURKSTAT) and formerly State Institute of Statistics (SIS), State Planning Organization (SPO), Address Based Population Registration System (ABPRS), International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Eurostat Data, Annual Reports of the General Directorate of Services for the Workers Abroad, Attached to the Ministry of Labour and Social Security (1970-2014).

Over several decades, the Turkish labour force has become more skilled. Recently, however, the people making of the workforce have gone to university, become trained, and have picked up a vast amount of experience. Unfortunately, this means many of educated and experienced workers have moved out of Turkey, resulting in what is called a "brain drain". Many studies indirectly provide evidence to support this idea. Germany continues to be the number one country of Turkish emigration, with more than 764.000 skilled and unskilled workers making it their home. After Germany, the U.K., Greece, France and the Netherlands also have a vast amount of Turkish workers, many of which are unskilled.

Table: 3
Number of Unskilled Turkish Labour Force in Europe

	Skilled Labour	Unskilled Labour
Germany	63459	706771
UK	10380	18806
Greece	6623	32139
France	5675	92035
Netherlands	4100	88377
Switzerland	2631	31571
Sweden	1923	15766
Austria	1616	62280
Belgium	1198	34424
Denmark	944	14550

GEP (2006), Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, World Bank; Narayanan, G.; Badri, A.A. & McDougall, R. (2012).

The nature of the emigrant populations differs considerably according to the three main destination regions: Europe, the ME and the CIS. Turkish emigrant communities in Europe continue to remain the same or even experience some increase while the number of the predominantly male worker communities in the ME countries, and the CIS fluctuated from year to year due to the nature of contract-dependent labour migration. In 2009, there had been an increase in migration to Europe, the ME and the CIS as well as migration overall.

With the EU choosing whether to begin promotion arrangements with Turkey by December 2004 (UN, 2005), the topic of Turkish immigrants in European nations and prospects of further migration from Turkey has ended up a significant issue. The number in Europe trusts that huge quantities of Turkish immigrants have neglected to coordinate their host groups. This is seen as hostile move immigrant emotions in various EU divided nations and is funneling worries about further immigration. Conversely, different examiners maintain that numerous Turkish nationals have incorporated well and even joined the positions of those legislators at the level of neighborhood and national governments as well as the European Parliament. Turkish immigrants are additionally seen as adding to job creation, on the grounds that maintain their own particular organizations (Erzan & Kuzubaş & Yıldız, 2006). Others propose that as the Turkish economy grows with EU enrollment, the weight to emigrate will lessen. As another hindrance, the EU generally sets long move periods after participation is procured, amid which the privilege of free development for Turkish nationals inside of the EU would be diminished. Others contend that the situation is

similar to the case of Greece, Portugal, and Spain (Hansen & Weil, 2001). There could even be an opposite movement pattern as some Turkish immigrants may come back to Turkey.

3.2. Political and Social Facets

As Europe evolved to include the entirety of Christendom, the formation of new outskirts followed, with the outer eastern European territories commonly addressed as the "periphery" (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). The periphery was viewed separately from Asia. Yet, at the same time, it was not regarded as solely European when compared with its Western counterparts. This separation is evident in the different conditions seen in Greece and the Balkans, as well as Russia; Hertzfeld (2002) wrote in "The European Self" that this distinction can become the source of hatred, stemming from the designation of an "inferior class" nation, and controversy within the country regarding the need for its citizens to change their ways toward adopting a "more European" stance.

This sort of refinement is sufficiently divisive with nations that are still geographically a piece of continental Europe. However, it is much more troublesome for a nation to see itself as a component of Europe on the off chance that it is, for the most part, Asian, has an alternate majority religion and ethnicity, and has been a military foe of Western Europe for a long time. It is on this circumstance that Turkey tries to join the European Union. With these incomprehensible contracts, EU member states trust that Turkey's membership could on a basic level, change the character of Europe. As a result, it is not unexpected they are unwilling to concede Turkey as a member.

Networks, exercises, institutions and organizations that natives and immigrants-utilize in order to express their will and take an interest in the life of a political community characterize civil society. As per Gramsci's definition (Bellamy & Schecter, 1993), civil society does likewise incorporate social factors used to apply aggregate weight and (potentially) acquisition target results. For instance, religion -as another important indicator for immigrants- assumes a key part in the analysis of immigration in the communal setting: As the scope of religious organizations has expanded essentially through immigration, the expanding impact on the religious-social connection can be noted. As stated by Sen (1994), Christians of different religious denominations have moved, with some of them building up new religious groups and others having, in a less prominent way, joined existing ones.

There are huge contrasts between religious personality and part of religion in public life between the EU and Turkey. In spite of the fact there is an assortment in the religious vicinity in the public circle in the EU, it is for the most part, portrayed as a common bastion of the innovative world. While secularism is undoubtedly an expansive force in Turkish governmental issues (Rouleau, 2000), it does not reject the religion of Turkish life. Religion has dependably been important to the Turks, and in spite of the fact that not every one of them is Muslim, most have some form of religious conviction. Nevertheless, the influence of religious expression in public life has melted away after some time contingent upon that controlled the administration. At the point when Atatürk founded modernizations in Turkey, he did as such by means of a top-down enforcement model, such as, changing over a large

number of the state-run religious orders of the Ottoman Empire. Different reforms were set up to make Turkey seem more cutting edge in Europe's eyes. Then again, Turkish individuals did not internalize these reforms, but rather rehearsed them in light of the fact that it was the law. There are moderate secularists in Turkey now, connected with the Social Democratic Party who don't need religion formally fixing to the government, yet regard the privileges of spiritual practice and don't favor armed force contribution in legislative issues. About the European Union, this moving thought of adequate religion in the communal circle is not by any means something keeping Turkey down. Maybe, this social factor adds to the insecurity of the legislature, with pressures between the religious and the secularists, as a political rule.

By the mid-1970s, the majority of Turkish migration to Western Europe was for family reunification. Furthermore, by the 1990s as a method for marriage continued to be one of the fundamental explanations behind settling in Western Europe. Around 25,000 to 40,000 Turks that belonged to the Western Thrace, and at the same time, are ethnic Turks, who live in the northeastern piece of Greece (Antoniou, 2005), have moved to Western Europe (Goffman, 2002). Between 12,000 to 25,000 people moved to Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, when the Thracian tobacco industry was a function of an extreme emergency and numerous tobacco producers lost their pay (Şentürk, 2008). After Germany, the Netherlands is the most famous destination for Western Thrace Turks, particularly in the locale of Randstad. There are an expected 600-700 Western Thrace Turks living in London, despite the fact that the aggregate number living outside of London is obscure (Anagnostou, 2005). Based on the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria, Bulgarian Turks make-up 12% of short-term migrants, 13% of long haul migrants, and 12% of the labor migrants (Gurak & Caces, 1992).

Between European and other countries in the world as a whole, Germany is the one that has the highest number of migrant stock as seen in Table 1. In 1995, it had more than 2 million Turkish migrants, accounting for about 7 percent of its population. Germany is followed by France with 0.2 million and 3 percent and Belgium with 0.08 million and 2 percent (TML, 2014; OECD, 2014). Europe would have experienced a population decline of about 5 million during 1995-2012. Therefore, the effect of international migration is particularly important for Western European countries such as Austria, Denmark, Italy, Scandinavian countries and Switzerland, where it has contributed to raising the rate of the natural population (IOM, 2013).

Table: 4
Stock of Turkish Workers Abroad, 1975 to 2010

	1975		1980		1985		1995		2005		2010	
	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%	# (x 1000)	%
Austria	29,8	3,8	65	3,2	75	3,1	147	4,4	127	3,8	110	3
Belgium	21	2,7	66,5	3,3	72,5	3,1	79,5	2,4	45,9	1,4	39,4	1
France	29,6	3,8	92,8	4,6	146,1	6,2	198,9	6	208	6,3	459,6	12,1
Germany	605	78,1	1462,4	72,5	1400	59,3	2 049,9	62	1912	57,9	1 629,4	43,2
Netherlands	46,1	5,9	121,7	6	156,4	6,6	127	3,8	160,3	4,9	372,7	9,8
Scandinavian Countries	20,1	2,6	34,3	1,7	41,2	1,7	73	2,2	51,6	1,6	145,6	3,8
Switzerland	23,2	3	99,3	4,9	51	2,2	79	2,4	79,5	2,4	71,6	1,8
Other EC	58,9	7,6	115,1	5,7	42	1,8	87	2,6	130	3,9	223,8	5,9
Total Europe	769,9	99,3	1760,2	87,2	1984,6	84	2 841,3	85,9	2714,3	82,1	3 052,1	81
The ME Countries	0	0	102,4	5,1	200	8,5	127	3,8	105	3,2	162,6	4,3
Australia	3,5	0,4	32,5	1,6	35	1,5	45	1,4	60	1,8	71	1,8
CIS Countries	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	1,4	75	2,3	104,9	2,7
Other Countries	2,2	0,3	123,4	6,1	140	5,9	245	7,4	350	10,6	375,5	9,9
Total	775,4	100	2018,6	100	2359,6	100	3 308,3	100	3 304,3	100	3 765,1	100

Source: Turkish Ministry of Labor Figures (1960-2013), based on work permits issued/ renewed by host countries. They show the situation at the end of each year / beginning of the next year.

The political and scholarly verbal confrontation on the social connection of movement has so far concentrated on the Muslim minority; however, it represents 3% of the aggregate populace of Germany. Because of the way the majority of Muslim migrants have settled down forever in Germany, members of the Muslim community have been working toward building up their own institutions and honing their customary ceremonies in Germany (Pischke & Velling, 1997). These efforts incorporate the development of ancient mosques and Muslim graveyards, the act of Muslim internment customs, dress codes, the custom butchering of creatures or the presentation of Islamic religious guidelines in public schools. According to Østergard-Nielsen (2003), the development of mosques and burial grounds in particular results in obvious changes to German cityscapes. By virtue of their architecture, size, and symbolic importance, such building arrangements have in all cases activated contention inside of neighboring groups.

There are blank in every one of the fields (not just economic or religious). German dietary patterns and the eatery scene have essentially changed over the course of the most recent decades: Non-German production and suppers have turned into a fundamental piece of regular life for just about everyone (SFZI, 2004). The expansive number of ethnic sustenance stores offering non-Germanic products, most importantly Turkish greengrocers and the Asia Shop, likewise draw numerous clients. As per Avcı's analyses (2006), the primary cause is the Turkish Döner, or kebab, which has turned into the most prominent sort of fast food in Germany. Since the end of the 1990s, kebabs have turned into the item with the most astounding deals on the German eatery market.

Relocation and the media have been a topic generally elaborated. Two angles seem, by all accounts, to be particularly applicable: Immigrants as media shops and makers, and immigrants as topics of reports in the German media. As stated by Atilgan (2002), the German media business sector offers an extensive variety of products for non-Germans, the vast majority of them being monolingual and addressing one nationality. More than fifty non-Germanic daily papers are offered in Germany; among the dialects of former "visitor workers," the majority of them are in Turkish (Becker & Behnisch, 2002). In the meantime,

German-Turkish film and TV organizations assume a more important part of the German media market.

3.3. Economic Analysis

Following World War II, the "economic miracle" of Western Germany was accompanied by an increase in labor requirements. Several aspects of the labor market were showing signs of shortage during the 1950s (Kaldor, 1945; Wolf, 1995; Neal, 2007; Eissel, 2011). As the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, a great flood of labor was stopped abruptly. As Paque indicated (1987), the lack of working hands led the Federal Republic of Germany to enlist foreign workers as "guests." This temporary solution soon became a permanent one, as in reality the foreign guest worker would be replaced by another foreign worker after a certain period. Following the cease in the enlistment of workers originating from countries outside the ECC in 1973, responding to the oil emergency, several workers that had already enlisted stayed in the country and started moving their families in as well (Castles & Kosach, 1985). The enlistment abruption found exactly 4 million foreigners living in Germany at that time, with their population only rising during the following period. Between 1961 and 1973, the population of the foreign workforce increased from 550 thousand to 2.6 million (Straubhaar, 1992; Frey & Ulrich, 1996; Hönekopp, 1997; Martin, 1997; Martin & Miller, 1980; Faini, 2009; Felbermayr & Larch & Lechthaler, 2012).

Negative slants toward immigrants, which have been observable in most industrialized nations amid the most recent decade, are frequently communicated as reasons for alarm that immigrants unfavorably influence the economic welfare of the local populace. Immigrants are regularly seen as a weight for general society spending plans as they purportedly pay less for assessments and commitments, from one perspective, and yet guarantee more advantages and excessively devour government-issued goods and services, on the other side. Moreover, the conceivably positive aberrant monetary impacts of immigration through large-scale economic and labor market effects, that change the level and development of GDP and the profits to, and the job of local labor and capital, are much more hard to pass on to the expansive open. Pertinent writing in economics gives little backing to such disdain toward immigrants. As indicated by the second of the Copenhagen Criteria, the European Commission (2010) expresses that candidate nations must have a perpetual market economy. For the separate countries of the European Union, there is saved dread of Turkey joining in view of a, to some degree, precarious economy and trepidation of mass emigration, as seen by past encounters in Turkish guest laborer programs.

According to Teitelbaum and Martin (2003), Turkish guest workers began to come to Western Europe beginning in 1960, as Turkey's constitution had recently ensured the privilege of its natives to get an international ID and travel abroad. Germany had specific enthusiasm for foreign workers, as their commercial enterprises were expanding and because of the development of the Berlin Wall, the supply of East German transients had become everything except scarce. In October 1961, they consented to a respective labor arrangement with Turkey, which permitted workers to get to Germany and work under one-year grants (Bolz, 1974; Paine, 1974; Krane, 1975). The arrangement was extremely prevalent in

Turkey, at first, drawing in nine thousand employees in 1961 and rising rapidly to 136,000 in 1973 (Penninx, 1982; Abadan-Unat, 1986; Gitmez, 1989). This satisfied the Germans, as they would have the capacity to get a modest labor force to staff their commercial enterprises and additionally keep unemployment low by having a steady supply of guest workers.

The issue accompanied the arrangement's execution in economic retreats. It was relied upon for Turkish families to return to their homeland upon rejection from their jobs, with the goal that job levels could be kept low. Nevertheless, this ended up going against the hobbies of both the employees and German manufacturing plant proprietors. Workers would not have preferred returning home, simply because by working in Germany, they would have the capacity to gain eight to ten times the wages they could get back in Turkey. Moreover, for the production line proprietors, there was a minimal motivator to force special turn, in light of the fact that they would be sending prepared laborers home and be forced to discover and employ untrained substitutions. In this manner, the guest workers, largely, did not return home, but rather their numbers expanded thanks to the landing of their families. In the first two-sided assertion, organizations could recharge their guest laborer licenses for up to two years, which additionally allowed the subordinate groups of the guest workers to get to Germany. Moreover, if the employees were in Germany for a long time, they could switch businesses and stay in Germany regardless of the possibility that they had lost their jobs. Indeed, even after this guest system ceased, Turks kept on moving to Germany either under refuge, "family unification" programs (Kiray, 1976; Faist, 1995) or through unlawful means. In view of these diverse variables, the occupation rate dropped drastically among foreigners in Germany from 66% in the mid-'70's to a humble 33% just a quarter century later.

From the experience of the special guest programs, Germany does not need Turkey to end up some portion of the EU because of an apprehension of mass emigration, which could destabilize the economy and extraordinarily raise the unemployment rate. This supposition is shared by different nations who stress that through such programs, their unemployment circumstances could deteriorate and with a foreign group of Muslims, there would be troubles with mix and osmosis (for example, the situation in France). Moreover, EU countries stress over Turkey joining the European Union from a monetary standpoint. As indicated by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2014), Turkey would be the poorest EU country, with a GDP of just \$2100 in 2001, contrasted with the normal GDP in the EU of \$21,000 Furthermore; roughly, 35% of Turkey's workers are utilized in farming sectors.

On the off chance, Turkey joined the EU, a large portion of these untrained workers could move from the homesteads of Anatolia into Western Europe. In rich EU countries, for example, Germany and France, stress these incompetent workers could group out the employment market. Likewise, Turkey has had an exceptionally temperamental economy before, which contracted by 6% in 1994, expanded by 6% every year from 1995-1997, and contracted again by 10% in 2001 (Altug, Filiztekin & Pamuk, 2007). It was just settling in 2002 with a crisis credit of \$16 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2008). With this past variance in its economy, a contention can be made that if Turkey was conceded as a full individual from the European Union. The general economic welfare of

EU countries could endure. In any case, the trepidation of mass immigration into Europe is not extremely established; as it is a standard strategy for new individuals from the European Union to have confinements in the middle of them and whatever is left of Europe for quite a long while before giving full open fringes.

In a meeting with the Huffington Post, migration master Hein de Haas (2015) says that with regards to the effect on European economies, a lot of explorations have demonstrated that migration expands GDP in light of the fact that transients add to the workforce. There is next to no authentic confirmation to bolster the case that migration is swarming out labor or cutting down wages. For the most part, openly verbal confrontations, enemies or defenders of migration, misrepresent the negative or beneficial outcomes of migration. He states it would be silly to propose migration as either the cause for basic unemployment or the trickiness of labor. Largely, Hein de Haas focuses on the fact that what is truly absent is an understanding that governments make social orders that are rich, open and de-regularized, and then they likewise make significantly more demand for transient labor. These social orders unavoidably pull in migration, and on the off chance, they close the entryway, we comprehend what you get - which is even more sneaking and sporadic migration because there are no lawful channels to coordinate the labor demand.

Table: 5
Comparison of Labor Migration under Two Scenarios³

Net Change in the Turkish Migrant Stock	2004-2015	2015-2030	Total
High Growth-Membership-Free Movement of Labor	246,000	1,888,000	2,134,000
Lower Growth-NO Membership-No Free Movement of Labor	760,000	1,974,000	2,734,000
Turkish Migrant Stock	2004	2015	2030
High Growth-Membership-Free Movement of Labor	2,499,000	2,745,000	4,633,000
Lower Growth-NO Membership-No Free Movement of Labor	2,506,000	3,267,000	5,241,000

According to Erzan et al. (2004), Turkey's entry into EU will cost more than they are worth. Due to strict regulations set in place via the EU, the flow of laborers from Turkey has been stunted. As Turkey awaits membership to the EU the labor force and Turkey's economy in general is dependent on the prospect of the country becoming a part of the union. If Turkey is granted admission into the EU in 2015, the number of migrants allowed into Europe will begin at over 2 million and explode toward 4.5 million by 2030. If access to the EU is not granted, migrant workers will continue to be around 500.000 and growing toward 600.000 in 2030, which is more than any other country.

On the other hand, there is remigration from Germany to Turkey or from Europe to Turkey. Individuals who decide to migrate to Turkey in an attempt to find work and improve their lives, do so under the pressure of dire economic situations, unemployment, poverty, but also war and political turmoil in their countries of origin. By choosing Turkey as the

³ The figures were taken from a series of "twin projects" findings at the Center for Economics and Econometrics at the Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey.

country of their destination, these individuals take into account several different factors, among which the option of employment in the informal marketplace, the likelihood of earning significantly more money than what was possible in their place of origin, geolocation and logistical issues, costs of transportation, and whether there is social support at the point of arrival from friends or family. From these factors, particular influence derives from labor demand in the black market, significantly fueling illegal migration. As Lewis et al. stated (2014), it is impossible to understand the position of the labor market by exclusively looking at individual nation-states, because "insecurities span pre-migration and journeying experiences (such as indebtedness, poverty, low education/social position, obligations to family left behind, , control by smuggler/trafficker/labor recruiter)".

The rate at which migration takes place in both directions between Turkey and Germany is generally steady. The German Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees provides administrative data based on local registration, which offers insight into both the country of destination and nationality of those departing, as well as the country of origin and nationality of those coming in.

Two factors mainly influenced the migration of families: (a) a 2004 German migration law that made entry conditions more complicated, even for those migrating to reunite with their families, as it asked for basic language skills as a prerequisite, among others, and (b) the decrease in the number of families moving from Turkey to Germany, signifying a shift in the marriage patterns among Turks in the country. In fact, it can be proposed that the latter has influenced the decrease more significantly since the deterioration of visas for family reunification had begun well before the introduction of the new migration law (Aydin, 2016).

In recent years, the migration from Germany to Turkey has drawn considerably more interest, partly because of the fear that it may lead to skilled workforce shortages. While a slight rise was recorded from 2008 to 2009 in emigration to Turkey from Germany, probably because economic conditions deteriorated in the country, numbers have returned to the levels before the recession, and the narrative of a massive return of Turks from Germany to Turkey is not supported by the actual data (BAMF, 2014).

In public conversation and the media, migration from Germany to Turkey is often attributed to social exclusion, discrimination, or inability to identify with the German society. A common notion is that Islamophobia has driven Turks away from Germany. Although there are many indications regarding discrimination against Turks in Germany, particularly in the housing and labor markets, and the education system, yet no definitive evidence exists to suggest that people dealing with higher discriminatory behavior are more likely to leave Germany.

4. Findings

Since Europe is considered a model to admire and is a region that attracts considerable immigration from Turkey, it is logical to conclude that the phenomenon of

immigration can be seen as a benchmark of advancement for nations. From several viewpoints, the influx of migrants increases a nation's allure and dynamics. This self-evident hypothesis sheds light on the reasons why individuals leave their countries to relocate to certain countries. Undoubtedly, the neighborhood political culture of migration is evolving into a marvelous way of dealing with the various strategies aiming to manage immigration globally. In the present study, the shared features and differences between the three norms are conveying the story of a nation's basic humankind and diverse characters. The common features underline how a certain problem draws sympathy to an expanded area of the human population. After considering all factors, it is evident that, when it comes to migration, there are standard thoughts, which are shared all around the world. However, the specific approach taken in each occasion relies heavily on the local political culture, which in turn originates from each nation's individual history.

Considering the pertinence of the European, Islamic and Nomadic norms a last arrangement of suggestions has been uncovered here. At a first level, the Islamic and Nomadic norms in reality appear bygone and optimistic, not suited to comprehend the way of our contemporary world. This stems actually from the way that these norms, from a Turkish perspective, were created over a timeframe set far back, contrasted with the European norms considerably more contemporary. Instigated by the abnormal amounts of worldwide migration Turkey has encountered beginning in 1960, particularly to Germany, and the constrained accessible examination with respect to this issue, exploring the part of migration on diverse parts of immigrants' exercises merits uncommon consideration. While the vast majority of the studies have been centered around the determinants of migration, and the part of settlements on monetary development and occupation, fewer studies have been led on its interest for transient work in the host nation and on its particular consequences for human capital.

The Turkish perseverance of patriarchal qualities and preservationist mentalities particularly in country ranges, the framework changes, and the subsequent changes in the work business sector can influence gender contrasts in instructive ventures too. The gender contrasts can be strengthened or weakened as an aftereffect of contrasts in social states of mind, monetary conditions, and the work market results. Work migration has dependably existed and will continue to exist. Western Europe's financial wellbeing and way of life have been made conceivable by the commitment of remote work. In a few decades, these laborers constitute a type of improvement help from the countries on the outskirts to the center. The size and states of future exchanges of work, nonetheless, are interested in theory. It is likely that future examples of work migration will differ because of the exigencies of the worldwide business sector. The present circumstance in the Western European center, portrayed 'by declining development rates, higher than typical local unemployment and rising pressures in the middle of local and outside populaces, will serve to keep down migration in the short run. Over the long haul, in any case, it is conceivable that universal migration to the center will recover its old energy. By the following decade, Western Europe might enhance its monetary development prospects. This circumstance, combined with proceeding with low populace development and high social portability, will lead to the augmentation of the immigration.

Case in point, there is presently, and would keep on being, huge work emigration pressure from Turkey. Particularly in eastern Turkey, youngsters today should leave their home regions to discover jobs, and most communicated little trust that the foundation activities being developed would make enough jobs to lessen emigration pressures. This contention that there will be a proceeding with emigration pressure appears to be persuading, particularly in the light of the huge interior migration, happening inside of Turkey and the way that half of Turkey's work force is still utilized in agriculture and encounters extensive unemployment and underemployment. Turkish works need to emigrate and European countries in the past profited from such migration, which is valid. Nevertheless, it decays thereafter. The real explanation behind anticipating this alleviation in migration is the confounding of the work/business sector, which stands up to Turks wishing to work in EU work markets. The quantity of jobs accessible to the incompetent Turks who need to emigrate is little and contracting, and almost no prospect that monetary or strategic patterns will change in ways which would allow untalented Turks to discover jobs in European work markets. This implies, despite the fact that flexibility of development for Turks might unleash a flood of Turks who immigrate to the EU work market, work migration in the middle of Turkey and the EU ought to rapidly come back to a level controlled by what number of Turks can really discover jobs there. With the outcome, that Turkish migration ought to die down not long after flexibility of development is powerful in light of the disintegration they had in the past and the greater part of them having numerable workforce.

Populace and migration are progressive components, and these dynamic components turn out to be considerably more mind boggling through financial, social and political procedures. Inside of this system and inside of a future in which Turkey's promotion to the EU may be understood, the demographic process that populates in both the EU and in Turkey may experience ought to likewise be analyzed in light of the work/business sector perspective. The change of the demographic contrast between the EU and Turkey into one of correspondence will be identified with the conceivable appearance of the 'demographic downfall' (the decrease of fruitfulness and a maturing populace) in the EU and the 'window of demographic open door' (a domain of consistent increment in the work supply, occupation and the nature of the work force and, therefore, in monetary execution) in Turkey. For the positive results for each member of the EU, Turkey and the vagrants themselves to happen, every strategy must perform a progression of assignments taking care of the issue of migration as a 'financial and political marvel that requires administration.' For Turkey, this requires quickly finishing participation transactions, coordinating with the EU and succeeding in supplementing the 'window of demographic open door' with 'expanding the work supply, the rate of vocation and keeping up a consistent financial development' in the following 20 years. For the EU, then, this requires quickly finishing enrollment arrangements if it will still be attempted by EU individuals, coordinating with Turkey and succeeding in supplementing its 'demographic death' with a 'far-located migration approach in light of financial objectivity and assorted qualities and free of xenophobia'. Should both the EU and Turkey succeed in doing this, the effect of transitory developments from Turkey to the EU ought to be gainful and successful to all concerned.

5. Conclusion

Migration has become a problematic area in terms of social, economic, and space concerns, significantly affecting the whole European continent. Worldwide migration is happening at such steady rates that it has elevated into an essential factor of the globalization process, both in a political and an economic level. These developments have generated questions of vital political and societal importance. There will be some time before the EU acknowledges Turkey as an equal partner. Europe has a stake in the ability of the Turkish government to remain firm and secure the basic rights of its citizens, including minorities. Some countries are afraid, to some extent, the economic implications of Turkey becoming a member of the EU. However, this is overcoming the behavior of Muslims as being generally incompatible with what is considered European. There are signs of change present, however; Turkey's government has a more "Islamic" orientation, and the military has not intervened. In addition, certain countries in the West of Europe, such as France, are starting to realize that the never-ending Muslim immigration will result in them comprising a large part of their population. Anyhow, significant investments will be required. Until that happens, these issues of economic and political nature, as well as essential issues regarding its character, will block Turkey from being invited as an equal member of the European family. The origination of European personality must first develop to oblige Turkey.

The worldwide immigration, which has an essential circumstance in the present, is a direct result of the need of economic, social and political conditions. It holds a prevailing place. Turks who immigrated to Western European nations requesting work in 60s are presently more than 4 million and this constitutes most of the settlers. Turks who live in these territories have a critical commitment to the economic and social existence of both Turkey and Western European countries. Moreover, the economic emergency, unemployment, and social-governmental issues, found in Turkey, drive the general population to move to alternate nations to work in irregular status. Consequently, the increment of the irregular immigration has been raised.

Another aspect of the irregular status is the one stemming from a lack of proper documentation, being either under-documented or entirely undocumented, which results in irregular labor due to inability to obtain the required work permits and a proper place to live. This status fuels dangerous and extremely fluid conditions for migrants, who are forced to sell out their labor for very little money. This means that they mainly look for jobs within the black economy, which commonly revolve around the textile, construction, agriculture and domestic service sectors.

There is additionally a critical group of research, inside individual European nations, at the European level, and other worldwide locales, not just North America. Nevertheless, the group of research is not yet a cognizant combined and grounded collection of information that permits us to see more completely the flow of economic and social dynamics of migration, their impact, and their potential future impact, on society, the economy, and the country. There is a fundamental need to raise the level of European research to address these issues with a noteworthy incorporated and synergetic program at the European level.

The overwhelming proportion of the populations looking for an entry in Europe are refugees from their own homes due to war and conflict. Therefore, the inability of the international community to solve the issues of violence, armed conflicts and violation of human rights in the countries of origin has been one of the primary drivers of the rise of illegal migration to Europe. No international political scheme exists to help end the conflict in Turkey. Moreover, only small efforts have been made towards dealing with inequality, chronic poverty, weak governance and environmental and climate changes, which make up for primary 'push' factors in several of the developing countries.

There have also been different analyzes by autonomous researchers. In any case, for doing far-reaching research in the zones of social science and economics, measurable information is required that offers the likelihood of making causal and improvement analyzes of immigration and combination procedures and their subsequent impacts. An experimental examination of the circumstance of migration and joining not just a measurably separated enrollment of settlers is required, as well as definite and amplified measurements on migration streams. Domestic migration insights do generate noteworthy findings in the event that they are looked at on a global level. To date, migration insights in Germany and other EU member states have been founded on a national level and in just uncommon cases, have been orientated toward universal similarity. National contrasts in the meanings of different classifications of outsiders and the nature of information still result in the way that much of the time direct correlations of the figures are unrealistic at all or are exceptionally confined.

It is of particular importance to overview the limits of acceptance and coordination by using a suitable set of pointers. For such a framework to work, reliable and accurate findings are needed. For this to be realized, it is necessary to develop an essential and deductive social reporting framework on migration and combination. Similarly, precisely specified targets have to be outlined, whereas markers will be used to mirror the most appropriate destinations, regardless of the real difficulty in their actualization. Thus, we will distinguish these markers, since it makes sense from an experimental point of view; it is also fundamental from the political point of view, for instance in the business/work sector and the training process regarding immigration-related issues. Assessment research is a similarly dangerous field with the logical research of migration and joining.

In summary, we can postulate that flaws in research and in the ability to access information affect more than just the research areas that are directly related to the administrative control of immigration, and the meeting of difficulties inalienable to mix. Issues in information innovation and deficits in substance rather influence migration and combine research in general. To circumvent these issues, a separated, interdisciplinary research is required, with the added benefit of being upheld and supported institutionally.

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